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United States Special Operations Command
United States Special Operations Command
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United States Special Operations Command
United States Special Operations Command Emblem
FoundedApril 16, 1987; 38 years ago (1987-04-16)
(38 years, 6 months ago)[1]
Country United States
TypeUnified combatant command
Special operations forces
RoleFunctional combatant command
SizeEntire command: 70,000[2][3]
  • Headquarters staff: 2,500[2]
Part ofUnited States Department of Defense
HeadquartersMacDill Air Force Base
Florida, U.S.
NicknamesUSSOCOM, SOCOM
EngagementsOperation Earnest Will
Invasion of Panama
Gulf War
Unified Task Force

Operation Gothic Serpent

Operation Uphold Democracy
War on Terror

Websitewww.socom.mil
Commanders
CommanderAdmiral Frank M. Bradley, USN[5]
Deputy CommanderLieutenant General Sean M. Farrell, USAF
Vice CommanderLieutenant General Francis L. Donovan, USMC[6]
Senior Enlisted LeaderCommand Sergeant Major Andrew J. Krogman, USA[7]
Insignia
Beret flash (for United States Army only)
Background trimming (for United States Army only)

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM or SOCOM) is the unified combatant command charged with overseeing the various special operations component commands of the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force of the United States Armed Forces. The command is part of the Department of Defense and is the only unified combatant command created by an Act of Congress. USSOCOM is headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida.

The idea of an American unified special operations command had its origins in the aftermath of Operation Eagle Claw, the disastrous attempted rescue of hostages at the American embassy in Iran in 1980. The ensuing investigation, chaired by Admiral James L. Holloway III, the retired Chief of Naval Operations, cited lack of command and control and inter-service coordination as significant factors in the failure of the mission.[8] Since its activation on 16 April 1987, U.S. Special Operations Command has participated in many operations, from the 1989 invasion of Panama to the war on terror.[9][10]

USSOCOM is involved with clandestine activity, such as direct action, special reconnaissance, counter-terrorism, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, psychological warfare, civil affairs, and counter-narcotics operations. Each branch has a distinct Special Operations Command that is capable of running its own operations, but when the different special operations forces need to work together for an operation, USSOCOM becomes the joint component command of the operation, instead of a SOC of a specific branch.[11]

History

[edit]

The unwieldy command and control structure of separate U.S. military special operations forces (SOF), which led to the failure of Operation Eagle Claw in 1980, highlighted the need within the US Department of Defense for reform and reorganization. The US Army Chief of Staff, General Edward C. "Shy" Meyer, had already helped create the U.S. Delta Force in 1977.[12] Following Eagle Claw, he called for a further restructuring of special operations capabilities. Although unsuccessful at the joint level, Meyer nevertheless went on to consolidate Army SOF units under the new 1st Special Operations Command in 1982.[13]

Senator Barry Goldwater, former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee
1st SOCOM SSI 1982-1990

By 1983, there was a small but growing sense in the US Congress of the need for military reforms. In June, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) began a two-year-long study of the Defense Department, which included an examination of SOF spearheaded by Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ). With concern mounting on Capitol Hill, the Department of Defense created the Joint Special Operations Agency on 1 January 1984; this agency, however, had neither operational nor command authority over any SOF.[14][15] The Joint Special Operations Agency thus did little to improve SOF readiness, capabilities, or policies, and therefore was deemed insufficient. Within the Defense Department, there were a few staunch SOF supporters. Noel Koch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and his deputy, Lynn Rylander, both advocated SOF reforms.[16]

At the same time, a few on Capitol Hill were determined to overhaul United States Special Operations Forces. They included Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and William Cohen (R-ME), both members of the Armed Services Committee, and Representative Dan Daniel (D-VA), the chairman of the United States House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness. Congressman Daniel had become convinced that the U.S. military establishment was not interested in special operations, that the country's capability in this area was second rate, and that SOF operational command and control was an endemic problem.[16] Senators Nunn and Cohen also felt strongly that the Department of Defense was not preparing adequately for future threats. Senator Cohen agreed that the U.S. needed a clearer organizational focus and chain of command for special operations to deal with low-intensity conflicts.[14]

In October 1985, the Senate Armed Services Committee published the results of its two-year review of the U.S. military structure, entitled "Defense Organization: The Need For Change."[17] James R. Locher III, the principal author of this study, also examined past special operations and speculated on the most likely future threats. This influential document led to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act.[18][19] By spring 1986, SOF advocates had introduced reform bills in both houses of Congress. On 15 May, Senator Cohen introduced the Senate bill, co-sponsored by Senator Nunn and others, which called for a joint military organization for SOF and the establishment of an office in the Defense Department to ensure adequate funding and policy emphasis for low-intensity conflict and special operations.[20] Representative Daniel's proposal went even further—he wanted a national special operations agency headed by a civilian who would bypass the Joint Chiefs and report directly to the US Secretary of Defense; this would keep Joint Chiefs and the Services out of the SOF budget process.[15]

Congress held hearings on the two bills in the summer of 1986. Admiral William J. Crowe Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, led the Pentagon's opposition to the bills. As an alternative, he proposed a new Special Operations Forces command led by a three-star general. This proposal was not well received on Capitol Hill—Congress wanted a four-star general in charge to give SOF more influence. A number of retired military officers and others testified in favor of the need for reform.[16] By most accounts, retired Army Major General Richard Scholtes gave the most compelling reasons for the change. Scholtes, who commanded the joint special operations task force during Operation Urgent Fury, explained how conventional force leaders misused SOF during the operation, not allowing them to use their unique capabilities, which resulted in high SOF casualties.[21] After his formal testimony, Scholtes met privately with a small number of Senators to elaborate on the problems that he had encountered in Grenada.[22]

Both the House and Senate passed SOF reform bills, and these went to a conference committee for reconciliation. Senate and House conferees forged a compromise. The bill called for a unified combatant command headed by a four-star general for all SOF, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, a coordinating board for low-intensity conflict within the National Security Council, and a new Major Force Program (MFP-11) for SOF (the so-called "SOF checkbook").[23][24] The final bill, attached as a rider to the 1987 Defense Authorization Act, amended the Goldwater-Nichols Act and was signed into law in October 1986. This was interpreted as Congress forcing the hand of the DOD and the Reagan administration regarding what it saw as the past failures and emerging threats. The DOD and the administration were responsible for implementing the law, and Congress subsequently passed two additional bills to ensure implementation.[16] The legislation promised to improve SOF in several respects. Once implemented, MFP-11 provided SOF with control over its own resources, better enabling it to modernize the force. Additionally, the law fostered interservice cooperation: a single commander for all SOF promoted interoperability among the same command forces. The establishment of a four-star commander-in-chief and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict eventually gave SOF a voice in the highest councils of the Defense Department.[23]

General James Lindsay, the first Commander in Chief, Special Operations Command

However, implementing the provisions and mandates of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 was neither rapid nor smooth. One of the first issues to arise was the appointment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, whose principal duties included monitorship of special operations activities and the low-intensity conflict activities of the Department of Defense. Congress increased the number of assistant secretaries of defense from 11 to 12, but the Department of Defense still did not fill this new billet. In December 1987, Congress directed Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh to carry out the ASD (SO/LIC) duties until the Senate approved a suitable replacement. Not until 18 months after the legislation passed did Ambassador Charles Whitehouse assume the duties of ASD (SO/LIC).[25]

Meanwhile, the establishment of USSOCOM provided its own measure of excitement. A quick solution to manning and basing a brand new unified command was to abolish an existing command. United States Readiness Command (USREDCOM), with an often misunderstood mission, did not appear to have a viable mission in the post-Goldwater-Nichols era, and its commander-in-chief, General James Lindsay, had had some special operations experience. On 23 January 1987, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the Secretary of Defense that USREDCOM be disestablished to provide billets and facilities for USSOCOM. President Ronald Reagan approved the establishment of the new command on 13 April 1987. The Department of Defense activated USSOCOM on 16 April 1987 and nominated General Lindsay to be the first Commander in Chief Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC). The Senate accepted him without debate.[16]

Operation Earnest Will

[edit]
MH-60 landing on Hercules

USSOCOM's first tactical operation involved 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) ("Night Stalkers") aviators, SEALs, and Special Boat Teams (SBT) working together during Operation Earnest Will in September 1987. During Operation Earnest Will, the United States ensured that neutral oil tankers and other merchant ships could safely transit the Persian Gulf during the Iran–Iraq War. Iranian attacks on tankers prompted Kuwait to ask the United States in December 1986 to register 11 Kuwaiti tankers as American ships so that they could be escorted by the U.S. Navy. President Reagan agreed to the Kuwaiti request on 10 March 1987, hoping it would deter Iranian attacks.[16] The protection offered by U.S. naval vessels, however, did not stop Iran, which used mines and small boats to harass the convoys steaming to and from Kuwait. In late July 1987, Rear Admiral Harold J. Bernsen, commander of the Middle East Force, requested NSW assets. Special Boat Teams deployed with six Mark III Patrol Boats and two SEAL platoons in August.[16] The Middle East Force decided to convert two oil servicing barges, Hercules and Wimbrown VII, into mobile sea bases. The mobile sea bases allowed SOF in the northern Persian Gulf to thwart clandestine Iranian mining and small boat attacks.[26]

On 21 September, Nightstalkers flying MH-60 and Little Birds took off from the frigate USS Jarrett to track an Iranian ship, Iran Ajr. The Nightstalkers observed Iran Ajr turn off her lights and begin laying mines. After receiving permission to attack, the helicopters fired guns and rockets, stopping the ship. As Iran Ajr's crew began to push mines over the side, the helicopters resumed firing until the crew abandoned the ship. Special Boat Teams provided security while a SEAL team boarded the vessel at first light and discovered nine mines on the vessel's deck, as well as a logbook revealing areas where previous mines had been laid. The logbook implicated Iran in mining international waters.[16]

One of two Iranian oil platforms set ablaze after shelling by American destroyers

Within a few days, the Special Operations forces had determined the Iranian pattern of activity; the Iranians hid during the day near oil and gas platforms in Iranian waters and at night they headed toward the Middle Shoals Buoy, a navigation aid for tankers. With this knowledge, SOF launched three Little Bird helicopters and two patrol craft to the buoy. The Little Bird helicopters arrived first and were fired upon by three Iranian boats anchored near the buoy. After a short but intense firefight, the helicopters sank all three boats. Three days later, in mid-October, an Iranian Silkworm missile hit the tanker Sea Isle City near the oil terminal outside Kuwait City. Seventeen crewmen and the American captain were injured in the missile attack.[16][27] During Operation Nimble Archer, four destroyers shelled two oil platforms in the Rostam oil field. After the shelling, a SEAL platoon and a demolition unit planted explosives on one of the platforms to destroy it. The SEALs next boarded and searched a third-platform 2 miles (3 km) away. Documents and radios were taken for intelligence purposes.[citation needed]

On 14 April 1988, 65 miles (100 km) east of Bahrain, the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts hit a mine, blowing an immense hole in its hull.[28] Ten sailors were injured. During Operation Praying Mantis the U.S. retaliated fiercely, attacking the Iranian frigate Sahand and oil platforms in the Sirri and Sassan oil fields.[27] After U.S. warships bombarded the Sirri platform and set it ablaze, a UH-60 with a SEAL platoon flew toward the platform but was unable to get close enough because of the roaring fire. Secondary explosions soon wrecked the platform.[16] Thereafter, Iranian attacks on neutral ships dropped drastically. On 18 July, Iran accepted the United Nations cease-fire; on 20 August 1988, the Iran–Iraq War ended. The remaining SEALs, patrol boats, and helicopters then returned to the United States.[16] Special operations forces provided critical skills necessary to help CENTCOM gain control of the northern Persian Gulf and balk Iran's small boats and minelayers. The ability to work at night proved vital because Iranian units used darkness to conceal their actions. Additionally, because of Earnest Will operational requirements, USSOCOM would acquire new weapons systems—the patrol coastal ships and the Mark V Special Operations Craft.[16]

Somalia

[edit]

Special Operations Command first became involved in Somalia in 1992 as part of Operation Provide Relief. C-130s circled over Somali airstrips during the delivery of relief supplies. Special Forces medics accompanied many relief flights into the airstrips throughout southern Somalia to assess the area. They were the first U.S. soldiers in Somalia, arriving before U.S. forces who supported the expanded relief operations of Restore Hope.[16][29][30] The first teams into Somalia were CIA Special Activities Division paramilitary officers with elements of JSOC. They conducted very high-risk advanced force operations prior to the entry of the follow-on forces. The first casualty of the conflict came from this team and was a Paramilitary officer and former Delta Force operator named Larry Freedman. Freedman was awarded the Intelligence Star for "extraordinary heroism" for his actions.[31]

The earliest missions during Operation Restore Hope were conducted by Navy SEALs. The SEALs performed several hydrographic reconnaissance missions to find suitable landing sites for Marines. On 7 December, the SEALs swam into Mogadishu Harbor, where they found suitable landing sites, assessed the area for threats, and concluded that the port could support offloading ships. This was a tough mission because the SEALs swam against a strong current which left many of them overheated and exhausted. Furthermore, they swam through raw sewage in the harbor, which made them sick.[16] When the first SEALs hit the shore the following night, they were surprised to meet members of the news media. The first Marines came ashore soon thereafter, and the press redirected their attention to them. Later, the SEALs provided personal security for President George Bush during a visit to Somalia.[16][30] In December 1992, Special Forces assets in Kenya moved to Somalia and joined Operation Restore Hope. January 1993, a Special Forces command element deployed to Mogadishu as the Joint Special Operations Forces-Somalia (JSOFOR) that would command and control all special operations for Restore Hope. JSOFOR's mission was to make initial contact with indigenous factions and leaders; provide information for force protection; and provide reports on the area for future relief and security operations. Before redeploying in April, JSOFOR elements drove over 26,000 miles (42,000 km), captured 277 weapons, and destroyed over 45,320 pounds (20,560 kg) of explosives.[16]

Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion of the 75th Ranger Regiment in Somalia, 1993

In August 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin directed the deployment of a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) to Somalia in response to attacks made by General Mohamed Farrah Aidid's supporters upon U.S. and UN forces. The JSOTF, named Task Force (TF) Ranger was charged with a mission named Operation Gothic Serpent to capture Aidid. This was an especially arduous mission, for Aidid had gone underground, after several Lockheed AC-130 air raids and UN assaults on his strongholds.[16][32][33]

While Marines from the 24th MEU provided an interim QRF (Force Recon Det and helicopters from HMM-263), the task force arrived in the country and began training exercises. The Marines were asked to take on the Aidid snatch mission, but having the advantage of being in the area for more than two months, decided after mission analysis that the mission was a "no-go" due to several factors, centered around the inability to rescue the crew of a downed helicopter (re: the indigenous forces technique of using RPGs against helicopters and blocking the narrow streets in order to restrict the movement of a ground rescue force). This knowledge was not passed on to the Rangers, due to the Marines operating from the USS Wasp and the Rangers remaining on land. TF Ranger was made up of operators from Delta Force, 75th Ranger Regiment, 160th SOAR, SEALs from the Naval Special Warfare Development Group, and Air Force special tactics units.[16][32] During August and September 1993, the task force conducted six missions into Mogadishu, all of which were successes. Although Aidid remained free, the effect of these missions seriously limited his movements.[33]

On 3 October, TF Ranger launched its seventh mission, this time into Aidid's stronghold the Bakara Market to capture two of his key lieutenants. The mission was expected to take only one or two hours.[32] Helicopters carried an assault and a ground convoy of security teams launched in the late afternoon from the TF Ranger compound at Mogadishu airport. The TF came under increasingly heavy fire, more intense than during previous missions. The assault team captured 24 Somalis including Aidid's lieutenants and were loading them onto the convoy trucks when a MH-60 Blackhawk was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG).[16][33] A small element from the security forces, as well as an MH-6 assault helicopter and an MH-60 carrying a fifteen-man combat search and rescue (CSAR) team, rushed to the crash site.[16][32][33] The battle became increasingly worse. An RPG struck another MH-60, crashing less than 1 mile (1.6 km) to the south of the first downed helicopter. The task force faced overwhelming Somali mobs that overran the crash sites, causing a dire situation.[32] A Somali mob overran the second site and, despite a heroic defense, killed everyone except the pilot, whom they took prisoner. Two defenders of this crash site, Master Sergeant Gary Gordon and Sergeant First Class Randall Shughart, were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.[16][32][33] About this time, the mission's quick reaction force (QRF) also tried to reach the second crash site. This force too was pinned by the Somali fire and required the fire support of two AH-6 helicopters before it could break contact and make its way back to the base.[16]

Map of the main battle sites during the Battle of Mogadishu

The assault and security elements moved on foot towards the first crash area, passing through heavy fire, and occupied buildings south and southwest of the downed helicopter. They fought to establish defensive positions so as not to be pinned down by the very heavy enemy fire while treating their wounded and worked to free the pilot's body from the downed helicopter. With the detainees loaded on trucks, the ground convoy force attempted to reach the first crash site. Unable to find it amongst the narrow, winding alleyways, the convoy came under devastating small arms and RPG fire. The convoy had to return to base after suffering numerous casualties and sustaining substantial damage to their vehicles.[34]

Reinforcements, consisting of elements from the QRF, 10th Mountain Division soldiers, Rangers, SEALs, Pakistan Army tanks and Malaysian armored personnel carriers, finally arrived at 1:55 am on 4 October. The combined force worked until dawn to free the pilot's body, receiving RPG and small arms fire throughout the night.[16] All the casualties were loaded onto the armored personnel carriers, and the remainder of the force was left behind and had no choice but to move out on foot.[32] AH-6 gunships raked the streets with fire to support the movement. The main force of the convoy arrived at the Pakistani Stadium-compound for the QRF-at 6:30 am,[32] thus concluding one of the bloodiest and fiercest urban firefights since the Vietnam War. Task Force Ranger experienced a total of 17 killed in action and 106 wounded. Various estimates placed Somali casualties above 1,000.[32] Although Task Force Ranger's few missions were successes, the overall outcome of Operation Gothic Serpent was deemed a failure because of the Task Force's failure to complete their stated mission, capturing Mohamed Farrah Aidid.[32] Most U.S. forces pulled out of Somalia by March 1994. The withdrawal from Somalia was completed in March 1995.[16] Even though Operation Gothic Serpent failed, USSOCOM still made significant contributions to operations in Somalia. SOF performed reconnaissance and surveillance missions, assisted with humanitarian relief, protected American forces, and conducted riverine patrols. Additionally, they ensured the safe landing of the Marines and safeguarded the arrival of merchant ships carrying food.[16][27]

Iraq

[edit]

USSOCOM's 10th Special Forces Group, elements of JSOC, and CIA/SAD Paramilitary Officers linked up again and were the first to enter Iraq prior to the invasion. Their efforts organized the Kurdish Peshmerga to defeat Ansar Al Islam in Northern Iraq before the invasion. This battle was for control of a territory in Northeastern Iraq that was completely occupied by Ansar Al Islam, an ally of Al Qaeda. This was a very significant battle and led to the death of a substantial number of terrorists and the uncovering of a chemical weapons facility at Sargat. These terrorists would have been in the subsequent insurgency had they not been eliminated during this battle. Sargat was the only facility of its type discovered in the Iraq war. This battle may have been the Tora Bora of Iraq, but it was a sound defeat for Al Qaeda and their ally Ansar Al Islam.[35] This combined team then led the Peshmerga against Saddam's Northern Army. This effort kept Saddam's forces in the north and denied the ability to redeploy to contest the invasion force coming from the south. This effort may have saved the lives of hundreds if not thousands of coalition servicemen and women.[36]

At the launch of the Iraq War, dozens of 12-member Special Forces teams infiltrated southern and western Iraq to hunt for Scud missiles and pinpoint bombing targets. Scores of Navy SEALs seized oil terminals and pumping stations on the southern coast.[37] Air Force combat controllers flew combat missions in MC-130H Combat Talon IIs and established austere desert airstrips to begin the flow of soldiers and supplies deep into Iraq. It was notably different from the Persian Gulf war of 1991, where Special Operations forces were mostly kept participating. But it would not be a replay of Afghanistan, where Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs led the fighting. After their star turn in Afghanistan, many special operators were disappointed to play a supporting role in Iraq. Many special operators felt restricted by cautious commanders.[38] From that point, USSOCOM has since killed or captured hundreds of insurgents and Al-Qaeda terrorists. It has conducted several foreign internal defense missions successfully training the Iraqi security forces.[39][40]

Afghanistan

[edit]

United States Special Operations Command played a pivotal role in fighting the former Taliban government in Afghanistan in 2001[41] and toppling it thereafter, as well as combating the insurgency and capturing Saddam Hussein in Iraq. USSOCOM in 2004 was developing plans to have an expanded and more complex role in the global campaign against terrorism,[42] and that role continued to emerge before and after the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011.[43] In 2010, "of about 13,000 Special Operations forces deployed overseas, about 9,000 [were] evenly divided between Iraq and Afghanistan."[43]

A Special Forces soldier from 7th SFG(A) gives an Afghan boy a coloring book in Kandahar Province during a meeting with local leaders, 12 September 2002

In the initial stages of the War in Afghanistan, USSOCOM forces linked up with CIA Paramilitary Officers from Special Activities Division to defeat the Taliban without the need for large-scale conventional forces.[44] This was one of the biggest successes of the global War on Terrorism.[45] These units linked up several times during this war and engaged in several furious battles with the enemy. One such battle happened during Operation Anaconda, the mission to squeeze the life out of a Taliban and Al-Qaeda stronghold dug deep into the Shah-i-Kot Valley and Arma Mountains of eastern Afghanistan. The operation was seen as one of the heaviest and bloodiest fights in the War in Afghanistan.[46] The battle on an Afghan mountaintop called Takur Ghar featured special operations forces from all 4 services and the CIA. Navy SEALs, Army Rangers, Air Force Combat Controllers, and Pararescuemen fought against entrenched Al-Qaeda fighters atop a 10,000-foot (3,000 m) mountain. Subsequently, the entrenched Taliban became targets of every asset in the sky. According to an executive summary, the Battle of Takur Ghar was the most intense firefight American special operators have been involved in since 18 U.S. Army Rangers were killed in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993.[47][48][49] During Operation Red Wings on 28 June 2005, four Navy SEALs, pinned down in a firefight, radioed for help. A Chinook helicopter, carrying 16 service members, responded but was shot down. All members of the rescue team and three of four SEALs on the ground died. It was the worst loss of life in Afghanistan since the invasion in 2001. The Navy SEAL Marcus Luttrell alone survived.[50][51] Team leader Michael P. Murphy was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions in the battle.[52]

Global presence

[edit]
U.S. Air Force Special Tactics Commandos training in Jordan

In 2010, special operations forces were deployed in 75 countries, compared with about 60 at the beginning of 2009.[43] In 2011, SOC spokesman Colonel Tim Nye (Army[53]) was reported to have said that the number of countries with SOC presence will likely reach 120 and that joint training exercises will have been carried out in most or all of those countries during the year. One study identified joint-training exercises in Belize, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Germany, Indonesia, Mali, Norway, Panama, and Poland in 2010 and also, through mid-year 2011, in the Dominican Republic, Jordan, Romania, Senegal, South Korea, and Thailand, among other nations. In addition, SOC forces executed the high-profile killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011.[citation needed]

In November 2009 The Nation reported on a covert JSOC/Blackwater anti-terrorist operation in Pakistan.[54]

In 2010, White House counterterrorism director John O. Brennan said that the United States "will not merely respond after the fact" of a terrorist attack but will "take the fight to al-Qaeda and its extremist affiliates whether they plot and train in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and beyond." Olson said, "In some places, in deference to host-country sensitivities, we are lower in profile. In every place, Special Operations forces activities are coordinated with the U.S. ambassador and are under the operational control of the four-star regional commander."[43]

The conduct of actions by SOC forces outside of Iraq and Afghan war zones has been the subject of internal U.S. debate, including between representatives of the Bush administration such as John B. Bellinger III, on one hand, and the Obama administration on another. The United Nations in 2010 also "questioned the administration's authority under international law to conduct such raids, particularly when they kill innocent civilians. One possible legal justification – the permission of the country in question – is complicated in places such as Pakistan and Yemen, where the governments privately agree but do not publicly acknowledge approving the attacks," as one report put it.[43]

In two decades fighting terrorism, 660 members of the special operation community have been killed and a further 2,738 were wounded.[55]

Subordinate commands

[edit]

Joint Special Operations Command

[edit]
The Joint Special Operations Command insignia

Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)[56] is a component command of the USSOCOM and is charged to study special operations requirements and techniques to ensure interoperability and equipment standardization, plan and conduct special operations exercises and training, and develop Joint Special Operations Tactics.[1] It was established in 1980 on the recommendation of Col. Charlie Beckwith, in the aftermath of the failure of Operation Eagle Claw.[57]

Units

  • The U.S. Army's 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta, popularly known as Delta Force, is the first of the two counter-terrorism, special mission units that fall under the Joint Special Operations Command.[58] Modeled after the British Special Air Service, Delta Force is regarded as one of the premier special operations forces in the world.[59] Delta also includes a stringent training and selection process. Delta recruits primarily from the most proficient and highly skilled soldiers of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, although it encompasses the capability of recruiting throughout the U.S. Armed Forces.[32][59] Recruits must pass a rigid selection course before beginning training, known as the Operators' Training Course (OTC). Delta has received training from numerous U.S. government agencies and other tiers one SOF and has created a curriculum based on this training and techniques that it has developed.[59] Delta conducts clandestine and covert special operations all over the world.[59] It has the capability to conduct myriad special operations missions but specializes in counter-terrorism and hostage rescue operations.[32][58][60]
  • The Intelligence Support Activity (ISA, The Activity) is the support branch of JSOC and USSOCOM. Its primary missions are to provide Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) mainly for Delta and DEVGRU's operations.[58][61] Before the establishing of the Strategic Support Branch in 2001, the ISA required the permission of the CIA to conduct covert operations, which considerably lessened its effectiveness in its support of JSOC operations as a whole.[58][62][63]
  • The U.S. Navy's Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU, SEAL Team Six) is the second of the two counter-terrorism, special mission units that fall under the Joint Special Operations Command.[58] DEVGRU is the U.S. Navy's counterpart to Delta, specializing in maritime counter-terrorism. DEVGRU recruits the most proficient operators from Naval Special Warfare, specifically the U.S. Navy SEALs. Like Delta, DEVGRU can conduct a variety of special operations missions but trains primarily for maritime counter-terrorism and hostage rescue operations. DEVGRU has gained prolific notoriety in recent years, due to high-profile hostage rescue operations and their role in the killing of Osama Bin Laden.[32][58]
  • The Air Force 24th Special Tactics Squadron (24th STS) is the AFSOC component of JSOC. The 24th STS consists of specially selected AFSOC personnel, including Pararescuemen, Combat Controllers, and TACPs. These special operators usually serve with Delta Force and DEVGRU, because of the convenience of the 24th STS's ability to synchronize and control the different elements of airpower and enhance air operations deep in enemy territory; as well as, in the case of Pararescuemen, providing needed medical assistance.[32]
  • The Joint Communications Unit (JCU) is a technical unit of the United States Special Operations Command charged to standardize and ensure interoperability of communication procedures and equipment of the Joint Special Operations Command and its subordinate units. The JCU was activated at Ft. Bragg, NC in 1980, after the failure of Operation Eagle Claw. The JCU has earned the reputation of "DoD's Finest Communicators".[64]

Portions of JSOC units have made up the constantly changing special operations task force, operating in the U.S. Central Command area of operations. The Task Force 11, Task Force 121, Task Force 6-26 and Task Force 145 are creations of the Pentagon's post-11 September campaign against terrorism, and it quickly became the model for how the military would gain intelligence and battle insurgents in the future. Originally known as Task Force 121, it was formed in the summer of 2003 when the military merged two existing Special Operations units, one hunting Osama bin Laden in and around Afghanistan, and the other tracking Sadaam Hussein in Iraq.[65][66][67]

Special Operations Command – Joint Capabilities

[edit]

Special Operations Command – Joint Capabilities (SOC-JC) was transferred to USSOCOM from the soon-to-be disestablished United States Joint Forces Command in 2011.[68] Its primary mission was to train conventional and SOF commanders and their staffs to support USSOCOM international engagement training requirements, and support the implementation of capability solutions in order to improve strategic and operational Warfighting readiness and joint interoperability. SOC-JC must also be prepared to support the deployed Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF) Headquarters (HQ).[citation needed]

The Government Accountability Office wrote that SOC-JC was disestablished in 2013, and positions were to be zeroed out in 2014.[69]

Army Special Operations Command

[edit]
USASOC SSI

On 1 December 1989, the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) activated as the 16th major Army command. These special operations forces have been America's spearhead for unconventional warfare for more than 40 years. USASOC commands such units as the well known Special Forces (SF, or the "Green Berets"), the Rangers, and such relatively unknown units as two psychological operations groups, a special aviation regiment, a civil affairs brigade, and a special sustainment brigade. These are one of the USSOCOM's main weapons for waging unconventional warfare and counter-insurgency. The significance of these units is emphasized as conventional conflicts are becoming less prevalent as insurgent and guerrilla warfare increases.[70][71][72][73]

Name Headquarters Structure and purpose
1st Special Forces Command (Airborne)
Fort Bragg, North Carolina The 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) manages seven special forces groups—the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne), 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 19th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (ARNG) and 20th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (ARNG)—that are designed to deploy and execute nine doctrinal missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, counter-insurgency, special reconnaissance, counter-terrorism, information operations, counterproliferation of weapon of mass destruction, and security force assistance; each special forces group consists of three to four battalions with a group support company and headquarters company. The command also manages two psychological operations groups—the 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) and 8th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne)—tasked to work with foreign nations to induce or reinforce behavior favorable to U.S. objectives; each psychological operations group consists of three to four battalions, most of which are geographically aligned. The command also manages the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) which enables military commanders and U.S. ambassadors to achieve national objectives by countering adversary control and improving a partner's control over populations via five geographically focused battalions and the 528th Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) that provides combat service support, combat medical support, and intelligence via multiple support operations teams and three battalions.
1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta
Fort Bragg, North Carolina Elite special operations and counter-terrorism unit under the control of Joint Special Operations Command.
75th Ranger Regiment
Fort Benning, Georgia In addition to a regimental headquarters, a Special Troops Battalion, and a military intelligence battalion, the 75th Ranger Regiment consists of three maneuver battalions of elite airborne infantry specializing in large-scale, joint forcible entry operations while simultaneously executing precision targeting operations raids across the globe. Additional capabilities include special reconnaissance, air assault, and direct-action raids seizing key terrain such as airfields, destroying strategic facilities, and capturing or killing the enemies of the Nation. The Regiment also helps develop the equipment, technologies, training, and readiness that bridge the gap between special operations and conventional combat maneuver organizations.
Army Special Operations Aviation Command (Airborne)
Fort Bragg, North Carolina The Army Special Operations Aviation Command (Airborne) organizes, mans, trains, resources and equips Army special operations aviation units to provide responsive, special operations aviation support to Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) consisting of five units and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne).
John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
Fort Bragg, North Carolina The SWCS selects and trains Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations soldiers consisting of five distinct units and the Directorate of Training and Doctrine: 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne)—which focuses on entry-level training—, 2nd Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne)—which focuses on advanced training—, Special Warfare Medical Group (Airborne)—which is part of the Joint Special Operations Medical Training Center—, Special Forces Warrant Officer Institute, and David K. Thuma Noncommissioned Officers Academy.

Units:

Special Forces soldiers from Task Force Dagger and Commander Abdul Rashid Dostum on horseback in the Dari-a-Souf Valley, Afghanistan, circa October 2001—celebrated in the movie 12 Strong
  • United States Army Special Forces (SF) aka Green Berets perform several doctrinal missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance, direct action, and counter-terrorism. These missions make Special Forces unique in the U.S. military because they are employed throughout the three stages of the operational continuum: peacetime, conflict, and war.[74] Foreign internal defense operations, SF's main peacetime mission, are designed to help friendly developing nations by working with their military and police forces to improve their technical skills, understanding of human rights issues, and help with humanitarian and civic action projects. Special Forces unconventional warfare capabilities provide a viable military option for a variety of operational taskings that are inappropriate or infeasible for conventional forces. Special Forces are the U.S. military's premiere unconventional warfare force.[75] Foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare missions are the bread and butter of Special Forces soldiers. For this reason, SF candidates are trained extensively in weapons, engineering, communications, and medicine. SF soldiers are taught to be warriors first and teachers second because they must be able to train their team and be able to train their allies during an FID or UW mission.[74][76] Often SF units are required to perform additional, or collateral, activities outside their primary missions. These collateral activities are coalition warfare/support, combat search and rescue, security assistance, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, humanitarian de-mining, and counter-drug operations.[77]
  • The 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (1st SFOD-D), commonly referred to as Delta Force, Combat Applications Group/"CAG", "The Unit", Army Compartmented Element, or within JSOC as Task Force Green,[78] is an elite Special Mission Unit of the United States Army, under the organization of the USASOC but is controlled by the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). It is used for hostage rescue and counterterrorism, as well as direct action and reconnaissance against high-value targets. 1st SFOD-D and its U.S. Navy counterpart, DEVGRU, "SEAL Team 6", perform many of the most highly complex and dangerous missions in the U.S. military. These units are also often referred to as "Tier One" and special mission units by the U.S. government.[citation needed]
  • The 75th Ranger Regiment (U.S. Army Rangers) is the premier light-infantry unit of the United States Army and is headquartered at Fort Benning, Georgia. The 75th Ranger Regiment's mission is to plan and conduct special missions in support of U.S. policy and objectives.[79] The Rangers are a flexible and rapid-deployable force. Each battalion can deploy anywhere in the world within 18 hours of notice. The Army places much importance on the 75th Ranger Regiment and its training; it possesses the capabilities to conduct conventional and most special operations missions. Rangers are capable of infiltrating by land, sea, or air and direct action operations such as conducting raids or assaulting buildings or airfields.[80]
The 22nd STS's Red Team jumps out of an MH-47G Chinook from the 160th SOAR during helocast alternate insertion and extraction training
  • The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Night Stalkers) headquartered at Fort Campbell, Kentucky provides aviation support to units within USSOCOM. The Regiment consists of MH-6 and AH-6 light helicopters, MH-60 helicopters and MH-47 heavy assault helicopters. The capabilities of the 160th SOAR (A) have been evolving since the early 1980s. Its focus on night operations resulted in the nickname, "Night Stalkers."[81] The primary mission of the Night Stalkers is to conduct overt or covert infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply of special operations forces across a wide range of environmental conditions.[82]
  • 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) and 8th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) Soldiers use persuasion to influence perceptions and encourage desired behavior.[83][84] PSYOP soldiers support national objectives at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of operations. Strategic psychological operations advance broad or long-term objectives; global in nature, they may be directed toward large audiences or at key communicators. Operational psychological operations are conducted on a smaller scale. 4th POG(A) is employed by theater commanders to target groups within the theater of operations. 4th POG(A) purpose can range from gaining support for U.S. operations to preparing the battlefield for combat. Tactical psychological operations are more limited, used by commanders to secure immediate and near-term goals. In this environment, these force-enhancing activities serve as a means to lower the morale and efficiency of enemy forces.[85]
  • 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) specialists identify critical requirements needed by local citizens in war or disaster situations. They also locate civilian resources to support military operations, help minimize civilian interference with operations, support national assistance activities, plan and execute noncombatant evacuation, support counter-drug operations and establish and maintain liaison with civilian aid agencies and other non-governmental organizations. In support of special operations, these culturally oriented, linguistically capable Soldiers may also be tasked to provide functional expertise for foreign internal defense operations, unconventional warfare operations and direct action missions.[86]
  • 528th Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) (SO) (A) has a difficult mission supporting USASOC. In their respective fields, signal, intelligence, medical, and support soldiers provide communications, focused intelligence, medical Role II support, supplies, maintenance, equipment, and expertise allowing ARSOF to "shoot, move and communicate" on a continuous basis. Because USASOC often uses ARSOF-unique items, soldiers assigned to these units are taught to operate and maintain a vast array of specialized equipment not normally used by their conventional counterparts. The 528th also provides the USASOC with centralized and integrated material management of property, equipment maintenance, logistical automation and repair parts and supplies.[87]
  • John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center (USAJFKSWCS) trains USSOCOM and Army Special Operations Forces through development and evaluation of special operations concepts, doctrines and training.[88]

Marine Forces Special Operations Command

[edit]
United States Marine Forces Special Operations Command emblem
DA/SR Operators from 1st SOB (Special Operations Battalion) respond to enemy fire in Afghanistan.

In October 2005, the Secretary of Defense directed the formation of United States Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC), the Marine component of United States Special Operations Command. It was determined that the Marine Corps would initially form a unit of approximately 2,500 to serve with USSOCOM. On February 24, 2006, MARSOC activated at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. MARSOC initially consisted of a small staff and the Foreign Military Training Unit (FMTU), which had been formed to conduct foreign internal defense. FMTU is now designated as the Marine Special Operations Advisor Group (MSOAG).[89]

As a service component of USSOCOM, MARSOC is tasked by the Commander USSOCOM to train, organize, equip, and deploy responsive U.S. Marine Corps special operations forces worldwide, in support of combatant commanders and other agencies. MARSOC has been directed to conduct foreign internal defense, direct action, and special reconnaissance. MARSOC has also been directed to develop a capability in unconventional warfare, counter-terrorism, and information operations. MARSOC deployed its first units in August 2006, six months after the group's initial activation. MARSOC reached full operational capability in October 2008.[90]

Units

  • Marine Raider Regiment (Marine Raiders) consists of a Headquarters Company and three Marine Raider Battalions, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd. The Regiment provides tailored military combat-skills training and advisor support for identified foreign forces in order to enhance their tactical capabilities and to prepare the environment as directed by USSOCOM as well as the capability to form the nucleus of a Joint Special Operations Task Force. Marines and Sailors of the MRR train, advise and assist friendly host nation forces – including naval and maritime military and paramilitary forces – to enable them to support their governments' internal security and stability, to counter-subversion and to reduce the risk of violence from internal and external threats. MRR deployments are coordinated by MARSOC, through USSOCOM, in accordance with engagement priorities for Overseas Contingency Operations.[91]
  • Marine Raider Support Group (MRSG) trains, equips, structures, and provides specially qualified Marine forces, including, operational logistics, intelligence, Military Working Dogs, Firepower Control Teams, and communications support in order to sustain worldwide special operations missions as directed by Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Special Operations Command (COMMARFORSOC).[92]
  • Marine Raider Training Center (MRTC) The mission of the Marine Raider Training Center (MRTC) is to assess and select personnel for assignment to Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) and to train and educate designated personnel in individual, basic, and advanced special operations in order to meet MARSOC's requirement to provide capable personnel to conduct special operations.[93]
[edit]
United States Naval Special Warfare Command emblem

The United States Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM, NAVSOC, or NSWC) was commissioned April 16, 1987, at Naval Amphibious Base Coronado in San Diego as the Naval component to the United States Special Operations Command. Naval Special Warfare Command provides vision, leadership, doctrinal guidance, resources and oversight to ensure component special operations forces are ready to meet the operational requirements of combatant commanders.[94] Today, SEAL Teams and Special Boat Teams comprise the elite combat units of Naval Special Warfare. These teams are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct a variety of missions to include direct action, special reconnaissance, counter-terrorism, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare and support psychological and civil affairs operations. Their operators are deployed worldwide in support of National Command Authority objectives, conducting operations with other conventional and special operations forces.[citation needed]

Units

SEALs emerge from the water during a demonstration.
A special warfare combatant-craft crewmen from Special Boat Team 22 fires a GAU-17 from a Special Operations Craft – Riverine (SOC-R).
  • United States Navy SEALs have distinguished themselves as an individually reliable, collectively disciplined and highly skilled special operations force. The most important trait that distinguishes Navy SEALs from all other military forces is that SEALs are maritime special operations, as they strike from and return to the sea. SEALs (SEa, Air, Land) take their name from the elements in and from which they operate. SEALs are experts in direct action and special reconnaissance missions. Their stealth and clandestine methods of operation allow them to conduct multiple missions against targets that larger forces cannot approach undetected. Because of the dangers inherent in their missions, prospective SEALs go through what is considered by many military experts to be the toughest training regime in the world.[95][96]
  • Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU), referred to as SEAL Team Six, the name of its predecessor which was officially disbanded in 1987.
  • SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams are SEAL teams with an added underwater delivery capability who use the SDV MK VIII and the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS), submersibles that provide NSW with an unprecedented capability that combines the attributes of clandestine underwater mobility and the combat swimmer.[97][98]
  • Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen (SWCC) operate and maintain state-of-the-art vessels and high-tech equipment to conduct coastal patrol and interdiction and support special operations missions. Focusing on infiltration and exfiltration of SEALs and other SOF, SWCCs provide dedicated rapid mobility in shallow water areas where larger ships cannot operate. They also bring to the table a unique SOF capability: Maritime Combatant Craft Aerial Delivery System—the ability to deliver combat craft via parachute drop.[1] Like SEALs, SWCCs must have excellent physical fitness, highly motivated, combat-focused and responsive in high-stress situations.[99]

Air Force Special Operations Command

[edit]
Air Force Special Operations Command emblem
An AC-130U Spooky from the 4th Special Operations Squadron
Combat Controllers from the 21st Special Tactics Squadron conducting close air support training with A-10 pilots in Nevada

Air Force Special Operations Command was established on May 22, 1990, with headquarters at Hurlburt Field, Florida. AFSOC is one of the 10 Air Force Major Commands or MAJCOMs, and the Air Force component of United States Special Operations Command. It holds operational and administrative oversight of subordinate special operations wings and groups in the regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve Command and the Air National Guard.[citation needed]

AFSOC provides Air Force special operations forces for worldwide deployment and assignment to regional unified commands. The command's SOF are composed of highly trained, rapidly deployable airmen, conducting global special operations missions ranging from the precision application of firepower via airstrikes or close air support, to infiltration, exfiltration, resupply and refueling of SOF operational elements.[100] AFSOC's unique capabilities include airborne radio and television broadcast for psychological operations, as well as aviation foreign internal defense instructors to provide other governments military expertise for their internal development.[citation needed]

The command's core missions include battlefield air operations; agile combat support; aviation foreign internal defense; information operations; precision aerospace fires; psychological operations; specialized air mobility; specialized refueling; and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.[38][101][102]

Components

Organization

  • The 1st Special Operations Wing (1 SOW) is located at Hurlburt Field, Florida. Its mission focus is unconventional warfare: counter-terrorism, combat search and rescue, personnel recovery, psychological operations, aviation assistance to developing nations, "deep battlefield" resupply, interdiction, and close air support. The wing's core missions include aerospace surface interface, agile combat support, combat aviation advisory operations, information operations, personnel recovery/recovery operations, precision aerospace fires, psychological operations dissemination, specialized aerospace mobility, and specialized aerial refueling.[106] Among its aircraft is the MC-130 Combat Talon II, a low-level terrain-following special missions transport that can evade radar detection and slip into enemy territory at a 200-foot (61 m) altitude for infiltration/exfiltration missions, even in zero visibility, dropping off or recovering men or supplies with pinpoint accuracy. It also operates the AC-130 Spooky and Spectre gunships that provide highly accurate airborne gunfire for close air support of conventional and special operations forces on the ground.[58]
  • The 24th Special Operations Wing (24 SOW) is located at Hurlburt Field, Florida. It is composed of the 720th Special Tactics Group, 724th Special Tactics Group, Special Tactics Training Squadron and 16 recruiting locations across the United States.[107][108] The Special Tactics Squadrons, under the 720th STG and 724th STG, are made up of Special Tactics Officers, Combat Controllers, Combat Rescue Officers, Pararescuemen, Air Force Special Reconnaissance, Air Liaison Officers, Tactical Air Control Party operators, and a number of combat support airmen which comprise 58 Air Force specialties.[108]
  • The 27th Special Operations Wing (27 SOW) is located at Cannon AFB, New Mexico. Its primary mission includes infiltration, exfiltration and re-supply of special operations forces; air refueling of special operations rotary wing and tiltrotor aircraft; and precision fire support. These capabilities support a variety of special operations missions including direct action, unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance, counter-terrorism, personnel recovery, psychological operations and information operations.[109]
  • The 193d Special Operations Wing (193 SOW) is an Air National Guard (ANG) unit, operationally gained by AFSOC, and located at Harrisburg International Airport/Air National Guard Station (former Olmsted Air Force Base), Pennsylvania. Under Title 32 USC, the 193 SOW performs state missions for the Governor of Pennsylvania as part of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard. Under Title 10 USC, the 193 SOW is part of the Air Reserve Component (ARC) of the United States Air Force. Its primary wartime and contingency operations mission as an AFSOC-gained unit is psychological operations (PSYOP). The 193 SOW is unique in that it is the only unit in the U.S. Air Force to fly and maintain the Lockheed EC-130J Commando Solo aircraft.[citation needed]
  • The 919th Special Operations Wing (919 SOW) is an Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) unit, operationally gained by AFSOC, and located at Eglin AFB Auxiliary Field #3/Duke Field, Florida. The 919 SOW flies and maintains the MC-130E Combat Talon I and MC-130P Combat Shadow special operations aircraft designed for covert operations.[citation needed]
  • The 352d Special Operations Wing (352 SOW) at RAF Mildenhall, United Kingdom serves as the core to the United States European Command's standing Joint Special Operations Air Component headquarters. The squadron provides support for three flying squadrons, one special tactics squadron and one maintenance squadron for exercise, logistics, and war planning; aircrew training; communications; aerial delivery; medical; intelligence; security and force protection; weather; information technologies and transformation support and current operations.[110]
  • The 353d Special Operations Group (353 SOG) is the focal point for all U.S. Air Force special operations activities throughout the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) theater. Headquartered at Kadena AB, Okinawa, Japan the group is prepared to conduct a variety of high-priority, low-visibility missions. Its mission is air support of joint and allied special operations forces in the Pacific. It maintains a worldwide mobility commitment, participates in Pacific theater exercises as directed and supports humanitarian and relief operations.[111]
  • The United States Air Force Special Operations School (USAFSOS) at Hurlburt Field, Florida is a primary support unit of the Air Force Special Operations Command. The USAFSOS prepares special operations Airmen to successfully plan, organize, and execute global special operations by providing indoctrination and education for AFSOC, other USSOCOM components, and joint/interagency/ coalition partners.[112]

Space Force Special Operations Command

[edit]

As of October 2023, the United States Space Force has not announced the formation of a Special Operations Commander. However, in July 2023, the United States Space Force assigned Col. Stephan Cummings as an "Element Commander" to U.S. Special Operations Command. As of October 2023, the United States Space Force has not announced any heraldry for Space Force Special Operations Command.

Other Components

[edit]

SOF Liaison Element

[edit]

The Special Operations Forces Liaison Element (SOFLE) is small group of special forces personnel, sometimes just one or two at a time, attached to embassies in Africa, Southeast Asia, South America, or elsewhere that terrorists are thought to be operating, planning attacks, raising money or seeking safe haven, especially those teams in the United States. MLEs report to the local US combat commanders and the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), instead of reporting to the local ambassador or CIA station chief.[citation needed]

Order of battle

[edit]
Special Operations Command order of battle April 2020 (click to enlarge)

List of commanders

[edit]
U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin (far left), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark A. Milley (center left), incoming combatant commander Bryan P. Fenton (center right) and outgoing commander Richard D. Clarke Jr. (far right) at the USSOCOM change of command ceremony on 30 August 2022.

The commander of U.S. Special Operations Command is a statutory office (10 U.S.C. § 167), and is held by a four-star general or admiral.

No. Commander Term Service branch
Portrait Name Took office Left office Term length
1
James J. Lindsay
Lindsay, James J.General
James J. Lindsay
(1932–2023)
16 April 198727 June 19903 years, 72 days
U.S. Army
2
Carl W. Stiner
Stiner, Carl W.General
Carl W. Stiner
(1936–2022)
27 June 199020 May 19932 years, 327 days
U.S. Army
3
Wayne A. Downing
Downing, Wayne A.General
Wayne A. Downing
(1940–2007)
20 May 199329 February 19962 years, 285 days
U.S. Army
4
Henry H. Shelton
Shelton, Henry H.General
Henry H. Shelton
(born 1942)
29 February 199625 September 19971 year, 209 days
U.S. Army
-
Raymond C. Smith Jr.
Smith, Raymond C. Jr.Rear Admiral
Raymond C. Smith Jr.
(1943–2022)
Acting
25 September 19975 November 199741 days
U.S. Navy
5
Peter J. Schoomaker
Schoomaker, PeterGeneral
Peter J. Schoomaker
(born 1946)
5 November 199727 October 20002 years, 357 days
U.S. Army
6
Charles R. Holland
Holland, Charles R.General
Charles R. Holland
(born 1946)
27 October 20002 September 20032 years, 310 days
U.S. Air Force
7
Bryan D. Brown
Brown, Bryan D.General
Bryan D. Brown
(born 1948)
2 September 20039 July 20073 years, 310 days
U.S. Army
8
Eric T. Olson
Olson, Eric T.Admiral
Eric T. Olson
(born 1952)
9 July 20078 August 20114 years, 30 days
U.S. Navy
9
William H. McRaven
McRaven, William H.Admiral
William H. McRaven
(born 1955)
8 August 201128 August 20143 years, 20 days
U.S. Navy
10
Joseph L. Votel
Votel, Joseph L.General
Joseph L. Votel
(born 1958)
28 August 201430 March 20161 year, 215 days
U.S. Army
11
Raymond A. Thomas
Thomas, Raymond A.General
Raymond A. Thomas
(born 1958)
30 March 201629 March 20192 years, 364 days
U.S. Army
12
Richard D. Clarke
Clarke, Richard D.General
Richard D. Clarke
(born 1962)
29 March 201930 August 20223 years, 154 days
U.S. Army
13
Bryan P. Fenton
Fenton, Bryan P.General
Bryan P. Fenton
(born 1965)
30 August 20223 October 20253 years, 34 days
U.S. Army
14
Frank M. Bradley
Bradley, Frank M.Admiral
Frank M. Bradley
3 October 2025Incumbent17 days
U.S. Navy

USSOCOM medal

[edit]
USSOCOM Medal Ribbon Bar

The United States Special Operations Command Medal was introduced in 1994 to recognize individuals for outstanding contributions to, and in support of, special operations. Some notable recipients include:[citation needed]

Since it was created, there have been more than 50 recipients, only seven of whom were not American, including;

(† posthumously)

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is the of the U.S. Department of Defense responsible for organizing, training, equipping, and deploying forces across the , , , Marine Corps, and supporting elements to execute missions requiring specialized capabilities. Established on April 16, 1987, at in , following congressional legislation—the Nunn-Cohen Amendment—enacted in response to deficiencies exposed by the failed 1980 hostage rescue attempt, USSOCOM centralizes command of elite units to address shortcomings in prior fragmented structures. USSOCOM's mission entails developing and employing special operations forces to conduct global activities, including , , , , and , in coordination with joint forces, interagency partners, allies, and to counter threats from state and non-state actors in support of U.S. national objectives. Commanding over 70,000 personnel organized under components such as U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare Command, , and Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command—plus the secretive —USSOCOM has executed pivotal operations, including enabling the rapid defeat of the in in 2001 and support for efforts in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. These efforts underscore SOF's in asymmetric environments, where small, adaptable teams achieve disproportionate effects against numerically superior foes through precision and initiative. While USSOCOM's forces have delivered strategic successes in disrupting terrorist networks and enabling partner nations' security, the command has encountered challenges from sustained high operational tempos post-2001, including isolated ethical misconduct cases and debates over mission scope expansion, leading to internal reviews that identified gaps but no systemic ethical breakdowns, advocating reinforced standards and force preservation. Such scrutiny reflects broader tensions in balancing SOF's expeditionary demands with long-term readiness amid persistent global deployments.

Establishment and Mandate

Background and Legislative Creation

Following the Vietnam War, U.S. special operations forces (SOF) suffered from neglect and underfunding, contributing to a degraded readiness often described as part of a "hollow force" within the military. This situation was starkly exposed by the failure of Operation Eagle Claw on April 24, 1980, a joint mission to rescue American hostages in Iran that aborted due to mechanical issues with helicopters, inadequate planning, and inter-service coordination breakdowns, resulting in the deaths of eight U.S. servicemen. The debacle highlighted systemic problems, including fragmented command structures, incompatible equipment across services, and a lack of specialized SOF advocacy within the Department of Defense (DoD). In response, initiated reforms to address these deficiencies, culminating in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433), which aimed to streamline joint operations and reduce service rivalries. Specifically targeting SOF, the Nunn-Cohen Amendment, introduced by Senators and and incorporated into the for Fiscal Year 1987 (P.L. 99-661, signed November 14, 1986), mandated the creation of a dedicated to SOF. This legislation elevated SOF's status by establishing U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as the fourth functional unified command, granting it authority over training, doctrine, equipment, and acquisition for all SOF components from the , , , and Marine Corps, while requiring the military services to provide personnel and funding support. USSOCOM was formally activated on April 16, 1987, at , , marking the first time directed the President to establish a new . The command's creation aimed to ensure SOF received dedicated resources and a unified voice in planning, directly addressing the coordination failures exemplified by and fostering interoperability among elite units. The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was activated on April 16, 1987, following the enactment of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment as part of the for Fiscal Year 1987, which amended the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433). This statutory creation distinguished USSOCOM as the sole established directly by congressional legislation rather than by Department of Defense directive or . The command's legal framework is codified primarily in 10 U.S.C. § 167, which designates it as the responsible for forces (SOF) drawn from the , , , and Marine Corps. Under 10 U.S.C. § 167(b), USSOCOM's principal function is to prepare assigned SOF to execute directed missions, encompassing peacetime, contingency, and wartime operations. The commander, a four-star general or , holds authority for ensuring SOF , developing specialized and tactics, acquiring unique and , conducting validation of operational concepts, and providing specialized and training. Additionally, the commander exercises command over SOF units assigned to the command and retains the prerogative to lead selected missions when explicitly directed by the President or of Defense, bypassing typical geographic combatant command chains for such tasks. This structure centralizes SOF oversight while preserving service-specific responsibilities for manning, training, and equipping forces under 10 U.S.C. § 167(c). Special operations, as defined in 10 U.S.C. § 101(e), involve activities executed in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments by SOF to attain military, diplomatic, informational, or economic goals, often employing unconventional methods disproportionate to conventional force capabilities. Core activities include (e.g., raids and sabotage), , (e.g., support to resistance movements), , , military information support operations, , and countering weapons of mass destruction, among others specified by the President or of Defense. These missions emphasize precision, adaptability, and integration with broader joint operations, with USSOCOM retaining acquisition and resource management authorities tailored to SOF-peculiar needs under 10 U.S.C. § 167(f).

Organizational Structure

Headquarters and Leadership

The headquarters of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is located at in , specifically at 7701 Tampa Point Blvd. Established on April 16, 1987, the headquarters serves as the central hub for coordinating and directing all special operations forces across the U.S. military services, including planning, resourcing, and synchronizing global special operations activities. The facility supports USSOCOM's role as a under the Department of Defense, with direct reporting to the Secretary of Defense, enabling rapid decision-making independent of geographic combatant commands. USSOCOM's leadership is structured with a four-star commander at the apex, typically rotating among the services to ensure balanced representation and expertise in special operations. The commander exercises authority over all assigned and attached special operations forces, focusing on maintaining operational readiness, innovation in tactics, and integration with conventional forces. As of October 3, 2025, Admiral Frank M. Bradley, a U.S. Navy SEAL officer and 1991 graduate of the United States Naval Academy, serves as the 14th commander, having succeeded General Bryan P. Fenton during a change of command ceremony at MacDill Air Force Base. Supporting the commander is the deputy commander, currently of the U.S. , who assists in overseeing daily operations, staff functions, and inter-service coordination. The leadership team also includes a vice commander, senior enlisted leader, and , forming a headquarters staff that emphasizes merit-based standards, quantifiable metrics, and auditable processes to sustain a culture of excellence in . This structure ensures USSOCOM's ability to adapt to evolving threats through decentralized execution and centralized control.

Subordinate Commands and Components

The subordinate commands and components of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) consist primarily of four service component commands, one joint sub-unified command, and various theater special operations commands (TSOCs) that integrate forces (SOF) into geographic combatant commands. These entities are responsible for the readiness, training, and deployment of approximately 70,000 active-duty, , and reserve personnel as of fiscal year 2022, with USSOCOM providing centralized acquisition, sustainment, and development while delegating service-specific management to the components. United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), activated on December 1, 1989, and headquartered at Fort Liberty, , serves as the Army's component to USSOCOM and oversees about 35,000 soldiers in units such as the 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne), which includes seven Special Forces groups focused on , , and ; the for special light infantry operations; the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment for aviation support; and the Special Warfare Center and School for training. USASOC also manages psychological operations and units aligned under USSOCOM, emphasizing scalable force projection for global missions. Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM), established in 1987 and based in , commands Navy SOF numbering around 10,000 personnel, including SEAL teams for maritime , special boat units, and support elements like the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU) for advanced tactics. It provides capabilities in , , and hydrographic surveys, with forces deployable via submarines, surface vessels, or expeditionary means. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), activated on May 22, 1990, and headquartered at , , directs over 20,000 airmen operating specialized aircraft such as the AC-130 gunship, CV-22 Osprey , and MC-130 variants for infiltration, exfiltration, and in austere environments. AFSOC emphasizes air mobility, precision strike, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, supporting joint and coalition operations with a focus on contested airspace penetration. Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC), the youngest component, was officially activated on February 24, 2006, and is headquartered at Camp Lejeune, , commanding approximately 3,000 in Marine Raider regiments structured for , , and , with an emphasis on integration with Marine expeditionary units for littoral and crisis response. MARSOC draws from the Marine Corps' expeditionary ethos, incorporating language training and expertise. The , a sub-unified command established in 1980 and headquartered at Fort Liberty, , focuses on highly sensitive, clandestine missions involving elite units like the Army's 1st SFOD-D () and Navy's DEVGRU, conducting , hostage rescue, and operations under direct USSOCOM authority or national tasking, with operational control often delegated to geographic commanders. Additionally, USSOCOM supports seven TSOCs as sub-unified commands under geographic combatant commands, including (SOCCENT) for the , Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA) established in 2008 for counterviolent extremism, and others like (SOCEUR) and (SOCKOR), which synchronize SOF activities regionally while drawing personnel and resources from the service components. These TSOCs numbered around 2,500 assigned personnel in 2022, enabling persistent presence and theater-specific adaptation.

Personnel, Budget, and Resources

As of 2025, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) comprises approximately 70,000 personnel, including , reserve component (Reserve and ), and civilian members assigned to its headquarters, theater special operations commands, and service component commands. This force structure supports the command's global missions, with personnel forming the majority, supplemented by part-time reservists for surge capacity and civilians for administrative and technical roles. Breakdowns by component vary, but the Army's special operations forces, under U.S. Army Special Operations Command, represent the largest share, with historical data indicating over 30,000 assigned military personnel across units like the and Special Forces Groups. maintains around 20,000 active duty, reserve, and civilian personnel, focusing on aviation and special tactics. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command fields nearly 3,000 active duty personnel for and . Naval Special Warfare Command includes about 2,900 active duty SEALs, with additional reserves. USSOCOM's covers special operations-peculiar costs, excluding service-funded pay and basic , which total around $13.7 billion annually as of recent assessments, operations, , , and for unique capabilities. The 2025 request emphasizes readiness, with operation and allocations supporting depot-level sustainment of aircraft like MH-6 variants and maritime craft, amid a flat topline since 2019 that has eroded by approximately 14% due to . and , development, test, and evaluation lines prioritize enhancements, with $1.3 billion slated for capabilities in 2025. Resources under USSOCOM include specialized equipment inventories tailored for , such as over 100 CV-22 tiltrotors, MH-47 Chinook helicopters, and MC-130 variants for infiltration and resupply, maintained through dedicated funding streams. These assets, along with advanced communications and precision-guided munitions, enable persistent presence in contested environments, though sustainment challenges arise from aging fleets and constraints. The command operates from headquarters and forward sites worldwide, leveraging joint facilities for training at locations like Fort Liberty and .

Doctrine and Capabilities

Special Operations Principles and Activities

Special operations forces (SOF) under the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) operate according to the SOF Truths, a set of five foundational principles that prioritize and deliberate preparation over material or expediency. These truths assert that humans are more important than hardware, as competent personnel can improvise with available tools while equipment alone cannot compensate for skill deficits; quality outperforms quantity, with small teams surpassing larger conventional units; SOF cannot be mass-produced, requiring extended, rigorous ; competent SOF cannot be improvised in crises but must be maintained in peacetime; and most operations demand non-SOF support from forces for , , and sustainment. Joint doctrine further delineates principles including unity of command, under which SOF integrate under a single authority for cohesive action; unity of effort, fostering coordination with interagency and multinational partners; and , enabling decentralized execution via intent-based orders to adapt to fluid environments. Legitimacy remains paramount, achieved through adherence to domestic and , the law of armed conflict, and to sustain political support. Characteristics of encompass high-risk activities in denied or sensitive areas by agile, self-contained teams employing clandestine methods, cultural expertise, and interdependence with conventional forces rather than substitution. SOF imperatives from joint doctrine guide planning and execution, emphasizing understanding the operational environment's physical, cultural, and political dimensions; recognizing political ramifications on U.S. interests; facilitating interagency integration; discriminatory engagement to limit collateral effects; evaluation of long-term strategic consequences; maintenance of credibility via ethical conduct; anticipation of psychological impacts; operations through indigenous and allied proxies; development of adaptable options; sustainment planning; intelligence primacy; and balancing operational security with joint synchronization. USSOCOM's core activities constitute specialized missions distinct from conventional operations, executed to achieve strategic effects through precision and . These include:
  • Direct Action: Short-duration strikes and offensive actions to seize, destroy, capture, or damage targets in hostile environments using tailored capabilities.
  • Special Reconnaissance: Clandestine collection or verification of information in denied areas to inform .
  • Unconventional Warfare: Support to indigenous resistance movements to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow adversarial governments or occupiers.
  • Foreign Internal Defense: Assistance to host nations in building capacity against internal threats like or .
  • Civil Affairs Operations: Activities to influence civilian populations and authorities, enhancing military-civil relations in operational areas.
  • Counterterrorism: Offensive measures targeting terrorist networks and indirect actions rendering environments hostile to them.
  • Military Information Support Operations: Targeted messaging to foreign audiences to shape behaviors aligned with U.S. objectives, in coordination with geographic commands.
  • Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: Efforts to WMD proliferation, development, or employment by state or non-state actors.
  • Security Force Assistance: Advising, training, and equipping partner security forces to bolster their effectiveness.
Additional activities such as , antiterrorism, and humanitarian assistance complement these cores, often integrating military and non-military elements to address root causes of instability or provide crisis relief. These activities demand regional expertise, psychological operations integration, and measurable outcomes tied to priorities, with empirical success hinging on precise execution rather than scale.

Training, Selection, and Equipment

Selection and assessment for USSOCOM's forces occur at the component commands of the , , , and Marine Corps, with processes emphasizing physical endurance, mental fortitude, moral character, adaptability, and team commitment to identify candidates capable of executing high-risk missions. These evaluations incorporate ethical foundations and real-world scenarios to gauge under stress. Attrition rates are high, often exceeding 50%, due to the demands of sustained performance without medical or administrative drop provisions in many phases. Component-specific assessments vary but share core rigor. Air Force special warfare candidates, for roles in combat control or pararescue, complete a four-week Assessment and Selection at the Special Warfare Training Wing, testing eight attributes including physical fitness and cognitive processing via field exercises and peer evaluations. Marine Corps candidates for Marine Raiders undergo the Assessment and Selection Program at the Marine Raider Training Center after recruiter screening, focusing on individual and team performance in aquatic, land navigation, and tactical scenarios over approximately three weeks in Phase 1, with further individual training augmentations. Navy SEAL candidates begin with the Physical Screening Test before entering Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) preparation, which includes basic conditioning, dive, and land warfare phases stressing hypothermia resistance and combat skills. Army Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) evaluates land navigation, small-unit tactics, and endurance over multiple weeks at Fort Liberty. Post-selection training pipelines, lasting 1-2 years depending on the component and role, develop proficiency in core activities like , , , and . These include service-unique phases—such as the Army's Qualification Course with modules on operations, weapons, and language training; Navy SEAL Qualification Training emphasizing maritime operations; Air Force special tactics courses in airfield seizure and personnel recovery; and Marine Individual Training Course for raiders—followed by USSOCOM-coordinated joint exercises and mission rehearsal. Joint facilities like the Joint Medical Training Center provide specialized instruction, such as the nine-month Combat Medic course, to ensure interoperability across forces. USSOCOM procures, equips, and sustains SOF-peculiar items through the Special Operations Forces Acquisition, , and (SOF AT&L) directorate, which holds delegated for rapid acquisition of non-standard gear tailored to austere environments and clandestine operations. This includes categories such as systems (e.g., protective and human performance optimization tools), weapons and electronic attack systems for precision engagement, mobility assets for ground and insertion, and C4ISR platforms enabling real-time intelligence and command in denied areas. Examples encompass devices for friendly force monitoring, advanced for target identification, and cyberspace operations tools for network disruption, with emphasizing speed, risk tolerance, and warfighter input over traditional Department of Defense timelines. SOF AT&L integrates enablers like unmanned systems and information operations kits to support missions beyond conventional .

Historical Operations

Formative Engagements (1987–2001)

Following its establishment on April 16, , under the Defense Reorganization Act, USSOCOM conducted initial operations that tested unified special operations forces (SOF) integration across services, emphasizing rapid deployment, joint command, and in support of geographic combatant commands. These formative engagements from to , including maritime interdiction, regime removal, coalition support, and raids, exposed doctrinal gaps in SOF sustainment and interagency coordination while demonstrating capabilities in and . Early missions prioritized countering immediate threats like and regional instability, with USSOCOM allocating resources to train over 40,000 SOF personnel by 1990, focusing on amid post-Cold War contingencies. In (July 1987–September 1988), USSOCOM SOF, including Navy SEALs and Army Special Forces, supported reflagging and escort of 29 Kuwaiti oil tankers in the against Iranian attacks, conducting over 3,700 shipboard boardings and maritime interdictions that neutralized threats without major escalation. This operation marked USSOCOM's debut in sustained presence missions, validating SOF roles in and gathering under Central Command, though it highlighted vulnerabilities in long-duration naval integration. Operation Just Cause in (December 20, 1989–January 31, 1990) represented USSOCOM's first large-scale combat test, deploying approximately 7,000 SOF personnel from (JSOC), including , SEAL Team 6, and the , to secure key infrastructure, neutralize Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) leadership, and facilitate Noriega's capture. SOF elements executed over 20 independent missions, such as the Rangers' airfield seizure at Rio Hato on December 20 (suffering 4 killed and 20 wounded from initial resistance) and SEALs' neutralization of Punta Paitilla airfield to prevent PDF air escape, contributing to the rapid collapse of Noriega's regime within days and minimal U.S. casualties relative to 27,000 conventional troops involved. These actions underscored SOF precision in urban and airborne assaults but revealed planning shortfalls in PDF loyalty assessments and follow-on stability operations. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (August 1990–February 1991), USSOCOM committed over 8,000 SOF operators across Central Command, conducting deep reconnaissance, sabotage of Iraqi command nodes, and Scud missile hunts with the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) enabling insertions hundreds of miles into Iraq. Air Force Special Tactics teams led the opening strikes by destroying Iraqi radar sites via helicopter raids on January 17, 1991, while Army Special Forces liaised with Saudi and coalition partners, training over 10,000 indigenous forces and disrupting Iraqi logistics. These efforts yielded tangible impacts, including the confirmed destruction of Scud infrastructure and rescue of downed pilots, but command tensions arose over SOF autonomy, as geographic commanders initially resisted full USSOCOM tasking authority, prompting post-war doctrinal refinements in joint special operations task forces (JSOTFs). In under Operation Restore Hope and Gothic Serpent (December 1992–October 1993), USSOCOM's Task Force Ranger, comprising , 75th Rangers, and 160th SOAR, executed high-risk raids against warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid's militia, culminating in the October 3–4, 1993, Battle of Mogadishu where two MH-60 Black Hawks were downed by RPGs, leading to 18 U.S. fatalities, 73 wounded, and an 18-hour urban fight involving over 100 Somali casualties per official counts. The mission to capture Aidid lieutenants succeeded in detaining 24 targets but exposed SOF limitations in prolonged ground recovery without armored support, influencing subsequent policy shifts away from toward focused . This engagement, analyzed in USSOCOM after-action reviews, emphasized the need for enhanced training and integration with conventional quick-reaction forces, shaping SOF employment doctrine for future contingencies.

Global War on Terror (2001–2021)

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, USSOCOM forces spearheaded the initial U.S. response in Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom, deploying Army Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas to link with Northern Alliance fighters, conduct unconventional warfare, and direct precision airstrikes that facilitated the Taliban's ouster from major cities by November 2001. These small-footprint teams, numbering around 300-500 SOF personnel initially, leveraged local proxies and airpower to achieve rapid territorial gains with minimal conventional troop commitment. USSOCOM underwent significant expansion during the GWOT to sustain persistent operations, with active-duty personnel growing from approximately 43,000 in 2001 to over 70,000 by the mid-2010s, alongside a increase from about $3 billion to nearly $13 billion annually by 2020. Overseas deployments quadrupled, enabling SOF to support combatant commands across multiple theaters including the , , and . This growth included adding five active-duty battalions, expanding the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, and boosting SEAL Team recruitment to meet demands for and missions. In Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom starting March 2003, USSOCOM's (JSOC) task forces conducted thousands of raids targeting high-value insurgents, capturing on December 13, 2003, in and disrupting networks through intelligence-driven operations. JSOC's Task Unit Blue (SEALs) and others executed over 50,000 missions by 2007, significantly degrading insurgent leadership and capabilities via capture or kill of more than 3,000 high-value targets across and combined. Globally, JSOC under USSOCOM synchronized counterterrorism efforts, culminating in Operation Neptune Spear on May 2, 2011, where raided Osama bin Laden's compound in , , killing the leader and yielding intelligence on terrorist networks. From 2014 onward, USSOCOM SOF advised partner forces in against , conducting raids in and that eliminated key leaders like on October 26, 2019, while training over 100,000 indigenous troops to reclaim territory. By 2021, USSOCOM had executed core missions encompassing , , and across 80 countries, contributing to the degradation of and core structures, though persistent threats required ongoing adaptation amid force strain from repeated deployments.

Post-Withdrawal Engagements (2021–2025)

Following the U.S. military withdrawal from on August 30, 2021, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) prioritized over-the-horizon capabilities, partner force , and selective to address enduring threats from groups such as the (ISIS) and affiliates, while adapting to reduced footprints in certain regions. This period saw a strategic pivot toward integrating forces (SOF) into broader competition frameworks, yet remained a core mission, with operations concentrated in the , , and parts of . USSOCOM's activities emphasized advising indigenous forces, precision strikes, and joint exercises to mitigate risks without large-scale ground commitments, reflecting empirical assessments of threat persistence and resource constraints post-. In Iraq and Syria, USSOCOM components sustained operations against ISIS holdouts through raids, intelligence-driven targeting, and enablement of local partners like the (SDF). From 2021 onward, SOF conducted or supported dozens of direct action missions annually, focusing on high-value targets and detention facility security to prevent breakouts that could regenerate caliphate networks. A notable example occurred January 2–3, 2025, when CENTCOM-enabled SDF operations near Dayr az-Zawr, , killed five ISIS operatives and detained two others, disrupting attack planning cells. These engagements, often involving small SOF teams for coordination and ground validation, contributed to a reported 20–30% reduction in ISIS operational capacity in the region by mid-2025, per CENTCOM assessments, though challenges persisted due to Iranian proxy interference and terrain advantages for insurgents. In the , USSOCOM targeted al-Shabaab and -Somalia affiliates amid escalating foreign fighter influences, with a surge in kinetic operations under revised authorities. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), integrating USSOCOM elements, executed targeted strikes in Somalia's Golis Mountains in July–August 2025, eliminating leadership safe havens and an estimated 15–20 militants, including key planners. By March 2025, tempo had increased significantly, with at least 16 confirmed strikes attributed to enhanced fusion involving SOF advisors embedded with Somali forces. These actions built on pre-withdrawal patterns but relied more on partnerships for ground execution, yielding measurable disruptions to attack plotting against U.S. interests, though casualty estimates varied due to limited post-strike assessments. Across broader , USSOCOM engagements shifted toward and multinational exercises following base closures in the . In 2024, SOF withdrew from Nigerien facilities amid diplomatic tensions, reallocating approximately 1,000 personnel to coastal and East African partners for training. Initiatives included civil-military operations in and , medical exchanges, and joint training with Somali units, enhancing local capacities against transnational threats. 2025 exercise, concluded May 27, 2025, involved SOF in multinational maneuvers across , validating rapid deployment and with over 10,000 participants from 30 nations, aimed at deterring instability spillover. These efforts underscored a data-driven approach, with USSOCOM reporting improved partner strike efficacy metrics, though critiques noted over-reliance on airpower amid ground access limitations.

Operational Achievements and Effectiveness

Key Successes in Counterterrorism and Unconventional Warfare

U.S. Special Operations Forces under USSOCOM conducted Operation Neptune Spear on May 2, 2011, in , , where Navy (DEVGRU) raided Osama bin Laden's compound, killing the leader responsible for the and severely disrupting the organization's command structure. The operation involved 23 SEALs, supported by Army aviators piloting stealth helicopters, an interpreter, and a combat dog, resulting in bin Laden's death without U.S. casualties and the recovery of intelligence materials that informed subsequent efforts. In unconventional warfare, Army Special Forces (Green Berets) from the 5th Special Forces Group achieved rapid territorial gains in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom, deploying as Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) 595 on October 19, 2001, to link with Northern Alliance commanders and conduct foreign internal defense against Taliban forces. ODA 595, operating partly on horseback, coordinated precision airstrikes and advised anti-Taliban militias, contributing to the capture of Mazar-i-Sharif and the swift collapse of Taliban control in northern Afghanistan within weeks, enabling the installation of Hamid Karzai as interim leader. Task Force Dagger, comprising these Green Beret teams, integrated with indigenous forces to dismantle al-Qaeda sanctuaries and facilitate the Taliban's ouster from power by December 2001. SOCOM elements also delivered tactical counterterrorism successes in the against Group affiliates of , through joint operations like that trained and advised Philippine forces, leading to the neutralization of key leaders and reduction of terrorist safe havens in the southern islands by the mid-2000s. These efforts, emphasizing principles such as building partner capacity, prevented the archipelago from becoming a major hub and informed USSOCOM's global SOF network for disrupting violent extremist organizations. In and under , Army Special Operations Forces conducted advisory missions and raids that supported partner forces in reclaiming over 100,000 square kilometers from ISIS by 2019, including high-value target captures that degraded the caliphate's operational tempo.

Empirical Metrics and Strategic Impacts

U.S. Special Operations Forces under USSOCOM have demonstrated high operational tempo in , conducting thousands of raids during the Global War on Terror. In , the frequency of such raids nearly tripled between 2009 and 2011, peaking at up to 40 per night during intensive periods, targeting insurgent networks and high-value individuals. By 2016, SOF executed around 350 raids specifically against and operatives, contributing to the capture or elimination of mid- and senior-level leaders. In , elements, such as , performed over 600 operations against targets in the latter half of 2003 alone, focusing on regime remnants and emerging insurgent figures. These tactical actions yielded measurable disruptions to adversary , with SOF accounting for a disproportionate share of neutralizations relative to their force size—approximately 7,000 personnel in at peak deployment. Notable outcomes include the 2011 raid by that killed , severing al Qaeda's symbolic leadership and enabling follow-on intelligence gains from seized materials. operations in from 2003 onward similarly degraded networks like al Qaeda in , with task forces capturing or killing figures whose removal correlated with temporary reductions in attack frequencies, as assessed through post-operation intelligence. Strategically, SOF contributions extended beyond kinetics to building partner capacity, training indigenous forces that conducted independent counter-ISIS operations by 2023, such as five unassisted strikes against ISIS remnants. This advisory role facilitated the territorial defeat of ISIS by 2019, with SOF enabling Iraqi and Syrian partners to reclaim key cities like through combined tactics. In 2023, USSOCOM supported dozens of transnational criminal and investigations worldwide, underscoring sustained global impact amid great power competition. However, comprehensive empirical evaluation remains constrained by classified data and methodological gaps; reports from the Government Accountability Office highlight unclear performance linkages to broader objectives, while RAND analyses advocate for integrated operational-intelligence metrics to better quantify long-term effects like network resilience or displacement of threats. Despite tactical efficacy, causal attribution to enduring strategic victories—such as reduced global incidence—is debated, with evidence indicating persistent ideological and operational adaptations by adversaries.

Controversies and Criticisms

Ethical Lapses and Internal Reviews

A series of high-profile incidents within U.S. forces, including allegations of drug trafficking by Army Special Forces soldiers returning from in 2018 and widespread reports of drug use, violence, and among SEAL units, prompted internal scrutiny at USSOCOM. These events, spanning both deployed and environments, raised concerns about ethical standards and unit discipline across the command. In August 2019, USSOCOM Commander General Richard D. Clarke directed a comprehensive enterprise-wide review of special operations culture and ethics, building on a prior 2018 assessment mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act. The resulting January 2020 USSOCOM Comprehensive Ethics Review Report examined trends in misconduct, from minor uniform code violations to serious crimes, attributing vulnerabilities not to systemic ethical failures but to cultural biases prioritizing mission accomplishment over leadership accountability, exacerbated by sustained high operational tempo and routine unit disaggregation. The report highlighted how disaggregation normalized fragmented force structures, eroding oversight and fostering conditions for lapses, while an overemphasis on deployments undermined discipline. It also identified an unhealthy sense of entitlement emerging in selection and training pipelines, contributing to professionalism gaps. Recommendations focused on structural reforms, including independent audits of deployment requirements, codification of force generation cycles to enforce presence, enhanced junior officer development courses, and creation of a three-star-led implementation team to monitor progress. Subsequent evaluations, such as a Department of Defense review of SOF programs, reinforced the need for rigorous mechanisms, noting that some personnel exhibited disordered leading to serious violations. By March 2023, USSOCOM committed to eradicating persistent "corrosive" through sustained emphasis on ethical training and oversight, amid ongoing challenges like a 2023 probe into over a dozen soldiers for drug trafficking. These reviews underscored shortcomings as a primary enabler of ethical drift, without evidence of inherent doctrinal flaws.

Overuse, Sustainability, and Force Structure Debates

Since the inception of the Global War on Terror in 2001, U.S. Forces (SOF) under USSOCOM have maintained elevated deployment rates, with many units cycling through six-month deployments followed by six-month dwell periods, contributing to perceptions of overuse. This operational tempo, which quadrupled post-9/11 alongside a tripling of budgets and doubling of force size to approximately 58,000 active duty, , and reserve personnel by 2022, has strained personnel readiness and family stability. Congressional hearings and Department of Defense analyses have highlighted risks of burnout, with SOF operators facing higher incidences of and attrition compared to conventional forces, though empirical metrics on exact rates vary due to classification. Sustainability concerns intensified as SOF absorbed missions beyond core , including stability operations and raids, leading to over-reliance by conventional commanders and policymakers. A 2023 National Defense University assessment argued that while high optempo contributed to internal issues like ethical lapses, deeper cultural factors—such as mission obsession and resistance to oversight—exacerbated long-term viability, independent of deployment cycles. Recruiting challenges emerged, with high optempo deterring potential candidates amid competition from civilian sectors, prompting USSOCOM to report difficulties maintaining end strength despite incentives. By 2025, officials described the workload as "difficult but manageable" following adjustments like reduced presence in , yet persistent global commitments in and partner training sustained pressures on force regeneration. Force structure debates have centered on whether USSOCOM's expanded posture aligns with strategic pivots toward great power competition against and , where peer adversaries demand conventional capabilities over SOF-centric . Proponents of contraction argue for reallocating resources to conventional forces, citing SOF's outsized growth—e.g., now exceeding some nations' total air forces in scale—and questioning sustainability in a non-permissive environment less suited to small-team insertions. Counterarguments emphasize SOF's adaptability for hybrid threats, gray-zone operations, and building partner capacity, warning that reductions could undermine U.S. influence in regions like the without viable alternatives. As of 2023, no major drawdowns have occurred, but ongoing reviews by and continue to weigh these trade-offs against empirical evidence of SOF's comparative effectiveness in low-intensity conflicts. The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has encountered political resistance in over proposed force structure reductions, particularly as the Department of Defense shifts emphasis from to great power competition with adversaries like and . In April 2025, bipartisan lawmakers expressed alarm during hearings that cuts to forces could undermine mission readiness, with members vowing to increase funding to counteract Army-led downsizing plans. These debates reflect broader tensions between maintaining USSOCOM's post-9/11 expansion—now numbering over 70,000 personnel—and reallocating resources for conventional forces, amid concerns that rapid growth has strained recruitment and retention. Congressional oversight mechanisms, designed to balance USSOCOM's statutory independence under the 1986 Nunn-Cohen Amendment with accountability, have drawn criticism for gaps in civilian control and transparency. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)), tasked with overseeing USSOCOM since 1986, has faced staffing shortfalls that hinder effective monitoring of global activities, as noted in a 2024 Government Accountability Office (GAO) assessment. Internal Department of Defense studies have highlighted struggles over command authority, with debates on whether USSOCOM's unique chain of command—bypassing traditional service secretaries—requires stronger civilian oversight to prevent autonomy from eroding interagency coordination. GAO reports have also identified deficiencies in USSOCOM's oversight of command-and-control structures and high-risk training, recommending enhanced standardization to mitigate accidents and ensure fiscal accountability. Legally, USSOCOM operations have tested the boundaries of existing authorizations, particularly the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which underpins deployments in over 80 countries but faces scrutiny for its expansive interpretation absent new congressional approval. The of 1973 mandates presidential notification to within 48 hours of introducing forces into hostilities and limits engagements to 60 days without authorization, yet successive administrations have notified under its provisions for raids and advisory missions, prompting debates on whether such actions constitute "hostilities" requiring stricter compliance. Special authorities like 10 U.S.C. § 127e, allowing USSOCOM to allocate up to $100 million annually for training foreign forces with limited reporting, have raised concerns over accountability in support, especially in regions without declared conflict. Additionally, the command's clandestine operations pose unique challenges under the law of armed conflict, including real-time legal advising for small-team missions where and targeting decisions must navigate ambiguous theaters of war. has considered reforms to these authorities, including enhanced reporting on global synchronization of anti-terrorism planning assigned to USSOCOM in the 2004 Unified Command Plan, to address potential overreach.

Strategic Evolution and Future Orientation

Global Presence and Interagency Partnerships

USSOCOM sustains a forward-leaning global presence by assigning special operations forces (SOF) to the six U.S. geographic combatant commands through dedicated Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs), enabling persistent engagement across theaters. These include under U.S. Central Command for and operations; under U.S. European Command for European security; under U.S. Indo-Pacific Command for activities; Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH) under U.S. Southern Command for ; Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA) under U.S. Africa Command for counterterrorism and partner capacity building; and coordination with U.S. Northern Command for homeland defense missions. This structure supports rotational and persistent deployments, with SOF conducting training, advising, and reconnaissance in dozens of countries to deter adversaries and enhance allied capabilities against irregular threats like and great power competition proxies. Operational examples underscore this dispersed footprint. In fiscal year 2024, USSOCOM supported exercises such as Tempest Wind in the Central Command , involving multinational SOF for maritime and ; training in under SOCAFRICA; and medical exchanges in to bolster regional health security partnerships. In the , SOCPAC facilitated agreements like the expanded U.S.-Fiji status of forces pact in early 2025, enabling increased troop rotations and for rapid response. European engagements included SOCEUR-led training with Cypriot and Romanian partners in 2024, while SOCSOUTH hosted Southern Star 2025 in , integrating U.S. SOF with hemispheric allies for scenarios. Recent deployments, including special operations units alongside naval and air assets in 2025, demonstrate agile positioning to address migration, narcotics, and instability without large conventional footprints. Interagency partnerships amplify USSOCOM's reach by integrating SOF with civilian expertise in , , and . Collaboration with the Department of State occurs through security cooperation programs like the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, where SOF provide and advisory support to host nations alongside State Department and USAID efforts to counter extremism in . USSOCOM also coordinates with the (CIA) on joint task forces for intelligence-driven operations, drawing on evolved post-Desert Storm protocols that emphasize complementary roles in , capture-kill missions, and covert support to reduce operational friction. Broader ties extend to the Departments of Justice and Treasury for disrupting terrorist financing networks, as highlighted in 2023 congressional testimony, ensuring SOF activities align with legal and economic pressure campaigns. These relationships prioritize empirical outcomes in partner nation self-sufficiency, though they require ongoing synchronization to mitigate overlaps in authority and risk.

Recent Reforms and Doctrinal Shifts

Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) initiated a doctrinal pivot from a post-9/11 emphasis on counterterrorism to prioritizing great power competition with adversaries such as China and Russia, viewing this as a return to special operations forces' (SOF) foundational role in irregular warfare and strategic deterrence. This realignment supports the 2022 National Defense Strategy by integrating SOF into multi-domain operations across competition, crisis, and conflict phases, with approximately 40% of USSOCOM resources redirected toward these priorities by 2021 and ongoing adjustments to enhance joint force access, influence, and resilience against peer threats. USSOCOM Commander General Bryan Fenton described this era as a "renaissance" for SOF, noting a 30% year-over-year increase in demand and projections for mission volumes to triple within the decade, driven by converging adversary alliances and the need for persistent engagements in over 80 countries. Key reforms include the Campaign Plan for Global (CP-GSO), which structures efforts around three lines: strategic competition to counter statecraft through partnerships, crisis response for deterrence, and sustained . Doctrinal updates emphasize modernization with , cyber, , and autonomous systems, including the formation of a special operations component under USSOCOM in June 2025 to bolster all-domain capabilities from seabed to orbit. In May 2025, acting of Defense for Colby Jenkins announced an overhaul of SOF to foster resilient, adaptable multi-domain teams focused on speed, smaller-scale operations, and Indo-Pacific alignment, while preserving core physical standards amid global force posture reviews. Army Special Operations Forces doctrine, codified in Field Manual 3-05 updated June 2025, further operationalizes these shifts by prioritizing to prevent escalation into high-end conflict, introducing the SOF-Space-Cyber Triad for enhanced command, control, communications, computers, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (C5ISRT) in denied areas, and stressing transgenerational partnerships for whole-of-society effects. These changes address prior over-reliance on land-centric by expanding to maritime and deep-strike missions, with empirical focus on measurable outcomes like partner resilience and adversary deterrence rather than kinetic metrics alone.

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