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Cheka
View on Wikipedia| Всероссийская чрезвычайная комиссия (Russian) | |
| Agency overview | |
|---|---|
| Formed | December 20, 1917 |
| Dissolved | February 6, 1922 |
| Superseding agency | |
| Type | Secret police Intelligence agency |
| Headquarters |
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| Agency executives |
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| Parent agency | Council of People's Commissars |
The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (Russian: Всероссийская чрезвычайная комиссия, romanized: Vserossiyskaya chrezvychaynaya komissiya, IPA: [fsʲɪrɐˈsʲijskəjə tɕrʲɪzvɨˈtɕæjnəjə kɐˈmʲisʲɪjə]), abbreviated as VChK (Russian: ВЧК, IPA: [vɛ tɕe ˈka]), and commonly known as the Cheka (Russian: ЧК, IPA: [tɕɪˈka]), was the first Soviet secret police organization. It was established on 20 December [O.S. 7 December] 1917 by the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian SFSR,[1] and was led by Felix Dzerzhinsky.[2][3] By the end of the Russian Civil War in 1922, the Cheka had at least 200,000 personnel.
Ostensibly created to protect the October Revolution from "class enemies" such as the bourgeoisie and members of the clergy, the Cheka soon became a tool of repression wielded against all political opponents of the Bolshevik regime. The organization had responsibility for counterintelligence, oversight of the loyalty of the Red Army, and protection of the country's borders, as well as the collection of human and technical intelligence. At the direction of Vladimir Lenin, the Cheka performed mass arrests, imprisonments, torture, and executions without trial in what came to be known as the "Red Terror". It policed the Gulag system of labor camps, conducted requisitions of food, and put down rebellions by workers and peasants. The Cheka was responsible for executing at least 50,000 to as many as 200,000 people, though estimates vary widely.
The Cheka, the first in a long succession of Soviet secret police agencies, established the security service as a major player in Soviet politics. It was dissolved in February 1922, and succeeded by the State Political Directorate (GPU). Throughout the Soviet era, members of the secret police were referred to as "Chekists".
Name
[edit]The official designation was All-Russian Extraordinary (or Emergency) Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage under the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR (Russian: Всероссийская чрезвычайная комиссия по борьбе с контрреволюцией и саботажем при Совете народных комиссаров РСФСР, Vserossiyskaya chrezvychaynaya komissiya po borbe s kontrrevolyutsiyey i sabotazhem pri Sovete narodnykh komisarov RSFSR).[4]
In 1918, its name was changed, becoming All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Profiteering and Corruption.
A member of Cheka was called a chekist (Russian: чеки́ст, romanized: chekíst, IPA: [t͡ɕɪˈkʲist] ⓘ). Also, the term chekist often referred to Soviet secret police throughout the Soviet period, despite official name changes over time. In The Gulag Archipelago, Alexander Solzhenitsyn recalls that zeks in the labor camps used old chekist as a mark of special esteem for particularly experienced camp administrators.[5] The term is still found in use in Russia today (for example, President Vladimir Putin has been referred to in the Russian media as a chekist due to his career in the KGB and as head of the KGB's successor, FSB[6]).
The Chekists commonly dressed in black leather, including long flowing coats, reportedly after being issued such distinctive coats early in their existence.[7][8] Western communists adopted this clothing fashion. The Chekists also often carried with them Greek-style worry beads made of amber, which had become "fashionable among high officials during the time of the 'cleansing'".[9]
History
[edit]| Chronology of Soviet security agencies | ||||||||||||||||
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In 1921, the Troops for the Internal Defense of the Republic (a branch of the Cheka) numbered at least 200,000.[10] These troops policed labor camps, ran the Gulag system, conducted requisitions of food, and subjected political opponents to secret arrest, detention, torture and summary execution. They also put down rebellions and riots by workers[11] or peasants, and mutinies in the desertion-plagued Red Army.[12]
After 1922, Cheka groups underwent the first of a series of reorganizations; however the theme of a government dominated by "the organs" persisted indefinitely afterward, and Soviet citizens continued to refer to members of the various organs as Chekists.[13]
The Cheka was largely controlled by people who came from well off backgrounds and from a diverse set of ethnicities. Eleven of the top twenty ranking Chekists were of the bourgeoisie or bourgeoisie-intelligentsia, one came from a family of wealthy landowners, two came from families of the industrial proletariat, only three were peasants, and three have unknown backgrounds. Six of the twenty were ethnic Russians, three were Polish Jews, three were Latvians, two were ethnic Poles, one was Ukrainian, one was an Azerbaijani Jew, one was Georgian, one was Armenian, one was a Russified Greek, and one was a Lithuanian Jew.[14]
Creation
[edit]
In the first month and a half after the October Revolution (1917), the duty of "extinguishing the resistance of exploiters" was assigned to the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee (or PVRK). It represented a temporary body working under directives of the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom) and Central Committee of RDSRP(b). The VRK created new bodies of government,[clarification needed] organized food delivery to cities and the Army, requisitioned products from bourgeoisie, and sent its emissaries and agitators into provinces. One of its most important functions was the security of revolutionary order, and the fight against counterrevolutionary activity (see: Anti-Soviet agitation).
On December 1, 1917, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK or TsIK)[15] reviewed a proposed reorganization of the VRK, and possible replacement of it. On December 5, the Petrograd VRK published an announcement of dissolution and transferred its functions to the department of TsIK for the fight against "counterrevolutionaries".[16] On December 6, the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom) strategized how to persuade government workers to strike against counter-revolution across Russia. They decided that a special commission was needed to implement the "most energetically revolutionary" measures. Felix Dzerzhinsky (the Iron Felix) was appointed as Director and invited the participation of the following individuals: V. K. Averin, I. K. Ksenofontov, S. K. Ordzhonikidze, Ya. Kh. Peters, K. A. Peterson, V. A. Trifonov, I. S. Unshlikht, V. N. Vasilevsky, V. N. Yakovleva, V. V. Yakovlev, D. G. Yevseyev, N. A. Zhydelev.
On December 7, 1917, all of those invited except Zhydelev and Vasilevsky gathered in the Smolny Institute with Dzerzhinsky to discuss the competence and structure of the commission to combat counterrevolution and sabotage. The obligations of the commission were: "to liquidate to the root all of the counterrevolutionary and sabotage activities and all attempts to them in all of Russia, to hand over counter-revolutionaries and saboteurs to the revolutionary tribunals, develop measures to combat them and relentlessly apply them in real-world applications. The commission should only conduct a preliminary investigation".[clarification needed] The commission should also observe the press and counterrevolutionary parties, sabotaging officials and other criminals.

Three sections were created: informational, organizational, and a unit to combat counter-revolution and sabotage. Upon the end of the meeting, Dzerzhinsky reported to the Sovnarkom with the requested information. The commission was allowed to apply such measures of repression as 'confiscation, deprivation of ration cards, publication of lists of enemies of the people etc.'".[16] That day, Sovnarkom officially confirmed the creation of VCheKa. The commission was created not under the VTsIK as was previously anticipated, but rather under the Council of the People's Commissars.[17]
On December 8, 1917, some of the original members of the Cheka were replaced. Averin, Ordzhonikidze, and Trifonov were replaced by V. V. Fomin, S. E. Shchukin, Ilyin, and Chernov.[17] On the meeting of December 8, the presidium of VChK was elected of five members, and chaired by Dzerzhinsky. The issues of "speculation" or profiteering, such as by black market grain sellers[18] and "corruption" was raised at the same meeting,[19] which was assigned to Peters to address and report with results to one of the next meetings of the commission. A circular, published on December 28 [O.S. December 15] 1917, gave the address of VCheka's first headquarters as "Petrograd, Gorokhovaya 2, 4th floor".[17] On December 11, Fomin was ordered to organize a section to suppress "speculation." And in the same day, VCheKa offered Shchukin to conduct arrests of counterfeiters.
In January 1918, a subsection of the anti-counterrevolutionary effort was created to police bank officials. The structure of VCheKa was changing repeatedly. By March 1918, when the organization came to Moscow, it contained the following sections: against counterrevolution, speculation, non-residents, and information gathering. By the end of 1918–1919, some new units were created: secretly operative, investigatory, of transportation, military (special), operative, and instructional. By 1921, it changed once again, forming the following sections: directory of affairs, administrative-organizational, secretly operative, economical, and foreign affairs.
First months
[edit]In the first months of its existence, VCheKa consisted of only 40 officials. It commanded a team of soldiers, the Sveaborgesky regiment, as well as a group of Red Guardsmen. On January 14, 1918, Sovnarkom ordered Dzerzhinsky to organize teams of "energetic and ideological" sailors to combat speculation. By the spring of 1918, the commission had several teams: in addition to the Sveaborge team, it had an intelligence team, a team of sailors, and a strike team. Through the winter of 1917–1918, all activities of VCheKa were centralized mainly in the city of Petrograd. It was one of several other commissions in the country which fought against counterrevolution, speculation, banditry, and other activities perceived as crimes. Other organizations included: the Bureau of Military Commissars, and an Army-Navy investigatory commission to attack the counterrevolutionary element in the Red Army, plus the Central Requisite and Unloading Commission to fight speculation. The investigation of counterrevolutionary or major criminal offenses was conducted by the Investigatory Commission of Revtribunal. The functions of VCheKa were closely intertwined with the Commission of V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, which beside the fight against wine pogroms was engaged in the investigation of most major political offenses (see: Bonch-Bruyevich Commission).

All results of its activities, VCheKa had either to transfer to the Investigatory Commission of Revtribunal, or to dismiss. The control of the commission's activity was provided by the People's Commissariat for Justice (Narkomjust, at that time headed by Isaac Steinberg) and Internal Affairs (at that time headed by Grigory Petrovsky). Although the VCheKa was officially an independent organization from Internal Affairs, its chief members such as Dzerzhinsky, Latsis, Unszlicht, and Uritsky (all main chekists), since November 1917 composed the collegiate of Internal Affairs headed by Petrovsky. In November 1918, Petrovsky was appointed as head of the All-Ukrainian Central Military Revolutionary Committee during VCheKa's expansion to provinces and front-lines. At the time of political competition between Bolsheviks and SRs (January 1918), Left SRs attempted to curb the rights of VCheKa and establish through the Narkomiust their control over its work. Having failed in attempts to subordinate the VCheKa to Narkomiust, the Left SRs tried to gain control of the Extraordinary Commission in a different way: they requested that the Central Committee of the party be granted the right to directly enter their representatives into the VCheKa. Sovnarkom recognized the desirability of including five representatives of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary faction of VTsIK. Left SRs were granted the post of a companion (deputy) chairman of VCheKa. However, Sovnarkom, in which the majority belonged to the representatives of RSDLP(b) retained the right to approve members of the collegium of the VCheKa.
Originally, members of the Cheka were exclusively Bolshevik; however, in January 1918, Left SRs also joined the organization.[20] The Left SRs were expelled or arrested later in 1918, following the attempted assassination of Lenin by an SR, Fanni Kaplan.
Consolidation of VCheKa and National Establishment
[edit]By the end of January 1918, the Investigatory Commission of Petrograd Soviet (probably same as of Revtribunal) petitioned Sovnarkom to delineate the role of detection and judicial-investigatory organs. It offered to leave, for the VCheKa and the Commission of Bonch-Bruyevich, only the functions of detection and suppression, while investigative functions entirely transferred to it. The Investigatory Commission prevailed. On January 31, 1918, Sovnarkom ordered to relieve VCheKa of the investigative functions, leaving for the commission only the functions of detection, suppression, and prevention of anti revolutionary crimes. At the meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on January 31, 1918, a merger of VCheKa and the Commission of Bonch-Bruyevich was proposed. The existence of both commissions, VCheKa of Sovnarkom and the Commission of Bonch-Bruyevich of VTsIK, with almost the same functions and equal rights, became impractical. A decision followed two weeks later.[21]
On February 23, 1918, VCheKa sent a radio telegram to all Soviets with a petition to immediately organize emergency commissions to combat counter-revolution, sabotage and speculation, if such commissions had not been yet organized. February 1918 saw the creation of local Extraordinary Commissions. One of the first founded was the Moscow Cheka. Sections and commissariats to combat counterrevolution were established in other cities. The Extraordinary Commissions arose, usually in the areas during the moments of the greatest aggravation of political situation. On February 25, 1918, as the counterrevolutionary organization Union of Front-liners was making advances, the executive committee of the Saratov Soviet formed a counter-revolutionary section. On March 7, 1918, because of the move from Petrograd to Moscow, the Petrograd Cheka was created. On March 9, a section for combating counterrevolution was created under the Omsk Soviet. Extraordinary commissions were also created in Penza, Perm, Novgorod, Cherepovets, Rostov, Taganrog. On March 18, VCheKa adopted a resolution, The Work of VCheKa on the All-Russian Scale, foreseeing the formation everywhere of Extraordinary Commissions after the same model, and sent a letter that called for the widespread establishment of the Cheka in combating counterrevolution, speculation, and sabotage. Establishment of provincial Extraordinary Commissions was largely completed by August 1918. In the Soviet Republic, there were 38 gubernatorial Chekas (Gubcheks) by this time.
On June 12, 1918, the All-Russian Conference of Cheka adopted the Basic Provisions on the Organization of Extraordinary Commissions. They set out to form Extraordinary Commissions not only at Oblast and Guberniya levels, but also at the large Uyezd Soviets. In August 1918, in the Soviet Republic had accounted for some 75 Uyezd-level Extraordinary Commissions. By the end of the year, 365 Uyezd-level Chekas were established.

In 1918, the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission and the Soviets managed to establish a local Cheka apparatus. It included Oblast, Guberniya, Raion, Uyezd, and Volost Chekas, with Raion and Volost Extraordinary Commissioners. In addition, border security Chekas were included in the system of local Cheka bodies.
In the autumn of 1918, as consolidation of the political situation of the republic continued, a move toward elimination of Uyezd-, Raion-, and Volost-level Chekas, as well as the institution of Extraordinary Commissions was considered. On January 20, 1919, VTsIK adopted a resolution prepared by VCheKa, On the abolition of Uyezd Extraordinary Commissions. On January 16 the presidium of VCheKa approved the draft on the establishment of the Politburo at Uyezd militsiya. This decision was approved by the Conference of the Extraordinary Commission IV, held in early February 1920.
Other types of Cheka
[edit]
On August 3, a VCheKa section for combating counterrevolution, speculation and sabotage on railways was created. On August 7, 1918, Sovnarkom adopted a decree on the organization of the railway section at VCheKa. Combating counterrevolution, speculation, and crimes on railroads was passed under the jurisdiction of the railway section of VCheKa and local Cheka. In August 1918, railway sections were formed under the Gubcheks. Formally, they were part of the non-resident sections, but in fact constituted a separate division, largely autonomous in their activities. The gubernatorial and oblast-type Chekas retained in relation to the transportation sections only control and investigative functions.
The beginning of a systematic work of organs of VCheKa in RKKA refers to July 1918, the period of extreme tension of the civil war and class struggle in the country. On July 16, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars formed the Extraordinary Commission for combating counterrevolution at the Czechoslovak (Eastern) Front, led by M. I. Latsis. In the fall of 1918, Extraordinary Commissions to combat counterrevolution on the Southern (Ukraine) Front were formed. In late November, the Second All-Russian Conference of the Extraordinary Commissions accepted a decision after a report from I. N. Polukarov to establish at all frontlines, and army sections of the Cheka and granted them the right to appoint their commissioners in military units. On December 9, 1918, the collegiate (or presidium) of VCheKa had decided to form a military section, headed by M. S. Kedrov, to combat counterrevolution in the Army. In early 1919, the military control and the military section of VCheKa were merged into one body, the Special Section of the Republic, with Kedrov as head. On January 1, he issued an order to establish the Special Section. The order instructed agencies everywhere to unite the Military control and the military sections of Chekas and to form special sections of frontlines, armies, military districts, and guberniyas.
In November 1920, the Soviet of Labor and Defense created a Special Section of VCheKa for the security of the state border. On February 6, 1922, after the Ninth All-Russian Soviet Congress, the Cheka was dissolved by VTsIK, "with expressions of gratitude for heroic work." It was replaced by the State Political Administration (GPU), a section of Internal Affairs of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Dzerzhinsky remained as chief of the GPU.
Operations
[edit]Suppression of political opposition
[edit]

As its name implied, the Extraordinary Commission had virtually unlimited powers and could interpret them in any way it wished. No standard procedures were ever set up, except that the commission was supposed to send the arrested to the Military-Revolutionary tribunals if outside of a war zone. This left an opportunity for a wide range of interpretations, as the whole country was in total chaos. At the direction of Lenin, the Cheka performed mass arrests, imprisonments, and executions of "enemies of the people". In this, the Cheka said that they targeted "class enemies" such as the bourgeoisie, and members of the clergy.
Within a month, the Cheka had extended its repression to all political opponents of the communist government, including anarchists and others on the left. On April 11/12, 1918, some 26 anarchist political centres in Moscow were attacked. Forty anarchists were killed by Cheka forces, and about 500 were arrested and jailed after a pitched battle took place between the two groups.[22] In response to the anarchists' resistance, the Cheka orchestrated a massive retaliatory campaign of repression, executions, and arrests against all opponents of the Bolshevik government, in what came to be known as "Red Terror". The Red Terror, implemented by Dzerzhinsky on September 5, 1918, was vividly described by the Red Army journal Krasnaya Gazeta:
Without mercy, without sparing, we will kill our enemies in scores of hundreds. Let them be thousands, let them drown themselves in their own blood. For the blood of Lenin and Uritsky … let there be floods of blood of the bourgeoisie – more blood, as much as possible..."[23]
An early Bolshevik, Victor Serge described in his book Memoirs of a Revolutionary:
Since the first massacres of Red prisoners by the Whites, the murders of Volodarsky and Uritsky and the attempt against Lenin (in the summer of 1918), the custom of arresting and, often, executing hostages had become generalized and legal. Already the Cheka, which made mass arrests of suspects, was tending to settle their fate independently, under formal control of the Party, but in reality without anybody's knowledge. The Party endeavoured to head it with incorruptible men like the former convict Dzerzhinsky, a sincere idealist, ruthless but chivalrous, with the emaciated profile of an Inquisitor: tall forehead, bony nose, untidy goatee, and an expression of weariness and austerity. But the Party had few men of this stamp and many Chekas. I believe that the formation of the Chekas was one of the gravest and most impermissible errors that the Bolshevik leaders committed in 1918 when plots, blockades, and interventions made them lose their heads. All evidence indicates that revolutionary tribunals, functioning in the light of day and admitting the right of defense, would have attained the same efficiency with far less abuse and depravity. Was it necessary to revert to the procedures of the Inquisition?"
The Cheka was also used against Nestor Makhno's Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine. After the Insurgent Army had served its purpose in aiding the Red Army to stop the Whites under Denikin, the Soviet communist government decided to eliminate the anarchist forces. In May 1919, two Cheka agents sent to assassinate Makhno were caught and executed.[24]

Many victims of Cheka repression were "bourgeois hostages" rounded up and held in readiness for summary execution in reprisal for any alleged counter-revolutionary act. Wholesale, indiscriminate arrests became an integral part of the system.[25] The Cheka used trucks disguised as delivery trucks, called "Black Marias", for the secret arrest and transport of prisoners.[26]
It was during the Red Terror that the Cheka, hoping to avoid the bloody aftermath of having half-dead victims writhing on the floor, developed a technique for execution known later by the German words "Nackenschuss" or "Genickschuss", a shot to the nape of the neck, which caused minimal blood loss and instant death. The victim's head was bent forward, and the executioner fired slightly downward at point-blank range. This had become the standard method used later by the NKVD to liquidate Joseph Stalin's purge victims and others.[27]
Persecution of deserters
[edit]It is believed that there were more than three million deserters from the Red Army in 1919 and 1920.[28] Officially there was about 2,630,000 registered deserters by the Central Committee for Struggle Against Desertion.[29] Approximately 500,000 deserters were arrested in 1919 and close to 800,000 in 1920, by troops of the 'Special Punitive Department' of the Cheka, created to punish desertions.[30][31] These troops were used to forcibly repatriate deserters, taking and shooting hostages to force compliance or to set an example.
In September 1918, according to The Black Book of Communism, in only twelve provinces of Russia, 48,735 deserters and 7,325 "bandits" were arrested, 1,826 were killed and 2,230 were executed. The exact identity of these individuals is confused by the fact that the Soviet Bolshevik government used the term 'bandit' to cover ordinary criminals as well as armed and unarmed political opponents, such as the anarchists.
Repression
[edit]| Mass repression in the Soviet Union |
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| Economic repression |
| Political repression |
| Ideological repression |
| Ethnic repression |
Number of victims
[edit]Estimates on Cheka executions vary widely. The lowest figures (disputed below) are provided by Dzerzhinsky's lieutenant Martyn Latsis, limited to RSFSR over the period 1918–1920:
- For the period 1918 – July 1919, covering only twenty provinces of central Russia:
- In 1918: 6,300; in 1919 (up to July): 2,089; Total: 8,389
- For the whole period 1918–19:
- In 1918: 6,185; in 1919: 3,456; Total: 9,641
- For the whole period 1918–20:
- In January–June 1918: 22; in July–December 1918: more than 6,000; in 1918–20: 12,733.
Experts generally agree these semi-official figures are vastly understated.[32] Pioneering historian of the Red Terror Sergei Melgunov claims that this was done deliberately in an attempt to demonstrate the government's humanity. For example, he refutes the claim made by Latsis that only 22 executions were carried out in the first six months of the Cheka's existence by providing evidence that the true number was 884 executions.[33] W. H. Chamberlin claims, "It is simply impossible to believe that the Cheka only put to death 12,733 people in all of Russia up to the end of the civil war."[34] Donald Rayfield concurs, noting that, "Plausible evidence reveals that the actual numbers … vastly exceeded the official figures."[35] Chamberlin provides the "reasonable and probably moderate" estimate of 50,000,[34] while others provide estimates ranging up to 500,000.[36][37] Several scholars put the number of executions at about 250,000.[38][39] Some believe it is possible more people were murdered by the Cheka than died in battle.[40] Historian James Ryan gives a modest estimate of 28,000 executions per year from December 1917 to February 1922.[41]
Lenin himself seemed unfazed by the killings. On 12 January 1920, while addressing trade union leaders, he said: "We did not hesitate to shoot thousands of people, and we shall not hesitate, and we shall save the country."[42] On 14 May 1921, the Politburo, chaired by Lenin, passed a motion "broadening the rights of the [Cheka] in relation to the use of the [death penalty]."[43]
Scholarly estimates
[edit]There is no consensus among the Western historians on the number of deaths from the Red Terror. One source gives estimates of 28,000 executions per year from December 1917 to February 1922.[44] Estimates for the number of people shot during the initial period of the Red Terror are at least 10,000.[45] Estimates for the whole period go for a low of 50,000[46] to highs of 140,000[46][47] and 200,000 executed.[48] Most estimations for the number of executions in total put the number at about 100,000.[49]
According to Vadim Erlikhman's investigation, the number of the Red Terror's victims is at least 1,200,000 people.[50] According to Robert Conquest, a total of 140,000 people were shot in 1917–1922.[51] Candidate of Historical Sciences Nikolay Zayats states that the number of people shot by the Cheka in 1918–1922 is about 37,300 people, shot in 1918–1921 by the verdicts of the tribunals – 14,200, i.e. about 50,000–55,000 people in total, although executions and atrocities were not limited to the Cheka, having been organized by the Red Army as well.[52]
According to anti-Bolshevik Socialist Revolutionary Sergei Melgunov (1879–1956), at the end of 1919, the Special Investigation Commission to investigate the atrocities of the Bolsheviks estimated the number of deaths at 1,766,188 people in 1918–1919 only.[53]
Atrocities
[edit]The Cheka engaged in the widespread practice of torture. Depending on Cheka committees in various cities, the methods included: being skinned alive, scalped, "crowned" with barbed wire, impaled, crucified, hanged, stoned to death, tied to planks and pushed slowly into furnaces or tanks of boiling water, or rolled around naked in internally nail-studded barrels. Chekists reportedly poured water on naked prisoners in the winter-bound streets until they became living ice statues. Others beheaded their victims by twisting their necks until their heads could be torn off. The Cheka detachments stationed in Kiev would attach an iron tube to the torso of a bound victim and insert a rat in the tube closed off with wire netting, while the tube was held over a flame until the rat began gnawing through the victim's guts in an effort to escape.[54][55]
Women and children were also victims of Cheka terror. Rape of women by Cheka guards and interrogators was commonplace, superiors would only put a stop to it if the rape became too brutal.[56] Many of the women were shot after they were raped. Children between the ages of 8 and 16 were imprisoned and occasionally executed.[55]
All of these atrocities were published on numerous occasions in Pravda and Izvestiya: January 26, 1919 Izvestiya #18 article Is it really a medieval imprisonment? («Неужели средневековый застенок?»); February 22, 1919 Pravda #12 publishes details of the Vladimir Cheka's tortures, September 21, 1922 Socialist Herald publishes details of series of tortures conducted by the Stavropol Cheka (hot basement, cold basement, skull measuring, etc.).[57]
The Chekists were also supplemented by the militarized Units of Special Purpose (the Party's Spetsnaz or ЧОН).
Cheka was actively and openly utilizing kidnapping methods.[58][59] With kidnapping methods, Cheka was able to extinguish numerous cases of discontent especially among the rural population. Among the notorious ones was the Tambov rebellion.
Villages were bombarded to complete annihilation, as in the case of Tretyaki, Novokhopersk uyezd, Voronezh Governorate. [citation needed]
As a result of this relentless violence, more than a few Chekists ended up with psychopathic disorders, which Nikolai Bukharin said were "an occupational hazard of the Chekist profession." Many hardened themselves to the executions by heavy drinking and drug use. Some developed a gangster-like slang for the verb to kill in an attempt to distance themselves from the killings, such as 'shooting partridges', or 'sealing' a victim, or giving him a natsokal (onomatopoeia of the trigger action).[60]
On November 30, 1992, by the initiative of the President of the Russian Federation the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation recognized the Red Terror as unlawful, which in turn led to the suspension of Communist Party of the RSFSR.
Regional Chekas
[edit]This section needs additional citations for verification. (December 2010) |
Cheka departments were organized not only in big cities and guberniya seats, but also in each uyezd, at any front-lines and military formations. Nothing is known on what resources they were created.
- Moscow Cheka (1918–1922)
- Chairman – Felix Dzerzhinsky (also the leader of the Cheka overall)[61]
- Deputy – Yakov Peters (initially the chairman of the Petrograd Department for a month, and the number two in the Cheka overall)
- Other members – Shklovsky, Kneyfis, Tseystin, Razmirovich, Kronberg, Khaikina, Karlson, Shauman, Lentovich, Rivkin, Antonov, Delafabr, Tsytkin, G. Sverdlov, Bizensky, Yakov Blumkin, Aleksandrovich, Fines, Zaks, Yakov Goldin, Galpershtein, Kniggisen, Martin Latsis (later transfer (chief of jail), Fogel, Zakis, Shillenkus, Yanson).
- Petrograd Cheka (1918–1922)
- Chairman – Moisei Uritsky (January 1918 to 30 August 1918),[62] Gleb Bokii (31 August 1918 to 30 September 1918), Meinkman (October 1918 to January 1919),[63] Varvara Yakovleva (acting chair in two periods; November 1918 to January 1919; and October 1919 to October 1921),[64] Nikolai Antipov (January 1919 to October 1919)[65]
- Deputy – Gleb Bokii (March 1918 to August 1918), Varvara Yakovleva (September 1918 to February 1922), Nikolai Antipov (acting deputy chairman from November 1918 to January 1919)
- Other members – Reiller, Kozlovsky, Model, Rozmirovich, I. Diesporov, Iselevich, Krassikov, Bukhan, Merbis, Paykis, Anvelt.
- Kharkov Cheka
- Deych, Vikhman, Timofey, Vera (Dora) Grebenshchikova, A. G. Aleksandra
- Ashykin.
Popular culture
[edit]- The Cheka were popular staples in Soviet film and literature. This was partly due to a romanticization of the organisation in the post-Stalin period, and also because they provided a useful action/detection template. Films featuring the Cheka include Ostern's Miles of Fire, Nikita Mikhalkov's At Home among Strangers, the miniseries The Adjutant of His Excellency, and also Dead Season (starring Donatas Banionis), and the 1992 Russian drama film The Chekist.[66]
- In Spain, during the Spanish Civil War, the detention and torture centers operated by the Republicans were named "checas" after the Soviet organization.[67] Alfonso Laurencic was their promoter, ideologist and builder.[68]
- Dzerzhinsky, who rarely drank, is said to have told Lenin – on an occasion in which he did so excessively – that secret police work could be done by "only saints or scoundrels ... but now the saints are running away from me and I am left with the scoundrels".[69]
- The Chekist, directed by Aleksandr Rogozhkin, is a 1992 French–Russian film based on a 1923 short story by Vladimir Zazubrin. It tells the story of a bloody work and downfall of a Soviet Cheka security official involved in mass executions during the Russian Civil War.
- The Soviet Story, a 2008 Latvian film, mentioned that Cheka is the Soviet terror machine, and Cheka is the "teacher" of Nazi gestapo.
Legacy
[edit]
Konstantin Preobrazhenskiy criticised the continuing celebration of the professional holiday of the old and the modern Russian security services on the anniversary of the creation of the Cheka, The Day of the Security Authorities of the Russian Federation, with the assent of the Presidents of Russia. (Vladimir Putin, former KGB officer, chose not to change the date to another): "The successors of the KGB still haven't renounced anything; they even celebrate their professional holiday the same day, as during repression, on the 20th of December. It is as if the present intelligence and counterespionage services of Germany celebrated Gestapo Day. I can imagine how indignant our press would be!"[70][71][72]
See also
[edit]References
[edit]- ^ Steinberg, Mark D. (2001). Voices of Revolution, 1917. London and New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 265–266. ISBN 978-0-300-09016-1.
- ^ The Impact of Stalin's Leadership in the USSR, 1924–1941. Nelson Thornes. 2008. p. 3. ISBN 978-0-7487-8267-3.
- ^ Moorehead, Alan (1958). The Russian Revolution. New York: Harper & Brothers. pp. 260. ISBN 978-0881843316.
{{cite book}}: ISBN / Date incompatibility (help) - ^ Tcheka – Official designation pertaining to State Archive of the Russian Federation «ф. 130, оп. 1, д. 1, л. 31 об.»
- ^ Solzhenitsyn, Alexander (1974). The Gulag Archipelago. Vol. II. New York: Harper Perennial. pp. 537–38. ISBN 978-0-06-092103-3.
An old Chekist! Who has not heard these words, drawled with emphasis, as a mark of special esteem? If the zeks wish to distinguish a camp keeper from those who are inexperienced, inclined to fuss, and do not have a bulldog grip, they say: 'And the chief there is an o-o-old Chekist!' ... 'An old Chekist' – what that means at the least is that he was well-regarded under Yagoda, Yezhov and Beria. He was useful to them all.
- ^ Davidoff, Victor (2011-05-10). "A Stalin Slip and Putin Trick | Opinion". The Moscow Times. Wayback Machine. Archived from the original on 2011-05-11. Retrieved 2021-12-31.
- ^ Khvostov, Mikhail (1995). The Russian Civil War (1): The Red Army. Bloomsbury US. ISBN 978-1855326088 – via Google Books.[permanent dead link]
- ^ Rayfield, Donald (2007). Stalin and His Hangmen: The Tyrant. Random House Publishing. ISBN 978-0307431837. Retrieved 2011-07-27 – via Google Books.
- ^ Louis Rapoport, Stalin's war against the Jews: the doctors' plot and the Soviet solution, 1991, p. 44
- ^ "The Cheka". History Learning Site. January 2013. Archived from the original on 2015-05-16. Retrieved 2013-12-11.
- ^ Vladimir Brovkin (1990). Workers' Unrest and the Bolsheviks' Response in 1919. Slavic Review. pp. 350–373.
- ^ Stephane Courtois, Mark Kramer (1999). The Black Book of Communism. pp. 90–99.
- ^ "Library of Congress / Federal Research Division / Country Studies / Area Handbook Series/ Soviet Union / Glossary". Lcweb2.loc.gov. Retrieved 2011-07-27.
- ^ Leggett, George (1981). The Cheka : Lenin's political police : the all-Russian extraordinary commission for combating counter-revolution and sabotage, December 1917 to February 1922. Internet Archive. Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press. pp. 257–259. ISBN 978-0-19-822552-2.
- ^ All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK or TsIK) is not to be confused with the Central Committee of RDSRP(b)
- ^ a b Mozokhin, O.B. out of history of activities of VChK, OGPU, NKVD, MGB. FSB archives.(in Russian)
- ^ a b c "Partial protocol of the 21st session of the Council of the People's Commissars". Memory.irk.ru. 1998-12-26. Archived from the original on 2017-08-04. Retrieved 2011-07-27.
- ^ Lewis, Oliver (2007-12-03). "How much did the Bolsheviks need the Cheka and how well did they make use of it?". E-International Relations. Retrieved 2022-11-02.
- ^ Carr, E. H. (1958). "The Origin and Status of the Cheka". Soviet Studies. 10 (1): 1–11. doi:10.1080/09668135808410134. ISSN 0038-5859. JSTOR 149095.
- ^ Schapiro (1984).
- ^ Izvestiya. February 28, 1918.
- ^ P. Avrich. G. Maximoff
- ^ Applebaum (2003), p. 9.
- ^ Avrich, Paul, "Russian Anarchists and the Civil War", Russian Review, Volume 27, Issue 3 (July 1968), pp. 296–306.
- ^ Figes (1996), p. 643.
- ^ Unknown (17 December 2016). Prisoners Exiting a Black Maria. Wayback Machine. Archived from the original on 2015-05-22. Retrieved 2021-12-31 – via Gulag: Many Days, Many Lives.
- ^ Paul, Allen. Katyn: Stalin's Massacre and the Seeds of Polish Resurrection. Naval Institute Press, 1996. ISBN 1-55750-670-1. pp. 111/112.
- ^ Stephane Courtois, Mark Kramer (1999). The Black Book of Communism. Harvard University Press. p. 98.
- ^ Figes, Orlando. "The Red Army And Mass Mobilization During The Russian Civil War 1918 to 1920" (PDF). Past & Present (129): 199 – via Boston University.
- ^ Stephane Courtois, Mark Kramer (1999). The Black Book of Communism. Harvard University Press. p. 92.
- ^ Chamberlain, William Henry, The Russian Revolution: 1917–1921, New York: Macmillan Co. (1957), p. 131
- ^ pp. 463–464, Leggett (1986).
- ^ Sergei Melgunov, "The Record of the Red Terror" Archived 2018-12-21 at the Wayback Machine, paulbogdanor.com.
- ^ a b pp. 74–75, Chamberlin (1935).
- ^ Donald Rayfield. Stalin and His Hangmen: The Tyrant and Those Who Killed for Him. Random House, 2004. ISBN 0375506322, p. 1926: GBYi.
- ^ p. 39, Rummel (1990).
- ^ "Statue plan stirs Russian row". BBC News. 2002-09-21. Retrieved 2011-07-27.
- ^ page 28, Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, paperback edition, Basic books, 1999.
- ^ p. 180, Overy, The Dictators: Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia, W. W. Norton & Company; 1st American Ed edition, 2004.
- ^ p. 649, Figes (1996).
- ^ Ryan, James (2012). Lenin's Terror: The Ideological Origins of Early Soviet State Violence. London: Routledge. p. 2. ISBN 978-1138815681
- ^ pp. 72 & 73, Volkogonov (1998).
- ^ p. 238, Volkogonov (1994).
- ^ Ryan (2012), p. 2.
- ^ Ryan (2012), p. 114.
- ^ a b Stone, Bailey (2013). The Anatomy of Revolution Revisited: A Comparative Analysis of England, France, and Russia. Cambridge University Press. p. 335.
- ^ Pipes, Richard (2011). The Russian Revolution. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. p. 838.
- ^ Lowe (2002), p. 151.
- ^ Lincoln, W. Bruce (1989). Red Victory: A History of the Russian Civil War. Simon & Schuster. p. 384. ISBN 0671631667.
... the best estimates set the probable number of executions at about a hundred thousand.
- ^ Vadim Erlikhman Потери народонаселения в XX веке.: Справочник М.: Издательский дом «Русская панорама», 2004. ISBN 5931651071
- ^ Conquest, Robert (2007). The Great Terror: A Reassessment, 40th Anniversary Edition. Oxford University Press. pp. in Preface, p. xvi: "Exact numbers may never be known with complete certainty, but the total of deaths caused by the whole range of Soviet regime's terrors can hardly be lower than some fifteen million.".
- ^ "К вопросу о масштабах красного террора в годы Гражданской войны // Николай Заяц". scepsis.net. Retrieved December 7, 2024.
- ^ Часть IV. На гражданской войнe. // Sergei Melgunov «Красный террор» в России 1918–1923. – 2-ое изд., доп. – Берлин, 1924
- ^ Lincoln, W. Bruce (1989). Red victory : a history of the Russian Civil War. Internet Archive. New York : Simon and Schuster. pp. 383–385. ISBN 978-0-671-63166-6.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: publisher location (link) - ^ a b Leggett, George (1981). The Cheka : Lenin's political police : the all-Russian extraordinary commission for combating counter-revolution and sabotage, December 1917 to February 1922. Internet Archive. Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press. pp. 197–198. ISBN 978-0-19-822552-2.
- ^ Lincoln, W. Bruce (1989). Red victory : a history of the Russian Civil War. Internet Archive. New York : Simon and Schuster. p. 383. ISBN 978-0-671-63166-6.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: publisher location (link) - ^ "Russia's Last Capitalists "d0e670"". publishing.cdlib.org. pp. 40–43. Retrieved 2022-11-02.
- ^ "Правовое регулирование внесудебных полномочий ВЧК - Главы из монографии ВЧК-ОГПУ - Статьи и публикации - Мозохин Олег Борисович - из истории ВЧК ОГПУ НКВД МГБ". mozohin.ru. Retrieved December 7, 2024.
- ^ В. П. Данилов. «Советская деревня глазами ВЧК-ОГПУ-НКВД», 1918–1922, М., 1998. // РГВА (Российский Государственный Военно-исторический Архив), 33987/3/32.
- ^ page 647, Figes (1996).
- ^ Leggett, George (1981). The Cheka : Lenin's political police : the all-Russian extraordinary commission for combating counter-revolution and sabotage, December 1917 to February 1922. Internet Archive. Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press. p. 28. ISBN 978-0-19-822552-2.
- ^ Leggett, George (1981). The Cheka : Lenin's political police : the all-Russian extraordinary commission for combating counter-revolution and sabotage, December 1917 to February 1922. Internet Archive. Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press. p. 34. ISBN 978-0-19-822552-2.
- ^ Leggett, George (1981). The Cheka : Lenin's political police : the all-Russian extraordinary commission for combating counter-revolution and sabotage, December 1917 to February 1922. Internet Archive. Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press. p. 111. ISBN 978-0-19-822552-2.
- ^ "Yakovleva Varvara Nikolaevna". Хронос. 1 February 2009. Retrieved 7 August 2025.
- ^ Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History. Slavica Publishers. 2006. p. 778. Retrieved 9 August 2025.
Nikolai Kirillovich Antipov
- ^ "Chekist". 1 January 2000 – via IMDb.
- ^ Carlos Alberto Montaner (August 4, 2003). "International justice begins at home". Miami Herald. Archived from the original on 2003-12-05. Retrieved December 7, 2024.
- ^ Rafael Chacón, "Por qué hice las checas de Barcelona. Laurencic ante el consejo de guerra", Editorial Solidaridad nacional, Barcelona, 1939.
- ^ Stove, R. J. "Nationalobserver.net". www.nationalobserver.net. Wayback Machine. Archived from the original on 2007-06-23. Retrieved 2021-12-31.
- ^ Article of Konstantin Preobrazhenskiy: "People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and Gestapo: cooperation of friends"
- ^ History of creation of the FSB on the official website of FSB (English translation).
- ^ Russian holidays and celebrations info: "December 20 – The day of national security service workers (professional holiday)".
Sources
[edit]- Andrew, Christopher M. and Vasili Mitrokhin (1999) The Sword and the Shield : The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB. New York: Basic Books. ISBN 0-465-00312-5.
- Carr, E. H. (1958) The Origin and Status of the Cheka. Soviet Studies, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 1–11.
- Chamberlin, W. H. (1935) The Russian Revolution 1917–1921, 2 vols. London and New York. The Macmillan Company.
- Dziak, John. (1988) Chekisty: A History of the KGB. Lexington, Massachusetts Lexington Books.
- Figes, Orlando (1997) A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891–1924. Penguin Books. ISBN 0-670-85916-8.
- Leggett, George (1986) The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police. Oxford University Press, New York. ISBN 0-19-822862-7
- Lincoln, W. Bruce (1999) Red Victory: A History of the Russian Civil War. Da Capo Press. ISBN 0-306-80909-5
- Lowe, Norman (2002). Mastering Twentieth Century Russian History. Palgrave. ISBN 978-0333963074.
- Melgounov, Sergey Petrovich (1925) The Red Terror in Russia. London & Toronto: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd.
- Overy, Richard (2004) The Dictators: Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia. W. W. Norton & Company; 1st American edition. ISBN 0-393-02030-4
- Rummel, Rudolph Joseph (1990) Lethal Politics: Soviet Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1917. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 1-56000-887-3
- Ryan, James (2012). Lenin's Terror: The Ideological Origins of Early Soviet State Violence. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-1-138-81568-1.
- Schapiro, Leonard B. (1984) The Russian Revolutions of 1917 : The Origins of Modern Communism. New York: Basic Books. ISBN 0-465-07154-6
- Volkogonov, Dmitri (1994) Lenin: A New Biography. Free Press. ISBN 0-02-933435-7
- Volkogonov, Dmitri (1998) Autopsy of an Empire: The Seven Leaders Who Built the Soviet Regime Free Press. ISBN 0-684-87112-2
External links
[edit]
Media related to Cheka at Wikimedia Commons- The Cheka – Spartacus Schoolnet collection of primary source extracts relating to the Cheka
- Development of the Soviet system of punitive organs (in Russian)
Cheka
View on GrokipediaName and Etymology
Origin and Colloquial Usage
The name "Cheka" derives from the Russian acronym ЧК (Cheka), formed from the initial letters of Chrezvychaynaya Komissiya ("Extraordinary Commission"), shorthand for the organization's full title: Vserossiyskaya Chrezvychaynaya Komissiya po Bor'be s Kontrrevolyutsiey i Sabotazhem ("All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage").[5][6] This abbreviation emerged directly from the Bolshevik decree establishing the agency on December 20, 1917, reflecting its mandate as a temporary emergency body amid post-revolutionary instability.[1] In colloquial Russian usage, "Cheka" rapidly supplanted the formal VChK acronym, becoming the everyday term for the secret police apparatus and its repressive functions during the Russian Civil War.[5] The word evoked fear and was applied generically to denote unchecked state terror, with operatives known as "Chekists" (chekisty), a designation that persisted into later Soviet security organs like the NKVD and KGB.[5] Post-Soviet analyses note its evolution into a broader pejorative for authoritarian coercion, as in the term "Chekism" (chekizm), describing a mindset of ruthless loyalty to regime security over legal norms.[5] This linguistic shift underscored the agency's role in embedding extrajudicial violence into Soviet political culture.Historical Context
Bolshevik Seizure of Power and Civil War Onset
The Bolshevik seizure of power occurred during the October Revolution on October 25, 1917 (Julian calendar; November 7 Gregorian), when forces loyal to the Petrograd Soviet, organized under the Bolshevik-led Military Revolutionary Committee, captured key infrastructure in Petrograd including bridges, telegraph stations, and the Winter Palace. This action overthrew Alexander Kerensky's Provisional Government with minimal violence; the assault on the Winter Palace resulted in fewer than a dozen deaths, and government ministers were arrested without significant resistance.[7] Vladimir Lenin, returning from hiding, addressed the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets that evening, proclaiming the transfer of power to the Soviets and the formation of a new government, the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom), with Lenin as chairman. In the immediate aftermath, Bolshevik authority consolidated in Petrograd but faced immediate challenges from rival socialist factions, military units, and regional governments unwilling to recognize Soviet rule. Kerensky fled southward and attempted a counter-offensive with Cossack forces under Pyotr Krasnov, which was repelled near Pulkovo Heights on October 28 (O.S.), marking early armed clashes.[7] The Bolsheviks dissolved the Provisional Government's structures and began suppressing opposition newspapers and organizations, while negotiating the Armistice of Brest-Litovsk with Central Powers in December 1917 to exit World War I, a move that alienated allies and fueled accusations of treason among socialists.[8] The onset of the Russian Civil War emerged from these tensions, with sporadic rebellions and declarations of autonomy beginning in late 1917; for instance, Don Cossacks proclaimed independence on January 10, 1918 (O.S. December 28, 1917).[9] The forcible dissolution of the Constituent Assembly on January 6, 1918 (O.S.), where Bolsheviks held only 24% of seats despite their monopoly on urban soviets, intensified opposition from Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) and Mensheviks, sparking uprisings in cities like Moscow and Yaroslavl.[10] These events, compounded by economic collapse, food shortages, and desertions from the front, created a volatile environment of sabotage, assassinations, and counter-revolutionary plots, prompting the Bolsheviks to seek mechanisms for internal security amid escalating multi-factional violence that would define the Civil War through 1922.[11]Formation
Establishment Decree and Initial Mandate
The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (Vserossiyskaya Chrezvychaynaya Komissiya, or VChK) was established on December 20, 1917 (December 7 Old Style), by a decree issued by the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom), the Bolshevik government's executive body chaired by Vladimir Lenin.[12][13] The decree, drafted amid escalating threats from anti-Bolshevik forces following the October Revolution, created the Cheka as an investigative agency to address immediate security challenges, including speculative profiteering and sabotage disrupting food supplies and economic stability in Petrograd.[12][1] Felix Dzerzhinsky, a Polish Bolshevik revolutionary, was appointed as its chairman at the first organizational meeting held that same day in Petrograd's Smolny Institute.[14][2] The decree specified the Cheka's initial mandate as a temporary institution, explicitly stating it would be abolished "at the moment when the counter-revolutionary attempts are finally crushed."[12][13] Its core duties focused on suppressing counter-revolutionary activities across Russia, irrespective of their social, class, or political origins: persecuting and dismantling acts of counter-revolution and sabotage; handing suspects over to revolutionary tribunals for trial; eliminating counter-revolutionary organizations, groups, and "social elements"; confiscating the property of identified counter-revolutionaries; publishing court lists and sentences; and devising ongoing methods to combat such threats.[12][13] Unlike regular judicial bodies, the Cheka was granted broad investigative authority but lacked formal powers of arrest, execution, or independent sentencing at inception; it was tasked primarily with preliminary inquiries and referrals to existing revolutionary courts, reflecting the Bolsheviks' intent to centralize repression without immediately replicating tsarist-style extrajudicial policing.[12][1] This mandate emerged from Lenin's urgent directives, including a December 19 letter to Dzerzhinsky emphasizing the need for an "extraordinary commission" to probe and prosecute counter-revolutionary sabotage in commerce, industry, and provisioning, amid reports of hoarding and speculation exacerbating urban shortages.[15] The Cheka's formation bypassed the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, underscoring Sovnarkom's assertion of direct executive control over security matters in the nascent regime's chaotic early phase.[12][14]Leadership under Dzerzhinsky
![Felix Dzerzhinsky][float-right]Felix Dzerzhinsky, a Polish Bolshevik revolutionary with prior experience in underground activities and Tsarist prisons, was appointed by Vladimir Lenin on December 20, 1917, as chairman of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (Cheka) for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage.[3] In this role, Dzerzhinsky directed the agency's initial operations from Petrograd, emphasizing rapid response to perceived threats against the Bolshevik regime without judicial oversight.[1] He personally oversaw the recruitment of early personnel, ensuring the Cheka's staff consisted exclusively of committed Bolsheviks to maintain ideological loyalty.[16] Under Dzerzhinsky's leadership, the Cheka expanded swiftly from an initial force of about 120 agents in early March 1918 to over 100,000 employees by 1919, incorporating specialized departments for counterintelligence, economic sabotage investigations, and paramilitary units numbering more than 20,000 by autumn 1918.[1] Dzerzhinsky appointed Yakov Peters as his deputy shortly after assuming command, delegating operational tasks while retaining ultimate authority over policy and executions.[3] This structure allowed for decentralized regional committees but centralized decision-making in Moscow after the capital's relocation in March 1918, enabling coordinated suppression of opposition across Soviet territories.[1] Dzerzhinsky's approach prioritized extrajudicial measures, including summary arrests, interrogations involving torture, and executions, as exemplified by his endorsement of public hangings in response to peasant revolts, such as Lenin's 1918 order in Penza to publicly execute 100 kulaks.[1] He viewed the Cheka as an instrument for decisively settling accounts with counterrevolutionaries, reporting actions to the Council of People's Commissars only post-facto to avoid bureaucratic delays.[17] During the Russian Civil War, Dzerzhinsky's direct involvement included night raids in Petrograd to eliminate suspected spies and the orchestration of the Red Terror, resulting in the execution of approximately 800 socialists without trial in 1918 alone.[3] This leadership style solidified the Cheka's reputation as the Bolsheviks' unyielding enforcer, though it drew internal party criticism for excesses by 1921, prompting its reorganization into the GPU.[3]
Organizational Development
Central Structure and Authority
The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (VChK), commonly known as the Cheka, was established as a central organ directly subordinate to the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom), the executive authority of the Soviet government.[18] A decree issued by Sovnarkom on December 20, 1917 (December 7 Old Style), defined its mandate and attachment to the council, granting it responsibility for investigating and suppressing counter-revolutionary activities, sabotage, and related threats without initial reliance on judicial institutions.[12] This positioning endowed the Cheka with extraordinary autonomy, allowing it to operate independently of the People's Commissariats of Internal Affairs and Justice, though it was required to coordinate on certain matters.[18] Leadership rested with Chairman Felix Dzerzhinsky, appointed by Vladimir Lenin on December 20, 1917, who held personal command over the organization's direction and personnel selections.[1] Dzerzhinsky presided over a collegium, a governing board of key officials including deputies such as Yakov Peters (responsible for operational sections) and Martin Latsis (overseeing political repression), which convened to approve major directives and personnel appointments.[19] The collegium's decisions reinforced centralized control, prioritizing Bolshevik loyalty in staffing; by early 1918, it mandated recruitment primarily from Communist Party members to ensure ideological alignment.[20] The central headquarters, initially in Petrograd and relocated to Moscow in March 1918, housed administrative, informational, and executive departments that coordinated nationwide activities.[21] These units handled intelligence analysis, arrest orders, and punitive measures, with authority expanding through decrees—such as the October 1919 formalization of judicial powers permitting trials, convictions, and executions without appeal.[19] While nominally reporting to Sovnarkom, the Cheka's operational independence meant leaders like Dzerzhinsky often informed the council only after actions were completed, minimizing external constraints during the Russian Civil War.[1] This structure facilitated rapid escalation of repressive capabilities, with central staff growing from an initial 40 operatives to thousands by 1921, underscoring its pivotal role in Bolshevik consolidation of power.[21]Regional and Local Chekas
Provincial Chekas, or gubcheka, were established in early 1918 in Bolshevik-controlled guberniyas to combat counter-revolution and sabotage at the regional level, mirroring the central VCheka's mandate while adapting to local conditions.[22] These bodies coordinated with local Soviets but maintained operational independence, appointing their own personnel—often drawn from party militants, workers, or former criminals—and handling investigations, arrests, and summary executions without mandatory judicial oversight.[1] By mid-1918, approximately 40 gubcheka operated across Soviet territories, expanding as Red Army advances secured more provinces.[22] Local structures included uezdcheka in counties and initial district Chekas, formed concurrently with provincial ones to penetrate rural and district areas, though district organs were abolished in January 1919 to streamline hierarchy.[22] Uezdcheka focused on grain requisitions, deserter hunts, and suppressing peasant unrest, employing tactics like village cordons and mass shootings that varied by locality—such as specialized torture methods in places like Kharkov or Tsaritsyn.[1] Poor communication lines during the Civil War granted these branches substantial autonomy, leading to excesses beyond central guidelines; Felix Dzerzhinsky frequently criticized local overzeal but struggled to enforce uniformity amid wartime chaos.[1] Nominally subordinate to provincial executive committees and the VCheka, local Chekas answered primarily to Communist Party directives, enabling rapid response to threats like White insurgencies or economic sabotage but fostering inconsistencies in repression.[23] By 1919, the decentralized network encompassed hundreds of committees with over 100,000 personnel, amplifying the Cheka's reach and contributing disproportionately to provincial casualties during the Red Terror.[1] This structure persisted until the Cheka's reorganization into the GPU in 1922, when centralization intensified.[22]Operational Tactics
Intelligence and Arrest Procedures
The Cheka's intelligence operations relied on a hierarchical network of informants, undercover agents, and surveillance units embedded across societal sectors, including factories, railways, military detachments, and educational institutions, to detect counter-revolutionary activities, sabotage, and speculation.[1] This system drew partial inspiration from Tsarist Okhrana practices, incorporating former imperial agents and methods such as postal censorship, telephone wiretaps, and infiltration of opposition groups.[2] By March 1918, the agency had grown from an initial cadre of about 120 personnel to thousands, expanding to over 100,000 operatives by late 1919, which facilitated real-time monitoring and preemptive disruption of perceived threats.[1] Agents often operated visibly—distinguished by leather coats and peaked caps—to instill fear and encourage denunciations from the populace, supplementing formal intelligence with crowdsourced reports of disloyalty.[1] Arrest procedures bypassed standard judicial processes, as stipulated in the Cheka's founding decree of December 20, 1917 (Old Style), which authorized the commission to independently persecute counter-revolutionaries, conduct searches, confiscate property, and detain suspects without prior warrants or appeals to revolutionary tribunals.[12] Operations typically involved sudden night raids by armed Chekist squads, who cordoned off districts, ransacked homes, and rounded up targets en masse, including relatives of suspected anti-Bolsheviks to compel compliance or extract information.[3] In Petrograd, for instance, Yakov Peters, a deputy to Felix Dzerzhinsky, mandated identity checks and preemptive arrests of officers' families in June 1919 to neutralize potential insurgencies.[3] Detainees faced immediate isolation and interrogation, where Cheka officials wielded unchecked prosecutorial, judicial, and punitive authority, often resolving cases within hours; resistance or insufficient cooperation led to summary executions at detention sites.[1] Dzerzhinsky himself advocated for such expedited "organized terror" as essential for revolutionary survival, declaring in July 1918 that judgments should culminate in rapid sentencing without prolonged deliberation.[3]Interrogation and Judicial Powers
The Cheka possessed extraordinary authority to conduct interrogations and impose penalties without adherence to conventional legal procedures, functioning as both investigative and punitive organ. Established by the Decree on the Formation of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission on December 7, 1917, it was empowered to "persecute and break up all acts of counter-revolution and sabotage" and to "bring before the revolutionary court all who are guilty," yet operational directives under Felix Dzerzhinsky permitted agents to execute verdicts summarily if delays threatened the revolution's security.[12] [15] This latitude enabled the Cheka to bypass revolutionary tribunals entirely, with agents authorized to shoot suspects on the spot during arrests or interrogations, as confirmed in internal orders emphasizing immediate action against perceived threats.[1] Interrogation practices emphasized coercion to obtain rapid confessions, often involving systematic torture to break detainees' resistance. Methods included prolonged beatings to the neck and head, forced ingestion of soapy water to induce vomiting, insertion of heated irons or glass fragments into orifices, and psychological terror such as mock executions or threats to family members, as detailed in a 1924 compilation of Cheka techniques derived from wartime operations.[24] These approaches were justified internally as necessary for efficiency amid civil war exigencies, yielding fabricated admissions that fueled further arrests, though contemporary accounts from prisoners highlight their role in manufacturing evidence rather than uncovering genuine plots.[25] A pivotal expansion of judicial powers occurred via a decree on October 5, 1919, which formally granted the Cheka competence to try cases, pronounce sentences—including death without appeal—and oversee executions, independent of higher soviet oversight.[19] This measure addressed earlier ambiguities in the Cheka's mandate, transforming it from a preparatory investigatory body into a de facto court system, with Dzerzhinsky's leadership ensuring alignment with Bolshevik priorities over procedural fairness. By 1921, such powers had facilitated tens of thousands of extrajudicial rulings, underscoring the Cheka's role in institutionalizing repression as a revolutionary norm.[1]Repressive Campaigns
Suppression of Political Opposition
The Cheka initiated suppression of political opposition shortly after its establishment, targeting groups perceived as threats to Bolshevik power. On December 30, 1917, it conducted its first major operation by arresting several Socialist Revolutionary (SR) members suspected of counter-revolutionary plotting, marking the onset of systematic political repression.[26] This action reflected the Cheka's mandate to combat sabotage and opposition without judicial oversight, prioritizing rapid elimination of dissent over legal proceedings.[1] In spring 1918, the Cheka escalated operations against anarchists, who had initially allied with the Bolsheviks but increasingly opposed their centralization. On April 12, 1918, Cheka forces raided approximately 26 anarchist centers in Moscow, resulting in at least 40 deaths and over 500 arrests during the clashes.[27] These raids dismantled anarchist networks in the capital, with many detainees subjected to summary executions or imprisonment in early concentration camps. By June 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee decreed the expulsion of Mensheviks and SRs from soviets, while the Cheka enforced this by raiding their organizations and shutting down opposition presses.[28] The July 6, 1918, Left SR uprising in Moscow prompted further crackdowns, as rebels assassinated Cheka leader Moisei Uritsky and attempted to kill Lenin. In retaliation, the Cheka arrested thousands of SRs and other suspected opponents, executing hundreds without trial, including figures like Fanny Kaplan's accomplices.[29] Throughout the Civil War, the agency focused on White Guard sympathizers and counter-revolutionary cells, conducting mass arrests in regions like Astrakhan where revolts erupted, often liquidating detainees extrajudicially to deter broader resistance.[1] These efforts consolidated Bolshevik control by neutralizing organized political alternatives, though estimates of executed political opponents in 1918 alone exceed 10,000, underscoring the Cheka's role in preempting challenges through terror.[30]Campaigns Against Deserters and Economic Sabotage
The Cheka intensified efforts against desertion amid the Red Army's acute manpower shortages during the Russian Civil War, where evasion and flight from fronts undermined Bolshevik military mobilization. On March 16, 1919, a special Cheka force of approximately 200,000 loyal troops was formed specifically to pursue and detain deserters, operating through punitive detachments that conducted mass raids, verified identities, and enforced returns to service.[31] These units resorted to hostage-taking from deserters' families or villages to compel surrenders and deter further escapes, often executing those deemed incorrigible without trial as part of extrajudicial measures. Nationally, Cheka arrests of deserters totaled around 500,000 in 1919 and nearly 800,000 in 1920, reflecting the scale of the crisis where registered desertions exceeded 2.6 million by official Bolshevik counts. In Moscow, local Cheka records document 770 such arrests and 47 executions for desertion between December 1, 1918, and November 1, 1920.[32] [33] Parallel campaigns addressed economic sabotage, framed by Bolshevik authorities as deliberate disruption of War Communism's centralized controls on production, distribution, and requisitioning from 1918 to 1921. The Cheka prioritized suppressing speculators—often labeled "bagmen" for black-market trading—who were accused of hoarding goods, inflating prices, and evading state monopolies, alongside industrial "wreckers" sabotaging factories or rail transport. In Moscow, speculation accounted for a surge in repressions, with 26,692 arrests recorded in the same 1918–1920 period, peaking at 14,000 cases in the first half of 1920 amid famine and supply breakdowns; 53 executions followed for these offenses. Sabotage proper yielded 396 arrests, while related malfeasance (negligent or intentional economic harm) saw 5,249 detentions, comprising roughly 80% of the Moscow Cheka's caseload. Arrests quadrupled during harvest seasons, such as summer 1919, when grain concealment threatened food levies, employing methods like night raids, goods seizures, fines, and assignment to forced labor camps.[33] These operations aligned with the Red Terror's escalation after the Soviet government's September 5, 1918, decree, which authorized summary executions for sabotage and speculation to safeguard the regime's economic survival against perceived class enemies. While Cheka directives, such as a December 1918 order demanding irrefutable evidence against bourgeois specialists, nominally curbed arbitrary actions, practice favored swift repression over investigation, contributing to broader instability as economic coercion fueled peasant resistance and urban discontent. Archival data from Moscow highlights localized intensity, though national figures remain estimates due to fragmented reporting and overlapping jurisdictions with military tribunals.[33]The Red Terror
Official Declaration and Rationale
The Red Terror was officially declared through a resolution adopted by the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom) on September 5, 1918, which formalized the policy of mass repression under the direction of the Cheka.[34] This decree followed the assassination of Cheka chief Moisei Uritsky on August 17, 1918, in Petrograd and the attempted assassination of Vladimir Lenin on August 30, 1918, in Moscow, events that Bolshevik leaders cited as evidence of escalating counter-revolutionary threats.[34] The resolution, signed by People's Commissar of Justice Dmitry Kursky, was based on a report from Cheka chairman Felix Dzerzhinsky detailing the agency's operations against counter-revolution, speculation, and sabotage.[34] The decree explicitly endorsed terror as a defensive necessity, stating that "in the present situation the safeguarding of the rear by means of terror is necessary" to protect the Soviet Republic from internal subversion amid the ongoing Civil War.[34] It directed the reinforcement of the Cheka with additional Communist Party members to ensure more systematic executions and called for the isolation of class enemies—defined as bourgeoisie, landowners, and clergy—in concentration camps, with immediate shooting for those involved in White Guard organizations, conspiracies, or uprisings.[34] Public disclosure of executed individuals' names and the justifications for their deaths was mandated to deter potential opponents and demonstrate the regime's resolve.[34] Bolshevik rationale framed the Red Terror as an essential countermeasure to the "White Terror" perpetrated by anti-Bolshevik forces, including summary executions and pogroms against suspected reds in territories under White control during 1918.[4] Lenin personally advocated for intensified terror in prior correspondence, such as his July 11, 1918, directive to Penza officials urging the public hanging of at least 100 kulaks as an example to suppress peasant revolts and grain hoarding, arguing that half-measures would doom the revolution. He later reinforced this in August 1918 communications, insisting on "mass terror" against Socialist Revolutionaries, bourgeoisie, and saboteurs to match enemy violence and secure Bolshevik power, viewing it as a class-based imperative rather than mere retaliation.[35] This policy aligned with Marxist-Leninist ideology, which prioritized eliminating exploiter classes to consolidate proletarian dictatorship, though implementation often extended beyond verified threats to preempt potential resistance.[23]Implementation and Key Phases
The Red Terror's implementation commenced in the immediate aftermath of two pivotal events on August 30, 1918: the assassination of Petrograd Cheka chief Moisei Uritsky by a Socialist Revolutionary and the shooting of Vladimir Lenin by Fanya Kaplan, which left him wounded. In Petrograd, Cheka forces under Gleb Uspensky responded by executing over 500 hostages—drawn from bourgeois, clerical, and political suspect classes—without judicial process, marking the terror's spontaneous onset as a retaliatory measure against perceived counter-revolutionary threats.[36] In Moscow, parallel reprisals ensued, with Cheka detachments liquidating dozens of prisoners from Butyrka and other jails on September 1, framing these actions as preemptive defense amid the Russian Civil War's escalating violence. Formalization followed on September 5, 1918, when the Council of People's Commissars decreed the "Resolution on Red Terror," institutionalizing Cheka authority for summary executions, mass arrests, concentration camps for "irreconcilable enemies," and property seizures to eradicate "counter-revolution and sabotage." This edict, drafted under Lenin's influence and overseen by Felix Dzerzhinsky's All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (Cheka), expanded operations nationwide, integrating party commissars into Cheka ranks to accelerate repressions and prioritizing class-based targeting over individual guilt.[34] Lenin reinforced this via a September 11 telegram to the Penza Cheka, urging "unhesitating shooting of dozens of hostages" per executed Soviet official, exemplifying the policy's hostage-taking mechanism to deter opposition. The terror unfolded in distinct phases aligned with Civil War dynamics. The initial phase (September–December 1918) focused on urban centers like Moscow and Petrograd, emphasizing rapid liquidation of Socialist Revolutionaries, anarchists, and White sympathizers, with Cheka reports documenting thousands of executions amid grain requisitions and anti-speculator drives. Escalation peaked in 1919 during White advances (e.g., Denikin's offensives), as Cheka units mobilized "mobile extraordinary commissions" for field executions of deserters and rear-guard saboteurs, integrating terror into military fronts and contributing to Bolshevik consolidation in core territories. By 1920–1921, amid famine and war exhaustion, the phase shifted toward economic enforcement against "bagmen" traders and kulaks, with decentralized provincial Chekas conducting autonomous purges, though centralized oversight waned as victories mounted.[30] This evolution reflected causal adaptation: terror's intensity correlated with frontline pressures, yielding to stabilization by early 1922, when Cheka reorganization into the GPU signaled partial de-escalation under the New Economic Policy.[37]Scale and Impact of Repression
Direct Executions and Arrest Statistics
The Cheka's direct executions peaked during the Red Terror's implementation from September 1918 onward, with summary shootings often conducted without trial in response to perceived threats like counter-revolutionary activities, speculation, and desertion. Official Soviet reports from the period, such as those published in Izvestiya, documented 1,183 executions in the initial months following the terror's formal declaration, though these figures covered only reported cases in select regions and excluded many extrajudicial killings by local Cheka detachments.[38] By late 1918, Cheka records for twenty provinces indicated 6,300 executions, a number historians consider an understatement due to incomplete reporting and the agency's operational secrecy.[16] Scholarly analysis of declassified archives yields higher but varying estimates for total direct Cheka executions from 1918 to 1922, ranging from approximately 37,300 to 140,000, with the lower figure derived from verified Cheka verdicts excluding tribunal sentences, and higher ones accounting for unreported mass shootings in provinces like Ukraine and the Urals.[4] Historian George Leggett, drawing on contemporary Cheka documents and émigré accounts, estimates 10,000 to 15,000 victims in the terror's early phase alone (September-October 1918), emphasizing the agency's role in escalating from targeted reprisals to widespread prophylactic executions.[4] These figures reflect direct Cheka actions, distinct from deaths in custody or by revolutionary tribunals, which added at least 14,200 more executions by 1921. Arrest statistics reveal the Cheka's broader repressive scope, with the agency detaining hundreds of thousands for interrogation, often as hostages or suspects in counter-revolutionary plots. In 1919-1920, Cheka units arrested roughly 1.3 million military deserters amid widespread Red Army flight, many of whom faced immediate execution or labor camps.[32] Specific campaigns yielded targeted hauls, such as 900 workers detained during the 1919 Tula strikes, with 200 subsequently executed.[4] By mid-1921, Cheka personnel had swollen to 137,000, enabling mass operations that processed over 200,000 new cases annually in some regions, though comprehensive totals remain elusive due to destroyed records and decentralized authority.[39] These arrests frequently served as precursors to executions, with detainees held in ad hoc prisons where mortality from starvation and disease compounded direct killings.Scholarly Estimates and Archival Evidence
Official Soviet reports, compiled from Cheka central records, claimed 12,733 executions carried out by the agency through April 1920, with a cumulative total of around 50,000 by mid-1921 when including regional tribunals.[1] These figures, however, excluded unrecorded summary executions by local Cheka detachments, which operated with significant autonomy and often failed to report killings to Moscow, as evidenced by surviving regional logs showing discrepancies of up to 80% in unreported deaths.[20] Historians analyzing pre- and post-Soviet archives have revised these numbers upward substantially. George Leggett's examination of Cheka operational documents in The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police (1981) concludes that plausible totals for direct executions range from 50,000 to at least 100,000 between December 1917 and February 1922, accounting for mass shootings during the Red Terror's peak in 1918–1919 and lesser-known campaigns against deserters and speculators.[40] Similarly, post-1991 declassified materials from Russian state archives, including Cheka plenipotentiary reports, indicate at least 37,000 documented shootings nationwide from 1918 to 1922, though analysts note this undercounts extrajudicial killings in remote areas like the Urals and Siberia where records were destroyed or never maintained.[41] Broader scholarly assessments, incorporating indirect archival corroboration such as survivor testimonies and cross-referenced tribunal verdicts, place the Cheka's direct death toll closer to 200,000 during the Red Terror phase alone (1918–1922), encompassing not only formal executions but also deaths from torture and immediate field liquidations justified as counterrevolutionary measures.[42] Early émigré historians like Sergei Melgunov, drawing on eyewitness accounts and leaked Bolshevik dispatches, proposed figures exceeding 1 million, but these have been critiqued as inflated by conflating Cheka actions with total Civil War fatalities; more conservative post-archival syntheses, such as those in The Black Book of Communism, align with the 100,000–200,000 range after deducting non-Cheka violence.[43][44]| Historian/Source | Estimated Executions | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Official Soviet Reports | 12,733–50,000 | Central Cheka tallies, 1918–1921[1] |
| George Leggett | 50,000–100,000+ | Archival operational records and regional reports[40] |
| Declassified Russian Archives (e.g., Zayats analysis) | ~37,000 | Documented shootings, 1918–1922 |
| Red Terror syntheses (e.g., Satter/Hudson) | ~200,000 | Combined executions, torture deaths, and unreported killings[42] |
