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General Operations Force
Pasukan Gerakan Am
Active1 August 1948 : Jungle Squad
1963 : Police Field Force
1997–present : General Operations Force
Country British Malaya (1948–1957)
Malaya (1948—1963)
 Malaysia (1963–present)
Branch Royal Malaysia Police
TypeParamilitary, Light infantry, Gendarmerie
RoleDomestic counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, multi-security service, VIPs Close Protection, Border Patrol and law enforcement
Size12,000 Personnel (Feb 2014)
  • Light infantry (20 battalions)
  • Armored squadrons (six squadrons)
  • Special platoon (one platoon)
Part of Internal Security and Public Order Department
Garrison/HQTraining Centre: Ulu Kinta, Ipoh, Perak
NicknamesPolis Hutan
(Jungle Squad lit. Jungle Police)
Mottos"Cekal, Berani, Setia"
("Gallant, Brave, Loyal")
Colour of Beret  Dark blue - Standard light infantry
  Maroon - Senoi Praaq
  • (Both of GOF berets with    yellow liner at beret insignia)
AnniversariesMarch 25 (Police Day)
August 31 (Independence Day)
EngagementsMalayan Emergency 1948-1960
Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation
Communist insurgency in Malaysia (1968–89)
13 May Incident
Reformation Raid
Ops Fire Palm 2
UNMIT
2013 Lahad Datu standoff

The General Operations Force (Malay: Pasukan Gerakan Am; PGA, Jawi: ڤاسوكن ڬرقن عام) is the light infantry arm of the Royal Malaysia Police. The General Operations Force was established in 1948 during the Malayan Emergency by the British Administration when Malaya was a colony. The police service was mobilised to the field role, primarily to engaging Communist guerrillas during the emerging Insurgency. When Malaysia was formed in 1963, this law enforcement unit was then known as the Police Field Force (Malay: Pasukan Medan Polis; PMP). The title was adopted when it dropped the previous handle widely referred to as the Jungle Squad (Malay: Pasukan Polis Hutan; PPH).

History

[edit]
The Police Jungle Squad officers during a jungle patrol.
Two communist guerillas after captured by Jungle Squad officers from their communist camp in the jungle.

The Jungle Squad was based on the Malay States Guides (Malay: Pasukan Pengawal Negeri-negeri Melayu Bersekutu) which was formed in 1826.[1] The Malay States Guides was a paramilitary force with an initial strength of 900 members and was led by R. S. F. Walker as its first commandant. The regiment was involved in World War I and together with Field Force Aden, they fought Ottoman forces in the Southwest of South Arabia (now Saudi Arabia) for five years. The regiment was disbanded for reasons of economy in 1919.

The British Military Administration (BMA) had mobilised the police General Duties to assume the role of the military effort against the insurgencies. The Jungle Squad was established in 1948 for that purpose against communist terrorists. Initially the new police arm was called the Flying Squad. However, it was renamed the "Jungle Squad" in the line with its major role against communist terrorists in the forest. In 1951, the Jungle Squad restructured and became known as "Jungle Company". In 1953, the Jungle Company continued to be augmented and became known by the name Police Field Force (Malay: Pasukan Polis Hutan (PPH)). It was under the command of the Police Commissioner of the Federation of Malaya and later when Malaysia was established it was placed under the Chief of Police. The Jungle Company was then deployed together with the British Army to infiltrate and track down communist insurgents operating in the jungles of Malaya. The strength of a single platoon then consisted of a mixture of 15 personnel led by a Lance Corporal to an Inspector. Over the period covering the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960) the Police Field Force suffered over 1,000 casualties.

The Police Field Force was also involved during the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontations. In various actions during the Confrontation, the Police Field Force detained Indonesian irregulars sent to the peninsula, with the view of running clandestine operations on Malaysian soil.[2] Following the May 13, 1969 incident, the Malaysian government realised the importance of a mobile and independent team and more capable to the facing of public order situations.

Following the disarmament of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) on 2 December 1989, the Police Field Force was reformed with attenuation from 21 battalions to 17 battalions on 1 September 1994. PPH changed its name to the General Operations Force (PGA) on 20 October 1997. On 11 November 1997, the submission of the RMP pennants ceremony was officiated by the King of Malaysia. This change of name in accordance with the rating duties GOF background itself. Prior to this duties in GOF associated with the forest for combating the communist threats. After the communists disarmed on 2 December 1989, GOF tasks changed in that scenarios became more varied.

Organisations

[edit]
Men from the indigenous tribes of Sabah and Sarawak were recruited by the Malaysian government as Border Scouts under the command of Richard Noone and other officers from the Senoi Praaq.

Prior to 1997, besides the regular Jungle Squad, there were a few specialised units attached to Police Field Forces:

  • Commando Force; "PPH 69" (Jungle Squad 69)
  • Senoi Praaq Force
  • Border Scouts (Malay: Pasukan Pengakap Sempadan) (for Sabah and Sarawak)
  • Unit Kawalan Kawasan (UKK) (Area Control Unit)
  • Unit Pencegah Penyeludupan (UPP) (Anti-Smuggling Unit)

After GOF restructuring, the Jungle Squad 69 was separated into a new police command while Senoi Praaq was absorbed into GOF and renamed to 'GOF 3rd Battalion'. Border Scouts and UKK were disbanded and its members absorbed into the GOF battalions and regular police forces. UPP was then formed into a federal agency whose members are drawn from the Royal Malaysian Police, Royal Malaysian Customs and Immigration Department of Malaysia. The UPP later renamed to Agensi Keselamatan Sempadan (Border Security Agency) in 2015.[3]

At present, the Royal Malaysia Police General Operations Force is organised along military lines consisting of brigades, battalions, companies, platoons and sections deployed where needed.

GOF brigades

[edit]

There are currently five brigades located in both Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia and every brigade is headed by those ranked Senior Assistant Commissioner (SAC) or above. The five GOF brigades are:

  1. GOF Northern Brigade; based in Ulu Kinta, Perak - led by SAC Balveer Singh Mahindra Singh
  2. GOF Central Brigade; based in Cheras, Kuala Lumpur - lead by SAC Hakemal Hawari of VAT 69 Commando
  3. GOF Southeast Brigade; based in Kuantan, Pahang - led by SAC Ahmad Radzi Hussain
  4. GOF Sarawak Brigade; based in Kuching, Sarawak - led by SAC Lim Bak Phai
  5. GOF Sabah Brigade; based in Kota Kinabalu, Sabah - led by SAC Nor Omar Sappi

The number of GOF battalions under the command of GOF brigades varies based on local needs. The Central and Sabah Brigades are composed of five battalions each. The Northern Brigade contains four battalions while the Southeast and Sarawak Brigades are composed of three battalions each.

GOF battalions

[edit]

GOF has a strength of 20 battalions located in both Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia with each commanded by a Police Superintendent. Each battalion consists of about three infantry companies and one mortar platoon.

Senoi Praaq

[edit]
Main article: Senoi Praaq
Members of the Senoi Praaq in 1953.

Senoi Praaq means War People in the language of the Semai Indigenous people of Peninsula Malaysia. The formation was moved to the Police Field Force in 1968 and increased to two battalions. The Senoi Praaq were established in 1957 employed with tracking and security roles, apart from performing the main function of contact with the aborigines peoples. Manned by aborigines of Peninsular Malaysia that were skilled in jungle tracking, it was successful in engaging the communist terrorists during the Malayan Emergency. The Senoi Praaq can be distinguished from other mainline GOF battalions by the use of the distinctive maroon beret and red hackle.

Tiger Platoons

[edit]

With the separation of 69 Commando, which is now part of the Pasukan Gerakan Khas (Special Operations Command; SOCOM), the General Operations Force Command established new versatile units with Special Operations capability to operate in all GOF brigades. These elite platoons were formed for special assignments, covert and overt operations and Search And Rescue (SAR), and are known generally as the Tiger Platoons.

Tiger Platoons from GOF Sabah and Sarawak Brigades actively operates as the region's main special operations forces[4] as both states are located far from Pasukan Gerakan Khas Headquarters.

GOF roles

[edit]
GOF officer worn their old Jungle Squad era uniform with Sterling L2A3 (Mk.4) submachine gun during 50th Independence Day Parade.

The General Operations Force are deployed, equipped and trained for specified roles in times of peace and during emergencies. The various roles include neutralising armed criminals, border patrols, counter terrorism, anti piracy and maritime security. The GOF also assists in general duties such as public security, close quarters combat in urban settings and anti smuggling patrols. In times of conflict or emergency, GOF brigades are used primarily for assigned duties in counter-terrorism and anti - guerrilla warfare. A brigade is essentially trained, equipped and organised for paramilitary roles in the field and also for insertion in major urban conurbations. All personnel are drawn from mainline Police Training Schools and inducted to GOF Training Centres, with the view of completing the study of anti guerrilla warfare and military training courses before graduating to GOF Battalions. Where borders are perilously dangerous, GOF units are deployed in localised security sweeps and defence operations. The GOF also employs units in riots and disturbances where necessary.

Training

[edit]

The first Training Centre was based at Sik, Kedah in 1949. Successful candidates trained there were sent on to the Police Field Force. Another School for the Police Field Force was opened in Sungai Buloh, Selangor with the aim of conducting basic training and refresher courses. In 1953, one new training centre was established in Dusun Tua, Hulu Langat, Selangor renamed the Jungle Squad Training Centre (Malay: Sekolah Latihan Pasukan Polis Hutan; SLPPH). In year 1964, the SLPPH was transferred to Kroh, Perak following the closure of the first two centres. The training centre itself was transferred again to Kentonmen, Ulu Kinta, Perak. In 1997, the training centre is renamed to Sekolah Latihan Pasukan Gerakan Am, SLPGA (English: General Operations Forces Training School) in line with the change of name of the Police Field Force to current Pasukan Gerakan Am (English: General Operations Force). On 22 September 2006, the training centre once again change its name to Pusat Latihan PGA (PLPGA) (English: GOF Training Centre).

It is a must for GOF police officers to enter the GOF Basic Course (Malay: Kursus Asas PGA). The course last for 14 weeks and they together with Senoi Praaq trainees need to attend Public Order Reserve Unit (PORU) (Malay: Latihan Polis Anti Rusuhan) before they can graduate.

The modules of the GOF Basic Course are:

  • Physical Training
  • Weapon Training
  • Field Skills Module
  • Combat Skills Module
  • Operation Techniques Module
  • Intelligence Module
  • Counter-insurgency Module
  • Conventional Warfare Module
  • Public Order Module
  • Public Policy Module

To enter the elite Senoi Praaq Battalions, Malaysian aboriginal needs to enter Orang Asli Constable Basic Course (Malay: Kursus Asas Konstabel Orang Asli) which last for six months.[5] This course is a collaborations between the RMP and Department of Orang Asli Development.

Headquarters

[edit]
Officers of Tiger Platoon in parade.
List of GOF Battalions and theirs Headquarters (update latest for 2026)
Battalion Speciality Headquarters Commanding Officer (CO)
GOF 1st Battalion Ulu Kinta, Ipoh, Perak Supt Oi Jing Bing
GOF 2nd Battalion Kulim, Kedah Supt Sivakumar Saminathan
GOF 3rd Battalion (Senoi Praaq) Special Trackers Bidor, Perak Supt Azhar Hashim
GOF 4th Battalion Semenyih, Hulu Langat, Selangor Supt Amanjit Singh
GOF 5th Battalion Simpang Renggam, Johor Supt Salehin Soleiman
GOF 6th Battalion Bakri, Muar, Johor Supt Shoaimi Ismail
GOF 7th Battalion Bukit Galing, Kuantan,Pahang Supt Davidson Tanggapan
GOF 8th Battalion Pengkalan Chepa, Kelantan Supt Abdul Rahim Abdul Rahman
GOF 9th Battalion Kubang Badak, Kuala Terengganu, Terengganu Supt Mannadzar Nasib
GOF 10th Battalion Sibu, Sarawak Supt Yusuf Baki Khan
GOF 11th Battalion Bukit Kawa,Kuching, Sarawak Supt Ku Majidin Che Jusoh
GOF 12th Battalion Miri, Sarawak Supt Mazlan Mohamed
GOF 14th Battalion Tawau, Sabah Supt Anselius Marcus
GOF 15th Battalion Sandakan, Sabah Supt Wilynton E. Watt
GOF 16th Battalion Kota Kinabalu, Sabah (Kinarut, Papar) Supt Jaswent Singh Sadu Singh
GOF 17th Battalion Lahad Datu, Sabah Supt Victor Cardona
GOF 18th Battalion (Senoi Praaq) Special Trackers Pengkalan Hulu, Perak Supt Raja Hafiz Bin Raja Razak
GOF 19th Battalion Area Security of VVIP Cheras, Kuala Lumpur ACP Rajab Ahad Ismail
GOF 20th Battalion ESSZONE Security Beluran, Sabah Supt Mohd Yusoff Daud
GOF 21st Battalion Keningau,Sabah P/Supt Hairulnizam Rashid
Tiger Platoon Special Operations Capable Every GOF Brigades Headquarters

The GOF battalions will be assisted by armoured car from:

  1. 1st Armored Squadron Kulim, Kedah
  2. 3rd Armored Squadron Ulu Kinta, Perak
  3. 5th Armored Squadron Cheras, Kuala Lumpur
  4. 7th Armored Squadron Bakri, Muar, Johor
  5. 9th Armored Squadron Kuantan, Pahang
  6. 11th Armored Squadron Kuching, Sarawak

Current task

[edit]

The Police GOF was successful in dealing with the armed rebellion led by the communist terrorists in Malaysia. Today the roles of the General Operations Force includes border and maritime security, anti piracy patrols, counter-terrorism, public security, search and rescue (SAR) and organised crime.

On 20 October 1997, the Police Field Force letterhead was changed to the new title; the General Operations Force or Pasukan Gerakan Am composed of 17 battalions organised in five brigades, deployed in both Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia.

In June 2004, one specialised battalion was tasked for VVIP security. It is the GOF 19th Battalion, based in Cheras, Kuala Lumpur.

In 2008, the GOF 20th Battalion was established and tasked specifically for airport special security in KLIA. The battalion then renamed to GOF KLIA Special Battalion.

In February 2014, after the Lahad Datu standoff, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak agrees to establish a new GOF brigade task to control Eastern Sabah Security Zone (ESSZONE).[6] The new brigade is named GOF 20th Battalion.

Future plans

[edit]

Royal Malaysian Police wishes to add another GOF Battalion based in Kunak, Sabah to provide security to ESSZONE and will be known as 21st Battalion.[7] With this addition, the Sabah Brigade will be split into two different brigades which is Northern Sabah Brigade and Eastern Sabah Brigade.[8]

Killed in the line of duty

[edit]
Main article: List of Malaysian police officers killed in the line of duty
Rank/No. Name Date Notes
PC 11483 Mohd Taib 1948-08-15 Killed during an ambush in Pahang
Insp I/530 Kartar Singh 1949-07-12 Killed in a firefight with the communists on duty near Rawang
Sgt (unnamed)
PC (unnamed)
PC (unnamed)
PC (unnamed)
PC (unnamed)
PC (unnamed)
PC (unnamed)
ASP (C) D. Hope 1949-12-12 At Jelebu Police Station, Negeri Sembilan, Police Sgt Jock Lovie joined the convoy of three Police trucks, containing a jungle Platoon consisting of E/Sgt D.J. Aylott, ASP (C) D.Hope, including 14 Malay policemen. Jock climbed into the front seat of the second truck. The trucks were not armoured and therefore, vulnerable if involved in an ambush. They left the Police Station roughly about mid morning and headed off in the direction of Seremban. When approaching a section of the winding road over the north–south mountain range. About halfway up the hill, the second truck, had some minor engine trouble and was overtaken by the third truck. The three trucks were almost at the top of the hill, where the banks were at least 10 foot high above the road. It was then that hell broke loose. A fusillade of gunfire rained down on the three trucks, killing and wounding many of the policemen. Jock immediately jumped from his truck and began firing towards the communist gunmen in their ambush position. Unfortunately, a stray bullet hit his carbine taking off the foresight. Nevertheless, he still continued to engage with the enemy. At this stage he was wounded in the hand, unable to fight with his carbine, instead lobbed a grenade in the direction of the communist gunmen. the grenade hit the top of the bank and rolled back. As he went over the bank, he was hit by five bullets, slowing him down totally. The communist gunmen now had control of the ambush position. When the firing stopped, the communist gunmen began throwing dead and wounded bodies onto the trucks. Before setting them ablaze, Jock could hear the communist gunmen calling out to each other to find the remainder of the live survivors. Jock moved his position beginning a hide and seek tactic. After about an hour of his movements, he came across another European Sergeant and a Malay. The three did not realise at that time, they were the only remaining survivors. The option was to stay put, if cornered fight it out. However, the communist gunmen left after their grisly work had been done. It was nearing twilight when the three decided to return to the road to find Army and Police personnel clearing up the massacre. The three were very quickly taken to the hospital in Seremban.
E/Sgt D.J. Aylott
PC 6402 Othman Bin Ahmad
PC 10841 Amin Bin Mohd Noor
PC 11219 Hassan Bin Mahmud
PC 11223 Awang Bin Muda
PC 10170 Abd Rashid Bin Jaafar
PC 3808 Hussein Bin Kasman
PC 9298 Ismail Bin Ibrahim
TPC 2077 Baharudin Bin Keling
TPC 12964 Abdullah Bin Yahya
TPC 12565 Abd Rahman Bin Kelom Mohd Jibin
TPC 12246 Zainal Abidin Bin Haji Ibrahim
TPC 12530 Idris Bin Kassim
TPC 2413 Mion Bin Nasir
Sgt 1541 Abu Bakar Bin Ali 1950-01-06 Killed during a firefight with communist gunmen in jungles surrounding Batu Gajah, Perak
E/Sgt F.R Young 1950-01-22 Ambushed by Communist gunmen at Seberang Prai, Penang
PC 12085 Hanasi Bin Ahmad
PC 1917 Othman Bin Haji Omar
PC 192 Abd Rahman Bin Wahab
PC 12051 Mohd Sohar Bin Abdul Ghani
PC 12894 Johari Bin Mohd
PC 2345 Mohd Shariff Bin Suleiman
EPC 1626 Abdul Hamid Bin Nair
SC 1638 Yeoh Chew Bhik
ASP V.H Franks 1952-03-11 Killed in a gunfight in jungle of Kulim, Kedah
PC 16772 Karim Bin Tahir
PC 18692 Hassan Basari Bin Endut
PC 12259 Jamaluddin Bin Said 1964-02-21 Ambushed by Indonesian guerillas at observation post at Bau, Kuching, Sarawak, during the Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation.
PC 28240 Abd Majid Bin Rahim
PC 1479 Abdullah Bin Muhammad 1968-06-17 Killed in an ambush during an operation in Bukit Berapit, Perak, as a result of the Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation.
PC 1509 Loh Ah Chu
PC 8365 Jalil Bin Bachik
PC 11401 Ismail Bin Mat Sidi
PC 14892 Nizan Bin Mohd Adam
PC 19839 Abdul Gahani Bin Mohd
PC 20239 Abdul Hamid Bin Bakar
PC 23086 Chan Eng Teck
PC 24008 Mustapha Bin Hussein
PC 24827 Mohamad Bin Othman
PC 25200 Hashim Bin Ismail
PC 25700 Abdullah Bin Ismail
PC 30449 Ang Lock Say
PC 30758 Mohd Salleh Bin Abidin
PC 30833 Ismail Bin Amir
PC 40281 Abdul Ghani Bin Daud
PC 29987 Abu Bakar Bin Ngah Wahab 1968-08-16 Killed during Operation near Sountern Thailand
PC 46737 Abd Jabar bin Othman 1970-02-10 Killed in ambush during Operation Sawadee Salam at Malaysia-Thai border
PC 16874 Bujang @ Malik Bin Sintal 1971-05-26 Killed during Operation Paradom in Sibu, Sarawak
PC 50053 Faridon Bin Abdul Ghani 1971-07-19 Killed during Operation Selamat Sawadi Salam in Thailand
PC 51183 Rani Bin Harun 1971-08-08 Killed in ambush during Operation Ngayau at Sarawak
PC 29964 Jurit bin Kida 1971-09-08
PC 52333 Razali Bin Puteh 1971-11-07
PC 49986 Raut bin Ismail 1972-07-10 Killed in Operation Ukur at Thailand border
PC 51458 Yahya bin Hassan 1973-02-08 Killed in Operation Amok in Sawah Raja, Negeri Sembilan
PC 51437 Roslan Bin Yahaya 1973-02-20
PC 5397 Mohd Yusoff Bin Jamlus 1973-05-14 Drowned during Operation Ngayau at Sarawak
PC 49769 Nordin Bin Salleh
PC 49833 Abdul Halim Bin Abdul Wahab
Sgt 26081 Lee Han Cheong 1973-07-26 Killed during Operation Nuasa in Sungai Siput, Perak
ASP G/4741 Mohd Johny Bin Mustapha 1975-04-06 Killed by the PARAKU Communist group ambush at the black pepper plantation near the Setabau River, Sibu, Sarawak .PC 1642 awarded the Seri Pahlawan Gagah Perkasa for his courageously.
PC 1642 Nuing s/o Saling
PC 41042 Suparman Bin Nasron 1975-06-18 Killed by communist ambush during Operation Ukur in Sadau, Thailand. A platoon of Jungle Squad from Police Field Force together with their Thailand counterpart escorting a topography team from the National Mapping Agency to measure Malaysia-Thailand border. The ambush killed 15 people, including eight from the Jungle Squad, three from National Mapping Agency and four from Royal Thai Police.[9]
PC 46768 Mohd. Nor Bin Tumin
PC 46787 Maduain Bin Abdul Wahab
PC 46794 Alizar Bin Sarunan
PC 49316 Saian Salimin
PC 49386 Maan Bin Ahmad Siraj
PC 53415 Abu Nordin Bin Ibrahim
PC 55688 Mohd. Zahid Jumangat
ASP Zamri Bin Ishak 1975-08-03 ASP Zamri Ishak head a team to track the communist guerrilla in Ops Bamboo on 3 August 1975. In the battle, Zamri was critically wounded when the booby trap exploded and struck the side of his foot. Further back-up squad giving aid him, however he died on the way to hospital several hours later.
Insp I/5084 Mohd Yusof Bin Talib 1975-08-14 Killed in ambush during Operation Sawadee
PC 55826 Mohd Yassin bin Salleh
PC 46955 Mohd Yusof Bin Abd Rahman 1975-09-03 Killed during morning physical training (PT) when subversive elements throws two grenades inside Police Field Force Central Brigade Camp in Kuala Lumpur. The grenades killed two Jungle Squad policemen and injured another 48.
PC 49614 Abd Hamid Bin Mohamad
Cpl 31507 Ridzewan Bin Shaadan 1976-06-03 Killed by Ambush in Bukit Keramat Pulai while taking their training.
TPC 63897 Yusoff Bin Ismail
TPC 63899 Zainal Bin Pandak Ahmad
TPC 64010 Jaafar Bin Hj. Mansor
PC 59511 Mohd Noor Bin Hashim 1978-01-05 Killed in food store located in Sungai Ruan, Pahang by Communist Terrorist.
PC 64580 Sharmuganithan
Insp I/6702 Mohamed Rashid Bin Amran 1978-06-17 Killed in a Communist operation at Kroh, Ulu Perak.
Cpl 14711 Zakaria Bin Buntal
PC 46866 Mohd Noor Bin Yassin
PC 52925 Husrin Bin Abu Shah
PC 57343 Yusof Bin Ahmad
PC 59367 Ahmad Bin Yassin 1979-09-16 Killed during Operation Ulu Rening in Kuala Kubu Bharu, Selangor
PC 72218 Arzimi bin Maarof 1980-08-31 Killed during Operation Ukur at Malaysia-Thai border
Insp I/8042 Azmi Bin Hamzah 1985-11-09 Killed during Memali Incident in Kedah
Cpl 62076 Bah Dawel s/t Pitang 1989-11-09 Killed in the helicopter crash when the Royal Malaysian Air Force Sikorsky S61 Nuri was shot down by enemy fire at Gunung Gerah near the Perak – Kelantan state border resulted killing the officers and six RMAF crews. Few day later, all bodies were found by PASKAU commando forces during the CSAR operations. It is the worse in terms of Malaysian police casualties in a single crash incident to date, matched only by the deaths of fifteen officers.
Cpl 62456 Alang Itam
PC 62393 Angah s/t Alek
PC 62435 Ejah s/t Long
PC 62444 Pandak s/t Alang
PC 62587 Hassan s/t Itam
PC 68853 Che Hasnor Bin Uval
PC 68970 Hashim Bin Itam
PC 71834 Pandak Hashim Bin Uda
PC 109830 Armada Chos
PC 112548 Hamad s/o Sodan
PC 114771 Alang Sabasah s/o Pab Belkoi
PC 114850 Arus s/t Awang
PC 114956 Shamsuddin Bin Sharin
PC 114957 Sarudin Bin Mat
L/Cpl 68858 Hasir s/o Sari 2008-12-05 Collapsed shortly and died after he fell unconscious from the chair during rest in the control post at 18th Battalions, Pengkalan Hulu, Perak.
L/Cpl 68938 Ngah Nordin Bin Abu 2009-05-06 L/Cpl 68938's body found by his colleague in the event lying with bloodstained on floor at Malaysia-Thailand border control post in Kwan Chu Hill at 11:30 hrs in the morning. He's from the 3rd GOF Battalions in Bidor, Perak just arrived at his duty place yesterday and during the incident, he was alone in the post. His body was to be sent to Tuanku Fauziah Hospital for autopsy and pending results autopsy, the case is classified as sudden death. Also found beside his body was M16 rifle, however until now have yet to find if the shot caused by the weapon.
PC 161529 Mohd. Faizal Bin Ahmad 2009-07-11 Died at Tengku Ampuan Afzan Hospital after two days received treatment. PC 161529 which suspect dengue collapsed shortly during a D-class driving course at Police Training Centre, Kuala Lumpur on 9 July.
Sgt 72472 Mohd Hashamdi Bin Abdullah 2010-09-27 Killed in the traffic accident during a return trip to 15th Battalion Headquarters in Karamunting City.
L/Cpl 135379 Sylvester Assin
L/Cpl 137381 Agustine Lee
L/Cpl 148923 Mohd Sapieh Bin Jalhani
Sgt 124082 Abd Aziz Bin Sarikon 2013-03-02 Killed by Sulu militants during the Lahad Datu invasion in Kampung Simunul, Semporna on 2 March 2013. Four officers (an officer from Special Branch Bukit Aman along with three Sabah police) were fatally shot.
L/Cpl 160475 Mohd Azrul Bin Tukiran
Cpl Baharudin A/L Ramli 2020-12-24

3rd GOF (Senoi Praaq)

Killed by smuggling groups during recon in Padang Besar, Perlis also near Malaysia-Thailand border on 24 November 2020. Corporal Norihan A/L Tari injured during shootout with smuggling group, result both receive Pingat Gagah Berani however Corporal Baharudin received his posthumous on 25 November same year while Norihan accepted his in July 2023

Keramat Pulai incidents

[edit]

On 3 June 1976, 35 recruits from the Police Field Force members had been ambushed by the communist bandits at Bukit Keramat Pulai, Perak during their final phase of Basic Jungle Squad Training. During the incident at 12:45pm, Cpl 31507 Ridzuan who was a platoon leader as well as drill instructor was fatally shot in his side of eye. Three trainees TPC 63897 Zainal, TPC 63899 Yusof and TPC 64010 Md. Saad were also killed about 15 metres from the communist control post. However, TPC 60899 Mohamad Salim and his teammates returned enemy fire. Shortly, this platoon successfully captured the communist stronghold which was modified to look like a house after the communist retreated after receiving violent opposition from the trainees. On extraordinary courage, TPC 60899 Mohamad Salim and TPC Mohammad Noh Hashim were both awarded the Panglima Gagah Berani one year later.[10][11]

Operations

[edit]
[edit]

Television show about the GOF

  • Gerak Khas (TV series) (1999–2020) - a few episode of season year 2000,2001,2004 showing role GOF during operation against pirates and militants
  • Akademi Polis (2008–2010)– a few episode showing role GOF teach recruits police who training jungle and fiction team
  • Titisan Darah Pahlawan (2013)–a Radio Televisyen Malaysia historical drama 30 episodes about recipient of medal who fought communist insurgency
  • Kalis Peluru (2023)–a Radio Televisyen Malaysia action police drama 13 episodes about life policemen with GOF
  • Lembing & Layang– a 2010 mini series biopic about early squadron orang asli later called Senoi Praaq
  • 999 (Malaysian TV series)

Films about the GOF

  • Awang Spanar – a 1987 film comedy action about two young man with policewomen solve kidnapping case and a scene GOF troops raid safehouse kidnapping
  • Jaket Biru - a 1991 action film about undercover cops and where scene GOF troops raid criminal hideout places
  • Bukit Kepong a 1981 patriotic film about tragedy Bukit Kepong attack in February 1950
  • "Takluk: Lahad Datu", a 2024 police war action film directed by Zulkarnain Azhar. The film is about VAT 69 involved based on 2013 Lahad Datu standoff and the movie also featured GOF involvement within the conflict in the movie.

Weaponry

[edit]

The firearms used by GOF during the year 1948 - 1980s.

Firearms Data
Pistols/Revolvers Shotguns Submachineguns Rifles Machineguns Grenades Mortars
Browning HP Winchester M1897 Sten Mk.II Heckler & Koch HK33 Bren LMG Mills bomb British 2-inch mortar
Colt M1911A1 Browning Auto-5 Sten Mk.V Lee–Enfield Rifle No. 4 Mk.I ML 3-inch Mortar
Webley Revolver Stevens single shotgun Sterling L2A3 Lee–Enfield Rifle No. 4 Mk.II
S&W M&P Lee–Enfield Rifle No. 4 Mk.III
Lee–Enfield No.5 Mk.I
FN FAL L1A1 SLR
M1 carbine
M1A1 Carbine
M2 Carbine

The firearms used by GOF during the year 1980 - presents.

Firearms Data
Pistols/Revolvers Shotguns Submachineguns Assault Rifles Sniper Rifles Machineguns Grenades
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General Operations Force

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The General Operations Force (GOF; Malay: Pasukan Gerakan Am, PGA) is the component of the Royal Malaysia Police (PDRM), focused on high-mobility operations for internal security, border protection, and suppression of armed threats. Originating in 1948 as the Police Field Force during the , it was created by British colonial authorities to conduct against communist insurgents, drawing on indigenous trackers like the for specialized . Over decades, the GOF has adapted to post-independence challenges, including the Communist Party of Malaya insurgency's end in 1989, cross-border , and natural disasters, while maintaining a structure of mobile battalions capable of rapid deployment nationwide. As of 2025, it comprises 23 battalions, with recent expansions in and enhancing frontier defenses against and trafficking. The force's defining , "Boleh Digerakkan Dalam Apa Jua Keadaan" (Mobilizable in Any Circumstances), underscores its versatility in both and humanitarian roles, supported by rigorous training at dedicated centers like Ulu Kinta.

History

Colonial Origins and Early Formation

The precursors to the General Operations Force originated in the late 19th-century British colonial efforts to impose order on the fractious Malay states amid resource extraction and inter-ethnic conflicts. In 1872, the Perak Armed Police was established by Captains Frank Athelstane Swettenham and Ronald MacDonald Speedy, drawing primarily on Sikh constables recruited from to suppress banditry, Chinese secret society violence, and local unrest following the 1875 assassination of British Resident . These units operated as a mobile force, conducting patrols in rugged interiors to protect operations and European interests, with an emphasis on rapid response over static garrisoning. By 1896, in conjunction with the formation of the protectorate encompassing , , , and , the Sikhs were reorganized into the 1st Battalion of the Malay States Guides under Lieutenant-Colonel R.S. Frowd Walker, incorporating elements from and armed police. The Guides served as a dedicated auxiliary, tasked with anti-banditry expeditions, border security, and quelling disturbances in remote districts, utilizing formations, mule-mounted , and tactics optimized for Malaysia's tropical jungles and hill country—such as small, agile squads for ambushes and rather than heavy conventional maneuvers. Recruitment prioritized combat-hardened Punjabi personnel, including Jat , Pathans, and , totaling several companies supported by a depot equipped with field guns for limited firepower projection. The Guides were disbanded in 1919 after World War I service, including deployments to Aden, but their institutional legacy persisted in the reformed Federated Malay States Police under centralized command from 1896 onward, which absorbed remaining armed detachments and expanded into unfederated states. Interwar police reforms emphasized jungle proficiency through ad hoc training in terrain-specific operations against persistent banditry and nascent subversive groups, fostering recruitment of local Malay and indigenous auxiliaries alongside Indian sepoys to enhance mobility and intelligence in forested frontiers. This foundational emphasis on versatile, light forces for internal security in challenging environments directly informed the subsequent creation of specialized Police Jungle Companies in the mid-20th century.

Role in the Malayan Emergency

The Police Field Force (PFF), the direct predecessor to the General Operations Force, played a pivotal role in counter-insurgency operations during the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960, focusing on both offensive jungle patrols and defensive village security. Established in late 1948 amid escalating communist guerrilla attacks, the PFF rapidly expanded to over 20 battalions, comprising primarily Malay and indigenous personnel trained for deep jungle warfare. These units conducted prolonged patrols that penetrated insurgent strongholds, disrupting supply lines and ambushing Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) groups, thereby restricting their mobility and forcing reliance on dwindling jungle resources. PFF battalions were integral to the Briggs Plan implemented in 1950, which resettled over 500,000 ethnic Chinese squatters—many suspected of providing food and intelligence to insurgents—into fortified New Villages protected by police outposts. This strategy isolated the MNLA from civilian support networks, with PFF units patrolling perimeters and conducting food denial operations that contributed to insurgent starvation and desertions. Empirical data underscores effectiveness: by 1952, under High Commissioner , police-led operations, bolstered by intelligence, accounted for a disproportionate share of the approximately 6,000 MNLA killed or surrendered, exceeding contributions despite the latter's larger numbers. Casualty ratios favored security forces, with only about 1,800 total police and military deaths against insurgent losses that eroded their fighting strength to scattered bands by the mid-1950s. Early PFF operations involved cordons, searches, and preemptive strikes against villages harboring insurgents, reflecting the causal imperative to sever MNLA logistics amid poor initial intelligence. Incidents like the December 1948 by army units—where 24 detained Chinese estate workers were shot after alleged confessions of aiding guerrillas—highlighted operational challenges in distinguishing non-combatants from supporters in a conflict where insurgents embedded within populations. While later inquiries questioned claims of executions without , declassified documents reveal no substantiated of systematic police atrocities, contrasting with verified MNLA terror campaigns that killed over 2,000 s; such measures, though harsh, aligned with the necessity of rapid area denial to prevent broader collapse, paving the way for later rule-of-law enforcement that sustained public cooperation and territorial gains. By 1955, PFF control extended over 80% of Malaya's territory, with insurgent incidents dropping from peaks of 500 monthly attacks in 1951 to under 100 by 1958, empirically validating the synergy of kinetic policing and population-centric security in defeating the without compromising the transition to Malayan in 1957.

Involvement in the Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation

The Police Field Force (PFF), the predecessor to the General Operations Force, was rapidly expanded and deployed to Sarawak's border regions following Malaysia's formation on 16 September 1963, to fortify defenses against Indonesian incursions aimed at undermining the new . PFF companies established and manned forward operating posts along the porous Sarawak-Kalimantan frontier, often fortifying police stations with sandbags and wire to serve as early warning and interception points for infiltrators. These units integrated with Malaysian Border Scouts—comprising indigenous Iban and other peoples—and Commonwealth army elements, leveraging local intelligence networks to monitor cross-border movements and preempt sabotage. This collaborative approach emphasized patrolling dense terrain and rapid response to sightings, effectively disrupting Indonesian attempts to incite unrest through guerrilla tactics. The inaugural major clash underscored PFF's frontline role: on 12 April 1963, roughly 60 Indonesian regulars from the National Army attacked the Tebedu , approximately 3 kilometers from the border and 100 kilometers south of , killing one corporal and wounding two others before withdrawing after a brief occupation. Malaysian , including PFF elements, swiftly resecured the site, preventing deeper penetration. Subsequent engagements, such as the Battle of Long Jawai on 28 September 1963, saw small PFF contingents—two personnel alongside 21 Border Scouts and six Gurkhas—repel an Indonesian force of over 100, holding elevated positions through determined defense and calling in air support, resulting in heavy enemy losses estimated at 17 killed. These actions highlighted PFF's resilience in outnumbered scenarios, contributing to the of infiltration routes. By integrating from local trackers with static border vigilance, PFF units helped Malaysian and allied forces capture or eliminate over 500 Indonesian infiltrators between August 1963 and mid-1964 alone, thwarting organized raids on villages and infrastructure that could have escalated into broader . This defensive efficacy, despite Indonesia's superior numbers and initial territorial advantages in , limited Konfrontasi to sporadic border skirmishes rather than decisive breakthroughs, straining Indonesian resources and contributing to the conflict's resolution in August 1966 after Suharto's rise. PFF's operations demonstrated the value of policing in , prioritizing infiltration denial over offensive pursuits.

Operations During the Second Communist Insurgency

The Police Field Force (PFF), predecessor to the General Operations Force (GOF), played a central role in Malaysia's counter- campaign against remnants of the Communist Party of Malaya () during the 1968–1989 , emphasizing jungle patrols, border interdiction, and area denial along the Thai frontier. Formed from earlier units, the PFF deployed battalions for sustained offensive operations, including and quick-reaction forces to disrupt CPM supply lines and bases in remote northern states like and . The 's onset was marked by a CPM on a PFF at Kroh-Betong on June 17, 1968, killing 18 personnel and prompting intensified PFF mobilization for retaliatory sweeps. PFF tactics evolved to include cordon-and-search missions in border regions, coordinated with checkpoints and intelligence-driven ambushes to isolate CPM fighters, who relied on cross-border sanctuaries in . Units like the , integrated into PFF structure, leveraged indigenous trackers for deep jungle penetration, contributing to area denial by establishing forward operating posts and denying CPM freedom of movement. These efforts supported the KESBAN (Keselamatan dan Pembangunan) doctrine, linking kinetic operations with rural development to erode CPM recruitment, though challenges persisted from limited Thai cooperation and CPM internal fractures. Successes included the capture of approximately 150 CPM members and surrenders of 117 others through targeted amnesty incentives, which accelerated after CPM factional splits in the early . By 1989, CPM active strength had declined from a peak of around 1,600 fighters to 1,188, attributable in part to PFF/GOF attrition and psychological operations promoting . The concluded with the Hat Yai Peace Agreement on December 2, 1989, following sustained pressure that included post-surrender amnesties offering initial payments of RM 3,000, rising to RM 5,000 after three years of rehabilitation. Overall casualties reflected the grinding nature of operations: 155 Malaysian security forces killed, including PFF personnel, against 212 CPM fatalities.

Post-Independence Reorganization and Naming as GOF

Following the end of the Second Communist Insurgency in 1989, the Police Field Force (Pasukan Polis Hutan), which had been primarily oriented toward counter-insurgency in , required adaptation to address a spectrum of post-Cold War security dynamics, including border incursions, smuggling, and civil disturbances. This necessitated a to emphasize mobility and multi-role capabilities as within the Royal Police framework, prioritizing operational versatility over specialized field policing. On 20 October 1997, the unit underwent formal reorganization and was renamed the General Operations Force (GOF), or Pasukan Gerakan Am in Malay, to denote its expanded purview beyond jungle operations to general tactical duties. Administrative integration remained under the Royal Malaysia Police, with battalions consolidated into five regional brigades to facilitate decentralized command and rapid response across and . The redesignation aligned with empirical assessments of threat evolution, enabling the force—comprising approximately 19 battalions at inception—to function as a asset for preventive patrols and escalation support without diluting its core proficiency.

Expansion and Reforms After Operation Daulat

Following the 2013 incursion, the Malaysian government initiated expansions to the General Operations Force (GOF) to bolster border security in eastern , including the allocation of one additional GOF in the 2015 national budget, announced in October 2014. This addition aimed to enhance presence amid ongoing threats from cross-border militancy and smuggling, with RM660 million earmarked for the (ESSCOM), encompassing GOF infrastructure, personnel deployment, and operational upgrades. Reforms emphasized streamlined rapid deployment protocols through ESSCOM's integrated framework, which coordinated GOF units with military and marine police for quicker mobilization along the 1,000-plus kilometer coastline. Pre-incursion delays in response were attributed to fragmented command structures; post-reform exercises demonstrated reduced deployment times from days to hours in simulated scenarios, as ESSCOM centralized intelligence and logistics by mid-2014. These changes prioritized causal factors like intelligence-sharing gaps exposed during , enabling empirical improvements in of smaller-scale intrusions. The expansions countered potential critiques of over-militarization by correlating with sustained deterrence: no equivalent large-scale territorial claims or armed landings have recurred in Sabah since 2013, despite persistent regional instabilities, as GOF reinforcements fortified the (ESSZone) against spillover from Philippine insurgencies. This outcome underscores the necessity of scaled-up capabilities in addressing asymmetric threats, rather than reallocating to less agile forces.

Roles and Missions

Core Operational Mandates

The core operational mandates of the General Operations Force (GOF) stem from the Royal Malaysian Police's (RMP) statutory responsibilities under Section 3(3) of the Police Act 1967 (Act 344), which directs the force to perform duties encompassing the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of offenders, the preservation of law and order, the maintenance of security, and any additional tasks specified by the Minister via Gazette notification. These mandates position the GOF as an extension of general policing authority, adapted for execution in environments demanding specialized capabilities, without altering the fundamental police-oriented framework. Organized as the RMP's component, the GOF emphasizes rapid deployment, sustained patrols, and operational resilience to fulfill these duties across Malaysia's challenging , including forested interiors, upland regions, and zones where conventional policing faces logistical constraints. This focus on mobility and enables effective coverage in expansive, rugged areas, supporting broader RMP objectives through paramilitary-style formations while adhering to civilian oversight and eschewing direct military subordination.

Border Security and Counter-Insurgency

The General Operations Force (GOF) maintains frontline defense along Malaysia's land borders, totaling approximately 2,742 kilometers shared with , , and , through sustained patrols and surveillance operations aimed at thwarting illegal entries, , and potential infiltrations. These efforts focus on high-risk frontier zones, including dense jungle terrains in and , where GOF battalions deploy mobile units equipped for rapid response to detect and interdict cross-border movements. In fiscal year operations, GOF personnel have demonstrated effectiveness in contraband seizures, such as RM1.12 billion worth of illicit goods alongside 774 migrant arrests reported in aggregated enforcement actions up to 2025. GOF's border security mandate extends to disrupting smuggling networks trafficking drugs, arms, and humans, which often serve as vectors for threats; for instance, operations like Op Wawasan at the Malaysia-Thailand border yielded over RM119 million in seized contraband in 2022 alone. Recent interdictions include the apprehension of 108 individuals, including 59 Malaysians, attempting unauthorized crossings in October 2025, underscoring GOF's role in denying access to illicit actors. In regions, such as , GOF conducted 10 operations between July and August yielding RM3.6 million in contraband seizures, highlighting operational intensity against porous frontiers. In counter-insurgency, GOF upholds doctrinal continuity from historical engagements against communist guerrillas by adapting tactics to contemporary non-state threats, including jihadist affiliates like that exploit border vulnerabilities for transit and logistics in . While primary counter-terrorism responses involve specialized units, GOF's frontier patrols provide layered denial, preventing insurgent safe havens or supply lines through routine -driven sweeps and joint exercises. Success metrics include sustained low incidence of confirmed insurgent crossings, attributed to fortified outposts and community-based from border populations. However, logistical strains persist in remote areas, where rugged terrain and limited infrastructure challenge sustained deployments, necessitating reliance on indigenous trackers and aerial support for operational efficacy.

Internal Security and Public Order

The General Operations Force (GOF), as the primary branch under the Royal Malaysian Police's Internal Security and Public Order Department, supports public order through specialized subunits like the Public Order Reserve Unit (PORU), designed for anti-riot operations and crowd management during civil unrest. These deployments focus on rapid response to maintain stability in high-risk scenarios, employing tactics that prioritize containment and to minimize escalation risks. In electoral contexts, GOF units have been activated to secure polling areas and deter disruptions; for example, during the September 2020 Sabah state election, the 14th Battalion's PORU was mobilized to enforce order and prevent potential flashpoints, contributing to the process proceeding without widespread violence. Similarly, GOF personnel reinforce security at large public gatherings and protests, balancing enforcement with restraint to avoid unnecessary confrontations, as evidenced by their role in upholding tranquility amid politically charged events. Beyond unrest, GOF supports for public safety, including flood evacuations where they secure affected zones and assist rescues; in December 2024, GOF teams in facilitated the air evacuation of a heart patient from inundated areas, demonstrating coordinated aid that sustains order during crises. During the starting March 2020, GOF battalions were assigned nationwide to monitor compliance with movement restrictions, preventing opportunistic disturbances and aiding in the restoration of normalcy post-lockdowns. GOF operations adhere to doctrines emphasizing minimal force, using non-lethal tools for successes, such as dispersing crowds without fatalities in monitored deployments, countering occasional media narratives of indiscriminate brutality that often conflate general police actions with specialized units. Post-deployment assessments in secured zones, like election vicinities, show reduced incident rates, with no major escalations reported in GOF-patrolled areas during the referenced Sabah polls, underscoring their stabilizing effect.

Counter-Terrorism and Maritime Patrols

The General Operations Force (GOF) supports Malaysia's counter-terrorism efforts through its capabilities, focusing on securing vulnerable border areas to prevent infiltration by terrorist networks and participating in joint operations with military units under the National Force framework established in 2016. These activities complement specialized police units like the Special Actions Unit, emphasizing rapid response and threat neutralization in high-risk zones, though primary arrests of terrorist suspects are often handled by intelligence-led agencies such as the . GOF's involvement has contributed to Malaysia's overall success in maintaining a low incidence of domestic terrorist attacks since the early , with no major JI-orchestrated incidents recorded in recent years, attributed in part to enhanced border vigilance. In joint operations, GOF battalions, including commando elements, collaborate with the to conduct sweeps and intelligence-supported raids against potential terrorist cells, particularly in eastern where cross-border threats from groups like have persisted. Achievements include the disruption of routes used for terrorist logistics, though specific attribution of neutralized threats to GOF remains integrated within broader reporting, with critiques centering on occasional delays in inter-agency coordination that could hinder real-time responses. GOF also undertakes maritime patrols in the Straits of , a chokepoint prone to and potential terrorist maritime activities, deploying personnel for interdiction and surveillance to deter attacks on shipping. These efforts involve joint patrols with Indonesian and Singaporean counterparts, facilitated by information exchanges and coordinated exercises, which have helped reduce incidents in the strait from peaks in the early to fewer than 10 reported attacks annually by the mid-2010s. However, challenges in trilateral coordination, including differing operational protocols and , have been noted as limiting effectiveness against evolving threats like armed robbery disguised as . GOF's marine-oriented units have supported arrests in these waters, though aggregate data on detentions credits multi-agency efforts rather than isolating GOF contributions.

Organizational Structure

Brigade and Battalion Framework

The General Operations Force (GOF) employs a hierarchical brigade and battalion framework as its core light infantry organization, comprising five active brigades designated as the 1st through 5th Brigades, each commanded by a Superintendent of Police and overseeing multiple battalions. This structure supports regional operational focus, with the 1st Brigade (Northern) based in the northern Peninsular Malaysia for swift responses to border and internal threats in that sector, the 2nd Brigade (Central) covering central areas, the 3rd Brigade (Southeastern) handling southeastern Peninsular operations, the 4th Brigade stationed in Sabah, and the 5th Brigade in Sarawak to address East Malaysian security needs. As of May 2025, the GOF maintains 23 s across these brigades, following the commissioning of three additional units (Batalion 21, 22, and 23) to bolster presence in and , with seven battalions in , four in , and twelve in . Each typically consists of companies and platoons structured for mobile , enabling independent or combined deployments. The regional basing facilitates rapid mobilization, as battalions can be surged to high-threat areas without full relocation, demonstrating empirical scalability in operations requiring , such as patrols or counter-insurgency surges where multiple battalions have been redeployed en masse historically. This framework ensures coverage of Malaysia's diverse terrain, from Peninsular jungles to Borneo's frontiers, optimizing response times measured in hours for regional contingencies.

Specialized Infantry Units

The represents a specialized element within the General Operations Force, drawing recruits primarily from the indigenous communities of to leverage their innate expertise in jungle navigation and tracking. Formed during the to disrupt communist insurgent influence among populations, the unit commenced induction training in 1955 and integrated into GOF structures post-independence. Their deep-jungle operations proved extremely successful in suppressing communist terrorists, attaining the highest kill ratio among all counter-insurgency forces by 1958. In modern contexts, Senoi Praaq battalions such as 3 and 18 under GOF focus on border security in forested regions, employing superior tracking skills to detect and pursue smugglers, poachers, and intruders. Personnel exhibit high integrity and terrain familiarity, making them indispensable for operations where conventional forces face challenges, including in remote areas. Tiger Platoons serve as elite, high-mobility assault detachments embedded in GOF s, equipped for rapid raids, VIP protection, border patrols, and multi-role responses including . Expansion since 2019 has enabled each to host a dedicated , bolstering tactical responsiveness across deployments. Basic training regimens, such as the 44-day course for Briged involving two senior officers and 84 personnel, emphasize endurance and specialized skills. Operational records highlight their effectiveness, with platoons from Battalions 7, 8, and 9 conducting 15-kilometer foot patrols to dismantle networks and executing swift rescues, such as saving 19 victims in Genting Peres on December 20, 2021. These units also demonstrate capabilities in exercises simulating enemy engagements, underscoring their role in maintaining operational versatility amid diverse threats.

Armored and Support Squadrons

The armored squadrons of the General Operations Force consist of lightly armored units assigned to each , primarily tasked with enhancing operational mobility, providing , and ensuring personnel protection during high-risk engagements. These squadrons deploy wheeled armored vehicles capable of traversing rugged border terrains, enabling rapid response and escort for elements in counter-insurgency and missions. In August 2025, the force received four new armored personnel carriers to augment squadron capabilities, with two allocated to and two to brigades for intensified border surveillance and deterrence against smuggling and infiltration. Earlier in February 2025, inspections of 4x4 armored vehicles underscored ongoing modernization efforts to equip squadrons for sustained and support roles in remote areas. Support squadrons complement armored assets by handling logistical sustainment, basic engineering tasks such as route clearance, and coordination, ensuring operational continuity in extended deployments. These units integrate seamlessly with battalions to facilitate approaches, where armored fire support suppresses threats while infantry advances, as demonstrated in routine border security operations along Malaysia's northern and eastern frontiers.

Training and Logistical Centers

The Pusat Latihan Pasukan Gerakan Am (PLPGA) in Ulu Kinta, , serves as the central facility for the General Operations , specializing in the development of operational doctrines tailored to tactics, jungle , and border security operations. Located within the Northern Brigade's perimeter at postal code 31150, the center equips personnel with skills for high-mobility deployments through structured courses emphasizing endurance and tactical proficiency. It conducts regular sessions, such as introductory courses for external squads and advanced refreshers, to maintain -wide readiness standards. Logistical centers supporting the force are integrated into brigade-level operations, with centralized coordination from ensuring supply sustainment for forward deployments along borders and remote terrains. These hubs manage procurement, maintenance, and distribution of essentials like combat gear and provisions, enabling prolonged operations without dependency on ad-hoc resupply. Police leadership has advocated for upgrades to these facilities, including enhanced storage and capabilities, to address dynamic threats as of 2025. Modernization efforts at PLPGA include facility expansions and joint exercises, such as simulations with national agencies, to align training with contemporary operational needs. Logistical hubs have similarly incorporated assessments for border outposts, focusing on self-sufficiency in austere environments.

Recruitment, Selection, and Training

Eligibility Criteria and Selection Process

Eligibility for the General Operations Force (GOF), a unit of the Royal Malaysian Police (PDRM), requires Malaysian , with applicants typically aged between 18 and 28 years. Candidates must possess at least a secondary education qualification equivalent to the (SPM) or lower, though specific intakes may accept PMR-level credentials for roles leading to GOF assignment. Physical standards include a minimum of 163 cm for men and 157 cm for women (without shoes), a chest measurement of at least 81 cm unexpanded (expanding to 86 cm) for men, and body weight not less than 50 kg for men, proportional to height and maintaining a between 19 and 26. Vision must be correctable to at least 6/9 without glasses, with no or major disabilities. The selection process begins with online applications via the PDRM e-Pengambilan portal, followed by preliminary screening for basic qualifications. Successful candidates undergo rigorous assessments, including endurance runs, push-ups, sit-ups, and courses designed to evaluate stamina, strength, and agility under stress, reflecting the unit's demands in border patrols and counter-insurgency operations. Medical examinations ensure no chronic illnesses or issues, while background —emphasizing clean criminal records and assessments—guards against infiltration risks, drawing from historical threats like communist insurgencies that necessitated ideological reliability in ranks. Attrition rates in GOF selection are high, often exceeding 50% during fitness and endurance phases, prioritizing merit-based performance over demographic quotas to maintain operational effectiveness in high-threat environments. Post-selection, candidates enter basic police training before specialized GOF evaluation, with only those demonstrating exceptional resilience advancing. This merit-focused approach, informed by ongoing reviews of recruitment modules to enhance integrity, underscores the force's emphasis on physical and psychological fitness for roles involving prolonged field deployments.

Basic and Advanced Training Programs

The basic training program for General Operations Force (GOF) recruits, known as Kursus Asas Pasukan Gerakan Am, emphasizes core competencies essential for security and counter-insurgency roles, including marksmanship, patrolling techniques, and jungle skills tailored to Malaysia's tropical terrain. This intensive phase typically lasts three months, following initial police recruit training, and involves rigorous physical conditioning, weapons handling with standard-issue firearms, foot patrols simulating operations, and drills such as construction, foraging, and navigation in dense forested areas. For specialized recruits like constables, the program is structured as a consolidated six-month course at the Pusat Latihan Pasukan Gerakan Am in Ulu Kinta, , integrating these elements to leverage indigenous knowledge of jungle environments. Advanced training extends these foundations with scenario-based instruction in anti-ambush maneuvers and urban combat tactics, preparing personnel for hybrid threats that may extend beyond jungle borders into populated areas or internal security operations. Courses at GOF training centers incorporate live-fire exercises, small-unit tactics to counter improvised threats, and defensive positioning against ambushes, drawing on operational lessons from Malaysia's rugged border regions. Proficiency is assessed through practical evaluations, with graduates required to meet benchmarks in accuracy, response times, and endurance to ensure operational readiness.

Specialized Unit Preparation

The preparation for specialized units within the General Operations Force, such as the battalions, incorporates bespoke regimens tailored to leverage the indigenous knowledge of recruits in jungle environments. Induction training for commenced in 1955, initially involving small groups from Temiar tribes, focusing on enhancing innate tracking and survival skills through paramilitary instruction that aligns with their cultural practices of hunting and . This approach integrates cultural familiarity with formal tactics, enabling recruits to apply ancestral expertise in and detection, distinct from standard police training. For units like the Tiger Platoons, preparation emphasizes advanced scouting techniques, drawing on specialized instruction from affiliated commando elements to develop capabilities in rapid response and terrain dominance. These regimens prioritize interoperability through joint exercises with units, fostering coordinated maneuvers in border and counter-insurgency scenarios. Training modules stress adaptability to real-world conditions, incorporating scenario-based drills that simulate operational challenges, thereby enhancing unit effectiveness in dynamic environments without reliance on conventional methods.

Equipment and Weaponry

Infantry Weapons and Small Arms

The primary small arm issued to General Operations Force (GOF) personnel is the Colt M4A1 carbine, chambered in , which equips most battalions for patrol and engagement duties. This gas-operated, select-fire weapon, upgraded to Block II configuration with Picatinny rails for optics and accessories, supports modular attachments like red dot sights and foregrips to adapt to jungle and border environments. Its compact design and lighter weight compared to full-length rifles enable mobility during extended foot patrols. Support fire is provided by the in , standard across police units including GOF for suppressive roles in squad maneuvers. Capable of belt-fed sustained fire up to 650-1,000 rounds per minute, it mounts on bipods or vehicles, with quick-change barrels to manage heat during prolonged operations. The submachine gun, firing , supplements primary arms in close-quarters scenarios within GOF's tactical teams, offering controllability and rapid 800-rounds-per-minute cyclic rate. Ammunition logistics emphasize NATO-standard calibers for and resupply efficiency, with centralized ensuring stockpiles for sustained and counter-smuggling missions. protocols include corrosion-resistant coatings and regular inspections to counter humidity-induced degradation, preserving operational reliability in Malaysia's .
WeaponTypeCaliberRole
Colt M4A1Primary individual weapon
HK MP5Close-quarters support
FN MAGSquad suppression

Vehicles and Armored Assets

The General Operations Force (GOF) primarily relies on light armored 4x4 vehicles optimized for rugged border terrains, jungle patrols, and rapid response in Malaysia's diverse landscapes, including and frontiers. These platforms provide mobility, ballistic protection, and capacity for small squads during high-threat operations such as anti-smuggling and counter-insurgency. Key assets include mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) designs that balance speed—up to 100 km/h on roads—with off-road capability via high ground clearance and . The 4x4 armored personnel carrier () serves as a modern cornerstone, with four units handed over to the GOF's Armored Squadron (Skuadron Perisai) on August 22, 2025, at a cost of RM10.72 million. These vehicles, inspected by the in February 2025, feature designs for blast resistance and modular armor for adaptability in patrol convoys. They support squadron-level deployments for securing communication routes and conducting armed escorts, replacing or supplementing older fleets in eastern . Legacy light armored vehicles remain in service for border operations, including four 4x4 APCs, four Shorland Land Rovers, and four IAG Jaws MRAPs allocated to GOF units under the (ESSCOM) as of recent tenders. These wheeled platforms, acquired in the –, facilitate quick insertion into remote areas but face maintenance challenges due to age, prompting procurements for higher operational availability. Squadrons integrate them into mixed patrols, with trucks like HICOM Handalan models providing rear-echelon transport for sustained missions, though specific fleet numbers for GOF are not publicly detailed beyond general police inventories.

Support and Surveillance Gear

The General Operations Force utilizes unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) for and in remote border regions, enabling the detection of activities and unauthorized crossings without exposing personnel to direct risks. These systems replace older equipment and support monitoring in areas with limited ground access, as part of broader Royal Malaysian Police initiatives to counter cross-border crimes. Command and control in rugged terrains rely on portable manpack radios, including 444 units of the Codan Patrol 2110M delivered to the Royal Malaysian Police for secure, long-range voice and data communications. These HF systems facilitate coordination during patrols and operations where cellular coverage is unavailable, enhancing and response times. Advanced satellite capabilities, such as the completed X-Band system mounted on mobile platforms, provide access and video feeds for operational oversight in isolated areas. This supports the force's mobility and integration with networks. Non-lethal munitions, including launchers and irritant projectiles, are standard for and perimeter defense during anti-smuggling enforcement, minimizing escalation in populated or civilian-proximate zones. Procurement emphasizes durable, field-tested imports adapted for tropical environments, with ongoing modernization to sustain operational readiness.

Notable Operations and Engagements

Historical Counter-Insurgency Campaigns

The General Operations Force traces its origins to the Police Field Force, established in April 1948 amid the , a communist led by the that sought to overthrow British colonial rule through . This unit, numbering around 3,000 personnel by the early 1950s, was specially trained for deep jungle operations, focusing on securing remote areas, manning fortified posts, and conducting patrols to deny insurgents access to food supplies and intelligence networks. Their efforts complemented military actions under strategies like the Briggs Plan, which emphasized population resettlement and intelligence-driven disruptions to insurgent logistics. Tactical doctrines evolved toward decentralized, small-team patrols of 10-20 men, enabling coverage of dense terrain where larger formations were ineffective, and fostering local intelligence from indigenous trackers and surrendered insurgents. These patrols targeted ambush-prone supply routes, contributing to the isolation of guerrilla bands by interdicting minyak (food) drops and rackets in rural estates. Units like the , a specialized company integrated into police operations from 1953, exemplified adaptations using aboriginal expertise for silent tracking and close-quarters engagements. In terms of operational metrics, police field units accounted for a disproportionate share of contacts, with estimates indicating they inflicted more insurgent casualties than formations through persistent patrolling and post defenses, amid overall tallies of approximately 6,710 guerrillas killed, 1,287 captured, and 2,702 surrendered by 1960. Successes included reclaiming over 500 square miles of contested areas by the mid-1950s via fortified outposts that fragmented insurgent mobility, yet these gains came against prolonged engagements that strained manpower and logistics, highlighting the doctrine's reliance on sustained presence over rapid decisive battles. This historical experience informed enduring GOF principles of mobility and area denial, balancing kinetic disruptions against the insurgents' adaptive , though critiques from military analyses note that while logistics interdiction eroded guerrilla cohesion, it required integration with broader civil measures to prevent resurgence.

Operation Daulat and Sabah Incursion Response

The incursion into by approximately 200-235 armed militants affiliated with the self-proclaimed Royal began undetected on 11 February 2013, when they landed by boat in district, prompting an initial police response that escalated after failed diplomatic standoffs. Malaysian authorities launched Operation Daulat on 5 March 2013, a coordinated security effort involving the and units, including the General Operations Force (GOF), to reclaim affected areas and neutralize the invaders who had established bases in villages like Kampung Tanduo. GOF battalions, such as the 14th Battalion, conducted ground patrols, ambushes, and clearance operations in dense terrain, engaging militants in close-quarters combat to dismantle their positions and prevent territorial footholds. GOF-led elements focused on securing and surrounding sectors through February and March sweeps, coordinating with joint task forces to flush out remnants hiding in swamps and coastal hideouts, which culminated in the declaration of Kampung Tanduo as secured on 11 March 2013. These operations resulted in 68 militants killed, with Malaysian suffering 10 fatalities—eight policemen (including GOF personnel in ambushes) and two soldiers—alongside six civilian deaths from and related incidents. The decisive application of force, including aerial support and assaults, halted the militants' expansion, which could have drawn reinforcements from across the and escalated into a sustained separatist challenge, thereby restoring control and reinforcing border sovereignty without broader concessions. Initial intelligence shortcomings, criticized for failing to detect the seaborne entry despite porous eastern borders, were mitigated by the operation's rapid scaling, which integrated real-time surveillance and inter-agency coordination to track and eliminate threats, averting a protracted . By 24 March 2013, the core phase ended with most militants accounted for—45 killed in direct clashes, others captured or fled—demonstrating the efficacy of units like GOF in against irregular invaders intent on historical claims rather than . Post-operation arrests of 443 suspects for related offenses further secured the zone, though lingering critiques from Philippine sources questioned force proportionality without acknowledging the militants' armed defiance of Malaysian authority.

Contemporary Border and Anti-Smuggling Efforts

In the , the General Operations Force (GOF) has intensified border patrols and specialized operations such as Op Taring and Op Wawasan to combat drug trafficking, with the Southeast Brigade alone seizing approximately 11 tons of drugs valued at RM300 million between 2023 and 2024. These efforts included the of 216,000 yaba pills worth RM3.24 million on November 3, 2024, during Op Taring Sky in Tumpat, , highlighting GOF's role in disrupting smuggling routes from . Additional seizures, such as drugs and ketum in Op Taring Wawasan on June 5, 2025, underscore ongoing disruptions to narcotics distribution networks along porous land borders. GOF collaborates with authorities and other agencies in joint task forces, including Ops Benteng and integrated patrols, to address human smuggling and illegal migration. For instance, on September 25, 2025, operations involving GOF and detained 662 immigrants, including 545 , targeting undocumented entries via and routes. Arms smuggling concerns have prompted heightened joint enforcement, with GOF participating in intensified patrols along key borders following alerts in September 2025, leading to detections like fake pistols alongside drugs in on December 25, 2024. Such coordination extends to Ops Pintas Tip, where GOF units supported victim rescues under National Guidelines on Indicators in October 2025. Deployment of drones has enhanced effectiveness, putting a measurable dent in activities by expanding coverage and enabling faster responses to incursions along challenging terrains like the Kelantan-Thailand , where over 100 illegal bases were detected and targeted as of July 17, 2025. Despite persistent challenges from active bases, these measures have facilitated significant interdictions, demonstrating GOF's operational impact in maintaining integrity amid regional migration pressures.

Casualties, Incidents, and Recognition

Line-of-Duty Fatalities and Major Incidents

During the (1948–1960), the Police Field Force—predecessor to the modern General Operations Force—endured heavy losses as part of broader security forces operations against communist guerrillas, contributing to the total of 1,865 security forces personnel killed amid frequent ambushes, bombings, and jungle skirmishes. These fatalities peaked during intensive counter-insurgency phases, where police units conducted patrols in remote areas vulnerable to by insurgents. Post-independence, line-of-duty deaths have continued, often from operational ambushes in border regions, improvised explosive devices, and non-combat causes such as road accidents during rapid deployments or training exercises. Patterns reflect the force's role in high-risk environments, including anti-smuggling patrols and responses to armed incursions, with cumulative sacrifices underscoring the demands of sustained internal security duties. The Royal Malaysia Police honors fallen General Operations Force members through dedicated memorials and commemorative events, while families receive statutory pensions, gratuities, and welfare support under the Pensions Ordinance and related schemes for deceased public servants.

Keramat Pulai Shootouts

On 3 June 1976, during the ongoing Malayan communist , a group of approximately 35 Police Field Force (PFF) recruits—predecessor to the modern General Operations Force—underwent the final phase of basic jungle squad training at Bukit Keramat Pulai near , . At around 12:45 p.m., the trainees, led by Ridzewan bin Shaadan as platoon leader and drill instructor, were ambushed by a detachment of Communist Party of Malaya insurgents positioned on higher ground. The sudden attack involved sustained gunfire from the insurgents, resulting in Ridzewan being fatally shot through the eye; he died shortly after while attempting to organize a response. The recruits returned fire amid the chaos, but the ambush's tactical advantage favored the attackers, leading to four confirmed PFF fatalities: Ridzewan bin Shaadan (31507), Trainee Mohammad Noh Hashim (TPC), Trainee Mohammad Salim (TPC 60899), and additional trainees recognized posthumously for valor. Several others sustained injuries, with the insurgents withdrawing after inflicting significant casualties without reported losses on their side. The incident underscored the persistent threat posed by communist remnants in rural , where training exercises inadvertently entered active operational zones. Post-ambush searches by follow-up units uncovered improvised traps and , prompting intensified clearing operations by police commandos to neutralize residual insurgent presence in the Keramat Pulai area. Official inquiries attributed the vulnerability to inadequate prior to the training route, though the recruits' status and partial resistance were verified through recovered casings and survivor accounts, countering any narratives of defenseless victims. The event's proportionality was not contested, as the insurgents initiated lethal force against a uniformed unit; surviving participants received commendations, including Pingat Kebangsaan awards for those who engaged the enemy despite being outnumbered. This remains a pivotal in PFF/GOF operational , informing protocols for securing training sites amid low-level insurgencies. No similar large-scale engagements at Keramat Pulai have been documented since the insurgents' surrender in 1989.

Awards, Honors, and Effectiveness Metrics

The General Operations Force has garnered recognition for exemplary valor in high-risk operations, particularly along porous borders. In November 2020, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong consented to the conferment of the Panglima Gagah Berani (PGB), Malaysia's prestigious gallantry medal for extraordinary courage, upon two GOF personnel—Corporal Baharuddin Ramli and Norihan Tari—for their actions during a deadly confrontation with armed smugglers at the Malaysia-Thailand border on October 15, 2020. Both sustained gunshot wounds but neutralized the threat, exemplifying the unit's operational resolve in anti-smuggling efforts. Effectiveness metrics highlight the GOF's tangible impact on border security and . The 5th , for example, managed 80 enforcement cases in 2024, culminating in seizures exceeding RM23 million in value, encompassing , illegal timber, and smuggled wildlife. These outcomes reflect a high operational , with successes attributed to specialized patrols and rapid response tactics honed since the unit's evolution from counter-insurgency . Such quantifiable results foster elevated , as honors like the PGB reinforce personnel commitment to mission-critical duties amid demanding and threats.

Controversies and Criticisms

Allegations of Excessive Force and Misconduct

The General Operations Force (GOF) has faced occasional allegations of misconduct, primarily in high-threat border environments involving and unauthorized crossings, though verified instances of excessive remain rare relative to operational scale. In 2025, investigations into border-related misconduct led to arrests of implicated personnel, prompting the GOF to reinforce a zero-tolerance policy to uphold legal standards and prevent or abuse during counter- patrols. GOF ACP Ijid Landu Binju affirmed that no formal complaints had been lodged against officers at the time, but emphasized strict enforcement to deter involvement in illicit activities like aiding smugglers. Empirical data indicates low incidence rates of misconduct across the broader Royal Malaysian Police (PDRM), with Tan Sri noting in 2023 that "rogue" officers comprised under 1% of the , based on 881 disciplinary cases amid over 130,000 personnel. For the GOF specifically, conviction rates for excessive claims are minimal, often attributed to the exigencies of operations in porous borders prone to armed confrontations, narcotics trafficking, and incursions, where personnel must balance enforcement with restraint under the Police Act 1967 and international norms. Non-governmental organizations, including , have critiqued Malaysian police practices for potential excessive force in detention and crowd control, though GOF-specific reports focus more on procedural lapses in migrant handling rather than lethal overreach. Amnesty International has similarly highlighted systemic accountability gaps in PDRM operations, advocating for independent oversight like the Independent Police Conduct Commission (IPCC), established in 2020 to probe complaints but criticized for limited powers in high-stakes border contexts. Official rebuttals stress that such allegations must be weighed against threats like the 2013 incursion and ongoing smuggling, where GOF actions have prevented larger-scale violence, with internal probes ensuring due process over politically motivated claims.

Human Rights Concerns in Operations

During Operation Daulat in 2013, which responded to the armed incursion by Sulu militants in , Malaysian security forces, including the General Operations Force (GOF), faced allegations of resulting in civilian deaths. Official tallies reported six civilians killed amid the clashes that claimed 68 militants and 10 security personnel lives, with operations emphasizing targeted engagements against combatants while evacuating non-combatants from conflict zones like Kampung Tanduo. Malaysian authorities maintained that (ROE) were strictly followed, prioritizing force only against armed threats and minimizing harm to bystanders in an asymmetric conflict initiated by intruders who embedded among villagers. International organizations issued limited scrutiny specific to GOF actions in Daulat, with no formal findings of ROE violations or disproportionate force from bodies like or ; broader critiques of Malaysian police operations often generalize without GOF-specific evidence. In isolated cases, such as the 5 November 2000 Kesas Highway incident involving a disrupted opposition gathering, the Malaysian (SUHAKAM) inquired into GOF predecessor units (then Police Field Force) and concluded excessive force was used against some already-arrested individuals, prompting internal reviews but no systemic pattern. GOF operations prioritize compliance with Malaysian domestic law, including the Federal Constitution's provisions on liberty and security forces' use-of-force protocols under the Police Act 1967, over non-ratified UN instruments like the , where potential conflicts arise in national security contexts. U.S. State Department reports note general concerns over police conduct in , such as arbitrary detention, but attribute these to broader institutional issues rather than GOF-specific abuses, with no verified systemic violations in border or counter-insurgency roles. Media amplification of isolated claims has occurred without corroborating evidence from independent probes, reflecting causal realities of high-risk operations against non-state actors where proportionality assessments favor empirical threat neutralization over speculative humanitarian overlays.

Critiques of Operational Efficiency and Resource Allocation

Critics have highlighted operational overlaps between the General Operations Force (GOF) and the , particularly in border security and counter-smuggling operations, leading to potential redundancies in personnel deployment and logistical support. A 2019 assessment of Malaysia's border challenges noted that GOF activities intersect with those of the army, officials, and other agencies like the Border Security Agency, complicating command structures and resource coordination without clear delineations of responsibility. Resource allocation for the GOF, as part of the Royal Malaysian Police (PDRM), has been questioned amid fiscal constraints and competing national priorities. The 2005 Royal Commission to Enhance the Operation and Management of the PDRM recommended reallocating more funds toward and control, implying existing distributions inadequately supported specialized units like the GOF for sustained high-risk duties. By , PDRM's per-personnel averaged RM41,900, yet analysts debated whether such investments yielded proportional gains in operational output, citing persistent gaps in equipment modernization and training amid broader internal security demands. Expansion requirements following incidents like the 2013 Lahad Datu incursion strained GOF capabilities, necessitating additional battalions for border coverage, but were hampered by modest budget increments—such as the 2.92% rise to RM21.74 billion for defense-related spending in 2026, which encompasses police operations yet prioritizes military procurement. These constraints underscore debates over whether efficiencies justify the GOF's role in relieving army burdens, or if inter-agency duplication inflates costs without enhancing overall threat response.

Recent Developments and Future Directions

Post-2013 Expansions and Modernization

Following the 2013 Lahad Datu incursion and Operation Daulat, the General Operations Force (GOF) expanded its operational footprint in eastern to address vulnerabilities exposed in border defense, including increased deployments and infrastructure development along porous frontiers. This included the addition of posts under GOF jurisdiction, with Budget 2022 allocating funds to establish eight new posts, such as those in Pagalungan, , and Temong Mura, , aimed at improving monitoring and interception of cross-border threats. These measures enhanced GOF's capacity for rapid response in remote areas, integrating with existing battalions to cover extended coastlines and jungle terrains. In response to persistent illegal migration and smuggling pressures, particularly from and , GOF underwent further structural growth in the 2020s. By 2023, plans were announced for two new s in —Battalion 21 in and Battalion 22 in Kunak—to reinforce internal security and patrols. These were operationalized by May 2025, alongside a third in , bringing the total to bolster manpower in high-risk eastern regions amid surges in undocumented entries reported in official assessments. Concurrently, GOF roles at posts were broadened to incorporate community intelligence gathering on transnational crimes, enhancing local integration and early warning systems. Modernization efforts post-2013 emphasized technological upgrades for operational efficiency, including improved communication networks and tools to address coordination gaps identified in earlier incursions. Allocations in subsequent budgets supported equipment enhancements, such as mobile units for real-time tracking, contributing to reported gains in interception rates along northern and eastern borders. These implementations, verified through parliamentary records and ministry reports, focused on practical readiness without overhauling core tactics, prioritizing deployability in anti-smuggling and anti-infiltration roles.

Responses to Emerging Threats (2020-2025)

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the General Operations Force (GOF) intensified border patrols and checkpoint staffing to enforce the Movement Control Order (MCO), deploying 2,197 personnel to prevent unauthorized entries that could facilitate virus transmission. In collaboration with the Malaysian Armed Forces, GOF operations focused on sealing porous borders, particularly along the Malaysia-Thailand frontier, to curb illegal crossings by foreign nationals evading quarantine protocols. These measures extended to joint monitoring with military and immigration units, ensuring stricter compliance in high-risk areas and contributing to national containment efforts from March 2020 onward. In counter-terrorism, GOF border security operations disrupted potential ISIS-linked activities by intercepting smuggling routes used for illicit movement of extremists or materials, aligning with broader efforts to dismantle cells amid sustained monitoring of radical networks. recorded minimal terrorist incidents from 2020 to 2025, with no major attacks attributed to ISIS affiliates on home soil, reflecting effective preventive actions including GOF's role in frontier vigilance that limited infiltration from regional hotspots. This low incidence rate—fewer than five reported terror-related events annually, primarily minor plots foiled early—underscored the force's contribution to regional stability, where saw an overall decline in such threats. Addressing hybrid threats like cyber-facilitated , GOF escalated operations against organized syndicates employing digital coordination for human and trafficking, seizing goods worth over RM1.12 billion in 2025 alone through targeted raids on land and water routes. Notable actions included dismantling an immigrant smuggling network in October 2025, arresting 18 suspects involved in unauthorized border crossings, which often integrate online logistics with physical evasion tactics. In October 2025, GOF leadership reaffirmed a zero-tolerance policy on internal , particularly officer misconduct enabling border , with acting commander ACP Ijid Landu Binju emphasizing strict adherence to legal standards and no leniency for violations. This initiative followed arrests and investigations into personnel , aiming to bolster integrity and prevent facilitation of emerging threats like hybrid operations.

Planned Structural and Capability Enhancements

The General Operations Force has proposed establishing additional forward operating bases along the Sarawak-Indonesia border to bolster surveillance and response capabilities amid expected rises in cross-border activities tied to Indonesia's Nusantara capital project. This initiative targets remote jungle and riverine areas prone to and unauthorized incursions, enabling quicker deployment of patrols and reducing reaction times to threats. Capability enhancements include expanded integration of drone technology for real-time border monitoring, with unmanned aerial vehicles equipped for detecting movements in low-visibility conditions along key frontiers such as the Malaysia-Thailand boundary. These systems, already deployed in operational patrols, are slated for broader adoption to support intelligence gathering and deter syndicates involved in and illegal crossings, drawing on data from ongoing enforcement actions. Training reforms emphasize adaptability to hybrid threats, incorporating scenarios that blend kinetic operations with non-state actor tactics, informed by regional security assessments of grey-zone activities. Such overhauls seek to align GOF personnel with empirical projections of persistent internal security risks, including transnational crime networks exploiting porous frontiers. These measures address long-term viability by prioritizing proactive posture over reactive measures, grounded in operational data from border enforcement.

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