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United States federal budget
United States federal budget
from Wikipedia

2024 US Federal Budget
The actual and projected budget deficit of the United States federal budget by the CBO

The United States budget comprises the spending and revenues of the U.S. federal government. The budget is the financial representation of the priorities of the government, reflecting historical debates and competing economic philosophies. The government primarily spends on healthcare, retirement, and defense programs.

The non-partisan Congressional Budget Office provides extensive analysis of the budget and its economic effects.

The budget typically contains more spending than revenue, the difference adding to the federal debt each year. CBO estimated in February 2024 that federal debt held by the public is projected to rise from 99 percent of GDP in 2024 to 116 percent in 2034 and would continue to grow if current laws generally remained unchanged. Over that period, the growth of interest costs and mandatory spending outpaces the growth of revenues and the economy, driving up debt. Those factors persist beyond 2034, pushing federal debt higher still, to 172 percent of GDP in 2054.[1]

The amount of U.S. public debt, measured as a percentage of GDP, held by the public since 1900

Overview

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CBO: U.S. Federal spending and revenue components for fiscal year 2023. Major expenditure categories are healthcare, Social Security, and defense. Income and payroll taxes are the primary revenue sources.
CBO: Revenue and Expense as % GDP. Deficits are projected to grow as a percentage of GDP as the country ages and healthcare costs rise faster than the economy.
CBO current law baseline as of May 2023, showing forecast of deficit and debt by year

The budget document often begins with the President's proposal to Congress recommending funding levels for the next fiscal year, beginning October 1 and ending on September 30 of the year following. The fiscal year refers to the year in which it ends. However, Congress is the body required by law to pass appropriations annually and to submit funding bills passed by both houses to the President for signature. Congressional decisions are governed by rules and legislation regarding the federal budget process. Budget committees set spending limits for the House and Senate committees and for Appropriations subcommittees, which then approve individual appropriations bills to allocate funding to various federal programs.[2]

If Congress fails to pass an annual budget, then several appropriations bills must be passed as "stop gap" measures. After Congress approves an appropriations bill, it is then sent to the President, who may either sign it into law or veto it. A vetoed bill is sent back to Congress, which can pass it into law with a two-thirds majority in each legislative chamber. Congress may also combine all or some appropriations bills into one omnibus reconciliation bill. In addition, the president may request and the Congress may pass supplemental appropriations bills or emergency supplemental appropriations bills.

Several government agencies provide budget data and analysis. These include the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Treasury Department. These agencies have reported that the federal government is facing many important long-run financing challenges, primarily driven by an aging population, rising interest payments, and spending for healthcare programs like Medicare and Medicaid.[3]

During FY2022, the federal government spent $6.3 trillion. Spending as % of GDP is 25.1%, almost 2 percentage points greater than the average over the past 50 years. Major categories of FY 2022 spending included: Medicare and Medicaid ($1.339T or 5.4% of GDP), Social Security ($1.2T or 4.8% of GDP), non-defense discretionary spending used to run federal Departments and Agencies ($910B or 3.6% of GDP), Defense Department ($751B or 3.0% of GDP), and net interest ($475B or 1.9% of GDP).[4]

CBO projects a federal budget deficit of $1.6 trillion for 2024. In the agency’s projections, deficits generally increase over the coming years; the shortfall in 2034 is $2.6 trillion. The deficit amounts to 5.6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2024, swells to 6.1 percent of GDP in 2025, and then declines in the two years that follow. After 2027, deficits increase again, reaching 6.1 percent of GDP in 2034.[1]

The following table summarizes several budgetary statistics for the fiscal year 2015-2021 periods as a percent of GDP, including federal tax revenue, outlays or spending, deficits (revenue – outlays), and debt held by the public. The historical average for 1969-2018 is also shown. With U.S. GDP of about $21 trillion in 2019, 1% of GDP is about $210 billion.[5] Statistics for 2020-2022 are from the CBO Monthly Budget Review for FY 2022.[6]

Variable As % GDP 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Hist Avg
Revenue[5] 18.0% 17.6% 17.2% 16.4% 16.4% 16.2% 17.9% 19.6% 17.4%
Outlays[5] 20.4% 20.8% 20.6% 20.2% 21.0% 31.1% 30.1% 25.1% 21.0%
Budget Deficit[5] -2.4% -3.2% -3.5% -3.8% -4.6% -14.9% -12.3% -5.5% -3.6%
Debt Held by Public[5] 72.5% 76.4% 76.2% 77.6% 79.4% 100.3% 99.6% 94.7%

Budget principles

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The U.S. Constitution (Article I, section 9, clause 7) states that "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time."

Each year, the President of the United States submits a budget request to Congress for the following fiscal year as required by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. Current law (31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)) requires the president to submit a budget no earlier than the first Monday in January, and no later than the first Monday in February. Typically, presidents submit budgets on the first Monday in February. The budget submission has been delayed, however, in some new presidents' first year when the previous president belonged to a different party.

The federal budget is calculated largely on a cash basis. That is, revenues and outlays are recognized when transactions are made. Therefore, the full long-term costs of programs such as Medicare, Social Security, and the federal portion of Medicaid are not reflected in the federal budget. By contrast, many businesses and some other national governments have adopted forms of accrual accounting, which recognizes obligations and revenues when they are incurred. The costs of some federal credit and loan programs, according to provisions of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, are calculated on a net present value basis.[7]

Federal agencies cannot spend money unless funds are authorized and appropriated by law. Like any law, such appropriations must be introduced in Congress as a bill and passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate and then usually be signed by the president.[8] Typically, separate Congressional committees have jurisdiction over authorization and appropriations. The House and Senate Appropriations Committees currently have 12 subcommittees, which are responsible for drafting the 12 regular appropriations bills that determine amounts of discretionary spending for various federal programs. In many recent years, regular appropriations bills have been combined into "omnibus" bills.

Congress may also pass "special" or "emergency" appropriations. Spending that is deemed an "emergency" is exempt from certain Congressional budget enforcement rules. Funds for disaster relief have sometimes come from supplemental appropriations, such as after Hurricane Katrina. In other cases, funds included in emergency supplemental appropriations bills support activities not obviously related to actual emergencies, such as parts of the 2000 Census of Population and Housing. Special appropriations have been used to fund most of the costs of war and occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan so far.[citation needed]

Budget resolutions and appropriations bills, which reflect spending priorities of Congress, will usually differ from funding levels in the president's budget. The president, however, retains substantial influence over the budget process through veto power and through congressional allies when the president's party has a majority in Congress.

Budget authority versus outlays

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The amount of budget authority and outlays for a fiscal year usually differ because the government can incur obligations for future years. This means that budget authority from a previous fiscal year can, in many cases, be used for expenditure of funds in future fiscal years; for example, a multi-year contract.

Budget authority is the legal authority provided by federal law to enter into financial obligations that will result in immediate or future outlays involving federal government funds. Outlays refer to the issuance of checks, disbursement of cash or electronic transfer of funds made to liquidate a federal obligation and is usually synonymous with "expenditure" or "spending". The term "appropriations" refers to budget authority to incur obligations and to make payments from the Treasury for specified purposes. Some military and some housing programs have multi-year appropriations, in which their budget authority is specified for several coming fiscal years.

In the congressional budgeting process, an "authorization" (technically the "authorization act") provides the legal authority for the executive branch to act, establishes an account which can receive money to implement the action, and sets a limit on how much money may be expended. However, this account remains empty until Congress approves an "appropriation", which requires the U.S. Treasury to provide funds (up to the limit provided for in the authorization). Congress is not required to appropriate as much money as is authorized.[9]

Congress may both authorize and appropriate in the same bill. Known as "authorization bills", such legislation usually provides for a multi-year authorization and appropriation. Authorization bills are particularly useful when funding entitlement programs (benefits which federal law says an individual has a right to, regardless if any money is appropriated), where estimating the amount of funds to be spent is difficult. Authorization bills are also useful when giving a federal agency the right to borrow money, sign contracts, or provide loan guarantees. In 2007, two-thirds of all federal spending came through authorization bills.[10]

A "backdoor authorization" occurs when an appropriation is made and an agency required to spend the money even when no authorizing legislation has been enacted. A "backdoor appropriation" occurs when authorizing legislation requires an agency to spend a specific amount of money on a specific project within a specific period of time. Because the agency would be violating the law if it did not do so, it is required to spend the money—even if no appropriation has been made. Backdoor appropriations are particularly vexsome because removing the appropriation requires amending federal law, which is often politically impossible to do within a short period of time. Backdoor authorizations and appropriations are sources of significant friction in Congress. Authorization and appropriations committees jealously guard their legislative rights, and the congressional budgeting process can break down when committees overstep their boundaries and are retaliated against.[11]

Federal budget data

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Federal Government revenue by type
  Other
Federal revenue adjusted for inflation (2020 Dollars)
Table compares US federal spending and revenue in 2019 vs. 2018 using CBO historical data.[12]

Several government agencies provide budget data. These include the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the U.S. Treasury Department. The CBO publishes The Budget and Economic Outlook in January, which covers a ten-year window and is typically updated in August. It also publishes a Long-Term Budget Outlook in July and a Monthly Budget Review. The OMB, which is responsible for organizing the President's budget presented in February, typically issues a budget update in July. The GAO and the Treasury issue Financial Statements of the U.S. Government, usually in the December following the close of the federal fiscal year, which occurs September 30. There is a corresponding Citizen's Guide, a short summary. The Treasury Department also produces a Combined Statement of Receipts, Outlays, and Balances each December for the preceding fiscal year, which provides detailed data on federal financial activities.

Historical tables within the President's Budget (OMB) provide a wide range of data on federal government finances. Many of the data series begin in 1940 and include estimates of the President's Budget for 2018–2023. Additionally, Table 1.1 provides data on receipts, outlays, and surpluses or deficits for 1901–1939 and for earlier multi-year periods. This document is composed of 17 sections, each of which has one or more tables. Each section covers a common theme. Section 1, for example, provides an overview of the budget and off-budget totals; Section 2 provides tables on receipts by source; and Section 3 shows outlays by function. When a section contains several tables, the general rule is to start with tables showing the broadest overview data and then work down to more detailed tables. The purpose of these tables is to present a broad range of historical budgetary data in one convenient reference source and to provide relevant comparisons likely to be most useful. The most common comparisons are in terms of proportions (e.g., each major receipt category as a percentage of total receipts and of the gross domestic product).[13]

Federal budget projections

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The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects budget data such as revenues, expenses, deficits, and debt as part of its "Long-term Budget Outlook" which is released annually. The 2018 Outlook included projections for debt through 2048 and beyond. CBO outlined several scenarios that result in a range of outcomes. The "Extended Baseline" scenario and "Extended Alternative Fiscal" scenario both result in a much higher level of debt relative to the size of the economy (GDP) as the country ages and healthcare costs rise faster than the rate of economic growth. CBO also identified scenarios involving significant austerity measures, which maintain or reduce the debt relative to GDP over time.

CBO estimated the size of changes that would be needed to achieve a chosen goal for federal debt. For example, if lawmakers wanted to reduce the amount of debt in 2048 to 41 percent of GDP (its average over the past 50 years), they might cut non-interest spending, increase revenues, or take a combination of both approaches to make changes that equaled 3.0 percent of GDP each year starting in 2019. (In dollar terms, that amount would total about $630 billion in 2019.) If, instead, policymakers wanted debt in 2048 to equal its current share of GDP (78 percent), the necessary changes would be smaller (although still substantial), totaling 1.9 percent of GDP per year (or about $400 billion in 2019). The longer lawmakers waited to act, the larger the policy changes would need to be to reach any particular goal for federal debt.[14]

Major receipt categories

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Breakdown of revenues for US Federal Government in 2023
CBO data on share of U.S. federal revenues collected by tax type from 1967 to 2016. Payroll taxes, paid by all wage earners, have increased as a share of total federal tax revenues, while corporate taxes have fallen. Income taxes have moved in a range, with Presidents Reagan and G.W. Bush lowering income tax rates, and Clinton and Obama raising them for the top incomes.[15]
CBO charts describing about $1.0 trillion in tax expenditures during 2013 (i.e., exemptions, deductions, and preferential rates) and their distribution across income groups. The top 20% of income earners received 50% of the benefit from these tax breaks; they also pay approximately 70% of federal income taxes.

During FY2018, the federal government collected approximately $3.33 trillion in tax revenue, up $14 billion or less than 1% versus FY2017. Primary receipt categories included individual income taxes ($1,684B or 51% of total receipts), Social Security/Social Insurance taxes ($1,171B or 35%), and corporate taxes ($205B or 6%). Corporate tax revenues declined by $92 billion or 32% due to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. Other revenue types included excise, estate and gift taxes. FY 2018 revenues were 16.4% of gross domestic product (GDP), versus 17.2% in FY 2017.[16] Tax revenues averaged approximately 17.4% GDP over the 1980-2017 period.[17]

During FY2017, the federal government collected approximately $3.32 trillion in tax revenue, up $48 billion or 1.5% versus FY2016. Primary receipt categories included individual income taxes ($1,587B or 48% of total receipts), Social Security/Social Insurance taxes ($1,162B or 35%), and corporate taxes ($297B or 9%). Other revenue types included excise, estate and gift taxes. FY 2017 revenues were 17.3% of gross domestic product (GDP), versus 17.7% in FY 2016. Tax revenues averaged approximately 17.4% GDP over the 1980-2017 period.[17]

Tax revenues are significantly affected by the economy. Recessions typically reduce government tax collections as economic activity slows. For example, tax revenues declined from $2.5 trillion in 2008 to $2.1 trillion in 2009, and remained at that level in 2010. From 2008 to 2009, individual income taxes declined 20%, while corporate taxes declined 50%. At 14.6% of GDP, the 2009 and 2010 collections were the lowest level of the past 50 years.[18]

Tax policy

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Tax descriptions

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The federal personal income tax is progressive, meaning a higher marginal tax rate is applied to higher ranges of income. For example, in 2010 the tax rate that applied to the first $17,000 in taxable income for a couple filing jointly was 10%, while the rate applied to income over $379,150 was 35%. The top marginal tax rate has declined considerably since 1980. For example, the top tax rate was lowered from 70% to 50% in 1980 and reached as low as 28% in 1988. The Bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003, extended by President Obama in 2010, lowered the top rate from 39.6% to 35%.[19] The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 raised the income tax rates for individuals earning over $400,000 and couples over $450,000. There are numerous exemptions and deductions, that typically result in a range of 35–40% of U.S. households owing no federal income tax. The recession and tax cut stimulus measures increased this to 51% for 2009, versus 38% in 2007.[20] In 2011 it was found that 46% of households paid no federal income tax, however the top 1% contributed about 25% of total taxes collected.[21] In 2014, the top 1% paid approximately 46% of the federal income taxes, excluding payroll taxes.[22]

The federal payroll tax (FICA) partially funds Social Security and Medicare. For the Social Security portion, employers and employees each pay 6.2% of the workers gross pay, a total of 12.4%. The Social Security portion is capped at $118,500 for 2015, meaning income above this amount is not subject to the tax. It is a flat tax up to the cap, but regressive overall as it is not applied to higher incomes. The Medicare portion is also paid by employer and employee each at 1.45% and is not capped. Starting in 2013, an additional 0.9 percent more in Medicare taxes was applied to income of more than $200,000 ($250,000 for married couples filing jointly), making it a progressive tax overall.

For calendar years 2011 and 2012, the employee's portion of the payroll tax was reduced to 4.2% as an economic stimulus measure; this expired for 2013.[23] Approximately 65% percent of tax return filers pay more in payroll taxes than income taxes.[24]

Tax expenditures

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The term "tax expenditures" refers to income exclusions, deductions, preferential rates, and credits that reduce revenues for any given level of tax rates in the individual, payroll, and corporate income tax systems. Like conventional spending, they contribute to the federal budget deficit. They also influence choices about working, saving, and investing, and affect the distribution of income. The amount of reduced federal revenues are significant, estimated by CBO at nearly 8% GDP or about $1.5 trillion in 2017, for scale roughly half the revenue collected by the government and nearly three times as large as the budget deficit. Since eliminating a tax expenditure changes economic behavior, the amount of additional revenue that would be generated is somewhat less than the estimated size of the tax expenditure.[18]

CBO reported that the following were among the largest individual (non-corporate) tax expenditures in 2013:

  • $248B – The exclusion from workers’ taxable income of employers’ contributions for health care, health insurance premiums, and premiums for long-term care insurance;
  • $137B – The exclusion of contributions to and the earnings of pension funds such as 401k plans;
  • $161B – Preferential tax rates on dividends and long-term capital gains;
  • $77B – The deductions for state and local taxes;
  • $70B – The deductions for mortgage interest.

In 2013, CBO estimated that more than half of the combined benefits of 10 major tax expenditures would apply to households in the top 20% income group, and that 17% of the benefit would go to the top 1% households. The top 20% of income earners pay about 70% of federal income taxes, excluding payroll taxes.[25] For scale, 50% of the $1.5 trillion in tax expenditures in 2016 was $750 billion, while the U.S. budget deficit was approximately $600 billion.[18] In other words, eliminating the tax expenditures for the top 20% might balance the budget over the short-term, depending on economic feedback effects.

Major expenditure categories

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Mandatory spending of the US Federal Government in 2023
Breakdown of discretionary outlays of US Federal Government for 2023
CBO projections of U.S. Federal spending as % GDP 2014-2024
A timeline showing projected debt milestones from the CBO
Social Security – Ratio of Covered Workers to Retirees. Over time, there will be fewer workers per retiree.
CBO forecast of Social Security tax revenues and outlays from 2015 to 2085. Under current law, the outlays are projected to exceed revenues, requiring a 29% reduction in program payments starting around 2030 once the Social Security Trust Fund is exhausted.[26]
Defense Spending 2001–2017
Interest to GDP, a measure of debt burden, was very low in 2015 but is projected to rise with both interest rates and debt levels over the 2016-2026 period.

During FY2018, the federal government spent $4.11 trillion, up $127 billion or 3.2% vs. FY2017 spending of $3.99 trillion. Spending increased for all major categories and was mainly driven by higher spending for Social Security, net interest on the debt, and defense. Spending as % GDP fell from 20.7% GDP to 20.3% GDP, equal to the 50-year average.[16]

During FY2017, the federal government spent $3.98 trillion, up $128 billion or 3.3% vs. FY2016 spending of $3.85 trillion. Major categories of FY 2017 spending included: Healthcare such as Medicare and Medicaid ($1,077B or 27% of spending), Social Security ($939B or 24%), non-defense discretionary spending used to run federal Departments and Agencies ($610B or 15%), Defense Department ($590B or 15%), and interest ($263B or 7%).[17]

Expenditures are classified as "mandatory", with payments required by specific laws to those meeting eligibility criteria (e.g., Social Security and Medicare), or "discretionary", with payment amounts renewed annually as part of the budget process. Around two thirds of federal spending is for "mandatory" programs. CBO projects that mandatory program spending and interest costs will rise relative to GDP over the 2016–2026 period, while defense and other discretionary spending will decline relative to GDP.[18]

Mandatory spending and social safety nets

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Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid expenditures are funded by more permanent Congressional appropriations and so are considered mandatory spending.[27] Social Security and Medicare are sometimes called "entitlements", because people meeting relevant eligibility requirements are legally entitled to benefits; most pay taxes into these programs throughout their working lives. Some programs, such as Food Stamps, are appropriated entitlements. Some mandatory spending, such as Congressional salaries, is not part of any entitlement program. Mandatory spending accounted for 59.8% of total federal outlays (net of receipts that partially pay for the programs), with net interest payments accounting for an additional 6.5%. In 2000, these were 53.2% and 12.5%, respectively.[18]

Mandatory spending is expected to continue increasing as a share of GDP. This is due in part to demographic trends, as the number of workers continues declining relative to those receiving benefits. For example, the number of workers per retiree was 5.1 in 1960; this declined to 3.0 in 2010 and is projected to decline to 2.2 by 2030.[28][29] These programs are also affected by per-person costs, which are also expected to increase at a rate significantly higher than economic growth. This unfavorable combination of demographics and per-capita rate increases is expected to drive both Social Security and Medicare into large deficits during the 21st century. Unless these long-term fiscal imbalances are addressed by reforms to these programs, raising taxes or drastic cuts in discretionary programs, the federal government will at some point be unable to pay its obligations without significant risk to the value of the dollar (inflation).[30][31] By one estimate, 70% of the growth in these entitlement expenses over the 2016-2046 period is due to healthcare.[32]

  • Medicare was established in 1965 and expanded thereafter. Spending for Medicare during 2016 was $692 billion, versus $634 billion in 2014, an increase of $58 billion or 9%.[18] In 2013, the program covered an estimated 52.3 million persons. It consists of four distinct parts which are funded differently: Hospital Insurance, mainly funded by a dedicated payroll tax of 2.9% of earnings, shared equally between employers and workers; Supplementary Medical Insurance, funded through beneficiary premiums (set at 25% of estimated program costs for the aged) and general revenues (the remaining amount, approximately 75%); Medicare Advantage, a private plan option for beneficiaries, funded through the Hospital Insurance and Supplementary Medical Insurance trust funds; and the Part D prescription drug benefits, for which funding is included in the Supplementary Medical Insurance trust fund and is financed through beneficiary premiums (about 25%) and general revenues (about 75%).[33] Spending on Medicare and Medicaid is projected to grow dramatically in coming decades. The number of persons enrolled in Medicare is expected to increase from 47 million in 2010 to 80 million by 2030.[34] While the same demographic trends that affect Social Security also affect Medicare, rapidly rising medical prices appear to be a more important cause of projected spending increases. CBO expects Medicare and Medicaid to continue growing, rising from 5.3% GDP in 2009 to 10.0% in 2035 and 19.0% by 2082. CBO has indicated healthcare spending per beneficiary is the primary long-term fiscal challenge.[35] Various reform strategies were proposed for healthcare,[36] and in March 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was enacted as a means of health care reform. CBO reduced its per capita Medicare spending assumptions by $1,000 for 2014 and $2,300 for 2019, relative to its 2010 estimate for those years.[37] If this trend continues, it will significantly improve the long-term budget outlook.[38]
  • Social Security is a social insurance program officially called "Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance" (OASDI), in reference to its three components. It is primarily funded through a dedicated payroll tax of 12.4%. During 2016, total benefits of $910 billion were paid out, versus $882 billion in 2015, an increase of $28 billion or 3%.[18] Social Security's total expenditures have exceeded its non-interest income since 2010. The deficit of non-interest income relative to cost was about $49 billion in 2010, $45 billion in 2011, and $55 billion in 2012.[39] During 2010, an estimated 157 million people paid into the program and 54 million received benefits, roughly 2.91 workers per beneficiary.[40] Since the Greenspan Commission in the early 1980s, Social Security has cumulatively collected far more in payroll taxes dedicated to the program than it has paid out to recipients—nearly $2.6 trillion in 2010. This annual surplus is credited to Social Security trust funds that hold special non-marketable Treasury securities. This surplus amount is commonly referred to as the "Social Security Trust Fund." The proceeds are paid into the U.S. Treasury where they may be used for other government purposes. Social Security spending will increase sharply over the next decades, largely due to the retirement of the baby boomer generation. The number of program recipients is expected to increase from 44 million in 2010 to 73 million in 2030.[34] Program spending is projected to rise from 4.8% of GDP in 2010 to 5.9% of GDP by 2030, where it will stabilize.[41] The Social Security Administration projects that an increase in payroll taxes equivalent to 1.8% of the payroll tax base or 0.6% of GDP would be necessary to put the Social Security program in fiscal balance for the next 75 years. Over an infinite time horizon, these shortfalls average 3.3% of the payroll tax base and 1.2% of GDP.[42] Various reforms have been debated for Social Security. Examples include reducing future annual cost of living adjustments (COLA) provided to recipients, raising the retirement age, and raising the income limit subject to the payroll tax ($118,500 in 2014).[43][44] Because of the mandatory nature of the program and large accumulated surplus in the Social Security Trust Fund, the Social Security system has the legal authority to compel the government to borrow to pay all promised benefits through 2036, when the Trust Fund is expected to be exhausted. Thereafter, the program under current law will pay approximately 75–78% of promised benefits for the remainder of the century.[40][45]

Discretionary spending

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  • Military spending: During 2016, the Department of Defense spent $585 billion, an increase of $1 billion versus 2015. This is a partial measure of all defense-related spending. The military budget of the United States during FY 2014 was approximately $582 billion in expenses for the Department of Defense (DoD), $149 billion for the Department of Veterans Affairs, and $43 billion for the Department of Homeland Security, for a total of $770 billion. This was approximately $33 billion or 4.1% below 2013 spending. DoD spending has fallen from a peak of $678 billion in 2011.[46] The U.S. defense budget (excluding spending for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Homeland Security, and Veteran's Affairs) is around 4% of GDP. Adding these other costs places defense spending around 5% GDP. The DoD baseline budget, excluding supplemental funding for the wars, grew from $297 billion in FY2001 to a budgeted $534 billion for FY2010, an 81% increase.[47] According to the CBO, defense spending grew 9% annually on average from fiscal years 2000–2009.[48] Much of the costs for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have not been funded through regular appropriations bills, but through emergency supplemental appropriations bills. As such, most of these expenses were not included in the military budget calculation prior to FY2010. Some budget experts argue that emergency supplemental appropriations bills do not receive the same level of legislative care as regular appropriations bills.[49] During 2011, the U.S. spent more on its military budget than the next 13 countries combined.[50]
Military spending, top 25 countries by % GDP, 2024[51]
Country % GDP spent on military
Ukraine
34.5
Israel
8.8
Algeria
8.0
Saudi Arabia
7.3
Russia
7.1
Myanmar
6.8
Oman
5.6
Armenia
5.5
Azerbaijan
5.0
Kuwait
4.8
Jordan
4.8
Burkina Faso
4.7
Mali
4.2
Poland
4.2
Burundi
3.8
Brunei
3.6
Morocco
3.5
United States
3.4
Estonia
3.4
Colombia
3.4
Latvia
3.3
Greece
3.1
Lithuania
3.1
Chad
3.0
Kyrgyzstan
3.0
Military spending, top 25 countries by PPP, 2024[52][53]
Country $billions spent on military
United States
997
China
555
Russia
412
India
283
Ukraine
188
Germany
97
South Korea
95
Japan
91
France
90
United Kingdom
85
Brazil
69
Poland
61
Italy
60
Turkey
55
Indonesia
47
Colombia
45
Mexico
40
Spain
39
Australia
31
Canada
31
Netherlands
21
Philippines
21
Romania
21
Greece
17
Malaysia
14
  • Non-defense discretionary spending is used to fund the executive departments (e.g., the Department of Education) and independent agencies (e.g., the Environmental Protection Agency), although these do receive a smaller amount of mandatory funding as well. Discretionary budget authority is established annually by Congress, as opposed to mandatory spending that is required by laws that span multiple years, such as Social Security or Medicare. The federal government spent approximately $600 billion during 2016 on the Cabinet Departments and Agencies, excluding the Department of Defense, up $15 billion or 3% versus 2015. This represented 16% of budgeted expenditures or about 3.3% of GDP. Spending is below the recent dollar peak of $658 billion in 2010.[54]

Interest expense

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Average interest rate on U.S. Federal debt
Interest on the federal debt
  Total interest payment for Fiscal year
  Interest payments % of total Federal revenue

CBO reported that net interest on the public debt was approximately $240 billion in FY2016 (6% of spending), an increase of $17 billion or 8% versus FY2015. A higher level of debt coincided with higher interest rates.[18] During FY2012, the GAO reported a figure of $245 billion, down from $251 billion. Government also accrued a non-cash interest expense of $187 billion for intragovernmental debt, primarily the Social Security Trust Fund, for a total interest expense of $432 billion. GAO reported that even though the national debt rose in FY2012, the interest rate paid declined.[55] Should interest rates rise to historical averages, the interest cost would increase dramatically.

As of January 2012, public debt owned by foreigners has increased to approximately 50% of the total or approximately $5.0 trillion.[56] As a result, nearly 50% of the interest payments are now leaving the country, which is different from past years when interest was paid to U.S. citizens holding the public debt. Interest expenses are projected to grow dramatically as the U.S. debt increases and interest rates rise from very low levels to more typical historical levels.[18]

Deficits and debt

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Federal debt to Federal revenue ratio
National debt of the United States
  Debt held by the public

Relationship of deficit and debt

[edit]

Intuitively, the annual budget deficit should represent the amount added to the national debt.[57] However, there are certain types of spending ("supplemental appropriations") outside the budget process which are not captured in the deficit computation, which also add to the national debt. Prior to 2009, spending for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was often funded through special appropriations excluded from the budget deficit calculation. In FY2010 and prior, the budget deficit and annual change in the national debt were significantly different. For example, the U.S. added $1 trillion to the national debt in FY2008 but reported a deficit of $455 billion. Due to rules changes implemented under President Obama in 2009, the two figures have moved closer together and were nearly identical in 2013 (a CBO-reported deficit of $680 billion versus change in debt of $672 billion). For FY2014, the difference widened again, with the CBO reporting a deficit of $483 billion [58] compared to a change in total debt outstanding of $1,086 billion.[59]

Debt categories

[edit]

The total federal debt is divided into "debt held by the public" and "intra-governmental debt." The debt held by the public refers to U.S. government securities or other obligations held by investors (e.g., bonds, bills, and notes), while Social Security and other federal trust funds are part of the intra-governmental debt. As of September 30, 2012, the total debt was $16.1 trillion, with debt held by the public of $11.3 trillion and intragovernmental debt of $4.8 trillion.[60] Debt held by the public as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) rose from 34.7% in 2000 to 40.3% in 2008 and 70.0% in 2012.[61] U.S. GDP was approximately $15 trillion during 2011 and an estimated $15.6 trillion for 2012 based on activity during the first two quarters.[62] This means the total debt is roughly the size of GDP. Economists debate the level of debt relative to GDP that signals a "red line" or dangerous level, or if any such level exists.[63] By comparison, China's budget deficit was 1.6% of its $10 trillion GDP in 2010, with a debt to GDP ratio of 16%.[64]

Risks associated with the debt

[edit]
Sectoral financial balances in U.S. economy 1990–2017. By definition, the three balances must net to zero. Since 2009, the U.S. capital surplus (i.e., trade deficit) and private sector surplus (i.e., savings greater than investment) have driven a government budget deficit.

The CBO reported several types of risk factors related to rising debt levels in a July 2010 publication:

  • A growing portion of savings would go towards purchases of government debt, rather than investments in productive capital goods such as factories and leading to lower output and incomes than would otherwise occur;
  • Rising interest costs would force reductions in important government programs;
  • To the extent that additional tax revenues were generated by increasing marginal tax rates, those rates would discourage work and saving, further reducing output and incomes;
  • Restrictions to the ability of policymakers to use fiscal policy to respond to economic challenges; and
  • An increased risk of a sudden fiscal pressure on the government, in which investors demand higher interest rates.[65]

However, since mid- to late-2010, the U.S. Treasury has been obtaining negative real interest rates at Treasury security auctions. At such low rates, government debt borrowing saves taxpayer money according to one economist.[66] There is no guarantee that such rates will continue, but the trend has remained falling or flat as of October 2012.[67]

Fears of a fiscal crisis triggered by a significant selloff of U.S. Treasury securities by foreign owners such as China and Japan did not materialize, even in the face of significant sales of those securities during 2015, as demand for U.S. securities remained robust.[68]

Government budget balance as a sectoral component

[edit]

Economist Martin Wolf explained in July 2012 that government fiscal balance is one of three major financial sectoral balances in the U.S. economy, the others being the foreign financial sector and the private financial sector. The sum of the surpluses or deficits across these three sectors must be zero by definition. Since the foreign and private sectors are in surplus, the government sector must be in deficit.

Wolf argued that the sudden shift in the private sector from deficit to surplus due to the global economic conditions forced the government balance into deficit, writing: "The financial balance of the private sector shifted towards surplus by the almost unbelievable cumulative total of 11.2 percent of gross domestic product between the third quarter of 2007 and the second quarter of 2009, which was when the financial deficit of US government (federal and state) reached its peak...No fiscal policy changes explain the collapse into massive fiscal deficit between 2007 and 2009, because there was none of any importance. The collapse is explained by the massive shift of the private sector from financial deficit into surplus or, in other words, from boom to bust."[69]

Economist Paul Krugman also explained in December 2011 the causes of the sizable shift from private sector deficit to surplus: "This huge move into surplus reflects the end of the housing bubble, a sharp rise in household saving, and a slump in business investment due to lack of customers."[70]

Contemporary issues and debates

[edit]
CBO forecasts that the 2017 Tax Act will increase the sum of budget deficits (debt) by $2.289 trillion over the 2018-2027 decade, or $1.891 trillion after macro-economic feedback.[17]
Federal budget deficits from FY2016 through FY2018 estimates. The 2016 and 2017 amounts are actual results. The CBO estimate for 2018 is from their January 2017 baseline, which reflected laws in place when President Trump was inaugurated. The OMB estimate is from President Trump's 2019 budget.[71]

Conceptual arguments

[edit]

Many of the debates surrounding the United States federal budget center around competing macroeconomic schools of thought. In general, Democrats favor the principles of Keynesian economics to encourage economic growth via a mixed economy of both private and public enterprise, a welfare state, and strong regulatory oversight. Conversely, Republicans and Libertarians generally support applying the principles of either laissez-faire or supply-side economics to grow the economy via small government, low taxes, limited regulation, and free enterprise.[72][73] Debates have surrounded the appropriate size and role of the federal government since the founding of the country. These debates also deal with questions of morality, income equality, and intergenerational equity. For example, Congress adding to the debt today may or may not enhance the quality of life for future generations, who must also bear the additional interest and taxation burden.[74]

Political realities make major budgetary deals difficult to achieve. While Republicans argue conceptually for reductions in Medicare and Social Security, they are hesitant to actually vote to reduce the benefits from these popular programs. Democrats on the other hand argue conceptually for tax increases on the wealthy, yet may be hesitant to vote for them because of the effect on campaign donations from the wealthy. The so-called budgetary "grand bargain" of tax hikes on the rich and removal of some popular tax deductions in exchange for reductions to Medicare and Social Security is therefore elusive.[75]

Trump tax cuts

[edit]

President Trump signed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act into law in December 2017. CBO forecasts that the 2017 Tax Act will increase the sum of budget deficits (debt) by $2.289 trillion over the 2018-2027 decade, or $1.891 trillion after macro-economic feedback. This is in addition to the $10.1 trillion increase forecast under the June 2017 policy baseline and existing $20 trillion national debt.[17] The Tax Act will reduce spending for lower income households while cutting taxes for higher income households, as CBO reported on December 21, 2017: "Overall, the combined effect of the change in net federal revenue and spending is to decrease deficits (primarily stemming from reductions in spending) allocated to lower-income tax filing units and to increase deficits (primarily stemming from reductions in taxes) allocated to higher-income tax filing units."[76]

CBO forecast in January 2017 (just prior to Trump's inauguration) that revenues in fiscal year 2018 would be $3.60 trillion if laws in place as of January 2017 continued.[77] However, actual 2018 revenues were $3.33 trillion, a shortfall of $270 billion (7.5%) relative to the forecast. This difference is primarily due to the Tax Act.[78] In other words, revenues would have been considerably higher in the absence of the tax cuts.

The New York Times reported in August 2019 that: "The increasing levels of red ink stem from a steep falloff in federal revenue after Mr. Trump's 2017 tax cuts, which lowered individual and corporate tax rates, resulting in far fewer tax dollars flowing to the Treasury Department. Tax revenues for 2018 and 2019 have fallen more than $430 billion short of what the budget office predicted they would be in June 2017, before the tax law was approved that December."[79]

Healthcare reform

[edit]

The CBO has consistently reported since 2010 that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (also known as "Obamacare") would reduce the deficit, as its tax increases and reductions in future Medicare spending offset its incremental spending for subsidies for low-income households. The CBO reported in June 2015 that repeal of the ACA would increase the deficit between $137 billion and $353 billion over the 2016–2025 period in total, depending on the impact of macroeconomic feedback effects. In other words, ACA is a deficit reducer, as its repeal would raise the deficit.[80]

The Medicare Trustees provide an annual report of the program's finances. The forecasts from 2009 and 2015 differ materially, mainly due to changes in the projected rate of healthcare cost increases, which have moderated considerably. Rather than rising to nearly 12% GDP over the forecast period (through 2080) as forecast in 2009, the 2015 forecast has Medicare costs rising to 6% GDP, comparable to the Social Security program.[81]

The increase in healthcare costs is one of the primary drivers of long-term budget deficits. The long-term budget situation has considerably improved in the 2015 forecast versus the 2009 forecast per the Trustees Report.[82]

U.S. healthcare costs were approximately $3.2 trillion or nearly $10,000 per person on average in 2015, the equivalent of roughly $13,000 per person in 2024. Major categories of expense include hospital care (32%), physician and clinical services (20%), and prescription drugs (10%).[83] U.S. costs in 2016 were substantially higher than other OECD countries, at 17.2% GDP versus 12.4% GDP for the next most expensive country (Switzerland).[84] For scale, a 5% GDP difference represents about $1 trillion or $3,000 per person. Some of the many reasons cited for the cost differential with other countries include: Higher administrative costs of a private system with multiple payment processes; higher costs for the same products and services; more expensive volume/mix of services with higher usage of more expensive specialists; aggressive treatment of very sick elderly versus palliative care; less use of government intervention in pricing; and higher income levels driving greater demand for healthcare.[85][86][87] Healthcare costs are a fundamental driver of health insurance costs, which leads to coverage affordability challenges for millions of families. There is ongoing debate whether the current law (ACA/Obamacare) and the Republican alternatives (AHCA and BCRA) do enough to address the cost challenge.[88]

The Great Recession

[edit]
Several major U.S. economic variables had recovered from the 2007-2009 Subprime mortgage crisis and Great Recession by the 2013-2014 time period.

In the wake of the 2007–2009 U.S. recession, there were several important fiscal debates around key questions:

  1. What caused the sizable deficit increases during and shortly after the Great Recession? The CBO reported that the deficit expansion was mainly due to the economic downturn rather than policy choices. Revenue fell while social safety net spending increased for programs such as unemployment compensation and food stamps, as more families qualified for benefits.[89] From 2008 to 2009, the large deficit increase was also driven by spending on stimulus and bailout programs.[90]
  2. Should the Bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003 be allowed to expire in 2010 as scheduled? Ultimately, the Bush tax cuts were allowed to expire for the highest income taxpayers only as part of the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012.
  3. Should significant deficits be continued or should fiscal austerity be implemented? While the deficit jumped from 2008 to 2009, by 2014 it had fallen to its historical average relative to the size of the economy (GDP). This was due to the recovering economy, which had increased tax revenue. In addition, tax increases were implemented on higher-income taxpayers, while military and non-military discretionary spending were reduced or restrained (sequestered) as part of the Budget Control Act of 2011.

Impact of Coronavirus and CARES Act of 2020

[edit]

The COVID-19 pandemic in the United States impacted the economy significantly beginning in March 2020, as businesses were shut-down and furloughed or fired personnel. About 16 million persons filed for unemployment insurance in the three weeks ending April 9. It caused the number of unemployed persons to increase significantly, which is expected to reduce tax revenues while increasing automatic stabilizer spending for unemployment insurance and nutritional support. As a result of the adverse economic impact, both state and federal budget deficits will dramatically increase, even before considering any new legislation.[91]

To help address lost income for millions of workers and assist businesses, Congress and President Trump enacted the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES) on March 18, 2020. It included loans and grants for businesses, along with direct payments to individuals and additional funding for unemployment insurance. Some or all of the loans may ultimately be paid back including interest, while the spending measures should dampen the negative budgetary impact of the economic disruption. While the law will almost certainly increase budget deficits relative to the January 2020 10-year CBO baseline (completed prior to the Coronavirus), in the absence of the legislation, a complete economic collapse could have occurred.[92]

CBO provided a preliminary score for the CARES Act on April 16, 2020, estimating that it would increase federal deficits by about $1.8 trillion over the 2020-2030 period. The estimate includes:

  • A $988 billion increase in mandatory outlays;
  • A $446 billion decrease in revenues; and
  • A $326 billion increase in discretionary outlays, stemming from emergency supplemental appropriations.

CBO reported that not all parts of the bill will increase deficits: “Although the act provides financial assistance totaling more than $2 trillion, the projected cost is less than that because some of that assistance is in the form of loan guarantees, which are not estimated to have a net effect on the budget. In particular, the act authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to provide up to $454 billion to fund emergency lending facilities established by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Because the income and costs stemming from that lending are expected to roughly offset each other, CBO estimates no deficit effect from that provision.”[93]

The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget estimated that, partially as the result of the CARES Act, the budget deficit for fiscal year 2020 would increase to a record $3.8 trillion, or 18.7% GDP.[94] For scale, in 2009 the budget deficit reached 9.8% GDP ($1.4 trillion nominal dollars) in the depths of the Great Recession. CBO forecast in January 2020 that the budget deficit in FY2020 would be $1.0 trillion, prior to considering the impact of the coronavirus pandemic or CARES.[95]

While the Federal Reserve is also conducting stimulative monetary policy, essentially "printing money" electronically to purchase bonds, its balance sheet is not a component of the national debt.

The CBO forecast in April 2020 that the budget deficit in fiscal year 2020 would be $3.7 trillion (17.9% GDP), versus the January estimate of $1 trillion (4.6% GDP). CBO also forecast the unemployment rate would rise to 16% by Q3 2020 and remain above 10% in both 2020 and 2021.[96]

Budget deficits under political parties

[edit]

Economists Alan Blinder and Mark Watson reported that budget deficits tended to be smaller under Democratic presidents, at 2.1% potential GDP versus 2.8% potential GDP for Republican presidents, a difference of about 0.7% GDP. Their study was from President Truman through President Obama's first term, which ended in January 2013.[97]

Balance of payments between the states

[edit]

In 2019, residents and businesses in only 8 states contributed, as a whole, more money to the federal treasury than they received in services. Per capita, these were Connecticut ($1,614), Massachusetts ($1,439), New York ($1,172), New Jersey ($1,163), Minnesota ($336), Colorado ($239), California ($168), and Utah ($130). All other states received more in services than taxpayers there contributed, especially in (per capita) Kentucky ($14,153), Virginia ($13,096), and Alaska ($10,144).[98]

Public opinion polls

[edit]

According to a December 2012 Pew Research Center poll, only a few of the frequently discussed deficit reduction ideas have majority support:

  • 69% support raising the tax rate on income over $250,000.
  • 54% support limiting deductions taxpayers can claim.
  • 52% support raising the tax on investment income.
  • 51% support reducing Medicare payments to high-income seniors.
  • 51% support reducing Social Security payments to high-income seniors.

Fewer than 50% support raising the retirement age for Social Security or Medicare, reducing military defense spending, limiting the mortgage interest deduction, or reducing federal funding for low income persons, education and infrastructure.[99]

Proposed deficit reduction

[edit]
2010 Report of the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform-Public Debt as % GDP Under Various Scenarios
Waterfall chart shows cause of change from deficit in 1994 to surplus in 2001, measured as a % GDP. Income tax revenues rose as a % GDP following higher taxes for high income earners, while defense spending and interest fell relative to GDP.

Strategies

[edit]

There are a variety of proposed strategies for reducing the federal deficit. These may include policy choices regarding taxation and spending, along with policies designed to increase economic growth and reduce unemployment. For example, a fast-growing economy offers the win-win outcome of a larger proverbial economic pie, with higher employment and tax revenues, lower safety net spending and a lower debt-to-GDP ratio. However, most other strategies represent a tradeoff scenario in which money or benefits are taken from some and given to others. Spending can be reduced from current levels, frozen, or the rate of future spending increases reduced. Budgetary rules can also be implemented to manage spending. Some changes can take place today, while others can phase in over time. Tax revenues can be raised in a variety of ways, by raising tax rates, the scope of what is taxed, or eliminating deductions and exemptions ("tax expenditures"). Regulatory uncertainty or barriers can be reduced, as these may cause businesses to postpone investment and hiring decisions.[100]

The CBO reported in January 2017 that:[18]

The effects on the federal budget of the aging population and rapidly growing health care costs are already apparent over the 10-year horizon—especially for Social Security and Medicare—and will grow in size beyond the baseline period. Unless laws governing fiscal policy were changed—that is, spending for large benefit programs was reduced, increases in revenues were implemented, or some combination of those approaches was adopted—debt would rise sharply relative to GDP after 2027.

During June 2012, Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke recommended three objectives for fiscal policy: 1) Take steps to put the federal budget on a sustainable fiscal path; 2) Avoid unnecessarily impeding the ongoing economic recovery; and 3) Design tax policies and spending programs to promote a stronger economy.[101]

President Barack Obama in June 2012 stated:[102]

What I've said is, let's make long-term spending cuts; let's initiate long-term reforms; let's reduce our health care spending; let's make sure that we've got a pathway, a glide-path to fiscal responsibility, but at the same time, let's not under-invest in the things that we need to do right now to grow. And that recipe of short-term investments in growth and jobs with a long-term path of fiscal responsibility is the right approach to take for, I think, not only the United States but also for Europe.

Specific proposals

[edit]

A variety of government task forces, expert panels, private institutions, politicians, and journalists have made recommendations for reducing the deficit and slowing the growth of debt. Several organizations have compared the future impact of these plans on the deficit, debt, and economy. One helpful way of measuring the impact of the plans is to compare them in terms of revenue and expense as a percentage of GDP over time, in total and by category. This helps illustrate how the different plan authors have prioritized particular elements of the budget.[103]

Government commission proposals

[edit]
  • President Obama established a budget reform commission, the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, which released a draft report in December 2010. The proposal is sometimes called the "Bowles-Simpson" plan after the co-chairs of the commission. It included various tax and spending adjustments to bring long-run government tax revenue and spending into line at approximately 21% of GDP, with $4 trillion debt avoidance over 10 years. Under 2011 policies, the national debt would increase approximately $10 trillion over the 2012–2021 period, so this $4 trillion avoidance reduces the projected debt increase to $6 trillion.[104] The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities analyzed the plan and compared it to other plans in October 2012.[105]

President Obama's proposals

[edit]
  • President Obama announced a 10-year (2012–2021) plan in September 2011 called: "Living Within Our Means and Investing in the Future: The President's Plan for Economic Growth and Deficit Reduction." The plan included tax increases on the wealthy, along with cuts in future spending on defense and Medicare. Social Security was excluded from the plan. The plan included a net debt avoidance of $3.2 trillion over 10 years. If the Budget Control Act of 2011 is included, this adds another $1.2 trillion in deficit reduction for a total of $4.4 trillion.[106] The Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) evaluated the President's 2012 budget against several alternate proposals, reporting it had revenues relative to GDP similar to the Domenici-Rivlin and Bowles-Simpson expert panel recommendations but slightly higher spending.[103]
  • President Obama proposed during July 2012 allowing the Bush tax cuts to expire for individual taxpayers earning over $200,000 and couples earning over $250,000, which represents the top 2% of income earners. Reverting to Clinton-era tax rates for these taxpayers would mean increases in the top rates to 36% and 39.6% from 33% and 35%. This would raise approximately $850 billion in revenue over a decade. It would also mean raising the tax rate on investment income, which is highly concentrated among the wealthy, to 20% from 15%.[107]

Congressional proposals

[edit]
  • The House of Representatives Committee on the Budget, chaired by Rep. Paul Ryan (R), released The Path to Prosperity: Restoring America's Promise and a 2012 budget. The Path focuses on tax reform (lowering income tax rates and reducing tax expenditures or loopholes); spending cuts and controls; and redesign of the Medicare and Medicaid programs. It does not propose significant changes to Social Security.[108] The Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) evaluated the 2012 Republican budget proposal, noting it had the lowest spending and tax revenue relative to GDP among several alternatives.[109]
  • The Congressional Progressive Caucus (CPC) proposed "The People's Budget" in April 2011, which it claimed would balance the budget by 2021 while maintaining debt as a % GDP under 65%. It proposed reversing most of the Bush tax cuts; higher income tax rates on the wealthy and restoring the estate tax, investing in a jobs program, and reducing defense spending.[110] The BPC evaluated the proposal, noting it had both the highest spending and tax revenue relative to GDP among several alternatives.[111] The CPC also proposed a 2014 budget called "Back to Work." It included short-term stimulus, defense spending cuts, and tax increases.[112]
  • Congressmen Jim Cooper (D-TN) and Steven LaTourette (R-OH) proposed a budget in the House of Representatives in March 2012. While it did not pass the House, it received bi-partisan support, with 17 votes in favor from each party. According to the BPC: "...the plan would enact tax reform by lowering both the corporate and individual income tax rates and raising revenue by broadening the base. Policies are endorsed that improve the health of the Social Security program, restrain health care cost growth, control annually appropriated spending, and make cuts to other entitlement programs." The plan proposes to raise approximately $1 trillion less revenue over the 2013–2022 decade than the Simpson-Bowles and Domenici-Rivlin plans, while cutting non-defense discretionary spending more deeply and reducing the defense spending cuts mandated in the Budget Control Act of 2011.[113] According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, this plan is ideologically to the Right of either the Simpson-Bowles or Domenici-Rivlin plans.[114]
  • In May 2012, House Republicans put forward five separate budget proposals for a vote in the Senate. The Republican proposals included the House-approved proposal by House Budget Chairman Paul Ryan and one that was very close in content to the budget proposal submitted earlier in 2012 by President Barack Obama.[115] The other three proposals each called for greatly reduced government spending. The budget put forward by Senator Mike Lee would halve the government over the next 25 years. Senator Rand Paul's budget included proposed cuts to Medicare, Social Security benefits and the closure of four Cabinet departments. The budget plan from Senator Patrick Toomey aimed to balance the budget within eight years. All five of the proposed plans were rejected in the Senate.[116][117]

Private expert panel proposals

[edit]
  • The Peter G. Peterson Foundation solicited proposals from six organizations, which included the American Enterprise Institute, the Bipartisan Policy Center, the Center for American Progress, the Economic Policy Institute, The Heritage Foundation, and the Roosevelt Institute Campus Network. The recommendations of each group were reported in May 2011.[118] A year later, Solutions Initiative II asked five leading think tanks — the American Action Forum, the Bipartisan Policy Center, the Center for American Progress, the Economic Policy Institute, and The Heritage Foundation — to address the near-term fiscal challenges of the "fiscal cliff" while offering updated long-term plans.[119] In 2015, the Peterson Foundation invited the American Action Forum, the American Enterprise Institute, the Bipartisan Policy Center, the Center for American Progress, and the Economic Policy Institute to developed specific, "scorable" policy proposals to set the federal budget on a sustainable, long-term path for prosperity and economic growth.[120]
  • The Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) sponsored a Debt Reduction Task Force, co-chaired by Pete V. Domenici and Alice M. Rivlin. The Domenici-Rivlin panel created a report called "Restoring America's Future", which was published in November 2010. The plan claimed to stabilize the debt to GDP ratio at 60%, with up to $6 trillion in debt avoidance over the 2011–2020 period. Specific plan elements included defense and non-defense spending freezes for 4–5 years, income tax reform, elimination of tax expenditures, and a national sales tax or value-added tax (VAT).[121][122]
  • The Hamilton Project published a guidebook with 15 different proposals from various policy and budget experts in February, 2013. The authors were asked to provide pragmatic, evidenced-based proposals that would both reduce the deficit and bring broader economic benefits. Proposals included a value added tax and reductions to tax expenditures, among others.[123]

Timing of solutions

[edit]

There is significant debate regarding the urgency of addressing the short-term and long-term budget challenges. Prior to the 2008-2009 U.S. recession, experts argued for steps to be put in place immediately to address an unsustainable trajectory of federal deficits. For example, Fed Chair Ben Bernanke stated in January 2007: "The longer we wait, the more severe, the more draconian, the more difficult the objectives are going to be. I think the right time to start was about 10 years ago."[124]

However, experts after the 2008-2009 U.S. recession argued that longer-term austerity measures should not interfere with measures to address the short-term economic challenges of high unemployment and slow growth. Ben Bernanke wrote in September 2011: "...the two goals--achieving fiscal sustainability, which is the result of responsible policies set in place for the longer term, and avoiding creation of fiscal headwinds for the recovery--are not incompatible. Acting now to put in place a credible plan for reducing future deficits over the long term, while being attentive to the implications of fiscal choices for the recovery in the near term, can help serve both objectives."[125]

IMF managing director Christine Lagarde wrote in August 2011[126]

For the advanced economies, there is an unmistakable need to restore fiscal sustainability through credible consolidation [deficit reduction] plans. At the same time we know that slamming on the brakes too quickly will hurt the recovery and worsen job prospects. So fiscal adjustment must resolve the conundrum of being neither too fast nor too slow. Shaping a Goldilocks fiscal consolidation is all about timing. What is needed is a dual focus on medium-term consolidation and short-term support for growth and jobs. That may sound contradictory, but the two are mutually reinforcing. Decisions on future consolidation, tackling the issues that will bring sustained fiscal improvement, create space in the near term for policies that support growth and jobs.

Total outlays in recent budget submissions

[edit]
Annual U.S. spending 1930–2014 alongside U.S. GDP for comparison
Federal, state, and local spending history
Federal budget 2022
Federal budget outlays by percentage
Federal budget outlays by percentage
Revenue and Spending of the Federal Government History
Taxes revenue by source chart history
Federal spending vs revenue

The budget year runs from October 1 to September 30 the following year and is submitted by the President to Congress prior to October for the following year. In this way the budget of 2013 is submitted before the end of September 2012. This means that the budget of 2001 was submitted by Bill Clinton and was in force during most of George W. Bush's first year in office. The budget submitted by George W. Bush in his last year in office was the budget of 2009, which was in force through most of Barack Obama's first year in office.

The President's budget also contains revenue and spending projections for the current fiscal year, the coming fiscal years, as well as several future fiscal years. In recent years, the President's budget contained projections five years into the future. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) issues a "Budget and Economic Outlook" each January and an analysis of the President's budget each March. CBO also issues an updated budget and economic outlook in August.

Actual budget data for prior years is available from the Congressional Budget Office; see the "Historical Budget Data" links on the main page of "The Budget and Economic Outlook".[128] and from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).[129]

Historical development

[edit]

The following table shows the development of annual expenditure and revenue of the United States federal government.[130]

Year Revenues
(million $)
Outlays
(million $)
Deficit
(million $)
Deficit
(in % of GDP)
1789–1849 (total) 1,160 1,090 70
1850–1900 (total) 14,462 15,453 −991
1901 588 525 63
1902 562 485 77
1903 562 517 45
1904 541 584 −43
1905 544 567 −23
1906 595 570 25
1907 666 579 87
1908 602 659 −57
1909 604 694 −89
1910 676 694 −18
1911 702 691 11
1912 693 690 3
1913 714 715 −1
1914 725 726 −1
1915 683 746 −63
1916 761 713 48
1917 1,101 1,954 −853
1918 3,645 12,677 −9,032
1919 5,130 18,493 −13,363
1920 6,649 6,358 291
1921 5,571 5,062 509
1922 4,026 3,289 736
1923 3,853 3,140 713
1924 3,871 2,908 963
1925 3,641 2,924 717
1926 3,795 2,930 865
1927 4,013 2,857 1,155
1928 3,900 2,961 939
1929 3,862 3,127 734
1930 4,058 3,320 738 0.8%
1931 3,116 3,577 −462 −0.5%
1932 1,924 4,659 −2,735 −4.0%
1933 1,997 4,598 −2,602 −4.5%
1934 2,955 6,541 −3,586 −5.8%
1935 3,609 6,412 −2,803 −4.0%
1936 3,923 8,228 −4,304 −5.4%
1937 5,387 7,580 −2,193 −2.5%
1938 6,751 6,840 −89 −0.1%
1939 6,295 9,141 −2,846 −3.1%
1940 6,548 9,468 −2,920 −3.0%
1941 8,712 13,653 −4,941 −4.3%
1942 14,634 35,137 −20,503 −13.9%
1943 24,001 78,555 −54,554 −29.6%
1944 43,747 91,304 −47,557 −22.2%
1945 45,159 92,712 −47,553 −21.0%
1946 39,296 55,232 −15,936 −7.0%
1947 38,514 34,496 4,018 1.7%
1948 41,560 29,764 11,796 4.5%
1949 39,415 38,835 580 0.2%
1950 39,443 42,562 −3,119 −1.1%
1951 51,616 45,514 6,102 1.9%
1952 66,167 67,686 −1,519 −0.4%
1953 69,608 76,101 −6,493 −1.7%
1954 69,701 70,855 −1,154 −0.3%
1955 65,451 68,444 −2,993 −0.7%
1956 74,587 70,640 3,947 0.9%
1957 79,990 76,578 3,412 0.7%
1958 79,636 82,405 −2,769 −0.6%
1959 79,249 92,098 −12,849 −2.5%
1960 92,492 92,191 301 0.1%
1961 94,388 97,723 −3,335 −0.6%
1962 99,676 106,821 −7,146 −1.2%
1963 106,560 111,316 −4,756 −0.8%
1964 112,613 118,528 −5,915 −0.9%
1965 116,817 118,228 −1,411 −0.2%
1966 130,835 134,532 −3,698 −0.5%
1967 148,822 157,464 −8,643 −1.0%
1968 152,973 178,134 −25,161 −2.8%
1969 186,882 183,640 3,242 0.3%
1970 192,807 195,649 −2,842 −0.3%
1971 187,139 210,172 −23,033 −2.1%
1972 207,309 230,681 −23,373 −1.9%
1973 230,799 245,707 −14,908 −1.1%
1974 263,224 269,359 −6,135 −0.4%
1975 279,090 332,332 −53,242 −3.3%
1976 298,060 371,792 −73,732 −3.1%
1977 355,559 409,218 −53,659 −2.6%
1978 399,561 458,746 −59,185 −2.6%
1979 463,302 504,028 −40,726 −1.6%
1980 517,112 590,941 −73,830 −2.6%
1981 599,272 678,241 −78,968 −2.5%
1982 617,766 745,743 −127,977 −3.9%
1983 600,562 808,364 −207,802 −5.9%
1984 666,438 851,805 −185,367 −4.7%
1985 734,037 946,344 −212,308 −5.0%
1986 769,155 990,382 −221,227 −4.9%
1987 854,287 1,004,017 −149,730 −3.1%
1988 909,238 1,064,416 −155,178 −3.0%
1989 991,104 1,143,743 −152,639 −2.7%
1990 1,031,958 1,252,993 −221,036 −3.7%
1991 1,054,988 1,324,226 −269,238 −4.4%
1992 1,091,208 1,381,529 −290,321 −4.5%
1993 1,154,334 1,409,386 −255,051 −3.8%
1994 1,258,566 1,461,752 −203,186 −2.8%
1995 1,351,790 1,515,742 −163,952 −2.2%
1996 1,453,053 1,560,484 −107,431 −1.3%
1997 1,579,232 1,601,116 −21,884 −0.3%
1998 1,721,728 1,652,458 69,270 0.8%
1999 1,827,452 1,701,842 125,610 1.3%
2000 2,025,191 1,788,950 236,241 2.3%
2001 1,991,082 1,862,846 128,236 1.2%
2002 1,853,136 2,010,894 −157,758 −1.5%
2003 1,782,314 2,159,899 −377,585 −3.3%
2004 1,880,114 2,292,841 −412,727 −3.4%
2005 2,153,611 2,471,957 −318,346 −2.5%
2006 2,406,869 2,655,050 −248,181 −1.8%
2007 2,567,985 2,728,686 −160,701 −1.1%
2008 2,523,991 2,982,544 −458,553 −3.1%
2009 2,104,989 3,517,677 −1,412,688 −9.8%
2010 2,162,706 3,457,079 −1,294,373 −8.7%
2011 2,303,466 3,603,065 −1,299,599 −8.5%
2012 2,449,990 3,536,945 −1,086,955 −6.8%
2013 2,775,106 3,454,648 −679,542 −4.1%
2014 3,021,491 3,506,091 −484,600 −2.8%
2015 3,249,887 3,688,383 −438,496 −2.4%
2016 3,267,961 3,852,612 −584,651 −3.3%
2017 3,316,182 3,981,554 −665,372 −3.7%
2018 3,329,907 4,109,047 −779,140 −3.9%
2019 3,463,364 4,446,960 −983,596 −4.7%
2020 3,421,164 6,553,621 −3,132,457 −14.9%
2021 4,047,111 6,822,470 −2,775,359 −12.0%
2022 4,897,399 6,273,324 −1,375,925 −5.4%
2023 4,440,947 6,134,672 −1,693,725 −6.3%
2024 4,919,000 6,752,000 −1,893,000 −6.4%

See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The United States federal budget is the government's annual statement of projected revenues, primarily from and corporate income taxes, taxes, and other sources, alongside outlays encompassing mandatory programs, discretionary appropriations, and net interest on the public debt. It serves as the primary mechanism for allocating fiscal resources, reflecting priorities in areas such as , national defense, and , while the spans from October 1 to September 30. The process begins with the President's proposed budget submitted to in early , followed by congressional budget resolutions, committee markups, and appropriations bills that must be enacted to avoid government shutdowns. Outlays are divided into —accounting for roughly two-thirds of the total and including entitlements like Social Security and Medicare, which operate under statutory formulas largely insulated from annual appropriations—and , subject to yearly congressional approval and split between defense and non-defense categories. Net interest payments on the accumulated federal debt have risen sharply amid higher borrowing and interest rates, comprising an increasing share of outlays. Revenues, while fluctuating with economic cycles, have hovered around 17-18 percent of (GDP) in recent decades, insufficient to cover outlays that have trended above 20 percent of GDP, resulting in persistent deficits that add to the public debt. For fiscal year 2025, outlays reached approximately $7.0 trillion (23 percent of GDP), revenues totaled $5.2 trillion, and the deficit stood at $1.8 trillion. This structural imbalance underscores defining challenges, including the long-term solvency of entitlement programs amid demographic shifts like aging populations and declining worker-to-beneficiary ratios, escalating costs that crowd out other priorities, and debates over fiscal without reforms to spending growth or revenue bases. The projects federal debt held by the public to exceed 100 percent of GDP by the late under current law, with outlays driven primarily by mandatory programs and rather than discretionary items. Recurrent controversies involve debt ceiling impasses, calls for entitlement restructuring versus adjustments, and the role of emergency spending in exacerbating deficits, all amid warnings from official analyses that the trajectory risks intergenerational inequities and economic constraints if unaddressed.

Fundamentals of the Federal Budget

Overview and Economic Scale

The United States federal budget consists of anticipated revenues, mainly from individual and corporate income taxes, payroll taxes, and other sources, alongside outlays encompassing mandatory programs like Social Security and Medicare, discretionary spending on defense and nondefense activities, and net interest payments on the public debt. The spans October 1 to September 30, with the budget reflecting congressional appropriations and executive proposals reconciled through processes when necessary. Deficits occur when outlays exceed revenues, necessitating borrowing via Treasury securities, which accumulates as federal debt held by the public. In 2025, federal outlays totaled $7.01 , equivalent to 23% of (GDP), while revenues amounted to $5.23 , or approximately 18% of GDP, resulting in a deficit of $1.78 , about 6% of GDP. These levels exceed long-term historical averages, where outlays have averaged roughly 21% of GDP and revenues 17.3% since 1975, reflecting expansions in and responses to economic disruptions like the . The projects the 2025 deficit at $1.9 , or 6.2% of GDP, with debt held by the public approaching 100% of GDP amid sustained borrowing. The budget's economic scale positions the federal government as a major actor in national resource distribution, with outlays influencing activity through crowding-out effects on capital markets and potential inflationary pressures from deficit . Compared to pre-2008 norms, where deficits rarely exceeded 3% of GDP outside recessions, recent trajectories show structural imbalances driven by demographic shifts boosting entitlement costs and choices expanding discretionary commitments. Projections indicate deficits averaging over 5% of GDP through 2035, elevating to 118% of GDP and raising concerns over fiscal sustainability absent reforms to revenues or expenditures.

Constitutional Framework and Limited Government Principles

The constitutional framework for the federal budget vests the "power of the purse" exclusively in , as articulated in Article I, Section 9, Clause 7, which states that "No Money shall be drawn from the , but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time." This provision ensures that executive spending cannot occur without legislative authorization, embodying a core check against executive overreach rooted in the framers' experience with monarchical abuses under British rule. Complementing this, Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 grants the authority "To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the ," linking taxation and spending to specific constitutional ends. Revenue measures must originate in the per Article I, Section 7, Clause 1, reflecting the framers' intent to tie fiscal power to representation proportional to population. The principles of limited government underpinning this framework derive from the Constitution's enumerated powers doctrine, which confines federal authority to those explicitly listed, with all others reserved to the states or the people under the Tenth Amendment: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." James Madison, in Federalist No. 41, argued that the "general Welfare" phrase does not confer an independent spending power but qualifies the purposes for which taxes may be levied, warning that a broad interpretation would nullify the enumeration of specific powers and invite unlimited federal expansion. This strict construction aligns with the framers' design to prevent the federal government from encroaching on state sovereignty and individual liberties, as evidenced by the debates during ratification where opponents feared the taxing clause could justify intrusive policies absent explicit delegation. Madison's contemporaneous writings, including his opposition to Alexander Hamilton's broader views during the 1790s bank debates, reinforced that spending must advance enumerated objectives like defense or debt repayment rather than serve as a blank check for discretionary largesse. Historically, adherence to these limits constrained federal outlays to minimal levels in the early republic, with expenditures primarily funding defense, debt service, and basic operations, averaging under 3% of GDP until the Civil War. The Tenth Amendment has been invoked to challenge federal spending that coerces states, as in cases limiting conditional grants that infringe on , underscoring that while may incentivize state actions through funding, such conditions cannot commandeer state legislatures or violate principles of . This framework prioritizes fiscal restraint and accountability, requiring annual appropriations to prevent perpetual entitlements and embedding bicameral approval and presidential as safeguards against hasty or unchecked disbursements. Despite subsequent judicial expansions interpreting "general welfare" more permissively—such as upholding programs—the original constitutional design remains oriented toward a federal budget serving discrete, welfare-promoting functions within bounded authority, not unbounded redistribution or social engineering.

Annual Budget Process and Institutions

The annual federal for the operates on a running from October 1 to September 30, during which must enact legislation authorizing spending and revenues. The process begins in the executive branch, where federal agencies submit proposals to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the preceding fall; OMB coordinates these inputs, evaluates priorities aligned with the president's agenda, and assists in formulating the president's comprehensive request. This request, including detailed justifications for proposed outlays and receipts, is transmitted to no later than the first Monday in . In , the president's proposal serves as a starting point but holds no binding authority; instead, the (CBO), an independent nonpartisan agency established by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, provides objective analyses, cost estimates, and baseline projections of revenues, spending, deficits, and debt under existing law to inform deliberations. and Budget Committees then draft a concurrent budget resolution, which sets non-binding topline levels for total spending, revenues, deficits, and debt limits, along with allocations to committees; this resolution must be adopted by April 15, though deadlines are frequently missed. Appropriations Committees in both chambers subsequently develop the 12 annual appropriations bills covering , which constitute roughly one-third of total outlays and require presidential approval. Mandatory spending, driven by entitlement laws like Social Security and Medicare, continues automatically unless altered through separate authorizing , while measures are handled via committees such as Ways and Means in the House. OMB oversees execution of enacted budgets in the executive branch, apportioning funds to agencies and monitoring compliance, with authority to impound funds subject to congressional oversight. Empirical patterns show recurrent delays, with Congress often relying on short-term continuing resolutions to maintain funding at prior-year levels and avert government shutdowns when full appropriations lapse by , as occurred in multiple fiscal years including partial resolutions in 2024. These institutional dynamics, rooted in , prioritize congressional control over the purse but contribute to fiscal uncertainty and mounting deficits absent timely reconciliation.

Core Concepts: Receipts, Outlays, and Authority

In the United States federal budget, receipts refer to the cash inflows collected by the federal government from the public, primarily through taxes such as individual income taxes, corporate income taxes, payroll taxes, and excise taxes, as well as non-tax sources like fees, fines, and earnings from the . These receipts are recorded on a cash basis when they are received by the , excluding any amounts that are offset against outlays, such as certain user fees dedicated to specific programs. For fiscal year 2024, total receipts amounted to approximately $4.9 trillion, representing about 17.4% of (GDP). Outlays, in contrast, represent the actual disbursements or equivalent transfers made by federal agencies to fulfill obligations, occurring when checks are issued, is disbursed, or electronic funds are transferred to settle liabilities such as payments to contractors, beneficiaries, or on debt. Outlays are also measured on a basis and include both (e.g., Social Security benefits) and (e.g., defense procurement), net of any offsetting collections. Unlike budget projections, outlays reflect realized expenditures; for instance, in 2024, federal outlays reached about $6.8 trillion, or roughly 24.0% of GDP, exceeding receipts and contributing to the deficit. Budget authority constitutes the legal authorization granted by through appropriations or other laws, enabling federal agencies to incur financial obligations that will lead to immediate or future outlays. This authority may be definite (a specific amount) or indefinite (available until expended), and it precedes obligations—binding commitments like contracts or grants—which in turn result in outlays over time, often spanning multiple fiscal years depending on the program's nature. The distinction ensures congressional control over spending potential; for example, budget authority for multi-year projects like may be appropriated upfront but disbursed gradually as obligations are met. Receipts fund these activities but do not directly grant authority, which stems solely from statutory enactment.

Federal Revenues

Primary Revenue Sources and Categories

The federal government derives the majority of its revenues from taxation, with individual income taxes and payroll taxes comprising over 80 percent of total receipts in fiscal year 2024, when collections reached $4.9 trillion. Individual income taxes, administered by the under the , formed the largest category at 49 percent, or approximately $2.4 trillion, reflecting progressive rates applied to after deductions and credits. Payroll taxes, levied under the and Self-Employment Contributions Act, accounted for 35 percent of revenues, totaling about $1.7 trillion, primarily funding Social Security Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) at a 12.4 percent rate (split equally between employees and employers) and Medicare Hospital Insurance at 2.9 percent, with additional Medicare surtaxes on high earners. These contributions apply to wages up to annual caps for OASDI ($168,600 in 2024) but without limit for Medicare. Corporate income taxes contributed roughly 10 percent, or around $0.5 trillion, imposed at a flat 21 percent rate on taxable profits since the 2017 , down from prior graduated rates. taxes on specific goods and services, such as fuel, tobacco, alcohol, and , generated about 2 percent, while duties and import fees added another 2 percent amid varying policies. Estate and gift taxes, miscellaneous fees, and earnings from the rounded out the remaining 2 percent.
Revenue CategoryShare of Total (%)Approximate Amount (FY 2024, $ trillions)
Individual Income Taxes492.4
Payroll Taxes351.7
Corporate Income Taxes100.5
Excise Taxes20.1
Customs Duties20.1
Other20.1
This breakdown underscores the reliance on direct taxes on labor and capital income, with indirect taxes playing a minor role compared to historical precedents like tariffs pre-1913. Federal receipts have expanded dramatically in nominal terms since the early , rising from under $1 billion in 1901 to $4.9 trillion in 2024, driven by , population increases, and policy expansions like the introduction of the permanent in 1913. As a share of GDP, revenues grew from 3.0% in 1900 to peaks exceeding 20% during , before stabilizing at an average of 17.4% over the past 40 years. Postwar trends show revenues fluctuating with business cycles and fiscal policies, averaging 17.3% of GDP over the last 50 years, with highs of 19.9% in 2000 during the tech boom and lows of 14.6% in 2010 amid the recovery. Revenues briefly surged to 19.6% of GDP in 2022, fueled by capital gains realizations and inflation pushing taxpayers into higher brackets despite the 2017 tax cuts, before moderating to 17.1% in 2024. These patterns reflect revenue elasticity to GDP growth, typically exceeding 1, meaning collections rise faster than the during expansions. Shifts in revenue composition underscore evolving tax reliance: individual income taxes grew from about 1% of GDP in to 8-9% today, comprising 49% of total receipts in 2024, while corporate income taxes declined from 4-5% of GDP in the mid-20th century to around 1.5-2% recently due to , deductions, and rate reductions. Payroll taxes for programs expanded steadily from 1% of GDP in 1940 to 6% by 2024, accounting for 35% of revenues, tied to wage base growth and program mandates. Major tax reforms illustrate policy impacts on trends: the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act halved top marginal rates, leading to an initial dip to 17.3% of GDP in 1983 before rebounding to 18.4% by 1989 amid strong growth, with real rising 30% over the despite lower rates. The 2001 and 2003 cuts reduced to 15.7% of GDP by 2004, recovering to 17.7% pre-recession. Similarly, the 2017 lowered corporate rates to 21% and adjusted individual brackets, causing a static-estimated $1.5 trillion loss over a , though dynamic effects from growth offset about 30%, with receipts falling to 16.2% of GDP in 2018 before climbing. Empirical evidence from these episodes indicates tax cuts reduce relative to baseline projections but are partially recouped through expanded , without fully self-financing, as behavioral responses and incentives yield modest long-term gains amid unchanged spending trajectories. Recent data through 2025 projections maintain revenues near 17% of GDP, with FY2025 estimates at $5.23 trillion amid ongoing economic recovery, though vulnerabilities to recessions and bracket creep persist. According to the Congressional Budget Office's baseline projections, federal revenues for FY 2026 are expected to reach $5,541 billion, or 19.1% of GDP (with projected GDP of approximately $29 trillion), representing a significant increase primarily due to the expiration of certain provisions of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act at the end of calendar year 2025. The projected breakdown by major sources includes: individual income taxes at 10.0% of GDP ($2,900 billion, 52% of total revenues); payroll taxes at 6.1% of GDP ($1,769 billion, 32%); corporate income taxes at 1.8% of GDP ($522 billion, 9%); and other sources (excise taxes, estate/gift taxes, customs duties, Federal Reserve remittances, etc.) at 1.2% of GDP ($348 billion, 6%). Overall, empirical trends demonstrate revenue resilience tied to underlying economic performance rather than rate levels alone, with structural factors like entitlement-linked taxes providing stability.

Impacts of Tax Rate Changes and Policy Reforms

The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 reduced the top marginal individual income tax rate from 70 percent to 50 percent in its initial phase, with further reductions to 28 percent by 1988 under subsequent legislation. Nominal individual income tax revenues increased from $244 billion in 1980 to $446 billion by 1989, outpacing initial projections by approximately 6 percent due to behavioral responses such as expanded bases from heightened economic activity. Federal receipts as a of GDP dipped from 19.1 percent in 1981 to 17.3 percent in 1983 amid recessionary pressures but stabilized around 18 percent by the late 1980s, reflecting partial dynamic offsets from growth exceeding static forecasts. The broadened the tax base by eliminating numerous deductions and exemptions while lowering the top individual rate to 28 percent and the corporate rate to 34 percent, aiming for revenue neutrality. Post-reform, federal revenues rose from 17.6 percent of GDP in 1986 to 19.0 percent in 1990, driven by sustained and compliance improvements from simplified structures, though causality is confounded by concurrent recovery. Empirical analyses indicate that base-broadening elements mitigated potential revenue shortfalls, with effective tax rates for high earners increasing despite nominal rate cuts due to reduced avoidance opportunities. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 and Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 lowered individual rates across brackets and reduced the top rate to 35 percent, alongside capital gains cuts. Revenues fell to 16.1 percent of GDP in 2004 post-dot-com bust but rebounded to 18.4 percent by 2007, with dynamic modeling estimating partial offsets from investment incentives boosting GDP by 0.5-1.0 percent annually. Critics attributing revenue dips solely to rate reductions overlook exogenous shocks like the 2001 recession and , which reduced collections independently of policy. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 slashed the corporate rate from 35 percent to 21 percent and adjusted individual brackets downward, with the Joint Committee on Taxation projecting a conventional $1.5 trillion revenue loss over 2018-2027. Actual federal revenues, however, exceeded post-enactment baselines by $502 billion cumulatively through 2024, attributed to stronger-than-anticipated GDP growth (averaging 2.5 percent annually post-2018) and repatriation of overseas profits yielding $777 billion in one-time collections. Receipts reached 17.4 percent of GDP in 2019 before pandemic distortions, compared to 16.3 percent pre-reform average, underscoring dynamic effects where lower rates expanded the tax base via investment and labor supply responses. Across these reforms, empirical patterns reveal that rate reductions at historically high levels (above 30-40 percent marginal) correlate with revenue-to-GDP ratios stabilizing or recovering within 3-5 years, as incentives for work, saving, and elevate faster than static models predict. Counterexamples, such as rate hikes in the 1990s under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, boosted revenues to 19.9 percent of GDP by 2000 but coincided with tech boom tailwinds, complicating attribution. Projections from bodies like the CBO often understate growth feedbacks, as evidenced by repeated overestimations of revenue shortfalls in dynamic scenarios. Overall, policy-induced revenue volatility stems more from expenditure growth and macroeconomic cycles than rate changes alone, with causal evidence favoring supply-side expansions over demand-side multipliers for long-term collection sustainability.

Federal Expenditures

Categorical Breakdown and Allocation

Federal expenditures are allocated across three primary categories: , , and net interest on the public debt. In 2024, total outlays reached $6.8 , with comprising the majority at $4.1 or 60 percent, driven by statutory entitlements that require payments based on eligibility criteria rather than annual appropriations. accounted for $1.8 or 27 percent, subject to annual congressional appropriations and divided between defense and nondefense programs. Net interest payments on the debt totaled approximately $884 billion or 13 percent, reflecting borrowing costs amid rising debt levels and interest rates. Mandatory spending encompasses programs authorized by permanent laws, including major entitlements like Social Security, Medicare, and , which together represent nearly 75 percent of this category. Social Security outlays were $1.5 trillion, providing retirement, disability, and survivor benefits to over 70 million recipients. Medicare expenditures reached about $902 billion, covering for elderly and disabled individuals through Parts A, B, and D, with costs escalating due to an aging population and rising healthcare prices. and the (CHIP) disbursed roughly $615 billion, funding state-administered health coverage for low-income populations, with federal matching rates varying by state economic conditions. Other mandatory outlays, totaling around $1.0 trillion, include income security programs such as unemployment compensation, (SNAP) benefits, and federal civilian and military retirement payments, as well as means-tested programs like . Discretionary spending, capped under budget enforcement mechanisms like the Fiscal Responsibility Act, allocates funds through 12 annual appropriations bills for controllable programs. Defense discretionary outlays approximated $850 billion, funding Department of Defense operations, procurement, personnel, and research, development, test, and evaluation activities, representing about 47 percent of total discretionary spending. Nondefense discretionary outlays, exceeding $950 billion and comprising the remainder, support a range of domestic and international priorities, including veterans' benefits ($301 billion via the Department of Veterans Affairs), transportation infrastructure, education grants, housing assistance, environmental protection, and scientific research through agencies like the National Institutes of Health and National Science Foundation. These allocations reflect congressional priorities, with nondefense programs often competing for limited funds amid caps that have constrained growth relative to mandatory categories. Net interest, a non-discretionary category, arises from servicing the accumulated federal and is calculated as gross payments minus income from federal lending programs. In FY , this category's expansion to 13 percent of outlays stemmed from higher average rates on securities—averaging over 3 percent—and the held by the public exceeding $28 , crowding out resources for other spending. Unlike mandatory or discretionary items, net lacks programmatic eligibility and grows automatically with issuance to finance deficits.
CategoryFY 2024 Outlays (trillions)Share of Total
Mandatory$4.160%
Discretionary$1.827%
Net Interest$0.913%
Total$6.8100%

Mandatory Spending Dynamics

Mandatory spending encompasses federal outlays authorized by permanent statutes, including eligibility-based entitlements such as Social Security, Medicare, , and income security programs, which do not require annual congressional appropriations. In 2024, these outlays reached $4.1 trillion, comprising more than 60% of total federal spending, with over half directed to Social Security and Medicare. Social Security accounted for approximately 36% of mandatory spending, Medicare 22%, and 15%, together representing nearly 75% of the category. The primary drivers of mandatory spending growth are demographic pressures from an aging population and per-capita healthcare cost increases exceeding economic growth rates. The retirement of has expanded beneficiary rolls for Social Security and Medicare, with the worker-to-beneficiary ratio declining and projected to strain funding. Healthcare expenditures per enrollee in Medicare and have risen due to technological advancements, greater service utilization, and inefficient pricing, outpacing general by 2-3 percentage points annually in historical trends. These factors, combined with automatic cost-of-living adjustments and open-ended enrollment, cause mandatory outlays to expand independently of discretion. Congressional Budget Office projections illustrate the trajectory: mandatory spending is expected to rise from about 13% of GDP in 2025 to higher shares by 2035, driven predominantly by Social Security and major health programs, while shrinking discretionary spending's relative role. Without reforms like benefit adjustments or revenue enhancements, this dynamic contributes to persistent deficits, as mandatory outlays plus net interest are forecasted to equal or exceed revenues by the late , crowding out other priorities. from long-term baselines underscores the unsustainability, with debt held by the public projected to surpass 118% of GDP by 2035 under current law. Politically entrenched programs resist cuts, as evidenced by failed comprehensive reforms since the , despite causal links to fiscal imbalances; however, targeted changes such as means-testing or premium support models could mitigate growth without violating entitlement principles. Source analyses from non-partisan bodies like CBO prioritize actuarial data over optimistic assumptions, revealing biases in academic projections that understate demographic impacts.

Discretionary Spending Priorities and Oversight

Discretionary spending encompasses federal outlays subject to annual congressional appropriations, totaling approximately $1.8 trillion in 2024, or about 27% of total federal spending. This category divides into defense and nondefense components, with national defense comprising roughly 47% of discretionary outlays in recent years, funded primarily through the Department of Defense for military operations, procurement, personnel, and research. Nondefense discretionary spending, the remainder, supports diverse functions including veterans' benefits (about 8% of discretionary total), , transportation , assistance, , and international affairs. Empirical data indicate defense priorities have emphasized readiness and modernization amid geopolitical tensions, while nondefense allocations often reflect domestic policy debates, such as infrastructure investments under laws like the , though constrained by statutory spending caps established in the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023. Key priorities within align with 12 appropriations subcommittees in both the and , each overseeing specific categories: for instance, the Defense Subcommittee handles military funding exceeding $850 billion in 2024, while the Labor, and , Subcommittee manages education and health programs totaling around $200 billion annually. , a significant nondefense priority, received about $137 billion in discretionary funding for 2025 requests, focusing on healthcare and benefits administration for over 18 million veterans. International affairs, including foreign , constitute a smaller share but have surged for specific conflicts, with supplemental appropriations for and adding tens of billions outside baseline caps. These priorities are shaped by presidential budget requests, such as the 2025 proposal of $1.79 trillion total discretionary authority, adjusted by for fiscal realities like and emerging threats. Oversight of discretionary spending occurs primarily through the constitutional appropriations power vested in , executed via the annual budget resolution and 12 appropriations bills that must pass both chambers and be signed by the president by 1. The and Appropriations Committees, supported by subcommittees, review agency justifications, conduct hearings, and incorporate nonpartisan analyses from the (CBO) for cost estimates and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) for program audits and performance evaluations. Executive branch execution is monitored via quarterly reporting requirements and the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which prohibits unilateral withholding of appropriated funds without congressional approval, ensuring funds are spent as directed or returned via rescissions. In practice, supplemental appropriations and continuing resolutions often extend oversight timelines, with CBO projecting baseline discretionary outlays rising modestly through 2035 absent policy changes, though actual levels fluctuate with emergencies and partisan negotiations. This framework promotes accountability but faces challenges from automatic mandatory spending growth, which has eroded discretionary's share of the budget to historic lows around 6% of GDP.

Budget Imbalances

Defining Deficits, Surpluses, and Their Metrics

In the United States federal budget, a deficit occurs when total outlays exceed total receipts during a , requiring the government to borrow funds to cover the shortfall. Conversely, a surplus arises when receipts surpass outlays, allowing the government to reduce borrowing or retire existing . These imbalances are calculated on a basis for the unified , which consolidates all federal revenues—primarily from taxes, fees, and other collections—and outlays across mandatory, discretionary, and net interest categories, excluding intragovernmental transfers in certain aggregations. Key metrics for assessing deficits and surpluses include nominal dollar amounts, which reflect absolute imbalances but are influenced by and economic scale; for 2024, the nominal deficit reached approximately $1.8 trillion before adjustments. A more standardized measure expresses these as a percentage of (GDP), providing context relative to the economy's size; the (CBO) projects the 2025 deficit at 6.2% of GDP under current law baselines. The primary deficit or surplus excludes net interest payments on the debt, isolating the imbalance driven by policy choices in revenues and non-interest spending; this metric highlights structural fiscal pressures, as the U.S. primary deficit has averaged around 4% of GDP in recent years amid rising mandatory outlays. The main structural challenges driving these deficits include rising mandatory spending on entitlements like Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, which constitute over 60% of the federal budget, and increasing net interest costs on the accumulated debt; discretionary spending contributes to deficits but is subject to annual appropriations and thus not inherently structural. Additional distinctions involve on-budget versus off-budget components: the unified deficit encompasses both, but off-budget items like Social Security surpluses or deficits are tracked separately to isolate general fund operations, though high-level analyses typically prioritize the unified figure for overall fiscal health. Cyclically adjusted metrics, adjusted for economic fluctuations by the CBO, further refine analysis by estimating structural deficits independent of effects, revealing persistent imbalances even in non-recession periods. These metrics collectively inform debt sustainability, with deficits compounding public debt when sustained, while rare surpluses—last achieved in fiscal years 1998–2001—demonstrate feasibility through revenue growth outpacing spending.

Historical Deficit Patterns by Era

The United States federal budget exhibited patterns of occasional surpluses and frequent deficits throughout its history, with deficits predominating during wars, economic crises, and periods of expanded government spending relative to revenues. From 1789 to the early 20th century, surpluses were common in peacetime, enabling debt reduction, while major conflicts like the Civil War produced sharp deficit spikes. Post-World War II, persistent deficits became the norm, averaging around 2-3% of GDP in peacetime but escalating during recessions and policy-driven expansions, with brief surpluses in the late 1990s marking a rare exception. In the , the federal government frequently achieved surpluses, paying down debt to zero by 1835 after the War of 1812. The Civil War (1861-1865) reversed this, with annual deficits averaging approximately 6% of GDP, causing public debt to rise from $65 million in 1860 to nearly $3 billion by 1865 due to war financing through borrowing and new taxes. Post-war, consistent surpluses from 1866 to 1893 reduced debt by over 50%, reflecting revenue growth from tariffs and excise taxes outpacing expenditures in an era of limited federal role. The Spanish-American War in 1898 briefly increased deficits to 3.3% of GDP, but quick resolution allowed return to surpluses. The early 20th century saw deficits tied to global conflicts and economic shocks. (1917-1918) generated deficits peaking at 16.4% of GDP in fiscal year 1919, funded by Liberty Bonds and tax increases, elevating debt from $1.2 billion pre-war to $25.5 billion. The 1920s featured surpluses averaging 0.5% of GDP, driven by economic growth and spending restraint, reducing debt to $16.2 billion by 1929. The (1929-1939) produced annual deficits averaging 3.7% of GDP, as programs expanded outlays amid falling revenues, with the deficit reaching 5.4% in 1934. (1941-1945) caused unprecedented deficits, peaking at 26.9% of GDP in 1943, with total war spending financed 60% by borrowing, ballooning debt to $259 billion or 112% of GDP by 1946. Post-World War II through the 1970s, deficits persisted but remained moderate, averaging 0.6% of GDP from 1947 to 1969, with brief surpluses in 1947 ($3.9 billion), 1948 ($11.8 billion), and 1969 ($3.2 billion) amid post-war booms and fiscal restraint. The (1950-1953) elevated deficits to 2.9% average, while escalation and programs in the 1960s pushed deficits higher, averaging 1.1% in the decade. The 1970s era saw deficits rise to 2.3% average, exacerbated by oil shocks, recession, and indexed entitlements, with the 1972 deficit hitting 4.2% of GDP. The marked elevated peacetime deficits, averaging 4.1% of GDP under tax cuts and defense buildup, peaking at 6.0% in 1983 ($207 billion absolute), as revenues fell while spending rose. The shifted to deficit reduction through , spending caps, and 1993 tax increases, yielding surpluses from 1998 ($69 billion, 0.8% GDP) to 2001 ($128 billion, 1.3% GDP), the first back-to-back peacetime surpluses since the . Since 2002, deficits have been continuous, averaging over 4% of GDP, with spikes during the (9.8% in 2009), COVID-19 response (14.9% in 2020), and ongoing entitlement growth, reaching $1.8 trillion (6.4% GDP) in fiscal 2024. Tax cuts, wars in and , and stimulus measures drove early 2000s increases, while structural imbalances in revenues versus sustain the pattern.

Post-2000 Deficits and Crisis Responses

Following federal budget surpluses from (FY) 1998 to FY 2001, deficits resumed in FY 2002 at $158 billion, or 1.4% of GDP, amid the dot-com recession, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) that reduced tax rates across brackets, and heightened defense outlays after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The EGTRRA, estimated by the (CBO) to reduce revenues by $1.35 trillion over 2002-2011 including extensions, combined with automatic stabilizers from the recession to erode projected surpluses. Post-9/11 military operations in and further elevated ; Overseas Contingency Operations funding totaled approximately $2.3 trillion through FY 2022, contributing to annual defense budgets exceeding $700 billion by the mid-2000s. Deficits expanded through the mid-2000s, reaching $413 billion in FY 2004 (3.4% of GDP), fueled by additional tax reductions in the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 and sustained war costs, though economic recovery partially offset revenue shortfalls. By FY 2007, the deficit had narrowed to $161 billion (1.2% of GDP) on stronger growth, but the reversed this trend, pushing the FY 2009 deficit to $1.41 trillion (9.8% of GDP). Policy responses included the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, authorizing $700 billion for the to stabilize banks and purchase troubled assets, with net costs ultimately at $32 billion after repayments. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 added $831 billion in spending and tax relief, including , , and aid to states, to counter the recession's depth. The COVID-19 pandemic triggered unprecedented deficits, with FY 2020 recording $3.13 trillion (14.9% of GDP) and FY 2021 at $2.77 trillion (12.4% of GDP), driven by emergency legislation amid economic shutdowns and revenue collapses. The of March 2020 provided $2.2 trillion, including direct payments, enhanced unemployment insurance, and loans to preserve jobs. Subsequent measures, such as the $900 billion Consolidated Appropriations Act of December 2020 and the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, extended aid with funds for vaccines, state relief, and child tax credits, amplifying outlays while revenues rebounded slower due to lockdowns. These responses, while averting deeper contraction per CBO analyses, elevated mandatory and discretionary spending, with total pandemic-related outlays exceeding $5 trillion by FY 2022. Deficits moderated to $1.38 trillion in FY 2022 (5.5% of GDP) as recovery progressed, but remained above pre-2008 levels.

National Debt Accumulation

Debt Composition and Ownership Structure

The gross federal debt consists of two primary components: debt held by the public and intragovernmental holdings. As of early October 2025, total gross debt stood at approximately $37.85 trillion, with debt held by the public comprising $30.28 trillion (about 80%) and intragovernmental holdings at $7.57 trillion (about 20%). Debt held by the public represents borrowing from external entities to finance deficits, while intragovernmental holdings reflect internal transfers, primarily to trust funds backed by dedicated revenues such as taxes. Debt held by the public is predominantly composed of marketable Treasury securities, which account for roughly 90% of this category and can be traded in secondary markets. These include Treasury bills (maturities under one year), notes (two to ten years), and bonds (over ten years), along with inflation-protected securities (TIPS) and floating-rate notes (FRNs). As reflected in the latest Monthly Statement of the Public Debt, outstanding marketable securities totaled around $27-28 trillion, with notes forming the largest share at approximately $15.4 trillion, followed by bills at $6.4 trillion and bonds at $5.1 trillion. The remainder consists of non-marketable securities, such as savings bonds and State and Local Government Series (SLGS) instruments, held directly by individuals and governments without secondary market trading. This structure allows the Treasury to manage short-term liquidity needs via bills while locking in longer-term funding through notes and bonds, with maturities weighted toward intermediate terms to balance rollover risk and interest costs. Ownership of debt held by the public is diversified across domestic and foreign entities, reducing concentration risk but exposing the U.S. to varying investor demands. Domestic holders dominate, accounting for about 70-75% of public debt, including the (holding roughly $4.5-5 trillion in Treasuries as part of its ), U.S. mutual funds, funds, banks, and companies, as well as state and local governments. Foreign investors hold approximately 25-30%, or $7.5-8.5 trillion, with major official holders like ($1.1 trillion) and ($0.8 trillion) leading as of mid-2025, followed by the , , and others; these figures are tracked via International Capital (TIC) data and reflect central banks' reserve management rather than commercial investment. Households and individuals hold a smaller direct share via savings bonds and direct purchases, often intermediated through financial institutions. Intragovernmental holdings primarily finance federal trust funds, representing non-marketable securities issued to accounts like the Social Security Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund, which holds the largest portion (over 30%, or about $2.5 trillion as of recent estimates), followed by the Medicare Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust Fund, civil service retirement funds, and military retirement funds. These holdings arise when trust fund surpluses are invested in special-issue Treasuries, effectively lending excess revenues to the general fund; however, as trust funds face projected shortfalls, redemptions draw on general revenues, blurring the distinction from public debt in economic terms. The composition underscores reliance on payroll-tax-funded programs, with Social Security and Medicare trusts comprising over 60% of intragovernmental debt.
CategoryApproximate Amount (Trillions, Oct 2025)Share of Public Debt (%)
4.5-5.015-17
Foreign Holders7.5-8.525-28
Domestic Private (Funds, Banks, etc.)12-1440-45
State/Local Governments & Other3-410-13

Debt-to-GDP Trajectories and Benchmarks

The U.S. federal debt held by the public as a percentage of (GDP) reached its historical peak of approximately 106% in 1946 following expenditures, after which strong postwar and fiscal restraint reduced the ratio to a low of 31% by 1981. This decline occurred as real GDP expanded at rates exceeding the interest rate on debt, enabling the government to service obligations without proportional borrowing increases. Subsequent decades saw the ratio rise gradually to 36% by 2007 amid expanding entitlements and defense spending, before surging to over 100% by 2020 due to responses to the and the , which involved trillions in stimulus and relief outlays. As of the end of fiscal year 2025, the (CBO) projects debt held by the public at 100% of GDP, reflecting persistent deficits averaging 5-6% of GDP since 2009 that have outpaced economic expansion. Under current law, CBO forecasts this ratio climbing to 107% by 2029 and 156% by 2055, driven primarily by rising on Social Security and Medicare, alongside growing net interest payments that could reach 5.4% of GDP. These projections assume no major policy changes, moderate real GDP growth of 1.8% annually through 2035, and interest rates on 10-year Treasury notes averaging 3.7%, though demographic shifts like an aging population are expected to pressure revenues relative to outlays. Benchmarks for debt sustainability lack universal consensus, but empirical studies indicate heightened risks above 90% of GDP, where median growth rates in advanced economies have historically declined by about 1 percentage point, as analyzed in cross-country data spanning two centuries. The sets a 60% threshold for members, yet the U.S., benefiting from dollar status, has tolerated higher levels without immediate default; however, models suggest a breaking point around 200% under favorable interest-growth differentials (r-g < 0), beyond which market confidence erodes even for the U.S. Sustained primary surpluses would be required to stabilize or reduce the ratio, but CBO baselines show deficits expanding to 7.3% of GDP by 2055, implying compounding interest burdens that could crowd out private investment and elevate long-term rates absent reforms. While some analyses downplay near-term crises due to low r-g dynamics, the trajectory underscores vulnerability to shocks like or geopolitical tensions that could invert this differential.
PeriodKey Debt-to-GDP RatioPrimary Drivers
1946106%WWII financing
198131%Postwar growth
200736%Entitlements rise
2020~100%Crisis responses
2025 (proj.)100%Ongoing deficits
2055 (proj.)156%Aging demographics, interest

Interest Costs, Crowding Out, and Fiscal Drag

Net costs on the U.S. federal debt represent the payments made by the to holders of government securities, excluding earned on government assets. In 2024, these costs totaled $882 billion, marking a 34 percent increase from the prior year and comprising about 13 percent of total federal expenditures. As a share of GDP, net reached 3.0 percent in 2024, up from 2.4 percent in 2023 and surpassing levels seen in the low- period of 2007–2020, which averaged around 1.5 percent. Projections from the (CBO) indicate further escalation, with net forecasted at $952 billion (3.2 percent of GDP) in 2025 and climbing to 5.4 percent of GDP by 2055 under current , driven by rising levels and higher average rates on securities. These mounting interest obligations crowd out other budgetary priorities, as they consume a growing portion of federal revenues without providing direct goods or services. Empirical analyses suggest that elevated borrowing competes with demand for capital, elevating real interest rates and reducing private investment. For instance, structural (DSGE) models applied to U.S. data estimate that increases in public lead to measurable declines in private , with one study finding a statistically significant crowding-out effect where a 1 percent rise in debt-to-GDP correlates with reduced business . Micro-level evidence from debt in comparable systems reinforces this, showing negative impacts on corporate borrowing and output, implying similar dynamics at the federal level where debt held by the public has exceeded 100 percent of GDP since 2020. Fiscal drag arises from these deficits and debt accumulation through multiple channels, including sustained higher interest rates that dampen economic expansion and potential inflationary pressures from monetized debt. High debt trajectories, projected to push deficits toward 7.3 percent of GDP by 2055, erode fiscal space for countercyclical policy and impose intergenerational burdens via reduced productivity growth. Government Accountability Office assessments highlight that unchecked primary deficits exacerbate this drag, as net interest compounds the shortfall, leading to slower GDP growth estimates in long-term baselines where debt crowds out productive private spending. Empirical literature on debt thresholds, including U.S.-specific studies, indicates that ratios above 90–100 percent of GDP are associated with 1 percent or more annual reductions in growth rates, underscoring the causal link between fiscal imbalances and diminished economic dynamism.

Historical Evolution

Origins Through the 19th Century

The U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1788, vested with the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises to provide for the common defense and general welfare, while prohibiting expenditures from funds without specific congressional appropriation. This framework established the legislative branch's dominance over federal finances, with no formal executive budget submission required until the 20th century. Under the preceding , the central government lacked direct taxation authority and relied on voluntary state contributions, resulting in chronic funding shortfalls that contributed to its replacement. In 1790, Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton's First Report on the Public Credit outlined a plan to consolidate and fund the Revolutionary War debt, totaling approximately $54 million in federal obligations and $25 million in state debts, by assuming state liabilities and issuing new securities backed by federal revenues primarily from tariffs and s. Congress enacted this via the and the Tariff Act of 1789, which imposed duties on imports averaging 8-10 percent, marking tariffs as the principal revenue source for decades. An 1791 on distilled spirits, intended to diversify revenue, provoked the but generated limited funds compared to customs duties, which supplied over 90 percent of federal income by the early 1800s. Throughout the , federal spending remained modest in peacetime, averaging 1.5-2 percent of GDP, focused on debt service, defense, and postal operations, with enacting itemized annual appropriation bills rather than a comprehensive . Surpluses were common outside wars, enabling debt reduction; for instance, the national debt fell from $83 million in 1816 post-War of 1812 to zero by 1835 under President Jackson's policies emphasizing land sales and revenues. The Mexican-American War (1846-1848) temporarily elevated outlays, but peacetime restraint prevailed until the Civil War (1861-1865), when expenditures surged from $67 million in 1860 to $1.3 billion in 1865, financed by borrowing and the first federal enacted in 1861 at rates up to 3 percent, which was repealed in 1872 after yielding modest revenue relative to war bonds. Public land sales supplemented s, contributing up to 10-20 percent of revenues in peak years like the 1830s, but declined with territorial expansion. The absence of a centralized meant Department estimates informed congressional deliberations, but appropriations were fragmented across general and specific bills, reflecting a decentralized suited to a role. This congressional control, rooted in constitutional , prioritized fiscal restraint, with deficits confined largely to wartime emergencies and resolved through post-conflict .

20th-Century Expansion: Wars and Welfare State

The 20th century witnessed a structural expansion of the U.S. federal budget, transitioning from outlays averaging under 3% of GDP in the early 1900s to sustained levels exceeding 20% by mid-century, propelled by wartime mobilizations and the institutionalization of welfare programs. World War I marked the initial surge, with federal spending rising from 2.5% of GDP in 1916 to 21.7% in 1918, driven by military procurement and financed through increased taxation and Liberty Bonds that elevated public debt from $1.2 billion in 1916 to $25.5 billion by 1919. This wartime escalation established precedents for deficit financing, though outlays receded to around 3.5% of GDP by 1922 as demobilization occurred. The Great Depression catalyzed the welfare state's emergence via the , where President Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration implemented deficit-financed relief, public works, and to address unemployment peaking at 25% in 1933. The of August 14, 1935, created federal old-age benefits, unemployment insurance, and aid to dependent children, embedding into the budget and increasing federal outlays from 3.6% of GDP in 1930 to 10.2% by 1936, with debt climbing from $22.5 billion to $33.7 billion over the same period. These programs shifted toward countercyclical intervention, permanently elevating the government's role beyond pre-Depression norms despite incomplete recovery until wartime stimulus. World War II induced the century's apex expansion, with defense outlays propelling total federal spending to 43.6% of GDP in 1944—up from 9.5% in 1939—totaling $92.7 billion in nominal terms and costing an inflation-adjusted $4.1 trillion, or roughly 40% of GDP at peak. Financing relied on war bonds, revenue acts expanding the base, and borrowing that ballooned to $258.7 billion by 1945, yet postwar reconversion saw outlays drop to 14.3% of GDP by 1948, retaining a higher baseline due to entrenched entitlements and military commitments averaging 10% of GDP through the 1950s. The 1960s Great Society under President accelerated welfare expansion, enacting Medicare and via the Social Security Amendments of July 30, 1965, which introduced federal health insurance for the elderly and poor, initiating open-ended entitlements that drove mandatory outlays from 5.5% of GDP in 1960 to 10.3% by 1975. Combined with escalation—defense spending reaching 9.5% of GDP in 1968—these initiatives stabilized federal outlays around 20% of GDP, reflecting a on government's expanded redistributive and security functions, though raising long-term fiscal pressures from demographic shifts and benefit growth.
Key PeriodFederal Outlays (% of GDP)Primary Drivers
Pre-WWI (1913)2.1%Limited civilian functions
WWI Peak (1919)21.7%Military mobilization
New Deal (1936)10.2%Relief and
WWII Peak (1944)43.6% effort
Great Society (1968)20.8%Entitlements and

Late 20th-Century Reforms and Surpluses

Efforts to address persistent federal deficits in the late 20th century began with the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, commonly known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, which mandated declining annual deficit targets culminating in balance by fiscal year 1991 through automatic sequestration of spending if legislative goals were unmet. The act introduced procedural mechanisms to enforce fiscal discipline, though parts were ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1986, leading to revisions that softened enforcement but maintained pressure for restraint. Despite initial deficits exceeding targets—such as $212 billion in fiscal year 1985—the law contributed to a cultural shift toward deficit reduction in congressional budgeting. Building on this foundation, the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, embedded in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, replaced aggregate deficit targets with caps on and pay-as-you-go rules requiring offsets for new or tax cuts. These mechanisms limited discretionary outlays and enforced revenue neutrality for policy changes, contributing to federal spending declining from 21.85 percent of GDP in 1990 to 18.22 percent by 2000. The 1990 act achieved approximately $500 billion in projected deficit reduction over five years through a mix of spending cuts and revenue measures, setting the stage for sustained fiscal controls. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 further advanced deficit reduction by raising top income tax rates to 39.6 percent for high earners, expanding the , and imposing spending restraints, with the estimating $433 billion in savings over five years, of which revenue measures accounted for about 70 percent. Complementing these were the welfare reforms of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, which converted aid to block grants and imposed work requirements, reducing growth. The , a bipartisan accord, locked in Medicare cuts totaling $112 billion and other restraints to achieve balance by 2002. These reforms, amid robust economic expansion from the mid-1990s dot-com boom and post-Cold War , yielded federal surpluses for the first time since : $69 billion in 1998, $126 billion in 1999, and $236 billion in 2000. Higher capital gains realizations and revenues from low drove receipts to record levels, while enforced spending caps prevented outlay growth from matching revenue gains. The surpluses reflected both policy-induced discipline and cyclical economic strength, with real GDP growth averaging over 4 percent annually from 1996 to 2000.

21st-Century Growth Amid Crises

The turn of the 21st century marked a shift from federal budget surpluses in fiscal years 1998–2001 to persistent deficits, driven initially by the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and subsequent military responses. The invasions of Afghanistan in October 2001 and Iraq in March 2003 initiated the Global War on Terror, with direct federal appropriations for these conflicts exceeding $2 trillion by 2023, encompassing operations in Iraq, Syria, and related areas. Including future obligations for veterans' care and interest on borrowed funds, total estimated costs reached $4–6 trillion, significantly elevating discretionary defense outlays from $306 billion in FY 2001 to a peak of $753 billion in FY 2011 (in nominal dollars). These expenditures, funded largely through supplemental appropriations outside the base budget, contributed to annual deficits averaging 3–4% of GDP in the mid-2000s, reversing prior fiscal gains. The 2008 financial crisis intensified budget growth through emergency interventions. The , enacted in October 2008, authorized up to $700 billion (later reduced to $475 billion) for stabilizing financial institutions via asset purchases and loans. Complementing this, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 provided $831 billion in stimulus spending on infrastructure, tax cuts, and aid to states, aimed at countering the Great Recession's contraction. Cumulative fiscal responses from 2008 to 2012 totaled approximately $1.8 trillion, pushing federal outlays to 24.4% of GDP in FY 2009 and widening the deficit to $1.4 trillion, or 9.8% of GDP. These measures, while debated for efficacy, entrenched higher mandatory and discretionary baselines, with outlays remaining elevated post-recession. The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 triggered the largest peacetime spending surge in U.S. history. Federal relief packages, including the CARES Act ($2.2 trillion), Consolidated Appropriations Act (2021, $900 billion), and American Rescue Plan ($1.9 trillion), delivered direct payments, enhanced unemployment benefits, and business support, totaling about $4.6 trillion in enacted aid by early 2023. Outlays spiked to $6.6 trillion in FY 2020 (31% of GDP) and $6.8 trillion in FY 2021, with deficits exceeding $3 trillion annually, financed by debt issuance that elevated public debt to 99% of GDP by 2024. Pandemic-related emergency designations facilitated rapid outlays but also perpetuated fiscal expansion, as temporary measures transitioned into ongoing programs, contributing to sustained deficits averaging 5–6% of GDP through 2024. Amid these crises, federal spending as a share of GDP rose from 18.2% in 2000 to 23.1% in 2024, underscoring a pattern of structural growth overlaid with acute crisis-driven spikes.

Major Debates and Controversies

Government Size: Efficiency vs. Overreach

The size of the U.S. federal government, often measured by total outlays as a percentage of (GDP), reached 23.3% in 2025 according to (CBO) projections, exceeding the historical average of around 20% since . This expansion reflects growth in programs like Social Security and Medicare, alongside discretionary allocations for defense and other functions, prompting debates on whether such scale enhances efficiency in delivering public goods or constitutes overreach that stifles economic dynamism. Economic analyses suggest an optimal government size for maximizing growth lies between 15% and 25% of GDP, with levels above this threshold correlating with reduced productivity and investment. Proponents of larger government argue it efficiently addresses market failures, such as providing national defense, infrastructure, and , where private provision may underdeliver due to externalities or free-rider problems. supports efficiency in targeted areas; for instance, government-funded nondefense has been linked to sustained long-term gains in the . However, first-principles evaluation reveals diminishing marginal returns: as spending grows, bureaucratic layers increase administrative costs, with declining by approximately 20% since 1995 while output per worker rose substantially. GAO reports highlight fragmentation, overlap, and duplication across hundreds of programs—such as 20 separate initiatives for biofuels across 12 agencies—resulting in redundant efforts and forgone savings estimated at over $100 billion over a decade if consolidated. Critics of expansive size emphasize overreach through inefficiency and waste, evidenced by $162 billion in improper payments in 2024 alone, representing payments made incorrectly due to errors, , or . GAO's High-Risk Series identifies dozens of programs vulnerable to mismanagement, with potential savings in the billions from reforms like better oversight in defense procurement and entitlement verification, yet implementation lags due to entrenched interests. Comparative data underscore this: surged 1.3% in 2024, while public operations suffer from slower and absent market incentives. Excessive size also crowds via higher taxes and , with studies indicating that consumption beyond 18-20% of GDP inversely affects growth rates in developed economies. Thus, while core functions justify some scale, current levels manifest overreach, prioritizing redistribution over value creation and eroding fiscal discipline.

Entitlements: Unsustainability and Reform Imperatives

![U.S. Social Security Revenues and Outlays Forecast][float-right] Mandatory spending on major entitlement programs—Social Security, Medicare, and —accounted for approximately 13 percent of GDP in 2023 and is projected to rise to 14.5 percent by 2035 under current law, driven primarily by an aging population and rising healthcare costs. The (CBO) estimates that federal outlays for these programs will increase from 10.5 percent of GDP in 2025 to 12.8 percent by 2055, outpacing revenue growth and exacerbating structural deficits. This trajectory reflects demographic pressures, including longer life expectancies and lower birth rates, which reduce the worker-to-beneficiary ratio for Social Security from 2.8 in 2025 to 2.3 by 2035. Social Security faces acute solvency challenges, with the combined Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) trust funds projected to exhaust reserves by 2035 under intermediate assumptions in the 2025 Trustees Report. At depletion, incoming payroll taxes would cover only 83 percent of scheduled benefits, necessitating an immediate 17 percent reduction or equivalent revenue increases absent reform. The program's 75-year actuarial deficit stands at 3.65 percent of taxable payroll, requiring either a payroll tax rate hike from 12.4 percent to 16.05 percent or comparable benefit adjustments for solvency through 2099. Medicare's Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust Fund faces depletion by 2036, after which revenues would fund 89 percent of costs, with Part A spending projected to grow from 3.0 percent of GDP in 2025 to 4.4 percent by 2099. Overall Medicare outlays are forecasted to rise faster than GDP due to per-beneficiary cost escalation and enrollment growth among baby boomers. ![Social Security Worker to Beneficiary Ratio][center] These projections underscore the unsustainability of pay-as-you-go financing, where current workers fund retirees amid shrinking support ratios—a decline from 5.1 workers per in 1960 to the current levels. Delaying reforms amplifies future adjustment burdens, as early action allows gradual changes like phased increases to 69 by 2033, reflecting post-1940 gains of over five years. Means-testing benefits for high-income recipients or shifting to premium support models for Medicare could align expenditures with fiscal capacity, though such measures face political resistance. The Trustees Reports emphasize that comprehensive reforms—combining revenue enhancements, benefit recalibrations, and structural efficiencies—are imperative to avert sharp benefit cuts or tax surges, preserving programs' without imperiling broader fiscal stability.

Tax Policy Efficacy: Supply-Side Evidence vs. Redistribution

Supply-side policies emphasize reducing marginal rates to enhance incentives for labor, investment, and , positing that can offset losses through a broader base, as illustrated by the Laffer curve's prediction of maximization at intermediate rates around 32-35 percent for the . Historical evidence supports this: the lowered the top individual rate from 91 percent to 70 percent, after which federal receipts rose from 17.6 percent of GDP in 1963 to 19.1 percent by 1968, accompanied by average annual real GDP growth of 5.3 percent from 1964 to 1969. Similarly, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 under Reagan reduced the top rate from 70 percent to 50 percent initially (further to 28 percent by 1988), yielding nominal growth from $599 billion in 1981 to $991 billion in 1989, with receipts stabilizing at approximately 18 percent of GDP post-recession and real GDP averaging 3.5 percent annual growth from 1983 to 1989. The of 2017 further exemplifies supply-side dynamics, slashing the corporate rate from 35 percent to 21 percent and adjusting individual brackets, resulting in real GDP growth accelerating from 2.4 percent in 2017 to 2.9 percent in 2018, while federal receipts reached 17.1 percent of GDP in subsequent years—exceeding the prior 20-year average of 16.6 percent—despite initial projections of decline. Empirical analyses corroborate these outcomes, with studies indicating that exogenous cuts boost GDP through heightened investment; for instance, a 1 percent of GDP reduction correlates with 2-3 percent higher real GDP via reduced distortions on capital and labor. The 2017 cuts specifically increased business investment by up to 11 percent among affected firms, contributing to overall output gains, though long-term effects depend on permanence and avoidance of deficit-financed spending. In contrast, redistributive policies raising top marginal rates to fund transfers exhibit weaker growth efficacy, as high rates erode incentives: periods with 90+ percent top rates, such as the , featured effective rates diluted by deductions but still correlated with subdued investment relative to post-cut eras, and cross-state evidence links higher taxes to 1-2 percent lower annual GDP growth. NBER quantifies that a 1 percent of GDP hike—often targeting high earners for redistribution—contracts real GDP by 2-3 percent, reflecting diminished work effort and , while Brookings analyses note that such increases rarely sustain long-term gains amid behavioral responses like reduced reported . High marginal rates also distort economic opportunity, with elasticities implying that rates above 50 percent meaningfully suppress and mobility, as evidenced by lower formation in high-tax jurisdictions.
PeriodKey Tax CutPre-Cut Receipts % GDPPost-Cut Peak Receipts % GDPAvg. Annual Real GDP Growth Post-Cut
1964 (Kennedy)Top rate 91% to 70%17.6% (1963)19.1% (1968)5.3% (1964-1969)
1981 (Reagan)Top rate 70% to 28%19.6% (1981)18.4% (1989)3.5% (1983-1989)
2017 (TCJA)Corporate 35% to 21%17.2% (2017)17.1% (post-2018 avg.)2.5% (2018-2019)
Causal realism favors supply-side over pure redistribution, as the former aligns incentives with productive activity—empirically yielding recovery through growth—while the latter imposes deadweight losses, with academic consensus (tempered by institutional biases toward interventionism) affirming that marginal rate outperform hikes for net fiscal and output effects when paired with spending restraint.

Partisan Contributions to Deficits: Data-Driven Analysis

Empirical analysis of U.S. federal deficits by presidential administration indicates that both Democratic and Republican leaders have presided over substantial shortfalls, often exacerbated by economic downturns, military engagements, and policy decisions rather than strict partisan ideology. Attribution of deficits solely to presidents overlooks Congress's role in appropriations and the influence of inherited fiscal conditions, yet data reveal patterns in average deficits as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). According to a study utilizing historical budget data, Republican presidents since the post-World War II era have overseen average annual deficits of 2.39% of GDP, compared to 1.99% under Democrats, suggesting marginally larger shortfalls under Republican terms when normalized for economic size.
President (Party)Term YearsAverage Annual Deficit (% GDP)Key Contributing Factors
Reagan (R)1981-1989~4.0%Tax cuts, defense buildup
G.H.W. Bush (R)1989-1993~4.0%,
Clinton (D)1993-2001-0.2% (surplus in later years)Economic boom,
G.W. Bush (R)2001-2009~2.5%Tax cuts, wars in /, 2008 crisis
Obama (D)2009-2017~5.0% (peaking at 9.8% in 2009)Stimulus response to ,
Trump (R)2017-2021~6.0% (spiking in 2020)2017 tax cuts,
Biden (D)2021-present~6.0% (as of FY 2023) , spending
These figures, derived from Treasury and records, highlight that while Republicans have frequently enacted revenue-reducing tax reforms without offsetting expenditure cuts—such as the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and the of 2017—Democrats have expanded programs, including the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 and the American Rescue Plan of 2021. Deficits under unified Republican control, as in 2003-2007, averaged higher than under periods, per baselines, underscoring bipartisan tendencies toward fiscal expansion amid crises. Causal factors beyond partisanship, such as automatic stabilizers during recessions (e.g., the leading to a 9.8% GDP deficit in FY 2009) and interest costs, amplify shortfalls regardless of administration. Analyses from nonpartisan sources like the emphasize that neither party has consistently prioritized deficit reduction; for instance, the last surpluses occurred under amid strong growth and restrained spending growth, a rarity not replicated since. Claims attributing deficits predominantly to one party often reflect ideological bias in media or academic sources, ignoring evidence of mutual complicity in entitlement growth and discretionary outlays. Overall, data affirm that fiscal indiscipline transcends party lines, with policy choices under both yielding cumulative debt exceeding $35 trillion by 2024.

Reform Strategies and Projections

Expenditure Control Mechanisms

The Constitution assigns the "power of the purse," requiring appropriations for federal expenditures beyond a limited set of exceptions, while the executive branch is obligated to faithfully execute those laws. This separation underpins primary expenditure controls, enforced through the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which formalized annual budget resolutions and prohibited indefinite presidential withholding of appropriated funds without congressional approval. The Act distinguishes between deferrals (temporary delays) and rescissions (permanent cancellations), mandating presidential proposals to within specified timelines, with funds released if not enacted. For discretionary spending, which comprised about 30% of the $6.8 trillion in federal outlays in 2024, must pass 12 annual appropriations bills, often consolidated into omnibus packages or supplemented by continuing resolutions when deadlines are missed. The imposed statutory caps on defense and non-defense through 2021, projected to reduce deficits by $917 billion over the decade, enforced via sequestration—automatic, across-the-board cuts triggered by failure to meet targets. Extended and modified in subsequent laws like the Bipartisan Budget Acts of 2013 and 2018, these caps have periodically restrained growth but faced overrides through supplemental appropriations for emergencies, such as $1.7 trillion in relief from 2020 to 2022. Mandatory spending, dominating over 60% of outlays in recent years through entitlements like Social Security and Medicare, operates on autopilot under permanent authorizations, evading annual controls absent new legislation. The debt ceiling, codified in 1917 and raised or suspended over 100 times since, limits borrowing to finance deficits but does not directly cap spending or revenues, rendering it a procedural rather than substantive restraint; breaches risk default but have prompted temporary maneuvers like extraordinary measures. Additional tools include reprogramming (shifting funds within appropriations) and unobligated balance clawbacks, subject to congressional notification, alongside oversight by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and inspectors general, which identified potential savings of over $100 billion from addressing fragmentation and inefficiencies as of 2025. Empirical assessments reveal mixed efficacy: sequestration averted some automatic increases but induced arbitrary cuts, contributing to operational disruptions without addressing structural drivers like entitlement growth, which GAO and CBO project to elevate outlays to 14% of GDP by 2053 absent reform. Persistent deficits—$1.8 trillion in 2024—indicate mechanisms often yield to political pressures, with GAO noting that while rescissions saved $15 billion in the 2018-2019 period, overall spending trajectories remain upward due to baseline budgeting that assumes continuation of current laws. Reforms proposed by GAO emphasize strengthening , such as automatic stabilizers' limits during downturns, to enhance fiscal discipline.

Revenue Strategies: Critiques of Increases

Critics of revenue enhancement through increases argue that such policies overlook the dynamic economic responses they induce, including reduced labor supply, , and overall growth, which can offset or exceed projected gains in collections. A comprehensive review of recent empirical studies by the found that es, particularly on corporate and individual income, consistently harm by distorting incentives and reallocating resources less efficiently. Similarly, a analysis of proposed tax hikes concluded they fail to reduce deficits meaningfully, as behavioral adjustments—such as deferred investments or relocation—diminish the tax base over time. Historical U.S. data provides evidence against relying on rate hikes for deficit reduction, as post-World War II episodes show tax increases often fail to curb deficits due to accompanying spending growth rather than sustained revenue buoyancy. The Joint Economic Committee documented that federal tax revenues as a share of GDP rose modestly after hikes like the increase under President Clinton (from 17.5% in 1993 to 19.8% in 2000), but deficits persisted until spending restraint, not further taxation, enabled surpluses. In contrast, major rate reductions have correlated with revenue expansion: following the Kennedy-Johnson cuts (top marginal rate from 91% to 70%), real income tax revenues surged 54% from 1965 to 1969, outpacing GDP growth. The Reagan-era Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, slashing the top rate from 70% to 50% (and later to 28%), saw federal revenues double nominally from $599 billion in fiscal 1981 to $991 billion in 1989, with receipts climbing to 18.4% of GDP by 1989 despite initial deficits from recession recovery. The Laffer curve framework, positing an inverted-U relationship between rates and revenue, finds empirical backing in U.S. rate variations, where high marginal rates (above 50-70%) historically yielded due to evasion, avoidance, and disincentives. Arthur Laffer's analysis highlights the arithmetic (rate times base) versus economic (base shrinkage) effects, with evidence from the Mellon cuts and reforms showing revenue peaks after reductions from prohibitive levels. Critics further contend that (CBO) static scoring exacerbates overestimation of hike benefits by ignoring macroeconomic feedbacks; dynamic estimates, incorporating growth effects, reveal tax cuts like the 2003 Bush reductions (top rate to 35%) boosted revenues by 44% from 2003 to 2007, shrinking deficits to $161 billion pre-recession. Proposals to target "high earners" or "loopholes" face scrutiny for underestimating mobility and substitution effects, as high-income taxpayers respond more elastically to rates, per Brookings elasticities showing revenue-maximizing top rates around 70% but current effective rates already near behavioral thresholds. International comparisons reinforce this, with low-tax regimes like post-1980s experiencing revenue-to-GDP gains via growth, not hikes, underscoring that U.S. critiques prioritize supply-side expansion over redistributional taxation for fiscal health.

Commission and Expert Proposals

The President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, commonly known as the Grace Commission and established by President in 1982, produced a final report in 1984 containing approximately 2,500 specific recommendations for improving federal efficiency and reducing costs across procurement, personnel management, asset utilization, and administrative operations. The commission estimated these measures could yield $424.4 billion in savings over three years through actions such as streamlining regulations, enhancing productivity incentives, and curbing waste in defense contracting and civilian agencies, though a Government Accountability Office analysis indicated that full implementation of major proposals would require legislative changes and face practical barriers like entrenched bureaucracies. Only about 20% of the recommendations were adopted by the Reagan administration or , primarily due to opposition from interest groups and lawmakers protecting specific programs, highlighting the political challenges in achieving structural savings without broader entitlement reforms. In 2010, the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, co-chaired by former Senators Alan Simpson and , released "The Moment of Truth," advocating for $4 trillion in deficit reduction over the subsequent decade to stabilize the . The plan emphasized spending restraints comprising two-thirds of the savings, including caps on discretionary outlays, reforms to Medicare payment structures to curb provider incentives for overutilization, and Social Security adjustments such as raising the gradually to reflect gains and progressive price indexing for benefits. Revenue measures formed the remainder, centered on tax code simplification: broadening the base by eliminating or capping deductions and credits worth $1.1 trillion over ten years while lowering individual and corporate rates to maintain progressivity and incentivize growth, without increasing top marginal rates. Despite empirical projections showing the package would reduce deficits without stifling GDP growth—based on dynamic scoring of supply-side effects—the proposal failed to secure the endorsement needed for congressional consideration, as partisan divisions prioritized short-term spending over long-term solvency. Subsequent expert efforts, such as the Bipartisan Policy Center's Domain of Ideals Task Force and the Peterson-Pew Commission on Budget Reform in the early , focused on procedural enhancements like multi-year ing and dynamic scoring mandates to better reflect economic feedbacks from policy changes, estimating these could facilitate $2-3 trillion in additional savings by aligning baselines with realistic growth. In December 2024, the published 76 policy options for reducing deficits from 2025 to 2034, including entitlement adjustments like means-testing Medicare premiums (projected to save $394 billion) and slowing defense growth ($886 billion), alongside tools such as limiting itemized deductions ($3.4 trillion potential). These options underscore that mandatory spending growth, driven by demographics and healthcare inflation, accounts for over 70% of projected baseline deficits, necessitating targeted reforms over mere hikes, which historical data shows often fail to outpace expenditure escalation without accompanying controls. Recent analyses from the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget similarly project that achieving debt stabilization at 100% of GDP by 2035 requires $7.8 trillion in net savings, prioritizing entitlement restructuring given their 50% share of the by 2034.

Long-Term Fiscal Scenarios and Risks

Under the Congressional Budget Office's extended baseline scenario, which assumes current laws governing taxes and spending generally remain unchanged, federal debt held by the is projected to climb from 99 percent of (GDP) at the end of 2025 to 156 percent by 2055. Persistent primary deficits, averaging 3.3 percent of GDP over the period, compound this accumulation, with total deficits reaching 7.8 percent of GDP by 2055 due to outlays expanding faster than revenues. Federal outlays rise from 23.3 percent of GDP in 2025 to 26.6 percent in 2055, driven by demographic pressures on entitlements and escalating net interest costs, while revenues stabilize near 18.8 percent of GDP. Mandatory spending on Social Security and Medicare constitutes the core driver of this , with these programs projected to increase from 13.4 percent of GDP in 2025 to 16.2 percent by 2055 amid an aging population and per capita healthcare cost growth outpacing the economy. Net payments alone are forecast to surge from 3.2 percent of GDP in 2025 to 6.3 percent in 2055, surpassing spending on defense and nondefense discretionary categories combined, as levels amplify borrowing costs even with moderate rates averaging 3.6 percent. The Social Security trustees' 2025 report indicates the program's combined trust funds will deplete by 2034, after which ongoing taxes could fund only 81 percent of scheduled benefits without legislative intervention. Medicare's Hospital Insurance Trust Fund faces exhaustion around 2036, risking automatic 11 percent benefit cuts unless reforms address solvency. These projections embed substantial risks, including sensitivity to economic assumptions: slower GDP growth or higher interest rates—each plausible given historical volatility—could accelerate debt dynamics, potentially pushing the beyond 200 percent by mid-century in adverse scenarios. Elevated may crowd out private investment, suppress long-term , and increase reliance on foreign creditors, heightening exposure to or demands for higher yields. The Government Accountability Office characterizes the trajectory as unsustainable, warning that without corrective action, rising interest crowds out other priorities and elevates crisis probability, where market pressures force abrupt or monetization via . Alternative fiscal paths, such as extending expiring 2017 tax cuts without offsets, could elevate to 214 percent of GDP by 2054, amplifying these vulnerabilities. Empirical evidence from high-debt episodes underscores causal links between fiscal profligacy and reduced growth, with each additional percentage point of correlating to 0.02 percent lower annual GDP growth per peer-reviewed analyses.

Broader Implications

Public Attitudes from Polling Data

Americans express significant concern over the federal budget deficit, with polls indicating widespread recognition of its economic risks. A Gallup survey conducted in September 2025 found that 67% of respondents believe a balanced federal budget would be good for the economy, while only 12% viewed it negatively. Similarly, Rasmussen Reports polling from December 2024 showed 67% of likely voters agreeing that balancing the budget would benefit economic growth. However, skepticism persists about feasibility, as 54% in the same Rasmussen survey doubted they would live to see a balanced budget under current policies. Public preference leans toward reducing deficits through spending cuts rather than tax increases. In the aforementioned Gallup poll, 49% favored spending reductions—22% exclusively and 27% mostly—compared to 16% who preferred tax hikes alone or mostly. This marks an increase from 40% support for cuts in 2012. Partisan divides are stark: 80% of Republicans favor cuts only or mostly, versus 61% of Democrats who prefer equal measures or mostly taxes. Despite this, a (57%) support taxing higher-income individuals to generate revenue, reflecting tolerance for targeted tax measures on the wealthy. Attitudes toward specific spending categories reveal resistance to cuts in entitlements, which constitute a large share of outlays. A survey from 2024 indicated 79% of adults oppose any reduction in Social Security benefits, with broad bipartisan agreement including 82% of Republicans and 87% of Democrats. Similar opposition applies to Medicare and , where majorities across parties view these programs favorably and resist structural reforms that might reduce benefits. Polls also highlight perceptions of inefficiency: A 2025 survey estimated Americans believe the government wastes 59 cents of every dollar spent, with 89% favoring audits to eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse. Support for institutional reforms like a balanced budget amendment remains strong. A 2023 poll cited in congressional testimony reported 80% voter approval for such an amendment requiring balance within 10 years. An August 2025 America's New Majority Project survey found 69% overall support, including 75% from Republicans and 70% from independents. These preferences underscore a desire for fiscal discipline without impairing popular programs, though polls consistently show abstract support for cuts erodes when applied to entitlements or defense.

Macroeconomic Effects and Causal Realities

Persistent federal budget deficits contribute to rising public debt, which exerts upward pressure on interest rates through the crowding-out mechanism, wherein government borrowing competes with private sector demand for , reducing capital available for productive private investment. Empirical estimates indicate that a 1 percentage-point increase in the elevates long-term interest rates by approximately 2 to 3 basis points, as derived from structural models and historical data analyses by the (CBO) and research. This causal channel manifests because increased issuance absorbs domestic savings, bidding up yields and discouraging business expansion and , thereby diminishing the economy's capital stock and potential output over time. Elevated debt levels also impede long-term by lowering and , as resources diverted to debt service reduce public investments in and while private sector dynamism wanes under higher borrowing costs. CBO projections illustrate this dynamic, forecasting that unchecked debt accumulation—reaching 118 percent of GDP by 2035—will slow annual GDP growth by constraining fiscal flexibility and amplifying interest burdens, which already surpass outlays on major discretionary categories like defense in recent years. Causal evidence from models confirms that crowds out investment, with a one-for-one displacement in some specifications, leading to persistent reductions in output per worker. Fiscal deficits pose inflationary risks, particularly when debt monetization pressures independence or demand-pull effects overwhelm supply in a high-debt environment. Recent high-frequency identification strategies reveal that exogenous deficit increases causally raise , with effects amplified by supply growth and financial intermediation constraints. In the U.S. context, post-2020 deficits correlated with elevated , as boosted amid supply bottlenecks, underscoring how deficits can erode when not offset by revenue growth or productivity gains. Net interest payments, projected to consume over 6 percent of GDP by mid-century, further exacerbate these pressures by diverting funds from growth-enhancing expenditures, creating a feedback loop where higher rates compound dynamics and heighten vulnerability to shocks.

References

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