Hubbry Logo
State ownershipState ownershipMain
Open search
State ownership
Community hub
State ownership
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Contribute something
State ownership
State ownership
State ownership
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia
Part of a series on
Economic systems
Major types
By ideology
By coordination
By regional model
Sectors
Property types
Transition
Coordination
Other types
Sign denoting state property at a highway right of way in Chicago, Illinois, United States

State ownership, also called public ownership or government ownership, is the ownership of an industry, asset, property, or enterprise by the national government of a country or state, or a public body representing a community, as opposed to an individual or private party.[1] Public ownership specifically refers to industries selling goods and services to consumers and differs from public goods and government services financed out of a government's general budget.[2] Public ownership can take place at the national, regional, local, or municipal levels of government; or can refer to non-governmental public ownership vested in autonomous public enterprises. Public ownership is one of the three major forms of property ownership, differentiated from private, collective/cooperative, and common ownership.[3]

In market-based economies, state-owned assets are often managed and operated as joint-stock corporations with a government owning all or a controlling stake of the company's shares. This form is often referred to as a state-owned enterprise. A state-owned enterprise might variously operate as a Nonprofit corporation, as it may not be required to generate a profit; as a commercial enterprise in competitive sectors; or as a natural monopoly. Governments may also use the profitable entities they own to support the general budget. The creation of a state-owned enterprise from other forms of public property is called corporatization.

In Soviet-type economies, state property was the dominant form of industry as property. The state held a monopoly on land and natural resources, and enterprises operated under the legal framework of a nominally planned economy, and thus according to different criteria than enterprises in market and mixed economies.

Nationalization is a process of transferring private or municipal assets to a central government or state entity. Municipalization is the process of transferring private or state assets to a municipal government.

State-owned enterprise

[edit]
Main article: State-owned enterprise

A state-owned enterprise is a commercial enterprise owned by a government entity in a capitalist market or mixed economy. Reasons for state ownership of commercial enterprises are that the enterprise in question is a natural monopoly or because the government is promoting economic development and industrialization. State-owned enterprises may or may not be expected to operate in a broadly commercial manner and may or may not have monopolies in their areas of activity. The transformation of public entities and government agencies into government-owned corporations is sometimes a precursor to privatization.

State capitalist economies are capitalist market economies that have high degrees of government-owned businesses.

Relation to socialism

[edit]
See also: Social ownership and State socialism
A house number plaque marking state property in Riga, Latvia

Public ownership of the means of production is a subset of social ownership, which is the defining characteristic of a socialist economy. However, state ownership and nationalization by themselves are not socialist, as they can exist under a wide variety of different political and economic systems for a variety of different reasons. State ownership by itself does not imply social ownership where income rights belong to society as a whole. As such, state ownership is only one possible expression of public ownership, which itself is one variation of the broader concept of social ownership.[4][5]

In the context of socialism, public ownership implies that the surplus product generated by publicly owned assets accrues to all of society in the form of a social dividend, as opposed to a distinct class of private capital owners. There is a wide variety of organizational forms for state-run industry, ranging from specialized technocratic management to direct workers' self-management. In traditional conceptions of non-market socialism, public ownership is a tool to consolidate the means of production as a precursor to the establishment of economic planning for the allocation of resources between organizations, as required by government or by the state.

State ownership is advocated as a form of social ownership for practical concerns, with the state being seen as the obvious candidate for owning and operating the means of production. Proponents assume that the state, as the representative of the public interest, would manage resources and production for the benefit of the public.[6] As a form of social ownership, state ownership may be contrasted with cooperatives and common ownership. Socialist theories and political ideologies that favor state ownership of the means of production may be labelled state socialism.

State ownership was recognized by Friedrich Engels in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific as, by itself, not doing away with capitalism, including the process of capital accumulation and structure of wage labor. Engels argued that state ownership of commercial industry would represent the final stage of capitalism, consisting of ownership and management of large-scale production and manufacture by the state.[7]

Within the United Kingdom, public ownership is mostly associated with the Labour Party (a centre-left democratic socialist party), specifically due to the creation of Clause IV of the "Labour Party Manifesto" in 1918. "Clause IV" was written by Fabian Society member Sidney Webb.

Public property

[edit]
Main article: Public property

There is a distinction to be made between state ownership and public property. The former may refer to assets operated by a specific state institution or branch of government, used exclusively by that branch, such as a research laboratory. The latter refers to assets and resources owned by the population of a state which are mostly available to the entire public for use, such as a public park (see public space).

Criticism

[edit]

In neoclassical economic theory, the desirability of state ownership has been studied using contract theory. According to the property rights approach based on incomplete contracting (developed by Oliver Hart and his co-authors), ownership matters because it determines what happens in contingencies that were not considered in prevailing contracts.[8]

The work by Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) is the leading application of the property rights approach to the question whether state ownership or private ownership is desirable.[9] In their model, the government and a private firm can invest to improve the quality of a public good and to reduce its production costs. It turns out that private ownership results in strong incentives to reduce costs, but it may also lead to poor quality. Hence, depending on the available investment technologies, there are situations in which state ownership is better. The Hart-Shleifer-Vishny theory has been extended in many directions. For instance, some authors have also considered mixed forms of private ownership and state ownership.[10] In the Hart-Shleifer-Vishny model it is assumed that all parties have the same information, while Schmitz (2023) has studied an extension of their analysis allowing for asymmetric information.[11] Moreover, the Hart-Shleifer-Vishny model assumes that the private party derives no utility from provision of the public good. Besley and Ghatak (2001) have shown that if the private party (a non-governmental organization) cares about the public good, then the party with the larger valuation of the public good should always be the owner, regardless of the parties' investment technologies.[12]

More recently, some authors have shown that the investment technology also matters in the Besley-Ghatak framework if an investing party is indispensable[13] or if there are bargaining frictions between the government and the private party.[14]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

State ownership

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
State ownership refers to the government's direct control and legal title over assets, enterprises, natural resources, or productive activities, distinguishing it from private ownership by individuals or firms and often justified as a means to pursue collective goals like equitable resource distribution or strategic economic planning. This form encompasses state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which operate commercially under public authority, as well as nationalized sectors such as utilities or transportation, appearing across economic systems from command economies to mixed-market ones with partial public stakes. Historically, state ownership expanded during the through nationalizations in post-colonial developing nations and wartime mobilizations in , aiming to industrialize rapidly or counter perceived market failures, yet outcomes varied widely: while some infrastructure projects advanced connectivity in isolated regions, pervasive examples in centrally planned systems like the yielded chronic shortages and stagnation due to misaligned incentives absent price signals. In contemporary settings, countries like maintain dominant SOEs in key industries, contributing to growth through scale but crowding out private investment via subsidized competition. Empirically, SOEs exhibit lower profitability, labor productivity, and compared to private counterparts, attributable to softened competitive pressures and principal-agent problems where political objectives supersede , as cross-country analyses confirm through metrics like and . episodes, conversely, have boosted efficiency in sectors like and , underscoring causal links between structure and performance via enhanced managerial . A defining controversy surrounds SOEs' vulnerability to , where proximity to political power facilitates , , and crony appointments, inflating costs and eroding fiscal resources—quantified in global data as higher labor expenses and subdued returns in weakly governed regimes. Despite occasional successes in resource-rich funds with arm's-length , systemic risks persist, prompting reforms toward partial to harness market discipline without fully relinquishing public influence.

Definition and Forms

State ownership refers to the direct or indirect possession, control, and management of assets, enterprises, resources, or property by a entity on behalf of the , as opposed to private individuals or corporations. This encompasses a range of holdings, from full equity in commercial entities to lands and natural resources, where the state exercises ultimate decision-making authority over use, disposition, and revenue allocation. Legally, state ownership derives from the foundational principle of , which vests governments with inherent powers to hold title to property under , independent of transient officeholders, to serve collective interests such as , infrastructure provision, or economic stabilization. In practice, this basis manifests through constitutional clauses authorizing state intervention in key sectors—such as natural resources or utilities—or enabling for compulsory acquisition, as codified in statutes like the U.S. Fifth Amendment's takings clause or equivalent provisions in civil law systems. Ownership structures often require dedicated legal frameworks to delineate , , and separation from political interference, with entities registered as corporations or trusts to limit fiscal risks to the public treasury. While recognizes to own property extraterritorially under treaties like the UN Charter's affirmation of equality, domestic implementation varies: jurisdictions emphasize statutory vesting of title in or treasury, whereas civil law systems rely on administrative codes treating state assets as inalienable patrimony unless legislated otherwise. Empirical from global surveys indicate that as of 2023, state ownership predominates in sectors like and in over 80% of surveyed economies, underscoring its entrenched legal legitimacy despite debates over efficiency.

Types of State-Owned Assets and Enterprises

State-owned assets comprise government-held properties and resources, including tangible items such as , buildings, , and natural resources like minerals and forests, as well as intangible assets including and financial holdings. These assets serve purposes ranging from revenue generation to strategic control, with governments often retaining ownership to address market failures or needs. Enterprises, in contrast, are operational entities structured to produce goods or services, typically organized as legal corporations to pursue commercial objectives under state ownership. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are classified by ownership structure, operational mandate, and sector. Fully state-owned SOEs operate without private shareholders, while majority-owned variants include minority private stakes, often in listed companies where the state holds . In countries, SOEs predominantly cluster in network-based sectors requiring high capital investment and exhibiting characteristics, such as (power generation and distribution), transportation (railways and ports), and , accounting for approximately half of total SOE value. Other significant categories include , where state banks manage deposits and lending, and , though the latter shows greater variation across jurisdictions due to competitive pressures. A distinct subtype involves strategic or resource-based assets, such as state-controlled operations and companies, which extract and manage natural resources to secure supply and fiscal revenues; for instance, national oil companies like (fully state-owned until partial listing in 2019) exemplify this, controlling vast reserves critical to export economies. Sovereign wealth funds represent another enterprise form, functioning as investment vehicles to allocate surplus government revenues—often from commodities—into diverse portfolios including stocks, bonds, and ; Norway's Government Pension Fund Global, established in 1990 and valued at over $1.5 trillion as of 2023, invests oil windfalls internationally to stabilize . Development institutions, a further category, provide funding for and industrial projects aligned with national priorities, blending commercial operations with objectives; examples include Brazil's BNDES, which disbursed $300 billion in loans from 2008 to 2018, primarily to and exports. non-commercial assets, such as government-held land and properties, differ from enterprises by lacking profit motives, instead supporting public goods like defense installations or conservation areas, though they may generate incidental through leasing. Across these types, empirical indicate SOEs comprised 126 of the world's 500 largest companies by in 2023, underscoring their scale despite varying outcomes tied to .

Historical Development

Pre-Modern and Early Industrial Era

In , the exercised ultimate ownership over , which was administered through temple estates and state-managed agricultural centers responsible for production, , and labor allocation, with portions granted to officials but subject to royal reclamation or oversight. Similarly, in during the late around the 4th millennium BCE, state-controlled textile workshops exemplified early centralized production facilities operated by palace administrations to support administrative and redistributive needs. The , particularly from the 4th century CE onward, developed state-owned fabricae—centralized factories—for manufacturing arms, armor, and military equipment, shifting from reliance on private contractors to direct imperial control amid logistical demands of large-scale warfare. Medieval European feudal systems positioned the as the paramount , with all theoretically comprising delegated through fiefs to vassals in exchange for and loyalty, while direct royal demesnes generated revenue via rents and seigneurial without intermediary grants. This hierarchical structure preserved ultimate title, limiting alienation of without royal consent and distinguishing it from private ownership, though practical control often resided with nobles or the church on granted estates. Under mercantilist policies from the 16th to 18th centuries, European states imposed monopolies on key commodities like salt and —such as France's régie for production and distribution—directly operating enterprises to maximize fiscal extraction and regulate flows. During the early industrial era, state ownership expanded selectively for strategic where private investment lagged, including U.S. examples like Georgia's state-constructed in the 1830s and 1840s to link ports and interiors for commerce and defense. In , Prussian authorities initiated state-owned railways from , funding and operating lines like the Berlin-Potsdam route to integrate markets and mobility, contrasting with Britain's predominantly private networks subsidized via land grants and guarantees. Persistent state enterprises included expanded royal arsenals and dockyards, such as Britain's Woolwich Arsenal established in 1716 and modernized for mechanized production by the early , prioritizing over commercial efficiency.

20th Century Nationalizations and Expansions

The Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917 initiated widespread in , beginning with the that expropriated private estates and redistributed them to peasants, followed by the nationalization of banks in December 1917 and major industries under policies from 1918 to 1921. By May 1918, over 300 enterprises had been seized or nationalized, encompassing key sectors like banking, transport, and , with the Supreme Economic Council overseeing the process to centralize control amid and economic collapse. This expanded state ownership to nearly the entire economy by the early 1920s, forming the basis for Soviet planned production, though it contributed to output declines of up to 80% in some industries due to disrupted incentives and management. In the , drove selective nationalizations in developing economies, exemplified by Mexico's expropriation of foreign oil assets on March 18, 1938, under President , which transferred control of reserves and facilities from U.S. and British firms like to the state-owned Petróleos Mexicanos (). This act seized approximately 18% of global oil production at the time, justified by labor disputes and sovereignty claims, but prompted international boycotts and delayed compensation until 1944, highlighting tensions between state assertions and foreign investment risks. In , pursued limited nationalizations, such as banks and select industries like steel, but emphasized state direction of private firms over outright ownership, with Hitler explicitly rejecting broad socialization to maintain industrial efficiency for rearmament. Post-World War II reconstruction accelerated nationalizations in , particularly under socialist-leaning governments seeking to secure "commanding heights" of the economy. In the , the Labour government from 1945 to 1951 nationalized the in 1946, (affecting 1,500 pits and 700,000 workers) via the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act, railways in 1947, and steel production in 1949, transferring assets worth billions to public corporations amid wartime damage and strikes. Similarly, France's provisional government post-liberation nationalized in 1945 for collaboration suspicions, followed by electricity, gas, , and major banks in 1945-1946, creating entities like to modernize infrastructure and allocate resources under state planning. These measures expanded state ownership to over 20% of industrial output in both nations by the , often rationalized by efficiency gains from coordination but later critiqued for bureaucratic rigidities that hampered innovation. In Eastern Europe, Soviet influence post-1945 imposed comprehensive nationalizations, mirroring the USSR model by seizing industries, banks, and land in countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia, where private enterprise shares dropped to under 10% by 1950. Developing nations followed suit in mid-century decolonization waves, with examples including Iran's oil nationalization in 1951 and Egypt's Suez Canal takeover in 1956, asserting control over strategic assets to fund development and reduce foreign dominance, though often incurring economic isolation and inefficiencies from politicized management. By the 1970s, such expansions had elevated state-owned enterprises to dominate economies in over 50 countries, controlling up to 30-40% of GDP in socialist states, yet empirical reviews indicate persistent underperformance relative to private counterparts due to misaligned incentives and corruption risks.

Post-1980s Privatizations and Reversals

In the and , a worldwide wave of privatizations transferred of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to private investors, driven by fiscal pressures, ideological shifts toward market , and evidence of SOE inefficiencies. Governments sold stakes in over 100 SOEs globally, raising approximately $1 trillion by the early through methods such as share offerings and auctions. In alone, divestitures totaled $25 billion across continents, with revenues from such sales surging internationally from the late onward. The led early efforts under Margaret , whose Conservative governments from 1979 onward divested major utilities and transport firms to curb subsidies, foster competition, and expand public shareholding. Key transactions included British Telecom in 1984, which raised £3.9 billion and marked the largest privatization to date; in 1986; and , fully privatized by 1987. These sales generated £2 billion in 1989–1990 and reduced the state's economic footprint from post-World War II nationalizations. Similar reforms spread to other developed economies, such as 's partial privatization of Japan National Railways in 1987 and in 1985, alongside advocacy from institutions like the World Bank for SOE divestitures in developing nations to access investment capital. The accelerated privatizations in transition economies. In , a voucher-based program from 1992 to 1994 distributed shares in over 15,000 SOEs to citizens, aiming for rapid de-statization amid and output collapse. Eastern European countries like and employed mass privatization alongside case-by-case sales, privatizing thousands of firms by the mid-1990s to integrate into market systems, though outcomes varied due to weak institutions and insider deals. In , under Pinochet had privatized extensively by the 1980s, followed by Mexico's sales of telecom and banking assets in the 1990s, often tied to conditions from the IMF. Reversals emerged sporadically from the , typically in regulated utilities where private management faced public backlash over pricing, service quality, or crises, though such renationalizations remained exceptions to the privatization trend. In , between 2007 and 2015, over 234 municipalities terminated private concessions for local networks, remunicipalizing them to regain control amid dissatisfaction with profit-driven operations. Political cycles also prompted partial rollbacks; for instance, Bolivia's 2006 hydrocarbon under President reclaimed fields from foreign firms partially privatized in the , citing resource sovereignty and revenue shortfalls. Empirical assessments indicate these reversals often stemmed from regulatory failures or ideological reversals rather than inherent defects, with privatization-nationalization cycles observed historically across sectors like and . In the UK, partial interventions occurred, such as temporary rail nationalizations post-privatization crashes, but full-scale reversals were limited.

Theoretical Foundations

Economic Rationale and First-Principles Analysis

State ownership is often justified on economic grounds as a response to market failures, such as the underprovision of public goods, externalities, or natural monopolies where private firms might exploit or fail to invest adequately in . In sectors like utilities or transportation, proponents argue that state intervention ensures universal access and long-term stability, preventing profit-driven underinvestment or price gouging that could harm consumers. For developing economies, state ownership in strategic industries is rationalized as a tool for industrialization and , where private capital may be scarce or risk-averse. From first principles, however, the core issue lies in the nature of and its impact on under . Economic agents respond to incentives shaped by property rights: private owners, facing personal gains or losses, allocate resources toward uses that maximize value as signaled by voluntary exchanges and prices. State ownership disrupts this by separating control from residual claimancy; managers and officials do not bear the full costs of errors, leading to and reduced vigilance against waste. This principal-agent misalignment is exacerbated in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), where political principals impose non-commercial objectives—like employment preservation or regional favoritism—overriding profit signals, unlike private firms disciplined by and threats. A fundamental causal barrier is the impossibility of rational economic calculation without market-generated prices rooted in private ownership. As articulated by Ludwig von Mises in 1920, SOEs lack the price system for capital goods that emerges from rivalrous bidding, rendering it impossible to assess relative scarcities or opportunity costs for complex production processes. Planners must resort to arbitrary valuations or imitate market prices, but these substitutes fail to convey dispersed, tacit knowledge of local conditions and preferences, as emphasized in related critiques of centralized direction. Public choice analysis further reveals that self-interested bureaucrats and politicians, unconstrained by market feedback, expand enterprises to maximize budgets or votes rather than efficiency, fostering rent-seeking and overcapacity. In essence, while state ownership may address specific coordination gaps , first-principles reasoning highlights systemic distortions and informational deficits that typically yield inferior compared to decentralized private ordering. Empirical patterns of SOE underperformance—such as lower and higher burdens—align with these theoretical predictions, though isolated cases of discipline via quasi-market reforms suggest partial mitigations are possible under strict conditions.

Ideological Associations and Debates

State ownership is fundamentally associated with socialist ideologies, which advocate for collective control over the to prioritize social welfare over individual profit. In , the state often serves as the mechanism for public ownership, directing resources toward equitable distribution and preventing private monopolies, as articulated in foundational economic comparisons distinguishing it from capitalism's reliance on private enterprise. Marxist theory specifically frames state ownership as a transitional tool under proletarian , enabling the expropriation of bourgeois to dismantle class exploitation and pave the way for , though historical implementations have perpetuated state control rather than its predicted obsolescence. In opposition, liberal and capitalist ideologies reject extensive state ownership, viewing it as incompatible with individual and efficient markets; rights are seen as essential for incentivizing innovation and cost containment through competitive pressures. posits a minimal state role limited to enforcing contracts and protecting rights, arguing that state intervention distorts price signals and fosters dependency, whereas critiques the liberal state as a mere executive committee for capitalist interests. Debates over state ownership hinge on its purported ability to deliver public goods without efficiencies. Socialist advocates contend it mitigates inequality by subordinating profit to societal needs, as evidenced in theoretical defenses of state firms handling strategic sectors like utilities or defense. Critics, grounded in theory, highlight chronic inefficiencies from political capture, where SOEs face soft budget constraints and prioritize ideological goals over viability, leading to resource misallocation. Empirical analyses reinforce this, showing state ownership correlates with lower firm performance, particularly under left-leaning governance that expands SOEs for redistributive aims, though relative efficiency may hold in monopolistic or high-social-function domains. Certain authoritarian systems, such as , have incorporated state oversight of private firms via corporatist structures to achieve , blending capitalist elements with dirigiste control distinct from socialist collectivization. These ideological tensions persist in modern policy, with proponents citing SOEs' role in countering market failures in developing economies, while detractors warn of entrenched bureaucracies stifling growth, as observed in cross-country growth regressions linking high SOE prevalence to slower GDP expansion.

Operational Mechanisms

Governance Structures in SOEs

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are typically governed through a hierarchical structure where the state acts as the ultimate owner, exercising control via designated ownership entities such as ministries, state holding companies, or centralized agencies. In centralized models, a single body—often a line ministry or —holds direct supervisory authority, setting strategic objectives and appointing key personnel to align operations with goals. Decentralized models, by contrast, distribute oversight across multiple entities, such as sector-specific regulators or regional authorities, which can fragment but allow for tailored sector expertise. This dual ownership typology influences efficiency, with centralized structures enabling quicker alignment but risking concentrated political capture, as evidenced in surveys of over 40 jurisdictions where fragmented ownership correlated with slower reform implementation. Boards of directors in SOEs form the core supervisory mechanism, responsible for strategic oversight, , and executive appointments, yet their composition frequently deviates from private-sector norms due to state influence. Directors are commonly nominated and appointed by the ownership entity, often prioritizing alignment with priorities over independent expertise; for instance, in many systems, up to 50% of board seats may be reserved for state representatives or political nominees, as seen in national practices reviewed across adherents. The CEO and report to the board, but ultimate loops back to the state owner through performance contracts or annual reporting, which emphasize non-commercial mandates like employment preservation or alongside profitability. Empirical analyses indicate that such politically influenced boards can undermine financial performance, with studies of Indian SOEs finding that higher proportions of independent directors paradoxically reduced returns due to conflicts with state directives, highlighting agency problems where managers prioritize bureaucratic incentives over . To counterbalance inherent vulnerabilities to , international standards advocate separating ownership functions from regulatory roles and empowering boards with in day-to-day operations. The Guidelines on of State-Owned Enterprises, revised in 2024, recommend transparent nomination processes based on merit, diversity of skills, and fixed-term appointments to professionalize boards, drawing from experiences in 59 jurisdictions where such reforms improved disclosure and reduced patronage risks. Despite these benchmarks, political interference persists, particularly in systems with oversight—such as China's integration of committees into SOE —which reconciles economic targets with ideological objectives but often subordinates commercial viability to state welfare maximization, as documented in comparative reviews. Safeguarding measures, including anti-corruption protocols and external audits, are critical, yet enforcement varies, with World Bank assessments noting that without robust legal frameworks, SOEs remain conduits for related-party transactions tied to political turnover.

Funding, Regulation, and Incentives

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are primarily funded through government allocations from tax revenues, subsidies, grants, and transfers, which often constitute a significant portion of national budgets in countries with extensive state ownership. For instance, in many emerging economies, SOEs receive direct fiscal injections to cover operational losses or pursue policy objectives, with empirical data indicating that subsidies to SOEs averaged 1-2% of GDP in select countries between 2010 and 2019. These mechanisms enable SOEs to access capital without the stringent profitability requirements imposed on private firms, but they foster dependency, as evidenced by Chinese SOEs receiving approximately $300 billion in subsidies from 1985 to 2005 to support industrial expansion. Additionally, SOEs often secure financing via state-controlled banks offering concessional loans or bonds backed by sovereign guarantees, which reduce borrowing costs but expose taxpayers to contingent liabilities. A core feature of SOE funding is the "soft budget constraint," a concept articulated by economist in 1986, whereby enterprises anticipate and receive bailouts from the state for poor performance, diminishing the discipline of financial accountability. This leads to overinvestment in unprofitable projects and inefficient , as funding sources—such as subsidies or exemptions—prioritize political or social goals over commercial viability, contrasting with private firms' reliance on market-tested returns. Empirical studies confirm that SOEs exhibit higher levels and lower profitability compared to private counterparts, with subsidies negatively impacting long-term financial health by encouraging riskier operations under the expectation of state support. Regulation of SOEs typically involves state oversight through dedicated ministries or ownership entities, which enforce compliance with national policies rather than purely market-driven standards, often resulting in exemptions from antitrust scrutiny or competitive bidding requirements. guidelines, updated in 2023, recommend frameworks ensuring a level playing field by subjecting SOEs to the same regulatory burdens as private entities, including transparent and disclosure rules, to mitigate distortions in competitive markets. However, in practice, arises when SOEs influence policy to their advantage, such as through privileged access to resources or lenient environmental and labor standards, as observed in sectors like where state firms dominate. World Bank analyses highlight that inadequate regulation exacerbates fiscal risks, with SOEs in developing countries frequently operating under hybrid models blending commercial mandates with obligations, leading to inconsistent enforcement. Incentives within SOEs diverge markedly from those in private firms, where owner monitoring aligns management with through equity stakes and market pressures. State ownership dilutes such incentives, as political appointees or bureaucrats prioritize employment preservation, , or ideological objectives over , with studies showing SOEs underperform in profitability metrics due to weaker performance-based and reduced fear of . For example, SOE managers may pursue expansive investments subsidized by the state, echoing the soft budget dynamic, while private firms face shareholder discipline that curbs overexpansion. from cross-country data indicates SOEs benefit from non-market advantages like exclusive contracts and low-interest loans, but these distort incentives toward rather than innovation or cost control, contributing to systemic inefficiencies. This misalignment often manifests in higher operational costs and lower , as incentives reward compliance with directives over competitive .

Empirical Performance

Profitability and Efficiency Comparisons

spanning multiple decades and countries demonstrates that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) generally underperform privately owned firms in measures of profitability and . A foundational cross-country study by Boardman and Vining (1989) compared the performance of 500 large industrial enterprises across 40 countries, finding that fully private firms achieved superior outcomes in profitability, , and compared to SOEs and mixed-ownership entities, with SOEs scoring lowest on a composite performance index. This disparity arises from structural incentives, as private firms prioritize while SOEs often pursue non-commercial objectives influenced by political directives. Subsequent analyses reinforce these findings. Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) examined matched samples of SOEs and private firms in nine countries, revealing that SOEs exhibited lower profitability ratios—such as returns on averaging 4.5% versus 7.2% for private firms—along with higher leverage (debt-to-equity ratios 20-30% greater) and , indicating inefficient . Similarly, an study (2019) of firms in developing economies found SOEs to be less profitable overall, with private ownership switches leading to profitability gains of up to 15-20% post-transition, attributed to reduced subsidies and enhanced market discipline. Privatization outcomes provide further evidence of efficiency gaps. Megginson and Netter's (2001) comprehensive survey of over 100 empirical studies on showed consistent post- improvements, including profitability increases averaging 10-20 percentage points in return on sales and significant rises in (up to 15%), across diverse sectors and regions from 1961 to 2000. These effects persisted in later reviews, such as Megginson's 2025 analysis, which documented sustained gains in capital investment (rising from 11.7% to 16.9% of sales) and operating efficiency following divestitures.
MetricSOEs (Typical Range)Private Firms (Typical Range)Source
Return on Assets2-5%5-10%Dewenter & Malatesta (2001); ADB (2019)
Return on Sales3-6%6-12%Boardman & Vining (1989); Emerald Insight (2021)
Total Factor Productivity Growth (Post-Privatization)N/A (Baseline)+10-15%Megginson & Netter (2001)
While exceptions exist—such as well-governed SOEs in competitive sectors like Norway's achieving profitability comparable to peers—these cases often involve arm's-length management and minority private stakes mimicking market incentives, rather than inherent state ownership advantages. Overall, the evidence underscores that private ownership fosters superior and , with SOEs' inefficiencies linked to soft budget constraints and agency conflicts absent rigorous profit-oriented oversight.

Broader Economic Impacts

State ownership of enterprises frequently imposes fiscal burdens on governments through direct subsidies, implicit guarantees, and bailouts for underperforming entities, which can elevate public debt levels and crowd out productive public spending. For instance, in many developing economies, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) account for significant fiscal transfers, with global estimates indicating that SOE losses contributed to up to 1-2% of GDP in some countries during periods of financial distress, exacerbating deficits and increasing liabilities. This dynamic is evident in cases where governments absorb SOE debts to prevent systemic failures, as seen in European nations post-2008 , where such interventions strained sovereign balance sheets and limited investments. SOEs often distort by crowding out private investment, as they benefit from preferential access to , , and regulatory leniency unavailable to private firms, leading to reduced in the non-state sector. Empirical analyses across cities with high SOE presence reveal slower growth in private firms' and overall , with non-SOEs experiencing up to 10-15% lower expansion rates in such environments due to competitive distortions. World Bank assessments of 76,000 firms in 91 countries highlight that SOEs in competitive sectors—comprising over 20% of such markets in low-income nations—hinder dynamism by monopolizing opportunities, resulting in lower aggregate investment-to-GDP ratios compared to economies with minimal state intervention. On macroeconomic growth, cross-country studies consistently link higher SOE shares to subdued GDP expansion, with increases in state ownership correlating to 0.5-1% annual reductions in growth rates through diminished and incentives. In from 2010-2016, elevated SOE prevalence was associated with stagnant productivity gains, as political objectives supplanted , amplifying opportunity costs in forgone private-led development. While resource-rich exceptions like demonstrate fiscal surpluses from SOEs channeling revenues into sovereign funds, broader evidence from IMF and World Bank data underscores that such successes are rare and sector-specific, with pervasive inefficiencies in and services dragging down overall economic vitality in high-SOE economies.

Case Studies

Notable Successes with Qualifications

Norway's ASA, with the state holding a 67% stake since its founding as Statoil in 1972, has achieved sustained profitability through effective management of and gas reserves, contributing significantly to the national economy via dividends and taxes exceeding NOK 1 trillion cumulatively by 2023. This success stems from a professionalized model that emphasizes long-term value over short-term political interference, enabling Equinor to operate competitively on global markets while investing in renewables. However, its performance relies heavily on Norway's abundant endowments and a small, homogeneous of about 5.5 million, limiting generalizability to resource-poor or larger economies where similar state interventions have faltered due to bureaucratic inertia or corruption. Singapore's , established in 1974 as a state investment vehicle, has delivered a compounded annual return of around 13% over five decades, growing its net portfolio to S$434 billion as of March 2025, with 66% exposure to developed economies including strong performers in and . This track record arises from arm's-length , merit-based appointments, and a focus on commercial viability rather than social mandates, allowing subsidiaries like to compete internationally. Qualifications include Singapore's exceptional institutional framework—characterized by low , efficient , and a scale of 5.9 million people—which mitigates typical SOE pitfalls like political capture, rendering the model challenging to replicate in contexts with weaker or entrenched networks. Saudi Aramco, fully state-owned until partial in 2019, reported net profits of $106.2 billion in and a record $161 billion in 2023, driven by low extraction costs averaging under $3 per barrel from vast reserves exceeding 260 billion barrels. Its profitability underscores the advantages of state control over natural monopolies in extractive industries, funding Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 diversification with massive upstream cash flows. Yet, this owes primarily to geological windfalls rather than operational or in competitive sectors, as evidenced by to global volatility—profits dipped 12% in amid lower oil benchmarks—and limited diversification beyond hydrocarbons despite state directives. In strategic sectors like and , China's state-owned enterprises have facilitated rapid scaling, such as building the world's largest network spanning over 45,000 km by 2023, leveraging centralized coordination and subsidized financing unavailable to private competitors. These achievements support national priorities in areas like and , where SOEs like have advanced capacity to 55 reactors operational by 2024. Nonetheless, such successes are qualified by non-market protections, including market barriers and fiscal transfers totaling trillions of yuan annually, which distort and yield lower returns on assets—averaging 3-5% for SOEs versus 10-15% for private firms—highlighting dependency on state favoritism over intrinsic competitiveness.

Prominent Failures and Lessons

The centrally of the , characterized by comprehensive state ownership of production, collapsed in 1991 amid chronic inefficiencies, including resource misallocation and technological stagnation, as central planners lacked price signals to guide decisions. Output growth stagnated from the onward, with agricultural productivity lagging far behind private systems due to the absence of individual incentives, culminating in a 20% drop in gross national product across successor states post-dissolution. Political priorities over economic viability exacerbated shortages, as state enterprises prioritized quotas over consumer needs, leading to black markets and eventual systemic breakdown. In , the state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (), nationalized in 1976, experienced a production collapse from 3.5 million barrels per day in 1998 to under 500,000 by 2020, driven by political purges of experienced managers, underinvestment, and diversion of revenues for social programs rather than maintenance. Mismanagement under Presidents Chávez and Maduro included firing thousands of skilled workers and replacing them with loyalists, resulting in facility deterioration and operational failures that contributed to and GDP contraction exceeding 70% from 2013 to 2021. British Leyland, nationalized in 1975 with government infusions totaling over £11 billion (equivalent to £100 billion today), failed to reverse declining , producing vehicles plagued by quality issues and labor disputes, as state oversight preserved excess at the expense of rationalization and innovation. By the , the firm required repeated bailouts, underscoring how public ownership insulated managers from risks, fostering persistent losses and a 10% share of the car market eroding to irrelevance. These cases illustrate key lessons: state-owned enterprises often suffer from principal-agent problems, where political appointees prioritize short-term over long-term viability, leading to and weak . Without competitive pressures and profit imperatives, SOEs exhibit "soft budget constraints," subsidizing inefficiencies that distort and stifle , as evidenced by repeated failures in and board independence. Empirical reviews of reforms highlight that partial or market-oriented can mitigate these, but full state control amplifies risks of capture by ruling elites, amplifying economic downturns during commodity slumps.

Criticisms and Controversies

Inefficiency, Corruption, and Political Capture

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) often exhibit inefficiencies stemming from the absence of market-driven incentives, such as and , which private firms face. Empirical studies consistently find that SOEs underperform private counterparts in productivity and , with soft budget constraints allowing persistent losses without threats. For instance, a comprehensive review of outcomes indicates that transferring SOEs to private typically yields gains through reductions and improved operational . In developing economies, this manifests as overstaffing and misaligned production, where SOEs prioritize or over , leading to —excessive costs unrelated to output. An analysis of firm-level data across multiple countries confirms lower in SOEs, attributing it to managerial slack and rather than inherent scale advantages. Corruption thrives in SOEs due to their monopoly positions in strategic sectors, opaque , and close ties to political elites, amplifying risks of , , and favoritism. A World Bank assessment highlights that is particularly acute in regulated monopolies, where SOEs control essential resources like or , enabling without competitive checks. IMF research quantifies these costs, showing that high levels correlate with SOE performance declines equivalent to 10-20% lower returns on assets compared to low-corruption environments, even in core sectors like utilities. data from foreign cases reveals that over 80% of investigated instances between 1999 and 2013 involved SOE officials, often through kickbacks or inflated contracts. Weak internal controls exacerbate this, as evidenced by UNODC analyses of SOE vulnerabilities in and licensing, where proximity facilitates over board decisions. Political capture occurs when SOEs serve as instruments for , electoral funding, or ideological goals, subordinating economic rationality to ruling party interests. In Brazil's scandal (2014-2016), politically appointed executives diverted billions in revenues to fund allied campaigns via overpriced contracts, resulting in a $2 billion loss and operational disruptions. South Africa's under the Zuma administration (2009-2018) saw entities like and manipulated for cadre deployment, leading to procurement irregularities costing an estimated 1.5% of GDP annually in inefficiencies and graft. Cross-country evidence from reviews indicates SOEs are routinely exploited for political finance, with appointments favoring loyalty over competence, distorting investment toward short-term gains or connected suppliers. This capture perpetuates inefficiency, as managerial decisions prioritize regime survival—such as maintaining employment for voter bases—over long-term viability, a pattern observed in Central and Eastern European transitions where SOE resources financed post-communist parties. Empirical models of underscore that such dynamics erode firm value, with politically connected SOEs showing 5-15% lower efficiency metrics due to misallocated capital.

Innovation Stagnation and Opportunity Costs

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) frequently demonstrate reduced outputs relative to private firms, attributable to weakened profit incentives, bureaucratic , and political interference that prioritize stability and employment over risk-taking and technological breakthroughs. A analysis of Chinese listed firms revealed that state ownership exerts a negative influence on output, measured by counts, due to softer budget constraints and diminished competitive pressures. Similarly, cross-country evidence from indicates that higher SOE prevalence correlates with slower , partly through constrained dynamics in sectors dominated by state control. These patterns stem from agency problems where managers face limited accountability for failure, leading to underinvestment in disruptive technologies. Empirical assessments of R&D further underscore stagnation: state firms convert R&D inputs into outputs, such as patents or gains, less effectively than private counterparts, with studies attributing this to divergent objectives where SOEs favor applied, incremental aligned with directives over radical, market-driven advancements. In China's sector, SOEs exhibit lower despite institutional support, reflecting inefficiencies in processes that hinder long-term technological progress. on firm-level confirms that SOEs generate lower economic value from R&D due to suboptimal incentive structures, rather than inherent capability deficits. Opportunity costs of state manifest in resource misallocation, where capital and labor tied to underperforming SOEs forego higher returns sectors, distorting overall economic . For example, analyses of structures show that increased state participation reduces labor and profitability, implying foregone gains from reallocating assets to competitive markets. In broader economic terms, SOEs' tendency toward excess and subsidized operations—evident in historical cases like Soviet-era enterprises—imposes fiscal burdens that crowd out private investment in innovation-intensive activities. A study of 114 major firms across countries found that direct ownership lowers efficiency metrics, amplifying these costs by locking resources in low-growth entities. These dynamics contribute to systemic stagnation, as evidenced by lower (TFP) in SOE-heavy industries, where decomposition analyses reveal inefficiencies in resource utilization that private ownership mitigates through market discipline. While partial can mitigate some effects, full state control perpetuates opportunity losses estimated in growth models at several percentage points of GDP in affected economies.

Recent Nationalizations and Policy Shifts (2000–2025)

In response to the 2008 global financial crisis, governments in developed economies implemented temporary nationalizations of financial institutions to stabilize banking systems and avert broader collapses. The nationalized plc on February 17, 2008, following a and , with the state acquiring full ownership through ; the bank was later sold to Virgin Money in 2012 after recapitalization. In the United States, the federal government took a 60.8% equity stake in Corporation in June 2009 as part of a $49.5 billion package under the , retaining control until divesting the shares by December 2013, which allowed partial recovery but at a net cost of approximately $10.5 billion to taxpayers. These actions were driven by crisis imperatives rather than ideological commitments to state ownership, often reversed through once stability was restored. In , left-wing governments pursued ideological nationalizations of natural resources and utilities, aiming to redistribute wealth and assert sovereignty, though often resulting in reduced investment and production declines. under President nationalized the country's largest private power utility, Electricidad de Caracas, on November 27, 2007, transferring control to the state-owned Corpoelec amid broader expropriations in oil and cement sectors that contributed to a sharp contraction in from $2.4 billion in 2007 to negative $1.2 billion by 2017. expropriated 51% of , its majority state-controlled oil company, from Spain's on April 16, 2012, citing energy self-sufficiency needs; this move triggered international arbitration and correlated with stagnant oil production, dropping from 780,000 barrels per day in 2012 to under 700,000 by 2023 despite reserves. under Evo nationalized hydrocarbons in 2006, increasing state take from 18% to 82% of revenues, which boosted fiscal income short-term but led to gas production stagnation and reliance on imports by the . These cases illustrate causal links between abrupt state takeovers and , as evidenced by World Bank data showing average FDI inflows in nationalizing Latin American economies falling 40% post-expropriation compared to regional peers. Energy security concerns in prompted targeted nationalizations amid the Russia-Ukraine conflict. acquired a 99.23% stake in SE by September 2022, following €40 billion in losses from curtailed Russian gas supplies, with the state injecting €13.3 billion in equity to nationalize the utility previously 76% owned by ; this shifted Uniper from a market-oriented trader to a state-directed entity focused on LNG diversification. Similar interventions occurred in the UK, where the government nationalized in November 2021 under the Energy Act 2022 after the supplier's collapse amid wholesale price spikes, affecting 1.7 million customers and costing £2.3 billion by 2023. These were pragmatic responses to geopolitical shocks rather than broad policy reversals from 1990s privatizations.
CountryYearSector/CompanyReason
Banking () liquidity
2009Automotive () to prevent
Venezuela2007Power (Electricidad de Caracas)Ideological resource control
2012Oil ()Energy
2022Energy ()Russian gas supply disruption
Policy shifts since 2010 reflect a nuanced revival of state involvement in strategic sectors across developed economies, blending subsidies and minority stakes with private ownership rather than outright , amid and supply chain vulnerabilities. The ' of 2022 allocated $52 billion in subsidies for manufacturing, effectively guiding private investment without equity control, signaling a departure from pure toward "state capitalism lite" as described in analyses of post-pandemic . In the , the 2023 Net-Zero Industry Act promotes state-backed financing for green technologies, with SOE shares in energy rising from 20% in 2010 to 35% by 2022 per data, driven by climate goals and . Emerging trends include Russia's post-2022 of assets from "unfriendly" countries, valued at over $20 billion, consolidating state control under wartime mobilization. Overall, while full nationalizations remain crisis-specific and often temporary, persistent geopolitical risks and technological have elevated state ownership's role, with global SOE assets growing 15% annually from 2015-2023 according to IMF estimates, prioritizing resilience over in credible assessments.

Global Variations and Future Prospects

State ownership exhibits significant variations across regions and economies, largely influenced by historical, political, and resource factors. In emerging markets, particularly in and parts of , state-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate key sectors, with revenues from SOEs in competitive markets averaging 17% of GDP in developing countries where data is available. exemplifies high state involvement, where SOEs number over 1,180 and state ownership in firms with any government stake has risen to 31% of capital by 2017, concentrated in and . In contrast, advanced market economies like the maintain minimal direct SOE presence, with state ownership limited to specific entities such as or the US Postal Service, reflecting a preference for private enterprise. OECD countries average SOE assets or revenues around 15% of GDP, though this varies: Norway's state holdings include substantial assets valued at approximately $112 billion as of 2023, primarily in , while retains significant stakes in utilities and . displays elevated levels post-, with SOEs prominent in and defense, underscoring in authoritarian systems.
Country/RegionApproximate SOE Share (% GDP, assets/revenues)Key Sectors
30%+ (capital share in state-involved firms),
Average15%Varied
Developing Countries (avg.)17% (revenues in competitive sectors),
<5% (limited entities), postal
Significant (state assets ~$112B total)
Future prospects for state ownership hinge on balancing strategic imperatives with efficiency demands, amid geopolitical tensions and technological shifts. Globally, SOEs have revived since the early , comprising 126 of the 500 largest companies by revenue in 2023 and holding assets equivalent to 50% of world GDP, yet reforms emphasize partial divestment and private partnerships, as seen in China's equitization efforts. In strategic sectors like , semiconductors, and critical minerals, concerns—exacerbated by events such as the 2022 Russia-Ukraine conflict and disruptions—may propel selective nationalizations or heightened state stakes, particularly in and . However, of SOE underperformance in and cost control, coupled with fiscal pressures, supports ongoing in non-essential areas to unlock growth, as advocated in policy analyses favoring hybrid models over full state control. frameworks stress enhanced governance for transparency and competitiveness, suggesting that without such adaptations, SOEs risk amplifying inefficiencies in an era of rapid private-sector disruption via AI and digitalization. Overall, while state ownership persists in resource-dependent or geopolitically sensitive economies, a convergence toward market-oriented reforms appears likely by 2030, contingent on verifiable improvements in SOE metrics.

References

  1. https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/career/state-owned-enterprise-soe/
  2. https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/computer-science/state-ownership
  3. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/503476/adbi-wp950.pdf
  4. https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/922251468767067921/privatization-and-control-of-state-owned-enterprises
  5. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0147596719301040
  6. https://rujec.org/article/27986/
  7. https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.12.4.133
  8. https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/WP/2019/wpiea2019253-print-pdf.ashx
  9. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/state-owned-enterprises-and-corruption_9789264303058-en.html
  10. https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/fiscal-monitor/2020/April/English/ch3.ashx
  11. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/soe.asp
  12. https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1260&context=clr
  13. https://fee.org/articles/private-property-and-government-under-the-constitution/
  14. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2023/09/22/why-countries-need-a-legal-framework-to-govern-state-ownership-of-companies/
  15. https://www.ifc.org/content/dam/ifc/doc/mgrt-pub/dp-2-state-ownership-perotti-2003.pdf
  16. https://rooseveltinstitute.org/publications/the-role-of-state-ownership/
  17. https://www.pwc.com/sg/en/government-public-services/assets/state-owned-enterprises-201504.pdf
  18. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/378431468740430088/pdf/multi-page.pdf
  19. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/ownership-and-governance-of-state-owned-enterprises-2024_395c9956-en.html
  20. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/the-size-and-composition-of-the-soe-sector-in-oecd-countries_5kg54cwps0s3.pdf
  21. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2017/09/the-size-and-sectoral-distribution-of-state-owned-enterprises_g1g7f9da/9789264280663-en.pdf
  22. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/state-owned-enterprises-and-sustainability_c99c7ef0-en.html
  23. https://africame.factsanddetails.com/article/entry-1203.html
  24. https://history.stackexchange.com/questions/65827/when-state-owned-enterprises-soe-start-to-be-practiced-widely-in-ancient-times
  25. https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/3414fq/did_the_romans_have_state_owned_weapons_factories/
  26. http://www.cliffehistory.co.uk/property-and-land-ownership.html
  27. https://www.quora.com/How-were-property-rights-defined-in-medieval-Europe-Who-owned-the-land
  28. https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/17553/trade/mercantilism-theory-and-examples/
  29. https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/cato/v22n2/cato_v22n2thc01.pdf
  30. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0094119021000723
  31. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mercantilism.asp
  32. https://theins.ru/en/history/264113
  33. https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917-2/economic-apparatus/economic-apparatus-texts/results-of-nationalization-of-industry/
  34. https://www.marxists.org/history/ussr/government/economics/socialistnationalisationofindustry.pdf
  35. https://apnews.com/article/mexico-us-oil-companies-1938-nationalization-c7c2c6aa5b22e36dd7f91ec8058b248c
  36. https://www.hbs.edu/businesshistory/Documents/maurer-article-mexican-oil.pdf
  37. https://mises.org/mises-wire/hitlers-views-private-property-and-nationalization
  38. https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/attlees-britain/
  39. https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/lessons-from-the-nationalization-nation-state-owned-enterprises-in-france/
  40. https://academic.oup.com/book/6907/chapter/151152891
  41. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/politics-and-government/mexico-nationalizes-foreign-oil-properties
  42. https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5580&context=faculty_scholarship
  43. https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/fp/fp_spr00mew01.html
  44. https://hbr.org/1991/11/does-privatization-serve-the-public-interest
  45. https://oxfordre.com/business/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190224851.001.0001/acrefore-9780190224851-e-93
  46. https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/british_telecom_privatisation.pdf
  47. https://www.cato.org/cato-journal/winter-2017/margaret-thatchers-privatization-legacy
  48. https://hbr.org/1992/01/british-privatization-taking-capitalism-to-the-people
  49. https://sk.sagepub.com/ency/edvol/embed/businesstoday/chpt/stateowned-enterprises
  50. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/843206/governance-brief-047-privatization-state-owned-enterprises.pdf
  51. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1999/06/nellis.htm
  52. https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shleifer/files/privatizing_russia.pdf
  53. https://nigerianpowersystem.wordpress.com/2020/06/08/examples-of-reversal-of-privatization-in-the-electricity-supply-industry/
  54. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/829321468324863598/pdf/WPS5029.pdf
  55. https://www.oxera.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/The-Thatcher-privatisation-legacy_1-1.pdf
  56. https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/state-owned-enterprises-global-economy-reason-concern
  57. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/06/ownership-and-governance-of-state-owned-enterprises-2024_136e9151/395c9956-en.pdf
  58. https://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/reader-mises-economiccalculation
  59. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/354443056_Principal-agent_problems_in_publicly_owned_enterprises_The_failure_of_the_shareholder
  60. https://www.csus.edu/faculty/s/kyle.swan/docs/gov%2520failure-revised.pdf
  61. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214629625000751
  62. https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/020915/what-are-differences-between-capitalism-and-socialism.asp
  63. https://polsci.institute/political-processes-institutions/liberal-vs-marxist-views-on-state/
  64. https://legalosphere.in/functions-of-the-state-liberal-and-marxist-view/
  65. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259548370_State-Owned_Enterprises_Inequality_and_Political_Ideology
  66. https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/evaluations/state-your-business/chapter-1-state-owned-enterprise-challenges-and-world-bank-group
  67. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1090951620300419
  68. https://dobetter.esade.edu/en/state-owned-enterprises-performance
  69. https://www.sciopen.com/article/10.26599/PEQ2024.9310401
  70. https://home.heinonline.org/blog/2020/07/capitalism-socialism-or-fascism-a-guide-to-economic-systems-and-ideologies/
  71. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264999321000730
  72. https://sites.duke.edu/djepapers/files/2022/08/Chouliara-Corporate-Governance.pdf
  73. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2013/05/boards-of-directors-of-state-owned-enterprises_g1g2eb30/9789264200425-en.pdf
  74. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/22785337221148295
  75. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2024/06/oecd-guidelines-on-corporate-governance-of-state-owned-enterprises-2024_68fa05cd.html
  76. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/safeguarding-state-owned-enterprises-from-undue-influence_47444e1c-en.html
  77. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/228331468169750340/pdf/Corporate-governance-of-state-owned-enterprises-a-toolkit.pdf
  78. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1755309122000168
  79. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0927538X2100127X
  80. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2014/05/financing-state-owned-enterprises_g1g3fd1d/9789264209091-en.pdf
  81. https://www.kornai-janos.hu/media/konyvek_cikkek/w20825/Kornai1986_The_Soft_budget_Constraint_-_Kyklos.pdf
  82. https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/oabmxx/v6y2019i1p1600207.html
  83. https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/public/doc/323/323.en.pdf
  84. https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1458&context=parkplace
  85. https://www.oxera.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Incentives-in-public-ownership.pdf
  86. https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/467167
  87. https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.91.1.320
  88. https://www.adb.org/publications/performance-differential-between-private-state-owned-enterprises
  89. https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.39.2.321
  90. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jacf.12645
  91. https://www.emerald.com/jabes/article/30/1/26/205050/Performance-comparison-of-state-owned-enterprises
  92. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336607500_Performance_Differential_Between_Private_and_State-Owned_Enterprises_An_Analysis_of_Profitability_and_Leverage
  93. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1043951X24000038
  94. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/11/28/new-report-reveals-large-presence-of-state-owned-businesses-in-competitive-sectors-in-developing-countries
  95. https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/fd7f79460aa965e5f4c4c5577e0ea649-0070062023/related/PFR-4-State-Owned-Enterprises.pdf
  96. https://www.equinor.com/about-us/the-norwegian-state-as-shareholder
  97. https://cases.som.yale.edu/equinor/overview/introduction
  98. https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b45b4a63e301435293bd1b10d1ede45b/en-gb/pdfs/stm202220230006000engpdfs.pdf
  99. https://www.temasekreview.com.sg/performance-and-portfolio.html
  100. https://www.temasek.com.sg/en/our-financials/portfolio-performance
  101. https://online.ucpress.edu/as/article/64/4/700/200621/Singapore-s-Temasek-Model-and-State-Asset
  102. https://www.aramco.com/en/investors/annual-report
  103. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2592351/business-economy
  104. https://apnews.com/article/saudi-arabia-aramco-2024-results-f3d8eb648b0deba0c5c000c2ead43fce
  105. https://www.forbes.com/sites/gauravsharma/2025/08/05/saudi-aramco-profit-dips-for-10th-quarter-in-a-row/
  106. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2019/05/why-chinas-state-owned-companies-still-have-a-key-role-to-play/
  107. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1755309119300437
  108. https://english.ckgsb.edu.cn/knowledge/article/flying-high-chinas-soes-are-growing-in-prominence-in-its-economy/
  109. https://www.seafarerfunds.com/commentary/state-owned-enterprises-and-investing-in-china
  110. https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/021716/why-ussr-collapsed-economically.asp
  111. https://online.norwich.edu/online/about/resource-library/consequences-collapse-soviet-union
  112. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/venezuela-crisis
  113. https://www.bakerinstitute.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/import/fdi-monaldi-venezuela_uSQ8FHh.pdf
  114. https://www.cato.org/commentary/last-rites-venezuelas-state-owned-oil-company
  115. https://www.economicsobservatory.com/why-did-venezuelas-economy-collapse
  116. https://www.city-journal.org/article/government-motors-1975
  117. https://www.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/11/20/auto.industry.uk/index.html
  118. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2019/253/article-A001-en.xml
  119. https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/984431624443117178/listing-state-owned-enterprises-in-emerging-and-developing-economies-lessons-learned-from-30-years-of-success-and-failure
  120. https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/600161611679881440-0090022021/original/StateOwnedEnterprises.pdf
  121. https://www.lexisnexis.com/blogs/in/b/risk-and-compliance/posts/3-reasons-working-with-state-owned-enterprises-demands-comprehensive-third-party-due-diligence
  122. https://www.unodc.org/e4j/zh/anti-corruption/module-4/key-issues/corruption-in-state-owned-enterprises.html
  123. https://blog-pfm.imf.org/en/pfmblog/2023/04/how-and-why-did-state-capture-and-massive-corruption-occur-in-south-africa
  124. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2023/01/safeguarding-state-owned-enterprises-from-undue-influence_9a91e6eb/47444e1c-en.pdf
  125. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/03/05/how-the-political-capture-of-state-owned-enterprises-is-damaging-democracy-in-central-and-eastern-europe/
  126. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/344300263_How_Do_Politicians_Capture_a_State_Evidence_from_State-Owned_Enterprises
  127. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13662716.2018.1456323
  128. https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=undergradawards_2020
  129. https://academic.oup.com/wber/advance-article/doi/10.1093/wber/lhaf024/8290983
  130. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4732462
  131. https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shleifer/files/state_vs_private.pdf
  132. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405473917300235
  133. https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/11/3/657
  134. https://www.npr.org/transcripts/7501292
  135. https://sccei.fsi.stanford.edu/china-briefs/reassessing-role-state-ownership-chinas-economy
  136. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/the-size-and-composition-of-the-soe-sector-in-oecd-countries_5kg54cwps0s3.pdf?contentType=/ns/WorkingPaper&itemId=/content/workingpaper/5kg54cwps0s3-en&containerItemId=/content/workingpaper/5kg54cwps0s3-en&accessItemIds=/content/workingpaperseries/22230939&mimeType=application/pdf
  137. https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-investment-climate-statements/norway
  138. https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/83663/which-countries-have-the-highest-number-of-state-owned-enterprises-after-china
  139. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0954349X24000134?dgcid=rss_sd_all
  140. https://www.gestaldt.com/insights/the-future-of-state-owned-enterprises-reform-or-reinvention
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
Contribute something
User Avatar
No comments yet.