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The language policy in Ukraine is based on its Constitution, international treaties and on domestic legislation. According to article 10 of the Constitution, Ukrainian is the official language of Ukraine, and the state shall ensure the comprehensive development and functioning of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of social life throughout the entire territory of the country. Some minority languages (such as Russian and Belarusian) have significantly less protection, and have restrictions on their public usage.

The 2012 law On the principles of the State language policy [uk; ru] granted regional language status to Russian and other minority languages. It allowed the use of minority languages in courts, schools and other government institutions in areas of Ukraine where the national minorities exceed 10% of the population.[1][2] The 2012 law was supported by the governing Party of Regions and opposed by the opposition parties, who argued that the law undermined the role of the Ukrainian language, violated Article 10 of the Constitution,[2][3][4] and was adopted with an irregular procedure.[5][6] Immediately after the 2014 Ukrainian revolution, on 23 February 2014, the Ukrainian Parliament voted to repeal the law. This decision was vetoed by the acting President Turchynov.[7][8] In October 2014, the Constitutional Court started reviewing the constitutionality of the 2012 law[9] and declared it unconstitutional on 28 February 2018.[10]

In April 2019, the Ukrainian parliament voted a new law, the law "On supporting the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the State language". The law made the use of Ukrainian compulsory (totally or within quotas) in more than 30 spheres of public life, including public administration, electoral process, education, science, culture, media, economic and social life, health and care institutions, and activities of political parties. The law did not regulate private communication. Some exemptions were provided for the official languages of the European Union and for minority languages, with the exclusion of Russian, Belarusian and Yiddish.[11][12] The Venice Commission and Human Rights Watch expressed concern about the 2019 law's failure to protect the language rights of Ukrainian minorities.[12][13] On 8 December 2023, the Ukrainian parliament passed a bill that claimed to have fixed this issues and was adopted in order to meet one of the European Commission’s criteria for the opening of Ukrainian European Union membership negotiations.[14]

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, on 19 June 2022 the Ukrainian parliament passed two laws which placed restrictions on Russian books and music. The new laws ban Russian citizens from printing books unless they take Ukrainian citizenship, prohibit the import of books printed in Russia, Belarus and the occupied Ukrainian territories, and prohibit the reproduction in the media and public transport of music performed or created by post-1991 Russian citizens, unless the musicians are included in a "white list" of artists who have publicly condemned Russian aggression against Ukraine.[15][16][17]

In June 2023, a bill for a new law (No. 9432) on the use of English [ru] as one of Ukraine's languages for international communication was introduced by president Zelenskyy.[18] Among other things, the bill encourages use of Ukrainian subtitles rather than dubbing for imported English-language movies.

Overview

[edit]
See also: Russification of Ukraine
Percentage of native speakers of Russian from the 2001 census. Russian was a regional language in 13 regions (shaded) with 10% or higher before the repeal of the 2012 languages law.[8]

Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the independence of Ukraine, the Russian language has dwindled. In 2001 it remained one of the two most used languages for business, legal proceedings, science, artistry, and many other spheres of everyday life. According to the 2001 census, 67.5% of the citizens of Ukraine regarded Ukrainian as their native language, with Russian being considered the native language for another 29.6%. Various other languages constituted the remaining 2.9%.[19]

Soviet era

[edit]

During the Soviet era, the status of Ukrainian was legally codified in 1922, when Ukrainian and Russian were declared to be of "national significance" and schools were allowed to use them both in teaching; they were never adopted as official languages of Soviet Ukraine but had formally equal status as "generally used languages".[20] In practice, however, Ukrainian was mainly a rural language and had lower prestige than Russian, which was the language of the educated urban society. After an initial phase of official commitment to Ukrainization in the 1920s and early 1930s under the Korenizatsiia policy, the Soviet era was marked by an increasing trend toward Russification.[20] In 1938 the study of Russian was made obligatory and in 1958 the study of the mother-tongue was made optional. From 1959 to 1989, on average 60-70% of the population spoke Ukrainian and 20% spoke Russian; Yiddish was also widely spoken by the decreasing Jewish population (from 14% in 1959 to 3.9% in 1989).[20]

1989 Law of the Languages

[edit]

On 28 October 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR adopted the "Law of Languages".[21] The Ukrainian language was declared the only official language, while the other languages spoken in Ukraine were guaranteed constitutional protection. The government was obliged to create the conditions required for the development and use of Ukrainian language as well as languages of other ethnic groups, including Russian. Usage of other languages, along with Ukrainian, was allowed in local institutions located in places of residence of the majority of citizens of the corresponding ethnicities.[clarification needed] Citizens were guaranteed the right to use their native or any other languages and were entitled to address various institutions and organisations in Ukrainian, in Russian, or in another language of their work, or in a language acceptable to the parties.[22]

The adoption of the "Law on Languages" preceded the Declaration of Independence of Ukraine (24 August 1991) by almost two years.[21] The Ukrainian SSR was still part of the Soviet Union, and its parliament still dominated by the Communist Party of Ukraine.[21] After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the law, with some minor amendments, remained in force in the independent Ukrainian state.[21] Ever since, there have been discussions on the potential adoption of Russian as a co-official language alongside Ukrainian, particularly raising debates during presidential and parliamentary election campaigns.[21] Leonid Kuchma had made raising the status of Russian one of his 1994 electoral promises, but did not deliver it during his presidency.[21]

Ukrainian Constitution

[edit]

The Constitution of Ukraine, adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on 28 June 1996, states at article 10: "The state language of Ukraine is the Ukrainian language. The State ensures the comprehensive development and functioning of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of social life throughout the entire territory of Ukraine. In Ukraine, the free development, use and protection of Russian, and other languages of national minorities of Ukraine, is guaranteed".[23]

2012 Law on the Principles of the State Language Policy

[edit]

On 7 February 2012 members of the Verkhovna Rada Serhii Kivalov and Vadym Kolesnychenko (both from the Party of Regions) entered a bill (commonly called "Kolesnychenko-Kivalov language bill"), that would have given the status of regional language to Russian and other minority languages. It allowed the use of minority languages in courts, schools and other government institutions in areas of Ukraine where the national minorities exceed 10% of the population.[1][2]

Supporters of the 2012 bill argued it would have made life easier for Russian-speaking Ukrainians.[24] Opponents feared that the adoption of Russian as a minority language could have spread rapidly, challenging Ukrainian and causing splits between eastern and western Ukraine.[25] In practice Russian at the time was already used widely[specify] in official establishments in Ukraine.[26]

Kolesnychenko-Kivalov language law
Verkhovna Rada
  • On the principles of the state language policy
Signed byViktor Yanukovych[27]
Signed8 August 2012
Effective10 August 2012
Legislative history
Bill titleBill n. 9073, "On the principles of the state language policy"[28]
Introduced byKolesnychenko and Kivalov
First reading5 June 2012[27]
Second reading3 July 2012[27]
Repeals
28 February 2018
Status: Repealed

In May 2012 Vadym Kolesnychenko, one of the authors of the 2012 language law, claimed that the law was supported by several higher education bodies, scientists and NGOs.[29] On 9 February 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded him and another author of the language law, Serhiy Kivalov, with the Medal of Pushkin for their "great contribution to the preservation and promotion of the Russian language and culture abroad".[30]

Some say that the bill contradicts the Constitution of Ukraine, violates the Budget Code, and aims to annihilate the Ukrainian language.[citation needed] It suffered a criticism in the conclusions of state authorities and their departments: the Main Scientific-Expert Bureau of the Ukrainian Parliament (23 May 2012),[31] the Parliamentary Committee on Culture and Spirituality (September 23, 2011), the Parliamentary Committee on Budget (3 November 2011), Ministry of Finance (9 September 2011), the Ministry of Justice (27 September 2011).[32] The bill also failed to obtain the support of the specialized institutions of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine: the Linguistics Institute, the Institute of the Ukrainian Language, the Institute of political and ethno-national researches, the Shevchenko Institute of Literature, the Institute of State and Law, the Ukrainian linguistic-informational Fund, the Philology Institute of Kyiv University, and the Academy of Sciences of the High School of Ukraine.[32]

Opinion adopted by the Venice Commission

[edit]

In December 2011, the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe issued an opinion on the draft law questioning whether the parallel use of Ukrainian and Russian was in compliance with article 10 of the Constitution:[33] "the question remains whether [...] there are sufficient guarantees, in the current Draft Law, for the consolidation of the Ukrainian language as the sole State language, and of the role it has to play in the Ukrainian multilinguistic society".[33]

Ukrayinska Pravda reported that the Venice Commission did not find in the draft law enough guarantees for the protection of the Ukrainian language,[34] and that the commission had come to the conclusion that the proposed law was just "another tool of the election campaign" for the Party of Regions.[35] Kolesnychenko, one of the authors of the law, claimed that the Opinion was "generally supportive",[36] but the opponents noted that it contained strong criticism about the failure to protect the role of Ukrainian as the State language.[37][38]

Fight in parliament

[edit]
Activists protesting the adoption of the law on 24 May 2012

Prior to 24 May 2012, there were rumors that a revision of the legislation on languages would take place in parliament (the Verkhovna Rada) and that the Secretary of National Security and Defense would attend the session.[39] Some 1,000 protesters gathered just outside the Verkhovna Rada building setting up another[clarification needed] tent city.[40] State law enforcement warned the protesters not to establish a tent city.[41]

At the evening session, the parliamentary opposition in the Verkhovna Rada (Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defense Bloc) blocked the main tribune in parliament as some representatives from the Party of Regions surrounded the presidium. The speaker was forced to announce a break in the session. After the break, Member of Parliament Vyacheslav Kyrylenko read a statement of the united opposition not to conduct any hearings regarding language issues. After the law draft #10154 "On the state language of Ukraine" was not adopted onto the daily agenda, Kyrylenko withdrew his draft #9059 "Prohibition of narrowing the sphere of use of Ukrainian language" from a revision, while Kolesnychenko gave a presentation on his draft #9073. The head of the Committee On Issues of Culture and Spirituality Volodymyr Yavorivsky disclosed the decision of the committee to reject the bill #9073 as it was the decision of the committee's majority. He pointed to the fact that the law draft in fact will introduce a bilingual situation in a number of regions. However, after a review, the bill was supported by the parliamentary majority which showed its support in adopting two state languages: Ukrainian and Russian. The parliamentary minority and the deputy group "Reforms for the Future" stayed in opposition to the bill. Parliament speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn was forced to hastily close[42] the session as further discussion descended into another[clarification needed] fight[43] leaving some members of parliament injured.[44][45]

The Party of Regions released a statement to the press where it accused the opposition of impeding the enactment of a bill that protects some constitutional rights of millions of citizens of Ukraine.[46] PoR leader in parliament Yefremov promised to revisit the issue once everything is stable.[47]

Implementation

[edit]
Participants of a hunger strike against the law in July 2012

The bill was eventually adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on second reading on 3 July 2012; it was supported by the Party of Regions, the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Lytvyn Bloc, while it was strongly opposed by the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and the Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defence Bloc. The bill was to come into force only after it was signed by Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and the Chairman of Parliament.[2] But the Chairman of Parliament Volodymyr Lytvyn tendered his resignation on 4 July 2012.[2] However, the Verkhovna Rada twice held votes of confidence in the speaker, and did not accept his resignation.[48] On 31 July, Lytvyn signed the law.[48] The bill was signed by President Yanukovych on 8 August 2012.[49] The law came into force on 10 August 2012.[1]

Since then, various Ukrainian cities and regions have declared Russian a regional language in their jurisdictions, these being the municipalities of Odesa, Kharkiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhia, Sevastopol, Dnipropetrovsk, Luhansk and Krasny Luch; and the oblasts of Odesa, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovsk.[50] Hungarian has been made a regional language in the town of Berehove (Hungarian: Beregszász) in the Zakarpattia Oblast, "Moldovan" in the village of Tarasivtsi (Romanian: Tărăsăuți) in the Chernivtsi Oblast,[50] and Romanian in the village of Bila Tserkva (Romanian: Biserica Albă) also in the Zakarpattia Oblast.[50] From then on, those languages could be used in city/Oblast administrative office work and documents.[50] As of September 2012 there were no plans for such bilingualism in Kyiv.[51] Chairman of the Supreme Council of Crimea Volodomyr Konstantinov stated in March 2013 that the August 2012 law had changed nothing in Crimea.[52]

Attempted repeal of the law

[edit]
See also: Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation

On February 23, 2014, the second day after the flight of Viktor Yanukovich, while in a parliamentary session, a deputy from the Batkivshchyna party, Vyacheslav Kyrylenko, moved to include in the agenda a bill to repeal the 2012 law "On the principles of the state language policy". The motion was carried with 86% of the votes in favour—232 deputies in favour vs 37 opposed against the required minimum of 226 of 334 votes. The bill was included in the agenda, immediately put to a vote with no debate and approved with the same 232 voting in favour. The bill would have made Ukrainian the sole state language at all levels.[7][53] Still, all the minority languages (including Russian) remain explicitly protected under article 10 of the Ukrainian Constitution. The repeal would also bring back into force the previous law on languages, which was in place in Ukraine for 23 years before July 2012 and was regulating the use of the minority languages.

However, the move to repeal the 2012 law "On the principles of the state language policy" provoked negative reactions in Crimea and in some regions of Southern and Eastern Ukraine. It became one of the topics of the protests against the new government approved by the parliament after the flight of Viktor Yanukovich.[54]

Passage of the repeal bill was met with regret by the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe.[55] The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities expressed concern over possible further unrest. He also proposed to give advice and facilitate discussions on new legislation, declaring that "we must avoid the mistakes made last time [in 2012] when unbalanced legislation was adopted without a proper dialogue in the Verkhovna Rada."[56] The bill was also criticized by the Ambassador for Human Rights of the Russian foreign ministry.[57] Bulgarian and Romanian foreign ministers evaluated it as a step in the wrong direction,[58] and the Greek foreign minister expressed disappointment.[59] The Hungarian foreign ministry expressed serious concerns, noting that the decision "could question the commitment of the new Ukrainian administration towards democracy".[60] The Polish foreign minister called it a mistake.[61] According to Uilleam Blacker writing for openDemocracy, the repeal bill contained no specific threat to the Russian language.[62][63]

After urgently ordering a working group to draft a replacement law on February 27, acting President Oleksandr Turchynov declared on 3 March that he will not sign the repeal bill until a replacement law is adopted to "accommodate the interests of both eastern and western Ukraine and of all ethnic groups and minorities".[64][65][66] Since then the repeal bill has not been signed nor vetoed by the President, and its status has long remained "ready for sign".[67]

On 7 April 2014, Batkivshchyna leader Yulia Tymoshenko stated she supported the 2012 language law.[68] On 3 November 2014, newly elected president Petro Poroshenko declared that the language policy in Ukraine will be amended.[69]

Law declared unconstitutional

[edit]

On 10 July 2014, 57 parliamentary deputies appealed the Constitutional Court of Ukraine to review the 2012 law "On the principles of the state language policy".[9] On 10 October 2014, the court opened the proceedings on the constitutionality of the law.[9] On 14 December 2016, the Constitutional Court ended the oral proceedings, and on 13 January 2017, moved to the closed part of the process.[9] On 28 February 2018, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine ruled the law unconstitutional.[10]

2015 ''Decommunization law''

[edit]

In April 2015, the Verkhovna Rada passed a law banning communist as well as Nazi propaganda and symbols.[70] The names of cities, villages, streets and squares that referred to communist slogans and leaders fell under the ban and had to be changed.[71] According to Volodymyr Viatrovych, who had inspired the law, in October 2016 Ukraine's toponymy had undergone a complete process of decommunization, including in the Donbas region.[72] Former Dnipropetrovsk became Dnipro, and Kirovohrad became Kropyvnytskyi.

The de-Russification of Ukrainian toponymy implied also the removal from railways and airports of any information board written in Russian; as of December 2016, all information had to be given only in Ukrainian and English.[16] Free Ukrainian language courses for civil servants working in the Donetsk regional administration were organised, and from January 2017 Ukrainian became the only language of official and interpersonal communication in public institutions.[72]

2016 Ukrainian language quotas in radio broadcasting

[edit]

In June 2016, a new law was enacted requiring Ukraine's radio stations to play a quota of Ukrainian-language songs each day. At least a quarter of a radio station's daily playlist had to be in Ukrainian from then on, rising to 30% in 12 months' time and 35% a year after that. The law also required TV and radio broadcasters to ensure at least 60% of programs such as news and analysis are in Ukrainian.[73] The law entered into force on 9 November, the national day for Ukrainian Language and Literacy.[72] President Petro Poroshenko hailed the law calling on people to share their favourite Ukrainian song on social medias,[74] while the pro-Russian Opposition Bloc criticised the law and said people had the right to decide for themselves what to listen to, and in which language.[73] According to The Economist, the passage of a law downgrading Russian in Ukraine could have helped "spark war in that country; Vladimir Putin has used it as evidence that Ukrainian nationalists are bent on wiping out Russian culture there."[75]

In May 2017, Verkhovna Rada enacted an analogous law prescribing a 75% Ukrainian-language quotas in all television channels operating in Ukraine.[72]

2017 Education Law

[edit]

Ukraine's 2017 education law made Ukrainian the required language of study in state schools from the fifth grade on, i.e. at the basic secondary and upper secondary levels, although it allowed instruction in other languages as a separate subject,[76][77][78] to be phased in 2023.[79] Education in minority languages in kindergarten and primary school remained unchanged, but at secondary level, students could only learn their native languages as a separate subject.[76][80] Additionally, from grade five onwards, two or more subjects could be taught in any of the languages of the EU, which include minority languages such as Hungarian, Polish and Romanian but not Belarusian, Yiddish and Russian.[81][78]

The 2017 education law provoked harsh reactions in Hungary, Romania, Russia, Poland, Bulgaria and other countries.[76][78] The Romanian parliament passed a motion condemning the law and warned that Ukraine could not proceed towards EU integration without respecting the language rights of national minorities.[76] The Russian Duma and Federation Council also adopted a resolution lamenting the violation of the language rights of the Russian-speaking minority in Ukraine.[76] The Hungary–Ukraine relations rapidly deteriorated over the issue of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine, as the education law was accused of being nationalistic and needlessly provocative.[82][83] Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko defended the law, claiming that "The law ensures equal opportunities for all ... It guarantees every graduate strong language skills essential for a successful career in Ukraine".[84] Hungary is since 2017 blocking Ukraine's attempt to integrate within the EU and NATO to help the Hungarian minority in Ukraine.[85]

On 7 December 2017, the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) stated that criticism of the law seemed justified, as the shift to all-Ukrainian secondary education could infringe on the rights of ethnic minorities.[86][81] Moreover, according to the Venice Commission, allowing certain subjects to be taught in the official languages of the EU could discriminate against speakers of Russian, the most widely used non-state language.[86][81] The Venice Commission formulated seven recommendations to the Ukrainian Government to amend the law; according to the new Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukraine has implemented six of these seven recommendations as of 2019.[87]

In January 2020 the law was changed and made it legal to teach "one or more disciplines" in "two or more languages – in the official state language, in English, in another official languages of the European Union"[clarification needed].[88] All non-state funded schools were made free to choose their own language of instruction.[88]

According to the 2020 law until the fifth year of education all lessons can be completely taught in the minority language without mandatory teaching of subjects in Ukrainian.[88] In the fifth year not less than 20% of the lessons must be taught in Ukrainian.[88] Then every year the volume of teaching in the state language (Ukrainian) should increase, reaching 40% in the ninth grade.[88] In the twelfth and final year at least 60% of education should be taught in Ukrainian.[88]

The 2017 language education law stipulated a 3-year transitional period to come in full effect.[89][90] In February 2018, this period was extended until 2023.[91] In June 2023 this period was again extended to September 2024.[92]

Lviv Oblast

[edit]
See also: Russian book ban in Ukraine

In September 2018, Lviv Oblast Council introduced a ban on the public use of the Russian-language cultural products (movies, books, songs, etc.) throughout the Lviv Oblast until the full cessation of the occupation of Ukraine's territory.[93] Human rights activists and lawyers called the law ill-defined, illegal, and unconstitutional.[94] The Lviv Regional Council decision was successfully challenged in an Administrative Court, among others by the Chuhuiv Human Rights Group; however, on 14 May 2019, the judgment of the Administrative Court was revoked on technical grounds by the Cassation Chamber of the Supreme Court of Ukraine.[94] The Chuhuiv Human Rights Group announced that they would file a lawsuit to the European Court of Human Rights against the ban.[94] The ban was overturned in January 2019 by a court.[95]

2019 Law on Protecting the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language

[edit]
Main article: Law of Ukraine "On protecting the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the State language"
"On protecting the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language"
Verkhovna Rada
Signed byPetro Poroshenko
Signed15 May 2019
Effective16 July 2019[96]
Legislative history
Bill titleNo.5670-d, "On Protecting the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language"
First reading4 October 2018
Second reading25 April 2019
Status: In force

The law "On Protecting the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language" made the use of Ukrainian compulsory (totally or within certain quotas) in the work of some public authorities, in the electoral procedures and political campaigning, in pre-school, school and university education, in scientific, cultural and sporting activities, in book publishing and book distribution, in printed mass media, television and radio broadcasting, in economic and social life (commercial advertising, public events), in hospitals and nursing homes, and in the activities of political parties and other legal entities (e.g. non-governmental organizations) registered in Ukraine.[12] Some special exemptions are provided for the Crimean Tatar language, other languages of indigenous peoples of Ukraine, the English language and the other official languages of the European Union; as languages of minorities that are not EU official languages, Russian, Belarusian and Yiddish are excluded from the exemptions.[12]

First vote

[edit]

On 4 October 2018, the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian parliament) voted with a majority of 261 MPs in the first reading of a new language law (bill No.5670-d, "On Protecting the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language"[97]). Thereafter, the bill "was prepared for second reading for about four months. During this time, the Verkhovna Rada's Committee on culture and spirituality worked out over 2,000 amendments to the document that were proposed by people's deputies. In particular, the document proposes creating the national commission on the standards of the state language and introducing the post of commissioner for the protection of the state language. Lawmakers started considering the document at second reading on February 28. The Verkhovna Rada continue[d] to review amendments to the bill during March 12–15 [2019]."[98] The Council of Europe asked the Verkhovna Rada to postpone the adoption of the bill until the post-election period.[99]

Second vote and signing

[edit]

On 25 April 2019, the Ukrainian parliament adopted the law.[100][101] Patriarch Filaret and former Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko were present in the parliament during the vote.[102][103] On the same day pro-Russian members of the Ukrainian Parliament blocked the chairman, Andriy Parubiy, from signing it by introducing two draft resolutions to repeal the law. "If parliament d[id] not support these resolutions, [Parliament chairman] Andriy Parubiy ha[d] the right to sign the law and forward it to the President of Ukraine to get his signature on it."[104] In total, four motions of appeal to cancel the law were submitted, and it was planned that the parliament would vote on those on 14 May 2019. Parubiy declared that after the parliament would have rejected those appeals, he would sign the law, and that the Ukrainian President would sign it "without delay."[105]

Then President Petro Poroshenko called the adoption of the law by the Ukrainian parliament "a historic decision"[106] and said he would sign the law as soon as he received it from parliament.[107] Poroshenko also said that the law "would not have been approved without Andriy Parubiy".[108]

Poroshenko showing the law signed. Chairman of the Ukrainian parliament Andriy Parubiy is on the left

Parliament chairman Parubiy signed the law on 14 May 2019, after the four draft bills to cancel the bill No.5670-d were rejected by parliament.[109][110] Parubiy said that the law "will be signed by the president of Ukraine in the coming hours or days."[109] On 15 May 2019, President Poroshenko, in his last week in office, signed the law.[111][112]

On 21 June 2019, the Constitutional Court received a petition from 51 members of the Ukrainian Parliament demanding that the law be checked for constitutionality. On 14 July 2021, the Constitutional Court ruled the law as constitutional.[113]

Analysis

[edit]

The law regulates the Ukrainian language in the media, education, and business aiming to strengthen its role in a country where much of the public still speaks Russian.[114] The Law does not apply to the sphere of private communication and the conduct of religious rites.[12]

The law requires every citizen to be proficient in Ukrainian and prevents access to "state positions" (members of parliament, civil servants, etc.) if their knowledge of Ukrainian is insufficient.[12] Ukrainian is the working language of both central and local authorities. In principle, all public authorities only accept to examine documents and applications written in Ukrainian, and their regulations and individual implementing acts are written in Ukrainian.[12]

The law requires elections and referendums to be conducted in Ukrainian and stipulates that all campaign material "broadcast on television, radio, placed on outdoor advertising media, distributed in the form of leaflets and newspapers, or posted on the Internet" be in Ukrainian.[12] Political parties and non-governmental organizations registered in Ukraine are required to adopt their "constituent documents and decisions" in Ukrainian and use Ukrainian in their dealings with the public authorities.[12]

Members of national minorities have the right to receive only preschool and primary education in their own language. As for secondary education, they have the right to study their own language as a subject, while one or more other subjects may be taught in English or one of the official languages of the European Union. Members of national minorities who do not speak an official EU language (Belarusians, Gagauzes, Jews, and Russians) may study at the secondary school level their language only as a subject.[12]

Scientific publications and public scientific events can only be in Ukrainian, English or other official EU language, as well as all cultural, artistic, recreational and entertainment events, unless the use of other languages is justified for artistic reasons or for the purpose of protecting ethnic minority languages.[12] Publishing houses are required to print, and bookstores are required to sell, at least 50% of their books in Ukrainian.[115][116] TV and film distribution firms must ensure 90% of their content is in Ukrainian.[12] The publication of print media in languages other than Ukrainian is permitted only on condition that they are accompanied by a Ukrainian translation, which must be identical in size, format, and substance. Exceptions are media published in Crimean Tatar or other indigenous languages (minorities which do not have a kin-State, such as Karaite and Krimchak minorities) and those published in English or other official EU languages.[12] Films produced in Ukraine must be in Ukrainian, and foreign films must be dubbed into Ukrainian unless they meet certain standards set out by the Ukrainian authorities.[115]

All publicly available information, such as advertisements, directional signs, pointers, signboards, messages, captions, must be in Ukrainian.[12] Ukrainian is the language of "public events" in the broad sense that are organized or financed, in whole or in part, by any public governmental authority. Another language may be used, but the organizer must provide simultaneous or consecutive translation into Ukrainian "if requested by at least one participant in such public event".[12]

The use of Ukrainian is also mandatory in the field of health care, medical care and medical services, but at the request of the service user, the service can be provided in another language acceptable to the parties.[12]

Administrative pecuniary sanctions are applied as a consequence of violations of the law.[12]

Contrary to the minority languages which are EU official languages, Russian, Belarusian and Yiddish are granted no exemption for the purposes of the law.[12][16]

Reactions

[edit]
A street poster in support of the 2019 language law

On 26 April 2019, Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó said the law was "unacceptable" and "part of Poroshenko's anti-Hungarian policy".[117]

On 30 April 2019, the European Commission said it would study and give its assessment to the law.[118] On 22 May 2019, the Chair of the Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe asked the Venice Commission to analyze the law.[119] On 1 June 2019, OHCHR expressed concern about the absence of special legislation regulating the use of minority languages in Ukraine and criticised the distinction between minorities speaking an official EU language and other national minorities.[120]

In December 2019, the Venice Commission said that several provisions of the law failed to strike a fair balance between promoting the Ukrainian language and safeguarding minorities' linguistic rights.[121]

In May 2019, the Kyiv District Administrative Court dismissed an NGO's application to prohibit Verkhovna Rada President Andriy Parubiy from signing and publishing the law.[122]

Russia asked the President of the UN Security Council to convene a meeting over the adoption by Ukraine's parliament of the law.[123]

In January 2022, Human Rights Watch expressed concerns about protection for minority languages.[13]

2022 restriction on Russian books and music

[edit]

On 19 June 2022, the Ukrainian parliament passed two laws which place severe restrictions on Russian books and music.[15][17][124] One law prohibits Russian citizens from printing books unless they renounce their Russian passport and take Ukrainian citizenship.[15] The law also prohibits the import of books printed in Russia, Belarus, and the occupied Ukrainian territories, and requires a special authorisation for the import of Russian books from other countries.[15] The other law bans the playing of music by post-Soviet era artists in the media and public transport and increases the quotas of Ukrainian speech and music contents in television and radio broadcasts.[15][16]

On 7 July, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed the law restricting the public performance of Russian music on television and radio,[125] and on 7 October, the law entered into force.[126] The law allows the playing of post-Soviet Russian music if the musician is included in a "white list" of artists who have publicly condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[125] The Security Service of Ukraine decides on inclusion and exclusion from the list.[126]

2023 Kyiv language ban

[edit]

On 13 July 2023, the Kyiv City Council prohibited the usage of "Russian language cultural product" in the city of Kyiv. This includes performance of all Russian language product including books, music, and films, in public.[127]

2023 changes to national minorities' rights

[edit]

On 8 December 2022, the Ukrainian parliament passed a bill that amends some laws on the rights of national minorities in light of the Council of Europe’s expert assessment and in order to meet one of the European Commission’s criteria for the opening of Ukrainian European Union membership negotiations.[14] These changes, in force from 8 January 2023, entitled privately-owned institutions of higher education to freely choose the language of study if it is an official language of the European Union, while ensuring that persons studying at such institutions study the state language Ukrainian as a separate academic discipline. It also guaranteed to national minorities whose mother tongue is among official languages of the European Union the right to use corresponding national minority language in the educational process along with Ukrainian.

The law ensured that pupils who had begun their general secondary education before 1 September 2018 in the language of the corresponding national minority, will have the right to continue to receive such education until the completion of their full secondary education in accordance with the rules that applied before the Law of Ukraine "On protecting the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language" came into force on 16 July 2019.[14][96]

See also

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References

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Further reading

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Language policy in Ukraine

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Language policy in Ukraine comprises legislation and regulations that designate Ukrainian as the sole state language and require its use across public administration, education, media, and services, aiming to reverse historical patterns of Russian linguistic dominance inherited from imperial and Soviet eras.[1] Since independence in 1991, the 1996 Constitution has enshrined Ukrainian as the official language in Article 10, though implementation remained inconsistent amid widespread bilingualism, with the 2001 census recording 67.5% of the population declaring Ukrainian as their native language and 29.6% Russian.[2] Policies accelerated after the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, which led to the repeal of the 2012 Kivalov-Kolesnichenko law that had permitted Russian as a regional language in areas where it was spoken by over 10% of residents, a measure reversed to prioritize national unity amid Russian aggression in Crimea and Donbas.[3] The pivotal 2019 Law on Ensuring the Functioning of Ukrainian as the State Language, adopted by parliament and signed by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, mandates Ukrainian quotas in television (90% by 2024), restricts non-Ukrainian instruction in secondary schools, and requires state officials to demonstrate proficiency, while allowing limited minority language use in private and cultural contexts.[4] These reforms have boosted Ukrainian's everyday prevalence, particularly post-2022 Russian invasion, yet controversies endure over potential impacts on Russian-speaking communities—comprising a significant urban and eastern demographic—drawing criticism from bodies like Human Rights Watch for insufficient minority protections and fueling Russian propaganda narratives of cultural suppression, despite evidence of voluntary language shifts driven by security concerns and de-Russification efforts.[5][6]

Linguistic and Historical Context

Ethnic and Linguistic Demographics

The 2001 All-Ukrainian Population Census, the most recent comprehensive enumeration, recorded a total population of 48.457 million, with ethnic Ukrainians comprising 77.8% (37.541 million) and Russians 17.3% (8.334 million).[7] Other notable minorities included Belarusians (0.6%), Moldovans (0.5%), Crimean Tatars (0.5%), Bulgarians (0.4%), Hungarians (0.3%), Romanians (0.3%), Poles (0.3%), and Jews (0.2%), collectively accounting for the remaining 4.1%.[7] These figures reflect a historically Slavic-majority composition, with Russian ethnicity concentrated in eastern and southern oblasts such as Donetsk (38.2%), Luhansk (39.1%), and Odesa (27.4%), influencing regional language dynamics.[7] Linguistically, the census indicated that 67.5% of the population (32.577 million) declared Ukrainian as their mother tongue, while 29.6% (14.274 million) reported Russian.[8] This discrepancy between ethnic identification and native language—wherein 14.8% of ethnic Ukrainians cited Russian as mother tongue—highlights historical bilingualism, particularly in urban and Russified areas.[9] Russian native speakers predominated in the southeast, exceeding 50% in Donetsk, Luhansk, and parts of Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, while Ukrainian dominated in the west and center.[8] No full census has occurred since 2001 due to political instability following the 2014 annexation of Crimea and conflict in Donbas, which removed approximately 8 million residents (including 1.5 million ethnic Russians and a higher proportion of Russian speakers) from government-controlled territory.[10] Recent estimates place Ukraine's de facto population at around 37 million as of 2023, excluding occupied areas, with ethnic proportions likely retaining a Ukrainian majority but altered by internal displacement favoring western regions.[10] Post-2014 surveys reveal a shift toward greater Ukrainian usage, with native language declarations stable but daily practices evolving: a pre-war trend of increasing Ukrainian in media and education accelerated after 2022, though Russian persists in 20-30% of households, especially among older generations and in the east.[11] Regional fluency varies, with 95% in the west proficient in Ukrainian versus 65% in central areas, underscoring persistent bilingualism amid policy-driven assimilation.[12]

Historical Russification and Bilingualism

In the Russian Empire, Russification policies systematically suppressed the Ukrainian language to promote Russian cultural and linguistic dominance. The Valuev Circular of July 18, 1863, issued by Minister of Internal Affairs Pyotr Valuev, declared Ukrainian a mere dialect of Russian unfit for literary development, restricting publications to ethnographic materials like folk songs while prohibiting religious texts, educational materials, and original works in Ukrainian.[13] This was followed by the Ems Ukase of May 18, 1876, under Tsar Alexander II, which banned all Ukrainian-language publications except historical documents in their original form, forbade theatrical performances and concerts in Ukrainian, and prohibited the importation of Ukrainian books from abroad.[14] These measures, part of broader imperial efforts from the 1860s to strengthen Russian in borderlands, aimed to erode Ukrainian distinctiveness by limiting access to native-language media and education, fostering reliance on Russian.[15] During the Soviet era, language policy oscillated between nominal promotion of Ukrainian and intensified Russification. The korenizatsiya (indigenization) policy in the 1920s and early 1930s encouraged Ukrainian usage in administration, education, and culture to consolidate Bolshevik control among non-Russians, leading to expanded Ukrainian schooling and publishing.[16] However, by the late 1930s, this reversed amid Stalinist purges targeting Ukrainian intellectuals, with Russian declared compulsory in schools by 1938 and positioned as the language of interethnic communication via the 1970 USSR Law on Languages.[13] Post-Stalin, under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, Ukrainian's share in education plummeted— from primary schools dropping from near 90% in 1950 to under 50% by 1980—while urban migration and media favored Russian, entrenching its prestige.[17] This historical suppression engendered widespread Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism, particularly passive proficiency in Russian among Ukrainians, as imperial and Soviet structures prioritized Russian for advancement and integration. By the late Soviet period, Russian dominated higher education, science, and urban life in eastern and southern Ukraine, with surveys indicating over 80% bilingualism by the 1980s, though active Ukrainian use varied regionally.[18] Such bilingualism reflected not linguistic parity but asymmetric dominance, where Russian's institutional backing marginalized Ukrainian, shaping sociolinguistic hierarchies that persisted into independence.[19] Empirical data from pre-1991 censuses underscore this legacy, with Russian native speakers comprising 20-30% in Ukraine overall but far higher in industrial centers due to targeted settlement and policy.[16]

Pre-Independence Language Policies

Imperial Russian Era Restrictions

In the Russian Empire, Ukrainian-inhabited territories, referred to as "Little Russia," faced systematic linguistic restrictions aimed at promoting Russian as the dominant language of administration, education, and culture to foster imperial unity and counter perceived separatist tendencies. These policies intensified after the 1863 January Uprising in Polish territories, which heightened Russian authorities' concerns over national awakenings among non-Russian subjects, leading to bans on Ukrainian publications and usage in official spheres.[20] Russian was mandated as the language of instruction in schools and compulsory in imperial educational institutions, such as the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, where Ukrainian lectures were prohibited by the early 19th century to standardize education under Russian linguistic norms.[20] The Valuev Circular, issued secretly on July 18, 1863, by Minister of Internal Affairs Pyotr Valuev, marked a pivotal escalation by directing censorship committees to prohibit the publication of original works and translations into "Little Russian" (Ukrainian), asserting that it lacked the capacity for scientific or educational expression and existed only as a dialect of Russian spoken by commoners.[21] Exceptions were permitted for historical documents and some religious texts, but the decree effectively halted most Ukrainian printing, with Valuev arguing that promoting it would "separate brother from brother" by encouraging artificial dialectal development.[22] Implementation varied, but it resulted in the rejection of numerous Ukrainian manuscripts by censors between 1863 and 1876, reflecting an intent to limit cultural expression while allowing limited folkloristic outputs.[21] These measures culminated in the Ems Ukase of May 18, 1876, a decree by Tsar Alexander II issued during his stay in Bad Ems, Germany, which expanded prohibitions by banning all Ukrainian-language printing of original works or translations (beyond historical originals), the importation of Ukrainian books from abroad, and public performances such as theater, concerts, or readings in Ukrainian within the empire.[23] The ukase targeted the cultural revival spurred by figures like Taras Shevchenko and was enforced rigorously, closing Ukrainian theaters and halting publications until partial relaxations in the 1905 Revolution, as part of a broader strategy to assimilate Ukrainian elites into Russian linguistic and administrative frameworks.[24] Despite enforcement gaps, these edicts suppressed Ukrainian intellectual output for decades, contributing to underground cultural persistence but reinforcing Russian as the sole permissible language in governance and higher education.[20]

Soviet Ukrainization and Reversal

In the early 1920s, as part of the broader Soviet policy of korenizatsiya (indigenization), the Communist Party of Ukraine (CP(B)U) initiated Ukrainization to promote the Ukrainian language and culture in state institutions, aiming to consolidate Bolshevik control among the local population.[25] This effort, formalized at the 12th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in April 1923, involved decrees such as the 27 July 1923 mandate for Ukrainizing schools and cultural institutions, and the 1 August 1923 resolution enforcing language equality while prioritizing Ukrainian in administration.[26] Implementation included mandatory language courses for officials, dismissal threats for non-compliance by 1924, and recruitment drives that increased Ukrainian membership in the CP(B)U from 23% in 1922 to 60% by 1933.[25] Ukrainization extended to education, where Ukrainian became the primary language of instruction; by the 1932–33 school year, 88% of students attended Ukrainian-language schools, and over 80% of primary schools used Ukrainian by the early 1930s.[25] [26] In publishing and media, 88% of factory newspapers shifted to Ukrainian by 1933, with 89% of newspaper circulation and three-quarters of theaters operating in Ukrainian.[25] [26] Cultural and administrative de-Russification efforts raised Ukrainian workers from 55% to 60% of the industrial workforce between 1926 and 1933, while adult literacy reached 74% by 1929, with 6.5 million Ukrainians literate in Ukrainian as of 1926.[25] By 1930, Ukrainian-language schools outnumbered Russian ones at 14,430 to 1,504.[27] The policy reversed abruptly in the early 1930s amid Stalin's collectivization drive and the 1932–33 famine in Ukraine, as Soviet leadership viewed aggressive Ukrainization as fostering "bourgeois nationalism."[25] In December 1932, the USSR Central Committee criticized its "incorrect" implementation, followed by the fall 1933 Kharkiv plenum that halted the policy and labeled it dangerous.[26] The appointment of Pavel Postyshev as CP(B)U leader in 1933 triggered purges targeting proponents, including the suicide of education commissar Mykola Skrypnyk in July 1933 and the execution of figures like Oleksandr Shumsky.[25] [26] This shift promoted Russian as the lingua franca, reversing gains in Ukrainian institutional dominance and aligning with intensified Russification through the Great Purge.[25]

Post-Independence Legal Evolution

Constitutional Foundation and Early Laws

The Law "On Languages in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic," adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR on November 28, 1989, established Ukrainian as the sole state language while allowing for the use of Russian and other languages of national minorities in official capacities where they constituted a majority in a given territory.[6] This legislation mandated the use of Ukrainian in state governance, education, and public administration, with provisions for bilingualism in regions of significant minority language prevalence, and it remained the operative framework immediately following Ukraine's declaration of independence on August 24, 1991.[28] Post-independence continuity of the 1989 law reflected a transitional approach, prioritizing the reversal of prior Russification without abrupt prohibitions, though practical implementation faced resistance in Russian-dominant eastern and southern oblasts where bilingual practices persisted informally.[29] The Constitution of Ukraine, ratified by the Verkhovna Rada on June 28, 1996, formalized Ukrainian's status in Article 10, declaring it "the state language of Ukraine" and obligating the state to ensure its "comprehensive development and functioning in all spheres of social life" while guaranteeing "the free development, use and protection of Russian, and other languages of national minorities." This provision balanced national consolidation with minority rights, prohibiting discrimination based on language and promoting the study of minority languages alongside Ukrainian.[30] Early constitutional implementation included executive decrees, such as those from the Cabinet of Ministers in the late 1990s, directing the phased transition of official documentation and civil service examinations to Ukrainian, though compliance varied regionally, with surveys indicating Russian dominance in urban administrative interactions persisting into the early 2000s.[31] Subsequent early measures reinforced these foundations without major legislative overhauls until the 2000s. For instance, the 1997 Law "On National Minorities in Ukraine" complemented Article 10 by affirming rights to cultural and linguistic preservation for minorities, including access to education in native languages where numbers warranted, but subordinated such rights to the primacy of Ukrainian in state affairs.[32] By 2000, approximately 67% of secondary school instruction occurred in Ukrainian, up from lower figures pre-independence, reflecting gradual enforcement amid debates over enforcement rigor versus regional autonomy. These policies aimed at linguistic normalization post-Soviet era, prioritizing empirical metrics like language proficiency in civil service (requiring Ukrainian by 2000 for new hires) over ideological mandates.[1]

2012 Regional Language Law and Repeal

On July 3, 2012, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law "On the Principles of the State Language Policy" (No. 5029-VI), which permitted the official use of regional or minority languages in public administration, education, and cultural spheres within territories where at least 10% of the population declared such a language as their native tongue according to the latest census.[33] [34] The legislation, often referred to as the Kivalov-Kolesnichenko Law after its sponsors Serhiy Kivalov and Vadym Kolesnichenko from the pro-Russian Party of Regions, effectively expanded the use of Russian—the most prominent minority language—in eastern and southern regions, where it met the demographic threshold in 13 out of 27 regions based on 2001 census data.[35] [36] President Viktor Yanukovych signed the bill into law on August 8, 2012, despite procedural irregularities, including the refusal of Verkhovna Rada Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn to countersign it immediately, and it entered into force on August 10, 2012.[37] [38] Proponents argued that the law aligned with European standards for minority language protections, such as those under the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which Ukraine had ratified in 2003, by decentralizing language use to reflect local demographics without challenging Ukrainian's status as the sole state language per Article 10 of the Constitution.[36] Critics, including Ukrainian nationalists and linguists, contended that it diluted the practical dominance of Ukrainian in official domains, potentially exacerbating linguistic divides and facilitating cultural Russification in Russian-speaking areas, as it allowed parallel administrative operations in regional languages and reduced requirements for Ukrainian proficiency in certain civil service roles.[35] [34] The law's passage, achieved with 234 votes amid disruptions and without a quorum verification, sparked immediate protests in Kyiv and western Ukraine, highlighting tensions between centralizing Ukrainian-language promotion and accommodating bilingual realities shaped by historical Soviet policies.[34] Following the Euromaidan Revolution and Yanukovych's ouster in February 2014, the Verkhovna Rada voted on February 23 to repeal the law by 278 to 38, framing it as a reversal of pro-Russian influences; however, Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov declined to sign the repeal, citing risks of inflaming regional unrest in Russian-speaking areas amid Crimea's annexation and Donbas conflict, leaving the law technically in effect.[39] [40] The unresolved status persisted until February 28, 2018, when Ukraine's Constitutional Court ruled the 2012 law unconstitutional, invalidating it primarily on procedural grounds: it had been promulgated without the required signature of the Verkhovna Rada Speaker, violating parliamentary adoption rules under Article 94 of the Constitution, though the court did not substantively address its compatibility with Article 10's mandate for Ukrainian's state functions.[41] [42] [43] This decision, initiated by 47 MPs' petitions in 2014, created a legal vacuum in language policy until the adoption of the 2019 Law on Ensuring the Functioning of Ukrainian as the State Language, which centralized Ukrainian's mandatory use while incorporating limited minority exemptions.[41] [40] The ruling drew mixed reactions, with some viewing it as a necessary correction to procedural flaws exploited by the Yanukovych administration, while others criticized it for overlooking the law's substantive protections amid ongoing separatist threats in Russian-majority regions.[44] [41]

2017 Education Reforms

The Verkhovna Rada adopted the Law "On Education" (No. 2145-VIII) on September 5, 2017, establishing a comprehensive reform of the education system, including provisions to prioritize Ukrainian as the language of instruction amid efforts to strengthen national cohesion following the 2014 annexation of Crimea and onset of conflict in Donbas.[45] The reforms extended compulsory secondary education from 11 to 12 years, restructured curricula for competency-based learning, and addressed linguistic imbalances inherited from Soviet-era policies, where minority-language schools—particularly Russian-medium ones comprising about 15% of secondary institutions in 2017—often resulted in graduates with insufficient Ukrainian proficiency for higher education or public sector employment.[46] [47] Article 7 designates Ukrainian, as the state language, as the mandatory language of the educational process in all public preschool, general secondary, vocational, and higher education institutions, with obligatory study of Ukrainian to enable professional and civic participation.[48] National minorities retain the right to pre-school and primary education (grades 1-4) in their native language alongside Ukrainian, conducted in separate classes or groups within public institutions.[48] In secondary education (grades 5-12), however, instruction occurs predominantly in Ukrainian, with minority languages available only as separate subjects or through extracurricular cultural societies; this shift aimed to ensure at least 80% of secondary coursework in Ukrainian by full implementation, particularly in Russian-prevalent regions.[48] [49] Transitional rules permitted students enrolled before September 1, 2018, to continue partial minority-language instruction until September 1, 2020, for non-EU languages (e.g., Russian) or 2023 for EU official languages (e.g., Hungarian, Romanian, Polish), featuring a phased increase in Ukrainian-taught subjects.[45] Exceptions applied to indigenous peoples like Crimean Tatars, allowing fuller native-language use, while private schools faced fewer restrictions.[50] The language provisions drew sharp international criticism for potentially infringing minority rights under frameworks like the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which Ukraine ratified in 2003.[51] Neighboring states including Hungary (with ~150,000 ethnic kin), Romania (~400,000), and Poland protested, viewing the restrictions as assimilationist; Hungary escalated by blocking Ukraine's NATO cooperation and EU visa liberalization advances.[46] [52] The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, in its December 2017 opinion, found the law partially compliant with European standards but discriminatory in distinguishing EU versus non-EU minorities, recommending extended transitions, clearer bilingual options in secondary schools, and enhanced state support for minority-language teacher training to preserve cultural identities without compromising Ukrainian integration.[53] Ukrainian officials defended the reforms as essential for reversing historical linguistic segregation that perpetuated regional divisions and limited mobility, citing data from pre-reform assessments showing over 70% of eastern Ukrainian students failing basic Ukrainian literacy tests.[46] Subsequent 2018 amendments incorporated some Venice suggestions, such as bilateral consultations for EU minorities, though full enforcement faced delays due to wartime disruptions after 2022.[47]

2019 State Language Protection Law

The Law of Ukraine "On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language" was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on April 25, 2019, as Law No. 2704-VIII.[54] It established Ukrainian as the sole state language, mandating its use across public administration, education, media, and services, while allowing other languages in private spheres and providing limited exceptions for indigenous and official EU languages.[54] [55] The legislation aimed to strengthen Ukrainian's position after decades of dominance by Russian in official domains, particularly in eastern and southern regions.[3] Signed by President Petro Poroshenko on May 15, 2019, the law entered into full force on July 16, 2019, with phased implementation for sectors like broadcasting and education to allow adaptation.[56] Key provisions include requirements for civil servants, judges, and prosecutors to demonstrate Ukrainian proficiency via exams starting in 2020, and for customer-facing services to be provided in Ukrainian unless otherwise requested.[54] [55] In media, it imposes quotas—75% Ukrainian content on television by 2020, rising to 90% by 2024—and requires printed periodicals to publish Ukrainian versions alongside others.[54] The law prohibits deliberate distortion of Ukrainian and creates the post of Commissioner for the Protection of the State Language to oversee compliance and handle violations, with fines up to 9,000 hryvnia for non-compliance in public sectors.[54] [55] Article 7 specifies education requirements, mandating Ukrainian as the language of instruction from the fifth grade onward, with transitional periods for minority-language schools; full Ukrainian-medium instruction applies by September 2023 for most subjects.[54] Exceptions permit instruction in languages of indigenous peoples like Crimean Tatars or official EU languages, but exclude Russian, which is treated as a foreign language without such protections.[54] [43] The legislation underscores citizens' rights to use Ukrainian and the state's duty to facilitate its learning, while affirming no restrictions on private use of other languages or religious practices.[54] Implementation has involved training programs and certification exams, though delays occurred due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2022 Russian invasion.[57] The law faced international scrutiny, with the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe issuing an opinion in December 2019 recommending greater accommodations for minority languages, particularly in education and regions with significant non-Ukrainian speakers, to align with European standards.[43] Critics, including Hungary and Russia, argued it discriminated against Russian speakers, comprising about 30% of Ukraine's population per 2001 census data, potentially exacerbating ethnic tensions.[3] [58] Proponents countered that it rectifies historical imbalances from Soviet-era Russification, where Russian dominated official use despite Ukrainians forming the majority, and does not prohibit Russian in daily life or literature.[59] [3] By 2021, grassroots initiatives and partial enforcement advanced compliance in public signage and services, though full rollout in media quotas persisted amid wartime priorities.[57]

Wartime Restrictions and Adjustments

2022 Bans on Russian Cultural Products

In response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Ukrainian government accelerated efforts to limit the influence of Russian cultural products, viewing them as vectors for propaganda and hybrid warfare.[60] These measures built on prior restrictions but intensified post-invasion, targeting imports, distribution, and public dissemination to prioritize national security and cultural sovereignty.[61] On June 19, 2022, the Verkhovna Rada passed amendments to the Law on Culture and the Law on Media, prohibiting the public performance, broadcasting, or reproduction of musical works by artists who held Russian citizenship after the Soviet Union's dissolution in 1991, unless those artists publicly condemned the invasion, renounced Russian citizenship, and acquired Ukrainian citizenship.[62] [63] This effectively barred contemporary Russian music from radio, television, public events, and online platforms in Ukraine, with exemptions for works created before 1991 or by artists meeting the specified criteria.[64] Enforcement fell to media regulators and cultural institutions, aiming to sever ties with what Ukrainian officials described as an aggressor state's soft power apparatus.[60] Parallel legislation banned the printing, importation, and distribution of books authored by individuals holding Russian citizenship post-1991, including bulk imports from Russia and Belarus, with similar exceptions for condemnation of aggression and citizenship change.[65] [61] This extended an earlier import prohibition on all Russian goods, enacted via Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 388 on April 9, 2022, which halted cultural product shipments amid broader economic sanctions.[66] Libraries and bookstores were directed to remove such titles, affecting an estimated millions of volumes, though pre-1991 Russian classics remained permissible.[67] These bans complemented Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) actions, such as blacklisting over 200 Russian films and series for distribution in cinemas and streaming services, reinforcing a 2014 prohibition on Russian audiovisual content that had lapsed in enforcement.[61] Ukrainian authorities justified the policies as countermeasures to information warfare, citing documented Russian use of cultural exports to normalize imperialism, while critics, including some international observers, raised concerns over proportionality despite the wartime context.[60] [64]

2023 Amendments for Minority Rights

In December 2023, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted Law No. 10288-1, amending legislation on national minorities to expand rights for communities whose native languages are official languages of the European Union, such as Hungarian, Romanian, Polish, and Bulgarian, while maintaining stricter limits on non-EU languages like Russian amid ongoing national security concerns related to the Russian invasion.[68][69] The amendments, signed into law by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on December 8, 2023, permit the use of these EU minority languages in political advertising (with mandatory Ukrainian translations), private secondary schools, and higher education institutions, addressing prior restrictions under the 2017 education law and 2019 state language law that had phased out minority-language instruction beyond primary levels.[70][71] These changes extended transitional provisions for minority-language education, building on a June 11, 2023, law that prolonged the adaptation period by one year for students entering minority-language programs, allowing instruction in EU official languages through the end of secondary education in regions with significant minority populations (defined as at least 15% of residents).[72] The reforms responded to European Union accession requirements, which emphasized protecting linguistic rights for EU-language minorities to align with standards under the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, while explicitly excluding Russian from expanded protections due to its association with Russian hybrid warfare tactics, including propaganda and cultural influence operations.[73][69] Implementation includes provisions for emergency services and domestic violence support in minority EU languages, as well as cultural and media usage rights, but critics from minority advocacy groups, such as the Federal Union of European Nationalities, argued the amendments fell short by not fully restoring pre-2017 bilingual education models or addressing administrative hurdles in certification for minority-language teachers.[74][75] The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe reviewed drafts and noted partial compliance with international standards, recommending further clarifications on quotas and enforcement to prevent de facto Ukrainian dominance in mixed-language areas.[76]

Implementation Across Sectors

Public Administration and Services

The Law of Ukraine "On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language," adopted on April 25, 2019, mandates Ukrainian as the exclusive language for public administration, including the exercise of powers by central and local government bodies, such as in official acts, procedural work, and record-keeping.[54] This extends to the drafting and publication of regulations, decrees, and other normative acts, which must be conducted and issued solely in Ukrainian, with no provisions for parallel versions in other languages unless explicitly required by international obligations.[54] Civil servants, state officials (including the President, Cabinet members, judges, and prosecutors), and employees of state or communal enterprises are required to possess and use Ukrainian proficiency in official duties, with levels determined by the National Commission on State Language Standards and verified via a state certificate or equivalent educational attestation.[54] Applicants for civil service positions have been obligated to pass Ukrainian language proficiency exams since July 16, 2021, with full enforcement for broader categories of roles taking effect by January 1, 2022, aiming to ensure competence in state functions amid regional linguistic diversity.[77][5] In public services, Ukrainian serves as the primary language for interactions with citizens, including administrative proceedings, appeals, and service delivery by bodies such as telecommunications and postal operators, though minority languages may be used supplementally in regions with significant non-Ukrainian populations upon request, subject to resource availability.[54] The Commissioner for the Protection of the State Language oversees enforcement, conducting inspections and responding to complaints; in 2022, this included 170 state control measures across public administration entities, with 130 completed despite disruptions from the Russian invasion, resulting in recommendations for compliance and the launch of nationwide campaigns providing over 500 free online resources for Ukrainian language acquisition.[78] Implementation has intensified since the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, with public administration reforms under the 2022–2025 Strategy emphasizing Ukrainian as a tool for national cohesion and operational efficiency in wartime conditions, including digital service platforms defaulting to Ukrainian interfaces. Violations, such as failure to use Ukrainian in official correspondence, incur administrative fines ranging from 300 to 400 tax-free minimum incomes after a 30-day remediation period, though enforcement data from 2022 recorded 2,846 citizen appeals—a 20% decline from 2021—attributed to conflict-related reductions in administrative activity.[78] Regional programs aligned with the State Language Policy Strategy to 2030 continue to promote proficiency among civil servants, prioritizing empirical integration over multilingual concessions in core governance to counter historical Russification influences.[79]

Education and Higher Learning

The 2017 Law on Education established Ukrainian as the mandatory language of instruction across all levels of state-funded education, with Article 7 specifying its use from the fifth grade onward in secondary schools, while allowing limited minority language instruction in early grades for non-indigenous groups like Russian speakers.[50] This reform aimed to address historical underuse of Ukrainian in classrooms, where Russian had predominated in eastern and southern regions, comprising up to 80% of instruction hours in some schools prior to 2014.[46] For EU-language minorities such as Hungarian and Romanian speakers, secondary education could include up to 50% native-language instruction alongside Ukrainian, but Russian, classified separately, faced stricter limits, confined largely to preschool and primary levels with Ukrainian as the subject language thereafter.[80] Indigenous groups like Crimean Tatars retained fuller rights to native-language schooling.[46] In higher education, Ukrainian serves as the official language of the educational process in public universities, as mandated by institutional statutes aligned with national law, though some programs incorporate English for internationalization.[81] Post-2014 reforms accelerated de-Russification, reducing Russian-language higher education offerings from dominant positions in urban centers—where it had been the sole language in many Soviet-era institutions—to marginal use, driven by policies emphasizing state language proficiency for professional integration.[82] The 2019 Law on Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language further reinforced this by requiring Ukrainian for theses, exams, and public defenses in universities, with exemptions for foreign-language programs but prohibitions on Russian as a primary medium.[3] Private higher education institutions gained flexibility in 2023 to incorporate minority languages alongside Ukrainian, responding to EU-aligned minority rights adjustments amid wartime pressures.[69] Implementation data indicate a sharp transition: by 2020, Russian-language secondary schools had largely shifted to Ukrainian instruction models, with transitional quotas phasing out minority-language hours.[83] Public attitudes, per 2025 surveys, reflect declining support for Russian as a school subject, dropping to under 40% nationally and lower in the east, correlating with security rationales post-2022 invasion rather than prewar bilingualism preferences exceeding 80%.[84] Enforcement challenges persist in rural areas with legacy Russian-speaking staff, but state certification exams in Ukrainian since 2019 have standardized proficiency, yielding measurable gains in graduates' state language competency amid reduced minority-language enrollment.[85]

Media, Publishing, and Broadcasting

The 2019 Law on Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language mandates that print media registered in Ukraine be published primarily in Ukrainian, with allowances for parallel versions in other languages provided the Ukrainian edition matches in volume, font size, and circulation.[54] This requirement took effect for national-level print outlets on January 16, 2022, extending to regional media on July 16, 2024; non-Ukrainian versions must be accompanied by an identical Ukrainian parallel, and online representations default to Ukrainian.[86] [87] Advertising in print, television, radio, and online must also be conducted exclusively in Ukrainian, a rule enforced since January 16, 2020.[88] In broadcasting, language quotas established under the 2017 amendments to media laws require national television channels to air at least 90% of weekly programming in Ukrainian as of 2024, up from earlier thresholds of 50-75%, with non-compliance classified as a significant violation under the 2022 Law on Media.[89] [90] Radio stations face quotas of at least 35% Ukrainian-language songs daily, rising to equivalent shares during prime-time slots (7:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.), a policy phased in from 2016 onward to prioritize domestic content.[91] These measures aim to elevate Ukrainian usage amid historical dominance of Russian in airwaves, though enforcement data from the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting indicate varying compliance, with fines issued for shortfalls as of 2023.[92] Publishing has seen heightened restrictions post-2022 Russian invasion, including a June 2023 ban on commercial imports of books and publishing products from Russia and Belarus, signed by President Zelenskiy to counter cultural influence and imperial narratives.[93] This builds on 2022 parliamentary resolutions prohibiting sales of Russian-origin books promoting aggression or chauvinism, while permitting Ukrainian-authored works in Russian; earlier 2019 sanctions targeted specific Russian publishers like Eksmo and AST for anti-Ukrainian content distribution.[61] [94] Domestic publishing must align with the 2019 law's Ukrainian primacy, fostering a shift where Ukrainian titles comprised over 70% of new releases by 2023, per industry reports, though critics note potential market contraction for minority-language works without state subsidies.[95]

Controversies and International Scrutiny

Criticisms from Minority Advocates

Minority rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch, have criticized provisions in Ukraine's 2019 State Language Protection Law that mandate Ukrainian as the exclusive language for customer service interactions, arguing that these requirements inadequately protect speakers of non-EU official languages such as Russian, potentially forcing assimilation without sufficient transitional measures or exemptions for regions with significant minority populations.[5] The law's stipulation that service providers must default to Ukrainian unless a customer requests otherwise in a minority language has been flagged for overlooking practical barriers, including the limited availability of personnel fluent in minority tongues in mixed-language areas.[5] The 2017 education reforms, which restrict full instruction in minority languages to primary school (up to grade 5, with a gradual shift to Ukrainian thereafter), have drawn sharp rebukes from advocates for Hungarian, Romanian, and Polish communities, who contend that this curtails cultural preservation and educational equity in regions like Zakarpattia Oblast, where ethnic Hungarians comprise approximately 12% of the population per pre-war estimates.[52] Hungarian minority representatives have highlighted a decline in native-language proficiency among youth following implementation, with secondary schools required to allocate at least 80% of subjects to Ukrainian by 2020, exacerbating dropout rates and hindering access to higher education for non-Ukrainian speakers.[96] Similarly, Romanian advocates in Chernivtsi Oblast have protested the formulaic transition quotas, asserting they undermine the 2014 trilateral agreement between Ukraine, Romania, and Hungary intended to safeguard minority schooling amid post-Maidan reforms.[97] The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, in its 2023 opinion on Ukraine's Law on National Minorities, recommended revisions to the State Language Law to better align with European standards, noting that while exemptions exist for EU-member state languages (benefiting Hungarian and Romanian), the framework still imposes disproportionate burdens on smaller groups like Poles, whose rights to administrative use of their language in majority-Polish locales remain under-enforced despite Article 10 of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.[98] Critics from the Minority Rights Group International have further argued that media quotas—requiring 90% Ukrainian content in print, TV, and radio—stifle minority-language journalism and political discourse, reducing representation in national debates and fostering isolation in southern and eastern oblasts where Russian speakers historically predominated, even absent security justifications.[99] These policies have been challenged for potentially violating Ukraine's obligations under the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, with OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities reports from 2018 onward documenting insufficient consultations with minority stakeholders prior to enactment, leading to heightened tensions with neighboring states advocating on behalf of their kin minorities. Although 2023 amendments to the minority rights law introduced provisions for indigenous languages like Crimean Tatar, advocates maintain that core restrictions persist, correlating with empirical trends such as a reported 20-30% drop in minority-language school enrollments between 2017 and 2021 in affected regions, per Ukrainian Ministry of Education data analyzed by independent monitors.[99]

Reactions from Neighboring States and EU Bodies

The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, in its December 2019 opinion on Ukraine's Law on Supporting the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language, concluded that the legislation failed to adequately balance the promotion of Ukrainian with the protection of minority linguistic rights, recommending revisions to ensure compliance with international standards and Ukraine's constitution.[100] The Commission welcomed provisions allowing parallel use of minority languages in certain areas but criticized overly restrictive requirements, such as mandatory Ukrainian in public services and education transitions, which could undermine minority access to mother-tongue instruction beyond primary levels.[101] A subsequent 2023 opinion on Ukraine's Law on National Minorities reiterated concerns, noting that while wartime derogations for security were justifiable, permanent restrictions on minority languages in media and education risked violating European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages obligations.[98] Hungary, home to advocacy groups for its ethnic kin in Ukraine's Transcarpathia region, mounted the most vehement opposition, with Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó announcing in December 2019 that Budapest would veto Ukraine's NATO membership bid due to the law's curbs on Hungarian-language education and services for approximately 150,000 ethnic Hungarians.[102] Hungarian officials argued the measures discriminated by phasing out minority-language schooling after fifth grade and mandating Ukrainian proficiency for public sector roles, prompting diplomatic expulsions and stalled cooperation until partial concessions in 2020 allowed limited Hungarian-medium high schools.[103] Even after Russia's 2022 invasion, Hungary continued leveraging the issue, with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in 2024 citing unresolved minority rights as a barrier to deeper EU-Ukraine integration, though critics attributed some rhetoric to domestic political opportunism amid Hungary's pro-Russia stance.[104] Romania voiced similar grievances over protections for its 400,000-strong minority, primarily in Bukovina and southern regions, protesting the 2019 law's education quotas and administrative language limits as infringing on Romanian-medium instruction and official usage.[105] President Klaus Iohannis canceled a planned 2017 visit to Kyiv in response to draft precursors, and in 2022, Romania's Foreign Ministry decried amendments to the minorities law as permitting undue restrictions during wartime without sufficient safeguards.[106] [107] Relations thawed somewhat by October 2023, when Ukraine recognized Romanian as a regional language equivalent to EU official tongues, enabling expanded use in minority areas, a concession Romania hailed as advancing bilateral ties amid EU accession talks.[108] Poland and Slovakia registered milder critiques, focusing on the 2017 education law's ripple effects rather than the 2019 statute directly; Polish officials in 2017 joined Visegrád Group condemnations of minority education curbs but prioritized post-2022 solidarity, integrating over 1 million Ukrainian refugees with language support programs rather than blocking aid.[96] Slovakia echoed Hungary's concerns in joint diplomatic notes but avoided vetoes, though its own 2024 draft language law drew parallel scrutiny from Hungarian minorities within Slovakia.[109] The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, in a May 2019 statement, urged Ukraine to align the law with Framework Convention commitments by preserving minority language rights in private and cultural spheres.[110] Overall, while EU bodies emphasized harmonization for candidacy progress—linking language policies to rule-of-law benchmarks—neighboring states' reactions blended genuine minority advocacy with geopolitical leverage, intensifying pre-invasion but yielding compromises post-2022 to support Ukraine's security needs.[111]

Russian Narratives vs. National Security Rationales

Russian state media and officials have portrayed Ukraine's language policies as systematic discrimination against Russian speakers, framing restrictions on Russian in public sectors as evidence of cultural genocide or "denazification" needs. For instance, in 2020, the Federation Council of Russia's Federal Assembly accused Ukrainian authorities of "massively discriminating" against the rights of Russian-speaking populations through laws limiting Russian's use in education and administration.[112] These narratives escalated prior to the 2022 invasion, with President Vladimir Putin and ministers citing language laws as indicators of oppression against ethnic Russians, linking them to broader justifications for military intervention in Donbas and beyond.[113] Russian representatives at the UN have claimed the "eradication" of Russian language in Ukraine, including via social media discrimination, as part of a pattern warranting protective action.[114] Such rhetoric positions Russian as a victimized minority language, ignoring historical Russification policies in Ukraine and framing post-2014 reforms as aggressive Ukrainization rather than decolonization efforts. In contrast, Ukrainian policymakers justify these measures as essential for national security and state integrity, viewing the prioritization of Ukrainian in official domains as a bulwark against foreign influence and hybrid warfare. The 2019 Law on Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language explicitly states that Ukrainian serves as the language of interethnic communication and a safeguard for human rights and national unity, particularly in response to Russian aggression since the 2014 annexation of Crimea.[54] Officials argue that unrestricted Russian-language media and education in eastern regions facilitated propaganda and separatism, as evidenced by Russian-imposed curricula in occupied territories that justify the invasion and erase Ukrainian identity.[115] President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has defended the policies by emphasizing Ukraine's sovereign right to a state language, rejecting Russian as a second official tongue amid ongoing hostilities.[116] Empirical trends post-invasion show no outright ban on private Russian use—over 30% of Ukrainians reported primary Russian use in surveys before 2022—but public shifts toward Ukrainian have accelerated due to security concerns, not coercion.[117] These opposing frames highlight causal tensions: Russian narratives amplify isolated restrictions to delegitimize Ukrainian sovereignty, drawing from state-controlled sources with evident propaganda incentives, while Ukraine's rationales stem from verifiable threats like linguistic weaponization in hybrid conflicts, supported by international observations of Russification in occupied areas.[118] Independent analyses note that pre-2022 policies balanced minority rights without eradicating Russian, but wartime bans on Russian cultural imports addressed immediate disinformation risks, underscoring language's role in resilience rather than ethnic suppression.[41]

Societal Impacts and Empirical Trends

Shifts in Everyday Language Use

Surveys conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) reveal a steady increase in the predominant use of Ukrainian in private and daily settings since Ukraine's independence, accelerating markedly after the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of conflict in Donbas. By 2015, approximately 50% of respondents reported speaking only or mostly Ukrainian at home, compared to 46% in 2006.[119] This gradual shift reflected growing national consolidation amid geopolitical pressures, with Ukrainian usage rising in family conversations, though Russian remained prevalent in eastern and southern regions.[120] The full-scale Russian invasion beginning February 24, 2022, triggered a rapid escalation in this trend, with many Russian-speaking Ukrainians voluntarily adopting Ukrainian as a symbol of resistance and identity. KIIS data from December 2022 indicated that 63% of respondents used Ukrainian exclusively or predominantly at home, a convergence in language practices not seen since the early 1990s.[121] [122] By April 2025, only 13% reported speaking Russian at home, while 19% used both languages interchangeably, leaving roughly 68% favoring Ukrainian in intimate settings—a figure corroborated by multiple polls showing reduced Russian dominance even in historically bilingual areas.[123] In public domains such as shops, public transport, and workplaces, Ukrainian has become the default for interactions, with anecdotal and survey evidence pointing to widespread code-switching away from Russian post-2022. A 2023 report noted 46.9% using Ukrainian exclusively or mostly in daily life overall, though subsequent data suggest further gains, driven by societal norms rather than exclusive enforcement.[124] This evolution aligns with parallel increases on social media platforms, where Ukrainian content surged from pre-war levels, reflecting broader cultural de-Russification without evidence of widespread coercion.[11] Regional variations persist, with western Ukraine maintaining higher Ukrainian usage historically, but national averages indicate a unifying linguistic trend amid wartime solidarity.[12]

Public Attitudes and Enforcement Data

A nationwide survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in October 2025 revealed that 87% of Ukrainians endorse "strategic Ukrainization" as the optimal language policy, defined as prioritizing Ukrainian in public spheres while permitting minority languages in private and cultural contexts.[125] This consensus spans regions, with support exceeding 80% even in historically Russian-speaking areas like the south and east, reflecting a post-2022 war-driven shift toward Ukrainian linguistic dominance.[126] Opposition to elevating Russian's official status remains minimal; a KIIS poll from March 2024 indicated that only 3% of respondents favored designating Russian as a second state language, while 7% supported its use in official settings without state status.[127] Concurrently, self-reported language practices have evolved: by April 2025, 63% of citizens reported using Ukrainian predominantly at home, up from 52% in 2020, with exclusive Russian use dropping to 13%.[123] A Razumkov Centre survey in June 2024 further documented that 78% now identify Ukrainian as their native language, a rise from 52% in 2006, attributed to wartime patriotism and policy reinforcement.[128] Enforcement of the 2019 Law on Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language, overseen by the Commissioner for the Protection of the State Language, has yielded declining complaint volumes, signaling heightened compliance. In 2024, the office registered 2,314 citizen appeals alleging violations—37% fewer than in 2023—with the service sector accounting for the majority (around 18-20% of cases) and Kyiv originating nearly one-third (261 complaints).[129] [130] Fines totaled nearly 200,000 UAH by mid-2025, including 16 for online non-compliance by September 2024, primarily targeting absent Ukrainian website versions or improper public communications.[131] [132] Earlier data from 2021-2023 recorded over 8,000 complaints cumulatively, but the downward trend post-2023 suggests policy normalization amid reduced tolerance for Russian in official domains.[133]

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