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2022 COVID-19 protests in China
2022 COVID-19 protests in China
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2022 COVID-19 protests in China
Part of protests over responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, COVID-19 pandemic in mainland China and democracy movements in China
Southwest Jiaotong University students mourning the victims of the fire in Ürümqi, holding blank sheets of paper and singing "The Internationale" and "March of the Volunteers"
Date2 November – 5 December 2022[1]
(1 month and 3 days)
Location
Mainland China and Hong Kong
(with solidarity protests abroad)
Caused by
MethodsProtests, protest songs, demonstrations, riots, civil unrest, student activism, internet activism
Resulted inAbandonment of the zero-COVID policy on 7 December 2022[5]
  • Some protesters detained
  • Images and videos of protests censored by the Chinese government
Parties
Protesters
Map
Cities in China where protests against COVID-19 lockdowns occurred

A series of protests against COVID-19 lockdowns began in mainland China in November 2022.[6][4][7][8][9] Colloquially referred to as the White Paper Protests (Chinese: 白纸抗议; pinyin: Bái zhǐ kàngyì) or the A4 Revolution (Chinese: 白纸革命; pinyin: Bái zhǐ gémìng),[10][11] the demonstrations started in response to measures taken by the Chinese government to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in the country, including implementing a zero-COVID policy. Discontent had grown since the beginning of the pandemic towards the policy, which confined many people to their homes for prolonged periods of time without work and left some unable to purchase or receive daily necessities.[12][13]

The demonstrations had been preceded by the Beijing Sitong Bridge protest on 13 October, wherein pro-democracy banners were displayed by an unnamed individual and later seized by local authorities. The incident was subsequently censored by state media and led to a widespread crackdown behind the Great Firewall.[14] Further small-scale protests inspired by the Sitong Bridge incident ensued in early November, before widespread civil unrest erupted following a 24 November building fire in Ürümqi that killed ten people[a], three months into a lockdown in Xinjiang.[16] Protesters across the nation demanded the end of the government's zero-COVID policy and lockdowns.[7]

The subjects in protest evolved throughout the course of the unrest, ranging from discontent with the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its general secretary Xi Jinping,[7][17] to inhumane working conditions brought on by the lockdowns, and human rights abuses against ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang.[18] The police had largely allowed such rallies to proceed, although officers had reportedly arrested several protesters in Shanghai.[19] There had also been reports of protesters being beaten and showered with pepper spray before detainment.[19][20][21][22] By early December, China pivoted away from many of its previous COVID restrictions by reducing testing, reducing lockdowns, and allowing people with mild infections to quarantine at home, effectively abandoning the zero-COVID policy.[23]

Background

[edit]

COVID-19 lockdowns in China

[edit]
Policemen wearing masks patrolling Wuhan Tianhe International Airport during the initial COVID-19 outbreak in January 2020

Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in mainland China, the Chinese government has made extensive use of lockdowns to manage outbreaks, in an effort to implement a zero-COVID policy. These lockdowns began with the lockdown of Wuhan in January 2020, and soon spread to other cities and municipalities, including Shanghai and Xinjiang. As these lockdowns became more widespread, they became lengthier and increasingly disruptive, precipitating increasing concern and dissent. In April 2022, the Chinese government imposed a lockdown in Shanghai, generating outrage on social media sites, such as Sina Weibo and WeChat. Citizens were displeased with the economic effects of the lockdown, such as food shortages and the inability to work. This discontent was exacerbated by reports of poor conditions in makeshift hospitals and harsh enforcement of quarantines.[24] These complaints were difficult to suppress, despite the strict censorship of social media in China.[25]

The spread of more infectious subvariants of the Omicron variant intensified these grievances. As these subvariants spread, public trust was eroded in the Chinese government's zero-COVID policy, indicating that lockdown strategies had become ineffective and unsustainable for the Chinese economy.[26] Concessions and vacillation generated a further lack of confidence and support for the policy. On 11 November, the Chinese government announced new and detailed guidelines on COVID measures in an attempt to ease the zero-COVID policy.[27][28] Enforcement by local governments varied widely: Shijiazhuang temporarily lifted most restrictions following the announcement,[24] while other cities continued with strict restrictions, fearing the consequences of easing lockdowns.[28] Following the rollout of the new guidelines, an outbreak of COVID-19 occurred in multiple regions of China.[29]

Democracy movements of China

[edit]

Various political movements for democracy have sprung up in opposition to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s one-party rule. The growing discontent with the Chinese government's response to COVID-19 has precipitated discussions of freedom and democracy in China and some calls for the resignation of Xi Jinping, who was endorsed for an unprecedented third term as CCP general secretary (the top position in China) weeks before the beginning of the widespread protests.[30][31]

Sitong Bridge protest

[edit]

On 13 October 2022, on the eve of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, a man hung two anti-lockdown and pro-democracy banners on the parapet of the Sitong Bridge [zh] in Beijing. The banners were swiftly removed by the local police, and mentions of it were censored from the Chinese Internet. Despite this, the news became widespread among the Chinese public.[14] It later inspired the principal goals of the upcoming protests. By 26 November, the banners' slogans had been re-echoed by nationwide protesters.[32][33]

Early protests

[edit]

Lanzhou

[edit]

On 2 November, the death of a 3-year-old boy to a gas leak in Lanzhou, reportedly after a delay in receiving treatment due to movement restrictions, had triggered a wave of public anger. Videos on social media showed residents taking to the streets demanding answers from authorities and buses containing SWAT teams arriving at the scene.[34] Local authorities issued apologies the next day.[35]

Guangzhou

[edit]

As lockdowns returned to Guangzhou starting on 5 November, residents of Haizhu District marched in the streets on the night of 15 November, breaking through metal barriers and demanding an end to the lockdown.[36] The Haizhu district is home to many migrant workers (Mingong) from outside the province, who were unable to find work and unable to have sustainable incomes during lockdowns. In videos spread online, residents also criticized hour-long queues for COVID testing, an inability to purchase fresh and affordable produce, and a lack of local government support.[37]

Zhengzhou Foxconn factory

[edit]

In late October, Taiwanese electronics manufacturer Foxconn began preventing workers at its mega-factory in Zhengzhou from leaving the premises, concluding that this was the best way of fulfilling the government's dual mandate of preventing infections and maintaining economic activity.[4] Nevertheless, some workers managed to scale barriers and flee to their homes, threatening the continued operation of the plant.[38] In early November, videos spread of workers leaving the city by foot to return home in defiance of lockdown measures.[4] In response, in mid-November, local governments around the country urged veterans and retired civil servants to sign up as replacement labor, promising bonuses.[39][40] State media claimed that more than 100,000 people had signed up by 18 November.[41]

On the night of 22–23 November,[9] workers at a Foxconn factory clashed with security forces and police over poor pay and haphazard COVID restrictions.[4] Workers articulated their demands in videos spread across Chinese social media, claiming that Foxconn had failed to provide promised bonuses and salary packages. According to one worker, new recruits were told by Foxconn that they would receive the bonuses in March and May 2023, long after the Chinese Lunar New Year, when money was needed the most. Protesters also accused Foxconn of neglecting to separate workers who had tested positive from others, all while preventing them from leaving the factory campus because of quarantine measures. Law enforcement was filmed beating workers with batons and metal rods, while workers threw objects back and overturned police vehicles.[4][21] In response, Foxconn offered 10,000 yuan (approximately US$1,400) and a free ride home to workers who agreed to quit their jobs and leave the factory.[21][9]

Chongqing

[edit]

In Chongqing, a man was filmed giving a speech in his residential compound on 24 November, loudly proclaiming in Chinese, "Give me liberty or give me death!"[b] to the cheers and applause of the crowd. When law enforcement officials attempted to arrest him, the crowd fought off the police and pulled him away, although he was ultimately still detained.[42][43] The man was dubbed the "Chongqing superman-brother" (重庆超人哥) online. Quotes by him from the video were widely circulated despite censorship, such as, "there is only one disease in the world and that is being both poor and not having freedom [...] we have now got both", referring to both the lockdown and high food prices.[42]

Escalation: Ürümqi fire and reaction

[edit]

On 24 November, a fire in a building in Ürümqi killed ten people and wounded nine in a residential area under lockdown.[44][7] The Xinjiang region had already been in a strict lockdown for three months by that point. During this time, videos and images circulated on Chinese social media showed people unable to purchase basic necessities such as food and medicine.[12] People accused the lockdown measures around the building for preventing firefighters from being able to reach the site in time, while others expressed anger at the government's response, which appeared to victim blame those who managed to escape the fire.[7] All ten of the dead were Uyghur people, with five of them living in the same household.[45][46]

On 25 November, a protest started in the Han-dominant Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps 104th Regiment [zh] as residents took to the streets in direct response to a public beating committed by disease control personnel.[47] A wave of protests soon started across the city, demanding an end to the harsh lockdown measures,[8][9][48] with a crowd outside the city government building. The secretary-general was forced to make a public speech, promising an end to lockdown in "low-risk" areas by the next day.[49]

26 November

[edit]
List circulated by Chinese students, including 51 universities, with anti-lockdown demonstrations as of 27 November[50]

By 26 November, protests and memorials in solidarity with the victims of the Ürümqi fire had spread to large Chinese cities such as Nanjing, Xi'an, and Shanghai.[7][8][9][51]

Nanjing

[edit]

On 26 November, in Nanjing, satirical posters against the zero-COVID policy were removed, and in protest, a student stood on the steps of the Communication University of China, Nanjing, holding a blank sheet of paper, until it was snatched from her. Subsequently, hundreds of students gathered on the steps with blank sheets of paper[52][53] to hold a candlelight vigil for victims of the fire, using phone flashlights as stand-ins for candles[54] and held up blank pieces of paper in reference to the censorship surrounding the event.[55] A student participating in the rally, who stated he was from Xinjiang, spoke: "Before I felt I was a coward, but now at this moment I feel I can stand up. I speak for my home region, speak for those friends who lost relatives and kin in the fire disaster, and for the deceased".[53] An unidentified man arrived to rebuke the protesting crowd, saying that "one day you'll pay for everything you did today", with students replying that "the state will also have to pay the price for what it has done".[52]

Lanzhou

[edit]

On 26 November, videos filmed protesters in Lanzhou destroying tents and booths for COVID-19 testing.[56][57] Protesters alleged that they were put under lockdown despite there being zero positive cases in the area.[58] Earlier in November, a case in Lanzhou had circulated on social media where a 3-year-old boy died before he could be taken to the hospital in time due to lockdown measures, sparking backlash and anger online.[9]

Shanghai

[edit]

The largest protest on 26 November appeared in Shanghai, as young people gathered on Ürümqi Middle Road (乌鲁木齐中路, officially "Wulumuqi Rd (M)"), in reference to the city where the fire took place.[53] They lit candles and laid flowers in mourning for the victims of the fire.[51] They also held pieces of blank paper over their faces or heads; white is the traditional colour of mourning in China.[53] Videos showed chants openly criticizing CCP general secretary Xi Jinping's administration,[53] with hundreds chanting "Step down, Xi Jinping! Step down, Communist Party!"[17][20][59] Videos circulating on social media also showed the crowd facing police, chanting slogans such as "serve the people", "we want freedom", and "we don't want the Health Code".[58] Some people sang the national anthem, "March of the Volunteers", during the protest.[60] In the early morning hours, police suddenly surrounded the crowd and arrested several people.[61] Police also used pepper spray and hand-to-hand violence to disperse the protesters and made arrests.[20]

Chengdu

[edit]

In Chengdu, crowds gathered in the streets and chanted, "We don't want lifelong rulers. We don't want emperors."[57][51]

Xi'an

[edit]

A mobile-lit vigil was also held at the Xi'an Academy of Fine Arts [zh], which attracted hundreds of demonstrators, according to posts circulated on social media.[51][62]

Korla

[edit]

A video emerged of hundreds gathered in the prefecture's government office in Korla, calling "Lift the lockdown!". Like the protesters in Ürümqi, many of those protesting in Korla were reported to be of Han ethnicity. An official came out and promised that lockdowns would be eased; he was welcomed by the crowd.[53]

27 November

[edit]
Students at Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu, holding a candlelight vigil for victims of the fire. The candles are arranged in a heart shape. The faces of students are blurred to protect anonymity.
Students at Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu, holding a candlelight vigil for victims of the fire

Shanghai

[edit]

In Shanghai, the Associated Press saw some bystanders charged and tackled by police near an intersection where there had previously been protests, although the bystanders were not visibly expressing dissent.[63] A protestor said police had tried to arrest him, but the crowd around him had pulled him free so he could escape.[57]

On 27 November, BBC News journalist Edward Lawrence was assaulted by Shanghai police, and detained for several hours.[64][65] Footage circulated on social media showed Lawrence being dragged to the ground in handcuffs.[66] The responding authorities stated that they arrested him "for his own good" so that he would not catch COVID-19 from the crowd.[67] The BBC News press team rebuked those claims as "not a credible explanation".[64]

A mock Ürümqi Middle Road street sign at a candlelight vigil in the United States

A photograph appeared to show police removing the Ürümqi Road's street sign later that night.[55]

Beijing

[edit]

At least 1,000 people gathered along Beijing's third ring road on 27 November to protest COVID restrictions.[68] The Beijing people chanted, "We are all Shanghai people! We are all Xinjiang people!".[69] Potentially due to proximity to political power in the nation's capital city, demonstrators in Beijing debated the use of explicitly political slogans, such as calling for Xi to step down, versus more narrowly opposing severe COVID controls, as well as whether to call it a protest or a simply a vigil. Participants discussed demands that the movement could agree upon, such as an apology for the Ürümqi fire, while others worried about police infiltration of marches, since some demonstrators had already received calls from local police.[70]

On 27 November, students held a memorial at Tsinghua University in Beijing, contributing to student demonstrations taking place at over 50 university campuses throughout China.[58][50] The protest began at 11:30 when some students held up signs outside the canteen and some hundreds joined them.[71] They chanted "freedom will prevail" and sang "The Internationale".[72] A female student from Tsinghua University said over a loudspeaker: "If because we are afraid of being arrested, we don't speak, I believe our people would be disappointed in us. As a Tsinghua student, I would regret this my whole life!"[73][51]

At Peking University, graffiti and banners echoed those of the Sitong bridge protest, but demonstrators did not gather until midnight local time. By 02:00, there were between one and two hundred. They sang "The Internationale" and chanted hesitantly. "No to COVID tests, yes to freedom!" was one of the slogans.[71]

Later that evening, some Beijing protesters gathered on both banks of the Liangma River,[69] also singing "The Internationale" and "March of the Volunteers". One remarked "do not forget those who died in the Guizhou bus crash... do not forget freedom", referring to a September incident in which a bus taking locals to a COVID-19 quarantine center crashed, killing 27 people.[74] In a confrontation between protesters and their opponents in Beijing, protesters were told not to be manipulated by foreign influences, with one protester replying, "by foreign influence do you mean Marx and Engels?" and, "We can't even go on foreign websites!"[75][76][77] Others in Beijing chanted slogans echoing the banners of the October Beijing Sitong Bridge protest, such as "Remove the traitor-dictator Xi Jinping!"[78]

At around 01:00 local time on 28 November, an official came to talk to the riverside protesters. At around 02:00, police marched in, and the protesters were dispersed. Police presence continued through 28 November.[69]

Wuhan

[edit]

Hundreds of people protested in Wuhan on 27 November, with many destroying metal barricades that surrounded locked-down communities, overturning COVID testing tents and demanding an end to lockdowns, while some demanded Xi to resign.[79][80][57]

Hong Kong

[edit]

Small-scale demonstrations took place in Hong Kong in solidarity with the protests in mainland China. On 27 November, at the University of Hong Kong, two students from the mainland distributed leaflets relating to the Ürümqi fire, prompting campus security to call in the police for assistance, but ultimately, no arrests were made. Also on the university's campus the same day, a group of students held up blank pieces of paper.[81]

28 November

[edit]
Police barricade on Ürümqi Middle Road. At one point, dozens of police officers stood shoulder-to-shoulder across the end of the street.[82]
Video of Ürümqi Middle Road on 28 November. A later video shows the road filled with parked transports

At the start of the school week, university students in Beijing and Guangzhou were sent home, with classes and final exams being moved online. Universities said they were protecting students from COVID-19, yet on the same day, China had also reported its first day-over-day decline in cases since 19 November.[83][84]

Shanghai

[edit]

After two days of protests in Shanghai, police erected barricades in Ürümqi Middle Road on 28 November.[85] Later that evening, police were out checking the phones of pedestrians in Shanghai,[83] in which they were specifically instructed to look for VPNs, Telegram, and Twitter.[86]

Protesters had planned to gather in the People's Square, but a large police presence prevented it. An attempt to change location was prevented when police also got there first.[87]

Hong Kong

[edit]

Over two dozen people took part in a demonstration in central Hong Kong, also holding up blank placards.[88]

Hangzhou

[edit]

On the evening of 28 November in Hangzhou, hundreds of citizens held a demonstration at the intersection of Hubin Yintai in 77, demanding the authorities to release the detained protesters. Around the same time, a driver played the song "Do You Hear the People Sing?" in the background while waiting for the traffic lights at the intersection near the in 77 shopping district and was cheered on by passersby.[89]

Beijing

[edit]

As universities began to shutter across Beijing, nine Tsinghua University dorms were closed, with positive COVID-19 cases as the reason given. Meanwhile, as the Beijing Forestry University closed, the administration noted that no students or faculty had tested positive.[90] Heavy police presence in the capital prevented demonstrators from gathering.[86]

The Guardian reported that six protesters were called by police that night asking for information about their actions, including one whose home was visited after refusing to answer the phone.[91]

29 November

[edit]
Security personnel standing by at Hong Kong University on 29 November

As on the previous day, there were crowds of police at the sites of past protests. In Shanghai, the sidewalks of Ürümqi Road were barricaded along the full length with two-meter-tall solid blue barricades. The People's Square in central Shanghai, where a protest had been planned for the night, was also heavily patrolled, with police stopping people, checking mobile phones, and asking if they had installed virtual private networks; all but one exit of the subway station there was closed off. Surveillance techniques previously used in Xinjiang were implemented in several cities.[87] University administrations responded to the rallies held the previous days by telling students that they could leave early for winter break, offering free rail and air travel to take them home.[92]

By midday, there had been at least 43 small-scale protests in 22 cities.[93]

Videos showed small-scale protests inside locked-down developments, with residents demanding to be freed.[92]

On social networks outside of the Chinese government's control, protesters planned how to track the police, use multiple mobile phones, and form small clusters in order to continue protesting.[92]

In a press conference live-streamed to a state media account on Sina Weibo, Chinese health authorities pledged a rectification of anti-COVID-19 measures. Live audience comments included, "We've cooperated with you for three years, now it's time to give our freedom back" and "Can you stop filtering our comments? Listen to the people, the sky won't fall".[94]

Jinan

[edit]

Video footage obtained by Reuters showed protesters struggling against police and barricades in the Lixia District of Jinan, the capital city of Shandong province. Protesters joined in chanting "lift the lockdown" as they attempted to push their way through barricades erected to enforce local lockdowns.[86]

Guangzhou

[edit]

Fresh protests arose in the Haizhu District of Guangzhou late in the evening of 29 November. Witnesses said that roughly 100 police officers converged on the district's Houjiao village and arrested at least three of the protesters. Police were wearing hazmat suits and held riot shields to protect themselves from debris as they attempted to contain the demonstration.[95] Barriers were torn down, the crowd threw objects, possibly glass bottles, and tear gas was used. Local authorities later stated that businesses would be allowed to re-open and the lockdown would be lightened. Other city districts of Guangzhou also cancelled mass testing and lightened lockdowns.[93][96]

30 November

[edit]

Hundreds of government vans, SUVs, and armoured vehicles were parked along city streets; police and paramilitary forces continued to randomly check citizens' IDs and mobile phones, looking for foreign apps, photos of the protests, or other evidence that people had taken part. Online mentions of the protests continued to be deleted.[93]

Upon the death of former CCP general secretary Jiang Zemin on the same day at 12:13 local time, censors moved to restrict Weibo comments related to his death, as some Weibo users had begun to compare his presidency to the current administration, in thinly veiled criticisms of current CCP general secretary Xi Jinping.[97] Some protesters on Telegram groups mentioned his death as an opportunity to gather in his honour and vent anger against the government's policies.[98]

4 December

[edit]

Wuhan

[edit]

On 4 December, renewed protests broke out at Wuhan University, with students asking to be allowed to freely return home due to lockdown hardships which included frequent virus testing, reduced access to food, and insufficient hot water supply in some dormitory buildings. Students felt that these problems made remaining at the university untenable and protesters further demanded openness and transparency regarding the school's processes going forward. Protest organizers asked students not to hold up white papers or chant anti-government slogans in order to increase the odds of success and the university relented, allowing students to take classes in person or return home to attend classes remotely.[99][100]

5 December

[edit]

Nanjing

[edit]

Students at Nanjing Tech University protested against a COVID-19 lockdown after just one positive case was found at the university. The students were displeased with poor communication from the university and worried about not being able to travel home for the winter holidays. Videos of the protest were posted on Twitter, showing students shouting, "We want to go home!" and, "Leaders, step down!" as a police car arrived on the scene.[1]

Abroad

[edit]
Vigil outside of the Chinese Consulate in Toronto, Canada, on 27 November

A vigil attended by around 80 to 100 people was held on 27 November at Liberty Square in Taipei, Taiwan, in solidarity with the protests in China. Speakers included Wang Dan and Zhou Fengsuo, activists who participated in the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests.[101][102]

Protests and vigils have also taken place in other cities, including Tokyo, London, Brisbane, Paris, and Amsterdam.[103] A member of esports organisation Alliance was placed under investigation after she staged a solo protest outside the Chinese embassy in Tanglin, Singapore.[104]

In the United States, vigils held by overseas Chinese took place at a variety of universities, including Yale University, Stanford University, Harvard University, and Carnegie Mellon University. On 29 November, the New York-based Chinese Alliance for Democracy (CAD) made a declaration of support for pro-democracy protesters in the wake of the protests in Shanghai,[105] and further vigils took place outside Chinese diplomatic missions in the US, with approximately 400 people attending a vigil outside the Chinese consulate in New York City and roughly 200 outside the Chinese consulate in Chicago.[106][107] One day earlier, during a 28 November vigil at Columbia University, a 21-year-old protestor was beaten unconscious and hospitalized, though some witnesses claimed that the assailant had mistakenly attacked the wrong person and had intended to attack a female counterprotester who had just spoken to the crowd.[108]

Censorship and resistance

[edit]

The broadcasts of the 2022 FIFA World Cup in China showed scenes of spectators in Qatar without COVID-19 restrictions, in contrast to stringent lockdowns in China, after which protests erupted across China against COVID policies.[109] On 22 November, a social media post, titled Ten Questions, went viral on WeChat, asking the rhetorical question of whether Qatar was "on a different planet" for having minimal COVID-19 control measures.[110] The post was shortly taken down, but not before archives could be made outside of the Chinese Internet.[111] In response to the outburst of protests, Chinese state broadcaster CCTV cut close-up shots of the maskless audience and replaced them with shots of the players, officials, or venues.[112][113]

Protesters and their supporters spread information on the protests across social media, and received support from overseas groups in information security and evading censorship.[114] At the demonstration at Tsinghua University in Beijing on 27 November, the Friedmann equations were used as a sign of protest as a play on the physicist's last name, a near homophone for "free man", "freed man", or even "freedom".[115][116][117] Later that evening, protesters near Liangma Bridge began to chant ironically, "I want to do COVID tests! I want to scan my health code!", stimulating Weibo users into using similar phrases to avoid censorship.[118][119] Crowds everywhere preemptively sang "March of the Volunteers" and "The Internationale" to avoid being accused by authorities of being unpatriotic or incited by foreign forces.[120] Video clips of Xi Jinping's speeches were also used in protest, with people quoting his statement, "now the Chinese people are organized and aren't to be trifled with" to avoid censorship and express discontent.[117] Protesters have also adopted the phrase "banana peel, shrimp moss" in online discussions, since "banana peel" (香蕉皮) has the same Chinese pinyin initials as "Xi Jinping", and "shrimp moss" (虾苔) is a homophone of "step down" (下台) in Mandarin Chinese, albeit with different tones.[121]

Internet censors censored the images and videos circulating on Chinese social media, but then they began circulating on Twitter, which has long been blocked by the Great Firewall in China.[122][55] Many people from within China resorted to privately sending videos of protests to an overseas Twitter account named Teacher Li Is Not Your Teacher, who then posts these videos for the Western public to see. Li's following on Twitter soon quadrupled to 800,000, which included journalists and activists, and some of his videos were broadcast on television.[123]

On Twitter, Chinese-language hashtags for cities with active demonstrations were reportedly flooded with spam from accounts suspected to be Chinese government-run.[124][125][126] A similar phenomenon is observed in Chinese social media, where government work units employed a technique called "comment flooding". As the Ili (Yili) Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture in Xinjiang had entered a 40-plus day lockdown that deprived many of urgent medical care and other needs, the hashtag "Yili Super Topic" was filled with residents pleading for help. To counteract the negativity, a government directive was sent out, instructing work units to "open a campaign of comment flooding on this Weibo Super Topic in accordance with work practices from the autonomous prefecture’s training session for internet commentary personnel." According to the directive, comment flooding topics "may include domestic life, daily parenting, cooking, or personal moods. All internet commentary personnel should post once per hour (twice in total), but not in rapid succession! Repeat: not in rapid succession!"[127][128]

Pro-government responses

[edit]

Pro-government social media commentators portrayed protesters as unwitting pawns of "Western agents", and as followers of the Hong Kong pro-democracy movement.[92][129] They characterized the protests as "stirring up trouble [in] the typical colour revolution way". Protesters were also condemned for "using their worst malice to agitate members of the public who don't understand their true nature — especially university students and intellectuals whose heads are stuffed with Western ideas — to join in".[92]

Blank paper symbolism

[edit]
Blank pieces of paper stuck to the characters "自由" ("Freedom"), part of the Core Socialist Values slogan board at Xidian University, during the protests

Blank A4-sized sheets of paper quickly became a symbol of the protests, with protesters at Tsinghua University showing blank A4 sheets of paper to represent censorship in China.[130][69] Blank sheets of paper became a way for protesters to recognize like-minded others.[69] Protesters also carried white flowers, standing with paper or flowers at intersections.[82]

Chinese diaspora communities promoted the terms "white paper revolution" and "A4 revolution" on social media to describe the protests.[131] By 28 November, posts containing blank papers, harmless sentences, and Friedmann equations had been removed from Chinese social media platforms.[117][118]

Detentions

[edit]

Some demonstrators were detained immediately following the protests while still others were detained in the weeks to follow, charged with "picking quarrels and provoking trouble". Although some individuals were released soon afterwards, or just in advance of the Lunar New Year, others remained in detention or were formally charged.[132]

One Chinese woman accused Chinese authorities of forcing some to sign blank arrest warrants and detaining them in secret locations.[133]

According to the Beijing police department contacted by the NPR, the detentions involved a "national security matter".[134] Universities from the UK, US, and Australia confirmed that former Chinese students from their institutions had been detained following the protests and Reporters Without Borders noted that four of the detainees were journalists.[135]

Publishing house editor Cao Zhixin was released on 19 April 2023, alongside three of her friends who had also participated in the protests, after four months of police custody following her December 2022 detention.[136]

Reactions

[edit]

China

[edit]

PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said at a regular press conference on 28 November that, "On social media there are forces with ulterior motives that relate this fire with the local response to COVID-19",[137] and, "We believe that with the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and support of the Chinese people, our fight against COVID-19 will be successful."[138] Regarding the case of BBC News journalist Edward Lawrence being assaulted and briefly detained in Shanghai, he stated that he was aware of the situation, but claimed it was caused by Lawrence's failure to identify himself properly.[65]

The Chinese government signaled plans to ease restrictions. On 30 November, vice premier Sun Chunlan announced that pandemic controls were entering a "new stage and mission", adding that the Omicron variant is less virulent and that rectification of control methods were underway. Sun said local governments should "respond to and resolve the reasonable demands of the masses".[139]

On 1 December, Xi commented to European Council president Charles Michel that he believes students frustrated by the prolonged strict COVID measures were behind the protests.[140]

On 7 December, Lu Shaye, China's ambassador to France, linked the protests to foreign forces, arguing that the real protests only took place on the first day and were then controlled by foreign forces to "trigger a color revolution" and that "white is also a color".[141][142]

Hong Kong

[edit]

Hong Kong security minister Chris Tang claimed that demonstrators in solidarity with the mainland protests attempted to "incite [others] to target the central authorities", and that the activities held were "not random" and were "highly organised", while also claiming that some individuals who were "active in the black-clad violence in 2019" also took part in the events.[143]

International

[edit]

Countries

[edit]
  • Canada: Prime Minister Justin Trudeau expressed his support for freedom of speech in China.[144][145]
  • Germany: German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier asked Chinese authorities to "respect" the freedom of protesters and that he "understand[s] why people want to voice their impatience and grievance". He said that he hoped the Chinese authorities would respect the protesters' rights to freedom of expression and freedom of demonstration, and that the protests would remain peaceful.[146] German government spokesperson Steffen Hebestreit suggested that the Chinese government should address its strict COVID lockdown policies by administering Western-made mRNA vaccines, which Germany and Europe had a "very good experience with" and had allowed most countries to ease COVID restrictions.[147]
  • Republic of China (Taiwan): The Mainland Affairs Council of the Republic of China (Taiwan) called on the PRC to treat protesters peacefully and rationally and to gradually loosen up COVID restrictions.[148] The Democratic Progressive Party called on the government to actively listen and respond to the demands of the people.[149]
  • United Kingdom: In response to the arrest of BBC journalist Edward Lawrence, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak described it as "shocking and unacceptable" and that China was moving towards "even greater authoritarianism".[150][151] British Foreign Secretary James Cleverly called the incident "deeply disturbing" and it was "clear" that the people of China were "deeply unhappy" about the COVID restrictions.[152][153] Business Secretary Grant Shapps said that there was "absolutely no excuse whatsoever" for journalists covering the protests to be attacked by police.[154]
  • United States: The Biden administration, via National Security Council spokesman John Kirby, voiced support for the protests, and that President Biden was being briefed on the situation.[155][156][157] The U.S. Embassy in Beijing said that Ambassador Nick Burns had raised concerns directly with senior Chinese officials. A senior US official stated that the White House was very careful to not overstate the nature of the protest and recognised that the majority of the protests in a country with a large population of over one billion people appeared "small, localized, and aimed more at the narrow goals of ending the COVID lockdowns and securing better working conditions than a loftier push for democracy."[158] The embassy encouraged American citizens to keep a 14-day supply of water, food, and medication for their household.[159][160][161] On 1 December, Chief Medical Advisor to the President, Anthony Fauci, said that China's lockdowns were "draconian" and lacked a justifiable public health endgame. He added that China should instead focus on improving poor vaccination rates among its elderly population.[162]

International organizations

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  • European Union: A European Union foreign policy spokesperson said that the EU was following the protests closely without additional comment.[22]
  • United Nations: Jeremy Laurence, spokesperson for the UN Human Rights Office, called on Chinese authorities to respect the right to peaceful protest and that protesters should not be arrested for exercising that right.[153]

Multinational corporations

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  • Apple Inc.: An update to Apple's mobile operating system on 9 November restricted the company's AirDrop feature in China. The update automatically turns off sharing for anyone outside of the user's contacts after 10 minutes, making it more difficult to widely share protest images in China. On 5 December, Chinese activists began a hunger strike outside Apple's headquarters in Cupertino, California, demanding that AirDrop restrictions be lifted.[163]

Aftermath

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On 7 December 2022, the Chinese government lifted most of the most stringent rules, reducing lockdowns and allowing people tested positive for COVID-19 to quarantine at home instead of being detained in a hospital or mass quarantine site;[164] these changes effectively led to the end of the zero-COVID policy.[165][166] The central and several local governments dropped requirements for a negative test to enter public transport or parks, while retaining the testing and quarantine requirements for international arrivals. Pharmacies were allowed to sell anti-fever cold medications previously restricted in fear of circumventing temperature checks.[167]

An analysis by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) concluded that while the protests were likely not the sole determining factor for the change in government policy, they contributed to the speed of the government's decision. Economic issues caused by zero-COVID policies, including a slowing of economic growth and fears of harming China's global supply chains, were also identified by CFR to be a significant factor for the government.[23]

Effects on civic engagement

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Within the first ten days of 2023, protests had already been held targeting a diverse array of citizen concerns, from a province-wide ban on fireworks in Henan, to workers' rights at a COVID-19 test factory in Chongqing, and consumer protections at Tesla showrooms and distribution centers throughout China. Although local demonstrations regarding disconnected and disparate issues had occurred regularly in the past, the overall eagerness on behalf of some segments of the Chinese population to take public action on a variety of different causes has led some commentators to posit that the COVID-19 lockdown protests have led to a subtle societal shift toward the acceptability of public assembly to achieve policy aims.[168]

During smaller protests related to local fireworks bans in cities and towns across other parts of China, some local authorities caved to popular demand and repealed bans, particularly since some citizens saw the New Year's fireworks celebrations as a release of pent-up frustrations stemming from the lockdown period.[169]

2023 healthcare reform protests

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Protests erupted in Wuhan and Dalian on 15 February 2023, in response to new health insurance reforms related to ongoing struggles within China's healthcare system and cash-strapped localities struggling to recover from zero-COVID expenditures. Most of the demonstrators were elderly citizens who opposed recent changes to the local healthcare insurance system, claiming that the reforms would make medical care more costly and reduce their access to it.[170]

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In June 2023, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that a Uyghur university student, Kamile Wayit, was sentenced to prison for sharing videos of the protests on WeChat under the crime of "advocating extremism."[171]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The 2022 COVID-19 protests in China consisted of decentralized demonstrations across dozens of cities opposing the government's stringent containment strategy, which enforced prolonged lockdowns, mass testing, and centralized quarantines to suppress transmission. Sparked by a residential fire in Urumqi, , on November 24, 2022, that killed at least ten residents—officially attributed to the blaze but widely blamed on barriers erected under lockdown protocols that hindered evacuation—the unrest rapidly escalated from mourning vigils to broader calls for ending restrictions. Protests involved students, urban professionals, and residents in locations including , , , and university campuses such as Tsinghua and Southwest Jiaotong, where participants held white A4 sheets of paper as symbols of censored expression and chanted demands for freedom from lockdowns, with some instances escalating to criticism of leadership. One compilation recorded 77 mass gatherings in 39 cities between November 27 and December 8, 2022, marking the most widespread public dissent since the 1989 events, though participation remained fragmented and subject to swift suppression via arrests, enhanced surveillance, and online . In response, Chinese authorities on December 7, 2022, issued "20 optimization measures" effectively dismantling core elements, including mandatory quarantines for mild cases, mass testing, and circuit-breaker lockdowns, allowing home isolation and travel resumption amid mounting economic strain and the policy's diminishing feasibility against variants. This abrupt pivot, coinciding with protest peaks, averted immediate escalation but precipitated a sharp surge with unverified estimates, while underscoring the regime's prioritization of stability over sustained viral elimination, though official narratives attributed the shift to optimized prevention rather than .

Background

Zero-COVID Policy Rationale and Implementation

The policy, formally termed "dynamic zero-COVID," aimed to suppress transmission to near-zero levels within communities by rapidly identifying, isolating, and extinguishing outbreaks upon detection. This approach contrasted with mitigation strategies elsewhere, prioritizing elimination over or endemic management, and was rooted in China's centralized governance enabling swift, large-scale enforcement. The policy's foundational precedent was the lockdown initiated at 10:00 a.m. on January 23, 2020, which confined 11 million residents for 76 days, halting outbound travel and internal movement to contain the initial outbreak epicenter. Official rationale centered on averting healthcare system overload and mass fatalities, informed by Wuhan's early exponential case growth in late 2019 and early 2020, where unchecked spread risked thousands of daily deaths absent intervention. leadership, including President , framed it as a "people's war" against the virus, asserting empirical success in preserving lives by maintaining low case counts— reported fewer than 100,000 official deaths by late 2022, versus millions globally—while crediting the strategy with enabling economic recovery phases post-initial containment. Critics, including some epidemiological analyses, contend persistence into 2022 overlooked Omicron's lower case-fatality rate (around 0.1-0.3% in modeled scenarios for vaccinated populations) and global evidence of manageable waves, attributing longevity to political imperatives like demonstrating systemic superiority over Western models rather than purely data-driven adaptation. Implementation relied on a multi-layered system of and containment, including ubiquitous testing—scaling to millions daily in affected areas—digital health codes via apps like and that restricted movement based on infection risk scores, and aggressive networks often involving police and community workers. Centralized facilities housed close contacts and positives separately from households, with localized "static management" sealing neighborhoods or cities upon case confirmation; for instance, Shanghai's 2022 lockdown affected 25 million people for over two months. The "dynamic" element, refined around August 2021 amid Delta variant surges, permitted temporary restrictions lifted once transmission chains were broken, theoretically minimizing duration compared to absolute zero-tolerance. Border controls formed a core pillar, with mandatory 14-day (later variable) hotel quarantines for all inbound travelers, hotel-hopping prevention via national tracking, and flight suspensions from high-risk origins, sustaining domestic case counts below 100 monthly through much of 2020-2021. Enforcement drew on the , police, and grid-based community oversight, with non-compliance penalized via fines, detention, or social credit deductions; empirical tracking via apps facilitated real-time monitoring, though data opacity limited independent verification of efficacy claims. This framework, while containing imported and sporadic clusters effectively in early phases, escalated in scope with Omicron's transmissibility, prompting nationwide measures that locked down over 300 million people intermittently by November 2022.

Empirical Outcomes of Zero-COVID: Lives Saved vs. Economic and Social Costs

China's Zero-COVID policy, implemented from early 2020 through November 2022, resulted in exceptionally low reported COVID-19 deaths, with official figures totaling around 5,000 by the policy's end, compared to millions in many Western nations. Independent modeling estimates suggest the strategy prevented approximately 1 million deaths relative to less stringent approaches, particularly during the initial phases with more lethal variants, by achieving near-elimination of transmission through mass testing, contact tracing, and localized lockdowns. Excess all-cause mortality during this 35-month period was estimated at a negative 1.48 million relative to pre-pandemic baselines, implying fewer overall deaths than expected, potentially due to suppressed COVID cases alongside incidental reductions in other mortality causes like accidents. However, these outcomes relied on opaque official data, which independent analyses indicate systematically underreported COVID-related fatalities even during the policy, as evidenced by discrepancies with verifiable elite mortality records. The policy's termination in December 2022 triggered a rapid wave, with excess deaths estimated at 1.87 million among adults aged 30 and older in the first two months alone, far exceeding official reports of about 121,000 COVID deaths by May 2023. This surge, equivalent to 5-10 times normal rates in sentinel populations, highlighted how prolonged suppression delayed infections without building population immunity or deploying effective vaccines against variants, leading to a concentrated mortality burden upon reopening. Peer-reviewed models attribute much of this to the policy's success in early containment but failure to adapt to milder strains, where the marginal lives saved diminished while vulnerability to breakthrough outbreaks increased; counterfactual simulations projected 1.55 million deaths from without adjustment, but actual post-policy excess suggests the strategy merely postponed a comparable toll under less controlled conditions. Economically, imposed substantial costs, with direct pandemic-related societal burdens estimated at 2.7% of 2019 GDP in the first quarter of 2020 alone, escalating through repeated disruptions. China's GDP growth slowed to 3% in 2022 from over 8% pre-pandemic averages, driven by factory shutdowns, port delays, and reduced consumer spending, which exacerbated peaking above 20% and deepened local government debt via heightened public expenditures on testing and . These effects compounded structural issues, including real estate sector contraction and diminished foreign investment, with interruptions rippling globally but hitting domestic output hardest through enforced mobility restrictions. Socially, the policy's reliance on extended lockdowns—sometimes lasting months for hundreds of millions—affected profoundly, with surveys indicating 35% of residents experienced anxiety or depression amid isolation, alongside increased distress from closures impacting over 200 million students and disrupting continuity. Stringent measures correlated with elevated psychological strain in urban areas during Omicron outbreaks, including higher reports of behavioral issues in youth and broader societal fatigue, as seen in isolated incidents like the fire where lockdown protocols hindered evacuations. While early-phase benefits in averting healthcare overload were evident, the cumulative non-COVID harms—such as delayed medical care and eroded trust in governance—escalated by late 2022, with independent assessments questioning the policy's net value as variants evolved, given underreporting biases in state-controlled metrics that downplayed both immediate risks and long-term sequelae.

Preceding Grievances and Isolated Incidents

The policy's enforcement through prolonged lockdowns and quarantines fostered deep-seated grievances, as residents endured economic stagnation, supply chain disruptions, and restricted access to . Shanghai's lockdown, spanning late March to early June 2022 and affecting approximately 25 million people, exemplified these burdens, with widespread reports of food rationing failures, halted public transportation, and overwhelmed healthcare systems prioritizing COVID isolation over other treatments. These measures contributed to a national GDP reduction of about 3.9% in 2022 attributable to implementation, alongside localized contractions in and consumer spending. Health impacts extended beyond COVID-19, with lockdowns linked to increased non-COVID mortality from delayed care for chronic conditions, accidents, and mental health crises, including suicides amid enforced isolation. Public frustration intensified over arbitrary rule enforcement, such as the culling of pets suspected of carrying the virus and inconsistent exemptions for officials, eroding trust in local governance. Financial hardships were acute for migrant workers and small businesses, many of whom faced wage losses and closures without adequate compensation, amplifying perceptions of policy rigidity over human costs. Isolated incidents of punctuated this buildup, though they remained localized and suppressed. Between June and mid-November 2022, monitors documented at least 40 instances of protests against COVID restrictions, often involving residents confronting officials over extensions or testing mandates. A prominent case occurred at Foxconn's iPhone factory in late October 2022, where thousands of workers fled the campus amid disputes over unpaid bonuses and substandard dormitory conditions under rules; by November 22, demonstrations escalated into clashes with , with videos showing smashed surveillance equipment and barriers. These events highlighted labor vulnerabilities but failed to galvanize broader action, as authorities swiftly contained them through arrests and information controls.

Early Protest Sparks

Regional Labor and Lockdown Disputes

In October 2022, an outbreak of cases at Foxconn's massive assembly plant in , province—employing over 200,000 workers—led to intensified lockdowns, confining workers to dormitories with reports of insufficient food rations, poor , and delayed medical care. These conditions sparked initial unrest, culminating on when thousands of migrant workers, fearing further restrictions, surged out of the facility and boarded company-provided buses to return to their home provinces, amid unfulfilled promises of full pay for the disrupted "surge production" period. Wage disputes escalated as workers claimed Foxconn withheld bonuses averaging 7,000 yuan (about $980) per person and violated contracts by reducing base salaries during the , prompting complaints to local labor authorities and viral videos of confrontations with security guards in hazmat suits. On November 23, prior to the fire, protests intensified into open clashes involving hundreds of workers who gathered outside dormitories, hurling objects at police in riot gear, smashing windows and cameras, and demanding resolution to pay issues and an end to quarantines. These events at highlighted broader regional frictions in manufacturing centers like and , where enforcements disrupted supply chains and migrant labor flows; similar smaller-scale factory walkouts over confinement-related wage losses and supply shortages were reported in and during late October, though official data suppressed exact figures. responded by offering 10,000 yuan (about $1,400) exit bonuses to quitting workers and denying allegations, while authorities imposed citywide restrictions affecting 13 million residents to contain both the virus and unrest. Such incidents underscored causal links between prolonged lockdowns, economic for low-wage migrants, and sporadic defiance, predating wider urban protests.

Sitong Bridge Protest and Its Limited Echo

On October 13, 2022, , a resident of also known as Peng Zaizhou, staged a solitary by climbing the Sitong Bridge in 's Haidian District and unfurling two large banners with black characters on a white background, accompanied by shouts through a . The banners criticized China's policies and called for political change, with one reading in part: "No to PCR tests, yes to food; no to lockdowns, yes to ; no to lies, yes to dignity; no to , yes to constitutional rule; no to , yes to ." Peng also demanded Xi Jinping's removal, framing the protest as opposition to authoritarian control amid ongoing lockdowns enforced just before the Chinese Communist Party's 20th National Congress. Authorities swiftly dismantled the banners, detained Peng, and erased visible traces of the site, including its listing on online maps by mid-2023. The protest garnered immediate international attention but had negligible domestic resonance at the time due to stringent censorship and , which blocked images and discussions within , limiting dissemination to VPN users and communities. No coordinated copycat actions or public gatherings emerged in the following weeks, as omitted coverage and social platforms like suppressed related keywords, reflecting the Chinese government's capacity to isolate individual dissent amid pervasive monitoring. Analysts noted the act's boldness but attributed its containment to the absence of a catalyzing event like widespread hardship or tragedy, with public frustration over simmering but not yet erupting into collective action. Retrospective assessments, particularly after the November 24, 2022, Ürümqi fire that killed at least 10 and sparked nationwide protests, recast Peng's demonstration as a symbolic precursor or "spark in darkness," though its pre-fire influence remained confined to niche online dissident circles rather than mass mobilization. Peng's whereabouts post-arrest remain unknown as of 2024, with reports of his reported sentencing in 2025 underscoring the risks of such solo defiance under China's security apparatus, which prioritizes preemptive suppression over tolerance of even isolated critiques.

Trigger and Escalation: Ürümqi Fire

Details of the Ürümqi Apartment Fire

On November 24, 2022, a fire erupted in a 15-story residential building in the Jixiangyuan area of , the capital of China's Uyghur Autonomous Region. The official cause was an electrical wiring fault in a that ignited in a bedroom on the 15th floor; the fire spread to the 17th floor, with smoke reaching the 21st floor. At the time, the building and surrounding neighborhood had been under strict lockdown measures for over 100 days, with residents confined to their homes and some apartment doors physically chained or sealed to enforce isolation protocols. Official reports from local authorities and stated that the fire resulted in 10 and 9 injuries, primarily from and burns among residents trapped inside. Among the confirmed victims were Uyghur family members, including Qemernisa Abdurahman, aged 48, and her four youngest children aged 13, 11, 9, and 3. However, local residents and eyewitness accounts circulating online claimed a higher death toll, potentially exceeding 40, alleging underreporting by officials to minimize scrutiny of impacts. Escape efforts were severely hampered by the enforcement: physical barriers, including metal and welded , prevented residents from fleeing stairwells or exiting the building promptly, as many called for help from windows without means of evacuation. Firefighters arrived but faced delays attributed by witnesses to narrow access roads blocked by checkpoints and insufficient space for ladder trucks to maneuver in the high-rise scenario; emergency response took approximately three hours to fully extinguish the flames by 22:35. Local government officials denied that COVID protocols directly impeded firefighting, instead citing structural challenges and road barriers unrelated to epidemic controls. Subsequent investigations by affected families, particularly Uyghur households, have demanded accountability for these delays, pointing to systemic neglect under prolonged isolation as a causal factor in the elevated fatalities.

Immediate Local Reactions in Xinjiang

On the evening of November 25, 2022, hours after the fire's cause was widely attributed to barriers and delayed access, residents in began assembling in streets near the incident site and local government offices. Crowds, numbering in the hundreds according to eyewitness videos shared online, chanted "End the !" while overturning metal barricades installed for containment and blocking intersections with vehicles to demand policy reversal. These actions reflected immediate causal links drawn by participants between the enforcement—such as welded doors and restricted movement—and the fire's 10 fatalities, with protesters voicing frustration over bureaucratic hurdles that reportedly slowed entry by over 30 minutes. Local responses extended to online platforms, where residents posted videos and messages questioning official narratives that downplayed lockdown interference, including denials from city officials that building doors were externally secured. Among Uyghur communities, particularly affected given the victims' reported ethnic composition, families and advocates amplified calls for accountability, highlighting how prolonged regional restrictions had isolated neighborhoods and impeded routine safety protocols. By November 26, gatherings persisted into the night, with some participants linking the incident to broader grievances over Xinjiang's extended lockdowns, which had persisted for over three months in parts of the region, leading to sporadic clashes as police deployed to disperse crowds using loudspeakers and barriers. Authorities responded swiftly with partial concessions, announcing eased restrictions in on November 26, including lifted testing requirements and permission for low-risk areas to resume operations, though enforcement varied and protests highlighted skepticism toward such measures as insufficient. No widespread violence was reported in initial Xinjiang reactions, but the events marked a rare public breach of quiescence in the region, fueled by from the fire's aftermath—such as charred escape routes obstructed by pandemic fixtures—rather than abstract .

Rapid Spread to Major Cities (26-28 November)

On 26 November 2022, protests in solidarity with the fire victims escalated beyond , reaching major urban centers including , , and , where participants held candlelight vigils that transitioned into open criticism of restrictions. In , crowds numbering in the hundreds gathered on Urumqi Road—named after the city—to mourn the deceased, but chants soon demanded an end to lockdowns, with some holding blank sheets of as a of censored dissent. Reports indicated at least 80-110 detentions in that night, though many were reportedly released shortly after. The following day, 27 November, demonstrations proliferated to additional cities such as , , and , with university campuses emerging as hotspots; over 100 institutions across hosted vigils or protests by this point, often involving students arranging candles in symbolic shapes like hearts to commemorate the fire victims while voicing frustration over lockdown enforcement. In and , gatherings similarly blended mourning with calls for policy reversal, drawing parallels to the fire's alleged exacerbation by barriers hindering escape. By 28 November, the unrest peaked in , where at least 1,000 protesters assembled along the Liangma River in the early hours, waving blank papers and chanting against restrictions, marking a rare public challenge in the capital. Overall, verified reports documented demonstrations in at least 17 cities by this timeframe, fueled by coordination despite , though participation remained decentralized and varied from dozens to thousands per site. Police presence intensified in response, conducting searches at protest sites in and to curb further assembly.

Peak Protests and Symbolism

White Paper Demonstrations and Tactics

The White Paper Movement, also known as the demonstrations, A4 protests or blank sheet protests, emerged as a central tactic in the 2022 COVID-19 protests in China, symbolizing resistance to government censorship under the policy. These protests involved holding up blank sheets of white A4 paper to represent the suppression of free expression, where explicit criticism could lead to detention, allowing participants to convey implicitly while evading immediate digital surveillance and content filters. The color white, traditionally associated with mourning in , further underscored grief over lockdown-related deaths, such as those from the November 24, 2022, Ürümqi fire. These demonstrations typically involved non-violent gatherings in public spaces, universities, and residential areas, where participants stood silently or in small groups displaying the blank papers, often accompanied by lit candles, smartphone flashlights, or chants like "No to lockdowns" and demands for freedom of speech. Tactics emphasized decentralization to avoid centralized crackdowns, with protests spreading organically from university campuses—such as Tsinghua University in Beijing and Xidian University in Xi'an—to urban streets in cities including Shanghai and Nanjing starting November 26, 2022. In Shanghai's Wuzhong district, a candlelight vigil escalated into a larger assembly where hundreds raised blank sheets, linking arms and singing protest songs before police intervention dispersed the crowd. The use of blank paper facilitated viral dissemination online via platforms like and before intensified, with images and videos of the sheets amplifying the message globally and inspiring solidarity actions abroad. Protesters adapted by affixing papers to public boards or statues inscribed with altered slogans, such as overlaying blank sheets on "" displays, to subvert official messaging without direct confrontation. While largely peaceful, some gatherings faced police and arrests, prompting participants to employ evasion strategies like quick dispersals and reliance on anonymous coordination through VPNs and encrypted apps. This symbolic minimalism highlighted the protests' focus on critiquing systemic restrictions rather than organized political overthrow, though isolated instances included calls for leadership changes.

Chronology of Key Urban Outbreaks (Shanghai, Beijing, Others)

In , protests began on November 26, 2022, with hundreds gathering for a on Wulumuqi Road to commemorate victims of the fire, during which participants held blank sheets of paper and chanted slogans demanding an end to lockdowns, , and even the resignation of and the . The following day, November 27, demonstrations escalated as hundreds clashed with police in the same area, holding blank papers as symbols of censored dissent, shouting "Down with the , down with ," and calling for freedom from COVID restrictions, prompting arrests including the detainment of dozens escorted onto buses. Reports indicated 80 to 110 individuals detained in amid the unrest. In Beijing, initial student-led actions emerged on November 27 at , where dozens gathered peacefully to sing the in defiance of lockdown policies. Protests expanded that evening to include residents and students from marching against restrictions and for broader political freedoms, encountering police cordons. By the early hours of November 28, over 1,000 people assembled near the Liangma River, voicing opposition to measures and echoing nationwide calls to end lockdowns. Protests simultaneously outbreak in other major cities on November 27, including , where thousands held blank papers and chanted against "lifelong rulers" and authoritarian control while demanding an end to COVID curbs. In , hundreds smashed COVID barricades and sang the in acts of resistance. saw mass demonstrations joining the wave, building on earlier barrier-toppling incidents earlier in the month amid a surge in infections. Additional outbreaks occurred in cities like and on university campuses across at least 17 locations, with actions verified from November 25 onward but peaking over the November 26-27 weekend.

Overseas Solidarity and Online Amplification

Protests in solidarity with the Chinese demonstrators emerged in at least a cities worldwide by November 28, 2022, including gatherings on university campuses and in expatriate communities. These events often featured participants holding blank sheets of paper, mirroring the symbolic tactic used domestically to evade while expressing dissent against restrictions. In , , demonstrators rallied outside the Chinese consulate on November 27, 2022, chanting slogans and displaying signs critical of the policies. Candlelight vigils and demonstrations occurred at institutions such as the , where students commemorated the fire victims and voiced support for ending lockdowns, with signage referencing Urumqi Road—the Beijing site of a prominent protest. Similar actions took place in European cities and among diaspora groups, fostering a sense of transnational unity among activists opposing 's controls, though participation remained limited compared to domestic scale. Online platforms outside China's Great Firewall played a crucial role in amplifying protest footage and narratives, as domestic users employed VPNs to upload videos to and despite Weibo and other local sites' rapid . By late November 2022, saw heightened activity, including over 3,500 accounts frequently referencing major Chinese cities in protest-related posts from November 21 to 30, though some were suspected bots potentially inflating visibility. This external digital dissemination helped sustain momentum by sharing unfiltered accounts of gatherings in , , and other locales, countering state media's minimization of the events.

Government Handling

Immediate Policy Shifts and Reopening Signals

On November 30, 2022, Vice Premier publicly stated that the variant exhibited lower pathogenicity compared to earlier strains, signaling a softening of China's strict containment strategy amid ongoing protests. This remark, delivered during a , marked one of the first high-level acknowledgments that the virus's evolution warranted adjustments to measures, coinciding with reports of localized easings in areas like and where protests had erupted. On December 1, 2022, President addressed frustrations with policies during a virtual meeting with European leaders, describing the measures as a response to public concerns and hinting at optimizations without directly referencing the protests. This followed scattered reports of municipal authorities lifting some quarantines and reducing mass testing requirements in response to local unrest, though central directives remained cautious. The most significant immediate policy shift occurred on December 7, 2022, when the State Council approved the "20 Optimization Measures" for prevention and control, which eliminated routine nucleic acid testing mandates, allowed mild cases to isolate at home rather than in centralized facilities, and removed health code checks for most domestic travel. These changes effectively dismantled core elements of the framework, with implementation beginning almost immediately in major cities, reflecting a rapid pivot attributed officially to the virus's reduced severity but temporally linked to the protest wave that peaked two weeks prior. Local governments reported compliance surges, including the reopening of public venues and suspension of area-wide lockdowns by mid-December.

Censorship Mechanisms and Pro-Government Mobilization

In late November 2022, following the outbreak of protests sparked by the fire, Chinese authorities escalated censorship to an "emergency level," intensifying content removal and keyword filtering across domestic platforms such as , , and Douyin. This involved automated and manual deletion of posts referencing protest symbols like blank A4 paper, chants of ", step down," or the incident, with censors prioritizing real-time suppression of viral videos and images shared from protest sites in cities including and . Authorities also pressured platforms to limit algorithmic promotion of dissent-related content, while enhancing surveillance of user accounts suspected of organizing or amplifying calls to end measures. Protesters adapted by employing circumvention tools like VPNs to upload material to international platforms such as and , though domestic access to these was further restricted, and outbound sharing faced intermittent blocks. Furthermore, Chinese-language searches on Twitter were flooded with pornographic spam from bot accounts, obscuring real-time information on the protests. This tactic was later confirmed by X product head Nikita Bier as a method employed by the Chinese government during periods of political turmoil to interfere with information access. Post-protest, extended to historical erasure, including the silencing of independent documentarians attempting to compile or interviews, and the removal of archived content to prevent commemoration of the events. This multi-layered approach, combining technical filters with human oversight, effectively contained the domestic visibility of the protests, though leaks persisted via overseas channels until mid-December 2022 when policy shifts muted further escalation. Parallel to censorship, the government mobilized pro-policy narratives through state-controlled media, which largely omitted coverage of the protests themselves and instead emphasized the strategy's purported successes in safeguarding , framing any as marginal or externally influenced. Official outlets like Xinhua and highlighted internal policy reviews as the driver for subsequent easing of restrictions announced on December 7, 2022, portraying the leadership's responsiveness as evidence of adaptive governance rather than concession to . Online, pro-government commentators—potentially including state-affiliated efforts—amplified messages of national unity and criticism of protesters as unpatriotic or manipulated by foreign actors, dominating permitted on platforms where anti-lockdown content was scrubbed. This selective amplification, coupled with , sustained an environment where supportive voices for prior policies appeared predominant domestically, contributing to a of broad compliance even as isolated surveys indicated varied public sentiment.

Detentions, Surveillance, and Containment Measures

Authorities deployed and erected physical barriers to contain gatherings in major cities following the outbreak of demonstrations on November 26, 2022. In Shanghai's Urumqi Road area, blue were installed, accompanied by a heavy police presence to block access and disperse crowds. Similar measures included police cordons in , where officers formed lines to restrict movement during vigils on November 27. In Urumqi, security forces blocked roads and surrounded sites to prevent escalation after initial unrest on November 25. Dozens of individuals were detained during the peak days, with reports of 80 to 110 in alone on the night of , primarily for participating in peaceful assemblies. Online sources documented additional detentions on Urumqi Road that evening, though exact figures remain unverified due to restricted information flow. Post-protest crackdowns intensified quietly in January 2023, targeting participants through home visits and summons, with several held for weeks or months without formal charges. Specific cases included the of four women in December 2022 on charges of "picking quarrels and provoking trouble," and the January 2023 of filmmaker Chen Pinlin for recording footage. Some detainees, such as a vigil participant, were released after four months in 2023. Overall numbers are opaque, with estimates suggesting hundreds affected nationwide, though Chinese authorities have not released official tallies. Surveillance played a central role in identifying and deterring protesters, leveraging China's extensive network of cameras, facial recognition, and digital monitoring. Police conducted phone searches for prohibited apps and protest-related content during street checks in late November 2022. Officials visited residences of suspected participants to issue warnings, drawing on data from scans and location tracking. This enabled a "silent " extending into 2023, where local authorities used party-state tools to locate demonstrators without public announcements. In high- regions like protest hotspots, such measures facilitated targeted detentions while minimizing visible confrontation. Protesters adapted by using blank papers to evade keyword-based and communicating via overseas channels to bypass domestic filters. Containment extended to site-specific restrictions, with police physically sealing off vigil locations and increasing patrols to preempt gatherings. In Shanghai and Beijing, barriers and officer deployments prevented recurrence at symbolic sites like Urumqi Road. These tactics, combined with warnings to universities and communities, aimed to restore order without acknowledging dissent, aligning with broader efforts to erase protest memory through enforced silence. While effective in quelling immediate unrest, such measures drew international criticism for suppressing peaceful expression, though domestic reporting framed them as necessary for public safety.

Domestic Viewpoints

Evidence of Broad Support for Prior Policies

Surveys conducted in the early stages of the revealed high levels of public satisfaction with China's policies, particularly following the in early 2020. A study tracking urban residents from February to May 2020 reported trust in the central government increasing from 8.7 to 8.9 on a 10-point scale, alongside a rise in preference for China's political system from 4.1 to 4.3 on a 5-point scale, attributing this rally effect to perceived effective containment of the virus. Similarly, a survey in late April 2020 among 613 respondents affiliated with Chinese universities found 89% rating national government information handling as satisfactory (4 or 5 on a 5-point scale) and 81% satisfied with provision of necessities during restrictions. This support persisted into 2022 prior to major urban lockdowns, with the same UCSD showing trust at 8.6 out of 10 in March 2022, reflecting sustained approval for policies that kept official deaths below 5,000 nationwide through November. A separate survey of 2,627 residents in lockdown-affected cities including , Shulan, and indicated 60.9% held positive views of lockdown performance, linking satisfaction to timely government responses, , and disclosure, as validated by analysis. These findings, drawn from online and university-based samples, suggest broad compliance and endorsement stemmed from observable outcomes like suppressed infection rates, though self-reported data in an authoritarian context may understate dissent due to . Public cooperation further evidenced policy backing, as voluntary adherence to mass testing and localized quarantines enabled to report near-zero community transmission for extended periods between 2020 and mid-2022, fostering a of in state communications and bolstering regime legitimacy. State media portrayed frontline medics, volunteers, and social workers as "逆行者" (nìxíngzhě), heroes who went against the flow by rushing to combat the pandemic, emphasizing their sacrifices for the public good to sustain support for strict containment measures. Even as economic strains mounted, pre- metrics highlighted resilience in approval, with the approach credited for averting the high mortality seen elsewhere, such as over 1 million excess deaths estimated in the United States by comparable dates. Declines in trust, evident only after prolonged disruptions like the March–June 2022 lockdown (dropping to 7.8/10 by ), underscore that earlier support was tied to perceived health successes rather than uniform endurance of restrictions.

Criticisms from Affected Groups and Economic Hardship Narratives

owners and migrant workers, among the most directly impacted by prolonged , articulated criticisms of China's , emphasizing irrecoverable financial losses and disrupted livelihoods. In Shanghai's extended from March to May 2022, which confined over 25 million residents, thousands of shuttered permanently, with owners reporting average losses exceeding 1 million yuan (about $140,000 USD) per due to halted operations and spoiled inventory. These groups highlighted how arbitrary enforcement—such as sudden neighborhood seal-offs without adequate supplies—exacerbated , leading to narratives of overreach prioritizing virus suppression over economic survival. Migrant workers, comprising a significant portion of China's urban labor force, faced mass layoffs and wage arrears amid factory halts, fueling protests that intertwined health restrictions with economic desperation. At Foxconn's iPhone assembly plant in , workers demonstrated in late October 2022 against unpaid salaries and coercive quarantine measures, with reports indicating delays in wages for up to two months affecting tens of thousands. Similar grievances surfaced in Guangzhou's Haizhu district in mid-November 2022, where construction and service sector workers clashed with police over extended quarantines that severed income streams, amid broader economic indicators showing reaching 19.9% in July 2022 before official data reporting paused. Economic hardship narratives extended to the middle class, who decried the zero-COVID strategy's contribution to stagnant growth and eroded savings, with China's GDP expanding only 3% in 2022—its slowest pace in decades outside major crises—attributed partly to lockdown-induced supply chain disruptions and consumer spending declines. Critics from these strata, including professionals in tech and real estate, portrayed the policies as causally linked to a property sector crisis and reduced foreign investment, amplifying calls during November 2022 vigils for policy reversal to avert deeper recession. These accounts, disseminated via encrypted apps before censorship intensified, underscored a perceived mismatch between official claims of controlled outbreaks and tangible costs like depleted household reserves and business bankruptcies.

Claims of Foreign Influence and Disruptive Elements

Chinese officials attributed elements of the 2022 protests to external interference, portraying them as orchestrated by "foreign forces" aiming to incite instability akin to color revolutions. On December 15, 2022, , China's ambassador to France, asserted that genuine domestic discontent manifested only on the protests' initial day, with subsequent escalation driven by outsiders who amplified slogans and tactics to provoke broader unrest. He likened the "" demonstrations to foreign-backed movements, though he declined to provide supporting evidence when pressed. Following protests in , Beijing's top security official vowed to suppress "hostile forces" and "foreign forces" perceived as exploiting public grievances. echoed these narratives, accusing Western entities of seeding discord through online amplification and tactical guidance, framing the unrest as a hybrid of organic frustration and deliberate disruption rather than purely spontaneous action. Officials suggested infiltrators introduced anti-regime chants, such as calls for leadership changes, which deviated from initial lockdown-specific demands triggered by the November 24 Urumqi fire that killed at least 10 people. These allegations extended to potential scapegoating of actors like and the , with Taiwanese officials preemptively dismissing any incitement claims as baseless while noting the protests' organic roots in policy failures. No verifiable evidence of coordinated foreign involvement—such as funding, training, or direct agitation—emerged from public records or investigations, with analyses attributing the protests' scale to cumulative domestic hardships from prolonged measures rather than external manipulation. Chinese authorities' emphasis on disruptive elements served to justify heightened and detentions post-protests, targeting individuals suspected of amplifying foreign narratives online or in gatherings.

International Reactions

State and Diplomatic Responses

The United States government, through White House spokesperson John Kirby, criticized China's zero-COVID policies on November 28, 2022, stating that the Chinese people have a "fundamental right" to peacefully protest without facing arrest or harassment. The Biden administration emphasized concerns over the policies' substantive failures rather than directly condemning police actions against demonstrators, reflecting a cautious approach amid ongoing U.S.-China tensions. U.S. officials anticipated potential policy adjustments by Beijing to address public discontent but assessed that the protests were unlikely to escalate into broader political upheaval. The adopted a resolution on December 15, 2022, urging the Chinese government to immediately cease suppression and intimidation of peaceful protesters, and to uphold including and expression. This stance aligned with broader EU calls for to handle demonstrations in accordance with international standards, though no coordinated diplomatic sanctions followed. The High Commissioner for , Volker Türk, on November 28, 2022, called upon Chinese authorities to ensure responses to the protests complied with , including refraining from arbitrary arrests and excessive use of force. This echoed appeals from multiple world leaders for to respect protesters' rights to peaceful assembly. Other states, including the and , issued statements supporting the while monitoring developments, but avoided escalatory measures; for instance, Foreign Office remarks focused on without specific policy shifts toward . Overall, diplomatic responses remained limited to verbal advocacy for rights observance, prioritizing stability in bilateral relations over confrontation.

Media Portrayals and NGO Assessments

outlets extensively covered the 2022 protests, framing them as a rare and significant outbreak of public dissent against the Chinese Communist Party's policies, often likening them to the largest demonstrations since the 1989 events. Coverage emphasized the protests' origins in the Urumqi apartment fire, which killed at least 10 people amid barriers, sparking vigils that evolved into broader chants for ending restrictions and, in some cases, demands for political freedoms like "Xi Jinping step down." Outlets highlighted symbolic acts, such as holding blank A4 sheets to evade censorship, portraying these as emblematic of suppressed frustration among urban youth and middle-class professionals exhausted by prolonged quarantines and economic disruptions. In contrast, official Chinese state media, including outlets like Xinhua and , provided minimal or no direct coverage of the protests, instead focusing on narratives supportive of the government's handling of and portraying any unrest as isolated incidents potentially instigated by foreign influences. This approach aligned with broader efforts, where domestic platforms rapidly scrubbed videos and discussions, leading to a "cat-and-mouse" dynamic between netizens and censors. State-affiliated reporting post-protests shifted emphasis to the policy pivot away from in early December 2022, without acknowledging protester influence, while later efforts included erasing online traces of the events to suppress . Human Rights Watch (HRW) assessed the protests as "unprecedented nationwide" actions against draconian restrictions, documenting peaceful demonstrations in over a dozen cities and urging authorities to respect the while condemning subsequent arrests and of participants. similarly portrayed the "White Paper Movement" as a pivotal expression of triggered by the Urumqi , interviewing detained protesters and highlighting systemic repression, including enforced disappearances and use of vague laws to silence critics, though both organizations' reports drew from eyewitness accounts and amid limited on-ground access. These NGOs attributed the protests' scale—estimated in the thousands across urban centers—to accumulated grievances from policy enforcement, while critiquing the government's response as exacerbating human rights abuses rather than addressing root causes like .

Corporate and Economic Implications

The protests, erupting on November 24-27, 2022, initially triggered declines in global stock markets amid fears of prolonged disruptions from China's policy, with major indices like the and Europe's STOXX 600 falling approximately 0.5-1% on November 28 due to concerns over instability and economic slowdown. These reactions reflected investor apprehension that unrest could extend lockdowns, exacerbating China's 2022 GDP growth contraction to 3%—the lowest in decades outside major crises—and amplifying global bottlenecks already strained by prior quarantines. The subsequent abrupt abandonment of measures, announced on December 7, 2022, reversed sentiment, spurring a rally in Chinese equities with the surging nearly 30% in ensuing weeks as factories and ports resumed operations, easing pressures on multinational corporations reliant on Chinese production. Foreign firms, including automakers and tech giants, had lobbied against the policy's toll on revenues—evident in profit collapses for exporters like Apple and Tesla during 2022 lockdowns—prompting accelerated diversification of supply chains to alternatives such as and to mitigate recurrence of such volatility. Longer-term, the events heightened corporate caution toward , contributing to net foreign direct investment outflows of $11.8 billion in Q3 2023, as executives cited political unpredictability and policy reversals undermining business predictability despite nominal reforms like lifted foreign ownership caps in select sectors. This shift underscored a broader derisking trend, with global firms reducing exposure from 20-30% of footprints pre-2020 to under 15% by 2023, prioritizing resilience over cost advantages amid demonstrated risks of sudden halts.

Aftermath

Abrupt End of Zero-COVID and Resulting COVID Surge

On December 7, , China's issued "Ten New Measures" that effectively dismantled the policy, allowing high-risk areas to downgrade emergency responses, eliminating centralized quarantines for asymptomatic and mild cases, reducing mandatory PCR testing, and permitting home isolation for positive individuals. These changes followed widespread protests and marked an abrupt pivot from three years of stringent controls, with officials citing improved rates and antiviral availability as enabling factors, though elderly coverage remained low at around 65% for boosters. The policy reversal triggered a rapid nationwide surge in Omicron variant infections, with daily cases escalating from under 1,000 reported in early to millions by mid-December, as pent-up transmission dynamics overwhelmed surveillance systems. Hospitals in major cities like and faced severe strain, with emergency rooms overflowing, oxygen shortages reported, and funeral homes backlogged; from crematoriums indicated processing up to ten times normal volumes. China's narrow official definition of deaths—limited to in hospitals—excluded fatalities from cardiovascular complications or those occurring at home, contributing to underreporting amid decentralized tracking post-policy shift. Official data from the National Health Commission tallied 59,938 COVID-related deaths between December 8, 2022, and January 12, 2023, predominantly among the elderly in medical facilities. Independent estimates, however, derived from excess mortality analyses, projected far higher tolls: a CDC modeling study calculated 1.41 million deaths from December 2022 to February 2023, while a JAMA Network Open analysis of sentinel surveillance data estimated 1.87 million excess all-cause deaths among those aged 30 and older in December 2022–January 2023 alone. These figures align with projections from infection-fatality ratios of 0.1–0.2% for Omicron applied to an estimated 80–90% national infection rate, highlighting vulnerabilities from inadequate prior exposure and limited severe-case immunity in the population. Peer-reviewed excess mortality studies confirmed spikes of 200–242% in death rates for those over 60 during the wave, concentrated in urban areas with higher case burdens.

Health and Mortality Data Post-Reopening

Following the abrupt termination of China's policy on December 7, 2022, through the issuance of "20 optimization measures" by the , the country experienced a rapid surge in infections dominated by the variant. Official reports from the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention indicated approximately 83,150 in-hospital deaths between December 8, 2022, and February 9, 2023, with cumulative confirmed deaths reaching around 121,000 by May 2023. These figures, however, were limited to hospital fatalities where was designated as the primary cause, systematically excluding community deaths, non-hospitalized cases, and those attributed to comorbidities, leading to substantial undercounting. Independent analyses using excess all-cause mortality methods—comparing observed deaths against pre-pandemic baselines adjusted for demographics and —revealed far higher tolls. A study in estimated 1.87 million excess deaths among individuals aged 30 and older during December 2022 and January 2023, derived from vital statistics and obituary data indicating spikes in cardiovascular, respiratory, and infectious disease mortality. Similarly, research published in Emerging Infectious Diseases projected 1.41 million COVID-19-attributable deaths over the 35 days immediately following policy relaxation, based on sentinel surveillance of infection fatality ratios (around 0.1-0.3% for ) applied to modeled infection volumes exceeding 80% national seroprevalence by early 2023. Another analysis in inferred approximately 712,000 excess deaths from December 2022 to February 2023, corroborated by elevated rates and regional reports. These estimates aligned with vulnerabilities exposed by prolonged enforcement, including limited hybrid immunity—fewer than 20% of elderly individuals had received booster vaccinations—and high susceptibility among the geriatric population, where infection fatality rates reached 1-5% in unvaccinated or waning-immunity cohorts. was disproportionately concentrated in urban areas and among those over 60, with some models suggesting national totals of 1.3-2.6 million deaths by February 2023 when extrapolating from elite obituary tracking and provincial data. Health system strain was evident in reports of overwhelmed hospitals and pharmacies during the peak, though official metrics downplayed non-fatal sequelae like , with post-surge serosurveys indicating widespread but uneven exposure. By March 2023, case positivity rates declined sharply, signaling wave subsidence, yet the disparity between official and estimated figures underscored challenges in transparent epidemiological accounting.

Long-Term Civic Impacts and Policy Lessons

The 2022 protests prompted an abrupt termination of China's zero-COVID policy on December 7, 2022, illustrating a key policy lesson that prolonged strict lockdowns, despite initial successes, generated unsustainable economic and social pressures capable of catalyzing nationwide unrest. This reversal, announced shortly after demonstrations peaked, underscored the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) pragmatic responsiveness to perceived threats to regime stability, prioritizing containment of dissent over ideological consistency in measures. However, the policy shift also exposed risks of rapid reopening, as subsequent surges overwhelmed healthcare systems, with official data reporting over 60,000 deaths in the first two months post-reopening, though independent estimates suggested higher figures due to underreporting. Civically, the events fostered fleeting surges in but yielded no enduring , as authorities swiftly deployed enhanced , arrests, and digital to deter replication. Freedom House's China Dissent Monitor documented over 5,455 dissent events from June 2022 onward, including a post-protest uptick in labor strikes over unpaid wages starting in early 2023, indicating that while zero-COVID grievances subsided, underlying civic frustrations—rooted in rights violations—persisted and diversified. Yet, domestic memory suppression intensified; by 2023-2025, references to the protests were systematically erased from online platforms, maps, and public discourse, with actions like jailing a filmmaker in January 2025 for documenting the events signaling a deliberate to prevent mythologization or . This approach, per assessments, effectively stifled commemorations and broader democratic emulation, reinforcing CCP control amid reports of ongoing disillusionment with governance. A broader lesson for the CCP was the vulnerability of urban, educated youth to horizontal coordination via , prompting refined digital repression tactics that prioritized preemptive video over reactive crackdowns. Surveys indicated a temporary "rally effect" bolstering central government confidence during early phases, but the protests revealed its erosion when policies imposed tangible hardships, teaching that public support hinges on balancing efficacy with livability rather than coercion alone. Internationally, the episode highlighted causal trade-offs in authoritarian : zero-tolerance strategies mitigated initial viral spread but amplified secondary civic costs, informing global debates on proportionality in without yielding replicable models for management. No evidence emerged of systemic reforms toward greater ; instead, the CCP doubled down on narrative control, framing the unrest as exogenous or minimal to preserve legitimacy.

Recent Developments and Suppressed Memory (2023-2025)

In the aftermath of the 2022 protests, Chinese authorities implemented extensive censorship measures to erase public memory of the events, including blocking keywords related to the movement on platforms like and detaining individuals involved in documentation efforts. Filmmaker Chen Pinlin, using the pseudonym , was arrested in January 2023 for producing a documentary on the protests and charged on February 18, 2023, with "picking quarrels and provoking trouble," a charge carrying up to five years' imprisonment; his detention exemplified the crackdown on . Other participants, such as Uyghur student Kamile Wayit, faced charges of "promoting " for sharing protest videos, while figures like , whose solitary demonstration inspired the unrest, remained disappeared. On the first anniversary in November 2023, domestic commemorations were preemptively suppressed through heightened surveillance, harassment of potential participants, and continued content restrictions, prompting to demand the release of detained protesters and an end to censorship. Abroad, activists organized vigils and shared personal accounts of trauma, arrests, and family repercussions, with many protesters like those interviewed by describing persistent fear but also a commitment to preserving the events' significance through diaspora networks. State responses combined repression with information blackouts, fostering apathy among some while disillusionment with government handling persisted among others. By the second anniversary in November 2024, domestic discourse remained , with protest-related terms still censored and reports of transnational repression targeting exiles, including abroad. Overseas events in cities like , , and drew crowds holding candles, blank papers, and white masks, where participants recounted beatings, forced confessions, and economic hardships under prior policies, emphasizing the movement's role in ending despite Beijing's tightening controls. Into 2025, suppression extended to broader digital restrictions, with regional rising amid general increases in dissent tracking over 11,000 cases since 2022, though specific references to the protests evoked risks of detention. Personal testimonies from participants highlighted enduring psychological impacts and a shift toward advocacy abroad, underscoring how official narratives omitted the unrest while grassroots efforts abroad sustained against state erasure.

References

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