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Deflation
Deflation
from Wikipedia

In economics, deflation is an increase in the real value of the monetary unit of account, as reflected in a decrease in the general price level of goods and services exchanged, measurable by broad price indices.[1]

Deflation occurs when the inflation rate falls below 0% and becomes negative. While inflation reduces the value of currency over time, deflation increases it. This allows more goods and services to be bought than before with the same amount of currency, but means that more goods or services must be sold for money in order to finance payments that remain fixed in nominal terms, as many debt obligations may. Deflation is distinct from disinflation, a slowdown in the inflation rate; i.e., when inflation declines to a lower rate but is still positive.[2]

Economists generally believe that a sudden deflationary shock is a problem in a modern economy because it increases the real value of debt, especially if the deflation is unexpected. Deflation may also aggravate recessions and lead to a deflationary spiral (see later section).[3][4][5][6][7][8][9]

Some economists argue that prolonged deflationary periods are related to the underlying technological progress in an economy, because as productivity increases (TFP), the cost of goods decreases.[10]

Deflation usually happens when supply is high (when excess production occurs), when demand is low (when consumption decreases), or when the money supply decreases (sometimes in response to a contraction created from careless investment or a credit crunch) or because of a net capital outflow from the economy.[11] It can also occur when there is too much competition and too little market concentration.[12][better source needed]

Causes and corresponding types

[edit]

In the IS–LM model (investment and saving equilibrium – liquidity preference and money supply equilibrium model),[13][14][15] deflation is caused by a shift in the supply and demand curve for goods and services.[citation needed] This in turn can be caused by an increase in supply, a fall in demand, or both.

When prices are falling, consumers have an incentive to delay purchases and consumption until prices fall further, which in turn reduces overall economic activity. When purchases are delayed, productive capacity is idled and investment falls, leading to further reductions in aggregate demand. This is the deflationary spiral. The way to reverse this quickly would be to introduce an economic stimulus. The government could increase productive spending on things like infrastructure or the central bank could start expanding the money supply.[15]

Deflation is also related to risk aversion, where investors and buyers will start hoarding money because its value is now increasing over time.[16] This can produce a liquidity trap or it may lead to shortages that entice investments yielding more jobs and commodity production. A central bank cannot, normally, charge negative interest for money, and even charging zero interest often produces less stimulative effect than slightly higher rates of interest. In a closed economy, this is because charging zero interest also means having zero return on government securities, or even negative return on short maturities. In an open economy, it creates a carry trade and devalues the currency. A devalued currency produces higher prices for imports without necessarily stimulating exports to a like degree.

Deflation is the natural condition of economies when the supply of money is fixed, or does not grow as quickly as population and the economy. When this happens, the available amount of hard currency per person falls, in effect making money more scarce, and consequently, the purchasing power of each unit of currency increases. Deflation also occurs when improvements in production efficiency lower the overall price of goods. Competition in the marketplace often prompts those producers to apply at least some portion of these cost savings into reducing the asking price for their goods. When this happens, consumers pay less for those goods, and consequently, deflation has occurred, since purchasing power has increased.

Rising productivity and reduced transportation cost created structural deflation during the accelerated productivity era from 1870 to 1900, but there was mild inflation for about a decade before the establishment of the Federal Reserve in 1913.[17] There was inflation during World War I, but deflation returned again after the war and during the 1930s depression. Most nations abandoned the gold standard in the 1930s so that there is less reason to expect deflation, aside from the collapse of speculative asset classes, under a fiat monetary system with low productivity growth.

CPI 1914-2022
American CPI 1914-2022
  Deflation
  M2 money supply increases year/year

In mainstream economics, deflation may be caused by a combination of the supply and demand for goods and the supply and demand for money, specifically the supply of money going down and the supply of goods going up. Historic episodes of deflation have often been associated with the supply of goods going up (due to increased productivity) without an increase in the supply of money, or (as with the Great Depression and possibly Japan in the early 1990s) the demand for goods going down combined with a decrease in the money supply. Studies of the Great Depression by Ben Bernanke have indicated that, in response to decreased demand, the Federal Reserve of the time decreased the money supply, hence contributing to deflation.

Causes include, on the demand side:

  • Growth deflation
  • Hoarding

And on the supply side:

  • Bank credit deflation
  • Debt deflation
  • Decision on the money supply side
  • Credit deflation

Growth deflation

[edit]

Growth deflation is an enduring decrease in the real cost of goods and services as the result of technological progress, accompanied by competitive price cuts, resulting in an increase in aggregate demand.[18]

A structural deflation existed from the 1870s until the cycle upswing that started in 1895. The deflation was caused by the decrease in the production and distribution costs of goods. It resulted in competitive price cuts when markets were oversupplied. The mild inflation after 1895 was attributed to the increase in gold supply that had been occurring for decades.[19] There was a sharp rise in prices during World War I, but deflation returned at the war's end. By contrast, under a fiat monetary system, there was high productivity growth from the end of World War II until the 1960s, but no deflation.[20]

Historically not all episodes of deflation correspond with periods of poor economic growth.[21]

Productivity and deflation are discussed in a 1940 study by the Brookings Institution that gives productivity by major US industries from 1919 to 1939, along with real and nominal wages. Persistent deflation was clearly understood as being the result of the enormous gains in productivity of the period.[22] By the late 1920s, most goods were over supplied, which contributed to high unemployment during the Great Depression.[23]

Bank credit deflation

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Bank credit deflation is a decrease in the bank credit supply due to bank failures or increased perceived risk of defaults by private entities or a contraction of the money supply by the central bank.[24]

Debt deflation

[edit]

Debt deflation is a phenomenon associated with the end of long-term credit cycles. It was proposed as a theory by Irving Fisher (1933) to explain the deflation of the Great Depression.[25]

Money supply-side deflation

[edit]

From a monetarist perspective, deflation is caused primarily by a reduction in the velocity of money or the amount of money supply per person.

A historical analysis of money velocity and monetary base shows an inverse correlation: for a given percentage decrease in the monetary base the result is a nearly equal percentage increase in money velocity.[16] This is to be expected because monetary base (MB), velocity of base money (VB), price level (P) and real output (Y) are related by definition: MBVB = PY.[26] However, the monetary base is a much narrower definition of money than M2 money supply. Additionally, the velocity of the monetary base is interest-rate sensitive, the highest velocity being at the highest interest rates.[16]

In the early history of the United States, there was no national currency and an insufficient supply of coinage.[27] Banknotes were the majority of the money in circulation. During financial crises, many banks failed and their notes became worthless. Also, banknotes were discounted relative to gold and silver, the discount depended on the financial strength of the bank.[28]

In recent years changes in the money supply have historically taken a long time to show up in the price level, with a rule of thumb lag of at least 18 months. More recently Alan Greenspan cited the time lag as taking between 12 and 13 quarters.[29][full citation needed] Bonds, equities and commodities have been suggested as reservoirs for buffering changes in the money supply.[30]

Credit deflation

[edit]

In modern credit-based economies, deflation may be caused by the central bank initiating higher interest rates (i.e., to "control" inflation), thereby possibly popping an asset bubble. In a credit-based economy, a slow-down or fall in lending leads to less money in circulation, with a further sharp fall in money supply as confidence reduces and velocity weakens, with a consequent sharp fall-off in demand for employment or goods. The fall in demand causes a fall in prices as a supply glut develops. This becomes a deflationary spiral when prices fall below the costs of financing production, or repaying debt levels incurred at the prior price level. Businesses, unable to make enough profit no matter how low they set prices, are then liquidated. Banks get assets that have fallen dramatically in value since their mortgage loan was made, and if they sell those assets, they further glut supply, which only exacerbates the situation. To slow or halt the deflationary spiral, banks will often withhold collecting on non-performing loans (as in Japan, and most recently America and Spain). This is often no more than a stop-gap measure, because they must then restrict credit, since they do not have money to lend, which further reduces demand, and so on.

Historical examples of credit deflation

[edit]

In the early economic history of the United States, cycles of inflation and deflation correlated with capital flows between regions, with money being loaned from the financial center in the Northeast to the commodity producing regions of the (mid)-West and South. In a procyclical manner, prices of commodities rose when capital was flowing in, that is, when banks were willing to lend, and fell in the depression years of 1818 and 1839 when banks called in loans.[31] Also, there was no national paper currency at the time and there was a scarcity of coins. Most money circulated as banknotes, which typically sold at a discount according to distance from the issuing bank and the bank's perceived financial strength.

When banks failed, their notes were redeemed for bank reserves, which often did not result in payment at par value, and sometimes the notes became worthless. Notes of weak surviving banks traded at steep discounts.[27][28] During the Great Depression, people who owed money to a bank whose deposits had been frozen would sometimes buy bank books (deposits of other people at the bank) at a discount and use them to pay off their debt at par value.[32]

Deflation occurred periodically in the U.S. during the 19th century (the most important exception was during the Civil War). This deflation was at times caused by technological progress that created significant economic growth, but at other times it was triggered by financial crises – notably the Panic of 1837 which caused deflation through 1844, and the Panic of 1873 which triggered the Long Depression that lasted until 1879.[17][28][31] These deflationary periods preceded the establishment of the U.S. Federal Reserve System and its active management of monetary matters. Episodes of deflation have been rare and brief since the Federal Reserve was created (a notable exception being the Great Depression) while U.S. economic progress has been unprecedented.

A financial crisis in England in 1818 caused banks to call in loans and curtail new lending, draining specie out of the U.S.[citation needed] The Bank of the United States also reduced its lending. Prices for cotton and tobacco fell. The price of agricultural commodities also was pressured by a return of normal harvests following 1816, the year without a summer, that caused large scale famine and high agricultural prices.[33]

There were several causes of the deflation of the severe depression of 1839–1843, which included an oversupply of agricultural commodities (importantly cotton) as new cropland came into production following large federal land sales a few years earlier, banks requiring payment in gold or silver, the failure of several banks, default by several states on their bonds and British banks cutting back on specie flow to the U.S.[31][34]

This cycle has been traced out on a broad scale during the Great Depression. Partly because of overcapacity and market saturation and partly as a result of the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act, international trade contracted sharply, severely reducing demand for goods, thereby idling a great deal of capacity, and setting off a string of bank failures.[23] A similar situation in Japan, beginning with the stock and real estate market collapse in the early 1990s, was arrested by the Japanese government preventing the collapse of most banks and taking over direct control of several in the worst condition.

Scarcity of official money

[edit]

The United States had no national paper money until 1862 (greenbacks used to fund the Civil War), but these notes were discounted to gold until 1877. There was also a shortage of U.S. minted coins. Foreign coins, such as Mexican silver, were commonly used.[27] At times banknotes were as much as 80% of currency in circulation before the Civil War. In the financial crises of 1818–19 and 1837–1841, many banks failed, leaving their money to be redeemed below par value from reserves. Sometimes the notes became worthless, and the notes of weak surviving banks were heavily discounted.[28] The Jackson administration opened branch mints, which over time increased the supply of coins. Following the 1848 finding of gold in the Sierra Nevada, enough gold came to market to devalue gold relative to silver. To equalize the value of the two metals in coinage, the US mint slightly reduced the silver content of new coinage in 1853.[27]

When structural deflation appeared in the years following 1870, a common explanation given by various government inquiry committees was a scarcity of gold and silver, although they usually mentioned the changes in industry and trade we now call productivity. However, David A. Wells (1890) notes that the U.S. money supply during the period 1879-1889 actually rose 60%, the increase being in gold and silver, which rose against the percentage of national bank and legal tender notes. Furthermore, Wells argued that the deflation only lowered the cost of goods that benefited from recent improved methods of manufacturing and transportation. Goods produced by craftsmen did not decrease in price, nor did many services, and the cost of labor actually increased. Also, deflation did not occur in countries that did not have modern manufacturing, transportation and communications.[17]

By the end of the 19th century, deflation ended and turned to mild inflation. William Stanley Jevons predicted rising gold supply would cause inflation decades before it actually did. Irving Fisher blamed the worldwide inflation of the pre-WWI years on rising gold supply.[35]

In economies with an unstable currency, barter and other alternate currency arrangements such as dollarization are common, and therefore when the 'official' money becomes scarce (or unusually unreliable), commerce can still continue (e.g., most recently in Zimbabwe). Since in such economies the central government is often unable, even if it were willing, to adequately control the internal economy, there is no pressing need for individuals to acquire official currency except to pay for imported goods.

Currency pegs and monetary unions

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If a country pegs its currency to one of another country that features a higher productivity growth or a more favourable unit cost development, it must – to maintain its competitiveness – either become equally more productive or lower its factor prices (e.g., wages). Cutting factor prices fosters deflation. Monetary unions have a similar effect to currency pegs.

Effects

[edit]

On spending and borrowing

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Some believe that, in the absence of large amounts of debt, deflation would be a welcome effect because the lowering of prices increases purchasing power.[36] However, while an increase in the purchasing power of one's money benefits some, it amplifies the sting of debt for others: after a period of deflation, the payments to service a debt represent a larger amount of purchasing power than they did when the debt was first incurred. Consequently, deflation can be thought of as an effective increase in a loan's interest rate. If, as during the Great Depression in the United States, deflation averages 10% per year, even an interest-free loan is unattractive as it must be repaid with money worth 10% more each year.

Under normal conditions, most central banks, such as the Federal Reserve, implement policy by setting a target for a short-term interest rate – the overnight federal funds rate in the U.S. – and enforcing that target by buying and selling securities in open capital markets. When the short-term interest rate hits zero, the central bank can no longer ease policy by lowering its usual interest-rate target. With interest rates near zero, debt relief becomes an increasingly important tool in managing deflation.

In recent times, as loan terms have grown in length and loan financing (or leveraging) is common among many types of investments, the costs of deflation to borrowers has grown larger.

On savings and investments

[edit]

Deflation can discourage private investment, because there is reduced expectations on future profits when future prices are lower. Consequently, with reduced private investments, spiraling deflation can cause a collapse in aggregate demand. Without the "hidden risk of inflation", it may become more prudent for institutions to hold on to money, and not to spend or invest it (burying money). They are therefore rewarded by saving and holding money. This "hoarding" behavior is seen as undesirable by most economists.[citation needed] Friedrich Hayek, a libertarian Austrian-school economist, wrote that:

It is agreed that hoarding money, whether in cash or in idle balances, is deflationary in its effects. No one thinks that deflation is in itself desirable.

— Hayek (1932)[37]

Compared with inflation

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Deflation causes a transfer of wealth from borrowers and holders of illiquid assets to the benefit of savers and of holders of liquid assets and currency, and because confused price signals cause malinvestment in the form of underinvestment. In this sense, its effects are the opposite of inflation, the effect of which is to transfer wealth from currency holders and lenders (savers) and to borrowers, including governments, and cause overinvestment. Whereas inflation encourages short term consumption and can similarly overstimulate investment in projects that may not be worthwhile in real terms (for example, the dot-com and housing bubbles), deflation reduces investment even when there is a real-world demand not being met. In modern economies, deflation is usually associated with economic depression, as occurred in the Great Depression and the Long Depression. Deflation was present during most economic depressions in US history.[38][better source needed]

Deflationary spiral

[edit]

A deflationary spiral is a situation where decreases in the price level lead to lower production, which in turn leads to lower wages and demand, which leads to further decreases in the price level.[39][40] Since reductions in general price level are called deflation, a deflationary spiral occurs when reductions in price lead to a vicious circle, where a problem exacerbates its own cause.[41] In science, this effect is also known as a positive feedback loop. Another economic example of this situation in economics is the bank run.

The Great Depression was regarded by some as a deflationary spiral.[42] A deflationary spiral is the modern macroeconomic version of the general glut controversy of the 19th century. Another related idea is Irving Fisher's theory that excess debt can cause a continuing deflation.

Counteracting deflation

[edit]

During severe deflation, targeting an interest rate (the usual method of determining how much currency to create) may be ineffective, because even lowering the short-term interest rate to zero may result in a real interest rate which is too high to attract credit-worthy borrowers. In the 21st-century, negative interest rates have been tried, but it cannot be too negative, since people might withdraw cash from bank accounts if they have a negative interest rate. Thus the central bank must directly set a target for the quantity of money (called "quantitative easing") and may use extraordinary methods to increase the supply of money, e.g. purchasing financial assets of a type not usually used by the central bank as reserves (such as mortgage-backed securities). Before he was Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke claimed in 2002, "sufficient injections of money will ultimately always reverse a deflation",[43] although Japan's deflationary spiral was not broken by the amount of quantitative easing provided by the Bank of Japan.

Until the 1930s, it was commonly believed by economists that deflation would cure itself. As prices decreased, demand would naturally increase, and the economic system would correct itself without outside intervention.

This view was challenged in the 1930s during the Great Depression. Keynesian economists argued that the economic system was not self-correcting with respect to deflation and that governments and central banks had to take active measures to boost demand through tax cuts or increases in government spending. Reserve requirements from the central bank were high compared to recent times. So were it not for redemption of currency for gold (in accordance with the gold standard), the central bank could have effectively increased money supply by simply reducing the reserve requirements and through open market operations (e.g., buying treasury bonds for cash) to offset the reduction of money supply in the private sectors due to the collapse of credit (credit is a form of money).

With the rise of monetarist ideas, the focus in fighting deflation was put on expanding demand by lowering interest rates (i.e., reducing the "cost" of money). This view has received criticism in light of the failure of accommodative policies in both Japan and the US to spur demand after stock market shocks in the early 1990s and in 2000–2002, respectively. Austrian economists worry about the inflationary impact of monetary policies on asset prices. Sustained low real rates can cause higher asset prices and excessive debt accumulation. Therefore, lowering rates may prove to be only a temporary palliative, aggravating an eventual debt deflation crisis.

Special borrowing arrangements

[edit]

When the central bank has lowered nominal interest rates to zero, it can no longer further stimulate demand by lowering interest rates. This is the famous liquidity trap. When deflation takes hold, it requires "special arrangements" to lend money at a zero nominal rate of interest (which could still be a very high real rate of interest, due to the negative inflation rate) in order to artificially increase the money supply.

Capital

[edit]

Although the values of capital assets are often casually said to deflate when they decline, this usage is not consistent with the usual definition of deflation; a more accurate description for a decrease in the value of a capital asset is economic depreciation. Another term, the accounting conventions of depreciation are standards to determine a decrease in values of capital assets when market values are not readily available or practical.

Historical examples

[edit]

EU countries

[edit]

The inflation rate of Greece was negative during three years from 2013 to 2015. The same applies to Bulgaria, Cyprus, Spain, and Slovakia from 2014 to 2016. Greece, Cyprus, Spain, and Slovakia are members of the European monetary union. The Bulgarian currency, the lev, is pegged to the Euro with a fixed exchange rate. In the entire European Union and the Eurozone, a disinflationary development was to be observed in the years 2011 to 2015.

Year Bulgaria Greece Cyprus Spain Slovakia EU Eurozone
2011 3.4 3.1 3.5 3.0 4.1 3.1 2.7
2012 2.4 1.0 3.1 2.4 3.7 2.6 2.5
2013 0.4 −0.9 0.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4
2014 −1.6 −1.4 −0.3 −0.2 −0.1 0.6 0.4
2015 −1.1 −1.1 −1.5 −0.6 −0.3 0.1 0.2
2016 −1.3 0.0 −1.2 −0.3 −0.5 0.2 0.2
2017 1.2 1.1 0.7 2.0 1.4 1.7 1.5

Table: Harmonised index of consumer prices. Annual average rate of change (%) (HICP inflation rate).[44] Negative values are highlighted in colour.

Hong Kong

[edit]

Following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Hong Kong experienced a long period of deflation which did not end until the fourth quarter of 2004.[45] Many East Asian currencies devalued following the crisis. The Hong Kong dollar, however, was pegged to the U.S. dollar, leading to an adjustment instead by a deflation of consumer prices. The situation was worsened by the increasingly cheap exports from mainland China, and "weak consumer confidence" in Hong Kong. This deflation was accompanied by an economic slump that was more severe and prolonged than those of the surrounding countries that devalued their currencies in the wake of the Asian financial crisis.[46][47]

Ireland

[edit]

In February 2009, Ireland's Central Statistics Office announced that during January 2009, the country experienced deflation, with prices falling by 0.1% from the same time in 2008. This was the first time deflation has hit the Irish economy since 1960. Overall consumer prices decreased by 1.7% in the month.[48]

Brian Lenihan, Ireland's Minister for Finance, mentioned deflation in an interview with RTÉ Radio. According to RTÉ's account,[49] "Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan has said that deflation must be taken into account when Budget cuts in child benefit, public sector pay and professional fees are being considered. Mr Lenihan said month-on-month there has been a 6.6% decline in the cost of living this year."

This interview is notable in that the deflation referred to is not discernibly regarded negatively by the Minister in the interview. The Minister mentions the deflation as an item of data helpful to the arguments for a cut in certain benefits. The alleged economic harm caused by deflation is not alluded to or mentioned by this member of government. This is a notable example of deflation in the modern era being discussed by a senior financial Minister without any mention of how it might be avoided, or whether it should be.[50][original research?]

Japan

[edit]

Deflation started in the early 1990s.[40] The Bank of Japan and the government tried to eliminate it by reducing interest rates and "quantitative easing," but did not create a sustained increase in broad money and deflation persisted. In July 2006, the zero-rate policy was ended.

Systemic reasons for deflation in Japan can be said to include:

  • Tight monetary conditions: The Bank of Japan kept monetary policy loose only when inflation was below zero, tightening whenever deflation ends.[51]
  • Unfavorable demographics: Japan has an aging population (22.6% over age 65) which has been declining since 2011, as the death rate exceeds the birth rate.[52][53]
  • Fallen asset prices: In the case of Japan asset price deflation was a mean reversion or correction back to the price level that prevailed before the asset bubble. There was a rather large price bubble in stocks and especially real estate in Japan in the 1980s (peaking in late 1989).[54][55]
  • Insolvent companies: Banks lent to companies and individuals that invested in real estate. When real estate values dropped, these loans could not be paid. The banks could try to collect on the collateral (land), but this wouldn't pay off the loan. Banks delayed that decision, hoping asset prices would improve. These delays were allowed by national banking regulators. Some banks made even more loans to these companies that are used to service the debt they already had. This continuing process is known as maintaining an "unrealized loss", and until the assets are completely revalued and/or sold off (and the loss realized), it will continue to be a deflationary force in the economy. Improving bankruptcy law, land transfer law, and tax law have been suggested as methods to speed this process and thus end the deflation.[56][57][58][59][60]
  • Insolvent banks: Banks with a larger percentage of their loans which are "non-performing", that is to say, they are not receiving payments on them, but have not yet written them off, cannot lend more money; they must increase their cash reserves to cover the bad loans.[61][62]
  • Fear of insolvent banks: Japanese people are afraid that banks will collapse so they prefer to buy (United States or Japanese) Treasury bonds instead of saving their money in a bank account. This likewise means the money is not available for lending and therefore economic growth. This means that the savings rate depresses consumption, but does not appear in the economy in an efficient form to spur new investment. People also save by owning real estate, further slowing growth, since it inflates land prices.[dubiousdiscuss]
  • Imported deflation: Japan imports Chinese and other countries' inexpensive consumable goods (due to lower wages and fast growth in those countries) and inexpensive raw materials, many of which reached all time real price minimums in the early 2000s. Thus, prices of imported products are decreasing. Domestic producers must match these prices in order to remain competitive. This decreases prices for many things in the economy, and thus is deflationary.[63][64]
  • Stimulus spending: According to both Austrian and monetarist economic theory, Keynesian stimulus spending actually has a depressing effect. This is because the government is competing against private industry, and usurping private investment dollars.[65] In 1998, for example, Japan produced a stimulus package of more than 16 trillion yen, over half of it public works that would have a quashing effect on an equivalent amount of private, wealth-creating economic activity.[66] Overall, Japan's stimulus packages added up to over one hundred trillion yen, and yet they failed. According to these economic schools, that stimulus money actually perpetuated the problem it was intended to cure.[67][68]

In November 2009, Japan returned to deflation, according to The Wall Street Journal. Bloomberg L.P. reports that consumer prices fell in October 2009 by a near-record 2.2%.[69] It was not until 2014 that new economic policies laid out by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe finally allowed for significant levels of inflation to return.[70] However, the COVID-19 recession once again led to deflation in 2020, with consumer good prices quickly falling, prompting heavy government stimulus worth over 20% of GDP.[71][72][73] As a result, it is likely that deflation will remain as a long-term economic issue for Japan.[74]

United Kingdom

[edit]

During World War I the British pound sterling was removed from the gold standard. The motivation for this policy change was to finance World War I; one of the results was inflation, and a rise in the gold price, along with the corresponding drop in international exchange rates for the pound. When the pound was returned to the gold standard after the war it was done on the basis of the pre-war gold price, which, since it was higher than equivalent price in gold, required prices to fall to realign with the higher target value of the pound.

The UK experienced deflation of approximately 10% in 1921, 14% in 1922, and 3 to 5% in the early 1930s.[75]

United States

[edit]
Annual inflation (in blue) and deflation (in green) rates in the United States since 1666
US CPI-U starting from 1913. Source: U.S. Department of Labor

Major deflations in the United States

[edit]

There have been four significant periods of deflation in the United States.

The first and most severe was during the depression in 1818–1821 when prices of agricultural commodities declined by almost 50%. A credit contraction caused by a financial crisis in England drained specie out of the U.S. The Bank of the United States also contracted its lending. The price of agricultural commodities fell by almost 50% from the high in 1815 to the low in 1821, and did not recover until the late 1830s, although to a significantly lower price level. Most damaging was the price of cotton, the U.S.'s main export. Food crop prices, which had been high because of the famine of 1816 that was caused by the year without a summer, fell after the return of normal harvests in 1818. Improved transportation, mainly from turnpikes, and to a minor extent the introduction of steamboats, significantly lowered transportation costs.[28]

The second was the depression of the late 1830s to 1843, following the Panic of 1837, when the currency in the United States contracted by about 34% with prices falling by 33%. The magnitude of this contraction is only matched by the Great Depression.[76] (See: § Historical examples of credit deflation.) This "deflation" satisfies both definitions, that of a decrease in prices and a decrease in the available quantity of money. Despite the deflation and depression, GDP rose 16% from 1839 to 1843.[76]

The third was after the Civil War, sometimes called The Great Deflation. It was possibly spurred by return to a gold standard, retiring paper money printed during the Civil War:

The Great Sag of 1873–96 could be near the top of the list. Its scope was global. It featured cost-cutting and productivity-enhancing technologies. It flummoxed the experts with its persistence, and it resisted attempts by politicians to understand it, let alone reverse it. It delivered a generation's worth of rising bond prices, as well as the usual losses to unwary creditors via defaults and early calls. Between 1875 and 1896, according to Milton Friedman, prices fell in the United States by 1.7% a year, and in Britain by 0.8% a year.

— Grant's Interest Rate Observer, 10 March 2006[77]

(Note: David A. Wells (1890) gives an account of the period and discusses the great advances in productivity which Wells argues were the cause of the deflation. The productivity gains matched the deflation.[78] Murray Rothbard (2002) gives a similar account.[79])

The fourth was in 1930–1933 when the rate of deflation was approximately 10 percent/year, part of the United States' slide into the Great Depression, where banks failed and unemployment peaked at 25%.

The deflation of the Great Depression occurred partly because there was an enormous contraction of credit (money), bankruptcies creating an environment where cash was in frantic demand, and when the Federal Reserve was supposed to accommodate that demand, it instead contracted the money supply by 30% in enforcement of its new real bills doctrine, so banks failed one by one (because they were unable to meet the sudden demand for cash – see Bank run). From the standpoint of the Fisher equation (see above), there was a simultaneous drop both in money supply (credit) and the velocity of money which was so profound that price deflation took hold despite the increases in money supply spurred by the Federal Reserve.

Minor deflations in the United States

[edit]

Throughout the history of the United States, inflation has approached zero and dipped below for short periods of time. This was quite common in the 19th century, and in the 20th century until the permanent abandonment of the gold standard for the Bretton Woods system in 1948. In the past 60 years, the United States has experienced deflation only two times; in 2009 with the Great Recession and in 2015, when the CPI barely broke below 0% at −0.1%.[80]

Some economists believe the United States may have experienced deflation as part of the 2008 financial crisis; compare the theory of debt deflation. Consumer prices dropped 1 percent in October 2008. This was the largest one-month fall in prices in the U.S. since at least 1947. That record was again broken in November 2008 with a 1.7% decline. In response, the Federal Reserve decided to continue cutting interest rates, down to a near-zero range as of December 16, 2008.[81]

In late 2008 and early 2009, some economists feared the U.S. would enter a deflationary spiral. Economist Nouriel Roubini predicted that the United States would enter a deflationary recession, and coined the term "stag-deflation" to describe it.[82] It was the opposite of stagflation, which was the main fear during the spring and summer of 2008. The United States then began experiencing measurable deflation, steadily decreasing from the first measured deflation of −0.38% in March, to July's deflation rate of −2.10%. On the wage front, in October 2009, the state of Colorado announced that its state minimum wage, which was indexed to inflation, was set to be cut, which would be the first time a state had cut its minimum wage since 1938.[83]

See also

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Notes

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from Grokipedia
Deflation is a persistent decline in the general of within an , equivalent to a negative rate of that enhances the of money held by individuals and firms. It typically arises from either supply-side factors, such as technological advancements and gains that outpace demand growth, or demand-side contractions, including reductions in or availability following financial disruptions. While deflation episodes are frequently linked to economic hardship—as in the U.S. of the 1930s, where prices fell by about 25% amid banking collapses and monetary contraction—empirical analyses across 17 countries from 1870 to 1999 reveal no strong causal connection between deflation and depressions, with most historical deflations occurring alongside positive or stable output growth rather than severe contractions. This distinction underpins debates over "good" versus "bad" deflation: the former, driven by as seen in the U.S. during the late 19th-century industrialization under the gold standard, supported real economic expansion by rewarding savers and efficient producers without evident spirals of deferred consumption. In contrast, "bad" deflation, often tied to crunches or errors that amplify real debt burdens through falling nominal incomes, can exacerbate downturns by increasing the effective weight of fixed obligations, though evidence indicates such dynamics stem more from underlying shocks like asset busts than price declines per se. Modern instances, such as Japan's prolonged deflationary stagnation since the asset bubble burst, highlight risks of responses that prioritize inflation targets over structural reforms, yet cross-country data affirm that deflation alone rarely predicts output collapse. Overall, deflation's effects hinge on its origins and institutional context, challenging blanket narratives of inherent harm while underscoring the role of flexible prices in .

Conceptual Foundations

Definition and Measurement

Deflation is a sustained decrease in the general of across an , equivalent to a negative rate. This price deflation entails a sustained fall in domestic price levels, increasing the currency's domestic purchasing power, and is distinct from currency depreciation, which involves weakening of the currency's value against foreign currencies, affecting its international purchasing power. This contrasts with , where the rate of price increase slows but remains positive, and one-off price reductions in specific sectors or items, which do not indicate broader deflationary trends. Sustained deflation is typically identified through consecutive negative readings in price indices over multiple quarters or years, distinguishing persistent episodes from temporary fluctuations. Deflation is quantified using key price indices, including the (CPI), which measures changes in prices for a fixed basket of goods and services purchased by urban consumers; the (PPI), tracking average price changes for domestic producer outputs; and the , capturing price movements for all goods and services produced within an economy. The CPI, for instance, weights components like housing, food, and transportation based on consumer expenditure surveys, with monthly updates reflecting current price data. These indices are subject to methodological challenges that can distort measurements. Substitution bias arises because fixed baskets do not fully account for consumers shifting to cheaper alternatives when relative prices change, leading the CPI to overstate inflation and understate deflation. adjustments, such as hedonic regressions for technological improvements in goods like , aim to isolate pure price effects but may introduce downward in reported price increases—or insufficient upward adjustments during price falls—potentially masking the full extent of deflationary trends. The origins of modern price indices date to the with rudimentary commodity price trackers, evolving into systematic indices in the for tariff and wage analysis. In the United States, the formalized national CPI calculations starting in 1913, aligning with the Federal Reserve's creation that year, which facilitated ongoing refinements in data collection and index construction for post-1913 economic monitoring.

Benign vs. Malign Deflation

Benign deflation arises from supply-side enhancements, such as technological innovations or improvements that expand output relative to the money supply, thereby lowering prices while elevating real incomes and living standards. In such scenarios, falling prices reflect greater efficiency rather than economic weakness, often coinciding with robust real GDP growth and minimal disruptions to , as increased production absorbs labor and capital productively. For instance, during the late from 1870 to 1896, annual deflation averaged approximately 1.2%, yet real GDP growth persisted at around 1.5% per year, driven by industrialization and efficiency gains that raised without widespread . Malign deflation, by contrast, stems from demand-side contractions, including monetary policy errors or external shocks that diminish aggregate spending and money velocity, potentially triggering a vicious cycle of reduced output and further price declines. Irving Fisher's debt-deflation theory posits that in over-indebted economies, deflation elevates the real value of nominal debts, prompting distress sales of assets, which depresses prices further, erodes collateral values, and intensifies bankruptcies and banking failures. This mechanism, observed acutely during the Great Depression, amplifies contractions when nominal rigidities prevent rapid adjustments in wages and debts. However, the theory has faced critique for underemphasizing relative price flexibility across sectors, where productivity-driven declines in specific goods prices may offset aggregate effects without necessitating spirals, as evidenced by historical episodes where deflation did not invariably lead to depression. Distinguishing the two relies on causal indicators: benign instances feature positive or accelerating real output growth, rising productivity metrics, and stable or improving employment, whereas malign cases show contracting GDP, falling capacity utilization, and credit crunches. Empirical analysis supports this bifurcation; Atkeson and Kehoe's examination of 17 countries from 1913 to 2000 revealed that roughly two-thirds of deflation episodes occurred alongside average or above-average real output growth, undermining the presumption that deflation inherently signals economic distress. Such findings, derived from comprehensive inflation and GDP data, highlight that supply-induced price declines foster prosperity, while demand deficiencies pose the true risks, challenging blanket policy aversion to all deflation.

Causes

Productivity-Driven Causes

Productivity-driven deflation occurs when technological advancements and efficiency improvements expand the supply of faster than the growth in nominal demand or , exerting downward pressure on prices while often boosting real output and living standards. This form of deflation, sometimes termed "good" or benign deflation, contrasts with demand-side contractions by reflecting positive supply shocks rather than economic distress. Empirical analyses of historical episodes, such as those by Bordo, Haubrich, and Filardo, identify surges as a primary driver in pre-World War I deflations, where falling prices coincided with robust growth rather than stagnation. A prominent historical instance unfolded during of 1873–1896, amid the Second . Innovations in steel production (e.g., ), railroads, and steam-powered machinery propelled productivity growth, enabling and lower transportation costs that flooded markets with cheaper goods. Wholesale prices declined by approximately 20–30% over this period, yet real wages rose by about 30–50% as output per worker increased, underscoring the era's non-malignant character. Similar dynamics appeared in Britain and other gold-standard economies, where structural supply expansions outstripped monetary growth, rewarding savers and without triggering widespread . In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the boom exemplified productivity-driven price declines in specific sectors. , observed by Intel co-founder in 1965 and validated through subsequent decades, predicted that the number of transistors on a microchip would double roughly every two years, exponentially enhancing computing power while costs per unit of performance plummeted. This led to a greater than 99% drop in the inflation-adjusted price of computing from 1980 to 2010, as measured by quality-adjusted metrics from the , contributing to overall despite broader inflationary pressures elsewhere. Such sectoral deflations, driven by and software innovations, amplified global without systemic economic harm, as evidenced by sustained GDP growth in advanced economies during the . Resource extraction efficiencies have also induced deflationary forces in energy markets. The U.S. shale revolution, propelled by hydraulic fracturing (fracking) advancements since the mid-2000s, unlocked vast reserves, causing prices to fall by roughly 47% relative to pre-fracking trajectories by 2013. This supply surge lowered input costs for and , exerting mild disinflationary effects across the economy—U.S. prices dropped over 50% from 2008 peaks by 2016—while spurring non-inflationary output gains in energy-intensive industries. Studies linking such supply shocks to price moderation, including those by Bordo and Filardo, affirm that these episodes foster efficiency without the debt-deflation traps seen in monetary contractions. Artificial intelligence (AI) represents a contemporary driver of technological deflation through accelerated production efficiency, reduced marginal costs, and enhanced supply chains, causing prices of goods and services to fall as supply growth outpaces demand. Short-term AI investments may temporarily boost demand, but long-term effects favor supply dominance, particularly in economies featuring high unemployment alongside strong corporate profits, where labor savings sustain profitability without proportional wage increases. However, counterarguments emphasize that while AI may exert deflationary pressures through productivity gains, central banks targeting around 2% inflation can respond with interest rate adjustments or monetary stimulus, and AI's creation of new jobs, markets, and demand may generate offsetting price increases. This mechanism contrasts with demand-pull inflation and parallels historical technological revolutions, such as the information technology surge.

Monetary and Credit Contraction

Monetary and credit contraction induces deflation when the supply of base money stagnates or declines, often due to policies restricting issuance or external constraints like adherence to a , which ties money growth to finite gold production rates of approximately 1-2% annually. Under such regimes, governments and s face limitations in expanding the money supply to match economic demands, potentially leading to price level reductions if velocity or credit multipliers also falter. Historical instances demonstrate that while these contractions can stem from deliberate tightening to curb prior inflation, prolonged inaction exacerbates outcomes through cascading credit shortages. In the United States during the 1920-1921 , the raised discount rates to 7% in June 1920 to combat wartime , contributing to a monetary slowdown that resulted in a 10.5% deflation in consumer prices over 1921. Real output fell by about 3%, and rose from 5.2% to around 11.7%, yet the economy recovered swiftly without sustained intervention, achieving by 1923 through wage and price adjustments unhindered by fiscal stimuli. This episode illustrates how short-term monetary restraint under partial influences can trigger deflation but allow rapid equilibration when not prolonged by policy errors. The provides a contrasting case of severe contraction, where the Federal Reserve's failure to counteract banking panics from 1930 to 1933 led to a one-third decline in the money supply, amplifying deflation through reduced credit multipliers as deposits evaporated. Economists and attributed this to the Fed's passivity, arguing that timely provision of could have mitigated the panics and stabilized the , preventing the credit implosion that deepened the downturn. adherence further constrained expansion, as outflows depleted reserves and forced domestic contraction to maintain convertibility. Since the abandonment of the gold standard and the shift to currencies post-1971, major monetary deflations have become rare in advanced economies, as s prioritize expansionary policies to avoid contractions, fostering an bias instead. However, disruptions in emerging systems like cryptocurrencies or stablecoins could precipitate localized credit contractions if issuance mechanisms falter or trust erodes, echoing historical multiplier effects without traditional backstops.

Debt Dynamics

In Irving Fisher's 1933 formulation, debt-deflation arises when a downturn initiates falling prices and nominal incomes, elevating the real value of fixed nominal debts since obligations remain unchanged while debtors' revenues and asset values decline. This prompts widespread debt liquidation as borrowers sell assets to repay creditors, depressing asset prices further and reinforcing deflation through a vicious cycle: over-indebtedness leads to liquidation, distress selling, reduced net worth, pessimism, reduced spending and hoarding, commodity price falls, more distress selling, and intensified deflation. The mechanism hinges on nominal rigidities in debt contracts, where falling prices amplify solvency risks without corresponding debt adjustments, forcing deleveraging that contracts credit and output. High pre-deflation leverage exacerbates this dynamic, as measured by elevated total -to-GDP ratios, which heighten vulnerability to price declines by magnifying real burdens and liquidation pressures. In the United States preceding the , private non-financial sector reached approximately 150% of GDP by 1929, contributing to the severity of the ensuing spiral as asset fire sales propagated deflation. Conversely, the U.S. deflationary episode of the 1880s, driven by productivity gains amid relatively low leverage, exhibited muted dynamics, with real output expanding despite price declines due to limited over-indebtedness constraining forced liquidations. Empirical assessments reveal limits to debt-deflation's universality, explaining severe depressions but not all deflations; analyses of episodes across 38 economies from 1870 to 2013 indicate that while crisis-linked deflations correlate with output contractions, many deflations—especially those without high prior leverage—coincide with growth, underscoring that processes can resolve insolvencies and relative price adjustments (e.g., flexibility) mitigate spirals absent systemic overleverage. Critiques note that Fisher's emphasis on the spiral overlooks how bankruptcies redistribute rather than amplify burdens long-term and how heterogeneous price responses—such as sticky nominal versus flexible goods prices—prevent uniform deflationary feedback in low- contexts.

Other Structural Factors

The collapse in prices from over $100 per barrel in mid-2014 to under $30 by early , triggered by a supply glut from surging U.S. production and Saudi Arabia's refusal to curtail output, imposed disinflationary pressures worldwide, lowering and edging some economies toward deflationary thresholds without corresponding monetary contraction. This episode underscored how exogenous commodity abundance, amplified by technological extraction efficiencies and geopolitical production decisions, can transmit deflationary shocks via reduced costs that permeate global supply chains and prices. Fixed exchange rate regimes within monetary unions have similarly fostered imported deflation, as evidenced in the Eurozone periphery during the 2010s sovereign debt crisis, where countries like Greece and Portugal faced competitiveness erosion from pre-crisis wage and price inflation exceeding that of core members such as Germany. Unable to devalue their currency, these economies underwent forced internal adjustments, entailing sharp fiscal austerity and labor market rigidities that suppressed prices and wages, culminating in outright deflation in Greece from 2013 onward as export competitiveness hinged on relative price declines rather than exchange rate flexibility. Structural overcapacity in export-oriented industries has perpetuated deflationary dynamics in , where the contracted by 2.3% year-over-year in September 2025, down from steeper declines earlier in the year, amid subdued domestic demand and policy-driven industrial expansion that outpaced absorption capacity. Official data from the National Bureau of Statistics attribute this to in sectors like and chemicals, contrasting with Japan's contemporaneous momentum—spring 2024 negotiations yielding average hikes of 5%, with projections for 6% in fiscal 2026—that has aided reflationary escape by stimulating consumption without relying on supply-side curbs.

Economic Effects

Positive Impacts

Deflation enhances the of nominal incomes and savings, allowing consumers and savers to acquire more goods and services with the same amount of money. In periods of benign deflation driven by gains, often rise as nominal wages remain stable or increase modestly while prices fall. For instance, during the U.S. from 1873 to 1896, wholesale prices declined by approximately 1.7% annually on average, yet for manufacturing workers rose by about 50% over the broader 1860–1890 period, reflecting improved labor and technological advances. This increase in real incomes supported higher living standards without corresponding eroding gains. Such dynamics also incentivize , as the real value of cash holdings appreciates over time, providing a positive return without reliance on interest-bearing assets. Empirical analyses of historical episodes indicate that deflationary periods frequently coincide with positive rather than contraction, particularly when stemming from supply-side improvements. A study of 17 countries from to 2000 found no systematic association between deflation and depression; output growth during deflationary years averaged comparable to inflationary periods, with depressions occurring independently of price declines in most cases. In roughly two-thirds of deflation episodes examined, real output expanded, underscoring that falling prices can signal efficient rather than economic distress. Deflation further promotes investment in productivity-enhancing capital by discouraging immediate consumption in favor of deferred spending, as lower future prices reward waiting. This aligns with observed patterns in growth-correlated deflations, where supply shocks—such as innovations in production—drive price reductions alongside output increases, as seen in the late 19th-century U.S. experience with railroad expansion and industrialization. Export-oriented economies can benefit from deflationary adjustments that restore competitiveness through lower domestic costs, facilitating surpluses. In Ireland's post-2008 adjustment from 2009 to 2013, cumulative price declines and wage moderation improved cost competitiveness, contributing to a more than 40% rise in goods exports despite domestic . These effects highlight deflation's role in correcting imbalances and fostering sustainable expansion when not entangled with debt overhangs.

Negative Impacts

Deflation can induce delayed and spending as agents anticipate further declines, thereby hoarding and diminishing in a manner consistent with Keynesian dynamics. This behavioral response has empirical backing in demand-deficient deflations, where expectations of persistent falls curb current expenditures; for example, during the U.S. from 1929 to 1933, real personal consumption declined amid a 25 percent drop in , amplifying the initial contraction. However, evidence suggests this effect is context-dependent and milder in productivity-driven deflations, where falls stem from supply efficiencies rather than demand weakness, limiting the scope for self-reinforcing postponement. Nominal wage stickiness compounds unemployment risks in deflationary environments, as downward rigidity in pay scales elevates relative to falling prices, raising firms' unit labor costs and incentivizing labor shedding to restore competitiveness. Historical data from the illustrate this mechanism: U.S. unemployment surged to a peak of 25 percent in , even as nominal wages fell, because price deflation outpaced wage adjustments, straining employer margins. Empirical analyses of deflationary shocks confirm that such rigidity amplifies joblessness, though its severity varies with institutional factors like union strength and policy responses. Deflation often coincides with the deflation of asset bubbles, where prior overleveraging in sectors like or equities leads to cascading defaults as nominal asset values plummet, eroding collateral and availability, while increasing real debt burdens by raising the value of nominal debts relative to falling incomes and prices. This dynamic was evident in interwar episodes, where falling prices exacerbated balance sheet deteriorations in overextended financial systems and contributed to prolonged economic stagnation, as exemplified by Japan's lost decades of deflationary pressures following the 1990s asset bubble. Critically, however, the root causation typically lies in pre-existing misallocations of and speculative excesses—malinvestments fueled by loose monetary conditions—rather than deflation initiating the burst; the price decline serves more as an amplifier than a primary trigger.

Effects on Debt, Savings, and Investment

Deflation increases the real value of nominal burdens, as fixed payments become more onerous relative to falling prices and incomes, often leading to defaults and bankruptcies among leveraged borrowers. In the United States during the depression, agricultural prices declined by approximately 20% from to amid broader deflation, exacerbating farm defaults and foreclosures, with thousands of farmers losing land as real service ratios surged. This dynamic disproportionately burdens debtors in both benign productivity-driven deflation and malign contractionary episodes, transferring wealth to creditors by enhancing the of repayments. Over longer horizons, such real debt revaluation can foster more prudent lending practices by heightening default risks for overextended borrowers, thereby disciplining allocation and reducing systemic leverage buildup. Empirical patterns from historical deflations, including the late 19th-century U.S. experience, show that while short-term insolvencies rise, surviving creditors emerge with strengthened balance sheets, potentially stabilizing financial intermediation absent monetary distortions. For savers and holders of cash or fixed-income assets, deflation elevates real returns by preserving or increasing the of nominal savings, rewarding deferred consumption and contrasting sharply with inflation's erosion of principal. In deflationary regimes, real interest rates typically rise as nominal rates adjust incompletely downward, yielding positive real yields that incentivize thrift; historical analyses indicate attractive real returns on safe assets during such periods, often exceeding 2% annually adjusted for price declines, versus negative real yields in high-inflation eras that penalize savers. Deflation typically favors cash and high-quality bonds, as falling prices enhance their real purchasing power. Conversely, it tends to be unfavorable for stocks, owing to declines in corporate pricing power, compressed profit margins, and increased real debt burdens; real estate and commodities also generally experience price declines. Defensive stocks may perform relatively better in such environments. Investment patterns under deflation shift toward durable, productive assets with enduring value, as falling prices compress margins on short-term goods but reward capital-intensive projects with long gestation periods. In the U.S. during the late 19th-century deflationary (roughly 1873–1896), railroad mileage expanded from about 70,000 to over 200,000 miles despite price declines averaging 1.5% annually, driven by productivity gains and investor focus on yielding sustained real economic benefits. Conversely, in malign deflationary spirals like the 2008–2009 crisis, heightened debt burdens and uncertainty triggered credit freezes, curtailing new investment as lenders withdrew amid fears of cascading defaults, even absent outright price collapse.

Theoretical Perspectives and Debates

Keynesian and Mainstream Views

In , deflation intensifies recessions by elevating , as falling prices increase the real value of money holdings and incentivize agents to hoard cash rather than spend or invest, thereby contracting further. posited in The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936) that expectations of ongoing price declines prompt deferred consumption, amplifying downward pressure on output and employment through a self-reinforcing cycle. This dynamic manifests acutely in a , where nominal interest rates hit the , rendering monetary expansion ineffective since agents demand infinite liquidity premiums on bonds, as observed in Japan's post-1990s stagnation and echoed in post-2008 analyses. Mainstream macroeconomic frameworks, building on Keynesian foundations, regard sustained deflation as a precursor to entrenched slumps and thus prioritize targets above zero to avert such traps. The U.S. Federal Reserve's 2% longer-run objective, formalized in , aims to furnish policy space for rate cuts during downturns while insulating against deflationary spirals that could bind at zero rates. The similarly pursues a 2% target, symmetrically applied, to establish a buffer against deflation risks and sustain monetary transmission amid wage and price rigidities. Advocates contend this mild facilitates real wage adjustments without nominal reductions, "greasing" labor markets and preempting behaviors inherent to deflationary environments. Keynesian perspectives frequently invoke the 1930s , where deflation exceeding 10% annually in 1932 coincided with U.S. GDP contractions of over 25% from peak to trough, as evidence of deflation's depressive potency. Yet this correlation falters under scrutiny for , as it neglects concurrent shocks like the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of June 1930, which escalated average U.S. duties to nearly 60% on dutiable imports, triggering retaliatory barriers that halved global trade volumes by 1933 and intensified output losses via supply disruptions rather than price effects alone. Cross-country and interwar data further reveal scant systematic ties between deflation episodes and growth shortfalls outside this outlier, underscoring empirical limits to portraying deflation as inherently destabilizing absent demand deficiencies.

Austrian and Supply-Side Critiques

The , particularly through the works of and , views deflation arising from the bust phase of the as a necessary corrective mechanism for malinvestments induced by prior monetary expansion. In , policies that artificially suppress rates via creation distort signals, encouraging unsustainable investments in capital-intensive projects misaligned with time preferences. This leads to an illusory boom, followed by inevitable resource reallocation during contraction, where falling prices facilitate the of unprofitable ventures and restore intertemporal coordination. Deflation in this context is not inherently harmful but essential for purging excesses, preventing prolonged distortions that could otherwise embed inefficiencies in the economy. A historical application of this theory points to the 1920s U.S. credit expansion under the , which fueled speculative investments in stocks and real estate, culminating in the 1929 crash and subsequent deflationary adjustment. argued that the preceding easy money policy, including discounted rediscount rates as low as 3.5% by 1927, created a cluster of errors in production structure, with deflation from 1929 to 1933—prices falling approximately 25%—serving to realign capital toward consumer-driven demands rather than perpetuating the bubble. Austrian proponents contend that resisting this deflation through interventions, such as Hoover's wage rigidities or FDR's expansions, prolonged the by hindering necessary liquidations. Critics from this school extend their analysis to modern inflation-targeting regimes, asserting that mandates like the Federal Reserve's 2% target since 2012 foster by signaling perpetual accommodation, thereby inflating asset bubbles such as the dot-com surge of the late 1990s or the housing mania peaking in 2006. These policies, by prioritizing over money supply neutrality, encourage excessive leverage and risk-taking, as agents anticipate bailouts, rather than allowing market-driven price adjustments under a neutral monetary standard. Supply-side perspectives align here by emphasizing that interventions distort supply incentives, preferring regimes that permit productivity-led price declines without countervailing monetary stimulus, which undermines savings and long-term . Under a , as advocated by like Mises, deflations associated with productivity gains or credit corrections historically supported stable growth by anchoring money to a non-debasable , avoiding the fiat-induced erosion of that penalizes savers. This framework enforces fiscal and monetary discipline, enabling natural price flexibility that rewards efficient production and innovation, contrasting with discretionary systems prone to boom-bust amplification.

Empirical Evidence on Outcomes

Empirical analysis of historical deflation episodes challenges the presumption that deflation invariably leads to economic contraction. A comprehensive study by economists Andrew Atkeson and Patrick J. Kehoe examined and real output growth across 17 countries from 1870 to 1997, identifying 73 distinct deflation episodes. In 65 of these cases, no associated depression occurred, with average real output growth during deflationary periods comparable to or exceeding that in inflationary times; only severe demand-driven instances, such as the of the 1930s, coincided with sharp declines. This finding indicates that deflation per se does not predict negative growth outcomes, as improvements often underpinned price declines without triggering recessions. Further disaggregation reveals a distinction between "good" and "bad" deflations, as explored by Michael Bordo and Andrew Filardo in their analysis of episodes under the classical (late 19th to early ). Supply-side deflations, driven by technological advances or gains, comprised the majority—approximately two-thirds—of historical cases and were typically accompanied by positive real GDP growth, averaging around 3% annually in non-crisis periods. In contrast, demand-shock deflations, representing about one-third, correlated with output contractions due to monetary contractions or banking failures. Post-World War II regimes have reduced deflation frequency through inflationary policies, yet residual episodes underscore that context—supply versus demand dynamics—determines outcomes rather than deflation itself. Contemporary data reinforces this pattern. In , persistent producer price index (PPI) deflation, with declines exceeding 2.5% year-over-year from mid-2023 through mid-2025 (reaching -3.6% in July 2025 after 34 consecutive months of contraction), coexisted with robust GDP expansion of approximately 5% annually in 2023–2025, supported by industrial output and export resilience amid overcapacity adjustments. This episode exemplifies - or efficiency-led deflation sustaining growth, absent the debt-deflation spirals seen in demand-constrained environments.

Historical Examples

19th-Century Productivity Deflations

In the post-Civil War from 1865 to 1900, rapid industrialization driven by expansions in railroads, production, and led to significant productivity gains that outpaced monetary expansion under the gold standard, resulting in an average annual deflation rate of approximately 1.7% in wholesale prices. Despite falling prices, real GDP grew at an annual rate of about 4%, reflecting robust output increases from technological innovations and . for workers rose substantially, with manufacturing daily wages increasing by around 50% nominally amid deflation, translating to real gains exceeding 60% as purchasing power improved. These dynamics demonstrated benign deflation, where lower prices enhanced affordability of like consumer products and housing, boosting living standards without widespread , as labor markets adjusted flexibly absent modern rigidities. In , the period from 1873 to 1896, often termed the , featured sustained deflation amid the diffusion of steam power, electricity precursors, and steel technologies across economies like the and . Wholesale prices declined by 1-2% annually on average, yet real output expanded through productivity improvements, with the UK maintaining low unemployment rates below 5% in most years due to wage and price flexibility that prevented persistent joblessness. The similarly avoided mass unemployment, as deflation accompanied industrial output growth of 5.35% per year from 1880 to 1896, underscoring that supply-driven price declines facilitated resource reallocation toward higher-efficiency sectors. The international played a key role in these episodes by anchoring money supplies to gold production, which increased at 2-3% annually but lagged behind productivity surges, enabling natural price adjustments without discretionary interventions. Empirical decompositions attribute the era's deflation primarily to positive shocks rather than monetary contractions, with negative demand shocks exerting negligible effects on output or . This framework supported global trade integration and capital flows, mitigating imbalances through automatic equilibrating mechanisms like specie flows, contrasting with later fiat-era disruptions. Overall, these deflations correlated with accelerated growth and innovation, challenging narratives equating price declines with economic harm.

Great Depression and Interwar Period

In the United States, the period from 1929 to 1933 witnessed a sharp deflationary contraction, with consumer prices falling by approximately 25 percent and wholesale prices by 32 percent, coinciding with a peak rate of 25 percent in 1933. This episode was driven primarily by the Federal Reserve's failure to counteract banking panics and deposit outflows, resulting in a one-third contraction in the money supply over the same interval. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, enacted in June 1930, compounded these pressures by raising average import duties to nearly 60 percent and triggering retaliatory measures from trading partners, which halved U.S. exports between 1929 and 1933. attributes the depth of the slump not to deflation per se, but to these policy-induced contractions in money and trade, which amplified output declines exceeding 25 percent in real GDP. Internationally, adherence to the gold standard regime intensified the deflationary transmission across economies, as countries maintained fixed exchange rates that compelled monetary tightening in response to gold outflows. Gold bloc nations, including and the until 1933, faced amplified contractions due to asymmetric gold hoarding by surplus countries like , which absorbed over half of global monetary gold reserves between 1928 and 1932. Competitive devaluations by early abandoners, such as Britain's departure from gold in September 1931, pressured remaining adherents but ultimately facilitated faster recoveries; nations exiting the standard experienced output rebounds averaging 10-15 percent higher than gold bloc peers in the ensuing two years. The U.S. turning point arrived in April 1933, when President Roosevelt's suspending gold convertibility and subsequent dollar devaluation by 40 percent against gold enabled monetary expansion and , with industrial production surging 57 percent from March to July 1933 alone. This shift correlated with a halt in deflation and a narrowing of the , underscoring how prior commitment to monetary orthodoxy had deferred necessary easing. Econometric models by demonstrate that the Federal Reserve's adherence to gold-standard constraints and reluctance to inject liquidity prolonged the depression; simulations indicate that expansionary from 1930 onward could have reduced the cumulative output loss by over half, validating critiques of delayed intervention as the core causal failure rather than deflationary dynamics themselves.

Post-1970s Episodes

In the fiat currency era following the end of the in the early 1970s, deflationary episodes have been infrequent, generally demand-driven rather than productivity-led, and often intensified by high levels or policy constraints in currency unions. These instances typically feature shorter durations—averaging 1–3 years in many cases—but deeper economic contractions when occurring amid elevated leverage, as falling prices raise real burdens and discourage spending via debt-deflation dynamics. Empirical analyses of international data panels confirm that post-1971 deflations correlate with output drops averaging 5–10% or more in affected economies, contrasting with milder historical precedents, due to entrenched expectations and financial fragilities under discretionary central banking. Japan's deflationary period, emerging after the 1989–1990 asset price bubble collapse—which saw the Nikkei 225 index decline 82% from its peak of 38,916 on December 29, 1989, to lows around 7,000 in 2008–2009, with full recovery taking about 34 years until February 2024—exemplifies prolonged stagnation in a high-debt context, driven by deflation, banking issues, and economic stagnation (Lost Decades). Consumer prices began declining in 1995, with annual CPI changes averaging -0.3% from to 2005 and remaining negative or near-zero through 2012, contributing to the "Lost Decades" of sub-1% annual GDP growth. The episode stemmed from overleveraged banks delaying resolutions, corporate balance sheet repairs, and structural reforms, despite liquidity injections that fueled asset rebounds but entrenched zero-bound interest rates and deflationary mindset. This sowed seeds for chronic low growth, as nominal wage rigidity and precautionary saving amplified the downturn, with real GDP contracting 1.5% in alone. In the sovereign debt crisis, experienced acute deflation from mid-2013 to early 2016, with the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices falling 1.3% in 2013, -0.2% in 2014, and -1.0% in 2015, marking 33 consecutive months of price declines. Triggered by austerity measures to address fiscal imbalances and achieve primary surpluses (reaching 3.7% of GDP by 2016), this internal devaluation reduced unit labor costs by 25% from 2010 peaks but contracted GDP by 25% overall, driving to 27.5% in 2013 and prompting social costs including and spikes. Lacking a flexible , 's fixed membership precluded depreciation adjustments, unlike Sweden's post-1992 floating krona regime, which maintained 2% and avoided deflation through export competitiveness gains amid global slowdowns.

Recent Developments (1990s–2025)

Following the burst of its asset price bubble in the early , Japan entered a prolonged period of known as the , characterized by chronic near-deflation and average annual real GDP growth of approximately 0.5% through the and . Consumer prices remained flat or slightly negative for much of this era, exacerbating debt burdens and discouraging investment amid banking sector impairments and demographic pressures. The implementation of in 2012, combining aggressive monetary easing with fiscal and structural measures, gradually shifted the economy toward positive , achieving sustained CPI increases above the 2% target by 2023 alongside the largest nominal wage hikes since the early in 2023–2025 spring labor negotiations. In China, producer price deflation intensified from 2023 amid a property sector crisis that eroded household wealth by an estimated $18 trillion and excess industrial capacity, with the Producer Price Index (PPI) falling 3.6% year-over-year in June 2025—the steepest drop since July 2023—before easing to -2.9% in August 2025. Despite these pressures, real GDP growth demonstrated resilience at around 5% in 2024 per official figures, though independent estimates placed it lower at 2.4–2.8%, challenging narratives of inevitable deflationary spirals given sustained export momentum and policy buffers. Global deflation risks escalated in 2025, with warnings of potential freezes due to tightened lending standards and reduced development for single-family homes, as highlighted in analyses. Oil market oversupply, driven by OPEC+ production increases, posed further downward pressure on prices, with projected to average $62 per barrel in Q4 2025 and $52 in 2026, amplifying industrial deflation risks. In the , progressed rapidly in 2024, reducing CPI to around 2.6% by mid-year, but Brookings analyses identified deflation as a notable amid softening . Counterbalancing these concerns, emerging gains from adoption could foster benign deflation through accelerated production efficiency, reduced marginal costs, enhanced supply chains, and labor-saving innovations, potentially leading to falling prices even in economies with high unemployment and strong corporate profits from cost compressions. Short-term AI investments may temporarily boost demand, but long-term supply growth is expected to dominate, contrasting with demand-pull inflation and aligning with historical technological revolutions.

Policy Responses

Monetary Interventions

Central banks, within inflation-targeting regimes typically aiming for around 2% inflation, employ interest rate cuts and monetary stimulus to counteract deflationary pressures, including those arising from productivity surges such as artificial intelligence advancements; when constrained by the on nominal rates, they resort to unconventional tools such as , negative rates, and forward guidance to stimulate and avert entrenched price declines. These interventions aim to lower long-term yields, encourage lending, and anchor inflation expectations, though empirical outcomes reveal limited potency in restoring robust growth amid structural headwinds. Quantitative easing (QE) involves large-scale asset purchases to expand the central bank's , injecting liquidity and depressing yields to combat deflation. The pioneered QE in March 2001, targeting current account balances at commercial banks, which expanded its from approximately 110 trillion yen pre-2001 to over 737 trillion yen by March 2024, equivalent to more than 120% of GDP. This policy, sustained through phases like ' aggressive easing from 2013, helped stabilize prices and prevent deeper deflationary spirals, with core CPI averaging near zero rather than plunging further. However, despite trillions in yen injected, Japan's real GDP growth remained subdued at an annual average of under 1% from 2001 to 2025, trapped in a (ZIRP) environment that fostered zombie firms and fiscal dependency without robust inflationary momentum. Negative interest rates, applied to , seek to penalize hoarding and spur bank lending during deflation risks. The (ECB) introduced negative deposit rates in June 2014, pushing the rate to -0.5% by 2019, alongside QE, which marginally boosted euro area lending volumes and economic activity. Empirical studies indicate a modest GDP uplift, with estimates suggesting 0.2-0.5% additional growth from the policy through 2022, primarily via cheaper borrowing costs passed to firms. Yet, these experiments compressed bank net interest margins, imposing annual costs exceeding €15 billion on European lenders by eroding profitability and prompting riskier asset shifts to compensate, thus distorting financial intermediation. The ECB ended negative rates in 2022 amid rising , highlighting their role as a temporary bridge rather than a sustained deflation cure. Forward guidance communicates future policy intentions to shape expectations and lower yields preemptively. The deployed calendar-based guidance in 2011-2012, committing to near-zero rates until mid-2013 or fell below 6.5%, building on initial 2008 signals during the to counter deflation fears. This tool proved effective short-term, reducing long-term Treasury yields by 20-50 basis points and supporting recovery without immediate balance sheet expansion. Nonetheless, overpromising risks erode credibility if economic conditions shift, as seen in subsequent adjustments that briefly spiked yields and underscored guidance's dependence on perceived resolve amid deflationary traps.

Fiscal and Structural Measures

Fiscal stimulus packages have been deployed to counteract deflationary pressures by boosting through and public investment. In , following the 2008 global , expansive fiscal measures totaling approximately 4 trillion yuan (about 12.5% of GDP at the time) focused on projects, which helped avert deeper deflation and contributed 1-2 points to annual GDP growth in the subsequent years. However, these interventions elevated public debt levels, with total debt-to-GDP ratios reaching around 350% by the mid-2020s, raising sustainability concerns amid persistent deflation risks. Ongoing fiscal expansion, including a targeted budget deficit of about 4% of GDP in 2025, aims to support growth but illustrates the trade-offs of debt accumulation without corresponding productivity gains. Structural labor market reforms, by reducing wage stickiness and enhancing flexibility, can mitigate deflationary spirals tied to rigid costs and unemployment. Ireland's post-2008 adjustments, including deregulation of employment protections and collective bargaining, facilitated a regain in competitiveness; unit labor costs fell by over 20% between 2008 and 2013, aiding export-led recovery and reducing unemployment from 15% in 2012 to under 5% by 2019. These measures eased downward nominal wage rigidity, which exacerbates deflation by preventing real adjustments, though initial short-term pain included higher unemployment before growth rebounded. Empirical analyses indicate such reforms yield long-term GDP gains of 1-2% when implemented swiftly, but success depends on complementary export orientation. Supply-side fiscal measures, such as tax reductions and , indirectly counter deflation by fostering productivity and investment-led growth rather than relying solely on demand stimulus. The U.S. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 under President Reagan lowered the top marginal rate from 70% to 50%, spurring real GDP growth averaging 3.5% annually from 1983 to 1989 and outperforming periods of pure fiscal demand boosts, as evidenced by comparative assessments showing stronger supply responses in output multipliers. in sectors like and further reduced costs, contributing to without recessionary deflation. Overall, these approaches demonstrate mixed empirical outcomes: while effective in restoring growth trajectories, their deflation-mitigating effects often lag and require avoidance of offsetting debt increases, with studies highlighting greater sustainability over repeated demand injections.

Critiques of Inflation-Targeting Regimes

Critics contend that inflation-targeting regimes, prevalent since the , exhibit an inherent asymmetry by prioritizing the avoidance of deflation while permitting deviations above the target inflation rate, such as the common 2% goal. This bias encourages central banks to maintain accommodative policies longer than warranted, fostering asset price bubbles. For instance, in the United States during the early , interest rates remained below those prescribed by the —by as much as 3 percentage points in 2003-2004—contributing causally to the housing market expansion that culminated in the 2007-2008 . Similar deviations have been observed globally, with policy rates systematically lower than Taylor-implied benchmarks since the early , amplifying credit expansions and subsequent busts. This framework also imposes a regressive burden on savers and wage earners by eroding real returns through steady mild , effectively functioning as a stealth on fixed-income assets. Empirical analysis links such regimes to heightened income inequality, primarily through Cantillon effects, where newly created money flows first to financial intermediaries and asset holders—such as banks and stockholders—enabling them to bid up prices in stocks, , and other investments before broader price increases dilute for later recipients like workers and pensioners. Studies confirm that post-adoption of in various economies correlates with widening Gini coefficients, as the benefits accrue disproportionately to those proximate to monetary expansion channels. Mainstream sources, including those from central banks, often underemphasize these distributional impacts, reflecting institutional incentives to justify discretionary . Proponents of reform argue that overlooks supply-side dynamics, reacting adversely to benign productivity-driven deflations while ignoring financial imbalances, as evidenced by regime vulnerabilities to shocks documented in cross-country simulations. In contrast, alternatives like nominal GDP (NGDP) level targeting—aiming for stable growth in total spending—better accommodate real output expansions without deflationary panic, stabilizing both prices and employment amid supply improvements; econometric models show NGDP rules outperforming inflation targets in reducing volatility during historical supply disturbances. Returning to commodity-linked standards, such as convertibility, is advocated for enforcing monetary neutrality and limiting discretion, drawing on pre-1914 evidence of sustained growth under despite episodic banking strains, which resolved without persistent distortions from expansion. These critiques underscore a toward rules that prioritize nominal aggregate balance over rigid price indices.

References

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