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Government spending
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Government spending or expenditure includes all government consumption, investment, and transfer payments.[1][2] In national income accounting, the acquisition by governments of goods and services for current use, to directly satisfy the individual or collective needs of the community, is classed as government final consumption expenditure. Government acquisition of goods and services intended to create future benefits, such as infrastructure investment or research spending, is classed as government investment (government gross capital formation). These two types of government spending, on final consumption and on gross capital formation, together constitute one of the major components of gross domestic product.
Spending by a government that issues its own currency is nominally self-financing.[3] However, under a full employment assumption, to acquire resources produced by its population without potential inflationary pressures, removal of purchasing power must occur via government borrowing, taxes, custom duties, the sale or lease of natural resources, and various fees like national park entry fees or licensing fees.[4] When these sovereign governments choose to temporarily remove spent money by issuing securities in its place, they pay interest on the money borrowed.[5] Changes in government spending are a major component of fiscal policy used to stabilize the macroeconomic business cycle.
Public expenditure is spending made by the government of a country on collective or individual needs and wants of public goods and public services, such as pension, healthcare, security, education subsidies, emergency services, infrastructure, etc.[6] Until the 19th century, public expenditure was limited due to laissez faire philosophies. In the 20th century, John Maynard Keynes argued that the role of public expenditure was pivotal in determining levels of income and distribution in the economy. Public expenditure plays an important role in the economy as it establishes fiscal policy and provides public goods and services for households and firms.
Theories of public expenditure
[edit]Several theories of taxation exist in public economics.[7] Governments can be separated into two distinct types when it comes to their fiscal and monetary sovereignty: currency-issuers and currency-users. Currency-users at all levels (national, regional and local) need to raise revenue from a variety of sources to finance public-sector expenditures. They are not in control of the currency that their jurisdiction transacts in and so are restricted by what revenue they can raise prior to executing spending policies. Currency-issuing governments have no such nominal fiscal restriction. They have an infinite fiscal capacity in that, in principle, they can issue as much of their own currency as they like. However, real resources and productive capacity within an economy are finite. It is the acquisition of these real resources for the public purpose and a non-inflationary bias in government policy-making that places the constraint on currency-issuing government spending, rather than nominal financing from prior revenue collection.
The details of taxation are guided by two principles: who will benefit, and who can pay. Public expenditure means the expenditure on the developmental and non-developmental activity such as construction of roadways and dams, and other activity.
Rules or principles that govern the expenditure policy of the government are called "canons of public expenditure". Economist George Findlay Shirras[8] laid down the following four canons of public expenditure, although some are understood not to be required:
- Canon of benefit – public spending must be done in a manner that it brings greatest social benefits.
- Canon of economy – it says that economy does not mean miserliness. Public expenditure must be made productively and efficiently.
- Canon of sanction – public spending should not be made without sanction of an appropriate authority.
- Canon of surplus – public revenue should exceed government expenditure, this avoiding a deficit. Government must prepare a budget to create a surplus.[9]
Three other canons are:
- Canon of elasticity – it says there should be enough scope in expenditure policy.government should be able to increase or decrease it according to the period.
- Canon of productivity – public expenditure should encourage production efficiency of the economy.
- Canon of equitable distribution – expenditure policy should minimize inequalities and it should be designed in a way to benefit poorer sections.[citation needed]
Principle of maximum social advantage
[edit]The criteria and pre-conditions for arriving at this solution are collectively referred to as the principle of maximum social advantage. Taxation (government revenue) and government expenditure are the two tools. Neither of excess is good for the society, it has to be balanced to achieve maximum social benefit. Dalton called this principle as "Maximum Social Advantage" and Pigou termed it as "Maximum Aggregate Welfare".
Dalton's principle of maximum social advantage – maximum satisfaction should be yield by striking a balance between public revenue and expenditure by the government. Economic welfare is achieved when marginal utility of expenditure = marginal disutility of taxation. He explains this principle with reference to
- Maximum social benefit (MSB)
- Maximum social sacrifice (MSS)[11]
It was introduced by Swedish Economist "Erik Lindahl in 1919".[12] According to his theory, determination of public expenditure and taxation will happen on the basis of public preferences which they will reveal themselves. Cost of supplying a good will be taken up by the people. The tax that they will pay will be revealed by them according to their capacities.[13]
Macroeconomic fiscal policy
[edit]
Government spending can be a useful economic policy tool for governments. Fiscal policy can be defined as the use of government spending and/or taxation as a mechanism to influence an economy.[14][15] There are two types of fiscal policy: expansionary fiscal policy, and contractionary fiscal policy. Expansionary fiscal policy is an increase in government spending or a decrease in taxation, while contractionary fiscal policy is a decrease in government spending or an increase in taxes. Expansionary fiscal policy can be used by governments to stimulate the economy during a recession. For example, an increase in government spending directly increases demand for goods and services, which can help increase output and employment. On the other hand, contractionary fiscal policy can be used by governments to cool down the economy during an economic boom. A decrease in government spending or an increase in taxes can help reduce inflationary pressures within the economy.[14] During economic downturns, in the short run, government spending can be changed either via automatic stabilization or discretionary stabilization. Automatic stabilization is when existing policies automatically change government spending or taxes in response to economic changes, without the additional passage of laws.[16][14] A primary example of an automatic stabilizer is unemployment insurance or an employment guarantee, which provide financial assistance to unemployed workers or direct wages to recently unemployed workers, respectively. Discretionary stabilization is when a government takes actions to change government spending or taxes in direct response to changes in the economy. For instance, a government may decide to increase government spending as a result of a recession.[16] With discretionary stabilization, most governments must pass a new law to make changes in government spending.[14]
John Maynard Keynes was one of the first economists to advocate for government deficit spending as part of the fiscal policy response to an economic contraction. According to Keynesian economics, increased government spending raises aggregate demand and increases consumption, which leads to increased production and faster recovery from recessions. Classical economists, on the other hand, believe that increased government spending exacerbates an economic contraction by shifting resources from the private sector, which they consider productive, to the public sector, which they consider unproductive.[17]
In economics, the potential "shifting" in resources from the private sector to the public sector as a result of an increase in government deficit spending is called crowding out.[14] The figure to the right depicts an outdated theory for the market for capital, otherwise known as the market for loanable funds. The downward sloping demand curve D1 represents demand for private capital by firms and investors, and the upward sloping supply curve S1 represents savings by private individuals. The initial equilibrium in this market is represented by point A, where the equilibrium quantity of capital is K1 and the equilibrium interest rate is R1. In this theory, if the government increases deficit spending, it will borrow money from the private capital market and reduce the supply of savings to S2. The new equilibrium is at point B, where the interest rate has increased to R2 and the quantity of capital available to the private sector has decreased to K2. The government has essentially made borrowing more expensive and has taken away savings from the market, which "crowds out" some private investment. The crowding out of private investment could limit the economic growth from the initial increase in government spending.[16][15]
A closer understanding of government fiscal operations contradicts the above loanable funds theory. In fact, in the first instance and all else equal, increased government deficit spending increases liquidity in the banking system, thereby pushing down on interest rates. Government borrowing is the act of swapping the excess bank reserves created via the increased deficit spending with Treasury securities, thus draining this excess liquidity back down to pre-spending levels. There is no "loanable funds" pool of currency in reality. Crowding out only refers to the shift of real resources from private to public use, not the crowding out of nominal private investment. Government deficit spending increases the net financial assets available to the non-government sector.[18][19]
Composition
[edit]Public expenditure can be divided into COFOG (classification of the functions of government) categories. Those categories are:
- pensions, subsidies for family and children, unemployment subsidies, R&D (Research and Development) on social protection.
- Health
- public health services, medical products, medical appliances and equipment, hospital services, R&D on healthcare.
- executive and legislative organs, financial and fiscal affairs, external affairs, foreign economic aid, public debt transactions, R&D related to general public services
- Education
- pre-primary, primary, secondary, tertiary education, R&D on education etc. See also List of countries by spending on education as percentage of government spending.
- Economic Affairs
- general economic, agriculture, fuel and energy, commercial and labour affairs, forestry, fishing and hunting, mining, manufacturing, transport, communication etc.
- Public order and safety/emergency services
- police, fire-protection services, emergency medical services, law courts, prisons, etc.
- Defence
- Military defence, civil defence, foreign military aid.
- Recreation, culture and religion
- Recreational and sporting services, cultural services, broadcasting and publishing services, religious services etc.
- Environmental protection
- waste management, pollution abatement, protection of biodiversity and landscape etc.
- Housing and community services
- Housing development, community amenities, water supply, street lighting etc.[20]
Final consumption
[edit]Government spending on goods and services for current use to directly satisfy individual or collective needs of the members of the community is called government final consumption expenditure (GFCE) It is a purchase from the national accounts "use of income account" for goods and services directly satisfying of individual needs (individual consumption) or collective needs of members of the community (collective consumption). GFCE consists of the value of the goods and services produced by the government itself other than own-account capital formation and sales and of purchases by the government of goods and services produced by market producers that are supplied to households—without any transformation—as "social transfers" in kind.[21]
Government spending or government expenditure can be divided into three primary groups, government consumption, transfer payments, and interest payments.[22]
- Government consumption refers to government purchases of goods and services. Examples include road and infrastructure repairs, national defence, schools, healthcare, and government workers’ salaries.
- Investments in sciences and strategic technological innovations to serve the public needs.[23]
- Transfer payments are government payments to individuals. Such payments are made without the exchange of good or services, for example old-age security payments, employment insurance benefits, veteran and civil service pensions, foreign aid, and social assistance payments. Subsidies to businesses are also included in this category.
- Interest payments are the interest paid to the holders of government bonds, such as saving bonds and treasury bills, including securities held by the government's central bank. The interest paid out to the central bank on these securities effectively is interest paid out on reserve balances deposited with the central bank.
National defense spending
[edit]Stated reasons for defense spending include deterrence[24] and active military operations.[25] Factors of recent defense spending increases include Russian invasion of Ukraine and related deteriorating security situation.[25] The countries with highest total military spending are USA and China, and the countries with highest military spending as percentage of GDP in 2023 among top 20 military spenders are Ukraine, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Russia.[26] Top 20 countries with the highest military spending 2023, where the values for China, Russia and Saudi Arabia are estimated:[26]
| Rank | Country | Spending (US$ bn) |
% of GDP | % of global spending |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| World total | 2,443 | 2.3 | 100 | |
| 1 | United States | 916.0 | 3.4 | 37 |
| 2 | China[a] | 296.0 | 1.7 | 12 |
| 3 | Russia | 109.0 | 5.9 | 4.5 |
| 4 | India | 83.6 | 2.4 | 3.4 |
| 5 | Saudi Arabia | 75.8 | 7.1 | 3.1 |
| 6 | United Kingdom | 74.9 | 2.3 | 3.1 |
| 7 | Germany | 66.8 | 1.5 | 2.7 |
| 8 | Ukraine | 64.8 | 37.0 | 2.7 |
| 9 | France | 61.3 | 2.1 | 2.5 |
| 10 | Japan | 50.2 | 1.2 | 2.1 |
| 11 | South Korea | 47.9 | 2.8 | 2.0 |
| 12 | Italy | 35.5 | 1.6 | 1.5 |
| 13 | Australia | 32.3 | 1.9 | 1.3 |
| 14 | Poland | 31.6 | 3.8 | 1.3 |
| 15 | Israel | 27.5 | 5.3 | 1.1 |
| 16 | Canada | 27.2 | 1.3 | 1.1 |
| 17 | Spain | 23.7 | 1.5 | 1.0 |
| 18 | Brazil | 22.9 | 1.1 | 0.9 |
| 19 | Algeria | 18.3 | 8.2 | 0.7 |
| 20 | Netherlands | 16.6 | 1.5 | 0.7 |
Some sources say that Russian and Chinese military spending are actually far higher.[27]
Healthcare and medical research
[edit]Research Australia[28] found 91% of Australians think 'improving hospitals and the health system' should be the Australian Government's first spending priority.
Crowding 'in' also[29] happens in university life science research Subsidies, funding and government business or projects like this are often justified on the basis of their positive return on investment. Life science crowding in contrasts with crowding out in public funding of research more widely:[30] "10% increase in government R&D funding reduced private R&D expenditure by 3%...In Australia, the average cost of public funds is estimated to be $1.20 and $1.30 for each dollar raised (Robson, 2005). The marginal cost is probably higher, but estimates differ widely depending on the tax that is increased".
In the US the total investment in medical and health research and development (R&D) in the US had grown by 27% over the five years from 2013 to 2017, and it is led by industry and the federal government. However, the industry accounted for 67% of total spending in 2017, followed by the federal government at 22%. According to the National Institute of Health (NIH) accounted for the lion's share of federal spending in medical and health research in 2017 was $32.4 billion or 82.1%.[31]
Also, academic and research institutions, this includes colleges, and universities, independent research (IRIs), and independent hospital medical research centres also increased spending, dedicating more than $14.2 billion of their own funds (endowment, donations etc.) to medical and health R&D in 2017. Although other funding sources – foundations, state and local government, voluntary health associations and professional societies – accounted for 3.7% of total medical and health R&D expenditure.
On the other hand, global health spending continues to increase and rise rapidly – to US$7.8 trillion in 2017 or about 10% of GDP and $1.80 per capita – up from US£7.6 trillion in 2016. In addition, about 605 of this spending was public and 40% private, with donor funding representing less than 0.2% of the total although the health spending in real terms has risen by 3.79% in a year while global GDP had grown by 3.0%.
According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), the increase in health spending in low-income countries, and it rose by 7.8% a year between 2000 and 2017, while their economies grew by 6.4%, it is explained in the figure. However, the middle-income economies health spending grew more than 6%, and average annual growth in high-income countries was 3.5%, which is about twice as fast as economic growth. In contrast, health spending by the high-income countries continues to represent to be the largest share of global spending, which is about 81%, despite it covers only 16% of world's population; although it down from 87% in 2000. The primary drivers of this change in global spending on healthcare are India and China, which they moved to higher-income groups. Furthermore, just over 40% of the world population lived in low-income countries, which is now dropped to 10%. Moreover, significant spending increments were in upper-middle-income economies, where population share has more than doubled over the period, and share of global health spending nearly also doubled due to China and India's vast population joining that group. Unfortunately, all other spending share income groups had declined.[32]
From the continent view, North America, Western Europe, and Oceanic countries have the highest levels of spending, and West Central Asia, and East Africa the lowest, which is closely followed by South Asia, it is explained in the figure.
It is also true that fast economic growth is associated with increased health spending and sustained rapid economic growth between 2000 and 2017. Even more, fast economic growth which is generally associated with the higher government revenues and health spending is mostly located in Asia such as China, India and Indonesia followed by the Middle East and Latin America. In these countries, the real health spending per capita grew by 2.2 times and increased by 0.6 percentage point as per a share of GDP from 2000 to 2017.
Gross fixed capital formation
[edit]Government acquisition intended to create future benefits, such as infrastructure investment or research spending, is called gross fixed capital formation, or government investment, which usually is the largest part of the government.[33] Acquisition of goods and services is made through production by the government (using the government's labour force, fixed assets and purchased goods and services for intermediate consumption) or through purchases of goods and services from market producers. In economic theory or in macroeconomics, investment is the amount purchased of goods which are not consumed but are to be used for future production (i.e. capital). Examples include railroad or factory construction.
Infrastructure spending is considered government investment because it will usually save money in the long run, and thereby reduce the net present value of government liabilities.
Spending on physical infrastructure in the U.S. returns an average of about $1.92 for each $1.00 spent on nonresidential construction because it is almost always less expensive to maintain than repair or replace once it has become unusable.[34]
Likewise, government spending on social infrastructure, such as preventative health care, can save several hundreds of billions of dollars per year in the U.S., because for example cancer patients are more likely to be diagnosed at Stage I where curative treatment is typically a few outpatient visits, instead of at Stage III or later in an emergency room where treatment can involve years of hospitalization and is often terminal.[35]
Energy infrastructure
[edit]

Science funding
[edit]Governments fund various research beyond healthcare and medical research and defense research . Sometimes, relevant funding decision-making makes use of coordinative and prioritizing tools, data or methods, such as evaluated relevances to global issues or international goals or national goals or major causes of human diseases and early deaths (health impacts).[46][additional citation(s) needed]
Travel
[edit]Although expenditure on ministerial, elected member and staff travel makes up only a small amount of central government expenditure, and the great majority of work trips by officials are undertaken at standard or economy class, the UK's National Audit Office has noted that this is an aspect of expenditure attracting high levels of public interest.[47]
Government spending by country
[edit]Per capita spending
[edit]In 2010 national governments spent an average of $2,376 per person, while the average for the world's 20 largest economies (in terms of GDP) was $16,110 per person. Norway and Sweden expended the most at $40,908 and $26,760 per capita respectively. The federal government of the United States spent $11,041 per person. Other large economy country spending figures include South Korea ($4,557), Brazil ($2,813), Russia ($2,458), China ($1,010), and India ($226).[48] The figures below of 42% of GDP spending and a GDP per capita of $54,629 for the U.S. indicate a total per person spending including national, state, and local governments was $22,726 in the U.S.
Percentage of GDP
[edit]

>55% 50–55% 45–50% 40–45% 35–40% 30–35%

This is a list of countries by government spending as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) for the listed countries, according to the 2014 Index of Economic Freedom[49] by The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal. Tax revenue is included for comparison. These statistics use the United Nations' System of National Accounts (SNA), which measures the government sector differently than the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The SNA counts as government spending the gross cost of public services such as state universities and public hospitals. For example, the SNA counts the entire cost of running the public-university system, not just what legislators appropriate to supplement students' tuition payments. Those adjustments push up the SNA's measure of spending by roughly 4 percent of GDP compared with the standard measure tallied by the BEA.[50]
| Country | Tax burden % GDP | Govt. expend. % GDP |
|---|---|---|
| Afghanistan | 9 | 23 |
| Albania | 23 | 28 |
| Algeria | 10 | 40 |
| Angola | 6 | 39 |
| Argentina | 35 | 41 |
| Armenia | 17 | 25 |
| Australia | 26 | 35 |
| Austria | 42 | 51 |
| Azerbaijan | 13 | 34 |
| Bahamas | 16 | 23 |
| Bahrain | 3 | 31 |
| Bangladesh | 10 | 16 |
| Barbados | 27 | 41 |
| Belarus | 25 | 36 |
| Belgium | 44 | 53 |
| Belize | 23 | 29 |
| Benin | 16 | 22 |
| Bhutan | 14 | 38 |
| Bolivia | 22 | 35 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 39 | 49 |
| Botswana | 28 | 32 |
| Brazil | 35 | 39 |
| Bulgaria | 26 | 34 |
| Burkina Faso | 14 | 24 |
| Burma | 4 | 19 |
| Burundi | 14 | 40 |
| Cambodia | 11 | 20 |
| Cameroon | 11 | 22 |
| Canada | 31 | 42 |
| Cape Verde | 20 | 32 |
| Central African Republic | 9 | 16 |
| Chad | 5 | 26 |
| Chile | 19 | 23 |
| China | 19 | 24 |
| Colombia | 15 | 29 |
| Comoros | 12 | 22 |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | 24 | 29 |
| 8 | 26 | |
| Costa Rica | 22 | 18 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 13 | 26 |
| Croatia | 33 | 43 |
| Cuba | 24 | 67 |
| Cyprus | 27 | 46 |
| Czech Republic | 35 | 43 |
| Denmark | 48 | 58 |
| Djibouti | 20 | 35 |
| Dominica | 24 | 36 |
| Dominican Republic | 13 | 16 |
| Ecuador | 18 | 44 |
| Egypt | 14 | 32 |
| El Salvador | 15 | 22 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 2 | 35 |
| Eritrea | 50 | 34 |
| Estonia | 33 | 38 |
| Ethiopia | 11 | 18 |
| Fiji | 23 | 28 |
| Finland | 43 | 55 |
| France | 44 | 56 |
| Gabon | 10 | 25 |
| Gambia | 13 | 26 |
| Georgia | 25 | 32 |
| Germany | 37 | 45 |
| Ghana | 15 | 24 |
| Greece | 31 | 52 |
| Guatemala | 11 | 15 |
| Guinea | 16 | 22 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 9 | 21 |
| Guyana | 21 | 31 |
| Haiti | 13 | 34 |
| Honduras | 16 | 26 |
| Hong Kong | 14 | 19 |
| Hungary | 36 | 49 |
| Iceland | 36 | 47 |
| India | 19 | 29[51] |
| Indonesia | 12 | 19 |
| Iran | 9 | 22 |
| Iraq | 2 | 45 |
| Ireland | 28 | 48 |
| Israel | 33 | 45 |
| Italy | 43 | 50 |
| Jamaica | 23 | 32 |
| Japan | 28 | 42 |
| Jordan | 14 | 33 |
| Kazakhstan | 15 | 22 |
| Kenya | 20 | 29 |
| Kiribati | 20 | 92 |
| N/A | N/A | |
| 26 | 30 | |
| Kuwait | 1 | 39 |
| 19 | 36 | |
| Laos | 14 | 21 |
| Latvia | 27 | 39 |
| Lebanon | 17 | 30 |
| Lesotho | 38 | 63 |
| Liberia | 20 | 31 |
| Libya | 1 | 67 |
| Liechtenstein | N/A | N/A |
| Lithuania | 16 | 38 |
| Luxembourg | 37 | 42 |
| 35 | 17 | |
| Madagascar | 11 | 16 |
| Malawi | 20 | 35 |
| Malaysia | 15 | 29 |
| Maldives | 16 | 43 |
| Mali | 14 | 25 |
| Malta | 34 | 42 |
| Mauritania | 18 | 28 |
| Mauritius | 18 | 25 |
| Mexico | 11 | 27 |
| Federated States of Micronesia | 12 | 65 |
| Republic of Moldova | 31 | 39 |
| Mongolia | 33 | 45 |
| Montenegro | 24 | 44 |
| Morocco | 23 | 35 |
| Mozambique | 20 | 34 |
| Namibia | 28 | 37 |
| Nepal | 13 | 19 |
| Netherlands | 39 | 50 |
| New Zealand | 32 | 48 |
| Nicaragua | 18 | 26 |
| Niger | 14 | 20 |
| Nigeria | 5 | 29 |
| 26 | 31 | |
| Norway | 43 | 44 |
| Oman | 2 | 38 |
| Pakistan | 9 | 20 |
| Panama | 18 | 27 |
| Papua New Guinea | 26 | 29 |
| Paraguay | 13 | 19 |
| Peru | 17 | 19 |
| Philippines | 12 | 16 |
| Poland | 32 | 44 |
| Portugal | 31 | 49 |
| Qatar | 3 | 31 |
| Romania | 28 | 37 |
| Russia | 30 | 36 |
| Rwanda | 13 | 27 |
| Saint Lucia | 25 | 35 |
| Saint Vincent and the Grenadines | 22 | 30 |
| Samoa | 23 | 44 |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 17 | 49 |
| Saudi Arabia | 4 | 35 |
| Senegal | 19 | 29 |
| Serbia | 35 | 45 |
| Seychelles | 32 | 36 |
| Sierra Leone | 12 | 22 |
| Singapore | 14 | 17 |
| 29 | 38 | |
| Slovenia | 37 | 51 |
| Solomon Islands | 37 | 51 |
| South Africa | 27 | 32 |
| Spain | 32 | 45 |
| Sri Lanka | 12 | 21 |
| Sudan | 7 | 18 |
| Suriname | 19 | 27 |
| Swaziland | 23 | 31 |
| Sweden | 45 | 51 |
| Switzerland | 29 | 34 |
| Syria | 10 | N/A |
| 9 | 23 | |
| Tajikistan | 20 | 27 |
| Tanzania | 15 | 27 |
| Thailand | 16 | 23 |
| East Timor | 61.5 | 51.2 |
| Togo | 17 | 24 |
| Tonga | 18 | 29 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 17 | 35 |
| Tunisia | 21 | 35 |
| Turkey | 25 | 35 |
| Turkmenistan | 18 | 15 |
| Uganda | 17 | 21 |
| Ukraine | 38 | 46 |
| United Arab Emirates | 6 | 24 |
| United Kingdom | 36 | 49 |
| United States | 25.1 | 41.6 |
| Uruguay | 27 | 33 |
| Uzbekistan | 20 | 31 |
| Vanuatu | 16 | 25 |
| Venezuela | 13 | 40 |
| Vietnam | 21 | 31 |
| Yemen | 5 | 29 |
| Zambia | 19 | 24 |
| Zimbabwe | 30 | 35 |
| Somalia | N/A | N/A |
| 24 | 34 |
Public social spending
[edit]
Public social spending comprises cash benefits, direct in-kind provision of goods and services, and tax breaks with social purposes provided by general government (that is central, state, and local governments, including social security funds).[52]
| Country | Public social spending % of GDP |
|---|---|
| France | 31.7 |
| Finland | 30.6 |
| Belgium | 29.2 |
| Italy | 28.9 |
| Denmark | 28.8 |
| Austria | 28.0 |
| Sweden | 26.7 |
| Greece | 26.4 |
| Spain | 25.4 |
| Germany | 25.0 |
| Portugal | 24.1 |
| Norway | 23.9 |
| Slovenia | 22.4 |
| Netherlands | 22.3 |
| Luxembourg | 22.2 |
| United Kingdom | 21.5 |
| OECD | 21.0 |
| Hungary | 20.7 |
| New Zealand | 19.7 |
| Switzerland | 19.6 |
| Czech Republic | 19.5 |
| Poland | 19.4 |
| Slovakia | 19.4 |
| United States | 19.0 |
| Australia | 18.8 |
| Canada | 17.2 |
| Estonia | 17.0 |
| Ireland | 17.0 |
| Israel | 16.0 |
| Iceland | 15.7 |
| Latvia | 14.4 |
| Chile | 11.2 |
| Korea | 10.1 |
European Union
[edit]Public expenditures represented 46.7 percent of total GDP of the European Union in 2018. Countries with the highest percentage of public expenditure were France and Finland with 56 and 53 percent, respectively. The lowest percentage had Ireland with only 25 percent of its GDP. Among the countries of the European Union, the most important function in public expenditure is social protection. Almost 20 percent of GDP of European Union went to social protection in 2018. The highest ratio had Finland and France, both around 24 percent of their GDPs. The country with least social protection expenditure as percent of its GDP was Ireland with 9 percent. The second largest function in public expenditure is expenditure on health. The general government expenditure on health in European Union was over 7 percent of GDP in 2018. The country with highest share of health expenditure in 2018 Denmark with 8.4 percent. The least percentage had Cyprus with 2.7 percent. General public services had 6 percent of total GDP of European Union in 2018, Education around 4.6 percent and all other categories had less than 4.5 percent of the GDP.[20][53]
Research, assessments and transparency
[edit]This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (November 2022) |
There is research into government spending such as their efficacies or effective design or comparisons to other options as well as research containing conclusions of public spending-related recommendations. Examples of such are studies outlining benefits of participation in bioeconomy innovation[54][55][56] or identifying potential "misallocations"[57] or "misalignments".[46] Often, such spending may be broad – indirect in terms of national interests – such as with human resources/education-related spending or establishments of novel reward systems. In some cases, various goals and expenditures are made public to various degrees, referred to fiscal transparency or "government spending transparency".[58][59][60][61][62]
Informed and optimized allocations
[edit]A study suggests "Greater attention to the development of methods and evidence to better inform the allocation of public sector spending between departments" may be needed and that decisions about public spending may miss opportunities to improve social welfare from existing budgets.[63]
Underlying drivers of spending alterations
[edit]A study investigated funding allocations for public investment in energy research, development and demonstration reported insights about past impacts of its drivers, that may be relevant to adjusting (or facilitating) "investment in clean energy" "to come close to achieving meaningful global decarbonization". The investigated drivers can be broadly described as crisis responses, cooperations and competitions.[64][65]
Principles and ethics
[edit]Studies and organizations have called for systematically applying principles to spending decisions or to take current issues and goals such as climate change mitigation into account in all such decisions. For example, scientists have suggested in Nature that governments should withstand various pressures and influences and "only support agriculture and food systems that deliver on the SDGs (in line with "public funds for public goods")".[66]
Similarly in regard to openness, a campaign by the Free Software Foundation Europe (FSFE) has called for a principle of "Public Money, Public Code" – that software created using taxpayers' money is developed as free and open source software,[67][68] and Plan S calls for a requirement for scientific publications that result from research funded by public grants being published as open access.[69][70][71]
Public sector ethics may also concern government spending,[72][additional citation(s) needed] affecting the shares and intentions of government spending or their respective rationales (beyond ethical principles or implications of the contextual socioeconomic structures),[citation needed] as well as corruption or diversion of public funds.[73]
In 2012, following a United States presidential Campaign to Cut Waste, the Office of Management and Budget issued a memorandum to the heads of federal departments and agencies calling for the avoidance of wasteful expenditure, identifying "practical steps" and setting specific targets for reduction of expenditure on travel, conference attendance and expense, real property and fleet management.[74]
History
[edit]Before World War I
[edit]At the end of the 19th century average public expenditure was around 10 percent of GDP. In US it was only 7 percent and in countries like United Kingdom, Germany or Netherlands it did not exceed amount of 10 percent. Australia, Italy, Switzerland and France had public expenditure over 12 percent of GDP. It was considered as a significant involvement of government in economy. This average share of public expenditure increased to almost 12 percent before the start of World War I. Due to the World War I anticipation, the share increased quickly in Austria, France, United Kingdom or Germany.[75]
Effect of World War I and interwar period
[edit]The World War I caused a global growth of the public expenditure share in GDP. In United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and France, which were affected a lot by the war, the share of public expenditure even exceeded 25 percent. In interwar period the average share of the public expenditure was still slightly increasing. The United States increased its public expenditure with the New Deal. Other governments also increased public expenditure to create more employment. The increase was accelerated by World War II anticipation in the second part of the 30s among European countries. In 1937 the amount of average public expenditure share was between 22 and 23 percent, twice as much as before World War I. However, it is fair to mention that part of this increase of public expenditure share was caused by GDP fall. Most of industrialized countries had its GDP over 15 percent before the World War II. Only Australia, Norway and Spain had less than 15 percent of GDP.[75]
World War II and post-war period
[edit]From the start of the World War I until 1960 the average share of public expenditure in GDP increased slowly from 22 to 28 percent. Most of this increase was given by growth of military spending caused by World War II. Spain, Switzerland and Japan had their public expenditure still below 20 percent of their GDPs.[75]
Second half of the 20th century.
[edit]The average public expenditure, as a share of GDP, increased rapidly between years 1960 and 1980 from around 28 to 43 percent. No industrial country had this share below 30 percent in 1980. In Belgium, Sweden and Netherlands it was even over 50 percent. In last two decades of 20th century share of public expenditure kept increasing, but the growth significantly slowed down. In 1996 the average public expenditure was around 45 percent, which is in comparison with 1960–1980 period slow increase from year 1980. During 1980–1996 period the public expenditure share even declined in many countries, for example United Kingdom, Belgium, Netherlands etc.[75]
Growth of public expenditure
[edit]There are several factors that have led to an enormous increase in public expenditure through the years
1) Defense expenditure due to modernization of defense equipment by the navy, army and air force to prepare the country for war or for prevention causes-for-growth-of-public-expenditure.
2) Population growth – It increases with the increase in population, more of investment is required to be done by government on law and order, education, infrastructure, etc. investment in different fields depending on the different age group is required.
3) Welfare activities – social welfare, pensions, etc.
- Provision of public and utility services – provision of basic public goods given by government (their maintenance and installation) such as transportation.
- Accelerating economic growth – to raise the standard of living of the people.
- Price rise – higher price level compels the government to spend an increased amount on purchase of goods and services.[76]
- Increase in public revenue – with the rise in public revenue government is bound to increase the public expenditure.
- International obligation – maintenance of socio-economic obligation, cultural exchange etc. (these are indirect expenses of government)
4) Wars and social crises – fighting among people and communities, and prolonged drought or unemployment, earthquake, hurricanes or tornadoes may lead to an increase in public expenditure of a country. This is because it will involve governments to re-plan and allocate resources to finance the reconstruction.
5) Creation of super national organizations – E.g., the United Nations, NATO, European community and other multinational organizations that are responsible for the provision of public goods and services on an international basis, have to be financed out of funds subscribed by member states, thereby adding to their public expenditure.
6) Foreign aid – Acceptance by the richer industrialized countries of their responsibility to help the poor developing countries has channeled some of the increased public expenditure of the donor country into foreign aid programmes.
7) Inflation – This is the general rise in the price level of goods and services. It increases the cost of all activities of the public sector and thus a major factor in growth in money terms of public expenditure
Present
[edit]Since the late 1980s, the average public expenditure to GDP ratio is increasing slowly. The only industrialized countries that reduced significantly are New Zealand, Ireland and Norway. One of the reasons is growing skepticism about governmental intervention in the economy.[75]
See also
[edit]- Rahn curve
- Open government
- Government operations
- Public finance
- Government budget
- Government waste
- Fiscal council
- Fiscal dominance
- Fiscal policy
- Sovereign wealth fund
- Mandatory spending
- Taxpayers unions
- Eurostat
- Government spending in the United Kingdom
- Government spending in the United States
- List of countries by historical government spending
- Expenditure incidence
Notes
[edit]- ^ SIPRI estimate
References
[edit]- Citations
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- General
- "The Future of Public Spending- The Economist".
- "Public spending on health care".
- "Digital Transformation".
- "Clean Energy Government investment".
- "Defense and Security". 22 April 2024.
- "Defense and Security in the US".
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- "Spending Review".
Works cited
[edit]- IRENA (2021). World Energy Transitions Outlook: 1.5°C Pathway (PDF). ISBN 978-92-9260-334-2. Archived (PDF) from the original on 11 June 2021.
- United Nations Development Programme (2020). Human Development Report 2020 The Next Frontier: Human Development and the Anthropocene (PDF) (Report). ISBN 978-92-1-126442-5. Archived (PDF) from the original on 15 December 2020.
External links
[edit]Government spending
View on GrokipediaFundamentals
Definition and Scope
Government spending, also referred to as public expenditure, constitutes the aggregate outlays by government entities across central, state, provincial, and local levels to acquire goods and services, make transfer payments, and undertake investments in physical and financial assets. From a macroeconomic standpoint, the International Monetary Fund defines it comprehensively as general government fiscal operations, encompassing expenditures by all government tiers, social security schemes, extrabudgetary funds, and quasi-fiscal activities such as subsidized lending through state-influenced institutions, while integrating net transfers to public enterprises.[7] This framework aims to capture the full scope of resource mobilization for public purposes, avoiding undercounting from fragmented budget reporting. The primary components include current expenditures—covering employee compensation, intermediate consumption of goods and services, subsidies, social security benefits, and interest on debt—and capital expenditures, such as gross fixed capital formation in infrastructure and equipment.[8] Transfer payments, which redistribute income without producing new goods or services (e.g., pensions, unemployment benefits, and intergovernmental grants), represent a substantial share but are excluded from the government consumption component in national accounts calculations of gross domestic product (GDP); there, government spending (G) is limited to final consumption expenditures and gross capital formation to reflect direct contributions to output.[9] [10] Exclusions from standard measures prevent double-counting or conflation with non-expenditure activities, such as principal debt repayments, pure lending operations, and commercial revenues or costs of public enterprises treated as private-sector equivalents.[7] Similarly, intergovernmental transfers are consolidated to eliminate offsets, ensuring the metric focuses on net resource use rather than internal fiscal flows. This delineation supports cross-country comparability, as promoted by institutions like the OECD and IMF, though variations persist due to differing institutional coverage and accounting standards.[10][7]Funding Mechanisms
Governments fund expenditures primarily through taxation, which encompasses direct levies on income, profits, and property, as well as indirect taxes on consumption such as value-added taxes (VAT) and excises. Social security contributions, mandatory payments tied to labor income for funding pensions and social insurance, often rank as the second-largest revenue source in advanced economies. According to the OECD, taxes and social contributions together comprise the bulk of general government revenues in member countries, with taxes alone forming the predominant share despite variations in composition across nations.[11][12] When current revenues prove insufficient to cover spending commitments, governments finance deficits via borrowing, typically by issuing sovereign bonds or treasury securities purchased by domestic and foreign investors. This mechanism shifts the fiscal burden to future periods, as principal and interest repayments draw from subsequent tax collections or further borrowing. The IMF notes that tax revenues (excluding social security contributions) constitute nearly two-thirds of budgetary funds in advanced economies, underscoring borrowing's role in bridging gaps rather than serving as a primary source.[13][14] Non-tax revenues, including user fees, fines, licenses, and proceeds from state-owned enterprise dividends or asset privatizations, supplement these core mechanisms but generally remain marginal, often below 10% of total revenues globally. In developing economies, non-tax sources like natural resource royalties can gain prominence, yet taxation and borrowing dominate fiscal operations worldwide, as evidenced by IMF's World Revenue Longitudinal Database tracking over 80% of revenues from these channels. Central bank monetization of debt, where new money finances government obligations, occurs in select contexts but risks inflation and is not a standard fiscal tool, with empirical studies linking it to currency devaluation in high-inflation episodes.[15][16]Public vs. Private Resource Allocation
Private resource allocation in market systems directs capital and labor toward uses that maximize value as determined by consumer demand and competitive pressures, with prices serving as signals of relative scarcity and opportunity costs.[17] This mechanism fosters innovation and efficiency, as firms that misallocate resources face losses and exit the market, while successful allocators expand.[18] In contrast, public allocation through government spending often prioritizes political objectives, such as electoral districts or interest group demands, rather than pure economic efficiency, resulting in projects that may persist despite poor returns due to lack of market discipline.[19] Empirical comparisons reveal persistent productivity gaps, with private sector output per worker in advanced economies outpacing public counterparts; for instance, in the UK from 1997 to 2023, market sector productivity rose nearly 65% while public sector productivity declined by 3%.[20] Government programs frequently exhibit waste, such as subsidies that distort consumption patterns and encourage overuse of targeted goods, reducing overall resource productivity.[19] Privatization efforts in sectors like utilities and transportation have demonstrated cost reductions and performance improvements in numerous cases, as private management introduces profit incentives absent in public bureaucracies.[18] Public spending can crowd out private investment by raising interest rates and absorbing savings that would otherwise fund entrepreneurial ventures, thereby displacing more efficient private allocations with potentially lower-return government initiatives.[17] Studies on public-private partnerships indicate that incorporating private operational control often yields higher efficiency than pure public provision, though full privatization shows mixed results depending on regulatory environments.[18][21] Institutional biases in academia and policy analysis, including a tendency toward favoring state intervention, may underemphasize these inefficiencies, as evidenced by selective reviews claiming parity between sectors despite broader data favoring market mechanisms.[22][23]Theoretical Foundations
Classical and Neoclassical Principles
Classical economists, exemplified by Adam Smith in An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), advocated restricting government expenditure to essential functions that private markets could not effectively provide, such as national defense, the administration of justice, and public works facilitating commerce where profitability was unattainable for individuals.[24] Smith argued that excessive spending beyond these duties led to inefficient resource allocation, as governments lacked the profit motives and competitive pressures guiding private enterprise, often resulting in waste and higher taxes that discouraged productive activity. David Ricardo, in On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817), extended this by cautioning against funding expenditures through public debt, which he viewed as reducing the capital stock available for investment and imposing intergenerational burdens via future taxation, preferring direct taxation to maintain fiscal discipline and avoid illusory benefits from borrowing.[25] Neoclassical economics, building on classical foundations with marginal analysis and general equilibrium theory from figures like Alfred Marshall and Léon Walras in the late 19th century, reinforced the preference for minimal government spending to preserve market efficiency. Neoclassical models posit that competitive markets achieve Pareto optimality through price signals, rendering most interventions distortionary; government spending, financed by taxes, generates deadweight losses by altering incentives for labor, saving, and investment, with empirical estimates indicating losses equivalent to 20-50% of revenue raised depending on tax elasticities.[26][27] Justifications for expenditure are limited to correcting market failures—such as providing pure public goods (non-excludable, non-rivalrous) or addressing externalities—but neoclassical theory emphasizes that even here, overprovision often occurs due to bureaucratic inefficiencies and lack of revealed preferences, with optimal government size typically below 20-25% of GDP to maximize growth in endogenous models incorporating productive spending.[28] Crowding out arises as public borrowing raises interest rates, displacing private capital formation, a mechanism formalized in neoclassical growth frameworks where higher spending reduces steady-state output per capita unless offset by exceptional productivity-enhancing effects, which historical data rarely confirm at scale.[26]Keynesian Interventions and Critiques
Keynesian economics advocates for active government intervention through increased public spending to address shortfalls in aggregate demand during economic downturns, positing that idle resources can be mobilized without displacing private activity. In The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money published in 1936, John Maynard Keynes theorized that an initial injection of government expenditure generates a multiplier effect, where recipients spend a portion of the funds, stimulating further economic activity; the simple multiplier formula is , with as the marginal propensity to consume, yielding values greater than 1 under typical assumptions of .[29] This framework underpins countercyclical fiscal policy, where deficits finance spending on infrastructure, public works, or transfers to boost output and employment when monetary policy alone proves insufficient.[30] Historical applications include the U.S. New Deal under President Franklin D. Roosevelt from 1933 onward, which expanded federal spending on relief, recovery, and reform programs—totaling about 8% of GDP by 1936—to combat the Great Depression's unemployment, which peaked at 25% in 1933.[29] Post-World War II reconstructions in Europe, influenced by Keynesian principles, involved deficit spending to rebuild infrastructure and demand, contributing to rapid growth in the 1950s and 1960s. More contemporarily, the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) authorized $831 billion in spending and tax cuts, with proponents claiming it preserved or created 2.5 to 3.6 million jobs by 2010 through multipliers estimated at 1.5 or higher in recessionary conditions.[31] Similarly, COVID-19 fiscal responses in 2020, such as the U.S. CARES Act's $2.2 trillion outlay, drew on Keynesian logic to support household incomes and prevent demand collapse, correlating with faster recoveries in high-spending nations per IMF analyses.[32] Critiques of Keynesian interventions emphasize empirical shortcomings and theoretical flaws, with studies often revealing multipliers below theoretical expectations and insufficient to justify large-scale deficits. Research by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko using U.S. data from 1947–2008 estimated spending multipliers at 1.5–2.0 during recessions but only 0.5 in expansions, indicating limited amplification and sensitivity to economic state.[33] Barro and Redlick's analysis of 1939–2008 data found defense spending multipliers near zero (0.06–0.4) and overall fiscal multipliers potentially negative when accounting for tax distortions, suggesting that government outlays crowd out private investment via higher interest rates or Ricardian equivalence, where forward-looking households increase savings anticipating future tax hikes.[34] Historical cases, such as the New Deal's failure to restore pre-Depression output until 1941 despite sustained deficits, and the 1970s stagflation in the U.S. and U.K.—where fiscal expansions amid 10–15% inflation rates and persistent unemployment undermined the inverse Phillips curve trade-off—illustrate implementation lags, inflationary risks, and political tendencies toward permanent spending hikes rather than cyclical balance.[35][31] Austrian school economists like Friedrich Hayek argued that Keynesian demand management ignores underlying malinvestments from prior credit expansions, distorting resource allocation and prolonging recessions by preventing necessary liquidations, as evidenced by prolonged recoveries in intervention-heavy episodes compared to market-driven ones.[36] Mainstream empirical work, while often from institutions with interventionist leanings, acknowledges that multipliers diminish in high-debt environments (above 90% of GDP) or open economies due to import leakages and currency depreciation, with IMF reviews estimating average values of 0.9 in advanced economies but warning of downside risks from debt dynamics.[32] Critics further note that academic estimates favoring higher multipliers frequently rely on vector autoregressions assuming exogenous shocks, potentially overstating effects amid endogeneity biases, whereas opportunity cost analyses reveal net losses when private sector alternatives are foregone.[34] Overall, while short-term demand support may occur, long-run evidence points to fiscal interventions exacerbating debt burdens—U.S. public debt rose from 40% of GDP in 1980 to over 120% by 2023—without commensurate growth, underscoring the limits of treating government spending as a neutral stabilizer.[37]Public Choice Theory and Political Incentives
Public choice theory analyzes government spending through the lens of self-interested actors in politics, treating politicians, bureaucrats, and voters as rational maximizers of personal utility rather than benevolent stewards of the public good. Originating in the works of economists like James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock during the 1960s, it challenges the assumption of unitary government decision-making by highlighting how individual incentives distort resource allocation toward inefficiency and expansion.[38] [39] In this framework, spending grows not due to objective societal needs but because politicians prioritize re-election through visible, localized benefits that secure voter support, while diffusing costs across taxpayers who face rational ignorance from low per-capita stakes.[40] Politicians face incentives to engage in pork-barrel spending, directing federal funds to specific districts or projects that yield concentrated electoral gains, often via logrolling agreements where legislators trade support for mutual district favors. Empirical analyses confirm this dynamic: for instance, increased pork-barrel allocations have been shown to boost incumbent fundraising by enhancing donor perceptions of influence and to raise vote shares, as evidenced in U.S. congressional data and UK constituency funding patterns ahead of the 2019 general election.[41] [42] Such practices exemplify the principal-agent problem, where elected officials, as agents, deviate from voter principals' long-term interests to capture short-term political rents, contributing to overall budget inflation—U.S. discretionary spending earmarks, for example, totaled over $16 billion annually in the early 2000s before partial reforms.[43] Bureaucratic incentives further exacerbate spending growth under public choice scrutiny. William Niskanen's 1971 model of bureaucracy posits that agency heads maximize budgets to expand discretionary authority, salaries, and empire size, leveraging informational monopolies to oversupply services relative to demand.[44] This leads to productive inefficiency, as bureaus propose outputs exceeding the efficient level where marginal benefit equals marginal cost; simulations in Niskanen's framework show budget-maximizing equilibria producing up to twice the optimal quantity under monopoly-like conditions.[45] Empirical support includes observations of regulatory agencies expanding scopes beyond initial mandates, with budget growth outpacing population or GDP metrics in many OECD countries.[46] Fiscal illusion complements these incentives by obscuring the true costs of spending from voters. Buchanan argued in his 1967 analysis that debt-financed expenditures create an illusion of "free" resources, as current generations enjoy benefits without immediate tax visibility, enabling politicians to sustain deficits—U.S. federal debt held by the public rose from 32% of GDP in 1980 to over 100% by 2020 partly due to such dynamics.[47] [48] Rational voters, bearing infinitesimal influence on outcomes, underinvest in monitoring, allowing systematic overspending; experimental evidence reinforces this, showing individuals misperceive tax burdens under complex or deferred financing structures.[49] Collectively, these mechanisms explain the ratchet effect in budgets, where spending surges during crises or electoral cycles but resists cuts, fostering long-term fiscal imbalance despite theoretical calls for restraint.[39]Economic Impacts
Fiscal Multipliers: Empirical Estimates
Empirical estimation of fiscal multipliers—the ratio of the change in aggregate output to a unit change in government spending—relies on identification strategies to address endogeneity, such as structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) using military spending news as exogenous shocks or narrative approaches isolating policy changes uncorrelated with economic conditions.[50] These methods aim to isolate causal effects, though debates persist over assumptions like Ricardian equivalence, where households anticipate future taxes and reduce consumption, potentially lowering multipliers below unity.[32] Meta-analyses of dozens of studies indicate average government spending multipliers in advanced economies range from 0.75 to 0.90, often below 1 after correcting for publication bias favoring significant positive results.[51] [52] A survey of 41 empirical papers finds spending multipliers averaging 0.75 in normal times for advanced economies, with revenue multipliers lower at 0.25, implying overall fiscal adjustments yield multipliers around 0.6 when financing is considered.[32] Estimates vary by composition: government investment multipliers exceed those for consumption, sometimes reaching 1.5 or higher, while consumption multipliers cluster near 1 or below.[32] State dependence influences magnitudes, with some evidence of larger effects during recessions or at the zero lower bound (ZLB), though findings are inconsistent. Local projection methods applied to U.S. data from 1939–2008 yield multipliers of 0.6–0.8 across slack and normal states, showing no systematic increase in high-unemployment periods (>6.5%) or ZLB episodes when including wartime rationing.[50] Excluding World War II, ZLB multipliers rise to about 1.4 at two-year horizons using military news shocks, but Blanchard-Perotti defense spending shocks suggest multipliers as low as 0.3–0.5 in low-unemployment expansions.[50] High public debt levels further depress multipliers, potentially turning them negative due to confidence erosion and crowding out.[32] [52]| Study/Source | Method/Approach | Spending Multiplier Estimate | Key Context/Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gechert & Heimberger (2022) meta-analysis | Publication bias-corrected meta of empirical studies | 0.75–0.82 | General; below 1 after bias adjustment[51] |
| IMF survey (Mineshima et al., 2014) | Review of 41 studies | 0.75 (advanced economies, normal times) | Lower for revenue (0.25); overall fiscal ~0.6[32] |
| Ramey & Zubairy (2018) | Local projections, U.S. military/Blanchard-Perotti shocks | 0.6–0.8 (full sample); up to 1.4 at ZLB excluding WWII | No consistent state dependence; lower in expansions[50] |
| Mercatus Center survey (2023) | Literature review | 0.50–0.90 average; >1 possible at ZLB/slack | Wide variation (-3 to 3); modest state effects[52] |
Crowding Out and Investment Displacement
The crowding out effect occurs when increased government borrowing to finance spending raises interest rates by competing for available loanable funds, thereby reducing private sector investment.[53] This mechanism is prominent in neoclassical economic models, where government demand for capital displaces private borrowing at higher costs, leading to lower capital formation and potential long-term growth reductions.[54] Empirical analyses indicate that such displacement intensifies during periods of high public debt, as seen in the U.S. where federal debt exceeding 120% of GDP correlates with elevated real interest rates and subdued private fixed investment.[55] Recent studies confirm that federal borrowing exerts upward pressure on long-term interest rates, with estimates suggesting a 1 percentage point increase in debt-to-GDP ratio raises rates by 2-4 basis points, deterring business expansion and residential construction.[56] For instance, the Congressional Budget Office projects that sustained deficits will crowd out private investment by increasing borrowing costs, reducing GDP growth by 0.1-0.3 percentage points annually over the next decade.[55] In the U.S. context, the rapid accumulation of $38 trillion in national debt by October 2025 has contributed to higher Treasury yields, amplifying displacement effects beyond pandemic-era levels.[57] Investment displacement extends beyond interest rate channels to include resource competition and reduced incentives for private innovation, particularly when public projects exhibit lower productivity returns than private alternatives.[58] Evidence from vector autoregression models applied to U.S. data shows that fiscal expansions financed by debt lead to statistically significant declines in non-residential investment, with coefficients indicating partial to complete offsetting of stimulus effects.[59] While some infrastructure spending may "crowd in" private activity through complementarities, aggregate evidence leans toward net displacement in mature economies operating near capacity.[60] Ricardian equivalence, positing that rational agents anticipate future taxes and save more to offset deficits without interest rate rises, offers a theoretical counter to crowding out but lacks robust empirical support due to assumptions of perfect foresight and no liquidity constraints.[61] Tests on U.S. household data reveal limited saving responses to deficits, reinforcing crowding out as the dominant channel in high-debt environments.[62] Overall, persistent government spending growth risks entrenching displacement, as higher debt service crowds out productive uses and heightens vulnerability to rate shocks.[63]Debt Dynamics and Long-Term Costs
Government spending that persistently exceeds revenues generates budget deficits, necessitating borrowing that accumulates public debt over time. This debt stock grows not only through new borrowing to finance ongoing deficits but also via interest payments, which compound if the interest rate on debt exceeds the economy's growth rate. The core dynamic of public debt sustainability is captured by the equation for the change in the debt-to-GDP ratio: approximately equal to the primary deficit (non-interest deficit) as a share of GDP plus the product of the existing debt-to-GDP ratio and the differential between the real interest rate (r) and the real growth rate (g). When r exceeds g, debt ratios tend to rise absent corrective fiscal adjustments, amplifying long-term burdens.[64][65] In the United States, federal debt held by the public stood at about 100 percent of GDP at the end of fiscal year 2025, projected by the Congressional Budget Office to climb to 156 percent by 2055 under current policies. Net interest payments on this debt are forecast to consume 3.2 percent of GDP in 2025—near postwar highs—and escalate to 5.4 percent by 2055, surpassing spending on defense or Medicare in some years and constraining future discretionary outlays. Globally, the International Monetary Fund projects public debt to exceed 100 percent of GDP by 2029, with risks of distress in 55 countries despite some having ratios below 60 percent, driven by elevated borrowing costs and slower growth.[66][67][68] These dynamics impose long-term costs through multiple channels. Rising debt service crowds out productive public investments like infrastructure, as interest claims priority over other expenditures, while higher government borrowing elevates real interest rates, discouraging private investment—a phenomenon known as crowding out that reduces capital formation and productivity. Empirical analyses consistently link higher public debt levels to slower economic growth; for instance, a review of studies finds that debt above certain thresholds correlates with reduced GDP growth rates, with each percentage-point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio associated with 0.02 percentage points lower annual growth on average.[58][54][17] Sustainability risks intensify if investor confidence erodes, potentially triggering sudden spikes in borrowing costs or fiscal crises, as seen historically in cases like Greece post-2009. Intergenerationally, accumulated debt shifts burdens to future taxpayers via higher taxes, reduced services, or inflation if monetized, lowering welfare for subsequent cohorts without corresponding benefits. Even in periods of low r-g differentials, recent reversals—with rising rates post-2022—underscore vulnerability, as prolonged high debt amplifies sensitivity to interest rate shocks and growth shortfalls.[63][69][56]Expenditure Composition
Mandatory Entitlements and Transfers
Mandatory entitlements and transfers refer to government expenditures authorized by permanent laws, where outlays are determined by eligibility criteria, benefit formulas, and participant numbers rather than annual congressional appropriations.[70] These differ from discretionary spending by lacking yearly funding caps, resulting in automatic adjustments for factors like inflation, wage growth, and demographics.[71] Transfers within this category involve payments to individuals, households, or other governments without requiring goods or services in exchange, such as retirement pensions, health subsidies, and income support.[72] In the United States, mandatory spending dominated federal outlays at $4.1 trillion in fiscal year 2024, representing over 60% of the $6.8 trillion total budget.[73] The largest components are Social Security, providing old-age, survivors, and disability insurance benefits based on payroll contributions; Medicare, offering health coverage primarily for those aged 65 and older or with disabilities; and Medicaid, a means-tested program funding medical care for low-income populations through federal-state partnerships.[71] In fiscal year 2023, these programs drove mandatory outlays to $3.8 trillion, with Social Security and Medicare comprising more than half, Social Security alone at approximately $1.35 trillion, Medicare at $839 billion, and Medicaid plus related health programs at $584 billion in federal funds.[74][75] Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid together accounted for nearly 75% of mandatory spending that year.[73] These programs incorporate indexed adjustments, such as cost-of-living allowances tied to the Consumer Price Index and benefit schedules linked to average wages, ensuring expenditures rise with economic and demographic shifts.[76] Population aging exacerbates growth: the beneficiary-to-worker ratio for Social Security increased from 3.3 in 2000 to 3.7 in 2023, straining trust fund solvency projected to exhaust reserves by 2034 without reforms.[76] Medicare's hospital insurance trust fund faces depletion by 2036, driven by rising per-capita health costs and an expanding elderly cohort.[76] Internationally, OECD nations exhibit parallel dynamics, with aging populations forecasted to boost entitlement outlays by 2-4% of GDP by 2050 in many countries, outpacing revenue growth from shrinking workforces.[77] Public pension and long-term care transfers, often mandatory, already consume 7-10% of GDP in high-spending members like France and Italy, with projections indicating further escalation absent policy changes.[78] Other transfers, including unemployment compensation and food assistance, add cyclical variability but remain statutorily mandated, activating during recessions—U.S. unemployment benefits, for instance, surged to $36 billion in 2020 amid COVID-19 before reverting.[79] Reform challenges stem from entrenched legal entitlements, where benefit reductions require legislative overrides of automatic triggers, contributing to persistent fiscal pressures as discretionary shares decline relative to mandates.[80] In fiscal year 2024, net interest on debt—partly fueled by entitlement-driven deficits—reached 13% of outlays, underscoring interconnections.[73]Discretionary Categories: Defense, Infrastructure, and Welfare
Discretionary spending in the U.S. federal budget consists of outlays subject to annual congressional appropriations, totaling approximately $1.8 trillion in fiscal year 2024, or about 26 percent of total federal spending.[81] This category contrasts with mandatory spending on entitlements like Social Security and Medicare, which is governed by statutory formulas rather than yearly votes. Within discretionary allocations, defense constitutes the largest share, followed by nondefense programs including infrastructure investments and select welfare initiatives such as housing assistance and energy aid for low-income households.[73] These expenditures fund operations, personnel, and capital projects, but their scale has declined relative to GDP over decades, from around 12 percent in the 1960s to under 7 percent in recent years.[82] Defense spending, the predominant discretionary category, reached $842 billion in fiscal year 2024, accounting for over half of total discretionary outlays.[83] This includes funding for military personnel (about 25 percent), operations and maintenance (around 35 percent), procurement of weapons systems, and research and development.[84] As a share of GDP, defense outlays stood at 3.0 percent in 2024, down from peaks exceeding 9 percent during the Cold War but elevated by post-9/11 conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.[85] Empirical analyses indicate that such spending supports national security through deterrence and power projection, though critics argue it crowds out private investment without proportional threat reductions in an era of asymmetric warfare.[86] Infrastructure spending falls under nondefense discretionary programs, primarily through the Department of Transportation and related agencies, with annual appropriations supporting highways, bridges, airports, and public transit. In fiscal year 2023, federal outlays for transportation infrastructure totaled roughly $100 billion, augmented by the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), which authorized $1.2 trillion over five years, including $550 billion in new discretionary and formula-based investments.[87] These funds address aging assets—over 45,000 U.S. bridges were classified as structurally deficient as of 2023—but face execution delays due to regulatory hurdles and local matching requirements.[88] Studies link sustained infrastructure outlays to productivity gains via reduced logistics costs, with a 1 percent GDP increase in public capital stock correlating to 0.1 percent annual growth in output, though returns diminish if projects prioritize political earmarks over economic returns.[89] Welfare-related discretionary spending encompasses targeted aid programs outside major mandatory entitlements, such as low-income housing vouchers, the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP), and community services block grants, totaling under $100 billion annually within the broader income security function.[90] For instance, tenant-based rental assistance and project-based housing support served about 5 million households in 2023, while LIHEAP provided $4 billion for heating and cooling aid to vulnerable populations.[79] Unlike automatic stabilizers in mandatory programs like SNAP, these discretionary allocations require yearly justification and have shrunk as a share of the budget amid fiscal pressures, comprising less than 5 percent of nondefense discretionary funds.[91] Allocations often reflect political bargaining rather than need-based metrics, with evidence showing variable efficacy: housing vouchers reduce homelessness by 20-30 percent for recipients but at high administrative costs exceeding $2,000 per household annually.[92]Waste, Fraud, and Inefficiency Patterns
Government spending exhibits persistent patterns of waste, fraud, and inefficiency, often stemming from program duplication, inadequate oversight, and incentives misaligned with cost control. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) identifies 38 high-risk areas across federal operations vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement, including Medicare improper payments, Department of Defense (DoD) weapon systems acquisition, and public assistance programs, where implementation of GAO recommendations has historically yielded billions in savings. In fiscal year 2024, federal agencies reported approximately $162 billion in improper payments across 68 programs, with 75% attributed to errors rather than intentional fraud, though broader estimates suggest annual fraud losses could range from $233 billion to $521 billion based on data from fiscal years 2018 to 2022. These figures underscore systemic issues like overpayments, underpayments, and ineligible beneficiaries, exacerbated by fragmented administration and limited data sharing among agencies. In entitlement programs, improper payments represent a major inefficiency vector, particularly in health care. For Medicare fee-for-service in fiscal year 2024, the improper payment rate stood at about 6.01%, consistent with prior years, while Medicaid's overall rate was 5.09%, down from 8.58% in 2023 but still totaling over $100 billion combined across both programs in fiscal year 2023. Critics, including congressional oversight, argue official rates understate true waste by excluding certain eligibility errors or unverified managed care payments, potentially doubling Medicaid's figure when accounting for incomplete audits. Fraud schemes, such as billing for non-rendered services, contribute, with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) recovering only a fraction of detected losses despite enhanced integrity efforts. Defense procurement exemplifies cost overrun patterns driven by concurrency in development and production, contractor price gouging, and optimistic initial estimates. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, originally baselined at $233 billion, has seen sustained cost growth and delivery delays as of 2025, with GAO highlighting persistent sustainment challenges and excess profits for contractors amounting to hundreds of millions on individual contracts. Broader DoD acquisition contracts frequently exceed budgets, with historical data showing overruns worsening as projects advance due to requirements creep and sole-source awards lacking competitive pressures. GAO's annual duplication reports identify overlapping initiatives, such as multiple agencies managing similar research grants, leading to redundant expenditures estimated in the tens of billions annually. Bureaucratic inefficiencies further manifest in program fragmentation and pork-barrel allocations, where political incentives prioritize earmarks over efficacy. GAO's 2024 duplication and cost-savings report flagged 112 new opportunities for consolidation, including streamlining federal real property management and information technology investments, potentially saving billions if addressed. Wasteful practices, like unused facilities or ineffective grants, persist due to weak performance metrics and diffused accountability, contrasting with private-sector disciplines like profit motives and market exit. These patterns collectively erode fiscal sustainability, with GAO estimating $67.5 billion in savings from implemented recommendations in fiscal year 2024 alone, yet many high-risk areas remain unaddressed.Comparative Perspectives
Spending as Percentage of GDP and Per Capita
Government spending as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) measures the scale of public sector activity relative to economic output, with international variations driven by factors such as welfare commitments, defense needs, and resource endowments. In advanced economies, ratios typically range from 30% to over 50%, while developing nations often exhibit lower figures due to limited fiscal capacity. Data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for 2024 projections indicate France at 56.99% of GDP, Italy at 53.8%, and Sweden at 47.49%, contrasting with the United States at 36.28% and South Africa at 32.62%.[2] Globally, the World Bank reports central government spending shares averaging around 15-20% in low-income countries, though total general government figures (including subnational levels) can exceed these when comprehensive data are available.[93]| Country/Region | Government Expenditure (% of GDP, latest available) | Source |
|---|---|---|
| France | 56.99 (2024 proj.) | IMF |
| Italy | 53.8 (2024 proj.) | IMF |
| United States | 36.28 (2024 proj.) | IMF |
| Japan | 41.16 (2024 proj.) | IMF |
| OECD Average | ~45% (2023) | OECD |
Correlations with Economic Growth and Freedom Indices
Cross-country empirical analyses consistently indicate an inverse relationship between the size of government spending, measured as a percentage of GDP, and long-term economic growth rates, particularly when spending exceeds moderate levels. For instance, studies examining post-World War II data across numerous countries find that higher shares of government consumption expenditure in GDP correlate with lower per capita GDP growth, as public outlays displace private investment and reduce incentives for productivity.[97] Similarly, Robert Barro's research highlights that nations with low government spending, such as South Korea achieving 6.2% annual growth, outperform those with higher fiscal burdens, attributing this to enhanced economic rights and reduced distortionary effects.[98] The Armey-Rahn curve formalizes this dynamic through an inverted-U relationship, positing an optimal government size of 15-25% of GDP beyond which additional spending hampers growth due to crowding out and inefficiency. Empirical validations across developed and developing economies support this threshold, with growth maximized at spending levels around 16-25% and declining thereafter; for example, panel data investigations confirm that deviations above this optimum lead to statistically significant negative growth impacts.[99][100][101] While some analyses report mixed or insignificant correlations in specific contexts, the preponderance of evidence from time-series and cross-sectional data underscores diminishing returns and eventual negative marginal effects from expansive fiscal policies.[102][103] Government spending levels also exhibit strong negative correlations with economic freedom indices, which aggregate factors like fiscal health, regulatory efficiency, and property rights. In the Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom, the government spending component penalizes high expenditures as a share of GDP—averaging around 31% globally in recent assessments—directly lowering overall scores and reflecting reduced policy flexibility.[104] Higher economic freedom scores, conversely, robustly predict superior GDP growth; a 7-point increase in freedom correlates with 10-15 percentage point gains in GDP over five years, mediated by lower spending that fosters investment and innovation.[105][106] This interplay is evident in panel regressions showing that the fiscal multiplier's effect on growth weakens in freer economies with restrained spending, as market mechanisms amplify private responses more effectively than state interventions.[107] Cross-country variations further illustrate that low-spending, high-freedom regimes achieve sustained prosperity, while elevated fiscal ratios constrain dynamism, aligning with causal evidence from institutional reforms that prioritize limited government.[108][109]High-Spending Welfare States vs. Low-Spending Market Economies
High-spending welfare states, such as Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, direct over 45% of GDP toward public expenditures, primarily on social transfers, healthcare, and education, aiming to mitigate inequality and provide universal safety nets.[110] In comparison, low-spending market economies like Singapore and Hong Kong allocate under 25% of GDP to government outlays, prioritizing minimal intervention, low taxes, and reliance on private enterprise for resource allocation and social mobility.[110] Switzerland, with spending around 33% of GDP, bridges the models through federalism and market-oriented policies. These contrasts highlight debates on sustainability, with empirical data showing trade-offs in growth, innovation, and dependency risks. Per capita GDP (PPP) underscores prosperity in both archetypes, though low-spending economies often lead: Singapore topped rankings at approximately $133,000 in 2024 estimates, followed by Ireland ($126,000) and Norway ($106,000), while Denmark ($71,000) and Sweden ($65,000) trailed among comparators; Hong Kong registered around $75,000.[111] [112] From 2010 to 2023, low-spending economies exhibited stronger average annual growth—Singapore at 3.5% and Ireland exceeding 5% in recovery phases—versus Nordic averages near 1.5-2%, attributable to export-led dynamism and reduced fiscal drag in the former.[113] High welfare spending correlates inversely with long-term growth rates, as elevated taxes and transfers diminish private investment incentives, per econometric analyses spanning developed economies.[114] Unemployment remains low across groups—Singapore at 2%, Hong Kong under 3%, versus 5-8% in Nordics—but the latter's figures reflect subsidized labor participation, masking underemployment in expansive public sectors.[115] Poverty metrics differ: absolute rates hover below 1% in Singapore and Hong Kong due to market-driven wage growth, while Nordic relative poverty (post-transfers) stays low at 10-15%, sustained by redistributive policies that, however, foster work disincentives over time.[116] Innovation indices reveal advantages for low-spending models; Singapore ranks high in patent filings and R&D efficiency, while studies link higher social expenditures to reduced entrepreneurship rates, as safety nets lower risk-taking. [117] Welfare states' successes often stem from cultural homogeneity, resource endowments (e.g., Norwegian oil), and pre-welfare capital accumulation, factors absent in scalable models; low-spending regimes, conversely, demonstrate replicable growth via institutional trust and property rights, though vulnerable to external shocks without buffers.[4]| Metric (Recent Averages) | High-Spending (e.g., Sweden, Denmark) | Low-Spending (e.g., Singapore, Hong Kong) |
|---|---|---|
| Govt Spending % GDP | 47-50% | 17-22% |
| Avg. GDP Growth (2010-2023) | 1.5-2% | 3-4% |
| Unemployment Rate | 6-8% | 2-3% |
| Global Innovation Rank | Top 10-20 | Top 5-10 |
Historical Trajectory
Pre-20th Century Origins
In ancient civilizations, government spending primarily supported rulers' courts, military campaigns, and basic infrastructure, funded through tribute, spoils of war, and rudimentary taxation systems. In Mesopotamia around 3000 BCE, city-states like Uruk allocated resources from agricultural surpluses and temple economies to maintain irrigation canals and ziggurats, with expenditures estimated at a small fraction of output due to decentralized priestly control. Similarly, in ancient Egypt under pharaohs such as Ramses II (r. 1279–1213 BCE), state outlays focused on Nile flood management, monumental construction like the temples at Karnak, and military expeditions, financed by corvée labor and grain levies rather than monetary budgets. These early systems lacked formalized accounting, relying on in-kind contributions that limited spending scale relative to societal production.[119] The classical era saw more structured public finance emerge, particularly in Greece and Rome, where expenditures centered on defense and civic projects. In Athens during the 5th century BCE, Pericles' administration spent Persian War reparations—approximately 9,700 talents of silver—on the Acropolis rebuilding, naval fleets, and festivals, representing a surge from peacetime norms funded by tribute from allied city-states. Roman Republic and Empire budgets, managed through the aerarium treasury, prioritized legions and roads; by the 1st century CE, military costs under Augustus equated to about 2.5% of estimated GDP, drawn from provincial taxes, customs duties, and conquest booty, with total state outlays remaining under 5% of economy-wide resources due to reliance on slave labor and private patronage for non-military needs. Overexpansion and debasement of currency in the 3rd century CE inflated costs, contributing to fiscal strain without modern welfare mechanisms.[120][121] Medieval European public finance was fragmented, with spending devolved to feudal lords and ecclesiastical institutions rather than centralized states. Kings like England's Henry II (r. 1154–1189) raised revenues through feudal aids, scutage (commutation of military service), and customs, allocating funds ad hoc for crusades or castles, often totaling less than 1% of feudal output in peacetime; parliamentary consent for extraordinary levies, as in the 1215 Magna Carta provisions, began constraining royal discretion. Italian city-republics such as Venice and Florence innovated funded public debt via prestiti (forced loans) from the 13th century, financing wars and canals through citizen subscriptions yielding 5% interest, marking early shifts toward sustainable borrowing amid trade-driven wealth. Overall, expenditures emphasized warfare and domain maintenance, with tithes (10% ecclesiastical levy) supporting church infrastructure independently of secular budgets.[122][123] By the early modern period, absolutist monarchies in France and England developed proto-budgets tied to mercantilist policies and perpetual wars. France under Louis XIV (r. 1643–1715) amassed debts exceeding 1 billion livres by 1715 for Versailles and military ventures, serviced by taille direct taxes and gabelle salt monopolies, yet peacetime spending hovered below 10% of GDP equivalents due to inefficient fermiers généraux collection. Britain's Glorious Revolution (1688) institutionalized parliamentary control over the purse, enabling funded debt via Bank of England annuities post-1694; 18th-century outlays spiked to 20–25% GDP during Napoleonic Wars but reverted to 10% in peace, focused on navy and debt interest. These systems prioritized sovereignty and conquest over redistribution, with borrowing innovations laying groundwork for later expansions.[124][125] In the 19th century, industrializing nations maintained restrained spending amid laissez-faire ideologies, with federal or central governments allocating under 5% of GDP to defense, debt, and nascent infrastructure. The U.S. federal budget from 1800–1900 averaged 2–3% GDP, balanced in peacetime via tariffs and excise, funding primarily military posts and lighthouse systems post-Louisiana Purchase (1803); Civil War (1861–1865) ballooned it to 15% temporarily. Britain's post-Napoleonic consolidation saw expenditures stabilize at 10–15% GDP by mid-century, servicing war debts while Gladstone's reforms (1860s) emphasized retrenchment. France's Third Republic (1870–1940) similarly kept civil outlays minimal, at around 15% GDP, prioritizing railways via private concessions over direct state spending. This era's fiscal conservatism reflected classical liberal views that excessive intervention distorted markets, presaging 20th-century divergences.[119][126][127]World Wars and Interwar Expansion
During World War I, government spending in major belligerent nations escalated sharply to support military mobilization, marking a significant departure from pre-war norms where expenditures typically hovered below 10% of GDP. In the United States, federal outlays increased from about 1.9% of GDP in 1916 to roughly 14.6% in 1919, driven predominantly by defense costs exceeding $25 billion in total war-related federal spending. In the United Kingdom, central government expenditure rose from approximately 8% of GDP in 1913 to 37% by 1918, financed through a mix of taxation, borrowing, and monetary expansion that contributed to postwar inflation.[128] Germany similarly saw its spending surge to over 50% of national income by 1918, with total wartime outlays reaching 170 billion marks, of which only 8% was covered by taxes, leading to heavy reliance on domestic borrowing and eventual hyperinflation in the early 1920s. The interwar period witnessed partial retrenchment in military spending but introduced structural expansions through social welfare initiatives and counter-cyclical policies amid economic volatility, including the Great Depression. In the U.S., federal spending declined to around 3% of GDP by the mid-1920s but climbed again with the New Deal programs starting in 1933, reaching about 10% of GDP by 1939 via public works, relief efforts, and precursors to entitlements like Social Security established in 1935.[129] European nations, grappling with reconstruction and unemployment, expanded fiscal roles; for example, Britain's government expenditure stabilized at 20-25% of GDP, incorporating unemployment benefits and housing subsidies that persisted from wartime precedents.[130] These shifts reflected evolving ideologies favoring state intervention, as articulated in Keynesian-influenced analyses, though causal links to Depression-era policies emphasized demand stimulation over pure military needs.[131] World War II amplified these trends with even greater fiscal mobilization, as governments assumed direct control over economies to prioritize war production. U.S. federal spending peaked at 43.6% of GDP in 1944, with defense alone accounting for about 37.5% amid total war costs exceeding $4 trillion in constant dollars, funded by tax hikes that broadened the base to include 90% marginal rates on high incomes and massive bond drives.[132] The UK reached 52% of GDP in expenditures by 1943, while Nazi Germany's pre- and early-war rearmament propelled military outlays from 1% of GNP in 1933 to 17% by 1938, escalating further during conflict through deficit financing and resource allocation that distorted civilian sectors.[128] These wartime surges, often exceeding 40% of GDP across combatants, entrenched higher baseline spending post-conflict, as demobilization failed to fully reverse expansions in administrative capacity and public expectations for state involvement.[127] Empirical analyses attribute this persistence to institutional lock-in from war bureaucracies and ideological acceptance of fiscal activism, rather than transient shocks alone.[130]Post-WWII Boom and 1970s-1980s Reforms
Following World War II, government spending in the United States contracted sharply from wartime peaks, with federal outlays declining from 41.9% of GDP in 1945 to 14.2% by 1948, reflecting demobilization and reduced defense needs.[133] However, the subsequent era saw gradual expansion driven by Cold War military commitments and domestic programs influenced by Keynesian demand management, which emphasized fiscal stimulus for full employment. By 1960, federal spending stabilized around 17.8% of GDP, rising to 19.8% by 1970 amid investments in infrastructure like the Interstate Highway System (1956) and social initiatives such as Medicare and Medicaid enacted in 1965 under the Great Society.[133] In Western Europe, post-war reconstruction via the Marshall Plan (1948-1952), which disbursed $13 billion in U.S. aid equivalent to about 3% of recipient countries' annual GDP, facilitated rapid recovery and laid groundwork for welfare state expansion.[134] Governments adopted mixed economies with increased social transfers, pensions, and health care, elevating total public expenditure from averages below 30% of GDP in the 1950s to over 40% by the late 1970s in nations like the UK and France, as war legacies created constituencies for expanded entitlements.[135] This boom correlated with the 1945-1973 economic miracle, but causal links to spending were debated, with critics noting private sector productivity and trade liberalization as primary drivers over fiscal intervention.[136] The 1970s brought stagflation—simultaneous high inflation (peaking at 13.5% in the U.S. in 1980) and unemployment—exacerbated by oil shocks (1973 and 1979) and perceived fiscal profligacy, undermining confidence in unchecked Keynesian expansion.[133] In the U.S., federal spending reached 21.7% of GDP by 1980, while Europe's higher burdens strained budgets amid slowing growth. This prompted 1980s reforms emphasizing supply-side incentives over demand stimulus. Under U.S. President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), policies included the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, slashing top marginal rates from 70% to 28% by 1988, alongside efforts to cap non-defense discretionary growth, though total outlays peaked at 23.1% of GDP in 1983 before falling to 21.1% by 1990 as economic expansion outpaced spending.[133] Defense rose from 5.2% to 6.2% of GDP initially for Cold War pressures, but overall restraint, per Reaganomics, aimed to reduce government's economic footprint. In the UK, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) tackled inflation exceeding 25% in 1980 through monetarist controls, public sector pay freezes, and privatizations of state firms like British Telecom (1984), curbing expenditure growth from 45.5% of GDP in 1979-1980 to stabilization around 42% by the late 1980s, despite resistance to deeper cuts.[137] These reforms prioritized deregulation and market mechanisms, yielding GDP growth accelerations—U.S. averaged 3.5% annually 1983-1989—while highlighting trade-offs, as absolute spending still rose amid demographic and entitlement pressures.[138] Empirical assessments, such as those from the Cato Institute, attribute partial success to curbing inflation and fostering investment, though deficits persisted due to incomplete spending discipline.[139]1990s-2008 Globalization Era
During the 1990s, many developed economies experienced fiscal restraint in government spending as a share of GDP, driven by the end of the Cold War, which reduced defense outlays through a "peace dividend," and intensified global competition that incentivized leaner public sectors to attract investment and maintain economic agility. In OECD countries, total government spending relative to GDP trended downward from the late 1980s through 2008, reflecting reforms aimed at deficit reduction and efficiency amid rapid trade liberalization and capital mobility.[140] This era's hyper-globalization, characterized by surging trade volumes and financial integration, exerted downward pressure on public consumption expenditures, as empirical analyses indicate that de facto trade openness weakened its historically positive association with spending levels during this period.[141] In the United States, federal outlays fell from 21.9% of GDP in the early 1990s to 18.2% by decade's end, facilitated by bipartisan budget agreements in 1990 and 1993 that imposed spending caps and prioritized entitlement reforms, alongside revenue growth from the tech-driven economic boom.[142] This restraint yielded federal budget surpluses from 1998 to 2001, the first since 1969, with discretionary non-defense spending reined in through divided government dynamics and welfare reforms under the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, which shifted aid to block grants and work requirements.[143] European Union members pursued similar discipline via the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, mandating deficits below 3% of GDP and debt under 60% for euro adoption, prompting cuts in public employment and subsidies in countries like Sweden and Italy to comply by the late 1990s.[144] The early 2000s marked a pivot, as the September 11, 2001, attacks prompted sharp defense spending escalations; U.S. military budgets rose approximately 50% (inflation-adjusted) over the subsequent decade, contributing to deficits that erased surpluses by 2002 through wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, funded largely via supplemental appropriations outside baseline budgets.[145] Globally, while core welfare and infrastructure outlays stabilized to support human capital in a knowledge economy, aggregate spending restraint persisted until the 2008 financial crisis, underscoring globalization's role in fostering fiscal prudence absent major shocks.[146] This period demonstrated that competitive pressures from open markets correlated with lower relative public burdens, though security imperatives could override such dynamics.[147]Post-2008 Crises, COVID-19, and 2020s Trends
In response to the 2008 global financial crisis, governments enacted substantial fiscal stimulus programs that markedly increased public spending. In the United States, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 provided roughly $831 billion in expenditures, tax relief, and entitlements to mitigate recessionary effects, contributing to total federal fiscal support of approximately $1.8 trillion from 2008 to 2012.[148][149] These measures elevated federal outlays as a share of GDP, with spending surging post-2007-2009 downturn before partial stabilization.[150] Across OECD nations, general government spending rose during the crisis onset, reflecting coordinated efforts to offset private sector contraction, though data compiled under SNA 2008 standards show varied trajectories by country.[10] In the Eurozone, initial stimulus gave way to austerity in peripheral economies like Greece and Ireland amid the sovereign debt crisis starting in 2010, where spending cuts and tax hikes aimed to restore fiscal balances but often prolonged recessions.[151][152] The COVID-19 pandemic triggered unprecedented expansions in government spending from 2020 onward, dwarfing prior interventions. The IMF's database records global fiscal measures exceeding tens of trillions in announced support, with G20 countries deploying significant on-budget outlays for health, income support, and business aid.[153] In the United States, the CARES Act alone authorized over $2.2 trillion in March 2020, followed by additional packages pushing total pandemic-related spending into multiple trillions, financed largely through deficits that ballooned public debt.[149] Eurozone responses included the NextGenerationEU recovery fund of €806.9 billion (about 5.6% of EU GDP), blending grants and loans to bolster spending amid lockdowns, while national measures varied from Germany's expansive fiscal rule suspensions to more restrained approaches elsewhere.[154] These actions temporarily spiked government expenditure ratios, with EU outlays as a percentage of GDP climbing sharply in 2020 before partial retrenchment.[155] Into the 2020s, government spending has trended toward elevated structural levels amid persistent deficits and rising debt burdens, complicating fiscal sustainability. U.S. federal outlays reached $7.01 trillion in fiscal year 2025, equivalent to 23% of GDP, driven by mandatory programs, interest payments, and discretionary allocations that have not reverted to pre-crisis norms.[84] Public debt held by the public stood at about 121% of GDP in Q4 2024, with projections nearing 125% by end-2025, as revenues lag expenditures despite economic recovery.[156][157] Globally, public debt surpassed $100 trillion in 2024, with advanced economies facing upward trajectories from post-crisis legacies and new priorities like climate investments, though empirical assessments link sustained high spending to slower growth without offsetting reforms.[158] In the Eurozone, consolidated fiscal rules post-2023 aim to curb deficits exceeding 3% of GDP, yet spending on aging populations and energy transitions sustains ratios above 45-50% of GDP in many members.[10] These patterns underscore causal pressures from entitlement growth and interest costs, with limited evidence of efficiency gains from prior expansions.[159]Major Controversies
Redistribution Outcomes and Dependency Risks
Government redistribution through progressive taxation and transfer payments has demonstrably reduced income inequality as measured by post-tax Gini coefficients in advanced economies. For instance, in OECD countries, transfers and taxes lower the Gini index by an average of 20-30 percentage points, with effects most pronounced in nations like Denmark and Sweden where redistribution intensity exceeds 25% of GDP.[160] However, empirical analyses indicate that such redistribution often correlates with slower long-term economic growth due to diminished incentives for investment and labor supply. A study of EU nations found that while baseline inequality hampers growth, aggressive redistribution exacerbates this by distorting resource allocation and reducing productivity gains from market-driven innovation.[161] Similarly, cross-country regressions reveal an inverse relationship between the size of transfer systems and GDP per capita growth rates over decades, as higher marginal effective tax rates on additional earnings crowd out private sector dynamism.[162] In the United States, federal and state welfare expenditures totaling over $1.1 trillion annually across more than 130 programs have failed to proportionally diminish poverty rates since the 1960s War on Poverty initiation, with the official poverty rate hovering around 11-15% despite trillions spent cumulatively.[163] This persistence arises partly from redistribution's unintended consequence of creating high effective marginal tax rates—often exceeding 100% via "welfare cliffs"—where beneficiaries lose benefits faster than they gain from incremental work, thereby eroding labor participation. Peer-reviewed evidence from Denmark confirms that increases in welfare payments for youth reduce employment probabilities by altering time allocation away from job-seeking toward leisure or education without commensurate skill gains.[164] In the U.S., recent data show families below the poverty line deriving over 50% of income from transfers rather than earnings, heightening reliance on public support.[165] Dependency risks extend intergenerationally, as parental receipt of disability insurance or prolonged welfare elevates children's future program participation by 2-3 percentage points, perpetuating cycles through learned behaviors and reduced human capital investment.[166] Cash transfers without work conditions typically yield neutral or negative effects on adult labor supply, as standard economic models predict substitution toward non-market activities when benefits exceed opportunity costs.[167] Reforms imposing time limits and employment mandates, such as the 1996 U.S. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, halved welfare caseloads within five years while boosting employment among single mothers by over 10 percentage points, illustrating that conditional redistribution mitigates dependency by realigning incentives with self-sufficiency.[168] In contrast, unconditional systems in high-spending European welfare states correlate with youth unemployment rates double those in low-transfer economies, underscoring causal links between generous, untargeted benefits and structural idleness.[169]Pork-Barrel Politics and Cronyism
Pork-barrel politics refers to the practice where legislators direct government expenditures toward specific localities or projects within their jurisdictions, primarily to secure electoral support rather than based on national merit or cost-benefit analysis. This often manifests through earmarks, which are provisions in appropriations bills allocating funds for pet projects, bypassing competitive processes. In the United States, earmarks proliferated in the late 20th century; by fiscal year 2005, they accounted for approximately 1% of the federal budget, or about $27 billion, frequently funding infrastructure or grants with limited broader economic justification.[170][171] Such allocations incentivize logrolling, where members of Congress trade votes on each other's district-specific requests, distorting priorities away from efficient national resource use.[172] Empirical analyses indicate that pork-barrel spending frequently yields inefficient outcomes, with total economic costs exceeding benefits due to favoritism over rigorous evaluation. A study incorporating pork into macroeconomic models found it contributes to short-sighted fiscal decisions, elevating state employment temporarily but failing to generate sustained growth, as funds crowd out private investment without proportional productivity gains.[173] In fiscal year 2024, U.S. Congress approved 8,098 earmarks totaling $14.6 billion, including $282 million for enhancements to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program despite ongoing debates over its overall value, exemplifying how such spending sustains politically connected programs at taxpayer expense.[174][171] Critics, including organizations tracking waste like Citizens Against Government Waste, have documented over 111,000 earmarks since 1991, correlating them with reduced legislative discipline and heightened deficit pressures.[175] Cronyism complements pork-barrel tactics by channeling government funds—through subsidies, contracts, or bailouts—to politically favored entities, often firms with lobbying ties, rather than via open competition. This rigs markets in favor of insiders, as seen in the 2008-2009 Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), where companies spending $1 on pre-crisis lobbying received $485 to $586 in bailout funds, amplifying moral hazard and resource misallocation.[176] Estimates place annual U.S. cronyism costs at around $100 billion in direct taxpayer subsidies, plus hundreds of billions more in consumer burdens from distorted competition, such as protected industries evading efficiency mandates.[177] Internationally, Canadian governments disbursed over $202 billion in business subsidies from 1994 to 2007, frequently to underperforming sectors, fostering dependency on state support rather than innovation.[178] These practices erode fiscal accountability, as connected recipients influence policy to perpetuate flows, evidenced by state-level examples like Illinois' $350 million in 2012 earmarks for cronies, which bypassed merit-based scrutiny.[179] The interplay of pork-barrel politics and cronyism undermines government spending efficiency by prioritizing relational networks over empirical returns, leading to persistent waste amid rising deficits. Quantitative reviews confirm that such favoritism correlates with lower overall economic productivity, as funds evade cost-benefit tests that would reveal net losses, such as in localized projects where localized gains fail to offset national opportunity costs.[180][181] Reforms like earmark moratoriums (e.g., U.S. ban from 2011-2021) temporarily curbed excesses but saw resurgence, underscoring entrenched incentives in expansive spending regimes.[182]Fiscal Sustainability Amid Demographics and Aging
Aging populations in developed economies, driven by fertility rates below replacement levels—averaging 1.5 children per woman in OECD countries as of 2023—and life expectancies exceeding 80 years, are exerting mounting pressure on government budgets through elevated expenditures on entitlements. The old-age dependency ratio, defined as individuals aged 65 and older per 100 working-age persons (20-64 years), stood at around 30 in OECD averages in 2022 but is forecasted to climb to 50 by 2050, implying fewer contributors supporting more beneficiaries.[183] This inversion reduces labor force participation and payroll tax revenues while amplifying outlays for pensions, which already account for over 7% of GDP in many member states, and healthcare, projected to add 2-4 percentage points to public spending by mid-century absent reforms.[184][185] The fiscal mechanics involve a shrinking contributor base funding defined-benefit systems designed for younger demographics; for example, IMF analysis indicates that aging weakens the multiplier effects of fiscal stimuli due to higher debt burdens and reduced output responses from spending shocks.[186] In the European Union, pension spending faces upward pressure from these trends, compounded by shrinking tax bases as workforce contraction outpaces economic growth, potentially pushing debt-to-GDP ratios beyond 100% in high-spending nations like Italy and France by 2050 if current trajectories persist.[185] OECD projections highlight that without adjustments—such as raising retirement ages or shifting to funded pensions—age-related costs could consume 10-15% of GDP increments in advanced economies, eroding fiscal space for other priorities like defense or infrastructure.[187] In the United States, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) forecasts that Social Security outlays will rise from 5.2% of GDP in 2025 to 6.2% by 2055, driven primarily by the retirement of baby boomers and longer lifespans, with Medicare adding another 2 percentage points due to per-beneficiary cost growth outstripping wages.[188] The Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) trust fund is projected to deplete by 2033, necessitating either benefit reductions of about 20%, payroll tax hikes, or debt financing thereafter, as revenues cover only 75-80% of scheduled benefits under current law.[189][67] Combined with net interest costs, these demographics contribute to federal debt reaching 166% of GDP by 2055 in CBO's extended baseline, signaling sustainability risks if growth falters below 1.8% annually.[188] Japan exemplifies acute challenges, with its old-age dependency ratio projected at 80.7 by 2050—the highest among major economies—and public debt already at 250% of GDP as of 2024, fueled by social security expansions since the 1990s.[190][191] Aging accounts for over half of the debt buildup, as pension and long-term care costs have surged 2-3% of GDP since 2000, while a shrinking workforce—down 1% annually—limits revenue growth.[192] OECD recommends medium-term consolidation, including consumption tax increases to 15% and retirement age hikes to 70, to avert intergenerational inequities, though low productivity growth (under 1% yearly) complicates stabilization.[193][194] Without such measures, simulations indicate debt could exceed 300% of GDP by 2040, risking higher borrowing costs if investor confidence erodes.[195]| Country/Region | Old-Age Dependency Ratio (2022) | Projected (2050) | Key Fiscal Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| OECD Average | ~30 | ~50 | Pensions +3-5% GDP; healthcare +2% GDP[184] |
| United States | 28 | 49 | Social Security to 6.2% GDP; OASI depletion 2033[189] |
| European Union | 36 | 55 | Pension pressure; debt >100% in select states[185][196] |
| Japan | 54.5 | 80.7 | Debt to 300%+ GDP possible; social security +2-3% GDP since 2000[190][191] |
Empirical Assessments and Reform Paths
Studies on Spending Efficiency and ROI
Empirical assessments of government spending efficiency often rely on fiscal multipliers, which measure the change in GDP per unit of additional public expenditure. Meta-analyses indicate that average multipliers for government spending range from 0.5 to 1.0, suggesting limited short-term economic amplification compared to theoretical Keynesian expectations of values exceeding 1.5.[201] For public investment, such as infrastructure, multipliers can reach 1.5 over 2-5 years, though these effects diminish if financed by distortionary taxes or debt.[202] In contrast, multipliers for government consumption spending are typically lower, around 0.8 or less, with evidence of crowding out private investment.[203] Long-term return on investment (ROI) studies reveal more pronounced inefficiencies, as sustained spending increases often correlate with reduced private sector productivity and slower growth. Cross-country analyses show that higher government expenditure as a share of GDP is associated with lower economic growth rates, with elasticities indicating that a 1 percentage point increase in spending-to-GDP ratio reduces annual growth by 0.02-0.03 percentage points over five years.[204] Sector-specific evaluations, such as those on public R&D, estimate social returns of 20-30% annually in the U.S., though these are concentrated in defense and space programs and often spill over unevenly to private innovation.[205] In health and education, ROI varies widely; for instance, public health interventions yield positive returns averaging $5-14 per dollar invested in areas like vaccination programs, but aggregate spending efficiency remains low due to administrative overhead and suboptimal allocation.[206] U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports highlight systemic waste eroding ROI, with federal improper payments totaling $236 billion in fiscal year 2023, representing over 5% of outlays in programs like Medicare and unemployment insurance.[207] Duplication and fragmentation across agencies further diminish efficiency; GAO identified 589 opportunities for savings in 2025, including overlapping economic development programs costing billions annually without commensurate outcomes.[208] International studies echo these findings, with public sector efficiency scores in many OECD countries below 70% of potential output, driven by governance factors like corruption and regulatory capture rather than input levels alone.[209]| Study/Source | Multiplier/ROI Estimate | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Gechert (2015) meta-analysis | 0.9-1.0 for spending; 1.5+ for investment | EU and U.S. data, short-term GDP impact[201] |
| GAO FY2023 Report | $236B improper payments (5%+ of select outlays) | U.S. federal programs, waste quantification[207] |
| IMF African efficiency analysis | Low health/education provision efficiency | Input-output gaps in service delivery[210] |