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Unification of Germany
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The Unification of Germany (German: Deutsche Einigung, pronounced [ˈdɔʏtʃə ˈʔaɪnɪɡʊŋ] ⓘ) was a process of building the first nation-state for Germans with federal features based on the concept of Lesser Germany (one without the Habsburgs' multi-ethnic Austria or its German-speaking part). After the deletion of the German Confederation due to the Austro-Prussian War, it commenced on 18 August 1866 with the adoption of the North German Confederation Treaty establishing the North German Confederation, initially a military alliance de facto dominated by the Kingdom of Prussia which was subsequently deepened through adoption of the North German Constitution.
The process symbolically concluded when most of the south German states joined the North German Confederation with the ceremonial proclamation of the German Empire (German Reich) having 25 member states and led by the Kingdom of Prussia of Hohenzollerns on 18 January 1871; the event was typically celebrated as the date of the German Empire's foundation, although the legally meaningful events relevant to the completion of unification occurred on 1 January 1871 (accession of South German states and constitutional adoption of the name "German Empire"), 4 May 1871 (entry into force of the permanent Constitution of the German Empire) and 10 May 1871 (Treaty of Frankfurt and recognition of the Empire by the French Third Republic).
Despite the legal, administrative, and political disruption caused by the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, the German-speaking people of the old Empire had a common linguistic, cultural, and legal tradition. European liberalism offered an intellectual basis for unification by challenging dynastic and absolutist models of social and political organization; its German manifestation emphasized the importance of tradition, education, and linguistic unity. Economically, the creation of the Prussian Zollverein (customs union) in 1818, and its subsequent expansion to include other states of the Austrian (under Austrian Empire)-led German Confederation, reduced competition between and within states. Emerging modes of transportation facilitated business and recreational travel, leading to contact and sometimes conflict between and among German-speakers from throughout Central Europe. The model of diplomatic spheres of influence resulting from the Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815 after the Napoleonic Wars endorsed Austrian dominance in Central Europe through Habsburg leadership of the German Confederation, designed to replace the Holy Roman Empire. The negotiators at Vienna underestimated Prussia's growing internal strength and declined to create a second coalition of the German states under Prussia's influence, and so failed to foresee that Prussia (Kingdom of Prussia) would rise to challenge Austria for leadership of the German peoples. This German dualism presented two solutions to the problem of unification: Kleindeutsche Lösung, the small Germany solution (Germany without Austria), or Großdeutsche Lösung, the greater Germany solution (Germany with Austria or its German-speaking part), ultimately settled in favor of the former solution in the Peace of Prague.
Historians debate whether Otto von Bismarck—Minister President of Prussia—had a master plan to expand the North German Confederation of 1866 to include the remaining independent German states into a single entity or simply that he planned to expand the power of the Kingdom of Prussia. They conclude that factors other than the strength of Bismarck's Realpolitik led a collection of early modern polities to reorganize their political, economic, military, and diplomatic relationships in the 19th century. Reaction to Danish and French nationalism prompted expressions of German unity. Military successes—especially those of Prussia—in three regional wars generated enthusiasm and pride that politicians could harness to promote unification. This experience echoed the memory of mutual accomplishment in the Napoleonic Wars, particularly in the War of Liberation of 1813–1814. By establishing a Germany without multi-ethnic Austria (under Austria-Hungary) or its German-speaking part, the political and administrative unification of 1871 avoided, at least temporarily, the problem of dualism.
Despite undergoing in later years several further changes of its name and borders, overhauls of its constitutional system, periods of limited sovereignty and interrupted unity of its territory or government, and despite dissolution of its dominant founding federated state, the polity resulting from the unification process continues today, surviving as the Federal Republic of Germany.
Early history
[edit]
Germans emerged in medieval times among the descendants of the Romanized Germanic peoples in the area of modern western Germany, between the Rhine and Elbe rivers, particularly the Franks, Frisians, Saxons, Thuringii, Alemanni, and Baiuvarii.[1] The region was divided into long-lasting divisions, or "Stem duchies", based upon these ethnic designations, under the dominance of the western Franks starting with Clovis I, who established control of the Romanized and Frankish population of Gaul in the 5th century, and began a new process of conquering the peoples east of the Rhine. In subsequent centuries the power of the Franks grew considerably.[2] By the early 9th century AD, large parts of Europe had been united under the rule of the Frankish leader Charlemagne, who expanded the Frankish Empire (Francia) in several directions including east of the Rhine, where he conquered Saxons and Frisians.[3] A confederated realm of German princedoms, along with some adjacent lands, had been in existence for over a thousand years; dating to the Treaty of Verdun i.e. the establishment of East Francia from eastern Frankish Empire in east of the Rhine in 843, especially when the Ottonian dynasty took power to rule East Francia in 919. The realm later in 962 made up the core of the Holy Roman Empire, which at times included more than 1,000 entities and was called the "Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation" from 1512 with the Diet of Cologne (new title was adopted partly because the Empire lost most of its territories in Italy and Burgundy to the south and west by the late 15th century, but also to emphasize the new importance of the German Imperial Estates in ruling the Empire due to the Imperial Reform). The states of the Holy Roman Empire ranged in size from the small and complex territories of the princely Hohenlohe family branches to sizable, well-defined territories such as the Electorate of Bavaria, the Margraviate of Brandenburg or the Kingdom of Bohemia. Their governance varied: they included free imperial cities, also of different sizes, such as the powerful Augsburg and the minuscule Weil der Stadt; ecclesiastical territories, also of varying sizes and influence, such as the wealthy Abbey of Reichenau and the powerful Archbishopric of Cologne; and dynastic states such as Württemberg. Among the German-speaking states, the Holy Roman Empire's administrative and legal mechanisms provided a venue to resolve disputes between peasants and landlords, between jurisdictions, and within jurisdictions. Through the organization of imperial circles (Reichskreise), groups of states consolidated resources and promoted regional and organizational interests, including economic cooperation and military protection.[citation needed]
Early modern era and Eighteenth century
[edit]Since the 15th century, with few exceptions, the Empire's Prince-electors had chosen successive heads of the House of Habsburg from the Duchy of Austria to hold the title of Holy Roman Emperor. Although they initially sought to restore central Imperial power, preserving a weak and fragmented Empire was convenient for France and Sweden, and therefore, their ensuing intervention led to the Peace of Westphalia which effectively precluded any serious attempts to reinforce the imperial central authority and petrified fragmentation and leading to the existence of more than 300 German-speaking political entities, most of them being parts of the Holy Roman Empire, as the Napoleonic Wars dawned. Still though, portions of the extensive Habsburg Monarchy (exclusively its large non-German-speaking territories: Lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen and the Austrian partition of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) or of the Hohenzollern Kingdom of Prussia (both the German-speaking former Duchy of Prussia and the non-German-speaking entire territory of the Prussian partition of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) as well as the German-speaking Swiss cantons were outside of the Imperial borders. This became known as the practice of Kleinstaaterei ("small-statery"). As a further consequence, there was no typical German national identity as late as 1800, mainly due to the highly autonomous or semi-independent nature of the princely states; most inhabitants of the Holy Roman Empire, outside of those ruled by the emperor directly, identified themselves mainly with their prince rather than with the Empire or the nation as a whole. However, by the 19th century, transportation and communication improvements started to bring these regions closer together.[4]
Dissolution of the Old Empire
[edit]Invasion of the Holy Roman Empire by the First French Empire in the War of the Second Coalition (1798–1802) resulted in a massive military defeat for the Empire's and allied forces at the hands of Napoleon Bonaparte. The treaties of Lunéville (1801) and the Mediatization of 1803 secularized the ecclesiastical principalities and abolished most free imperial cities and so these territories along with their inhabitants were absorbed by dynastic states. This transfer particularly expanded the territories of Württemberg and Baden. In 1806, after a successful invasion of Prussia and the defeat of Prussia at the joint battles of Jena-Auerstedt 1806 during the War of the Third Coalition, Napoleon dictated the Treaty of Pressburg which included the formal dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire and the abdication of Emperor Francis II from the nominal reign over it. Napoleon established instead a German client state of France known as the Confederation of the Rhine which, inter alia, provided for the mediatization of over a hundred petty princes and counts and the absorption of their territories, as well as those of hundreds of imperial knights, by the Confederation's member-states. Several states were promoted to kingdoms including the Kingdom of Bavaria, the Kingdom of Saxony or the Kingdom of Hanover.[5] Following the formal secession from the Empire of the majority of its constituent states, the Emperor dissolved the Holy Roman Empire.[6] In his abdication, Francis released all former estates from their duties and obligations to him, and took upon himself solely the title of Emperor of Austria, which had been established since 1804.[7]
Rise of German nationalism under Napoleon
[edit]Under the hegemony of the First French Empire (1804–1814), popular German nationalism thrived in the reorganized German states. Due in part to German-speaking peoples' shared experience, albeit under French rule, various justifications emerged to identify "Germany" as a potential future single state. For the German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte,
The first, original, and truly natural boundaries of states are beyond doubt their internal boundaries. Those who speak the same language are joined to each other by a multitude of invisible bonds by nature herself, long before any human art begins; they understand each other and have the power of continuing to make themselves understood more and more clearly; they belong together and are by nature one and an inseparable whole.[8]

A common language may have been seen to serve as the basis of a nation, but as contemporary historians of 19th-century Germany noted, it took more than linguistic similarity to unify these several hundred polities.[9] The experience of German-speaking Central Europe during the years of French hegemony contributed to a sense of common cause to expel the French invaders and reassert control over their own lands. Napoleon's campaigns in Poland (1806–07) resulting in his decision to re-establish a form of Polish statehood (the Duchy of Warsaw) at the cost of Prussian-conquered Polish territories, as well as his campaigns on the Iberian Peninsula, in western Germany, and his disastrous invasion of Russia in 1812, disillusioned many Germans, princes and peasants alike. Napoleon's Continental System nearly ruined the Central European economy. The invasion of Russia included nearly 125,000 troops from German lands, and the destruction of that army encouraged many Germans, both high- and low-born, to envision a Central Europe free of Napoleon's influence.[10] The creation of student militias such as the Lützow Free Corps exemplified this tendency.[11]
The debacle in Russia loosened the French grip on German princes. In 1813, Napoleon mounted a campaign in the German states to bring them back into the French orbit; the subsequent War of Liberation culminated in the great Battle of Leipzig, also known as the Battle of Nations. In October 1813, more than 500,000 combatants engaged in ferocious fighting over three days, making it the largest European land battle of the 19th century. The engagement resulted in a decisive victory for the Coalition of Austria, Prussia, Russia, Saxony, and Sweden. As a result, the Confederation of the Rhine collapsed and the French period came to an end. Success encouraged the Coalition forces to pursue Napoleon across the Rhine; his army and his government collapsed, and the victorious Coalition incarcerated Napoleon on Elba. During the brief Napoleonic restoration known as the 100 Days of 1815, forces of the Seventh Coalition, including an Anglo-Allied army under the command of the Duke of Wellington and a Prussian army under the command of Gebhard von Blücher, were victorious at Waterloo (18 June 1815).[a] The critical role played by Blücher's troops, especially after having to retreat from the field at Ligny on the 17th, helped to turn the tide of combat against the French. The Prussian cavalry pursued the defeated French on the evening of the 18th of June, sealing the allied victory. From the German perspective, the actions of Blücher's troops at Waterloo, and the combined efforts at Leipzig, offered a rallying point of pride and enthusiasm.[13] This interpretation became a key building block of the Borussian myth expounded by the pro-Prussian nationalist historians later in the 19th century.[14]
Congress of Vienna and the rise of German dualism
[edit]
After Napoleon's defeat, the Congress of Vienna established a new European political-diplomatic system based on the balance of power. This system reorganized Europe into spheres of influence, which, in some cases, suppressed the aspirations of the various nationalities, including the Germans and Italians.[15]
Generally, an enlarged Prussia and the 38 other states consolidated from the mediatized territories of 1803 were confederated within the Austrian Empire's sphere of influence. The Congress established a loose German Confederation (1815–1866), headed by Austria, with a "Federal Diet" (called the Bundestag or Bundesversammlung, an assembly of appointed leaders) that met in the city of Frankfurt am Main. Its borders resembled those of its predecessor, the Holy Roman Empire (though there were some deviations e.g. Prussian territory in the Confederation was extended to include the formerly Polish territories of the Lauenburg and Bütow Land and the former Starostwo of Draheim, while the Austrian part was extended to include the formerly Polish territories of the Duchy of Oświęcim and the Duchy of Zator) for the years 1818–1850, meaning that large portions of both Prussia and Austria were left outside the new borders. In recognition of the imperial position traditionally held by the Habsburgs, the emperors of Austria became the titular presidents of this parliament. Despite the term Diet (Assembly or Parliament), this institution should in no way be construed as a broadly, or popularly, elected group of representatives. Many of the states did not have constitutions, and those that did, such as the Duchy of Baden, based suffrage on strict property requirements which effectively limited suffrage to a small portion of the male population.[16]
Problems of reorganization
[edit]
Problematically, the built-in Austrian dominance failed to take into account Prussia's 18th-century emergence in Imperial politics. This impractical solution did not reflect the new status of Prussia in the overall set-up. Although the Prussian army had been dramatically defeated in the 1806 Battle of Jena-Auerstedt, it had made a spectacular comeback at Waterloo. Consequently, Prussian leaders expected to play a pivotal role in German politics.[17] Ever since the Prince-Elector of Brandenburg had made himself King in Prussia at the beginning of that century, their domains had steadily increased through inheritance and war. Prussia's consolidated strength had become particularly apparent during the Partitions of Poland, the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War under Frederick the Great.[18] As Maria Theresa and Joseph tried to restore Habsburg hegemony in the Holy Roman Empire, Frederick countered with the creation of the Fürstenbund (Union of Princes) in 1785. Austrian-Prussian dualism lay firmly rooted in old Imperial politics. Those balance of power manoeuvers were epitomized by the War of the Bavarian Succession, or "Potato War" among common folk. Even after the end of the Holy Roman Empire, this competition influenced the growth and development of nationalist movements in the 19th century.[19]
Prelude
[edit]Vormärz
[edit]The period of Austrian and Prussian police-states and vast censorship between the Congress of Vienna and the Revolutions of 1848 in Germany later became widely known as the Vormärz ("before March"), referring to March 1848. During this period, European liberalism gained momentum; the agenda included economic, social, and political issues. Most European liberals in the Vormärz sought unification under nationalist principles, promoted the transition to capitalism, and sought the expansion of male suffrage, among other issues. Their "radicalization" depended upon where they stood on the spectrum of male suffrage: the wider the definition of suffrage, the more radical they had the potential to be.[20]
The surge of German nationalism, stimulated by the experience of Germans in the Napoleonic period and initially allied with liberalism, shifted political, social, and cultural relationships within the German states.[21] In this context, one can detect nationalism's roots in the experience of Germans in the Napoleonic period.[22] Furthermore, implicit and sometimes explicit promises made during the German Campaign of 1813 engendered an expectation of popular sovereignty and widespread participation in the political process, promises that largely went unfulfilled once peace had been achieved.[23]
Emergence of liberal nationalism and conservative response
[edit]


Despite considerable conservative reaction, ideas of unity joined with notions of popular sovereignty in German-speaking lands. The Burschenschaft student organizations and popular demonstrations, such as those held at Wartburg Castle in October 1817, contributed to a growing sense of unity among German speakers of Central Europe.[25]
At the Wartburg Festival in 1817 the first real movements among students were formed – fraternities and student organizations emerged. The colors black, red and gold were symbolic of this. Agitation by student organizations led conservative leaders such as Klemens Wenzel, Prince von Metternich, to fear the rise of nationalist sentiment.[23]
The assassination of German dramatist August von Kotzebue in March 1819 by a radical student seeking unification was followed on 20 September 1819 by the proclamation of the Carlsbad Decrees, which hindered intellectual leadership of the nationalist movement.[23] Metternich was able to harness conservative outrage at the assassination to consolidate legislation that would further limit the press and constrain the rising liberal and nationalist movements. Accordingly, these decrees drove the Burschenschaften underground, restricted the publication of nationalist materials, expanded censorship of the press and private correspondence, and limited academic speech by prohibiting university professors from encouraging nationalist discussion. The decrees were the subject of Johann Joseph von Görres's pamphlet Teutschland [archaic: Deutschland] und die Revolution (Germany and the Revolution) (1820), in which he concluded that it was both impossible and undesirable to repress the free utterance of public opinion by reactionary measures.[25]
The Hambach Festival (Hambacher Fest) in May 1832 was attended by a crowd of more than 30,000.[26] Promoted as a county fair,[27] its participants celebrating fraternity, liberty, and national unity. Celebrants gathered in the town below and marched to the ruins of Hambach Castle on the heights above the small town of Hambach, in the Palatinate province of Bavaria. Carrying flags, beating drums, and singing, the participants took the better part of the morning and mid-day to arrive at the castle grounds, where they listened to speeches by nationalist orators from across the political spectrum. The overall content of the speeches suggested a fundamental difference between the German nationalism of the 1830s and the French nationalism of the July Revolution: the focus of German nationalism lay in the education of the people; once the populace was educated as to what was needed, it would reach those goals. The Hambach rhetoric emphasized the overall peaceable nature of German nationalism: the point was not to build barricades, a very "French" form of nationalism, but to build emotional bridges between groups.[28] As he had done in 1819, after the Kotzebue assassination, Metternich used the popular demonstration at Hambach to push conservative social policy. The "Six Articles" of 28 June 1832 above all else reaffirmed the principle of monarchical authority. On 5 July, the Frankfurt Diet voted for an additional 10 articles, which reiterated existing rules on censorship, restricted political organizations, and limited other public activity. Furthermore, the member states agreed to send military assistance to any government threatened by unrest.[29] Prince Wrede led half of the Bavarian army to the Palatinate to "subdue" the province. Several hapless Hambach speakers were arrested, tried and imprisoned; one, Karl Heinrich Brüggemann (1810–1887), a law student and representative of the secretive Burschenschaft, was sent to Prussia, where he was first condemned to death, but later pardoned.[26]
Crucially, both the Wartburg rally in 1817 and the Hambach Festival in 1832 had lacked any clear-cut vision for unification. At Hambach, the positions of the many speakers illustrated their disparate agendas. Held together only by the idea of unification, their notions of how to achieve this did not include specific plans but instead rested on the nebulous idea that the Volk (the people), if properly educated, would bring about unification on their own. Grand speeches, flags, exuberant students, and picnic lunches did not translate into a new political, bureaucratic, or administrative apparatus. While many spoke about the need for a constitution, no such document emerged from the key nationalist rallies. In 1848, nationalists sought to remedy that problem.[30]
Economy and the customs union
[edit]
Several other factors complicated the rise of nationalism in the German states. The man-made factors included political rivalries between members of the German confederation, particularly between the Austrians and the Prussians, and socio-economic competition among the commercial and merchant interests, and the old land-owning and aristocratic interests. Natural factors included widespread drought in the early 1830s, and again in the 1840s, and a food crisis in the 1840s. Further complications emerged as a result of a shift in industrialization and manufacturing; as people sought jobs, they left their villages and small towns to work during the week in cities, returning for a day and a half on weekends.[31]
The economic, social and cultural dislocation of ordinary people, the economic hardship of an economy in transition, and the pressures of meteorological disasters all contributed to growing problems in Central Europe.[32] The failure of most of the governments to deal with the food crisis of the mid-1840s, caused by the potato blight (related to the Great Irish Famine) and several seasons of bad weather, encouraged many to think that the rich and powerful had no interest in their problems. Those in authority were concerned about the growing unrest, political and social agitation among the working classes, and the disaffection of the intelligentsia. No amount of censorship, fines, imprisonment, or banishment, it seemed, could stem the criticism. Furthermore, it was becoming increasingly clear that both Austria and Prussia wanted to be the leaders in any resulting unification; each would inhibit the drive of the other to take the lead in unification.[33]
Formation of the Zollverein, an institution key to unifying the German states economically, helped to create a larger sense of economic unification. Initially conceived by the Prussian Finance Minister Hans, Count von Bülow, as a Prussian customs union in 1818, the Zollverein linked the many Prussian and Hohenzollern territories. Over the ensuing thirty years (and more) other German states joined. The Union helped to reduce protectionist barriers between the German states, especially improving the transport of raw materials and finished goods, making it both easier to move goods across territorial borders and less costly to buy, transport, and sell raw materials. This was particularly important for the emerging industrial centers, most of which were located in the Prussian regions of the Rhineland, the Saar, and the Ruhr valleys.[34] States more distant from the coast joined the Customs Union earlier. Not being a member mattered more for the states of south Germany, since the external tariff of the Customs Union prevented customs-free access to the coast (which gave access to international markets). Thus, by 1836, all states to the south of Prussia had joined the Customs Union, except Austria.[35]
In contrast, the coastal states already had barrier free access to international trade and did not want consumers and producers burdened with the import duties they would pay if they were within the Zollverein customs border. Hanover on the north coast formed its own customs union – the "Tax Union" or Steuerverein – in 1834 with Brunswick and with Oldenburg in 1836. The external tariffs on finished goods and overseas raw materials were below the rates of the Zollverein. Brunswick joined the Zollverein Customs Union in 1842, while Hanover and Oldenburg finally joined in 1854[36] After the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg were annexed by Prussia and thus annexed also to the Customs Union, while the two Mecklenburg states and the city states of Hamburg and Bremen joined later because they were reliant on international trade. The Mecklenburgs joined in 1867, while Bremen and Hamburg joined in 1888.[35]
Roads and railways
[edit]By the early 19th century, German roads had deteriorated to an appalling extent. Travelers, both foreign and local, complained bitterly about the state of the Heerstraßen, the military roads previously maintained for easy troop movement. As German states ceased to be a military crossroads, however, the roads improved; the length of hard–surfaced roads in Prussia increased from 3,800 kilometers (2,400 mi) in 1816 to 16,600 kilometers (10,300 mi) in 1852, helped in part by the invention of macadam. By 1835, Heinrich von Gagern wrote that roads were the "veins and arteries of the body politic..." and predicted that they would promote freedom, independence and prosperity.[37]As people moved around, they came into contact with others, on trains, at hotels, in restaurants, and for some, at fashionable resorts such as the spa in Baden-Baden. Water transportation also improved. The blockades on the Rhine had been removed by Napoleon's orders, but by the 1820s, steam engines freed riverboats from the cumbersome system of men and animals that towed them upstream. By 1846, 180 steamers plied German rivers and Lake Constance, and a network of canals extended from the Danube, the Weser, and the Elbe rivers.[38]
As important as these improvements were, they could paled in comparison to the impact of the railway. German economist Friedrich List called the railways and the Customs Union "Siamese Twins", emphasizing their important mutually beneficial relationship.[39] He was not alone: the poet August Heinrich Hoffmann von Fallersleben wrote a poem in which he extolled the virtues of the Zollverein, which he began with a list of commodities that had contributed more to German unity than politics or diplomacy.[40] Historians of the German Empire later regarded the railways as the first indicator of a unified state; the patriotic novelist, Wilhelm Raabe, wrote: "The German empire was founded with the construction of the first railway..."[41] Not everyone greeted the iron monster with enthusiasm. The Prussian king Frederick William III saw no advantage in traveling from Berlin to Potsdam a few hours faster, and Metternich refused to ride it at all. Others wondered if the railways were an "evil" that threatened the landscape: Nikolaus Lenau's 1838 poem An den Frühling (To Spring) bemoaned the way trains destroyed the pristine quietude of German forests.[42]
The Bavarian Ludwig Railway, which was the first passenger or freight rail line in the German lands, connected Nuremberg and Fürth in 1835. Although it was 6 kilometers (3.7 mi) long and only operated in daylight, it proved both profitable and popular. Within three years, 141 kilometers (88 mi) of track had been laid, by 1840, 462 kilometers (287 mi), and by 1860, 11,157 kilometers (6,933 mi). Lacking a geographically central organizing feature (such as a national capital), the rails were laid in webs, linking towns and markets within regions, regions within larger regions, and so on. As the rail network expanded, it became cheaper to transport goods: in 1840, 18 Pfennigs per ton per kilometer and in 1870, five Pfennigs. The effects of the railway were immediate. For example, raw materials could travel up and down the Ruhr Valley without having to unload and reload. Railway lines stumulated economic activity by creating demand for commodities and by facilitating commerce. In 1850, inland shipping carried three times more freight than railroads; by 1870, the situation was reversed, and railroads carried four times more. Rail travel changed how cities looked and how people traveled. Its impact reached throughout the social order, affecting the highest born to the lowest. Although some of the outlying German provinces were not serviced by rail until the 1890s, the majority of the population, manufacturing centers, and production centers were linked to the rail network by 1865.[43]
Geography, patriotism and language
[edit]
As travel became easier, faster, and less expensive, Germans started to see unity in factors other than their language. The Brothers Grimm, who compiled a massive dictionary known as The Grimm, also assembled a compendium of folk tales and fables, which highlighted the story-telling parallels between different regions.[b] Karl Baedeker wrote guidebooks to different cities and regions of Central Europe, indicating places to stay, sites to visit, and giving a short history of castles, battlefields, famous buildings, and famous people. His guides also included distances, roads to avoid, and hiking paths to follow.[45]
The words of August Heinrich Hoffmann von Fallersleben expressed not only the linguistic unity of the German people but also their geographic unity. In Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles, officially called Das Lied der Deutschen ("The Song of the Germans"), Fallersleben called upon sovereigns throughout the German states to recognize the unifying characteristics of the German people.[46] Such other patriotic songs as "Die Wacht am Rhein" ("The Watch on the Rhine") by Max Schneckenburger began to focus attention on geographic space, not limiting "Germanness" to a common language. Schneckenburger wrote "The Watch on the Rhine" in a specific patriotic response to French assertions that the Rhine was France's "natural" eastern boundary. In the refrain, "Dear fatherland, dear fatherland, put your mind to rest / The watch stands true on the Rhine", and in other such patriotic poetry as Nicholaus Becker's "Das Rheinlied" ("The Rhine"), Germans were called upon to defend their territorial homeland. In 1807, Alexander von Humboldt argued that national character reflected geographic influence, linking landscape to people. Concurrent with this idea, movements to preserve old fortresses and historic sites emerged, and these particularly focused on the Rhineland, the site of so many confrontations with France and Spain.[47]
German revolutions and Polish uprising of 1848–1849
[edit]The widespread—mainly German—revolutions of 1848–49 sought unification of Germany under a single constitution. The revolutionaries pressured various state governments, particularly those in the Rhineland, for a parliamentary assembly that would have the responsibility to draft a constitution. Ultimately, many of the left-wing revolutionaries hoped this constitution would establish universal male suffrage, a permanent national parliament, and a unified Germany, possibly under the leadership of the Prussian king. This seemed to be the most logical course since Prussia was the strongest of the German states, as well as the largest in geographic size. Meanwhile, center-right revolutionaries sought some kind of expanded suffrage within their states and potentially, a form of loose unification. Finally, the Polish majority living in the share of Polish territory annexed by Prussia pursued their own liberation agenda.[citation needed]
Frankfurt Parliament
[edit]
Their pressure resulted in a variety of elections, based on different voting qualifications, such as the Prussian three-class franchise, which weighted votes based on the amount of taxes paid and therefore gave some electoral groups—chiefly the wealthier, landed ones—greater representative power.[49]
On 27 March 1849, the Frankfurt Parliament passed the Paulskirchenverfassung (Constitution of St. Paul's Church) and offered the title of Kaiser (Emperor) to the Prussian king Frederick William IV the next month. He refused for a variety of reasons. Publicly, he replied that he could not accept a crown without the consent of the actual states, by which he meant the princes. Privately, he feared opposition from the other German princes and military intervention from Austria or Russia. He also held a fundamental distaste for the idea of accepting a crown from a popularly elected parliament: he would not accept a crown of "clay".[50] Despite franchise requirements that often perpetuated many of the problems of sovereignty and political participation liberals sought to overcome, the Frankfurt Parliament did manage to draft a constitution and reach an agreement on the kleindeutsch solution. While the liberals failed to achieve the unification they sought, they did manage to gain a partial victory by working with the German princes on many constitutional issues and collaborating with them on reforms.[51]
The aborted 1848–1849 German Empire in retrospective analysis
[edit]Scholars of German history have engaged in decades of debate over how the successes and failures of the Frankfurt Parliament contribute to the historiographical explanations of German nation building. One school of thought, which emerged after The Great War and gained momentum in the aftermath of World War II, maintains that the failure of German liberals in the Frankfurt Parliament led to bourgeoisie compromise with conservatives (especially the conservative Junker landholders), which subsequently led to the so-called Sonderweg (distinctive path) of 20th-century German history.[52] Failure to achieve unification in 1848, this argument holds, resulted in the late formation of the nation-state in 1871, which in turn delayed the development of positive national values. Hitler often called on the German public to sacrifice all for the cause of their great nation, but his regime did not create German nationalism: it merely capitalized on an intrinsic cultural value of German society that still remains prevalent even to this day.[53] Furthermore, this argument maintains, the "failure" of 1848 reaffirmed latent aristocratic longings among the German middle class; consequently, this group never developed a self-conscious program of modernization.[54]
More recent scholarship has rejected this idea, claiming that Germany did not have an actual "distinctive path" any more than any other nation, a historiographic idea known as exceptionalism.[55] Instead, modern historians claim 1848 saw specific achievements by the liberal politicians. Many of their ideas and programs were later incorporated into Bismarck's social programs (e.g., social insurance, education programs, and wider definitions of suffrage). In addition, the notion of a distinctive path relies upon the underlying assumption that some other nation's path (in this case, the United Kingdom's) is the accepted norm.[56] This new argument further challenges the norms of the British-centric model of development: studies of national development in Britain and other "normal" states (e.g., France or the United States) have suggested that even in these cases, the modern nation-state did not develop evenly. Nor did it develop particularly early, being rather a largely mid-to-late-19th-century phenomenon.[57] Since the end of the 1990s, this view has become widely accepted, although some historians still find the Sonderweg analysis helpful in understanding the period of National Socialism.[58][59]
Problem of spheres of influence: The Erfurt Union and the Punctation of Olmütz
[edit]
After the Frankfurt Parliament disbanded, Frederick William IV, under the influence of General Joseph Maria von Radowitz, supported the establishment of the Erfurt Union—a federation of German states, excluding Austria—by the free agreement of the German princes. This limited union under Prussia would have almost eliminated Austrian influence on the other German states. Combined diplomatic pressure from Austria and Russia (a guarantor of the 1815 agreements that established European spheres of influence) forced Prussia to relinquish the idea of the Erfurt Union at a meeting in the small town of Olmütz in Moravia. In November 1850, the Prussians—specifically Radowitz and Frederick William—agreed to the restoration of the German Confederation under Austrian leadership. This became known as the Punctation of Olmütz, but among Prussians it was known as the "Humiliation of Olmütz."[60]
Although seemingly minor events, the Erfurt Union proposal and the Punctation of Olmütz brought the problems of influence in the German states into sharp focus. The question became not a matter of if but rather when unification would occur, and when was contingent upon strength. One of the former Frankfurt Parliament members, Johann Gustav Droysen, summed up the problem:
We cannot conceal the fact that the whole German question is a simple alternative between Prussia and Austria. In these states, German life has its positive and negative poles—in the former, all the interests [that] are national and reformative, in the latter, all that are dynastic and destructive. The German question is not a constitutional question but a question of power; and the Prussian monarchy is now wholly German, while that of Austria cannot be.[61]
Unification under these conditions raised a basic diplomatic problem. The possibility of German (or Italian) unification would overturn the overlapping spheres of influence system created in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna. The principal architects of this convention, Metternich, Castlereagh, and Tsar Alexander (with his foreign secretary Count Karl Nesselrode), had conceived of and organized a Europe balanced and guaranteed by four "great powers": Great Britain, France, Russia, and Austria, with each power having a geographic sphere of influence. France's sphere included the Iberian Peninsula and a share of influence in the Italian states. Russia's included the eastern regions of Central Europe and a balancing influence in the Balkans. Austria's sphere expanded throughout much of the Central European territories formerly held by the Holy Roman Empire. Britain's sphere was the rest of the world, especially the seas.[62]
This sphere of influence system depended upon the fragmentation of the German and Italian states, not their consolidation. Consequently, a German nation united under one banner presented significant questions. There was no readily applicable definition for who the German people would be or how far the borders of a German nation would stretch. There was also uncertainty as to who would best lead and defend "Germany", however it was defined. Different groups offered different solutions to this problem. In the Kleindeutschland ("Lesser Germany") solution, the German states would be united under the leadership of the Prussian Hohenzollerns; in the Grossdeutschland ("Greater Germany") solution, the German states would be united under the leadership of the Austrian Habsburgs. This controversy, the latest phase of the German dualism debate that had dominated the politics of the German states and Austro-Prussian diplomacy since the 1701 creation of the Kingdom of Prussia, would come to a head during the following twenty years.[63]
External expectations of a unified Germany
[edit]Other nationalists had high hopes for the German unification movement, and the frustration with lasting German unification after 1850 seemed to set the national movement back. Revolutionaries associated national unification with progress. As Giuseppe Garibaldi wrote to German revolutionary Karl Blind on 10 April 1865, "The progress of humanity seems to have come to a halt, and you with your superior intelligence will know why. The reason is that the world lacks a nation [that] possesses true leadership. Such leadership, of course, is required not to dominate other peoples but to lead them along the path of duty, to lead them toward the brotherhood of nations where all the barriers erected by egoism will be destroyed." Garibaldi looked to Germany for the "kind of leadership [that], in the true tradition of medieval chivalry, would devote itself to redressing wrongs, supporting the weak, sacrificing momentary gains and material advantage for the much finer and more satisfying achievement of relieving the suffering of our fellow men. We need a nation courageous enough to give us a lead in this direction. It would rally to its cause all those who are suffering wrong or who aspire to a better life and all those who are now enduring foreign oppression." [c]
German unification had also been viewed as a prerequisite for the creation of a European federation, which Giuseppe Mazzini and other European patriots had been promoting for more than three decades:
In the spring of 1834, while at Berne, Mazzini and a dozen refugees from Italy, Poland and Germany founded a new association with the grandiose name of Young Europe. Its basic, and equally grandiose idea, was that, as the French Revolution of 1789 had enlarged the concept of individual liberty, another revolution would now be needed for national liberty; and his vision went further because he hoped that in the no doubt distant future free nations might combine to form a loosely federal Europe with some kind of federal assembly to regulate their common interests. [...] His intention was nothing less than to overturn the European settlement agreed [to] in 1815 by the Congress of Vienna, which had reestablished an oppressive hegemony of a few great powers and blocked the emergence of smaller nations. [...] Mazzini hoped, but without much confidence, that his vision of a league or society of independent nations would be realized in his own lifetime. In practice Young Europe lacked the money and popular support for more than a short-term existence. Nevertheless he always remained faithful to the ideal of a united continent for which the creation of individual nations would be an indispensable preliminary.[65]
Prussia's growing strength: Realpolitik
[edit]
King Frederick William IV suffered a stroke in 1857 and could no longer rule. This led to his brother William becoming prince regent of the Kingdom of Prussia in 1858. Meanwhile, Helmuth von Moltke had become chief of the Prussian General Staff in 1857, and Albrecht von Roon would become Prussian Minister of War in 1859.[66] This shuffling of authority within the Prussian military establishment would have important consequences. Von Roon and William (who took an active interest in military structures) began reorganizing the Prussian army, while Moltke redesigned the strategic defense of Prussia by streamlining operational command. Prussian army reforms (especially how to pay for them) caused a constitutional crisis beginning in 1860 because both parliament and William—via his minister of war—wanted control over the military budget. William, crowned King Wilhelm I in 1861, appointed Otto von Bismarck to the position of Minister-President of Prussia in 1862. Bismarck resolved the crisis in favor of the war minister.[67]
The Crimean War of 1854–55 and the Italian War of 1859 disrupted relations among Great Britain, France, Austria, and Russia. In the aftermath of this disarray, the convergence of von Moltke's operational redesign, von Roon and Wilhelm's army restructure, and Bismarck's diplomacy influenced the realignment of the European balance of power. Their combined agendas established Prussia as the leading German power through a combination of foreign diplomatic triumphs—backed up by the possible use of Prussian military might—and an internal conservatism tempered by pragmatism, which came to be known as Realpolitik.[68]
Bismarck expressed the essence of Realpolitik in his subsequently famous "Blood and Iron" speech to the Budget Committee of the Prussian Chamber of Deputies on 30 September 1862, shortly after he became Minister President: "The great questions of the time will not be resolved by speeches and majority decisions—that was the great mistake of 1848 and 1849—but by iron and blood."[69] Bismarck's words, "iron and blood" (or "blood and iron", as often attributed), have often been misappropriated as evidence of a German lust for blood and power.[70] First, the phrase from his speech "the great questions of time will not be resolved by speeches and majority decisions" is often interpreted as a repudiation of the political process—a repudiation Bismarck did not himself advocate.[d] Second, his emphasis on blood and iron did not imply simply the unrivaled military might of the Prussian army but rather two important aspects: the ability of the assorted German states to produce iron and other related war materials and the willingness to use those war materials if necessary.[72]
By 1862, when Bismarck made his speech, the idea of a German nation-state in the peaceful spirit of Pan-Germanism had shifted from the liberal and democratic character of 1848 to accommodate Bismarck's more conservative Realpolitik. Bismarck sought to link a unified state to the Hohenzollern dynasty, which for some historians remains one of Bismarck's primary contributions to the creation of the German Empire in 1871.[73] While the conditions of the treaties binding the various German states to one another prohibited Bismarck from taking unilateral action, the politician and diplomat in him realized the impracticality of this.[74] To get the German states to unify, Bismarck needed a single, outside enemy that would declare war on one of the German states first, thus providing a casus belli to rally all Germans behind. This opportunity arose with the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870. Historians have long debated Bismarck's role in the events leading up to the war. The traditional view, promulgated in large part by late 19th- and early 20th-century pro-Prussian historians, maintains that Bismarck's intent was always German unification. Post-1945 historians, however, see more short-term opportunism and cynicism in Bismarck's manipulation of the circumstances to create a war, rather than a grand scheme to unify a nation-state.[75] Regardless of motivation, by manipulating events of 1866 and 1870, Bismarck demonstrated the political and diplomatic skill that had caused Wilhelm to turn to him in 1862.[76]
Three episodes proved fundamental to the unification of Germany. First, the death without male heirs of Frederick VII of Denmark led to the Second War of Schleswig in 1864. Second, the unification of Italy provided Prussia an ally against Austria in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. Finally, France—fearing Hohenzollern encirclement—declared war on Prussia in 1870, resulting in the Franco-Prussian War. Through a combination of Bismarck's diplomacy and political leadership, von Roon's military reorganization, and von Moltke's military strategy, Prussia demonstrated that none of the European signatories of the 1815 peace treaty could guarantee Austria's sphere of influence in Central Europe, thus achieving Prussian hegemony in Germany and ending the dualism debate.[77]
The Schleswig-Holstein Question
[edit]The first episode in the saga of German unification under Bismarck came with the Schleswig-Holstein Question. On 15 November 1863, Christian IX became king of Denmark and duke of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg, which the Danish king held in personal union. On 18 November 1863, he signed the Danish November Constitution which replaced The Law of Sjælland and The Law of Jutland, which meant the new constitution applied to the Duchy of Schleswig. The German Confederation saw this act as a violation of the London Protocol of 1852, which emphasized the status of the Kingdom of Denmark as distinct from the three independent duchies. The German Confederation could use the ethnicities of the area as a rallying cry: Holstein and Lauenburg were largely of German origin and spoke German in everyday life, while Schleswig had a significant Danish population and history. Diplomatic attempts to have the November Constitution repealed collapsed, and fighting began when Prussian and Austrian troops crossed the Eider river on 1 February 1864.[citation needed]
Initially, the Danes attempted to defend their country using an ancient earthen wall known as the Danevirke, but this proved futile. The Danes were no match for the combined Prussian and Austrian forces and their modern armaments. The needle gun, one of the first bolt action rifles to be used in conflict, aided the Prussians in both this war and the Austro-Prussian War two years later. The rifle enabled a Prussian soldier to fire five shots while lying prone, while its muzzle-loading counterpart could only fire one shot and had to be reloaded while standing. The Second Schleswig War resulted in victory for the combined armies of Prussia and Austria, and the two countries won control of Schleswig and Holstein in the concluding peace of Vienna, signed on 30 October 1864.[78]
War between Austria and Prussia, 1866
[edit]
The second episode in Bismarck's unification efforts occurred in 1866. In concert with the newly formed Italy, Bismarck created a diplomatic environment in which Austria declared war on Prussia. The dramatic prelude to the war occurred largely in Frankfurt, where the two powers claimed to speak for all the German states in the parliament. In April 1866, the Prussian representative in Florence signed a secret agreement with the Italian government, committing each state to assist the other in a war against Austria. The next day, the Prussian delegate to the Frankfurt assembly presented a plan calling for a national constitution, a directly elected national Diet, and universal suffrage. German liberals were justifiably skeptical of this plan, having witnessed Bismarck's difficult and ambiguous relationship with the Prussian Landtag (State Parliament), a relationship characterized by Bismarck's cajoling and riding roughshod over the representatives. These skeptics saw the proposal as a ploy to enhance Prussian power rather than a progressive agenda of reform.[79]
Choosing sides
[edit]The debate over the proposed national constitution became moot when news of Italian troop movements in Tyrol and near the Venetian border reached Vienna in April 1866. The Austrian government ordered partial mobilization in the southern regions; the Italians responded by ordering full mobilization. Despite calls for rational thought and action, Italy, Prussia, and Austria continued to rush toward armed conflict. On 1 May, Wilhelm gave von Moltke command over the Prussian armed forces, and the next day he began full-scale mobilization.[80]
In the Diet, the group of middle-sized states, known as Mittelstaaten (Bavaria, Württemberg, the grand duchies of Baden and Hesse, and the duchies of Saxony–Weimar, Saxony–Meiningen, Saxony–Coburg, and Nassau), supported complete demobilization within the Confederation. These individual governments rejected the potent combination of enticing promises and subtle (or outright) threats Bismarck used to try to gain their support against the Habsburgs. The Prussian war cabinet understood that its only supporters among the German states against the Habsburgs were two small principalities bordering on Brandenburg that had little military strength or political clout: the Grand Duchies of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Mecklenburg-Strelitz. They also understood that Prussia's only ally abroad was Italy.[81]
Opposition to Prussia's strong-armed tactics surfaced in other social and political groups. Throughout the German states, city councils, liberal parliamentary members who favored a unified state, and chambers of commerce—which would see great benefits from unification—opposed any war between Prussia and Austria. They believed any such conflict would only serve the interests of royal dynasties. Their own interests, which they understood as "civil" or "bourgeois", seemed irrelevant. Public opinion also opposed Prussian domination. Catholic populations along the Rhine—especially in such cosmopolitan regions as Cologne and in the heavily populated Ruhr Valley—continued to support Austria. By late spring, most important states opposed Berlin's effort to reorganize the German states by force. The Prussian cabinet saw German unity as an issue of power and a question of who had the strength and will to wield that power. Meanwhile, the liberals in the Frankfurt assembly saw German unity as a process of negotiation that would lead to the distribution of power among the many parties.[82]
Austria isolated
[edit]
Although several German states initially sided with Austria, they stayed on the defensive and failed to take effective initiatives against Prussian troops. The Austrian army therefore faced the technologically superior Prussian army with support only from Saxony. France promised aid, but it came late and was insufficient.[83] Complicating the situation for Austria, the Italian mobilization on Austria's southern border required a diversion of forces away from battle with Prussia to fight the Third Italian War of Independence on a second front in Venetia and on the Adriatic sea.[84]

A quick peace was essential to keep Russia from entering the conflict on Austria's side.[85] In the day-long Battle of Königgrätz, near the village of Sadová, Friedrich Carl and his troops arrived late, and in the wrong place. Once he arrived, however, he ordered his troops immediately into the fray. The battle was a decisive victory for Prussia and forced the Habsburgs to end the war with the unfavorable Peace of Prague,[86] laying the groundwork for the Kleindeutschland (little Germany) solution, or "Germany without Austria."
Founding a unified state
[edit]There is, in political geography, no Germany proper to speak of. There are Kingdoms and Grand Duchies, and Duchies and Principalities, inhabited by Germans, and each [is] separately ruled by an independent sovereign with all the machinery of State. Yet there is a natural undercurrent tending to a national feeling and toward a union of the Germans into one great nation, ruled by one common head as a national unit.
— article from The New York Times published on July 1, 1866[87]
Peace of Prague and the North German Confederation
[edit]The Peace of Prague sealed the dissolution of the German Confederation. Its former leading state, the Austrian Empire, was along with the majority of its allies excluded from the ensuing North German Confederation Treaty sponsored by Prussia which directly annexed Hanover, Hesse-Kassel, Nassau, and the city of Frankfurt, while Hesse Darmstadt lost some territory but kept its statehood. At the same time, the original East Prussian cradle of the Prussian statehood as well as the Prussian-held Polish- or Kashubian-speaking territories of Province of Posen and West Prussia were formally annexed into the North German Confederation, thus Germany. Following adoption of the North German Constitution, the new state obtained its own constitution, flag, and governmental and administrative structures.[citation needed]
Through military victory, Prussia under Bismarck's influence had overcome Austria's active resistance to the idea of a unified Germany. The states south of the Main River (Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria) signed separate treaties requiring them to pay indemnities and to form alliances bringing them into Prussia's sphere of influence.[88] Austria's influence over the German states may have been broken, but the war also splintered the spirit of pan-German unity, as many German states resented Prussian power politics.[89]
Unified Italy and Austro-Hungarian Compromise
[edit]The Peace of Prague offered lenient terms to Austria but its relationship with the new nation-state of Italy underwent major restructuring. Although the Austrians were far more successful in the military field against Italian troops, the monarchy lost the important province of Venetia. The Habsburgs ceded Venetia to France, which then formally transferred control to Italy.[90]
The end of Austrian dominance of the German states shifted Austria's attention to the Balkans. The reality of defeat for Austria also caused a reevaluation of internal divisions, local autonomy, and liberalism.[91] In 1867, the Austrian emperor Franz Joseph accepted a settlement (the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867) in which he gave his Hungarian holdings equal status with his Austrian domains, creating the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary.[92]
War with France
[edit]The French public resented the Prussian victory and demanded Revanche pour Sadová ("Revenge for Sadova"), illustrating anti-Prussian sentiment in France—a problem that would accelerate in the months leading up to the Franco-Prussian War.[93] The Austro-Prussian War also damaged relations with the French government. At a meeting in Biarritz in September 1865 with Napoleon III, Bismarck had let it be understood (or Napoleon had thought he understood) that France might annex parts of Belgium and Luxembourg in exchange for its neutrality in the war. These annexations did not happen, resulting in animosity from Napoleon towards Bismarck.[citation needed]
Background
[edit]By 1870 three of the important lessons of the Austro-Prussian war had become apparent. The first lesson was that, through force of arms, a powerful state could challenge the old alliances and spheres of influence established in 1815. Second, through diplomatic maneuvering, a skilful leader could create an environment in which a rival state would declare war first, thus forcing states allied with the "victim" of external aggression to come to the leader's aid. Finally, as Prussian military capacity far exceeded that of Austria, Prussia was clearly the only state within the Confederation (or among the German states generally) capable of protecting all of them from potential interference or aggression. In 1866, most mid-sized German states had opposed Prussia, but by 1870 these states had been coerced and coaxed into mutually protective alliances with Prussia. If a European state declared war on one of their members, then they all would come to the defense of the attacked state. With skilful manipulation of European politics, Bismarck created a situation in which France would play the role of aggressor in German affairs, while Prussia would play that of the protector of German rights and liberties.[94]
At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Metternich and his conservative allies had reestablished the Spanish monarchy under King Ferdinand VII. Over the following forty years, the great powers supported the Spanish monarchy, but events in 1868 would further test the old system, finally providing the external trigger needed by Bismarck.[citation needed]
Spanish prelude
[edit]A revolution in Spain overthrew Queen Isabella II, and the throne remained empty while Isabella lived in sumptuous exile in Paris. The Spanish, looking for a suitable Catholic successor, had offered the post to three European princes, each of whom was rejected by Napoleon III, who served as regional power-broker. Finally, in 1870 the Regency offered the crown to Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a prince of the Catholic cadet Hohenzollern line. The ensuing furor has been dubbed by historians as the Hohenzollern candidature.[95] Over the next few weeks, the Spanish offer turned into the talk of Europe. Bismarck encouraged Leopold to accept the offer.[96] A successful installment of a Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen king in Spain would mean that two countries on either side of France would both have German kings of Hohenzollern descent. This may have been a pleasing prospect for Bismarck, but it was unacceptable to either Napoleon III or to Agenor, duc de Gramont, his minister of foreign affairs. Gramont wrote a sharply formulated ultimatum to Wilhelm, as head of the Hohenzollern family, stating that if any Hohenzollern prince should accept the crown of Spain, the French government would respond—although he left ambiguous the nature of such response. The prince withdrew as a candidate, thus defusing the crisis, but the French ambassador to Berlin would not let the issue lie.[97] He approached the Prussian king directly while Wilhelm was vacationing in Ems Spa, demanding that the King release a statement saying he would never support the installation of a Hohenzollern on the throne of Spain. Wilhelm refused to give such an encompassing statement, and he sent Bismarck a dispatch by telegram describing the French demands. Bismarck used the king's telegram, called the Ems Dispatch, as a template for a short statement to the press. With its wording shortened and sharpened by Bismarck—and further alterations made in the course of its translation by the French agency Havas—the Ems Dispatch raised an angry furor in France. The French public, still aggravated over the defeat at Sadová, demanded war.[98]
Open hostilities and the disastrous end of the Second French Empire
[edit]
Napoleon III had tried to secure territorial concessions from both sides before and after the Austro-Prussian War, but despite his role as mediator during the peace negotiations, he ended up with nothing. He then hoped that Austria would join in a war of revenge and that its former allies—particularly the southern German states of Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria—would join in the cause. This hope would prove futile since the 1866 treaty came into effect and united all German states militarily—if not happily—to fight against France. Instead of a war of revenge against Prussia, supported by various German allies, France engaged in a war against all of the German states without any allies of its own.[99]
The reorganization of the military by von Roon and the operational strategy of Moltke combined against France to great effect. The speed of Prussian mobilization astonished the French, and the Prussian ability to concentrate power at specific points—reminiscent of Napoleon I's strategies seventy years earlier—overwhelmed French mobilization. Utilizing their efficiently laid rail grid, Prussian troops were delivered to battle areas rested and prepared to fight, whereas French troops had to march for considerable distances to reach combat zones. After a number of battles, notably Spicheren, Wörth, Mars la Tour, and Gravelotte, the Prussians defeated the main French armies and advanced on the primary city of Metz and the French capital of Paris. They captured Napoleon III and took an entire army as prisoners at Sedan on 1 September 1870.[100]
Proclamation of the German Empire
[edit]
The humiliating capture of the French emperor and the loss of the French army itself, which marched into captivity at a makeshift camp in the Saarland ("Camp Misery"), threw the French government into turmoil; Napoleon's energetic opponents overthrew his government and proclaimed the Third Republic.[101] "In the days after Sedan, Prussian envoys met with the French and demanded a large cash indemnity as well as the cession of Alsace and Lorraine. All parties in France rejected the terms, insisting that any armistice be forged "on the basis of territorial integrity." France, in other words, would pay reparations for starting the war, but would, in Jules Favre's famous phrase, "cede neither a clod of our earth nor a stone of our fortresses".[102] The German High Command expected an overture of peace from the French, but the new republic refused to surrender. The Prussian army invested Paris and held it under siege until mid-January, with the city being "ineffectually bombarded".[103] Nevertheless, in January, the Germans fired some 12,000 shells, 300–400 grenades daily into the city.[104] On January 18, 1871, the German princes and senior military commanders proclaimed Wilhelm "German Emperor" in the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles.[105] Under the subsequent Treaty of Frankfurt, France relinquished most of its traditionally German regions (Alsace and the German-speaking part of Lorraine); paid an indemnity, calculated (on the basis of population) as the precise equivalent of the indemnity that Napoleon Bonaparte imposed on Prussia in 1807;[106] and accepted German administration of Paris and most of northern France, with "German troops to be withdrawn stage by stage with each installment of the indemnity payment".[107]
War as "the capstone of the unification process"
[edit]Victory in the Franco-Prussian War proved the capstone of the unification process. In the first half of the 1860s, Austria and Prussia both contended to speak for the German states; both maintained they could support German interests abroad and protect German interests at home. In responding to the Schleswig-Holstein Question, they both proved equally diligent in doing so. After the victory over Austria in 1866, Prussia began internally asserting its authority to speak for the German states and defend German interests, while Austria began directing more and more of its attention to possessions in the Balkans. The victory over France in 1871 expanded Prussian hegemony in the German states (aside from Austria) to the international level. With the proclamation of Wilhelm as Kaiser, Prussia assumed the leadership of the new empire. The southern states became officially incorporated into a unified Germany at the Treaty of Versailles of 1871 (signed 26 February 1871; later ratified in the Treaty of Frankfurt of 10 May 1871), which formally ended the war.[108] Although Bismarck had led the transformation of Germany from a loose confederation into a federal nation state, he had not done it alone. Unification was achieved by building on a tradition of legal collaboration under the Holy Roman Empire and economic collaboration through the Zollverein. The difficulties of the Vormärz, the impact of the 1848 liberals, the importance of von Roon's military reorganization, and von Moltke's strategic brilliance all played a part in political unification.[109] "Einheit – unity – was achieved at the expense of Freiheit – freedom. The German Empire became," in Karl Marx's words, "a military despotism cloaked in parliamentary forms with a feudal ingredient, influenced by the bourgeoisie, festooned with bureaucrats and guarded by police." Indeed, many historians would see Germany's "escape into war" in 1914 as a flight from all of the internal-political contradictions forged by Bismarck at Versailles in the fall of 1870.[110]
Internal political and administrative unification
[edit]The new German Empire included 26 political entities: twenty-five constituent states (or Bundesstaaten) and one Imperial Territory (or Reichsland). It realized the Kleindeutsche Lösung ("Lesser German Solution", with the exclusion of Austria) as opposed to a Großdeutsche Lösung or "Greater German Solution", which would have included Austria. Unifying various states into one nation required more than some military victories, however much these might have boosted morale. It also required a rethinking of political, social, and cultural behaviors and the construction of new metaphors about "us" and "them". Who were the new members of this new nation? What did they stand for? How were they to be organized?[111]
Constituent states of the Empire
[edit]Though often characterized as a federation of monarchs, the German Empire, strictly speaking, federated a group of 26 constituent entities with different forms of government, ranging from the main four constitutional monarchies to the three republican Hanseatic cities.[112]
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Political structure of the Empire
[edit]The 1866 North German Constitution became (with some semantic adjustments) the 1871 Constitution of the German Empire. With this constitution, the new Germany acquired some democratic features: notably the Imperial Diet, which—in contrast to the parliament of Prussia—gave citizens representation on the basis of elections by direct and equal suffrage of all males who had reached the age of 25. Furthermore, elections were generally free of chicanery, engendering pride in the national parliament.[113] However, legislation required the consent of the Bundesrat, the federal council of deputies from the states, in and over which Prussia had a powerful influence; Prussia could appoint 17 of 58 delegates with only 14 votes needed for a veto. Prussia thus exercised influence in both bodies, with executive power vested in the Prussian King as Kaiser, who appointed the federal chancellor. The chancellor was accountable solely to, and served entirely at the discretion of, the Emperor. Officially, the chancellor functioned as a one-man cabinet and was responsible for the conduct of all state affairs; in practice, the State Secretaries (bureaucratic top officials in charge of such fields as finance, war, foreign affairs, etc.) acted as unofficial portfolio ministers. With the exception of the years 1872–1873 and 1892–1894, the imperial chancellor was always simultaneously the prime minister of the imperial dynasty's hegemonic home-kingdom, Prussia. The Imperial Diet had the power to pass, amend, or reject bills, but it could not initiate legislation. (The power of initiating legislation rested with the chancellor.) The other states retained their own governments, but the military forces of the smaller states came under Prussian control. The militaries of the larger states (such as the Kingdoms of Bavaria and Saxony) retained some autonomy, but they underwent major reforms to coordinate with Prussian military principles and came under federal government control in wartime.[114]
Historical arguments and the Empire's social anatomy
[edit]The Sonderweg hypothesis attributed Germany's difficult 20th century to the weak political, legal, and economic basis of the new empire. The Prussian landed elites, the Junkers, retained a substantial share of political power in the unified state. The Sonderweg hypothesis attributed their power to the absence of a revolutionary breakthrough by the middle classes, or by peasants in combination with the urban workers, in 1848 and again in 1871. Recent research into the role of the Grand Bourgeoisie—which included bankers, merchants, industrialists, and entrepreneurs—in the construction of the new state has largely refuted the claim of political and economic dominance of the Junkers as a social group. This newer scholarship has demonstrated the importance of the merchant classes of the Hanseatic cities and the industrial leadership (the latter particularly important in the Rhineland) in the ongoing development of the Second Empire.[115]
Additional studies of different groups in Wilhelmine Germany have all contributed to a new view of the period. Although the Junkers did, indeed, continue to control the officer corps, they did not dominate social, political, and economic matters as much as the Sonderweg theorists had hypothesized. Eastern Junker power had a counterweight in the western provinces in the form of the Grand Bourgeoisie and in the growing professional class of bureaucrats, teachers, professors, doctors, lawyers, scientists, etc.[116]
Beyond the political mechanism: forming a nation
[edit]
If the Wartburg and Hambach rallies had lacked a constitution and administrative apparatus, that problem was addressed between 1867 and 1871. Yet, as Germans discovered, grand speeches, flags, and enthusiastic crowds, a constitution, a political reorganization, and the provision of an imperial superstructure; and the revised Customs Union of 1867–68, still did not make a nation.[117]
A key element of the nation-state is the creation of a national culture, frequently—although not necessarily—through deliberate national policy.[118][111] In the new German nation, a Kulturkampf (1872–78) that followed political, economic, and administrative unification attempted to address, with a remarkable lack of success, some of the contradictions in German society. In particular, it involved a struggle over language, education, and religion. A policy of Germanization of non-German people of the empire's population, including the Polish and Danish minorities, started with language, in particular, the German language, compulsory schooling (Germanization), and the attempted creation of standardized curricula for those schools to promote and celebrate the idea of a shared past. Finally, it extended to the religion of the new Empire's population.[119]
Kulturkampf
[edit]For some Germans, the definition of nation did not include pluralism, and Catholics in particular came under scrutiny; some Germans, and especially Bismarck, feared that the Catholics' connection to the papacy might make them less loyal to the nation. As chancellor, Bismarck tried without much success to limit the influence of the Roman Catholic Church and of its party-political arm, the Catholic Centre Party, in schools and education- and language-related policies. The Catholic Centre Party remained particularly well entrenched in the Catholic strongholds of Bavaria and southern Baden, and in urban areas that held high populations of displaced rural workers seeking jobs in the heavy industry, and sought to protect the rights not only of Catholics, but other minorities, including the Poles, and the French minorities in the Alsatian lands.[120] The May Laws of 1873 brought the appointment of priests, and their education, under the control of the state, resulting in the closure of many seminaries, and a shortage of priests. The Congregations Law of 1875 abolished religious orders, ended state subsidies to the Catholic Church, and removed religious protections from the Prussian constitution.[121]
Integrating the Jewish community
[edit]
The Germanized Jews remained another vulnerable population in the new German nation-state. Since 1780, after emancipation by the Holy Roman Emperor Joseph II, Jews in the former Habsburg territories had enjoyed considerable economic and legal privileges that their counterparts in other German-speaking territories did not: they could own land, for example, and they did not have to live in a Jewish quarter (also called the Judengasse, or "Jews' alley"). They could also attend universities and enter the professions. During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras, many of the previously strong barriers between Jews and Christians broke down. Napoleon had ordered the emancipation of Jews throughout territories under French hegemony. Like their French counterparts, wealthy German Jews sponsored salons; in particular, several Jewish salonnières held important gatherings in Frankfurt and Berlin during which German intellectuals developed their own form of republican intellectualism. Throughout the subsequent decades, beginning almost immediately after the defeat of the French, reaction against the mixing of Jews and Christians limited the intellectual impact of these salons. Beyond the salons, Jews continued a process of Germanization in which they intentionally adopted German modes of dress and speech, working to insert themselves into the emerging 19th-century German public sphere. The religious reform movement among German Jews reflected this effort.[122]
By the years of unification, German Jews played an important role in the intellectual underpinnings of the German professional, intellectual, and social life. The expulsion of Jews from Russia in the 1880s and 1890s complicated integration into the German public sphere. Russian Jews arrived in north German cities in the thousands; considerably less educated and less affluent, their often dismal poverty dismayed many of the Germanized Jews. Many of the problems related to poverty (such as illness, overcrowded housing, unemployment, school absenteeism, refusal to learn German, etc.) emphasized their distinctiveness for not only the Christian Germans, but for the local Jewish populations as well.[123]
Writing the story of the nation
[edit]Another important element in nation-building, the story of the heroic past, fell to such nationalist German historians as the liberal constitutionalist Friedrich Dahlmann (1785–1860), his conservative student Heinrich von Treitschke (1834–1896), and others less conservative, such as Theodor Mommsen (1817–1903) and Heinrich von Sybel (1817–1895), to name two. Dahlmann himself died before unification, but he laid the groundwork for the nationalist histories to come through his histories of the English and French revolutions, by casting these revolutions as fundamental to the construction of a nation, and Dahlmann himself viewed Prussia as the logical agent of unification.[124]
Heinrich von Treitschke's History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century, published in 1879, has perhaps a misleading title: it privileges the history of Prussia over the history of other German states, and it tells the story of the German-speaking peoples through the guise of Prussia's destiny to unite all German states under its leadership. The creation of this Borussian myth (Borussia is the Latin name for Prussia) established Prussia as Germany's savior; it was the destiny of all Germans to be united, this myth maintains, and it was Prussia's destiny to accomplish this.[125] According to this story, Prussia played the dominant role in bringing the German states together as a nation-state; only Prussia could protect German liberties from being crushed by French or Russian influence. The story continues by drawing on Prussia's role in saving Germans from the resurgence of Napoleon's power in 1815, at Waterloo, creating some semblance of economic unity, and uniting Germans under one proud flag after 1871.[e]
Mommsen's contributions to the Monumenta Germaniae Historica laid the groundwork for additional scholarship on the study of the German nation, expanding the notion of "Germany" to mean other areas beyond Prussia. A liberal professor, historian, and theologian, and generally a titan among late 19th-century scholars, Mommsen served as a delegate to the Prussian House of Representatives from 1863 to 1866 and 1873 to 1879; he also served as a delegate to the Reichstag from 1881 to 1884, for the liberal German Progress Party (Deutsche Fortschrittspartei) and later for the National Liberal Party. He opposed the antisemitic programs of Bismarck's Kulturkampf and the vitriolic text that Treitschke often employed in the publication of his Studien über die Judenfrage (Studies of the Jewish Question), which encouraged assimilation and Germanization of Jews.[127]
See also
[edit]Notes
[edit]- ^ Although the Prussian army had gained its reputation in the Seven Years' War, its humiliating defeat at Jena and Auerstadt crushed the pride many Prussians felt in their soldiers. During their Russian exile, several officers, including Carl von Clausewitz, contemplated reorganization and new training methods.[12]
- ^ They traced the roots of the German language, and drew its different lines of development together.[44]
- ^ The remainder of the letter exhorts the Germans to unification: "This role of world leadership, left vacant as things are today, might well be occupied by the German nation. You Germans, with your grave and philosophic character, might well be the ones who could win the confidence of others and guarantee the future stability of the international community. Let us hope, then, that you can use your energy to overcome your moth-eaten thirty tyrants of the various German states. Let us hope that in the center of Europe you can then make a unified nation out of your fifty millions. All the rest of us would eagerly and joyfully follow you."[64]
- ^ Bismarck had "cut his teeth" on German politics, and German politicians, in Frankfurt: a quintessential politician, Bismarck had built his power-base by absorbing and co-opting measures from throughout the political spectrum. He was first and foremost a politician, and in this lied his strength. Furthermore, since he trusted neither Moltke nor Roon, he was reluctant to enter a military enterprise over which he would have no control.[71]
- ^ Many modern historians describe this myth, without subscribing to it.[page needed][126]
References
[edit]- ^ Heather, Peter. "Germany: Ancient History". Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Archived from the original on March 31, 2019. Retrieved November 21, 2020.
Within the boundaries of present-day Germany... Germanic peoples such as the eastern Franks, Frisians, Saxons, Thuringians, Alemanni, and Bavarians—all speaking West Germanic dialects—had merged Germanic and borrowed Roman cultural features. It was among these groups that a German language and ethnic identity would gradually develop during the Middle Ages.
- ^ Minahan 2000, pp. 288–289.
- ^ Minahan 2000, pp. 288–289[not specific enough to verify]
- ^ See, for example: Vann, James Allen (1975). The Swabian Kreis: Institutional Growth in the Holy Roman Empire 1648–1715. Studies Presented to International Commission for the History of Representative and Parliamentary Institutions. Vol. LII. Bruxelles: Editions de la librairie encyclopédique. OCLC 2276157. OL 4590654M.; Walker, Mack (1998). German Home Towns: Community, State, and General Estate, 1648–1871. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-8508-4. OL 466977M.[page needed]
- ^ Gagliardo, John G. (1980). Reich and Nation. The Holy Roman Empire as Idea and Reality, 1763–1806. Indiana University Press. pp. 278–279. ISBN 0-2531-6773-6. OCLC 5563434. OL 22078286M.
- ^ Kann, Robert A. (1974). History of the Habsburg Empire: 1526–1918. Los Angeles: University of California Press. p. 221. ISBN 978-0-5200-4206-3. OL 7708659M.
- ^ Mann 1971, p. 70.
- ^ Fichte, Johann Gottlieb (1808). "Address to the German Nation". www.historyman.co.uk. Retrieved June 6, 2009.
- ^ Sheehan 1989, p. 434.
- ^ Walter, Jakob (1996). Raeff, Marc (ed.). The diary of a Napoleonic foot soldier. Windrush Press. ISBN 0-9000-7537-6. OCLC 59977347. OL 20208714M.[page needed]
- ^ Sheehan 1989, pp. 384–387.
- ^ Sheehan 1989, p. 323.
- ^ Sheehan 1989, pp. 322–323.
- ^ Blackbourn & Eley 1984, Part 1; Nipperdey 1996, Chapter 1.[page needed]
- ^ Sheehan 1989, pp. 398–410; Scott, Hamish M. (2006). The Birth of a Great Power System. London & New York: Longman. pp. 329–361. ISBN 978-0-5822-1717-1. OCLC 889270087. OL 3311839M..
- ^ Lee 1980.
- ^ Zamoyski 2007, pp. 98–115, 239–40.
- ^ Sheehan 1989, pp. 398–410.
- ^ Berenger, Jean (1997) [1990]. A History of the Habsburg Empire 1700–1918. Translated by Simpson, C.A. New York: Longman. pp. 96–97. ISBN 978-0-5820-9007-1. OCLC 891447020. OL 7879682M..
- ^ Sperber 1993.
- ^ Namier, Lewis (1952). Avenues of History. New York: Macmillan. p. 34. OCLC 422057575. OL 6114891M.
- ^ Nipperdey 1996, pp. 1–3.
- ^ a b c Sheehan 1989, pp. 407–408, 444.
- ^ Sheehan 1989, pp. 460–470; German Historical Institute
- ^ a b Sheehan 1989, pp. 442–445.
- ^ a b Sheehan 1989, pp. 610–613.
- ^ Sheehan 1989, p. 610.
- ^ Sheehan 1989, p. 612.
- ^ Sheehan 1989, p. 613.
- ^ Sheehan 1989, pp. 610–615.
- ^ Blackbourn 1994.
- ^ Sperber 1993, p. 3.
- ^ Blackbourn 1998, p. 127.
- ^ Sheehan 1989, pp. 465–467; Blackbourn 1998, pp. 106–107
- ^ a b Keller, Wolfgang; Shiue, Carol (March 5, 2013). The Trade Impact of the Zollverein. Boulder: University of Colorado. pp. 10, 18.
- ^ Ploeckl, Florian (August 2010). "The Zollverein and the Formation of a Customs Union" (PDF). Economic and Social History Series, Nuffield College, Oxford, Nuffield College (Discussion Paper 84): 23.
- ^ Sheehan 1989, p. 465.
- ^ Sheehan 1989, p. 466.
- ^ Sheehan 1989, pp. 467–468.
- ^ Sheehan 1989, p. 502.
- ^ Sheehan 1989, p. 469.
- ^ Sheehan 1989, p. 458.
- ^ Sheehan 1989, pp. 466–467.
- ^ "The Brothers Grimm online". Grimm Brothers' Home Page. Retrieved April 27, 2023.
- ^ (in German) Hans Lulfing, Baedecker, Karl, Neue Deutsche Biographie (NDB). Band 1, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1953, p. 516 f.
- ^ (in German) Peter Rühmkorf, Heinz Ludwig Arnold, Das Lied der Deutschen Göttingen: Wallstein, 2001, ISBN 3-8924-4463-3, pp. 11–14.
- ^ Dominick, Raymond III (1992). The Environmental Movement in Germany. Bloomington: Indiana University. pp. 3–41. ISBN 0-2533-1819-X. OL 1549008M.
- ^ (in German) Badische Heimat/Landeskunde online 2006 Veit's Pauls Church Germania. Retrieved 5 June 2009.
- ^ Blackbourn 1998, pp. 138–164.
- ^ Sperber, Jonathan (2000). Revolutionary Europe, 1780–1850. New York: Longman. ISBN 0-5822-9446-0. OL 6779824M..[page needed]
- ^ Blackbourn 1998, pp. 176–179.
- ^ See, e.g.: Ralf Dahrendorf, German History[not specific enough to verify], (1968), pp. 25–32; Wehler, Hans-Ulrich (1973). Das Deutsche Kaiserreich, 1871–1918 (in German). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. pp. 10–14. ISBN 3-5253-3340-4. OCLC 873428. OL 23130743M.; Krieger 1973; Grew & Bien 1978, pp. 312–345; Kocka, Jürgen; Mitchell, Allan (1993). Bourgeois Society in Nineteenth Century Europe. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8549-6414-7. OL 8300088M.; Kocka, Jürgen (January 1988). "German History before Hitler: The Debate about the German Sonderweg". Journal of Contemporary History. 23 (1): 3–16. doi:10.1177/002200948802300101. JSTOR 260865. S2CID 159651458.; Berghahn, Volker (1982). Modern Germany: Society, Economy and Politics in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-5213-4748-8. OL 2382839M.
- ^ World Encyclopedia V.3 p. 542.
- ^ For a summary of this argument, see Blackbourn & Eley 1984, Part 1.
- ^ Blackbourn & Eley 1984, Part 1.
- ^ Blackbourn & Eley 1984, Chapter 2.
- ^ Blackbourn & Eley 1984, pp. 286–293.
- ^ Kocka, Jürgen (February 2003). "Comparison and Beyond". History and Theory. 42 (1): 39–44. doi:10.1111/1468-2303.00228.; Kocka, Jürgen (February 1999). "Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of the German Sonderweg". History and Theory. 38 (1): 40–50. doi:10.1111/0018-2656.751999075..
- ^ For a representative analysis of this perspective, see Evans 1987.
- ^ Taylor, A. J. P. (1980) [1954]. The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918. Oxford: Clarendon. p. 37. ISBN 978-0-1988-1270-8. OL 7402365M.
- ^ Droysen, Johann Gustav. Modern History Sourcebook: Documents of German Unification, 1848–1871. Retrieved April 9, 2009.
- ^ Zamoyski 2007, pp. 100–115.
- ^ Blackbourn 1998, pp. 160–175.
- ^ Mack Smith, Denis (ed.). Garibaldi (Great Lives Observed), Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1969, p. 76.
- ^ Mack Smith, Denis (1994). Mazzini. Yale University Press. pp. 11–12. ISBN 978-0-300-05884-0.
- ^ Holt & Chilton 1917, p. 27.
- ^ Holt & Chilton 1917, pp. 13–14.
- ^ Blackbourn 1998, pp. 175–179.
- ^ Hollyday, Frederic B. M. (1970). Bismarck. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. pp. 16–18. ISBN 978-0-1307-7362-3. OL 4576160M.
- ^ Blackbourn & Eley 1984, Part I.
- ^ Mann 1971, pp. 316–395, Chapter 6.
- ^ Hull, Isabel V. (2005). Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (New ed.). Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. pp. 90–108, 324–333. ISBN 978-0-8014-7293-0. OL 7848816M.
- ^ Howard 1968, p. 40.
- ^ Mann 1971, pp. 390–395.
- ^ Taylor 1988, Chapter 1 and Conclusion.
- ^ Howard 1968, pp. 40–57.
- ^ Sheehan 1989, pp. 900–904; Wawro 1996, pp. 4–32; Holt & Chilton 1917, p. 75
- ^ Holt & Chilton 1917, p. 75.
- ^ Sheehan, pp. 900–906.
- ^ Sheehan 1989, p. 96; Wawro 1996, pp. 82–84.
- ^ Sheehan 1989, pp. 905–906.
- ^ Sheehan 1989, p. 909.
- ^ Wawro 1996, pp. 50–60, 75–79.
- ^ Wawro 1996, pp. 57–75.
- ^ Taylor 1988, pp. 87–88.
- ^ Sheehan 1989, pp. 908–909.
- ^ The Situation of Germany. (PDF) – The New York Times, July 1, 1866.
- ^ Sheehan 1989, p. 910.
- ^ Blackbourn 1998, pp. 225–269, Chapter V: From Reaction to Unification.
- ^ Schjerve, Rosita Rindler (2003). Diglossia and Power: Language Policies and Practice in the Nineteenth Century Habsburg Empire. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 199–200. ISBN 978-3-1101-7654-4. OL 9017475M.
- ^ Sheehan 1989, pp. 909–910; Wawro 1996, Chapter 11.
- ^ Sheehan 1989, pp. 905–910.
- ^ Bridge, Roy; Bullen, Roger (2004). The Great Powers and the European States System 1814–1914 (2nd ed.). Longman. ISBN 978-0-5827-8458-1. OL 7882098M.[page needed]
- ^ Howard 1968, pp. 4–60.
- ^ Howard 1968, pp. 50–57.
- ^ Howard 1968, pp. 55–56.
- ^ Howard 1968, pp. 56–57.
- ^ Howard 1968, pp. 55–59.
- ^ Howard 1968, pp. 64–68.
- ^ Howard 1968, pp. 218–222.
- ^ Howard 1968, pp. 222–230.
- ^ Wawro 2003, p. 235.
- ^ Taylor 1988, p. 126.
- ^ Howard 1968, pp. 357–370.
- ^ Die Reichsgründung 1871 (The Foundation of the Empire, 1871), Lebendiges virtuelles Museum Online, accessed 2008-12-22. German text translated: [...] on the wishes of Wilhelm I, on the 170th anniversary of the elevation of the House of Brandenburg to princely status on January 18, 1701, the assembled German princes and high military officials proclaimed Wilhelm I as German Emperor in the Hall of Mirrors at the Versailles Palace.
- ^ Taylor 1988, p. 133.
- ^ Crankshaw, Edward (1981). Bismarck. New York: The Viking Press. p. 299. ISBN 0-3333-4038-8. OL 28022489M.
- ^ Howard 1968, pp. 432–456, Chapter XI: the Peace.
- ^ Blackbourn 1998, pp. 255–257.
- ^ Wawro 2003, p. 302.
- ^ a b Confino 1997.
- ^ Evans 2005, p. 1.
- ^ Blackbourn 1998, p. 267.
- ^ Blackbourn 1998, pp. 225–301.
- ^ Blackbourn & Eley 1984; Blickle 2004; Scribner & Ogilvie 1996.[page needed]
- ^ See, e.g.: Eley, Geoff (1980). Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and Political Change After Bismarck. New Haven: Yale University Press. ISBN 0-3000-2386-3. OCLC 5353122. OL 4416729M.; Evans 2005; Evans, Richard J. (1978). Society and politics in Wilhelmine Germany. London and New York: Barnes & Noble. ISBN 0-06-492036-4. OCLC 3934998. OL 21299242M.; Nipperdey 1996; Sperber 1984.[page needed]
- ^ Blackbourn 1998, pp. 240–290.
- ^ See, e.g.: Llobera & Goldsmiths' College 1996; (in German) Alexandre Escudier, Brigitte Sauzay, and Rudolf von Thadden. Gedenken im Zwiespalt: Konfliktlinien europäischen Erinnerns, Genshagener Gespräche; vol. 4. Göttingen: 2001
- ^ Blackbourn 1998, pp. 243–282.
- ^ Blackbourn 1998, pp. 283, 285–300.
- ^ Sperber 1984.
- ^ Kaplan 1991.
- ^ Kaplan 1991, in particular, pp. 4–7 and Conclusion.
- ^ Blackbourn & Eley 1984, p. 241.
- ^ Friedrich, Karin (2000). The Other Prussia: Royal Prussia, Poland and Liberty, 1569–1772. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 5. ISBN 978-0-5210-2775-5. OL 7714437M.
- ^ See, e.g.: Koshar, Rudy (1998). Germany's Transient Pasts: Preservation and the National Memory in the Twentieth Century. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. ISBN 978-0-8078-4701-5. OCLC 45729918. OL 689805M.; Kohn, Hans (1954). German History; Some New German Views. Boston: Beacon. OCLC 987529. OL 24208090M.; Nipperdey 1996.
- ^ Llobera & Goldsmiths' College 1996.
Sources
[edit]- Blackbourn, David (1994). Marpingen: Apparitions of the Virgin Mary in Bismarckian Germany. New York: Knopf. ISBN 0-6794-1843-1.
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Further reading
[edit]- Bazillion, Richard J. (1990). Modernizing Germany: Karl Biedermann's career in the kingdom of Saxony, 1835-1901. American university studies. Vol. 84. New York: P. Lang. ISBN 978-0-8204-1185-9.
- Brose, Eric Dorn (2013). German history 1789-1871: from the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich. New York; Oxford: Berghahn. ISBN 978-1-78238-004-7.
- Bucholz, Arden (1991). Moltke, Schlieffen, and Prussian War Planning. New York: Berg. ISBN 0-8549-6653-6.
- — (2001). Moltke and the German Wars 1864–1871. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. ISBN 0-3336-8758-2.
- Clark, Christopher M. (2006). Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-02385-7.
- Clemente, Steven E. (1992). For King and Kaiser! The making of the Prussian Army Officer, 1860 - 1914. Contributions in military studies. New York: Greenwood Press. ISBN 978-0-313-28004-7.
- Cocks, Geoffrey, ed. (1990). German professions, 1800 - 1950 (1. [print.] ed.). New York, NY: Oxford Univ. Press. ISBN 978-0-19-505596-2.
- Dahrendorf, Ralf (1979) [1967]. Society and Democracy in Germany. Doubleday. ISBN 0-3850-6304-0. OL 21335583M.
- Dwyer, Philip, ed. (2001). Modern Prussian history, 1830 - 1947 (1. publ ed.). Harlow: Pearson Education. ISBN 978-0-582-29270-3.
- Flores, Richard R. (2002). Remembering the Alamo: memory, modernity, and the master symbol. History, culture, and society series (1 ed.). Austin, Texas: Univ. of Texas Press. ISBN 978-0-292-72540-9.
- Friedrich, Otto (1995). Blood and iron: from Bismarck to Hitler; the von Moltke family's impact on German history (1. ed.). New York, NY: Harper Collins. ISBN 978-0-06-016866-7.
- Groh, John E. (1982). Nineteenth century German Protestantism: the church as social model. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America. ISBN 978-0-8191-2077-9.
- Henne, Helmut; Objartel, Georg (1983). German Student Jargon in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. Berlin; NY: de Gruyter. OCLC 9193308.
- Hughes, Michael (1991). Nationalism and society: Germany 1800 - 1945 (repr ed.). London: Arnold. ISBN 978-0-7131-6522-7.
- Kollander, Patricia (1995). Frederick III: Germany's liberal emperor. Contributions to the study of world history. Westport (Conn.) London: Greenwood press. ISBN 978-0-313-29483-9.
- Lambert, Susan, ed. (1971). The Franco-Prussian War and the Commune in caricature, 1870 - 71. London: Victoria and Albert Museum. ISBN 978-0-901486-30-1.
- Lowenstein, Steven M. (1994). The Berlin Jewish community: enlightenment, family, and crisis, 1770-1830. Studies in Jewish history. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-508326-2.
- Lüdtke, Alf (1989). Police and State in Prussia, 1815-1850. Paris; New York; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-30164-0.
- Mann, Golo (1968). The History of Germany Since 1789. OL 5546196M.
- Ohles, Frederik (1992). Germany's rude awakening: censorship in the land of the Brothers Grimm. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press. ISBN 978-0-87338-460-5.
- Pflanze, Otto, ed. (1979). The unification of Germany: 1848 - 1871 (Reprint ed.). Huntington, N.Y: Krieger. ISBN 978-0-88275-803-9.
- Schleunes, Karl A. (1989). Schooling and society: the politics of education in Prussia and Bavaria 1750-1900. Oxford New York: Berg St. Martin's press. ISBN 978-0-85496-267-9.
- Schulze, Hagen (1991). The Course of German Nationalism: From Frederick the Great to Bismarck, 1763–1867. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-5213-7759-1. OL 2227160M.
- Showalter, Dennis E. (2015). The Wars of German Unification (2nd ed.).
- — (1975). Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technology, and the Unification of Germany. Hamden, Connecticut: Hailer. ISBN 0-9798-5009-6.
- Sked, Alan (2001). The decline and fall of the Habsburg Empire 1815-1918 (2. ed.). Harlow: Longman. ISBN 978-0-582-35666-5.
- Smith, Woodruff D. (1991). Politics and the sciences of culture in Germany, 1840-1920. New-York Oxford: Oxford university press. ISBN 978-0-19-506536-7.
- Sorkin, David (1999). The transformation of German Jewry: 1780 - 1840. Jewish studies. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press. ISBN 978-0-8143-2828-6.
- Sperber, Jonathan (1994). The European Revolutions, 1848–1851. New Approaches to European History. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-5215-4779-6. OCLC 27814087. OL 24776092M.
- Stargardt, Nicholas (1994). The German idea of militarism: radical and socialist critics, 1866-1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-46692-9.
- Steinberg, Jonathan (2011). Bismarck: A Life. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-984543-9.
- Wawro, Geoffrey (2000). Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792–1914. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-4152-1445-2. OCLC 50552980. OL 45213M.
External links
[edit]Unification of Germany
View on GrokipediaHistorical Preconditions
Fragmentation and Dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire
The Holy Roman Empire, a loose confederation originating from the coronation of Otto I in 962, experienced progressive fragmentation due to its elective monarchy and decentralized feudal structure, which empowered local princes, bishops, and free cities at the expense of imperial authority.[8] This devolution intensified after the deaths of rulers without clear heirs, leading to subdivisions of territories among heirs and the proliferation of semi-autonomous entities. By the late 18th century, the Empire encompassed approximately 360 distinct political units, ranging from kingdoms and duchies to ecclesiastical states and imperial cities, many exercising de facto sovereignty.[8] Such internal divisions eroded central governance, as princes prioritized regional interests over imperial unity, fostering a landscape of competing loyalties that persisted for centuries.[9] The Protestant Reformation in the 16th century exacerbated disunity by introducing religious schisms, with princes adopting Lutheranism or Calvinism to assert independence from Habsburg Catholic emperors.[10] The Peace of Augsburg in 1555 formalized this divide through the principle of cuius regio, eius religio, allowing rulers to determine their territories' faith, but it excluded Calvinists and sowed seeds for further conflict.[10] Tensions erupted in the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), a devastating multi-phase conflict involving Protestant and Catholic states within the Empire, external powers like Sweden and France, and resulting in population losses of up to 30% in German lands.[11] The ensuing Peace of Westphalia in 1648 codified fragmentation by granting princes extensive sovereignty, including rights to conduct foreign policy, form alliances, and maintain confessional status quo, effectively transforming the Empire into a federation of independent actors with the emperor reduced to a figurehead.[12] This entrenched disunity faced its final challenge during the Napoleonic Wars, as French victories undermined Habsburg influence. Following defeat at Austerlitz on 2 December 1805 and the Treaty of Pressburg on 26 December 1805, which ceded Austrian territories to Napoleon's allies, Napoleon formed the Confederation of the Rhine on 12 July 1806, incorporating 16 German states that seceded from imperial allegiance on 1 August.[13] To preempt Napoleon from assuming the imperial crown himself, Emperor Francis II issued a declaration on 6 August 1806 abdicating the throne, dissolving the imperial institutions, and releasing all states from feudal obligations to the Empire.[13] [14] This act ended the Holy Roman Empire after 844 years, leaving behind a mosaic of sovereign entities whose rivalries and lack of cohesion would impede collective German action until the 19th century.[15]Napoleonic Wars and German Awakening
The Napoleonic Wars profoundly disrupted the fragmented German states, beginning with French victories that led to the Peace of Lunéville in 1801, which ceded the left bank of the Rhine to France and weakened the Holy Roman Empire. Napoleon's formation of the Confederation of the Rhine in July 1806 consolidated 16 German states under French influence, prompting Emperor Francis II to abdicate on August 6, 1806, formally dissolving the Holy Roman Empire after over a millennium of existence. This restructuring reduced the number of German polities from hundreds to fewer than 40, centralizing power in larger states like Prussia and Austria while subordinating them to French hegemony.[16][14] Prussia's catastrophic defeat at the Battles of Jena-Auerstedt on October 14, 1806, exposed military and administrative obsolescence, resulting in the loss of half its territory and population via the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807. In response, reformers like Heinrich vom Stein enacted the October Edict on October 9, 1807, abolishing serfdom, promoting land sales to peasants, and introducing municipal self-government to foster civic participation and economic vitality. Karl August von Hardenberg extended these efforts after 1810, implementing financial reforms, reducing guild restrictions, and modernizing the army under Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, emphasizing universal conscription and merit-based officer promotions to build a resilient state capable of resisting French domination. These changes, driven by pragmatic necessity rather than ideology, laid groundwork for Prussian resurgence by enhancing administrative efficiency and national cohesion.[17][18] Parallel to military reforms, an intellectual awakening stirred German nationalism among educated elites, fueled by resentment toward French occupation. Johann Gottlieb Fichte delivered his Addresses to the German Nation in 1808 at Berlin, advocating moral regeneration through education and a unified cultural identity transcending dynastic loyalties. Ernst Moritz Arndt's pamphlets, such as What is the German's Fatherland? (1813), popularized calls for resistance, portraying Napoleon as a tyrant and invoking shared language and heritage as bonds for liberation. This sentiment, initially confined to universities and salons, gained traction amid ongoing humiliations, framing the struggle as a defense of Volk against foreign imposition.[19] The tide turned with Napoleon's disastrous Russian campaign in 1812, prompting Prussia to sign the Treaty of Kalisz with Russia on February 28, 1813, and declare war on France in March, igniting the Wars of Liberation. Prussian forces, allied with Russia, Austria, and other German states, culminated in the Battle of Leipzig from October 16–19, 1813, where 500,000 troops clashed, resulting in a decisive coalition victory that expelled French armies from German soil. The subsequent Congress of Vienna in 1815 established the German Confederation, a loose alliance of 39 sovereign states presided over by Austria, intended to maintain balance of power but lacking centralized institutions or a unified foreign policy, thus preserving fragmentation while channeling latent nationalist energies into future aspirations.[20][21][22]Emergence of Nationalism and Conflicting Ideologies
The resistance to Napoleonic occupation during the Wars (1803–1815) fostered a burgeoning sense of German national identity, as Prussian reforms and anti-French propaganda emphasized shared linguistic and cultural ties among the fragmented states, laying groundwork for post-war nationalist sentiments.[23][24] This awakening manifested in intellectual currents like Johann Gottlieb Fichte's advocacy for a unified German spirit and Friedrich Ludwig Jahn's promotion of physical education through Turnvereine (gymnastics clubs) starting in 1811, aimed at cultivating discipline and patriotism among youth.[25] By 1817, student fraternities known as Burschenschaften proliferated across universities, blending egalitarian liberalism with calls for political unification under a constitutional framework, symbolized by the Wartburg Festival where participants burned symbols of foreign influence and feudalism.[26] These nationalist stirrings intertwined with liberalism, advocating individual rights, press freedom, and representative assemblies, yet clashed with conservative ideologies prioritizing monarchical absolutism, aristocratic privileges, and the status quo of the German Confederation established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815.[27] Conservatives, led by figures like Austrian Chancellor Klemens von Metternich, viewed unified nationalism as a threat to particularist loyalties—fidelity to local duchies, kingdoms, and principalities—and feared it would erode Habsburg influence in multi-ethnic Austria.[28] Liberal nationalists countered with visions of a federal Germany, debating Kleindeutschland (a Protestant Prussian-led state excluding Austria) against Großdeutschland (inclusive of Catholic Austria), but internal tensions arose between egalitarian democrats and those favoring hierarchical constitutional monarchy.[6] The ideological rift intensified after events like the 1819 Hep-Hep riots, which exposed ethnic exclusions in nationalism (targeting Jews as non-German), prompting conservative backlash through the Carlsbad Decrees of September 20, 1819.[29] These measures, enacted by the Confederation's Bundestag, imposed federal censorship on publications, dissolved Burschenschaften, mandated university oversight to dismiss "demagogic" professors (over 30 removed by 1820), and created a central commission to prosecute sedition, effectively stifling overt liberal-nationalist agitation for a generation.[30][31] While temporarily quelling unrest, the decrees highlighted the causal primacy of state power over ideals, as conservative repression preserved fragmentation but sowed seeds of resentment that resurfaced in the 1830s through underground Junges Deutschland literary circles and economic pressures favoring unity.[32]Economic and Material Foundations
Zollverein: Prussian-Led Customs Union
The Zollverein originated in Prussia's 1818 customs reform, which created a tariff-free internal market within Prussian territories and extended to smaller adjacent states including Anhalt-Bernburg, Anhalt-Dessau, and the principalities of Hohenzollern-Hechingen and Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen.[33] This initiative abolished internal duties while imposing a unified external tariff of 10% on imports, generating revenue primarily for Prussia through centralized administration.[34] By 1828, preliminary customs unions formed between Prussia and Hesse-Darmstadt, and South German states like Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden established a parallel Middle German Commercial Union, but Prussian diplomacy integrated these efforts.[35] Formalized on January 1, 1834, the Zollverein united eighteen states, covering approximately two-thirds of the German Confederation's population and excluding Austria, with Prussia directing policy through a central tariff commission in Berlin.[34] Subsequent accessions expanded membership: Saxony joined in 1834, Hanover and Oldenburg in 1854, and the southern states of Bavaria and Württemberg adhered to its commercial provisions by 1866 without full political integration until after the Austro-Prussian War.[36] Tariff revenues, shared based on population and territory, disproportionately benefited Prussia, which retained 65% of collections due to its administrative role and border length, fostering fiscal dependence among members.[34] Austria's exclusion stemmed from its protectionist trade stance, which prioritized high tariffs to shield domestic industries and integrate non-German territories like Hungary, clashing with Prussia's vision of a German-centric free-trade zone.[37] Prussian opposition, rooted in rivalry for German leadership, prevented Austrian entry despite Habsburg proposals for a broader Mitteleuropäischer Handelsverein, as inclusion would dilute Prussian control and economic leverage.[36] Economically, the Zollverein dismantled over 1,800 internal customs barriers, standardizing weights, measures, and currencies while promoting industrial growth; trade volumes within the union rose significantly, with Prussian exports to members increasing by factors documented in integration studies.[37] This market unification enhanced efficiency, reduced transaction costs, and accelerated industrialization, particularly in coal, iron, and textiles, binding disparate states through mutual economic interests under Prussian hegemony.[34] Politically, it eroded Austrian influence in German affairs, accustomed states to Prussian institutions, and laid infrastructural groundwork—such as shared railway standards—for later military mobilization, rendering political unification a logical extension of economic interdependence.[33]Industrialization, Railways, and Infrastructure
The Zollverein customs union, formed in 1834 under Prussian leadership, eliminated internal tariffs among member states and established a uniform external tariff, spurring trade volumes and capital flows that accelerated industrialization across German territories, with Prussia benefiting disproportionately from its control over the Ruhr coal basin and Silesian iron deposits.[36] By the 1850s, Prussian industrial production overtook Austria's, driven by expanded output in coal—which increased sevenfold between 1840 and 1870—and iron, key inputs for machinery and armaments that underpinned economic primacy.[38] This resource endowment and market access via the Zollverein fostered proto-industrial clusters in textiles, chemicals, and metalworking, generating revenues that funded state ambitions and diminished reliance on agrarian economies in southern states.[39] Railway expansion epitomized Prussian infrastructural strategy, with the state assuming direct control over lines to prioritize national integration over private profit, contrasting fragmented private ventures elsewhere. The German railway network grew from roughly 5,800 kilometers in 1850 to about 20,000 kilometers by 1871, quadrupling in length during this period and handling increasing freight in coal and iron that fueled upstream industries.[40][41] Prussian lines, comprising a majority of this expansion, lowered bulk transport costs by up to 50 percent on key routes, stimulating regional specialization—such as Ruhr coal exports to southern factories—and embedding economic dependencies that aligned smaller states with Berlin's orbit.[42] Beyond railways, complementary infrastructure like improved highways and canals augmented connectivity, but railways' strategic value lay in dual economic and military utility; Prussian reforms enabled rapid troop mobilization, as seen in the 1866 Austro-Prussian War where rail logistics outpaced Habsburg capabilities, decisively tipping conflicts toward unification.[43] This network not only amplified industrial agglomeration—evident in urban population surges near Prussian junctions—but also eroded particularist barriers by standardizing gauges and tariffs under Zollverein auspices, laying causal groundwork for political consolidation through material incentives rather than ideological appeals.[44] Overall, these developments entrenched Prussia's hegemonic position, as southern states' industrial lag compelled alignment with northern markets and infrastructure for competitiveness.[38]Failures of Liberal Nationalism
Vormärz Period and Early Agitation
The Vormärz, spanning from the restoration of the German Confederation in 1815 following the Congress of Vienna to the outbreak of revolutions in March 1848, represented a phase of intensifying political agitation amid conservative repression. Intellectuals, students, and emerging middle classes expressed desires for constitutional governance, press freedom, and national unity, drawing on post-Napoleonic awakening while confronting the fragmented political order enforced by Austrian influence under Klemens von Metternich.[45] This era's tensions arose from the Confederation's structure, which prioritized monarchical sovereignty over collective German identity, fostering underground networks that challenged the status quo without achieving structural change until 1848.[26] Student organizations, particularly the Burschenschaften—liberal-nationalist fraternities formed in universities starting in 1815—played a pivotal role in early agitation by promoting unity under a single German flag and rejecting the Confederation's divisions. These groups organized symbolic gatherings, such as the Wartburg Festival on October 18, 1817, where approximately 500 students commemorated the 300th anniversary of the Reformation, the recent Battle of Leipzig, and Germany's liberation from Napoleon by burning books deemed anti-nationalist, signaling resistance to foreign influence and internal conservatism. Such actions highlighted youthful idealism but alarmed authorities, associating student activism with potential subversion.[46] The assassination of conservative playwright August von Kotzebue by Burschenschaft member Karl Sand on March 23, 1819, prompted severe backlash, culminating in the Carlsbad Decrees adopted by the Confederation's Bundestag on September 20, 1819. These measures, driven by Metternich, imposed federal oversight on universities, dissolved Burschenschaften, mandated press censorship, and required states to suppress "demagogic" activities, effectively creating a police-state apparatus that curtailed public discourse.[30] While temporarily quelling overt agitation—leading to the exile or imprisonment of figures like journalist Joseph Görres—the decrees inadvertently deepened resentment, as enforced silence amplified underground radicalism and intellectual critique, evidenced by the rise of the Young Germany movement's satirical writings against censorship.[26][31] Agitation persisted through mass demonstrations, most notably the Hambach Festival on May 27–28, 1832, which drew 20,000 to 30,000 participants to the ruins of Hambach Castle in the Palatinate, inspired by the July Revolution in France.[47] Attendees, including students, workers, and liberals from across German states, paraded with black-red-gold banners—symbolizing nascent unity—and heard speeches demanding a national parliament, civil rights, and dissolution of the Confederation's repressive framework, as articulated by radical democrat Johann August Wirth.[48] Bavarian and Prussian authorities responded with heightened surveillance and arrests, but the event underscored the widening gulf between popular aspirations and elite control, channeling economic grievances from proto-industrial regions into political nationalism.[49] Despite these efforts, Vormärz agitation remained fragmented, lacking coordinated leadership or military backing, thus failing to coerce unification but priming the social pressures that erupted in 1848.[45]Revolutions of 1848–1849: Frankfurt Parliament
The Revolutions of 1848 across the German Confederation states erupted in March, sparked by economic distress from poor harvests and the revolutionary fervor emanating from France, leading to widespread demands for constitutional governments, freedom of the press, and national unification.[50] Barricade fighting in cities like Berlin compelled rulers, including Prussia's Frederick William IV, to grant initial concessions such as promising constitutions and revoking censorship, though these were tactical retreats rather than genuine commitments to reform.[51] A pre-parliament (Vorparlament) convened in Frankfurt in late March to organize elections for a national assembly, resulting in the selection of delegates through indirect voting by male citizens over age 24, yielding approximately 587 members due to boycotts by some conservative groups, short of the planned 649.[52] The Frankfurt National Assembly convened on May 18, 1848, in St. Paul's Church, dominated by middle-class liberals and professors seeking to establish a constitutional monarchy for a unified Germany encompassing the Confederation states but excluding non-German Habsburg territories.[52] Early actions included appointing Archduke John of Austria as provisional regent on June 28 to head an executive central authority, though this body lacked coercive power or a standing army to enforce decisions.[53] In December 1848, the assembly proclaimed the "Basic Rights for the German People," guaranteeing equality before the law, abolition of feudal privileges, and freedoms of expression and religion, which briefly served as imperial law but proved unenforceable without state compliance.[54] Debates fractured along lines of whether to pursue a "Greater Germany" including Austria or a "Little Germany" under Prussian leadership, delaying substantive progress amid radical demands for social reforms that alienated conservative delegates.[6] On March 28, 1849, the assembly adopted a constitution envisioning a federal empire with universal male suffrage, a bicameral legislature, and a hereditary emperor, then offered the imperial crown to Frederick William IV on April 3, 1849.[55] He rejected it, deeming the offer illegitimate as it came from popular sovereignty rather than the German princes, exposing the assembly's dependence on monarchical assent it could not compel.[55] By May 1849, with princes reasserting control through restored militaries and suppressing local uprisings, the assembly dissolved on May 30 after losing quorum; remnants relocated to Stuttgart but were forcibly disbanded by Württemberg troops on June 18.[56] The failure stemmed primarily from the assembly's structural impotence—no independent enforcement mechanisms against state governments that ignored its edicts—and internal divisions that prevented unified action, underscoring that liberal appeals to abstract rights yielded to princely power politics once revolutionary momentum waned.[6][56] This collapse reinforced the causal primacy of military and diplomatic strength over parliamentary idealism in achieving unification, as later Prussian strategies demonstrated.[57]Lessons from Liberal Collapse: Prioritizing Power over Ideals
The Frankfurt Parliament, convened on May 18, 1848, in St. Paul's Church, ultimately collapsed by June 1849 due to its inability to translate liberal and nationalist aspirations into enforceable action, as it possessed no independent military or executive authority to compel the German states' compliance.[58] Internal divisions exacerbated this weakness, with delegates debating endlessly over constitutional details, the inclusion of Austria (Grossdeutschland versus Kleindeutschland), and the balance of powers, while failing to secure unified support from the fragmented principalities or a reliable popular base beyond initial middle-class enthusiasm. Prussian King Frederick William IV's rejection of the offered imperial crown on April 3, 1849—dismissing it as a "crown from the gutter" undeserving of monarchical acceptance—highlighted the parliament's dependence on reluctant rulers, leading to its dissolution by Prussian troops amid resurgent conservative forces.[33] This failure underscored the inadequacy of liberal strategies rooted in moral persuasion, constitutional drafting, and appeals to enlightened self-interest, which proved insufficient against entrenched dynastic loyalties and the absence of coercive mechanisms in a system of sovereign states. Liberals, often intellectuals and professionals from various regions, lacked a centralized power structure, allowing monarchs to reassert control through armies loyal to individual crowns rather than abstract national ideals; for instance, the parliament's provisional central authority was ignored by states like Bavaria and Saxony, which prioritized local autonomy over federal unity.[59] Empirical outcomes from 1848 demonstrated that ideological consensus alone could not overcome veto powers held by great powers like Prussia and Austria, whose military dominance dictated geopolitical realities, revealing a causal disconnect between professed liberal principles and the material forces required for state-building. Otto von Bismarck explicitly drew this contrast in his September 30, 1862, address to the Prussian House of Deputies' budget committee, rejecting the liberal emphasis on parliamentary debate in favor of pragmatic power: "The great questions of the day will not be settled by speeches and majority decisions... but by iron and blood," prioritizing Prussia's organizational strength and military readiness over ideological liberalism.[60] Bismarck's realpolitik succeeded where 1848 efforts faltered by leveraging Prussian fiscal and reform capacities to modernize the army despite budgetary opposition, enabling decisive wars that excluded ideological rivals like Austria and imposed unity through conquest rather than negotiation.[61] The core lesson from this liberal collapse lies in the primacy of power asymmetries in achieving national consolidation: fragmented ideals disseminated through assemblies yielded to unified state action backed by superior force, as Prussia's 4:1 military advantage over Austria in 1866 and subsequent victories illustrated how causal efficacy in international affairs stems from monopolized violence and strategic manipulation, not diffused enlightenment.[62] Without subordinating ideals to such realist imperatives—evident in Bismarck's exclusion of liberal parliamentarism until unification was secured under monarchical auspices—national projects risk dissolution amid competing sovereignties, a pattern borne out by the revolutions' retreat to pre-1848 restorations by 1850.[58]Bismarck's Realpolitik and Prussian Ascendancy
Domestic Reforms and Military Modernization
In the late 1850s, following Prussia's perceived military shortcomings during the Crimean War and the Second Italian War of Independence, War Minister Albrecht von Roon proposed a comprehensive army reorganization in 1860 to modernize the Prussian forces.[63] The plan called for increasing the annual recruitment contingent from 40,000 to 63,000 men, extending compulsory active service from two to three years, and reducing reliance on the amateurish Landwehr militia by integrating it into a professionalized Ersatz Reserve system, aiming to raise the standing army's peacetime strength to approximately 200,000 troops.[64] These changes sought to create a more disciplined, trained force capable of rapid mobilization, supported by the adoption of the breech-loading Dreyse needle gun and improved artillery.[65] The liberal-dominated Prussian Landtag rejected the accompanying budget bill in February 1860, demanding parliamentary control over military appointments and a shorter service term, which they viewed as essential to curb monarchical absolutism under the 1850 constitution.[66] King Wilhelm I, ascending the throne in 1861 amid ongoing deadlock, considered abdication but instead appointed Otto von Bismarck as Minister-President and Foreign Minister on September 22, 1862, tasking him with resolving the impasse.[63] In his inaugural address to the budget commission on September 30, 1862, Bismarck famously declared that "not through speeches and majority decisions will the great questions of the day be decided... but by iron and blood," signaling a prioritization of executive authority and military readiness over liberal proceduralism.[67] Bismarck proceeded to collect taxes and implement the military reforms without parliamentary approval, invoking the "gap theory" (Lückentheorie) that the constitution permitted executive governance in the absence of a budget vote.[63] Under Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke, who had held the position since 1857, tactical innovations included the establishment of a permanent General Staff for strategic planning, emphasis on railroad networks for logistics—Prussia's 10,000 kilometers of track by 1866 enabling swift troop deployments—and corps-level autonomy in battlefield command to enhance flexibility.[65] These measures transformed the army into a professional instrument of state power, vindicated by victories in the 1864 Danish War and 1866 Austro-Prussian War. Domestically, Bismarck's approach entrenched crown supremacy by purging liberal officials from administrative roles and bypassing legislative oversight, effectively reforming the balance of power without formal constitutional amendment.[64] The strategy faced opposition, including legal challenges and calls for resistance from liberals, but public support grew after military successes; in 1866, the Landtag approved the Indemnity Bill on September 3, retroactively legitimizing unbudgeted expenditures from 1862 to 1866 by a vote of 230 to 75.[68] This precedent weakened parliamentary fiscal authority, prioritizing realpolitik governance and military efficacy as foundations for Prussian dominance, though it deepened divisions between conservative Junkers and urban liberals.[63]Schleswig-Holstein War: Testing Danish Neutrality
The Schleswig-Holstein duchies, personal possessions of the Danish crown, held a unique status under international agreements: Holstein belonged to the German Confederation with a predominantly German population, while Schleswig, though Danish in majority northern areas, was linked to Holstein by the 1460 Treaty of Ribe, preventing separate succession or integration.[69] The London Protocol of May 8, 1852, signed by Denmark, Prussia, Austria, Britain, France, Russia, and Sweden, confirmed the duchies' indivisibility and succession to Prince Christian of Glücksburg (later Christian IX) upon King Frederick VII's death, explicitly barring constitutional ties between Denmark proper and Schleswig that could undermine Holstein's confederal rights.[70] Upon Frederick VII's death on November 15, 1863, Christian IX ascended the throne, but the Danish Rigsdag enacted the November Constitution on November 13, 1863, extending Danish laws to Schleswig and effectively incorporating it, which German nationalists and confederal authorities viewed as a direct violation of the protocol's guarantees.[69] Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, seeking to rally smaller German states under Prussian leadership and assert dominance without immediate great-power backlash, coordinated with Austria to issue a joint ultimatum on January 16, 1864, demanding Denmark rescind the constitution and restore the status quo; Denmark's refusal escalated tensions.[71] This maneuver tested European responses, as Bismarck anticipated limited intervention: Britain protested diplomatically but prioritized domestic issues, France under Napoleon III remained neutral to avoid entanglement, and Russia offered tacit support to Prussia for balancing Austria.[72] War commenced on February 1, 1864, when Prussian forces under General Friedrich von Wrangel, supported by Austrian troops, crossed into Schleswig, bypassing Holstein to target Danish fortifications directly.[73] Prussian breech-loading needle guns provided a decisive technological edge over Danish smoothbore muskets, enabling rapid advances; the key Battle of Dybbøl on April 18, 1864, saw Prussian artillery and infantry overwhelm Danish entrenchments after a prolonged bombardment, resulting in over 5,000 Danish casualties and the fort's capture.[74] Denmark's naval blockade proved ineffective against Prussian coastal operations, and by June, Danish forces evacuated the mainland, leading to an armistice on June 9, 1864.[73] The Treaty of Vienna, signed October 30, 1864, compelled Denmark to cede Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg unconditionally to Austria and Prussia, with Holstein administered by Austria and Schleswig-Lauenburg by Prussia under joint oversight.[75] This outcome isolated Denmark diplomatically—its appeals for neutrality enforcement under the London Protocol went unheeded by guarantor powers—and bolstered Prussian prestige, fostering German unity against a perceived external aggressor while exposing Austria's reliance on Prussian military prowess, paving the way for their 1866 rivalry.[76] Bismarck's calculated risk confirmed that Prussian assertiveness could proceed with minimal external interference, validating his strategy of exploiting dynastic disputes to advance unification without provoking a broader coalition.[71]Austro-Prussian War: Defeating the Habsburg Rival
The Austro-Prussian War, also known as the Seven Weeks' War, erupted on June 14, 1866, when Prussian forces under Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke invaded Holstein, prompting Austria to declare war three days later.[77] The conflict stemmed from escalating rivalry over dominance in German affairs, exacerbated by disputes over the administration of Schleswig and Holstein following their joint occupation after the 1864 war against Denmark.[77] Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck had deliberately maneuvered to isolate Austria diplomatically, securing an alliance with Italy—which sought Venetian territories—and preventing intervention by France or Russia through calculated diplomacy.[78] Bismarck's strategy rested on Prussia's military reforms, including the adoption of the breech-loading Dreyse needle gun and efficient mobilization via railroads, which granted Prussian armies a decisive edge in firepower and maneuverability over the Austrian forces reliant on slower-loading muzzle-loaders.[79] Prussia mobilized approximately 285,000 troops in three armies, advancing rapidly into Bohemia to confront the main Austrian force of about 247,000 under Ludwig von Benedek, augmented by 24,000 Saxons.[80] Austria's strategy faltered due to divided command and hesitation, allowing Moltke to execute converging maneuvers that encircled the Austrians.[81] The decisive engagement occurred at the Battle of Königgrätz (Sadowa) on July 3, 1866, where Prussian forces numbering around 200,000 overwhelmed the Austrian army, inflicting roughly 45,000 casualties against 9,000 Prussian losses, compelling Benedek's retreat.[82] Concurrently, Prussian victories over Hanover, Saxony, and other German Confederation allies secured northern theaters, while Italian forces tied down Austrian troops in the south despite their defeat at Custoza.[81] The war concluded with an armistice at Nikolsburg on July 26, 1866, followed by the Peace of Prague on August 23, 1866, which imposed lenient terms on Austria to preserve future Prussian goodwill and deter French meddling.[83] Austria ceded no territory directly but agreed to the dissolution of the German Confederation, permanent exclusion from German political affairs, and recognition of Prussian hegemony over northern states.[77] Prussia annexed Hanover, Electoral Hesse, Nassau, and the free city of Frankfurt, while south German states like Bavaria remained independent but aligned with Prussia through bilateral treaties.[84] Total Prussian casualties amounted to about 11,765 battle deaths and 25,000 wounded, contrasted with heavier Austrian losses exceeding 40,000 battle deaths across fronts.[81] This swift defeat eliminated the Habsburgs as rivals in German unification, enabling Bismarck to reorganize northern Germany under Prussian leadership and setting the stage for broader imperial ambitions.[83]Formation of the North German Confederation
Following Prussia's victory in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck dissolved the German Confederation and pursued the integration of northern and central German states under Prussian leadership, excluding Austria and the South German states. Prussia annexed the Kingdom of Hanover, the Electorate of Hesse-Kassel, the Duchy of Nassau, and the Free City of Frankfurt, thereby eliminating rival powers and incorporating approximately 4 million additional subjects, increasing Prussia's population to over 23 million. These annexations, justified by Bismarck as necessary for security against French influence, faced international criticism but were recognized by the Treaty of Prague on August 23, 1866.[85] In August 1866, Prussia concluded offensive and defensive alliances with 21 other states north of the Main River, forming an initial military union that laid the groundwork for political confederation. This alliance, driven by Prussian military superiority and Bismarck's diplomatic pressure, compelled states like the Kingdom of Saxony to join despite initial resistance following their defeat alongside Austria. The treaties stipulated collective defense and Prussian command of unified forces, effectively subordinating the participants to Berlin's direction. By late 1866, Bismarck drafted a constitution emphasizing federal structure with retained state sovereignty, countering liberal demands for a more centralized or democratic system.[86] The Constitution of the North German Confederation was adopted on April 16, 1867, by the constituent assembly, establishing a federal state with the King of Prussia as hereditary President responsible for foreign policy, military command, and appointment of the Chancellor—initially Bismarck himself. The bicameral legislature consisted of the Bundesrat, representing states with Prussia holding 17 of 58 votes to ensure dominance, and the Reichstag, elected by universal manhood suffrage for economic matters but lacking veto power over executive decisions. No bill of rights was included, prioritizing institutional stability and Prussian hegemony over individual liberties or egalitarian reforms. The Confederation unified tariffs, currency, and railways, fostering economic integration while maintaining monarchical authority in internal affairs.[87][88] The 22 member states encompassed Prussia (including annexed territories), the Kingdom of Saxony, Grand Duchies of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Oldenburg, and Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, duchies such as Anhalt, Brunswick, Saxe-Altenburg, Saxe-Meiningen, and Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, principalities including Lippe, Reuss Elder Line, Reuss Younger Line, Schaumburg-Lippe, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, and Waldeck-Pyrmont, and the free Hanseatic cities of Bremen, Hamburg, and Lübeck. This structure represented about 30 million inhabitants, with Prussia controlling over 60% of the territory and population, enabling Bismarck to position the Confederation as a prelude to broader German unification through calculated alliances rather than ideological appeals.[89][90]Culmination: Franco-Prussian War and Empire Proclamation
Diplomatic Maneuvers: Ems Dispatch and Provocation
In the aftermath of the withdrawal of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen's candidacy for the Spanish throne on July 12, 1870, French Foreign Minister Antoine Duc de Gramont sought further assurances from Prussia to prevent any future Hohenzollern claim, viewing it as a threat to French influence.[91] On July 13, 1870, while King Wilhelm I of Prussia was taking his morning promenade at the Ems spa, French Ambassador Vincent Benedetti approached him to demand a formal pledge that no Prussian prince would ever again seek the Spanish crown; Wilhelm, having already endorsed the withdrawal, politely declined, stating he could not commit on such matters and instructing Benedetti to address further inquiries to Bismarck.[92] Wilhelm then dictated a report of the encounter to Foreign Office Secretary Heinrich Abeken, who telegraphed it to Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in Berlin, emphasizing the king's courteous refusal and dismissal of the ambassador without acrimony.[93] Bismarck, anticipating an opportunity to exploit French bellicosity and unify German states against external aggression, edited the telegram upon receipt, shortening it by omitting Wilhelm's conciliatory phrases—such as his willingness to receive Benedetti again if needed—and restructuring it to convey a sharper tone of Prussian rebuff.[94] The original dispatch read: "His Majesty the King has refused the demand... and instructed me to telegraph to Your Excellency... that His Majesty has nothing further to communicate to the Ambassador," preserving the politeness of the exchange; Bismarck's version condensed it to: "Benedetti intercepted me... to demand... that I authorize him to telegraph... that I bind myself... His Majesty refused to receive the Ambassador again... and instructed me to report to Your Excellency that His Majesty had no further communication to make to the Ambassador." This alteration portrayed Benedetti as importunate and Wilhelm's response as curt dismissal, heightening the perceived insult without fabricating events.[95] With Wilhelm's tacit approval after consultation, Bismarck shared the edited dispatch with Prussian military leaders and then released it to the North German Confederation's press and foreign embassies that evening, framing it as a factual report of French overreach.[96] In France, the published text—amplified by Le Nord newspaper on July 14—ignited public fury, with Gramont decrying it in the Corps Législatif as an "insolent" provocation that demanded satisfaction, leading Emperor Napoleon III's government to mobilize troops and secure legislative approval for war on July 15 despite internal divisions.[97] Bismarck's maneuver succeeded in shifting diplomatic initiative, as France declared war on Prussia on July 19, 1870, allowing the North German Confederation and southern states to portray themselves as defenders against unprovoked Gallic aggression, thereby facilitating broader German alignment under Prussian leadership.[91]Military Campaigns and French Capitulation
The Franco-Prussian War's military campaigns commenced following France's declaration of war on July 19, 1870, with Prussian forces under Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke rapidly advancing into French territory using superior rail logistics and mobilization. Early clashes, including French defeats at Wissembourg on August 4 and Wörth on August 6, exposed French command disarray and inferior artillery, as Prussian Krupp breech-loading guns outranged French pieces. By mid-August, Marshal Achille Bazaine's Army of the Rhine retreated to Metz, where it was besieged, while the Army of Châlons under Marshal Patrice de MacMahon moved to relieve it but was outmaneuvered.[98][99] The decisive Battle of Sedan unfolded on September 1–2, 1870, where approximately 120,000 French troops, including Emperor Napoleon III, faced encirclement by over 200,000 Prussian and allied German soldiers from the Third and Fourth Armies. Prussian artillery dominated, forcing French forces into a meuse river bend; failed French counterattacks and leadership vacillation led to surrender, with 17,000 French casualties, 104,000 captured—including Napoleon III—and only 9,000 Prussian losses. This catastrophe shattered French imperial command, prompting the Army of Metz's capitulation on October 14 after 173,000 troops surrendered, enabling Prussian forces to redirect toward Paris.[100][99][98] Post-Sedan, the French Government of National Defense organized resistance, but Prussian armies, bolstered by contingents from Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden, encircled Paris starting September 19, 1870, isolating 600,000 defenders and civilians. Relief efforts, such as the Loire Army's failed pushes at Orléans in December, faltered against Prussian coordination; the city endured bombardment from January 5, 1871, amid famine, with residents resorting to eating rats and zoo animals. Starvation and military exhaustion culminated in an armistice on January 28, 1871, as French envoys, led by Jules Favre, capitulated to Prussian terms, paving the way for peace negotiations while Prussian troops occupied key forts.[101][98][101]Versailles Proclamation: Birth of the German Empire, January 18, 1871
On January 18, 1871, in the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles, King Wilhelm I of Prussia was proclaimed the first emperor of a unified Germany by the rulers of the participating German states, marking the symbolic birth of the German Empire amid the Franco-Prussian War.[102][103] The ceremony occurred following Prussia's decisive victory at the Battle of Sedan on September 2, 1870, which resulted in the capture of Napoleon III, and during the ongoing siege of Paris by German forces, underscoring the event's intent as a demonstration of German military dominance over France.[1][104] Otto von Bismarck, serving as Chancellor of the North German Confederation, played a central role by reading the proclamation, which announced the offer of the imperial crown to Wilhelm I from the kings of Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg, the Grand Duke of Baden, and representatives of other principalities, duchies, and free Hanseatic cities.[105][106] Assembled attendees included German princes, military commanders such as Crown Prince Frederick, ministers, and envoys from the southern states that had entered alliances with Prussia against France in July and August 1870, including Bavaria (which retained unique rights like its own postal service and military contingents under the November 1870 treaties).[1][107] The proclamation text emphasized the voluntary union of the North German Confederation—formed in 1867 after the Austro-Prussian War—with the South German states, totaling 25 federal entities under Prussian leadership, though Wilhelm I initially resisted the title "German Emperor," preferring "Emperor of Germany" to avoid implying sovereignty over the kings of other states and only relented after Bismarck's persuasion on January 17.[1][108] Wilhelm's emotional opposition culminated in tears before the event, and he deliberately snubbed Bismarck afterward by walking past without acknowledgment, reflecting tensions over the perceived subordination of the Prussian crown.[1] This act formalized the shift from the decentralized German Confederation (dissolved in 1866) to a federal empire with Wilhelm as hereditary emperor, a position not derived from popular sovereignty as in the failed 1848 Frankfurt Parliament but from monarchical consent and Prussian military success, enabling centralized authority in foreign policy, army, and customs while preserving states' internal autonomy.[104][2] The choice of Versailles, a site of French monarchical grandeur built under Louis XIV, intentionally humiliated the defeated Third French Empire and symbolized the reversal of French dominance in Europe established by the 1806 Confederation of the Rhine.[102][106]Internal Consolidation and State-Building
Federal Structure and Prussian Dominance
The German Empire's federal constitution, promulgated on April 16, 1871, built directly upon the framework of the North German Confederation established in 1867, incorporating four southern states—Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt—via bilateral treaties following their entry after the Franco-Prussian War. This structure united 25 monarchies and free cities with the imperial territory of Alsace-Lorraine, granting varying degrees of sovereignty to member states while centralizing key powers in foreign policy, defense, and customs. States retained authority over internal matters such as education, police, and local justice, but the empire's design ensured centralized control over railways, telegraphs, and a unified military command.[89][109] Prussian dominance defined the federation's practical operation, as the Kingdom of Prussia encompassed roughly two-thirds of the empire's land area and population—approximately 17 million of 41 million inhabitants in 1871—providing an overwhelming demographic and economic base. The Prussian monarch, William I, assumed the title of German Emperor, and the chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, who was Prussian prime minister, directed imperial policy without accountability to the Reichstag. In the Bundesrat, the upper house representing state governments, Prussia commanded 17 of 58 votes, enabling it to veto legislation (requiring 14 opposing votes) and form blocking coalitions with smaller allies, thus safeguarding Prussian interests against federal reforms.[109][110] The military's integration under Prussian auspices further entrenched this hegemony; the empire's armed forces operated as a single entity led by the emperor as supreme commander, adhering to Prussian organizational principles, conscription laws, and general staff doctrines, with no separate armies permitted for other states beyond limited reserves. Southern kingdoms negotiated exemptions, such as Bavaria retaining its own war ministry and postal service, but these concessions were tactical to secure their adhesion without diluting Prussian strategic primacy. This arrangement reflected Bismarck's realpolitik: fostering unity through Prussian leadership while accommodating particularist sentiments to prevent secessionist pressures.[111][112]Kulturkampf: Conflict with Catholic Church
The Kulturkampf, or "culture struggle," emerged in the newly unified German Empire as Chancellor Otto von Bismarck sought to assert state authority over the Catholic Church, viewing its ultramontane tendencies—exemplified by Pope Pius IX's declaration of papal infallibility in July 1870—as a threat to national loyalty, particularly amid the Catholic Centre Party's electoral gains in 1871, which secured 63 seats in the Reichstag.[113] This conflict, spanning roughly 1871 to 1887, targeted Catholic institutions in Prussia and extended to the empire, driven by Bismarck's concerns over divided allegiances in Catholic-heavy regions like the Rhineland, Polish provinces, and southern states, where the Church's influence was perceived to prioritize Rome over Berlin.[114] Protestant Prussian dominance fueled the measures, framing them as necessary to prevent ecclesiastical interference in state affairs such as education and civil registry.[115] Initial legislation began in 1871 with a Prussian school supervision law granting state oversight of religious instruction, escalating in 1872 with the Jesuit Law of July 4, which expelled the Society of Jesus from Prussian territory and dissolved its institutions, followed by the Pulpit Paragraph prohibiting clergy from political commentary during sermons.[116] The 1873 May Laws, introduced by Prussian Minister of Public Worship Adalbert Falk, imposed state regulation on seminary training, required civil examinations for priests, and subordinated bishop appointments to government approval, aiming to secularize clerical formation and reduce Vatican sway.[113] Further enactments included the 1874 Breadbasket Law, empowering the state to defund and dismiss non-compliant priests, and the 1875 introduction of mandatory civil marriage, detaching matrimonial records from church control to prioritize state jurisdiction.[114] By 1876, laws enabled sequestration of church property for non-adherence, compounding financial pressures on Catholic dioceses.[114] Enforcement provoked widespread resistance, leading to the imprisonment or exile of over 1,800 priests by the campaign's peak, with five Prussian bishops deposed or arrested, including figures like Paul Melchers of Cologne, and nearly 1,000 parishes left without priests by 1875, depriving more than one million Catholics of sacraments.[117] [113] [115] Over 200 priests and 130 Catholic newspaper editors faced arrest, while fines and seizures targeted church assets valued at around 16 million marks, galvanizing the Centre Party's cohesion and public sympathy for the Church as a bulwark against perceived Protestant overreach.[117] [113] Bismarck's strategy, rooted in realpolitik to neutralize internal divisions post-unification, inadvertently fortified Catholic political organization, as the Centre Party's voter base expanded in response to state coercion.[114] The Kulturkampf waned after 1878 amid Bismarck's pivot toward anti-socialist legislation, recognizing the Church's utility against emerging leftist threats; Falk's resignation in 1879 marked a thaw, with partial repeals in the 1880s restoring some episcopal rights and allowing exiled clergy's return, culminating in the 1887 reconciliation that nullified most punitive laws and affirmed church autonomy in spiritual matters, though state oversight of education persisted.[116] [114] This retreat underscored the limits of coercive secularization in a confessional patchwork empire, strengthening Catholic resilience and Centre Party influence into the Wilhelmine era, while highlighting Bismarck's pragmatic adaptability over ideological rigidity.[114]Administrative Unification and Legal Frameworks
The southern German states—Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt—formally acceded to the North German Confederation through bilateral treaties negotiated in November 1870, which were ratified and incorporated into the new German Empire by February 1871, thereby extending the provisional constitutional framework nationwide.[118] These treaties preserved significant autonomy for the southern monarchies, including Bavaria's rights to maintain its own postal service, railways, and military contingents under imperial command during wartime, reflecting Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's strategy to balance Prussian dominance with particularist sentiments to facilitate unification without outright annexation.[119] The Constitution of the German Empire, adopted by the Reichstag on April 14, 1871, and proclaimed by Kaiser Wilhelm I on April 16, 1871, entering into force on May 4, 1871, provided the primary legal framework, adapting the 1867 North German Confederation constitution with modifications to accommodate the south.[119] It established a federal monarchy where the Empire held exclusive legislative authority over foreign affairs, the army and navy, maritime and commercial law, currency, weights and measures, patents, and postal and telegraph services, while delegating internal administration, police, education, and civil justice to the states.[118] The bicameral legislature comprised the Bundesrat, representing state governments with Prussia holding 17 of 58 votes, ensuring veto power over legislation, and the Reichstag, elected by universal male suffrage for three-year terms (extended to five in 1888), with 397 members by 1874, though lacking initiative rights or control over the executive.[120] Administratively, unification proceeded incrementally without a centralized civil service; states retained their own bureaucracies and legal codes, leading to persistent diversity in local governance, taxation, and judiciary until later reforms like the 1879 imperial court system for uniform civil procedure.[121] Imperial offices, such as the Reich Chancellery under Bismarck, coordinated federal policies, but enforcement relied on state cooperation, with early unifications in currency via the Reichsbank (established 1876) and transport through imperial railways oversight.[122] This decentralized structure mitigated resistance from federalist states but perpetuated inefficiencies, as evidenced by the absence of a uniform civil code until the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch of 1900, underscoring the Empire's evolution as a confederation prioritizing military and economic cohesion over administrative centralization.[118]Nation-Building and Social Dynamics
Cultural Integration and Language Standardization
The formation of the German Empire in 1871 accelerated the standardization of the German language, which had already coalesced around High German variants through 19th-century literature and printing presses. Administrative decrees and educational mandates enforced Standard German—derived from central-southern dialects—as the lingua franca for bureaucracy, courts, and official correspondence across the 25 states, overriding local variants in formal usage. Prussian orthographic norms, emphasizing phonetic consistency, served as the de facto standard until the 1901 Reichsorthographie reform, which codified spelling rules empire-wide to facilitate uniform documentation and reduce ambiguities in interstate communication.[123] Compulsory elementary education, universalized under the empire's framework and modeled on Prussia's system since 1763, played a pivotal role by mandating instruction in Standard German from primary levels onward. By 1900, literacy rates exceeded 90% in most states, with curricula incorporating national history texts and grammar drills that marginalized dialects in classrooms; teachers, trained in state seminaries, were required to prioritize Hochdeutsch proficiency to prepare pupils for military service and civil exams. Dialects like Plattdeutsch in Hanover or Alemannic in Baden persisted robustly in rural households and markets, comprising up to 70% of spoken interactions in some northern districts as late as 1900, but urban migration and print media eroded their prestige, confining them increasingly to informal spheres.[124] Broader cultural integration relied on institutional mechanisms rather than top-down homogenization, given the federation's respect for state sovereignty. Universal male conscription, enacted in 1871, assembled over 700,000 annual recruits into mixed regiments where Standard German commands and shared drills inculcated imperial loyalty, though barracks often retained regional accents and rivalries. Expanded rail networks, reaching 60,000 kilometers by 1913, enabled labor mobility and cultural diffusion, as workers from Saxony encountered Bavarian customs in Ruhr factories, gradually blending traditions without erasing them.[125] Regional identities endured, with southern Catholics upholding distinct festivals like Munich's Oktoberfest—attended by 5 million by 1910—and processions, while northern Protestants favored restrained commemorations such as Sedan Day on September 1, honoring the 1870 victory. Bismarck prioritized political cohesion over cultural uniformity, viewing excessive regionalism as tolerable so long as it subordinated to the throne; his Kulturkampf (1871–1878) targeted ecclesiastical influence as a dual loyalty threat but spared ethnic German folkways, allowing federalism to buffer against full assimilation. Empirical measures of unity, like rising intermarriage rates (from 5% cross-state in 1871 to 15% by 1900 in industrial zones), indicated gradual convergence, yet surveys and travelogues attested to persistent divides in attire, cuisine, and etiquette that underscored the empire's mosaic character.[113]Jewish Emancipation: Opportunities and Tensions
The Law Concerning the Equality of Religious Confessions, enacted by the North German Confederation on July 3, 1869, abolished remaining civil disabilities based on religion, granting Jews full legal equality with Christians in access to public offices, professions, and civic rights across Prussian-dominated territories.[126] This measure extended southward upon the proclamation of the German Empire on January 18, 1871, with holdout states like Bavaria formally adopting equivalent provisions by April 22, 1871, thereby unifying emancipation nationwide under the empire's constitutional framework, which affirmed civil rights irrespective of creed in Article 3.[127] Jewish communities, numbering approximately 525,000 in 1871 or about 1.6% of the population, largely embraced unification as a culmination of decades-long advocacy for integration, viewing it as enabling broader societal participation amid the era's economic liberalization and industrialization.[128] Emancipation opened avenues for Jews in education, with enrollment at universities rising sharply—such as at Berlin, where Jewish students increased from 6% in 1871 to over 10% by 1880—and professional fields, including law, medicine, and banking, where figures like Gerson von Bleichröder exemplified rapid ascent through ties to Bismarck's administration.[129] Military service became accessible without prior barriers, fostering loyalty to the empire; during the Franco-Prussian War, Jewish enlistment rates matched or exceeded the general population, with over 12,000 serving and earning distinctions like the [Iron Cross](/page/Iron Cross).[130] Economically, Jews capitalized on unified markets, dominating sectors like commerce and finance—by 1890, they comprised 20% of Berlin's bankers despite minimal population share—driving urban growth but also concentrating in liberal professions aligned with modernization.[131] Despite legal parity, social and cultural tensions endured, rooted in longstanding religious prejudices and exacerbated by post-unification nationalism, which recast Jews as outsiders incompatible with emerging ethnic homogeneity ideals.[132] The 1873 stock market crash fueled scapegoating, with economic envy manifesting in stereotypes of Jewish overrepresentation in finance, prompting the first organized political antisemitism via Adolf Stoecker's Christian Social Workers' Party in 1878, which garnered Reichstag seats by blending welfare rhetoric with exclusionary appeals to Protestant workers.[131] By 1879–1881, the "Antisemitism Debate" in Berlin newspapers highlighted deepening rifts, as critics like Heinrich von Treitschke proclaimed "the Jews are our misfortune," reflecting a shift from confessional to racial framing that persisted despite Bismarck's initial tolerance for Jewish utility in state-building.[131] Such dynamics underscored emancipation's limits: formal rights did not erase informal barriers like university quotas or elite club exclusions, sustaining Jewish incentives for assimilation while breeding resentment among conservatives wary of perceived cultural dilution.[132]Economic Policies and Social Stability
Following unification in 1871, the German Empire implemented monetary reforms to standardize currency across former states, introducing the gold-backed Mark in 1871–1873 to replace disparate silver-based systems prevalent in most regions.[133] This shift facilitated trade integration and economic stability by eliminating exchange rate fluctuations that had hindered commerce within the pre-unification Zollverein customs union.[133] The establishment of the Reichsbank in 1876 as a central issuing authority further centralized monetary policy, serving as a lender of last resort and promoting uniform banking practices amid rapid industrialization.[134] Trade policy initially favored free trade, leveraging the Zollverein's external tariffs, but economic downturns in the late 1870s—marked by agricultural depression and falling grain prices—prompted Chancellor Otto von Bismarck to pivot toward protectionism. The 1879 tariff law, enacted on July 15, imposed moderate duties on imports including wheat (50 marks per ton), rye (40 marks per ton), and oats (40 marks per ton), alongside higher rates on livestock and manufactured goods, forging an alliance between industrialists ("iron") and agrarian interests ("rye").[135] This "marriage of iron and rye" generated revenue for imperial finances while shielding domestic producers from foreign competition, particularly from Russia and the United States, though it raised consumer costs and sparked debates over its long-term efficiency.[136] These policies underpinned a surge in industrialization, with German steel production exceeding France's by the early 1870s and overall output expanding fivefold between 1870 and 1914, driven by coal, iron, and railroad infrastructure.[137] [138] Economic concentration in large-scale industry, agriculture, and banks fostered national cohesion, as regional disparities diminished through shared prosperity, though growth slowed temporarily during the 1873–1890 "long depression."[136] To address emerging social tensions from urbanization and proletarianization, Bismarck enacted anti-socialist measures alongside welfare reforms, banning socialist organizations via the 1878 Anti-Socialist Laws after assassination attempts on Emperor Wilhelm I, while introducing compulsory health insurance in 1883 covering workers' medical costs through employer-employee contributions.[139] Subsequent laws in 1884 (accident insurance) and 1889 (old-age pensions for those over 70) aimed to undercut Marxist appeals by tying workers' security to the state, stabilizing class relations and bolstering regime legitimacy without conceding political power.[140] These initiatives, funded partly by tariff revenues, mitigated unrest in industrial centers like the Ruhr, though enforcement of anti-socialist bans faced resistance and did not eliminate the Social Democratic Party's electoral gains.[139] Overall, economic unification and targeted social provisions reinforced internal stability, enabling the Empire to prioritize external diplomacy over domestic upheaval.Historiographical Perspectives and Long-Term Assessments
Debates on Bismarck's Strategy: Master Plan or Opportunism
Historians have long debated whether Otto von Bismarck pursued a deliberate, long-term master plan for German unification under Prussian leadership or operated primarily through opportunism, exploiting unforeseen circumstances via Realpolitik. Proponents of the master plan interpretation point to Bismarck's 1862 "blood and iron" speech to the Prussian Landtag, in which he declared that Germany's future would not be decided by speeches and majority votes but by iron and blood, signaling a premeditated strategy of military confrontation to achieve Prussian dominance.[141] This view posits the three wars of unification—the 1864 Schleswig-Holstein conflict with Denmark, the 1866 Austro-Prussian War, and the 1870–1871 Franco-Prussian War—as sequential steps in a calculated blueprint, with Bismarck's diplomatic maneuvers, such as the 1865 alliance with Italy against Austria, demonstrating foresight in isolating rivals.[142] Supporters, including earlier apologetic historians and Bismarck himself in his post-1890 memoirs, argued that he anticipated a French war as essential for rallying southern German states, claiming in Gedanken und Erinnerungen that unification required such a conflict to overcome particularist resistances.[143] However, the memoirs' reliability is questioned, as they were composed after Bismarck's dismissal by Kaiser Wilhelm II, potentially embellishing his prescience to bolster his legacy amid political isolation.[144] Revisionist historians, notably A. J. P. Taylor in his 1955 biography Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman, contend that Bismarck lacked a coherent grand design, instead reacting tactically to contingencies without a fixed blueprint for full unification. Taylor emphasized Bismarck's pre-1862 ambivalence toward aggressive unification, noting his earlier roles as Prussian ambassador to the Frankfurt Diet and St. Petersburg, where he prioritized Prussian interests over pan-German ambitions and even counseled caution against premature conflict with Austria in the 1850s.[145] Evidence for opportunism includes Bismarck's post-1866 flexibility: initially envisioning only a North German Confederation excluding Catholic south German states like Bavaria, he accelerated full unification only after French provocations, such as the 1870 Hohenzollern candidacy crisis and Benedetti's Ems demands, which he manipulated via the edited Ems Telegram to provoke war—actions reactive rather than proactively scripted.[141][146] The opportunistic perspective aligns with Bismarck's own admissions of Realpolitik's improvisational nature, as in his reported metaphor of "listening for the footsteps of God" and hanging one's cloak on the right peg—seizing divine or historical opportunities rather than dictating them.[146] Post-World War II historiography, influenced by efforts to demythologize authoritarian figures, largely favors this view, portraying Bismarck as a pragmatic Junker who advanced Prussian hegemony by adapting to crises like the 1862 constitutional standoff with King Wilhelm I, rather than executing a rigid itinerary.[147] Yet, even critics acknowledge an underlying consistency: Bismarck's commitment to Prussian primacy and exclusion of Austria (Kleindeutschland solution) provided a directional framework, allowing opportunistic tactics to serve enduring goals without a detailed endgame mapped in advance. This synthesis—strategic opportunism—dominates modern assessments, underscoring how Bismarck navigated Europe's balance of power, allying temporarily with powers like Russia or Italy, but always contingent on shifting dynamics rather than irrevocable commitments.[148]Critiques of Aggressive Unification: Wars as Necessary Realism
Otto von Bismarck's approach to German unification, encapsulated in his September 30, 1862, "Blood and Iron" speech to the Prussian House of Delegates, emphasized military strength ("iron") and resolve ("blood") over mere parliamentary debate as the means to resolve the German Question, reflecting a realist assessment that fragmented states required forceful consolidation amid great power rivalries.[149][150] In this view, defended by proponents of realpolitik, the wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870–1871 were not gratuitous aggression but calculated necessities to overcome entrenched obstacles like Austrian dominance, French opposition, and the hesitancy of smaller German principalities, where diplomatic overtures alone had repeatedly faltered.[148][33] The failure of non-violent efforts, such as the 1848–1849 revolutions and the Frankfurt Parliament's assembly, underscored the improbability of peaceful unification; these initiatives collapsed due to monarchist resistance, economic disparities, religious divisions, and mutual suspicions among states, leaving Prussia's military preeminence as the only viable path to a cohesive entity capable of withstanding external threats.[33] Historians arguing from a pragmatic standpoint contend that Bismarck's exclusion of Austria via the 1866 Austro-Prussian War—resulting in the Treaty of Prague and the North German Confederation—was essential to neutralize a rival with historical claims over German affairs, as prolonged coexistence would have perpetuated paralysis in collective decision-making.[151][148] Similarly, the 1864 Danish War secured Schleswig-Holstein, bolstering Prussia's northern flank and economic integration through the pre-existing Zollverein customs union established in 1834, which had already demonstrated the limits of economic incentives without political enforcement.[33][148] The Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, provoked through the edited Ems Dispatch on July 13, 1870, is critiqued by some as manipulative but defended as realist orchestration to galvanize southern states like Bavaria and Württemberg against a perceived French aggressor, leading to the Empire's proclamation at Versailles on January 18, 1871.[148][33] In this perspective, Bismarck's restraint—annexing only northern territories adding about 4 million people after 1866, avoiding overextension—exemplifies rational egoism amid structural constraints, where ideological romanticism or legitimist alliances with Austria would have diluted Prussian interests and invited intervention.[151] Critics of portraying these actions as inherently aggressive overlook the causal reality of 19th-century Europe, where balance-of-power dynamics demanded decisive military leverage to forge a viable nation-state from over 30 sovereign entities, as evidenced by the rapid dissolution of prior confederations like the German Confederation of 1815.[33][151] This realist historiography posits that Bismarck's wars preserved a unified Germany from the fragmentation that plagued earlier attempts, enabling subsequent stability until 1914, and counters deterministic narratives by highlighting empirical successes in economic standardization and defense against revanchism.[148][151] While academic sources occasionally frame such realpolitik through lenses favoring liberal ideals, the pragmatic outcomes—Prussia's emergence as hegemon without broader continental war—affirm the necessity of force in contexts where consent-based unity proved illusory.[33]Debunking Sonderweg: Rejecting Deterministic Paths to Catastrophe
The Sonderweg thesis, advanced by historians associated with the Bielefeld School such as Hans-Ulrich Wehler, contends that Germany's unification in 1871 under Prussian authoritarian auspices engendered a structurally flawed polity—characterized by a dominant Junker class, weak bourgeois liberals, and an overweening state—that deviated from Anglo-French models of parliamentary democracy, rendering National Socialism a logical, if extreme, outcome of inherent national pathologies.[152] This interpretation posits a teleological continuity from Bismarckian conservatism to Hitler, with the Weimar Republic's collapse in 1933 seen as predetermined by 19th-century "abnormalities" like the absence of a full bourgeois revolution and persistent feudal elements.[153] However, such determinism overlooks the contingency of historical causation, where specific, non-inevitable events—such as the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914, precipitating World War I, and the subsequent Treaty of Versailles imposing 132 billion gold marks in reparations—disrupted Germany's constitutional monarchy far more than pre-1914 structures alone.[154] Critiques of the Sonderweg emphasize empirical parallels with other European nations, undermining claims of German exceptionalism. David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, in their analysis of modernization processes, demonstrate that Britain's vaunted liberal path featured analogous "peculiarities," including aristocratic dominance in politics (e.g., the House of Lords' veto power until 1911) and incomplete enfranchisement until 1918, yet without descending into totalitarianism.[152] Germany's post-unification achievements—universal male suffrage via the Reichstag elections from 1871, pioneering social insurance laws (health in 1883, accident in 1884, pensions in 1889 covering over 10 million workers by 1890), and explosive industrial growth (GDP per capita rising from 1,621 marks in 1871 to 3,843 in 1913)—reflect adaptive pragmatism rather than fatal flaws.[154] The thesis's methodological overreach, projecting 20th-century horrors backward onto the 19th, ignores how Bismarck's Realpolitik stabilized the Reich against revolutionary excesses seen in France's Third Republic (with 14 governments from 1870-1914) or Russia's 1905 upheavals, fostering instead a hybrid system amenable to reform.[153] Rejecting Sonderweg's causal determinism aligns with causal realism, wherein outcomes stem from intersecting contingencies rather than embedded national essences. The Nazi seizure of power hinged on acute crises: Weimar's hyperinflation peaking at 29,500% monthly in November 1923, the Great Depression's unemployment surge to 30% by 1932 (6 million jobless), and elite miscalculations like President Hindenburg's appointment of Hitler as chancellor on January 30, 1933, amid fragmented parties (NSDAP's 37% in March 1933 elections but no majority).[155] Post-1945 democratic success in West Germany—evident in the Basic Law's ratification on May 23, 1949, and sustained growth (GDP averaging 8% annually 1950-1960)—further disproves inevitability, as institutional choices post-catastrophe enabled convergence with Western norms.[156] While academic proponents of Sonderweg, often from left-leaning institutions, may have amplified it to underscore collective guilt amid post-war Vergangenheitsbewältigung, rigorous historiography favors non-exceptionalist accounts, recognizing unification as a contingent achievement amid Europe's multipolar risks rather than a predestined route to ruin.[153]References
- https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_North_German_Confederation

