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Moon Jae-in
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Moon Jae-in (Korean: 문재인, pronounced [mun.dʑɛ.in] ⓘ; born 24 January 1953) is a South Korean politician and lawyer who served as the 12th president of South Korea from 2017 to 2022. A member of the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), he was the party's leader from 2015 to 2016 and also represented Sasang in the National Assembly from 2012 to 2016. Before his presidency, he served as the senior secretary for civil affairs and the chief of staff to President Roh Moo-hyun.[2]
Born in Geoje to North Korean refugees, Moon was raised in poverty in Busan.[3] He excelled in school and studied law at Kyung Hee University. He became a lawyer and was involved in human rights activism with Roh Moo-hyun. He was imprisoned for organizing a protest against the Yushin Constitution. As a result of his work in human rights law, Moon was chosen to be Roh's campaign manager in the 2002 presidential election.[4] He served in Roh's administration in various official capacities. In 2012, Moon was a candidate for the Democratic United Party in the 2012 presidential election, which he lost to Park Geun-hye.
In the 2017 presidential election, Moon was elected president as the Democratic Party of Korea candidate after Park Geun-hye was impeached and removed from office.[5][6] As president, Moon received international attention for his meetings with North Korean Chairman Kim Jong Un at inter-Korean summits in April, May, and September 2018, making him the third South Korean president to meet their North Korean counterpart. On June 30, 2019, he met with both Kim and US president Donald Trump at the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). During his presidency, Moon favored the Sunshine Policy, a peaceful approach to Korean reunification.[7] On economic policy, he favored reform of chaebols (conglomerates),[8] raised the minimum wage by more than 16%,[9] and lowered the maximum workweek from 68 to 52 hours.[10] During the COVID-19 pandemic in South Korea, Moon received praise domestically and internationally.[11] His party won a historic victory in the 2020 South Korean legislative election.[12] However, his party lost the next presidential election, making him the first president since South Korea's democratization in 1987 to transfer power to the opposition after a single term. He left office in May 2022, succeeded by his former prosecutor general, Yoon Suk Yeol.
Early life, education, and military service
[edit]Moon Jae-in was born in Geoje, South Korea, on January 24, 1953, shortly before the end of the Korean War, as the second child and oldest son among five children of father Moon Yong-hyung and mother Kang Han-ok. His parents were refugees from South Hamgyong Province, North Korea who fled their native city of Hungnam in the Hungnam evacuation during the Korean War.[3] His father worked as head of the agriculture department that detained food, especially the rice of Korean colonial people, as one of the main tasks in Heungnam, Hamju, South Hamgyong Province.[13][14]
His family eventually settled in Busan. Since his father did not want to become a government employee as he had been in North Korea, he started a business selling socks, which left his family in great debt. His mother became the main earner by selling clothes received from relief organizations and delivering briquettes. Moon's family became attached to the Catholic Church when his mother went to the local cathedral to receive whole milk powder. Moon once said in an interview that he did not know how to ride a bike since his family was too poor to afford a bike or a monthly school tuition.[15]
Moon entered Kyungnam High School and reportedly placed at the top of his class.[3][16] He was accepted to study law at Kyung Hee University with a full scholarship.[17] At university, he met his future wife, Kim Jung-sook. After organizing a student protest against the Yushin Constitution, he was arrested, convicted, imprisoned at Seodaemun Prison, and expelled from the university.[3][18][19] Later, he was conscripted into the military and assigned to the 1st Special Forces Brigade,[20] where he participated in "Operation Paul Bunyan" during the axe murder incident in Panmunjom.[21][22]
After his honorable discharge, the death of his father motivated him to study for the bar exam. He stayed at the Buddhist temple of Daeheungsa to study for the exam and passed the first of two rounds in 1979. In 1980, he returned to Kyung Hee University to complete the remainder of his studies. Later that year, he passed the second round of the bar exam and was admitted to the Judicial Research and Training Institute. He graduated from the Institute ranked second in his class but was not appointed a judge or prosecutor due to his history of student activism against the Yushin dictatorship under Park Chung Hee.[23] Moon then chose to go into private practice instead.
Early career
[edit]Human rights lawyer
[edit]After becoming a lawyer, he worked under future president Roh Moo-hyun in the 1980s.[24] Along with Roh, he took cases involving the labor rights issues and became renowned for his work in human rights.[25] As a member of the Busan Bar Association, Moon investigated the child labor camp known as the Brothers Home.[26][27]
He was a founding member of the progressive South Korean newspaper, The Hankyoreh, in 1988.[28][7]
Roh Moo-hyun administration
[edit]Yielding to Roh's insistence, Moon became Roh's campaign manager during his presidential bid.[4] After Roh's victory, Moon became Roh's close aide holding various roles in a presidential administration. Moon held roles as Senior Presidential Secretary for Civil Affairs, Senior Presidential Secretary for Civil Society and Chief Presidential Secretary from 2003 to 2008.
When the National Assembly voted to impeach Roh in 2004, Moon led the legal delegation for Roh at the Constitutional Court and won the case. Moon, as Roh's chief of staff, led the preparation committee of the 2nd Inter-Korean Summit but did not attend the summit.[citation needed]
Political career before the presidency
[edit]Entry to politics
[edit]Despite his earlier indifference, he began to get involved in politics. He published a memoir called Moon Jae-in: The Destiny which became a bestseller.[29] His popularity had been rising steadily against his likely opponent in the presidential race, Park Geun-hye. In a February 2012 poll, Moon rivaled Park in popularity.[30]
Moon managed to capitalize on the conservatives' decline in popularity amid a series of corruption scandals. As one pundit said, "Moon had managed to portray himself as a moderate and rational leader who has the backing of the younger generation".[31]
2012 general election
[edit]In 2012, Moon entered a bid for a seat in the National Assembly in the 19th legislative election. Moon won a seat in the Sasang District of Busan on April 11, 2012, as a member of the Democratic United Party with 55% of the vote.[17] As of 2021, Sasang District belongs to the Conservative Party.[32]
2012 presidential campaign
[edit]On September 16, 2012, Moon received the presidential nomination for the Democratic United Party.
He ran for the 2012 presidential election as the Democratic United Party's candidate in a three-way race against Park Geun-hye, the incumbent ruling party's candidate and daughter of the late president Park Chung Hee,[33] as well as independent software mogul Ahn Cheol-soo. Ahn dropped out of the race and endorsed Moon after polls showed a most likely definitive loss for both candidates were there to be a three-way race against Park. Moon went on to lose the election.
Leader of the Democratic Party
[edit]Moon was elected as the leader of New Politics Alliance for Democracy (NPAD) on February 2, 2015. Prior to his election, Moon and NPAD party leader and 2012 presidential candidate rival Ahn Cheol-soo had many public disputes over the direction of the party.
Moon's official role led Ahn Cheol-soo to quit and form the centrist People's Party. Ahn's departure and Moon's new tenure as party leader led to renaming the liberal, NPAD Party as the new Democratic Party.
During his leadership, Moon scouted several politically prominent people, including police studies/criminology expert Pyo Chang-won, political critic Lee Chul-hee, and former president Park's secretary Cho Ung-chun to prepare for upcoming 2016 legislative elections. After his recruitment, Moon resigned his position for another scouted advisor/former Park advisor Kim Chong-in.[34]
2017 presidential election
[edit]Primary and general election
[edit]
Moon was considered the frontrunner to win Korea's 2017 presidential election, which would be the 19th term of the country's presidency, following the impeachment and removal of Park Geun-hye. The election had originally been scheduled for December 2017, but was brought forward to May 2017 in order to ensure that they would take place within 60 days of Park's removal, as required by the Constitution.
He won the Democratic Party's nomination against fellow party members Ahn Hee-jung, Lee Jae-myung, and Choi Sung with 57% of the votes.
The general election originally had 15 announced candidates. Moon faced four other major party nominees during the election, including 2012 presidential rival and past party colleague Ahn Cheol-soo of the People's Party and Hong Jun-pyo of the Liberty Korea Party. He was elected the 19th president of South Korea in Korea's 19th presidential election by a large plurality over two.
On May 10, 2017, Moon won the election with a plurality of 41.1% votes (out of 13,423,800 votes nationwide).[35] As Moon was elected in a special election, he did not have the usual 60-day transition period of previous administrations but was instead inaugurated the day after the election.
Campaign positions on domestic policy
[edit]Economic policy
[edit]Moon's campaign promises in 2017 included intentions to put a 10 trillion won ($8.9 billion) fiscal stimulus to support job creation, start-ups, and small to mid-sized companies. His announced goal is to create 810,000 public sector jobs through raising taxes on the wealthy.[36]
Moon's policy against corporate corruption, specifically in regard to Korean conglomerates known as "chaebols " is to give "minority shareholders more power in electing board members" of the companies.[36]
Transparency
[edit]Moon also promised transparency in his presidency, moving the presidential residence from the palatial and isolated Blue House to an existing government complex in downtown Seoul.[37]
Homophobia controversy
[edit]Moon was criticized for homophobic comments he made in a televised presidential debate for the 2017 presidential election, where Moon said he opposed homosexuality,[38] in response to conservative candidate Hong Jun-pyo's remarks that gay soldiers were a source of weakness in the South Korean military. Moon's remark prompted immediate criticism during the debate from Sim Sang-jung, the sole presidential candidate to support LGBT rights and a member of the left wing Justice Party.[39] The discriminatory remark also prompted outrage from gay rights activists, with some finding it especially unacceptable considering Moon being the leading liberal candidate and a former human rights lawyer. Some of Moon's supporters dismissed the comments as a tact to win, as South Koreans tend to be conservative on social issues.[40] Moon later backtracked on his original comments, clarifying that he believes there should be no discrimination based on sexual orientation, while at the same time opposing legalizing same-sex marriage.[41]
Campaign positions on foreign policy
[edit]Moon has favored a peaceful reunification between the two Koreas. He was both widely criticized and widely praised for his comments stating that his first visit if elected president would be to visit North Korea, a visit that would be not unlike Roh Moo-hyun's visit to the country in 2007. Similarly, Moon's foreign policy towards North Korea is considered to closely align with the Sunshine Policy embraced by former liberal presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun.[7]
His 2017 presidential campaign has supported re-opening of the Kaesong industrial park.[42]
Moon's relatively liberal stance in foreign policy is reflected as he is quoted in a book: "I'm pro-U.S., but now South Korea should adopt diplomacy in which it can discuss a U.S. request and say no to the Americans."[43] He opposes a re-balance of the security alliance with the United States, but has also stated that he would like South Korea "to be able to take the lead on matters on the Korean Peninsula."[7] At the same time, Moon has stated that he considers America as a "friend" for its role in helping South Korea avoid communism while helping its economic growth.[44]
Presidency (2017–2022)
[edit]This section needs to be updated. (May 2022) |
| Presidency of Moon Jae-in May 10, 2017 – May 10, 2022 | |
| Cabinet | Full list |
|---|---|
| Party | Democratic |
| Election | 2017 |
| Seat | Seoul |
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Moon was sworn into office immediately after official votes were counted on 10 May 2017, replacing Acting President and Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn.[45] There was no transition period between the election and inauguration, unlike other presidential elections due to the nature of an election following a presidential impeachment and removal of his predecessor, Park Geun-hye.[46] He served out the typical single five-year term with his presidential term concluding in 2022.[47][48]
President Moon and his government has been widely described as left-wing[49][50][51] or liberal by media.
On 15 August 2019, coinciding with Liberation Day, large-scale flag rallies occurred in central Seoul, including Seoul Station, City Hall Plaza, Daehanmun, and the outer ring of Gwanghwamun Plaza, calling to impeach Moon Jae-in. Protests were also held on 3 October, the national foundation day.[52]
Domestic policy
[edit]Fiscal policy stance
According to <2017-2021 National Fiscal Management Plan>, the Moon Jae-in administration projected that the South Korea economy would achieve improved growth driven by exports and investment. However, it pointed out that the income polarization problem intensified while South Korea achieved hypergrowth in the past. To solve the income inequality, it was urgent to switch to a new economic paradigm. Moon Jae In administration emphasized the active role of government finance to achieve the goal of a “people-centered, sustainable growth economy”.[53] This led to an expansionary fiscal policy stance. This was implemented as 'income-led growth', which was the core economic policy of the Moon Jae In administration. The Moon administration diagnosed that the proportion of corporate income in the national economy has increased due to the corporate-centered economic policy, while the proportion of household income has decreased significantly. As a result, the imbalance, such as the income gap between companies and households, the corporate income gap between large and small companies, and the wage income gap between workers, has deepened. The income-led growth policy was aimed at increasing the income of households to achieve economic growth.[54]
The policy consisted of three pillars: increasing household income, expanding social safety nets and welfare, and investing in people. First, it planned to raise the minimum wage and expand ‘earned income tax credit’ to improve the income of low-wage workers. Policies to support self-employed small business owners were also initiated by reducing card fees and rent. Second, welfare expansion such as basic pension for the elderly, pension for the disabled, childern’s allowance, and basic living security was initiated. Third, the government sought to strengthen human capacity by reducing blind spots in employment insurance and strengthening unemployment benefit coverage. According to the <Performance and Tasks of Income-led growth>, the proportion of low-wage workers has decreased since 2018, largely due to minimum wage increases. Wage disparities in the labor market based on gender, employment type, and company size have also shown improvement. Notably, the ‘labor income share’ increased by 5.5%, representing the most significant increase compared to previous administrations. Also income distribution indicators improved due to the improvement of the basic living security system, the increase in the basic pension, and the establishment of child allowances. In addition, the number of employment insurance policyholders continued to increase, helping to reduce blind spots.[55]
The expansionary fiscal stance was also reflected in the 'Korean-style fiscal rules' announced in 2020. The purpose is to secure fiscal sustainability, but government spending is set to be flexibly expanded in times of crisis rather than applying strict fiscal rules. In situations where the role of finance is required, the direction of implementation was specified to actively respond to changes in economic and financial conditions with bold financial support from the government. An exception was included for national disasters or economic crises necessitating significant fiscal expenditure, with management indicators to be gradually reapplied over four years once the exceptional circumstances subside. The formula for calculating the fiscal management limit also reflects a relatively flexible fiscal stance. Rather than a simple and strict limit regulation, management indicators were designed through a calculation formula that considers both ‘national debt’ and the ‘Consolidated Fiscal Balance’. For example, if ‘National Debt as a Percentage of GDP’ exceeds the initial target threshold of 60%, the framework permits adjustments, such as reducing the ‘consolidated fiscal balance’ of the initial target threshold of -3%, to ensure compliance. Furthermore, the legal basis was planned to be included in the 'enforcement decree', which is less legally binding than the law.[56]
Chaebol reform
[edit]South Korea's economic growth has been attributed in large part to Chaebols, or family-owned conglomerates. Prominent examples of conglomerates include Samsung and Hyundai,[57] concentrated power (collusion), connections with the government including most recently the 2016 Choi Soon-sil scandal which ultimately led to the special election Moon won. Moon subsequently appointed "chaebol sniper" Kim Sang-jo, a well-known shareholder activist, to the role of fair-trade commissioner aimed at reforming chaebols.[8]
Tech policy
[edit]As President, Moon signed into law an amendment to the Telecommunications Business Act that has been referred to as the "Anti-Google Law". The legislation prohibits Apple and Google, which operate the App Store and Google Play Store, respectively, from requiring app developers on these platforms to use their payment systems to sell their products. As a result, app developers will be able to avoid paying commission to Apple or Google by directing customers to pay through alternate platforms.[58]
Health care policy
[edit]Moon's health care policy included the benefit coverage expansion in National Health Insurance.[59]
Prosecution reform
[edit]Prosecution reform was implemented to rearrange the prosecution and its investigation right and to rebuild the corrupt prosecution.[60][61]
So far, the prosecution has had both investigation rights, and accusation rights and it leads to vastly over-concentrated power.[62]
So, the main purpose of coordinating the prosecution and police investigation rights is to weaken the accusation right of the prosecution.[63]
It was started under the Moon Jae-in administration by former Ministers of Justice such as Cho Guk, Choo Mi-ae, and Park Beom-gye. Yoon Suk Yeol, who was the president, also participated as former Prosecutor General.[64][65][66][67]
As part of the process, the Corruption Investigation Office for high-ranking officials was established, and the backlash from the prosecution was very strong.
Against this 'power rearrange' process, some executives of prosecution withdrew their seats as a sign of resistance.[68][69]
In addition, through coordinating the prosecution and police investigation rights, the ruling party tried to shift the power of the prosecution to others.[70]
Like the time the Corruption Investigation Office For High-ranking Officials was established, high-ranking officials of the prosecution again resigned as a sign of resistance against coordinating the prosecution and police investigation rights.
As a result, the power of the prosecution weakened compared to the past, by the prosecution reform during the Moon Jae-in administration.[71]
Still there are some limitations. As the opposition party interrupted the related legislation process, it took more time than usual and some of the core part of the prosecution reform was revised.[72]
Capital punishment
[edit]Moon opposed efforts to re-implement capital punishment.[73]
Investigation of labor abuses
[edit]Moon approved of a bill passed in April 2020 to investigate labor abuses in the work camp known as Brothers Home, which he investigated as a lawyer in 1987.[26][27]
Minimum wage
[edit]Moon's government launched a series of minimum wage hikes. One of these was in 2018, which raised the minimum wage by 16.4% from the previous year to 7,530 won (US$6.65) an hour.[9][74] In a 2018 report, the NGO Oxfam cited South Korea as one of the few countries in Asia to have made efforts to reduce inequality that year.[75]
Maximum hour work week
[edit]The maximum hour work week was reduced from 68 to 52.[10] In October 2018, a study conducted by a telecommunications firm found that in central Seoul the amount of time people spent in or near their workplace fell by 55 minutes, and time spent of leisure activities went up in residential areas.[74] However, they found little to no change elsewhere in the country.[74] Bars and restaurants in central Seoul reported a loss in business.[74]
Education
[edit]Moon's predecessor and daughter of Park Chung Hee, Park Geun-hye, originally planned to mandate usage of state-issued history textbooks in 2018. Moon reversed those plans in May 2017 in one of his first major acts as president. Critics of Park's original plan saw this as a way for Park to mitigate some representations of her father's oppressive policies under a dictatorial rule, only highlighting the positive accomplishments of the past. Park previously stated in 2015 that she wanted to replace the "left-leaning" books with those created from the government that would instill greater patriotism.[76] Although the Park government responded to subsequent backlash by switching from its official position of requiring the textbooks to be used, to allowing schools the choice to use them, Moon's action scrapped the program altogether. Schools continued using privately published, government-approved textbooks written under educational guidelines instead.[77]
Animal rights and dog meat
[edit]During his campaign, Moon promised to adopt a dog from an animal sanctuary; this was considered relevant to South Korean politics, as the country allows for consumption of dog meat. He adopted Tory, a four-year-old black mongrel saved from a dog meat farm, from an animal rights group. The move was considered as sending "a strong message against the dog meat trade".[78]
Energy
[edit]
Moon's administration focused on increasing South Korea's consumption of natural gas, away from nuclear and coal as sources of energy. These plans include delaying construction on nuclear reactors as well as re-opening dialogue around a natural gas pipeline that would come from Russia and pass through North Korea.[79] At the event on June 19, 2017, marking the end of operations at South Korea's oldest nuclear reactor, Kori Unit 1, Moon outlined his plan for the future of energy in Korea, saying "we will abandon the development policy centered on nuclear power plants and exit the era of nuclear energy." This would be implemented by canceling plans for new nuclear power plants and not renewing licenses for operating plants. In addition, he shut down eight coal-fired power plants upon assuming office in May 2017, and pledged to shut down the remaining ten coal plants by the end of his term. In the long term, he envisioned renewable sources would eventually be able to meet Korea's demand, but in the interim, proposed liquefied natural gas (LNG) as a stopgap measure while coal and nuclear were taken offline in the coming decades.[80]
COVID-19 pandemic
[edit]
Moon's response to the COVID-19 pandemic has been praised both domestically and internationally.[11] In the first few weeks of March 2020, daily cases fell from 800 to fewer than 100, reducing daily cases by more than 90% at its peak.[81]
However, more than 1.5 million South Koreans signed a petition to impeach Moon over what they claimed was the government's initial mishandling of the coronavirus outbreak in South Korea.[82] In response, more than 1.3 million South Koreans signed a second petition in just two weeks to support Moon over what they claimed was the government's capable control of the coronavirus.[83]
An opinion poll conducted between 5–6 March 2020 by Embrain, a public polling company, showed that 53% of the public had a positive evaluation of Moon's handling of the COVID-19 pandemic in South Korea.[84] An opinion poll by Gallup Korea in the first week of March 2020 showed his approval rating rose from 44% to 67%, due to public's approval of his administration's handling of the outbreak.[85] By January 2021, according to a Realmeter survey, his approval rating decreased to 34%, the lowest point during his presidency.[86]
According to the Yonhap News Agency, James Kim, the Chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea stated that "Korea is proactively and transparently dealing with COVID-19. The confirmed cases are surging in Korea, due to the country's well-prepared testing procedures compared to other countries."[87] CNBC's Matt McCarthy, a New York City doctor, praised Moon's government work on solving the coronavirus crisis, stating that "South Korea had been able to test tens of thousands of people. With the country's aggressive testing efforts, Korea's death toll from the disease is less than 1%, while the global average is 3.4%. This is thanks to the government's early preparation for the outbreak of infectious diseases."[88]
In 2020, although a spike in new coronavirus cases in South Korea prompted authorities to reimpose tighter social distancing curbs in Seoul, there were thousands of demonstrators protesting against Moon Jae-in's policies.[89][90] Police said that they would probe all participants of demonstrations held in downtown Seoul to look into whether they violated a court decision related to COVID-19 and other regulations.[91] On October 3 the national foundation day, conservative groups held drive-thru anti-government rallies in southern Seoul, amid concerns about the spread of COVID.[92]
LGBT rights
[edit]Moon opposes same-sex marriage. In a 2017 presidential television debate, he openly declared that he opposes homosexuality in some forms.[93][94]
Speaking to Buddhist and Christian religious leaders in October 2019, Moon said, "A national consensus should be the priority for same-sex marriage. However, regarding the human rights of sexual minorities, they should not be socially persecuted or discriminated against."[95]
In July 2020, the proposal of South Korea's first comprehensive anti-discrimination law, which would provide legal protection for minority communities, including the LGBTQ community, did not receive any open support from Moon.[96] However, in December 2020, in a special report by the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, Moon emphasized the necessity of enacting the Equality Act in the country.[97]
Human Rights Watch, in their Word Report 2020, called on the Korean government to take note of the urgent need for protecting the rights of Korea's lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender community.[98] "President Moon Jae-in, who started his legal career fighting for human rights, is in several ways failing to promote them now," said John Sifton, Asia advocacy director at Human Rights Watch. In 2020, he and his government need to reverse course and prioritize human rights in South Korea, North Korea, and worldwide.[99][better source needed]
2020 legislative election and subsequent reforms
[edit]Moon's Democratic Party won 163 constituency seats, while their satellite Platform party won 17 proportional representation seats, giving the alliance a total of 180 seats in the 300-seat assembly, enough to reach the three-fifths super-majority required to fast-track assembly procedures and "do everything but revising the Constitution at the parliament."[100] This was the largest majority for any party since democracy was restored in 1987.[101] The United Future Party and their satellite Future Korea Party won 84 constituency and 19 proportional seats respectively; their total of 103 seats (34.3%) was the worst conservative result since the 1960 legislative elections.
Subsequently, with its new three-fifths majority, the Democratic Party implemented a series of reforms and were approved by the National Assembly in December 2020 including:
- removal of the National Intelligence Service (NIS)'s involvement in domestic intelligence and activities and transferring of such powers to the National Police Agency[102]
- Revisions to the 18 May Special Act, penalizing those involved in making false factual claims regarding the 1980 Gwangju Uprising
- Revisions to the Inter-Korean Relations Act, penalizing sending of flyers to North Korea via balloons launched near the demilitarized zone
- Revisions to the Labor Standards Act, setting the maximum work week to 52 hours a week, including overtime while allowing a business to exceed the 52-hour limit by giving an extended paid vacation for workers.
- guaranteed paid parental leave for temporary workers
- expansions to the range of workers who can participate in unions and raising the maximum duration of a collective bargaining agreement from two years to three years.
- re-establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.[103]
- launch of the new Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials and stripping the opposition's right to veto appointments of a new agency head.
- establishment of local policing, allowing each city and province to establish its own autonomous police force instead of a single national police force.
- establishment of a new National Bureau of Investigation, quasi-independent and insulated from the National Police Agency.
Foreign policy
[edit]International relations
[edit]
Moon visited the United States to meet with U.S. President Donald Trump in June 2017, discussing U.S.-Korea trade relations as well as North Korea's missile programs.[104] Moon revealed in a joint news conference that President Trump accepted an invitation to visit South Korea.[105]
North Korea
[edit]

Outlining his North Korea strategy in a speech in Berlin, Germany, on 6 July 2017, Moon characterized the process leading to unification as a long-term project, rather than laying out any detailed plans for a unified Korea.
He emphasized alliance with the United States and specified the need to assure dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. At the same time, he presented the question of unification in a regional context and signaled his hopes of working in cooperation with the international community. He supported sanctions against North Korea, while leaving open the possibility of their being rescinded, and indicated that it is crucial to establish a peace treaty with North Korea to end the Korean War officially in exchange for denuclearization.[106]
Moon opposed the full deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems during his presidential campaign and called for more peace talks engaging with North Korea.
As of late July, following North Korea's latest missile launch and increasingly aggressive actions, Moon asked the U.S. permission to build up its domestic defense systems and temporarily set up a full THAAD system.[107]
Moon met with Kim Jong Un, Chairman of the Workers' Party of Korea, on 27 April 2018.[108]
The inter-Korean rapprochement arouses broad enthusiasm among the South Korean population: Moon Jae-in's popularity reached 68% in April 2018.[109]
Kim and Moon met again on 26 May. The second meeting was also at the DMZ, this time on the North Korean side of the Panmunjom village.[110] The meeting took two hours. The meeting had not been publicly announced beforehand.[111] The meeting was largely centered around the cancelled summit with Donald Trump.[110]
In September 2018, Moon Jae-in visited Pyongyang in the September 2018 inter-Korean summit. He and 150 delegates—including prominent figures in business, culture, and religion—flew to the Sunan Airport in Pyongyang and met with Kim Jong Un.[112] The two Korean leaders announced an agreement to decrease hostilities on the DMZ, further joint-economic projects, and open North Korean weapons facilities to international experts.[113] The leaders also gave a speech to 150,000 North Korean citizens in the Rungrado 1st of May Stadium with themes of unification, lasting peace, and friendship.[114] Moon also climbed Mount Paektu with Kim, which had been a "long unfulfilled dream" for him.[115] Moon was called "Kim Jong Un's Top Spokesman" by Bloomberg News.[116] In October 2018, Moon visited Europe and lobbied for reconciliation with North Korea during the tour.[117][118]
In March 2019, U.N. panel accused South Korea of violating sanctions by not notifying the Security Council about its deliveries of petroleum products for use at inter-Korean joint liaison office.[119] Also in the Annex of the Updated Guidance on Addressing North Korea's Illicit Shipping Practices, issued from United States Department of the Treasury, a ship of South Korea was listed as that believed to have engaged in ship-to-ship transfers with North Korean tankers.[120]
In January 2020, Moon was still serious about inter-Korean cooperation.[121] However, on June 16, North Korea blew up an inter-Korean joint liaison office.[122] On 23 September, as video speech at 75th Session of United Nations General Assembly, Moon mentioned about his hope that "the UN and the international community provide support so that we can advance into an era of reconciliation and prosperity through the end-of-war declaration" and "the end-of-war declaration will open the door to complete demilitarization and permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula."[123]
Unemployment
[edit]In January 2019, South Korea's unemployment rate hit 4.5%,[124] the highest number observed for the month of January since 2010,[125] while the youth unemployment rate, which tracks Koreans aged 25–34 who have not secured jobs, reached its highest in South Korea in 19 years. According to Statistics Korea, 338,000 young Koreans were unemployed in July 2018. The number is the highest since youth unemployment marked 434,000 in 1999, as the nation was still recovering from the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Some experts said the current Moon Jae-in government's purportedly pro-labor policies, including the raise in minimum wage, which led The Wall Street Journal to call President Moon Jae-In's economic program "Asia's most radical left-wing",[126] and reduction of maximum weekly work hours from 68 to 52, may be contributors to the increasing number of Koreans unable to find jobs.[127]
In November 2018, the Financial Times reported that President Moon Jae-In replaced Kim Dong-yeon, finance minister, by Hong Nam-ki, an economic policy official currently serving in the prime minister's office, and Jang Ha-sung, presidential chief of staff for policy. The reshuffle sets the stage for new economic ideas "in a nation that is struggling to transition away from its once-successful manufacturing model".[128]
As of December 2021, the unemployment rate was down to 3.7%, the lowest since 2017 and in line with the unemployment rate of the previous two decades.[129]
Post-presidency (2022–present)
[edit]
Moon left office on 9 May 2022, and was succeeded the next day by Yoon Suk Yeol, who previously was appointed by Moon to be Prosecutor General of South Korea. Moon also was the final president to occupy the Blue House as the official presidential office and residence after 74 years, as Yoon moved the presidential office to the former Ministry of Defence building at Yongsan District, Seoul upon taking office. Moon now resides at Pyeongsan Village, at Yangsan, South Gyeongsang Province.[130]
In May 2024, Moon published a memoir entitled From the Periphery to the Center (변방에서 중심으로). The book renewed discussion of several controversies related to his presidency.[131]

Following the declaration of martial law by President Yoon Suk Yeol on December 3, 2024, Moon said in a post on X: "I hope that the National Assembly will act quickly to protect our democracy from crumbling."[132] He made a further statement urging the military to not participate in a non-emergency declaration of martial law, or obstruct the National Assembly's vote on its lifting.[133]
In a February 2025 interview, Moon expressed his regret for appointing Yoon as Prosecutor General during his term, as Yoon used the conflict over prosecution reform with Moon's administration as a springboard to enter politics and win the presidency. Moon initially planned to travel to Seoul to protest the martial law, before the National Assembly overturned the martial law order. Moon called his successor "completely unfit for the presidency—he had no vision, no policy skills, and wasn't prepared".[134][135][136] On 14 February 2025, the Hankyoreh revealed that former Defense Intelligence Command leader Roh Sang-won's personal notebook contained specific action plans to arrest Moon, as well as several other individuals such as judges and celebrities, and have them sent to a detention center.[137][138]
Legacy
[edit]Moon finished his term as president with the highest approval rating in the history of the 6th Republic since free and fair elections resumed in 1987.[130][139] However, despite his high approval ratings, his party lost power only after five years, the first since Korea's democratization in 1987.[140] This suggests with assertions that his high approval ratings were primarily the outcome of extensive public relations efforts to build and maintain a favorable public image, coupled with an avoidance of addressing controversial issues during his presidency.[141]
OECD and Pew Research Center polls showed that during and after the COVID-19 pandemic, which took place during Moon's presidency, South Koreans' levels of trust in government increased, and the government oversaw a more responsive and effective disaster response to the pandemic compared to previous disasters which took place in South Korea, such as the MERS outbreak and the Sewol ferry disaster.[142] Moon's government reduced the maximum hour work week from 68 hours to 52, which led to an increase in work-life balance, expanded childcare benefits and provision, and also health care coverage.[142]
However, Moon's government did not act on a new anti-discrimination bill despite having a majority in the National Assembly. It also failed to effectively resolve a housing crisis in the Seoul area and its surroundings (where half of South Korea's population resides).[142] The Seoul housing crisis was said to be enough to swing the 2022 presidential election to the opposition conservatives to succeed Moon.[143] Critics contended that the rapid increase in the minimum wage adversely affected the South Korean economy, which has a large number of self-employed people.[144] Moon expressed some regret for the increase's impact on the self-employed.[145][146]
For foreign policy, Moon would be remembered for presiding over South Korea's increased stature and prestige in international affairs as a middle power, and pushing forward with trade negotiations with South East Asia and India under his signature New Southern Policy (NSP).[147] NSP aimed to diversify South Korea's economic and strategic relationships due to uncertainty caused by increasing competition between its closest ally, the United States, and the largest trading partner, China.[148] However, Moon's summits with North Korea failed to achieve any significant breakthrough in inter-Korean or US-North Korea relations, and relations between South Korea and Japan fell to further new lows.[148]
In 2017, Moon apologized to Vietnam for war crimes committed by South Korean troops during the Vietnam War,[149] although the issue was minimized by the Vietnamese media and South Korean media as it was not seen as an official apology.[150]
Electoral history
[edit]| Party | Candidate | Votes | % | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Democratic United | Moon Jae-in | 65,336 | 55.0 | |
| Saenuri | Son Su-jo | 51,936 | 43.7 | |
| Total votes | 208,214 | 100.0 | ||
| Democratic United gain from Saenuri | ||||
| Party | Candidate | Votes | % | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Saenuri | Park Geun-hye | 15,773,128 | 51.6 | |
| Democratic United | Moon Jae-in | 14,692,632 | 48.0 | |
| Total votes | 30,721,459 | 100.0 | ||
| Party | Candidate | Votes | % | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Democratic | Moon Jae-in | 936,419 | 57.0 | |
| Democratic | Ahn Hee-jung | 353,631 | 21.5 | |
| Democratic | Lee Jae-myung | 347,647 | 21.2 | |
| Democratic | Choi Sung | 4,943 | 0.3 | |
| Total votes | 1,642,677 | 100.0 | ||
| Party | Candidate | Votes | % | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Democratic | Moon Jae-in | 13,423,800 | 41.1 | |
| Liberty Korea | Hong Jun-pyo | 7,852,849 | 24.0 | |
| People | Ahn Cheol-soo | 6,998,342 | 21.4 | |
| Bareun | Yoo Seong-min | 2,208,771 | 6.7 | |
| Justice | Sim Sang-jung | 2,017,458 | 6.1 | |
| Total votes | 32,807,908 | 100.0 | ||
Honours
[edit]National honours
[edit]
South Korea: Recipient of the Grand Order of Mugunghwa (3 May 2022)
Foreign distinctions
[edit]
Austria: Grand Star of the Decoration of Honour for Services to the Republic of Austria (14 June 2021)
Colombia: Grand Collar of the Order of Boyaca (25 August 2021)[151]
Norway: Grand Cross of the Order of Saint Olav (12 June 2019)[152]
Slovenia: Member of the Order for Exceptional Merits (21 September 2021)
Spain: Knight of the Collar of the Order of Civil Merit (8 June 2021)[153]
Sweden: Knight of the Royal Order of the Seraphim (14 June 2019)[154]
Other awards
[edit]- Atlantic Council: Global Citizen Awards (19 September 2017)
IOC:
Gold Olympic Order (30 August 2018)[155]- Time: One of the 100 Most Influential People of 2018[156]
Legal proceedings
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Libel case
[edit]In September 2015, Moon sued former prosecutor Koh young-ju for libel in response to a statement he had made during Moon's campaign in 2013. Koh had been quoted as calling Moon a "communist."[157] As a public figure, Koh had been noted for his investigation into the Burim incident, where he investigated five alleged communists who were later convicted of violating the anti-Communist National Security Law.[158] On August 23, 2018, Seoul Central District Court Judge Kim Kyung-jin. Koh lauded the ruling as a victory for freedom of speech in South Korea.[159] However, on 2 June 2020, the case was appealed. The prosecutor representing Moon is seeking one and a half years of jail time for Koh.[160]
2018 opinion rigging scandal in South Korea
[edit]In April 2018, a group of supporters of the South Korean President Moon Jae-in were charged with online opinion rigging.[161] The accused suspects were the members of the ruling Democratic Party (DPK).[162] The main perpetrator, as well as the leader of the pro-Moon group, was a well-known power-blogger called "Druking".[161]
In 2018, the special prosecutor indicted South Gyeongsang Province Governor Kim Kyung-soo in relation to this case. In 2019, he was jailed for two years on charges of online-rigging operations in both the first and second instance.[163] On 21 July 2021, he was sentenced to two years by the Supreme Court for online-rigging operations (crime on 'Interference with Business' by damaging or destroying any data processor,[164] 컴퓨터등장애업무방해죄) and eventually lost his position as governor.[165][166]
Alleged harassment of human rights groups
[edit]On 13 July 2020, Park Sang-hak, a citizen of South Korea and North Korean defector, wrote an op-ed in The Washington Post. He contended that the Moon administration was working to silence human rights activists in an effort to placate North Korea. Park wrote, "Ten days ago, a TV station revealed my home address to the world, exposing me to other North Korean assassins and their supporters in the South. My personal bank accounts are under investigation, and the government has forbidden me from leaving the country. On 30 June, the government moved to pull the civic licenses of our nongovernmental organization, preventing us from holding charity fundraisers."[167] Park cited other examples of the Moon administration's interference with human rights activists, including a 2018 effort by NIS agents under the Moon administration to block journalists from accessing a speech by Thae Yong-ho, the highest-ranking official known to have defected from North Korea.[168]
In response to the Moon administration's treatment of Park Sang-hak, the North Korea Freedom Coalition issued a letter to President Moon. It alleged that human rights activists had been "harassed" and urged the Moon administration to "cease these actions of intimidation which seek to silence their freedom of expression." The letter noted that the South Korean government's actions appeared to conflict with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treaty, which was signed by South Korea in 1990.[169] Signatories included Suzanne Scholte.[170]
Bribery charges
[edit]On 24 April 2025, Moon was indicted for bribery on suspicion that he had facilitated the employment of his former son-in-law at Eastar Jet, in exchange for the airline's founder, Lee Sang-jik, being appointed as head of the Korea SMEs and Startups Agency.[171]
Personal life
[edit]Family
[edit]Moon married Kim Jung-sook, a vocalist at Kyung Hee University where he was also a student.[citation needed]
He and Kim both individually revealed in separate Korean talk shows that they met each other when Moon was a student activist protesting the Yushin Constitution.[172]
He has two children: a daughter and a son, Moon Joon Yong who is active as a media artist.[14]
Pets
[edit]Before elected as the president in 2017, they lived with several dogs and cats who were all once abandoned by their previous guardians. Among those, a Pungsan dog Maru (마루) and a cat Jjingjjing (찡찡; also called Jjingjjingi; 찡찡이) have been confirmed to live with them at the Blue House either by the media or its official social media posts. Jjingjjing is the country's first-ever "First Cat."[173]
After settling in at the official presidential residence at the Blue House, a dog Tori (토리; a mixed-breed) was adopted from an animal shelter in contrast with other "First Dogs" who have traditionally been purebred Jindo dogs.[174] In regards to Tory's adoption, Moon stated that "we need to pay more attention to abandoned animals and care for them as a society" and that he wanted to remove the stigma against Tory's dark coat, which contributed to him being virtually un-adoptable for two years after he was rescued in 2015.[175] He also received a pair of Pungsan dogs, male Songgang (송강) and female Gomi (곰이) from North Korean counterpart Kim Jong Un as a gift shortly after meeting in September 2018.[citation needed] Gomi later gave birth to six puppies, Sani (산이), Deuri (들이), Gangi (강이), Byeori (별이), Dari (달이), and Haennim (햇님) named after Korean words for parts of nature - a mountain, grass field, a river, a star, the Moon and the Sun. On 30 August 2019, the six puppies were sent to Seoul, Incheon, Daejeon and Gwangju, leaving their parents at Cheong Wa Dae.[176]
Religion
[edit]Moon is the third Korean president who is a Catholic, after Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun (a lapsed Catholic). Moon's wife, First Lady Kim Jung-sook, is also Catholic. He is the second leader who remains a practicing Catholic while in office; his baptismal (or Christian) name is Timothy.[177]
Nickname
[edit]His nickname is "Dark King" (명왕; 冥王; Myeongwang), after the character Silvers Rayleigh from the Japanese manga series One Piece.[178]
Authored books
[edit]- Moon Jae-in (15 June 2011). 문재인의 운명 [Fate of Moon Jae-in] (in Korean) (1st ed.). Seoul: Gagyo. ISBN 978-89-7777-188-8.
- ———————; Kim In-hoe (23 November 2011). 검찰을 생각한다 [Think of the prosecution] (in Korean). Paju: May Books. ISBN 978-89-966875-2-8.
- ——————— (6 August 2012). 사람이 먼저다 [Person comes first] (in Korean). Seoul: Purple Cow. ISBN 978-89-97838-02-8.
- ——————— (8 August 2012). 문재인이 드립니다 [Moon Jae-in gives it] (in Korean). Paju: Leaders Book. ISBN 978-89-01-14936-3.
- ——————— (10 December 2013). 1219 끝이 시작이다 [1219 The end is beginning] (in Korean). Seoul: Bada Books. ISBN 978-89-5561-690-3.
- ——————— (20 January 2017). 대한민국이 묻는다 [Korea Asks You] (in Korean). Paju: Book 21. ISBN 978-89-509-6884-7.
- ———————; Lee Na-mi (23 March 2017). 운명에서 희망으로 [From Fate To Hope] (in Korean). Paju: Dasan Books. ISBN 979-11-306-1171-6.
- ——————— (16 April 2024). 문재인의 독서노트 [Moon Jae-in's Reading Notes] (in Korean). Yangsan: Pyeongsan Bookstore. ISBN 979-11-983086-1-0.
- ——————— (18 May 2024). 변방에서 중심으로 [From the Periphery to the Center] (in Korean). Paju: Gimm-young Publishers. ISBN 978-89-349-3575-9.
See also
[edit]Notes
[edit]- ^ Supporting role in the operation
References
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{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ^ Lim, Jeong-yeo (14 May 2017). "Korea greets first-ever 'first cat'". The Korea Herald. Retrieved 5 January 2018.
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- ^ 이, 유미 (30 August 2019). 靑, 김정은 선물한 풍산개 '곰이' 새끼 6마리 지자체에 분양 [Blue House, puppies of Gom-ee, a Pungsan dog given by Kim Jong Un as a gift sent to local governments]. Yonhap News Agency (in Korean). Retrieved 13 June 2025.
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External links
[edit]- Moon Jae-in Camp (archived 2014) (in Korean)
Moon Jae-in
View on GrokipediaEarly life and education
Family background and childhood
Moon Jae-in was born on January 24, 1953, at a refugee center on Geoje Island in South Gyeongsang Province, South Korea.[13] His parents had fled North Korea's Hamhung area during the Korean War, evacuating southward amid the advancing communist forces as part of the large-scale Hungnam evacuation in December 1950 aboard the American merchant ship Meredith Victory, which carried over 14,000 refugees to Geoje without loss of life.[14] The family, originating from what is now North Korea's South Hamgyong Province, arrived as war refugees in a nation reeling from devastation, where post-armistice South Korea faced widespread scarcity and reconstruction challenges.[15] Raised in a poor refugee household amid the socioeconomic hardships of early post-war South Korea, Moon experienced the struggles of displacement and limited resources typical of many families uprooted by the conflict.[13] His parents worked to sustain the family, which included Moon as the eldest son among five siblings, in an environment marked by rural isolation on Geoje before relocating to Busan around age six.[16] In Busan, a bustling port city and hub for war-displaced southerners, the family navigated urban poverty, reflecting the broader context of rapid urbanization and anti-communist fervor in the region's conservative-leaning society under Syngman Rhee's regime.[17] Moon's early years were shaped by the pervasive anti-communist education and cultural emphasis on national division in South Korean schools and communities, reinforcing the trauma of separation from northern roots while fostering resilience in a divided peninsula.[18] The family's modest circumstances, including reliance on parental labor in a recovering economy, underscored the long-term impacts of the war on ordinary households, though specific details of their living conditions remain consistent with general refugee experiences rather than exceptional deprivation.[13]Academic pursuits and military service
Moon Jae-in enrolled in Kyung Hee University College of Law in 1972 after succeeding on his second attempt at the entrance examination.[19] His university years coincided with widespread student activism against the authoritarian rule of President Park Chung-hee, during which Moon participated in demonstrations, including one that led to his arrest.[18] [20] In 1975, Moon was conscripted for mandatory military service in the Republic of Korea Army, where he served until 1978 as a sergeant in the Army Special Warfare Command, known for its elite "Black Beret" units.[21] His duties included frontline assignments near the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), notably as part of the special forces contingent during Operation Paul Bunyan in August 1976—a joint U.S.-South Korean operation to cut down a tree in the DMZ Joint Security Area following the axe murder incident that killed two U.S. officers.[21] [22] Following his discharge, Moon resumed his studies and completed his law degree at Kyung Hee University in 1980.[23] That same year, he passed the state bar examination on his attempt while detained for activism-related activities.[16] He subsequently attended the Judicial Research and Training Institute, graduating second in his class.[23] [19]Legal career
Human rights law practice
Moon Jae-in began his human rights law practice after passing the bar exam in 1977 and completing his judicial training, initially focusing on cases involving political dissidents and labor disputes in Busan during the authoritarian regime of Chun Doo-hwan.[8] In 1982, he joined a law firm led by Roh Moo-hyun, where he represented democracy advocates, student activists protesting military rule, and union leaders facing charges under national security laws.[24] [25] These efforts targeted government suppression of protests, such as those following the 1980 Gwangju Uprising, though specific case outcomes for Moon remain sparsely documented in public records beyond general advocacy for habeas corpus challenges against arbitrary detentions.[26] As a founding member of Minbyun (Lawyers for a Democratic Society), established in 1988 to counter military dictatorship abuses, Moon handled pro-democracy litigation emphasizing labor rights and opposition to censorship, aligning with the group's focus on defendants persecuted for anti-regime activities. [27] Minbyun's caseload during this period prioritized left-leaning clients, including those accused of communist sympathies, contributing to democratization efforts but drawing later scrutiny for limited engagement with victims of leftist violence or conservative persecutions under prior regimes.[28] Critics, including conservative outlets, have accused Moon's practice of selective advocacy, alleging it overlooked human rights violations against non-dissident groups while prioritizing ideologically aligned causes, a pattern attributed to Minbyun's progressive orientation that persisted post-democratization.[29] This approach earned bar association recognition for challenging authoritarian overreach but fueled claims of politicized lawyering, with empirical impacts measured more by broader regime transitions than quantifiable win rates in individual petitions.[30]Involvement in Roh Moo-hyun administration
Moon Jae-in joined the Roh Moo-hyun administration shortly after Roh's inauguration on February 25, 2003, serving as Senior Presidential Secretary for Civil Affairs from that year through 2006 in multiple stints.[31] In this role, he oversaw citizen petitions, civil society engagement, and efforts to promote transparency, including institutional reforms targeting the Supreme Prosecutors' Office, National Intelligence Service, and National Police Agency to curb potential abuses of power.[31] These initiatives aligned with Roh's progressive agenda of participatory governance, such as early mechanisms for public input on policy, though empirical outcomes showed limited long-term reductions in systemic graft, as subsequent investigations revealed persistent vulnerabilities in elite networks.[32] A pivotal event in Moon's tenure occurred amid the National Assembly's impeachment motion against Roh on March 12, 2004, for alleged violations of electoral law neutrality. Having retired briefly on February 12, Moon returned on March 13 to act as chief counselor, organizing and leading a defense team of 7-8 lawyers for the Constitutional Court trial; he emphasized precise legal arguments over public relations, with costs covered by Roh's personal funds, declaring, "I must help the President in his time of need."[33] The Court overturned the impeachment on December 14, 2004, restoring Roh's powers, but the episode highlighted tensions between the administration's transparency pushes and accusations of political favoritism.[33] Moon's civil affairs work extended to anti-corruption drives, including legal reforms like introducing a jury system in courts by 2008 to enhance public accountability in judicial processes.[31] However, these efforts coexisted with administration scandals, such as probes into Roh family influence-peddling; Roh's brother Roh Gun-ho was convicted of bribery in 2009 for accepting funds tied to government land deals, yielding a mixed record where high-profile convictions exposed causal gaps between rhetoric and enforcement, as familial ties undermined broader graft eradication.[34] Critics, including conservative outlets, argued Moon enabled Roh's ideological priorities—such as decentralizing power from chaebols and intelligence agencies—over rigorous, apolitical investigations, fostering perceptions of selective transparency that prioritized progressive realignments.[35] This phase causally informed Moon's enduring focus on prosecutorial independence, evident in his later advocacy for structural curbs on investigative overreach, though without resolving underlying conflicts of interest in political-legal spheres.[35]Pre-presidential political career
Entry into politics and 2012 elections
Moon Jae-in entered electoral politics in 2012 at age 59, after a career as a human rights lawyer and senior aide to former President Roh Moo-hyun. On April 11, he was elected to the National Assembly as the Democratic United Party (DUP) candidate for Busan's Sasang-gu district, securing the seat in Roh's former political stronghold with 47.5% of the vote against rivals from the Saenuri Party and others.[24][19] This victory positioned Moon as a natural successor to Roh, leveraging his role as Roh's chief of staff from 2007 to 2008 and shared progressive credentials on issues like inter-Korean engagement and chaebol reform.[36] Moon resigned his parliamentary seat in October 2012 to pursue the presidency after the DUP selected him as its candidate on September 16, defeating rivals including Sohn Hak-kyu in primaries emphasizing anti-corruption and welfare expansion.[36] His campaign centered on "economic democratization," advocating curbs on family-run conglomerates' dominance, fairer wealth distribution, and job creation through public investment, while critiquing the incumbent Lee Myung-bak administration's growth-at-all-costs model that had exacerbated inequality.[37] Moon targeted urban voters disillusioned with conservative rule, promising to revive Roh-era policies, but faced challenges in rural areas where Saenuri Party candidate Park Geun-hye drew on her father Park Chung-hee's legacy of industrialization.[24] In the December 19 presidential election, Moon garnered 14,692,632 votes, or 48.02%, falling short of Park's 15,773,128 votes (51.55%) in a turnout of 75.8%.[38] The results underscored a stark urban-rural divide, with Moon winning majorities in Seoul (52.4%) and Gwangju (84.0%) but trailing Park by wide margins in conservative strongholds like Daegu (80.1%) and North Gyeongsang (80.8%).[39] Post-election audits and lawsuits by Moon's camp alleged vote-rigging, including duplicate ballots and discrepancies in several districts, but courts dismissed challenges for lack of evidence sufficient to overturn results.[40] In 2017, the National Intelligence Service admitted deploying cyber operatives to sway online opinion against Moon via thousands of pro-Park posts, an interference confirmed by prosecutors but deemed non-decisive in outcome, as physical vote tampering was not substantiated.[41] These events highlighted vulnerabilities in South Korea's electoral process to state agency meddling, though Park's familial symbolism and broader conservative voter loyalty proved causally pivotal in the narrow defeat.[42]Democratic Party leadership
Moon Jae-in was elected chairperson of the New Politics Alliance for Democracy (NPAD) on February 7, 2015, succeeding Kim Han-gil and Ahn Cheol-soo in a leadership vote aimed at unifying the party's progressive and centrist wings.[16] His tenure emphasized anti-corruption campaigns against the Park Geun-hye administration but quickly encountered internal discord, particularly with Ahn's faction advocating market-oriented reforms and broader appeal to moderates. By late 2015, escalating tensions prompted calls for Moon's resignation, including an ultimatum from Ahn Cheol-soo for a party convention to resolve leadership disputes; Ahn subsequently defected with dozens of lawmakers to form the centrist People's Party in January 2016.[43] Moon resigned as NPAD chair—rebranded as The Minjoo Party of Korea in September 2015—on January 27, 2016, after 354 days marked by factional infighting, inability to reconcile non-mainstream groups, and key defections that weakened the party's cohesion.[44][45] Critics, including former allies, attributed these failures to Moon's prioritization of the party's progressive core over pragmatic compromises, fostering perceptions of ideological rigidity.[46] Following his resignation, interim leader Kim Chong-in steered The Minjoo Party to a plurality of 123 seats in the April 13, 2016, National Assembly election, capitalizing on voter backlash against Park's scandals.[47] Moon, though not formally in charge, influenced the party's direction from the pro-Roh Moo-hyun faction and supported the August 2, 2016, merger with the Unification Democratic Party—a more leftist group—to form the Democratic Party of Korea, installing Choo Mi-ae as leader and sidelining Kim's centrists.[1] This reorganization, driven by Moon's allies expelling Kim in July 2016, shifted the party leftward, emphasizing progressive policies on labor rights and chaebol reform but drawing accusations of factionalism that alienated moderate voters and hindered broader coalitions.[48] Moon bolstered the party's grassroots base through vocal participation in the candlelight protests against Park starting October 2016, which mobilized millions and eroded the ruling Saenuri Party's support.[49] These demonstrations correlated with Democratic Party approval rising to around 31% by November 2016, up from mid-20s earlier in the year amid ongoing scandals, positioning the opposition for gains in subsequent polls.[50] However, detractors contended that Moon's leadership style exacerbated chronic factionalism—evident in post-merger power struggles—and a pronounced leftward tilt that prioritized ideological conformity, ultimately limiting the party's ability to retain centrist defectors and sustain unified momentum.2017 presidential campaign
Domestic policy proposals
Moon Jae-in's 2017 presidential campaign proposals for domestic policy focused on pro-labor reforms to mitigate economic inequality, which he attributed to the dominance of family-run chaebol conglomerates and lax protections under prior conservative administrations. He advocated deconcentrating chaebol power through stricter antitrust measures and ending government-business collusion, arguing that such structures stifled competition, concentrated wealth among elites, and exacerbated income disparities.[51][52][53] These pledges aimed to foster a more equitable economy by curbing monopolistic practices, though critics noted potential risks of deterring investment if regulations overly hampered efficient large-scale operations.[54] Central to his platform was a commitment to raise the minimum wage to 10,000 South Korean won (approximately $8.80 USD at the time) per hour by 2020, from the 2017 level of 6,470 won, as part of an "income-led growth" strategy to empower low-wage workers and boost domestic consumption.[55][56] Proponents viewed this as a corrective to stagnant real wages under conservative rule, potentially reducing poverty and stimulating demand. However, economists cautioned that abrupt hikes could price low-skill labor out of the market, leading to unemployment spikes—especially among youth and in service sectors—and straining small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with thin margins, where higher costs might force layoffs, reduced hours, or bankruptcies absent productivity offsets.[57][58] From causal reasoning grounded in labor economics, wages exceeding marginal revenue product incentivize firms to substitute capital or fewer workers, amplifying distortions in dualistic markets like South Korea's, where SMEs employ most workers but lack chaebol-scale efficiencies.[59] Moon also proposed capping the standard workweek at 52 hours (40 regular plus 12 overtime), down from the prevailing 68-hour norm, to alleviate chronic overwork and enhance worker health and family time.[55] This reform sought to redistribute labor demand, potentially creating jobs by necessitating more hires for the same output, while addressing critiques of exploitative conditions under previous governments. Yet, pre-election analyses highlighted trade-offs: rigid caps could suppress total hours and GDP in overtime-dependent industries like manufacturing, raising unit labor costs unless accompanied by technological or managerial gains, and complicating SME operations amid skill shortages.[60] In healthcare, he pledged expansions to universal national health insurance via "Moon Jae-in Care," targeting fuller coverage for essential services like MRI and CT scans to benefit the underinsured and counter inequality in access.[61] This built on existing systems but promised broader benefits without immediate tax hikes, aiming to shift toward preventive care; however, fiscal realists warned of straining public finances long-term, as expanded entitlements could inflate costs without corresponding revenue or efficiency reforms.[62] Overall, these proposals reflected a redistributive ethos prioritizing labor over capital, with intended causal chains of higher incomes fostering growth, though empirical precedents and economic theory suggested risks of disincentivizing employment and investment.[63]Foreign policy positions
Moon Jae-in's 2017 presidential campaign emphasized reviving elements of the Sunshine Policy, advocating a dual-track approach that paired international sanctions and military deterrence with unconditional inter-Korean dialogue and economic incentives to pursue denuclearization. He proposed recognizing North Korean leader Kim Jong-un as a legitimate interlocutor, potentially reopening joint ventures such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex, and leading efforts to restart six-party talks involving the two Koreas, the United States, China, Russia, and Japan.[32][54] Regarding the United States alliance, Moon affirmed its foundational role in South Korea's security but called for a more equitable partnership with increased Seoul autonomy, including the transfer of wartime operational control from U.S. forces and the willingness to assert "no" to Washington when national interests conflicted. He expressed reservations about joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises, viewing them as escalatory toward Pyongyang and preferring de-escalatory measures through direct engagement. On the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, whose initial deployment had provoked Chinese economic retaliation, Moon pledged to review and potentially renegotiate terms, delaying full implementation pending diplomatic resolution while maintaining conditional cooperation.[54][32] Moon advocated a "balanced diplomacy" to mend ties with China, emphasizing Beijing's pivotal influence in restraining North Korea and proposing a bilateral summit to address THAAD grievances without alienating the U.S. ally. This softer stance toward China aimed to diversify South Korea's external dependencies and mitigate trade disruptions from the missile defense dispute.[32][54] Conservative rivals and analysts critiqued Moon's platform as overly conciliatory, accusing it of naivete toward Pyongyang's regime, which had historically exploited engagement for economic gains without verifiable disarmament steps. They highlighted causal precedents from prior Sunshine Policy eras (1998–2008), where substantial South Korean aid and summits failed to halt North Korea's nuclear program, culminating in its first underground test in 2006 amid ongoing dialogue. Such approaches, detractors argued, risked emboldening North Korea's intransigence by decoupling incentives from enforceable denuclearization benchmarks, potentially straining the U.S. alliance through perceived appeasement signals.[64]Campaign controversies and outcome
Moon Jae-in secured victory in the snap presidential election held on May 9, 2017, following the impeachment and removal of Park Geun-hye, obtaining 41.1% of the vote against Hong Joon-pyo's 24.0% and Ahn Cheol-soo's 21.4%.[65][66] Voter turnout reached 77.2%, the highest for a presidential election in two decades.[67] The campaign occurred amid heated disputes over the impeachment's legitimacy, with conservatives arguing it represented a biased, opposition-orchestrated effort to undermine Park's mandate and clear the path for a liberal successor, bypassing a standard electoral cycle.[68] Park's supporters, including emerging far-right groups, labeled the process an "illegal coup," citing procedural overreach and selective enforcement of scandals against conservative leadership while downplaying similar issues in prior administrations.[68] Though the Constitutional Court upheld the impeachment unanimously—including by judges appointed by Park—critics contended the ruling reflected institutional capture by anti-conservative forces, enabling Moon's rapid ascent without robust opposition mobilization.[69] Moon drew backlash from LGBT advocates during the campaign for comments viewed as endorsing or tolerating discrimination, particularly his reluctance to condemn a military probe targeting gay soldiers for alleged misconduct under the Uniformed Military Penal Code.[70][71] As a former human rights lawyer, Moon had previously stated opposition to blanket discrimination but supported exemptions for military contexts, framing homosexuality as a private matter unfit for special legal protections amid South Korea's conservative societal norms.[72] Critics, including international outlets, highlighted this as insensitive and aligned with institutional homophobia, while defenders portrayed it as pragmatic deference to national security and cultural realities rather than personal prejudice.[70] Conservative challengers and post-election litigants alleged irregularities in vote tallying, including potential tampering with National Election Commission servers, but South Korean courts rejected these claims, citing insufficient evidence of manipulation or hacking sufficient to alter the outcome.[73] No substantiated fraud emerged, though procedural critiques persisted regarding the compressed timeline's impact on verification and the impeachment's role in depressing conservative turnout.[73]Presidency (2017–2022)
Domestic policies
Moon Jae-in's domestic agenda centered on "income-led growth," aiming to boost household incomes via wage hikes and welfare expansion to stimulate consumption and reduce inequality, though critics argued it contributed to sluggish economic performance and youth unemployment. His administration pursued chaebol reforms to dismantle collusion between conglomerates and government, including pledges to curb cross-shareholdings and enhance corporate governance, but progress was limited; by 2020, despite legislative pushes for stricter oversight, chaebols retained significant influence, partly due to reliance on firms like Hyundai for inter-Korean projects. Economic indicators reflected mixed results: GDP growth averaged 2.5% annually from 2017 to 2019, below prior decades, with the 2020 pandemic exacerbating contraction to -0.7%.[74][75][76] Labor initiatives included a sharp minimum wage increase of 16.4% in 2018 to 7,530 won per hour—the largest single-year hike—and another 10.9% to 8,350 won in 2019, alongside capping the workweek at 52 hours from 68 to promote work-life balance. These measures aligned with reducing labor market dualism between regular and irregular workers, but they correlated with small business closures, a 1.2% rise in youth unemployment to 9.9% by 2019, and apologies from Moon for unmet job creation targets of 810,000 positions annually. Union influence grew, with organized labor density rising to 10.5%, yet overall employment gains fell short amid policy-induced hiring caution.[59][77][78] Judicial reforms targeted the prosecution service, which Moon viewed as overly powerful and politicized from his human rights lawyer background; key changes in 2020-2022 via the Prosecutors' Office Act and Criminal Procedure Act stripped prosecutors of direct investigative authority in many cases, transferring it to police, and separated indictment from investigation to curb abuse. Proponents hailed it as decentralizing power and addressing historical overreach, but opponents, including appointee Yoon Suk-yeol who later investigated Moon allies, criticized it for weakening accountability and enabling political interference, with investigations into figures like Cho Kuk highlighting selective enforcement debates. By 2022, the reforms faced implementation hurdles, including prosecutor resignations and uneven case handling.[79][80][81] Social programs expanded under an "inclusive welfare" framework, doubling the basic elderly pension to 300,000 won monthly by 2021, covering 80% of seniors, and launching a 2018 lifelong care plan for developmental disabilities with increased funding for childcare, education subsidies, and youth employment aid. Healthcare saw reinforced universal coverage, with public health spending rising 20% to 11.5% of GDP by 2020, emphasizing preventive care and medical access amid aging demographics. Education reforms included free tuition extensions and anti-corruption drives in admissions, though fertility rates hit a record low of 0.84 births per woman in 2020, underscoring limits of pronatalist incentives like extended parental leave. These efforts increased social expenditure to 12.5% of GDP, but fiscal strains emerged, with debt-to-GDP climbing to 50.2% by 2021.[82][83][84] The COVID-19 response, starting March 2020, emphasized massive testing (over 500,000 daily by mid-2020), aggressive contact tracing via apps and CCTV, and targeted quarantines without nationwide lockdowns, achieving one of the lowest per-capita death rates globally at 0.3 per 100,000 initially. Moon's administration mobilized 1.4 trillion won in emergency aid, including cash payments to households, and integrated recovery into a "Korean New Deal" with 160 trillion won for digital and green infrastructure. Approval ratings surged above 60% in 2020 for crisis management, though later waves exposed vaccine rollout delays and regional disparities, with total cases reaching 1 million by year-end 2021. Success stemmed from institutional capacity built post-MERS 2015, but critiques noted overreliance on private firms for testing kits and uneven enforcement.[85][86][87]Economic and chaebol reforms
Moon Jae-in's administration prioritized chaebol reforms as part of its "fair economy" pillar, aiming to dismantle circular cross-shareholdings that enabled family control and concentrated economic power, following the 2016-2017 impeachment of Park Geun-hye amid scandals involving conglomerates like Samsung.[75] Upon taking office in May 2017, Moon appointed Kim Sang-jo, dubbed the "chaebol sniper," as chairman of the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) to enforce stricter antitrust measures and curb undue influence.[88] Key legislative efforts included the December 2020 passage of three bills by Moon's Democratic Party to limit chaebol dominance: one requiring conglomerates to report acquisitions to antitrust authorities for review, another targeting abuse of market power through subsidiary transactions, and a third enhancing penalties for violations.[89] Earlier, in 2018, the administration advanced KFTC-led initiatives to reduce interlocking ownership structures, though progress stalled amid business resistance and economic pressures, such as reliance on chaebols for employment and potential North Korean investments.[90][91] Despite these measures, reforms yielded limited structural change; chaebols maintained over 80% of GDP contribution through affiliates by 2021, with family owners retaining control via complex equity webs, as enforcement prioritized symbolic prosecutions over systemic breakup.[76] Critics, including economic analysts, noted that the policies failed to foster small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) effectively, exacerbating inequality as chaebol affiliates benefited from government support while independent firms struggled.[92] Moon's broader income-led growth strategy, intertwined with chaebol curbs, correlated with decelerating GDP growth from 3.2% in 2017 to 2.0% in 2019 pre-COVID, attributed partly to heightened regulatory uncertainty deterring investment.[74]Labor and wage initiatives
Moon Jae-in's administration implemented aggressive wage increases as part of its income-led growth strategy, raising South Korea's national minimum wage by 16.4% to 7,530 won per hour effective January 2018, followed by a 10.9% hike to 8,350 won per hour in 2019, with an initial pledge to reach 10,000 won by 2020.[93][59] These hikes exceeded prior annual increases of around 7%, aiming to boost low-income consumption and reduce inequality by elevating labor income share in national income from 52.4% to 60% over five years.[94][95] Complementing wage policies, the government capped the statutory maximum workweek at 52 hours (40 regular plus 12 overtime) starting July 2018 for large firms, extending to smaller ones by 2021, down from a previous 68-hour limit, to curb overwork and redistribute jobs amid youth unemployment exceeding 10%.[96][97] Labor market reforms sought to protect non-regular workers, including expanded earned income tax credits and unemployment benefits, while promoting unionization and inclusive hiring in the public sector.[95][98] Empirical outcomes revealed adverse employment effects, with econometric analyses indicating a significant negative impact from the 2018-2019 minimum wage surges, including reduced hiring and hours for low-skilled youth and self-employed workers, contributing to stalled job growth and a 0.5-1% drop in employment rates relative to pre-2018 trends.[99][100] Self-employment rose as a buffer, but youth joblessness worsened, prompting policy adjustments like moderated wage hikes post-2019 and exemptions for small businesses.[96][77] The 52-hour cap yielded mixed results, creating some additional positions through hour redistribution but straining small firms and sectors like services, where compliance costs exacerbated hiring freezes.[97][101] Overall, while real wages for minimum earners rose initially, net labor market dualization persisted, with critics attributing sluggish consumption gains to offsetting employment losses rather than sustained income boosts.[59][94]Prosecution and judicial changes
Moon Jae-in's administration prioritized reforming South Korea's prosecution service, which had long held extensive powers over investigations and indictments, often criticized for political misuse under prior governments. Upon taking office on May 10, 2017, Moon appointed Cho Kuk as senior presidential secretary for civil affairs to lead initial efforts, framing the reforms as essential to curbing prosecutorial overreach rooted in authoritarian legacies.[102][103] These initiatives faced resistance from the prosecution, including public clashes with then-Prosecutor General Yoon Suk-yeol, whom Moon appointed in July 2019 to ostensibly advance the agenda despite Yoon's conservative stance.[104] Key legislative changes began in December 2020, when the National Assembly passed amendments allowing police to independently investigate most crimes, stripping prosecutors of direct investigative authority except in cases involving public officials or major corruption; this shift aimed to foster balance but drew criticism for potentially diluting prosecutorial expertise.[105] Further reforms culminated in May 2022 with amendments to the Prosecutors' Office Act and Criminal Procedure Act, which separated investigation from indictment powers, established a dedicated investigation office under the prosecutor's control, and created an inspection unit for internal oversight; Moon signed these into law on May 3, 2022, despite protests from legal professionals and opposition parties who argued the measures enabled executive interference.[106][105] Proponents, including Moon, contended the changes addressed "demands of history" by preventing retaliatory prosecutions, while detractors viewed them as politically motivated to shield allies amid probes into figures like Cho Kuk, convicted in 2021 for influence-peddling.[79][107] Regarding the judiciary, Moon's government influenced appointments through the Democratic Party's Assembly majority, filling vacancies on the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court with judges perceived as more progressive, including three Constitutional Court justices during his term that extended into 2025 terms.[108] These selections aimed to counterbalance what reformers saw as entrenched conservative influence from prior administrations, though no sweeping structural overhauls akin to prosecutorial changes occurred; critics alleged politicization, pointing to rulings favoring Moon's policies on issues like labor disputes.[109] The reforms overall intensified partisan divides, with subsequent President Yoon Suk-yeol partially reversing investigative transfers by 2023 to restore prosecutorial roles.[110]Healthcare, education, and social programs
Moon Jae-in's administration expanded South Korea's national health insurance system through the "Moon Jae-in Care" initiative, announced in August 2017, which aimed to reduce out-of-pocket medical expenses by broadening coverage for procedures previously excluded, such as MRI scans and certain treatments, while excluding cosmetic services.[111] [112] This policy, formalized in the Comprehensive National Health Insurance Plan (2019–2023), invested approximately 30.6 trillion KRW (about 27 billion USD) by 2022 to achieve near-universal coverage, enabling most citizens to access essential care with minimal personal costs and addressing gaps for underprivileged groups.[111] [113] However, the expansion strained the National Health Insurance system's finances, prompting debates over long-term sustainability and potential premium hikes, with critics noting risks of fiscal deficits despite government claims of improved equity.[114] In education, the government prioritized reducing reliance on private tutoring (hagwon) and promoting public schooling equity, implementing free high school education nationwide starting in 2021 to alleviate financial burdens on families and curb inequality in access to quality instruction.[115] [116] Moon pledged comprehensive reforms, including curriculum flexibility to foster creativity over rote learning and efforts to integrate or streamline higher education institutions, though implementation faced resistance from entrenched private education interests and uneven outcomes in diminishing hagwon dominance.[117] [118] These measures aligned with broader goals of fairness, as articulated in 2019 ministerial meetings emphasizing trust restoration through standardized public systems.[119] Social programs under Moon emphasized lifecycle support to combat low fertility rates (around 0.8 births per woman in 2018–2021) and aging demographics, including free childcare for children under age 6, expanded from existing pilots, and doubled basic elderly pensions with coverage extended to 80% of those over 65 by increasing benefits and eligibility.[82] [120] The administration created public sector jobs and enhanced unemployment insurance generosity in 2019, targeting irregular workers, while allocating funds for low-birth countermeasures like parental leave expansions and housing subsidies for young families.[94] [121] These initiatives, part of an "inclusive welfare state" framework, aimed to redistribute resources from wealthier groups but encountered fiscal pressures, with total welfare spending rising amid critiques of insufficient structural reforms for sustainability.[83]COVID-19 response
South Korea's initial response to the COVID-19 outbreak under President Moon Jae-in emphasized rapid testing, contact tracing, and treatment without imposing nationwide lockdowns, drawing on lessons from the 2015 MERS outbreak where government delays had drawn sharp criticism.[122] The first confirmed case occurred on January 20, 2020, in a traveler from Wuhan, prompting the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) to expand testing capacity from 1,000 to over 10,000 daily tests within weeks through public-private partnerships and innovations like drive-through screening stations.[123] Contact tracing leveraged CCTV footage, mobile phone GPS, and credit card records to identify and quarantine close contacts, often notifying them via text with movement histories, which contained clusters such as the Daegu church outbreak in February-March 2020 that accounted for over half of early cases.[124] This approach yielded a case fatality rate of approximately 0.7% by mid-March 2020, far below the global average of 3.4% at the time, with daily new cases flattening to around 100 by April after peaking near 1,000.[125][126] The strategy relied on high public compliance with mask mandates, social distancing guidelines, and voluntary isolation, supported by transparent communication from Moon, who held frequent briefings emphasizing "all-out" efforts without politicizing the crisis early on.[85] By June 2020, cumulative cases stood at about 12,000 with fewer than 300 deaths, enabling economic activity to resume with minimal interruption compared to lockdown-dependent nations.[127] However, privacy concerns arose over the extensive data usage in tracing, with critics arguing it set precedents for surveillance expansion, though empirical containment success—evidenced by avoided exponential spread in Daegu—outweighed such risks in causal terms.[126] Later phases exposed limitations, particularly in vaccine procurement and variant management. As cases surged in late 2020 (reaching 1,092 daily by December with 739 total deaths), and amid Delta and Omicron waves in 2021-2022, the administration faced criticism for delayed securing of mRNA vaccines, prioritizing negotiations over bulk pre-purchases and relying heavily on AstraZeneca supplies initially deemed insufficient for seniors.[128][129] Vaccination coverage lagged peers like Israel, with only about 2% fully vaccinated by April 2021, contributing to renewed distancing measures and public fatigue; daily cases peaked at over 600,000 by March 2022, though per capita deaths remained low at around 600 per million by Moon's term end in May 2022.[130][131] Domestic approval split along partisan lines, with Moon's supporters crediting the model for averting worse outcomes while opponents highlighted procurement mismanagement and over-reliance on imported diagnostics early on.[132][133] Overall, the response's early empirical efficacy stemmed from scalable testing infrastructure and behavioral adherence, but vaccine delays amplified later pressures, as evidenced by excess mortality analyses showing contained but not eliminated pandemic impacts.[134]Foreign policy
Moon Jae-in pursued a foreign policy centered on inter-Korean reconciliation, strengthening the U.S.-South Korea alliance while navigating tensions with China over security deployments, and expanding economic diplomacy with regional powers. His administration emphasized "peace through strength" via dialogue with North Korea, but outcomes were limited as Pyongyang continued nuclear advancements without verifiable dismantlement.[7][135] This approach drew criticism for prioritizing engagement over enforcement of sanctions, potentially undermining deterrence amid North Korea's missile tests.[136]North Korea engagement
Moon initiated aggressive diplomatic outreach to North Korea, hosting three summits with Kim Jong-un in 2018: the first on April 27 at Panmunjom, yielding the Panmunjom Declaration committing to denuclearization, peace regime establishment, and military tension reduction; a surprise second on May 26 at Panmunjom to advance implementation; and the third in September 18-20 in Pyongyang, where agreements included military hotline expansions and joint Olympic bids.[137][138] These efforts facilitated temporary de-escalation, such as liaison office openings and family reunions, but stalled after the February 2019 U.S.-North Korea Hanoi summit failure, with no concrete nuclear concessions from Pyongyang.[139] By 2020, North Korea dismantled the liaison office and resumed tests, highlighting the policy's inability to secure lasting verifiable progress toward denuclearization despite Moon's mediation role in U.S.-North Korea talks.[7] Moon's Sunshine Policy revival prioritized economic incentives like inter-Korean projects (e.g., Kaesong Industrial Complex revival proposals) over sanctions enforcement, which critics argued emboldened Kim without reciprocity.[140]U.S. and alliance dynamics
Moon reaffirmed the U.S.-South Korea alliance as the cornerstone of security, increasing defense spending contributions and conducting joint exercises, though scaled back some amid North Korea talks to avoid provocation.[141] Tensions arose over the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system; initially opposing rushed deployment under Park Geun-hye, Moon ordered a probe into additional launchers installed covertly in May 2017 but approved full operation by October 2017 following North Korean missile launches over Japan.[142][143] Trade frictions emerged during KORUS FTA renegotiations, with Trump demanding concessions on steel exports and auto tariffs, leading to a revised deal in 2018 that raised South Korean auto export quotas.[144] Despite strains, Moon coordinated closely with U.S. presidents on North Korea, facilitating Trump's summits with Kim, and elevated alliance roles in Indo-Pacific strategy under Biden in 2021.[145] The policy balanced deterrence with diplomacy but faced domestic critique for perceived deference to U.S. demands amid alliance cost-sharing hikes to 1.414% of GDP by 2021.[146]China relations
Economic interdependence defined Moon's China policy, with bilateral trade reaching $300 billion annually by 2019, focusing on infrastructure, environment, and third-market cooperation.[147][148] However, THAAD deployment triggered Beijing's economic retaliation, including tourism boycotts and Lotte Group sanctions, straining ties to their lowest in decades despite Moon's efforts to normalize via 2017 visits and "three nos" assurances (no additional THAAD, no U.S. missile defense participation, no trilateral military alliance).[149][150] Moon advocated multilateralism and free trade with China while upholding the U.S. alliance, but avoided explicit criticism of Beijing's North Korea support or Uyghur policies, prioritizing stability.[146] Outcomes included resumed high-level dialogues but persistent security divergences, with China viewing South Korea's U.S. alignment warily.[151]Broader international efforts
Moon advanced the New Southern Policy, boosting ties with ASEAN and India through 2017-2022 summits and trade pacts, diversifying beyond China dependence with investments exceeding $100 billion.[152] Relations with Japan deteriorated over historical disputes, including 2018-2019 court rulings on forced labor compensation leading to export controls and severed GSOMIA intelligence sharing in 2019 (restored months later).[153] With Russia, Moon proposed the "Nine Bridges" initiative in 2019 for Eurasian connectivity, including energy and rail projects, discussed at G20 sidelines, though implementation lagged due to sanctions.[154][155] Multilateral engagements emphasized UN roles, climate accords, and vaccine diplomacy during COVID-19, positioning South Korea as a middle power.[156]North Korea engagement
Moon Jae-in pursued an engagement policy toward North Korea, emphasizing dialogue and economic cooperation to reduce tensions and advance denuclearization, building on the Sunshine Policy framework of prior progressive administrations.[157] This approach gained momentum following North Korea's participation in the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, where Kim Jong-un's sister, Kim Yo-jong, met Moon and conveyed an invitation for inter-Korean talks.[158] The policy aimed to foster peace through summits and joint projects, though it faced constraints from United Nations sanctions and required coordination with the United States.[139] The first inter-Korean summit occurred on April 27, 2018, at the Panmunjom House of Peace, where Moon and Kim Jong-un signed the Panmunjom Declaration.[159] The declaration committed both sides to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, cease all hostile acts, and pursue a peace regime to formally end the Korean War, including military tension reduction measures like a buffer zone along the military demarcation line.[159] A follow-up summit on May 26, 2018, at Panmunjom reaffirmed these goals and outlined steps for military talks.[160] Moon's facilitation contributed to the June 12, 2018, Singapore summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Kim, where North Korea pledged to work toward denuclearization in exchange for security guarantees, though without specific timelines or verification mechanisms.[161] The third inter-Korean summit took place in Pyongyang from September 18 to 20, 2018, resulting in the Pyongyang Joint Declaration.[162] This agreement advanced non-military exchanges, such as reconnecting rail and road links, and supported Moon's proposal for joint economic projects contingent on sanctions relief. Moon also mediated ahead of the February 27-28, 2019, Hanoi summit between Trump and Kim, but it ended without agreement after North Korea demanded full sanctions removal without verifiable nuclear dismantlement.[163] Despite a temporary moratorium on North Korean nuclear and long-range missile tests from late 2017 to mid-2019, the engagement yielded no substantive progress toward denuclearization, as Pyongyang continued short-range missile launches and covert uranium enrichment activities.[7] Relations deteriorated after Hanoi, with North Korea resuming missile tests in May 2019 and demolishing the inter-Korean liaison office in Kaesong in June 2020 amid stalled talks.[140] Critics, including U.S. analysts, argued Moon's policy prioritized reconciliation over pressure, leading to misalignment with Washington and empowering North Korea without extracting lasting concessions, as evidenced by the absence of verified dismantlement or a formal war-end declaration by the end of his term.[7][164] Moon maintained that sustained dialogue had de-escalated immediate risks, though empirical outcomes showed persistent North Korean nuclear advancements and unfulfilled declaration commitments.[165]U.S. and alliance dynamics
Moon Jae-in's administration maintained the longstanding U.S.-South Korea alliance while pursuing inter-Korean engagement, leading to both cooperation and frictions, particularly over North Korea policy and burden-sharing. Upon taking office in May 2017, Moon met with U.S. President Donald Trump on June 30, 2017, reaffirming the alliance's ironclad nature and committing to coordinated pressure on North Korea's nuclear program amid escalating missile tests.[141] This early alignment supported Moon's "Sunshine Policy" revival, where Seoul acted as a mediator, facilitating the first Trump-Kim Jong-un summit in Singapore on June 12, 2018, following Moon's own inter-Korean summits.[166] Coordination intensified through multiple Trump-Moon summits, including bilateral meetings at the UN General Assembly in September 2018 and 2019, where Moon briefed Trump on Pyongyang summits and both leaders emphasized denuclearization commitments.[167] A notable trilateral encounter occurred on June 30, 2019, at the Korean Demilitarized Zone, where Moon hosted Trump and Kim, symbolizing allied support for dialogue despite stalled progress post-Hanoi summit in February 2019.[168] However, tensions arose over U.S. demands for increased South Korean defense contributions; Trump sought to triple Seoul's payments under the Special Measures Agreement, from $800 million in 2016 to $5 billion annually, prompting protracted negotiations that strained relations until a 2019 deal raised contributions by 8.2% to about $920 million for 2020-2021.[169] Moon's preference for suspending U.S.-South Korea military exercises to sustain North Korean talks clashed with U.S. strategic priorities, as seen in the post-Singapore halt of "Freedom Guardian" drills, which Trump praised but military officials criticized for readiness risks.[170] The administration also navigated deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, approved under Park Geun-hye but facing Moon's initial review due to Chinese economic retaliation; full operation resumed by 2018 amid North Korean threats, underscoring alliance imperatives over Seoul's hedging toward Beijing.[145] Under President Joe Biden, Moon's May 21, 2021, Washington summit yielded a joint statement recommitting to extended deterrence against North Korea and addressing supply chain resilience, but highlighted divergences on engagement versus sanctions enforcement.[171] Moon advocated resuming talks with Pyongyang, contrasting Biden's focus on credible military posture, including resumption of large-scale exercises like Freedom Shield in 2022.[172] Overall, Moon's term saw South Korea's defense budget rise 7.6% annually on average, reaching 1.3% of GDP by 2021, bolstering alliance capabilities despite policy gaps.[173] These dynamics reflected Moon's balancing act, prioritizing denuclearization diplomacy while upholding mutual defense treaty obligations forged in 1953.[174]China relations
Moon Jae-in's administration inherited strained South Korea-China relations due to the 2017 deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, which prompted Chinese economic retaliation including informal boycotts of South Korean tourism, retail, and entertainment sectors, resulting in estimated losses exceeding $7.5 billion.[175] To resolve the dispute, Moon's government announced the "three no's" commitment in October 2017—no additional THAAD deployments, no integration into a broader U.S.-led missile defense network, and no trilateral military alliance with the U.S. and Japan—leading China to lift most retaliatory measures and normalize bilateral ties.[176] [149] Moon pursued a policy of "practical cooperation" with China, emphasizing economic interdependence and coordination on Korean Peninsula issues, as articulated during his first state visit to Beijing in December 2017, where he met President Xi Jinping and issued a joint statement affirming mutual respect and non-interference.[177] [178] Subsequent engagements included a June 2019 sideline meeting at the G20 in Osaka, a December 2019 summit in Beijing focused on post-THAAD recovery and trade, and phone discussions in February 2020 and January 2021 addressing COVID-19 cooperation and denuclearization.[179] [180] [148] These efforts aimed to balance South Korea's U.S. security alliance with economic ties to China, its largest trading partner, which accounted for approximately 25% of South Korean exports in intermediate goods like semiconductors during Moon's term.[181] [182] Despite diplomatic overtures, relations remained tense over security divergences, with China viewing THAAD's ongoing operation as a threat despite the 2017 accord, and Xi Jinping declining to visit South Korea throughout Moon's presidency.[149] Moon's government avoided criticizing China on human rights issues, including the 2019 Hong Kong protests and Xinjiang policies, framing them as internal matters during Xi's explanations in bilateral talks to preserve harmony, though Seoul later clarified it did not fully endorse China's characterization.[183] [184] On Taiwan, Moon adhered to the "one China" policy without deviation, refraining from enhanced unofficial ties to prevent Beijing's backlash.[185] This cautious approach prioritized stability but drew domestic conservative criticism for conceding to Chinese pressure without reciprocal concessions on issues like North Korea sanctions enforcement.[186]Broader international efforts
Moon Jae-in advanced South Korea's New Southern Policy, launched in 2017, to deepen economic, cultural, and people-to-people ties with ASEAN nations, emphasizing connectivity and mutual prosperity over traditional security alliances.[187] As the first sitting South Korean president to visit all 10 ASEAN member states within two years, Moon conducted bilateral summits and hosted the 2019 ASEAN-Republic of Korea Commemorative Summit in Busan, marking 30 years of dialogue relations and yielding agreements on trade, investment, and digital cooperation valued at over $300 billion in projected exchanges.[188] [189] These efforts diversified South Korea's partnerships amid regional supply chain shifts, with ASEAN becoming its fourth-largest trading partner by 2021.[190] In multilateral arenas, Moon championed inclusive global governance through forums like the United Nations and MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, Australia), positioning South Korea as a middle power advocate for sustainable development.[191] At the 2020 UN General Assembly, he stressed multilateralism's role in addressing pandemics and inequality, proposing enhanced UN distribution of COVID-19 vaccines to developing nations.[192] On climate change, Moon pledged South Korea's carbon neutrality by 2050 during a 2020 national address and at the 2021 UN Climate Change Conference preparatory events, committing $35 billion to green initiatives including hydrogen energy and forest conservation, while implementing the Paris Agreement through domestic emissions reductions.[193] [194] Moon's outreach extended to the Middle East and Europe via targeted state visits to bolster energy security and defense exports. In January 2022, he toured the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt—the first such trip by a South Korean president in over a decade—securing nuclear power plant contracts worth $20 billion with the UAE and arms deals exceeding $3 billion with Saudi Arabia, alongside cultural promotions like K-pop exhibitions.[195] [196] His 2018 European itinerary included stops in France, Germany, and later Italy, the Vatican, Belgium, and Denmark, focusing on trade pacts and EU-South Korea strategic partnerships amid Brexit uncertainties.[197] These initiatives yielded free trade agreement upgrades and joint ventures in shipbuilding and renewables, though critics noted limited progress in resolving historical disputes with some partners.[198]Economic performance
During Moon Jae-in's presidency from May 2017 to May 2022, South Korea's real GDP growth averaged 2.3% annually, reflecting modest expansion amid structural challenges and external shocks like the COVID-19 pandemic. Growth stood at 3.16% in 2017, eased to 2.91% in 2018 and 2.04% in 2019, contracted by 0.71% in 2020 due to pandemic lockdowns and supply disruptions, then rebounded to 4.30% in 2021 supported by exports and fiscal stimulus.[199] This performance lagged behind the 3-4% averages of prior administrations, with private investment subdued by regulatory pressures on chaebol conglomerates and policy uncertainty.[59] The administration's income-led growth strategy, emphasizing minimum wage hikes—rising 16.4% to 7,530 won per hour in 2018 and another 10.9% in 2019—aimed to boost household consumption but yielded mixed results, as wage gains disproportionately benefited large firms while small businesses faced higher labor costs, contributing to a surge in low-productivity self-employment from 24.8% of the workforce in 2017 to 27.5% by 2021.[59] Exports, driven by semiconductors and automobiles, remained a growth pillar, comprising over 40% of GDP, but domestic consumption grew sluggishly at under 2% annually pre-pandemic. Household debt escalated to 105.8% of GDP by end-2021, fueled by real estate speculation and low interest rates, prompting Bank of Korea warnings of financial vulnerabilities.[200] Income inequality metrics showed stability, with the Gini coefficient hovering around 0.33 from 2017 to 2021, below the OECD average but indicative of limited progress in redistribution despite expanded social spending.[201] Critics, including analyses from economic think tanks, attributed subdued productivity growth—averaging 1.2% yearly—to over-reliance on wage policies over structural reforms, with total factor productivity stagnating compared to export-led peers.[202] By 2022, as growth slowed to 2.61%, the economy faced headwinds from global inflation and U.S. rate hikes, underscoring the limits of Moon's policy mix in fostering sustainable dynamism.[199]Unemployment trends
The overall unemployment rate in South Korea during Moon Jae-in's presidency (May 2017 to May 2022) remained structurally low, averaging approximately 3.5-3.7% annually, consistent with pre-presidency levels but with a temporary spike to around 4% in 2020 amid the COVID-19 pandemic.[203][204] In 2017, the rate stood at 3.683%, showing minimal change from 3.675% in 2016, before edging up slightly to about 3.8% in 2019 and peaking during global economic disruptions.[204] By 2021, it had declined to 3.64%, and further to 2.86% in 2022, reflecting recovery efforts including public sector job creation initiatives that added over 800,000 positions, primarily in low-skill public roles.[203] Youth unemployment (ages 15-24), however, emerged as a key challenge, rising sharply from around 8% pre-2017 to over 10% in 2018, driven by structural mismatches between education and labor market needs rather than cyclical factors.[205] The rate fluctuated thereafter, dipping to 7.1% by late 2019 before COVID-19 pressures pushed it back toward 9-10% in 2020, with partial recovery to 6.64% in 2022.[206] Moon's administration responded with policies such as expanding public youth jobs and vocational training, yet critics attributed persistent high youth rates to rapid minimum wage hikes—exceeding 16% in 2018-2019—which reportedly increased hiring costs for small firms and entry-level positions, exacerbating underemployment in irregular jobs.[207][59]| Year | Overall Unemployment Rate (%) | Youth Unemployment Rate (%) |
|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 3.675 | ~8.0 |
| 2017 | 3.683 | ~9.0-10.0 |
| 2018 | ~3.7 | >10.0 |
| 2019 | ~3.8 | ~7.1 (late year) |
| 2020 | ~3.9 | ~9-10 |
| 2021 | 3.64 | ~8.0 |
| 2022 | 2.86 | 6.64 |
Housing and inequality issues
Moon Jae-in's administration introduced extensive regulatory measures to curb housing speculation and improve affordability, including loan-to-value ratio caps introduced in June 2017 and subsequent taxes on multiple homeowners, such as enhanced capital gains levies. Despite these efforts, which totaled 28 policy packages primarily aimed at demand suppression, Seoul apartment prices surged, rising 119% over the five years from 2017 to 2022. Government targets for annual housing supply, set at 450,000 to 500,000 units, were frequently unmet due to regulatory hurdles on development, leading critics to argue that the focus on price controls over construction exacerbated shortages and benefited speculators with existing assets. The housing crisis intertwined with broader inequality challenges, as real estate appreciation concentrated wealth among homeowners while sidelining younger and lower-income buyers, amplifying asset-based disparities. Moon's New Economic Policy emphasized income-led growth to mitigate this, through initiatives like expanding social welfare transfers and reducing irregular employment via public sector hiring drives. These measures correlated with a slight narrowing of income inequality, evidenced by the household disposable income Gini coefficient declining from 0.354 in 2017 to 0.333 in 2021. However, outcomes were mixed, with minimum wage increases and job policies facing backlash for contributing to small business closures and stagnant youth employment, failing to fully offset wealth gaps driven by property markets. Real estate inequity emerged as a defining policy shortfall, eroding public support and highlighting tensions between redistribution goals and market dynamics.2020 elections and governance shifts
In the April 15, 2020, legislative elections, President Moon Jae-in's Democratic Party secured a supermajority in the National Assembly, winning 163 seats directly and aligning with smaller parties like the Platform Party to control 180 of 300 total seats.[208][209] This outcome, achieved amid the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic with a record voter turnout of 66.2%—the highest in nearly three decades—weakened the opposition United Future Party, which captured only 103 seats, reducing its capacity to serve as an effective check on the executive.[210] The supermajority was interpreted by supporters as a public mandate for Moon's administration to accelerate reforms, particularly in response to effective pandemic containment measures that contrasted with global struggles.[210] The concentrated legislative power facilitated rapid passage of contentious bills, including key elements of prosecution reform, such as requirements for real-name disclosure in prosecutorial financial accounts to enhance transparency and curb alleged abuses.[209] These measures, enacted shortly after the election without substantial opposition amendments, aimed to redistribute investigative powers from the prosecution service to police and an anti-corruption body, fulfilling a core Moon Jae-in campaign pledge dating to 2017.[103] However, critics argued that the rushed legislative process—bypassing extended debate due to the supermajority—eroded institutional checks, exemplified by investigations into Prosecutor General Yoon Suk-yeol, whom Moon had appointed in 2019 but who increasingly resisted administration-driven probes into prior conservative governments.[211] Empirical indicators of power concentration risks emerged in the diminished opposition veto power and heightened executive influence over judicial appointments, with the Democratic Party's dominance enabling impeachment-like scrutiny of independent prosecutors without bipartisan consensus.[211] While the electoral victory provided a democratic basis for governance shifts toward reform acceleration, it also fueled perceptions of authoritarian tendencies, as opposition voices warned of systemic weakening of prosecutorial independence, potentially prioritizing political retribution over balanced oversight.[209][103] This dynamic, though rooted in a popular vote amid crisis recovery, highlighted tensions between electoral mandates and the long-term stability of separated powers in South Korea's presidential system.Post-presidency (2022–present)
Public engagements and writings
Following his departure from office in May 2022, Moon Jae-in published a memoir titled From the Periphery to the Center on May 18, 2024, spanning 656 pages and focusing on his presidential tenure's foreign policy, including defenses of his North Korea engagement strategy such as the 2018-2019 inter-Korean summits and U.S.-DPRK dialogues.[212][213] In the book, Moon portrayed these efforts as pathways to denuclearization and peace, attributing setbacks to external factors like U.S. policy shifts rather than North Korean intransigence.[214] Critics, including conservative media and analysts, faulted the work for lacking remorse over policy outcomes, excessive self-justification, and underestimating North Korea's strategic deceptions, with some labeling it naive given the absence of verifiable denuclearization progress.[215][216] Moon maintained public visibility through targeted interventions aligned with his former party's positions. In August 2024, he delivered a congratulatory video message to the Democratic Party of Korea's national congress, urging unity and continuity in progressive governance amid domestic challenges.[217] He has also commented on institutional reforms, echoing his presidential-era advocacy for curbing prosecutorial powers, particularly in statements decrying perceived abuses by investigative authorities.[218] In April 2025, amid his indictment on bribery charges related to alleged influence-peddling during his term, Moon publicly rejected the accusations as "unjust" and politically driven, framing them as retaliation by entrenched prosecutorial elements resistant to reform ahead of the June presidential election.[219][11] His Democratic Party allies amplified this narrative, portraying the legal actions as an effort to undermine opposition figures.[220] These statements reinforced his role as an informal advisor to the party, though retrospective polls on his presidency's legacy showed sustained public skepticism, with average approval ratings during his term at approximately 40% and lower end-of-term figures reflecting disillusionment over unfulfilled promises like inter-Korean breakthroughs.[221] In February 2026, Moon admitted the failure of his administration's real estate policy, stating on February 9, "We failed in our real estate policy."[222] On February 11, he endorsed a comprehensive anti-discrimination law, recommending Hong Sung-soo's book on the topic and emphasizing personal responsibility in discrimination issues.[223]Legal investigations and indictments
In April 2025, former South Korean President Moon Jae-in was indicted on bribery charges by the Jeonju District Prosecutor's Office, marking him as the sixth ex-president to face such proceedings in the country's history.[10][224] The allegations center on Moon's purported arrangement to appoint Lee Sang-jik, a former lawmaker from his Democratic Party, to a nonprofit foundation position in exchange for preferential hiring of Moon's former son-in-law, identified only by the surname Seo, at budget airline Air Premia.[12][225] Prosecutors claim this constituted bribes totaling 217 million South Korean won (approximately $151,000 USD at the time), funneled through Seo's salary and additional payments to Moon's daughter, Da-hye, who was also implicated.[226][227] Moon was indicted without detention, and his trial remains pending as of October 2025.[228] Moon has denounced the indictment as "unjust," asserting it stems from prosecutorial overreach and political retaliation by the subsequent Yoon Suk-yeol administration, which he accuses of targeting opponents.[10][226] His legal team contends the job placement and appointment were legitimate professional arrangements without illicit quid pro quo, emphasizing a lack of direct evidence linking Moon to explicit demands for favors.[12] Prosecutors, however, drew parallels to prior cases against former presidents Park Geun-hye and Lee Myung-bak, both convicted of bribery involving undue influence over appointments and employment for personal gain, to justify the charges under South Korea's anti-corruption framework.[10][224] Separate probes have referred Moon to investigators over alleged involvement in a public opinion rigging scandal during his 2012 presidential campaign, though these stem from earlier referrals and have not yet resulted in formal indictments post-presidency.[229] No convictions have been secured in any of these matters, amid ongoing debates about the impartiality of South Korea's prosecutorial system, which critics from Moon's camp describe as institutionally biased toward conservative interests.[228]Personal life
Family and personal interests
Moon Jae-in married Kim Jung-sook in March 1981 at Shinseon Catholic Church in Busan, shortly after he completed judicial training.[230][231] The couple has two children: a son named Moon Joon-yong and a daughter named Moon Da-hye.[232] Moon Da-hye, born in 1984, divorced her husband in 2022 amid public scrutiny over his employment at a Thai airline company, where he held a director-level position despite lacking relevant aviation qualifications; this matter later contributed to bribery allegations against Moon in 2025.[12][10] The family kept pet dogs during Moon's presidency, including Maru, a Pungsan breed gifted from North Korea in 2018, and Tori, a four-year-old black mixed-breed rescued from a dog meat farm and adopted from a shelter in July 2017 as the first "First Dog" from such a background.[233][234][235] Tori's adoption highlighted efforts against animal cruelty, as the dog participated in public campaigns promoting shelter adoptions over consumption.[236][237] Moon has cited reading and hiking among his personal pursuits, with memoirs and accounts noting his fondness for literature and outdoor mountain treks.[238][214] In 2012, during his presidential campaign, he acquired the nickname "X-file" from critics referencing perceived enigmas in his background and associations.[239]Religious and philosophical views
Moon Jae-in, a practicing Catholic whose baptismal name is Timothy, has publicly identified as a member of the Catholic Church, drawing from family traditions where his mother sought church aid during hardship.[240] He is the third South Korean president to be Catholic and the second to maintain active practice in office, including attending services at Hongje-dong Catholic Church with his wife.[240][241] During meetings with Pope Francis in 2018, Moon emphasized his faith, requesting Vatican support for Korean Peninsula peace as both a head of state and Catholic.[242][243] His philosophical outlook emphasizes a "people-centered" approach, heavily shaped by mentorship under Roh Moo-hyun, a former president and fellow human rights lawyer whose progressive ideals Moon chronicled in his 2011 memoir Moon Jae-in's Seven Years.[244] This perspective prioritizes social equity and reconciliation, aligning with Roh's legacy of participatory democracy and criticism of elite-driven governance, though Moon adapted it toward inter-Korean engagement rather than Roh's more confrontational domestic reforms.[245][246] Moon's Catholic-influenced views exhibit leanings toward themes of peace and social justice, evident in his advocacy for dialogue with North Korea as a moral imperative rooted in Christian reconciliation, potentially echoing broader progressive theological emphases on alleviating division.[247] However, critics, including policy analysts, have faulted this for selective pacifism that downplayed North Korea's empirical threats, such as missile tests and nuclear advancements during his 2017–2022 term, which yielded no verifiable denuclearization progress despite summits.[163][248][249] Conservative observers argue this idealism overlooked causal realities of Pyongyang's regime intransigence, prioritizing symbolic gestures over deterrence amid ongoing provocations.[7][250]Electoral history
Moon Jae-in's electoral record includes a narrow loss in the 2012 presidential election and a victory in the 2017 snap presidential election following the impeachment of Park Geun-hye.[251][65]| Year | Date | Party | Votes | Percentage | Opponent(s) | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2012 | December 19 | Democratic United Party | N/A | 48% | Park Geun-hye (51.6%) | Defeated[251] |
| 2017 | May 9 | Democratic Party | N/A | 41% | Hong Joon-pyo (24%), Ahn Cheol-soo (21%) | Elected[65][252] |
