Rohingya people

The Rohingya are a predominantly Sunni Muslim ethnolinguistic group whose members speak a dialect of Bengali and trace their presence in Myanmar's Rakhine State (formerly Arakan) to Muslim settlements dating back at least to the 15th century under the Mrauk-U Kingdom, though claims of earlier 8th-century origins lack conclusive archaeological corroboration and are disputed by Burmese nationalists who emphasize later migrations from Bengal during British colonial rule (1824–1948).^[1][2] Numbering approximately 1.2 million refugees in Bangladesh as of 2024—primarily from the 2017 exodus triggered by clashes between Rohingya militants of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and Myanmar security forces—the group faces statelessness under Myanmar's 1982 Citizenship Law, which excludes them from national recognition, viewing most as post-colonial Bengali interlopers rather than indigenous.^[3] Their plight stems from intertwined factors of demographic competition in resource-scarce Rakhine, historical Rohingya insurgencies seeking Islamic autonomy (e.g., 1947–1962 Mujahideen rebellions), reciprocal communal riots with Buddhist Rakhine (e.g., 2012 Meiktila violence), and Myanmar's post-independence policies prioritizing ethnic Burman-Buddhist consolidation amid fears of Islamist separatism.^[4] While international bodies like the UN have labeled state responses as genocidal, empirical analyses highlight bidirectional violence, including Rohingya attacks on civilians and economic incentives in rice-producing areas driving selective pogroms, underscoring causal roles of poverty, illegal border flows from Bangladesh, and mutual ethnic animosities over land rather than unilateral extermination intent.^[5][6] The Rohingya's defining characteristics include a patrilineal kinship system, oral traditions blending Persian-Arabic influences with local folklore, and a diaspora spanning Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Malaysia, where remittances sustain remittances amid ongoing Myanmar insurgencies displacing remnants.^[7] Notable figures like 20th-century leader M.A. Gani advanced self-determination claims, but internal divisions—exacerbated by ARSA's jihadist ties and competition with Rakhine Buddhist militias—have perpetuated cycles of flight and radicalization in camps, challenging repatriation efforts.^[8]

Nomenclature and ethnic identity

Etymology and self-designation

The term "Rohingya" serves as the primary self-designation for the Muslim population concentrated in Myanmar's Rakhine State, pronounced in their dialect as Ruáingga or similar variants, and is asserted by the group to signify "inhabitants of Rohang," an endonym for the historical region of Arakan (modern Rakhine).^[4] This etymology traces "Rohang" to linguistic adaptations of "Arakan," with the suffix -ya or -ga denoting origin or belonging in local dialects, reflecting claims of longstanding ties to the territory dating to at least the 9th–10th centuries when the name "Rohan" or "Rohang" was reportedly applied to the area.^[9][10] Historical linguistic analysis links the term to pre-colonial references, such as Persian designations like "Rkon" or Chakma usages of "Roang" for the region, evolving into "Rohingya" through phonetic shifts in Bengali-influenced Muslim communities.^[11] Earlier colonial-era attestations include British records from the late 18th century referring to "Rooinga" or "Rwangya" for Muslim groups in Arakan, suggesting continuity rather than invention, though the term's formal adoption as an ethnoreligious identifier gained prominence in the mid-20th century amid political mobilization.^[12] Alternative derivations, such as from the Arabic raḥm ("mercy") tied to early Arab traders, have been proposed but lack robust empirical support compared to the regional toponymic origin, which aligns with self-narratives emphasizing indigenous Muslim presence in Arakan predating significant Bengali migrations.^[1] Myanmar authorities reject "Rohingya" as a fabricated label to obscure migrant Bengali roots, preferring "Bengali" and viewing it as a post-colonial construct, a stance rooted in demographic records showing influxes during British rule (1824–1948).^[13] This contention underscores how self-designation functions politically, with Rohingya usage asserting autochthony against official narratives of foreign origin.^[14]

Debate on indigeneity versus migrant origins

The debate centers on whether the Rohingya constitute an indigenous ethnic group with deep historical roots in Rakhine State (formerly Arakan), or primarily descendants of Bengali Muslim migrants who arrived in significant numbers during the British colonial period. Proponents of Rohingya indigeneity, including community leaders and some historians, argue that Muslims have resided in Arakan since at least the 8th or 9th century, tracing origins to Arab, Persian, and Portuguese traders who intermarried with locals and established early settlements.^{[15] [1]} These claims posit a continuous Muslim presence predating the dominant Rakhine Buddhist population's arrival in the 9th-10th centuries, with the term "Rohingya" derived from "Rohang," an ancient name for Arakan.^[16] However, such assertions rely heavily on oral traditions and selective interpretations of chronicles, lacking robust archaeological or epigraphic corroboration for a distinct pre-colonial "Rohingya" identity or large-scale indigenous Muslim communities.^[17] In contrast, Myanmar's government and Rakhine nationalists maintain that the Rohingya are not indigenous but largely "Bengalis" who migrated from Chittagong (in present-day Bangladesh) during British rule (1824-1948), when colonial authorities encouraged Indian labor inflows to cultivate rice paddies and address shortages in Arakan's agrarian economy.^{[4] [18]} Historical estimates indicate Arakan's pre-colonial population was sparse, with Muslims comprising a minority—possibly around 30,000 out of 100,000 total inhabitants before British conquest—suggesting limited indigenous roots for the current demographic scale.^[19] British records document substantial Bengali settlement, contributing to a sharp post-1826 population rise, while post-independence censuses and refugee flows underscore ongoing cross-border movements rather than ancient continuity.^{[20] [21]} Empirical data favors the migrant-origin perspective for the bulk of the modern Rohingya population, as pre-19th-century Muslim communities in Arakan were smaller, more integrated into the kingdom's multi-ethnic fabric, and not self-identified as "Rohingya"—a ethnonym emerging prominently only in the 20th century amid identity politics.^{[22] [2]} The absence of verifiable ancient artifacts or inscriptions linking Rohingya specifically to early Islamic arrivals undermines claims of millennium-old indigeneity, while colonial labor policies provide a causal explanation for demographic expansion, aligning with patterns observed in other British-administered regions like Assam. Myanmar's denial of the "Rohingya" label reflects this view, classifying them outside the 135 recognized indigenous nationalities and attributing statelessness to undocumented migration rather than historical entitlement.^{[4] [23]} This stance, while politically charged, draws on demographic records showing minimal Muslim presence in northern Rakhine before colonial incentives, contrasting with activist narratives that amplify early contacts without proportional evidence.^[1]

Myanmar official stance and denial of "Rohingya" term

The government of Myanmar does not recognize "Rohingya" as a legitimate ethnic designation for the Muslim population in Rakhine State, viewing it as a fabricated or politically motivated term that lacks historical basis within the country's official ethnic classifications.^{[24] [25]} Instead, officials consistently refer to this group as "Bengalis" or "Bengali Muslims," emphasizing their purported origins as migrants from Bengal (modern-day Bangladesh and parts of India) rather than as an indigenous ethnic group native to Myanmar.^{[4] [26]} This terminology aligns with the state's narrative that the population's presence stems primarily from colonial-era labor migrations under British rule, rather than pre-colonial settlement, thereby justifying restrictions on citizenship and rights under the 1982 Citizenship Law, which grants full citizenship only to members of the 135 officially recognized ethnic groups with documented pre-1823 residency.^{[26] [23]} In practice, this denial manifests in policy and discourse: during the 2014 national census, enumerators were instructed not to allow self-identification as "Rohingya," forcing respondents to select "Bengali" or other categories, which contributed to widespread boycotts and undercounting of the population.^[27] State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi explicitly requested in May 2016 that the United States avoid using the term "Rohingya" during diplomatic engagements, citing its potential to exacerbate communal tensions in Rakhine State, and similarly urged a UN special rapporteur in June 2016 to refrain from it in official communications.^{[24] [28]} During her December 2019 appearance at the International Court of Justice defending Myanmar against genocide allegations, Suu Kyi again omitted the term entirely, referring to the group as "the population of Rakhine State" or avoiding ethnic labels altogether.^[29] The military-led government and successive administrations maintain that accepting "Rohingya" as an ethnic identity would confer undue indigenous status, potentially entitling the group to political representation and land rights in Rakhine State, where demographic pressures and resource competition with the ethnic Rakhine Buddhist majority fuel ongoing conflicts.^{[30] [31]} Foreign Ministry spokesperson Kyaw Zay Ya articulated in 2016 that "Rohingya are not recognized as among the 135 official ethnic groups," underscoring the stance as rooted in legal and historical criteria rather than contemporary self-identification.^{[25] [24]} This position persists under the post-2021 military junta, which continues to classify the group outside Myanmar's constitutional ethnic framework, linking the denial to broader security concerns over alleged insurgent activities and illegal immigration from Bangladesh.^[4]

Historical migrations and settlement

Pre-Islamic Arakan and early Muslim arrivals

The region of Arakan, now Rakhine State in Myanmar, developed early Indianized kingdoms from the 4th century CE onward, characterized by urban planning, hydraulic engineering, and religious influences from Hinduism and Buddhism. The Dhanyawadi kingdom, flourishing approximately from the 4th to 8th centuries CE, represented one of Southeast Asia's initial polities with Indian cosmological layouts, including reservoirs and moats for agriculture and defense, and served as a hub for Mahayana Buddhist practices centered on artifacts like the Mahamuni Buddha image.^{[32] [33]} This era reflected agrarian advancements and trade links with South India and Southeast Asian cultures such as the Pyu and Mon.^[34] Succeeding Dhanyawadi, the Vesali kingdom endured from roughly the 6th to 11th centuries CE, featuring fortified cities with brick temples, inscriptions in Sanskrit and local scripts, and a syncretic blend of Mahayana Buddhism, Hinduism, and indigenous animist elements. Vesali's rulers, documented in stone pillars like the Anandacandra inscription from the 8th century, maintained prosperity through maritime commerce and internal stability, though the kingdom declined amid invasions and environmental shifts by the 11th century.^{[35] [33]} Archaeological evidence, including terracotta plaques and coinage, underscores Vesali's role as a transitional hub before the rise of later dynasties, with no indications of Islamic presence in these pre-12th-century layers.^[34] Arakan's Bay of Bengal coastline enabled early interactions with Muslim traders from the Arabian Peninsula and Persia starting in the 8th century CE, primarily via maritime routes disrupted by monsoons and shipwrecks. Local chronicles, such as those referenced in later Arakanese histories, describe the arrival of Arab sailors around 788 CE, who survived strandings, introduced Islamic teachings, and formed nascent communities through intermarriage with Arakanese Buddhists and Hindus.^{[36] [1]} These contacts, echoed in oral traditions and some Persian accounts, involved small-scale settlements of merchants dealing in spices, textiles, and slaves, but lacked corroboration from contemporary inscriptions or large-scale artifacts, suggesting limited demographic impact prior to the 12th century.^[19] Claims of widespread Islamization or indigenous Muslim lineages tracing to Vesali-era Arabs, advanced in certain advocacy narratives, rely on unverified genealogies rather than material evidence.^[1] Subsequent waves of Muslim entrants in the 9th to 13th centuries included Persian and Moorish traders, alongside refugees from conflicts in Bengal after its 1204 conquest by Turkish forces under Muhammad bin Bakhtiyar Khilji, though these remained sporadic and integrated marginally into Arakan's predominantly Buddhist society.^{[1] [37]} No census or epigraphic records indicate a sizable Muslim population in Arakan before the 15th century; instead, early Muslims functioned as coastal enclaves, with Islam spreading gradually through commerce rather than conquest or mass migration.^[4] This pre-kingdom phase set the stage for later amplifications under the Mrauk U dynasty, when political alliances with Bengal drew thousands more settlers.^[38]

Arakan Kingdom era (15th-18th centuries)

The Kingdom of Mrauk U, ruling Arakan from 1430 to 1784, saw expanded Muslim presence amid alliances with Bengal sultanates and Portuguese adventurers, though Buddhists comprised the majority population.^[39] In 1430, exiled prince Min Saw Mon regained the throne with support from Muslim forces from Bengal, prompting settlement of Bengali Muslims as soldiers and administrators.^[1] This era featured Arakanese kings adopting Persianate titles like Sultan and issuing coins with Arabic inscriptions from approximately 1430 to 1645, reflecting cultural borrowing rather than religious conversion of the monarchy.^[40] Muslim numbers grew through maritime trade, intermarriage, and captives from joint Arakanese-Portuguese raids on Bengal's coastal regions during the 16th and 17th centuries, which enslaved tens of thousands, many of whom were Muslim Bengalis integrated into Arakanese society as laborers, soldiers, or settlers.^[41] These raids, targeting Portuguese competitors and Mughal territories, supplied slaves to Mrauk U's multiethnic court and countryside, contributing to a noticeable Muslim minority concentrated in northern Arakan near the Bengal frontier.^[42] Historical accounts indicate limited voluntary conversions from Buddhism to Islam, with the Muslim community maintaining distinct Bengali linguistic and cultural traits, distinct from the Buddhist Arakanese majority.^[43] By the 18th century, as Mrauk U declined amid internal strife and Burmese incursions, the Muslim population faced increasing marginalization, yet retained communities in areas like present-day Maungdaw and Buthidaung, where they engaged in agriculture and trade.^[44] Portuguese chronicles and Bengali literary references document Muslim poets and nobles at the Arakanese court, underscoring Islamic cultural influence without altering the kingdom's Theravada Buddhist core.^[45] These developments laid foundations for the enduring Muslim presence in Arakan, though later narratives diverge on whether descendants formed an indigenous ethnic group or retained migrant origins tied to Bengal.^[38]

British colonial labor migrations from Bengal

Following the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826), Britain annexed Arakan (present-day Rakhine State) as part of the Treaty of Yandabo in 1826, incorporating it into the Bengal Presidency to exploit its fertile coastal plains for rice cultivation and other agriculture.^[46] British administrators actively encouraged labor inflows from the neighboring Chittagong region in East Bengal to address labor shortages, offering uncultivated lands for reclamation and higher wages than in Bengal, particularly amid local famines and cyclones driving emigration.^[47] This policy intensified after 1839 with systematic agricultural development, transforming seasonal workforce needs into opportunities for permanent settlement, especially as the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 facilitated broader Indian migration to Burma.^[46] Migrants, predominantly Muslim peasants from Chittagong known as Chittagonians, initially arrived as seasonal agricultural laborers for rice planting and harvesting cycles, with estimates of 15,000 crossing annually from Cox's Bazar by 1872, rising to 80,000–200,000 per year in the 1880s and averaging around 50,000 by 1917.^[47] Permanent settlement accelerated in the late 19th century, with approximately 500 families establishing homesteads yearly in the 1870s, clearing wastelands in northern townships like Maungdaw and Buthidaung for paddy fields; by the 1880s, Chittagonians comprised about 70% of Maungdaw's population.^[47] The Government of Burma Act of 1935 further prompted mass permanent relocation due to fears of impending immigration restrictions, shifting transient workers into rooted communities.^[46] These migrations drove marked demographic changes, with the Muslim population in Arakan Division rising from 12.24% in 1869 to 25.56% by 1931, and in Akyab District (encompassing northern areas) from 20.67% to 38.41% over the same period.^[47] Census records indicate 58,255 Muslims in Sittwe District by 1872, increasing to 178,642 by 1911, with British-era settlers outnumbering pre-colonial Muslim residents by roughly 4:1 in 1931; northern townships like Maungdaw reached 80% Muslim and Buthidaung 60%, often displacing local Buddhists southward due to land competition.^[46][47] These shifts, documented in decennial censuses and administrative gazetteers, reflected economic incentives over indigenous claims, though later classifications distinguished "Chittagonian Mahomedans" (immigrants) from "Arakan Mahomedans" (earlier settlers).^[47]

Post-colonial demographic shifts

Following Burmese independence from Britain on January 4, 1948, the Muslim population in Arakan Division—predominantly Bengali-speaking and including those later self-identifying as Rohingya—continued its expansion amid a porous border with East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh). The 1953 census enumerated 582,984 Muslims, representing 28.5% of Arakan's total population of 1,186,738, an increase from 25.9% (255,361 Muslims) recorded in the 1931 colonial census.^{[48] [49]} This post-independence uptick reflected a combination of natural demographic pressures and cross-border movements, as economic opportunities in Arakan's rice cultivation drew seasonal and permanent migrants from Chittagong, building on colonial-era patterns. By the 1973 census, Muslims constituted 35.1% of Arakan's population, numbering 1,118,731 out of 1,712,838 residents—a proportional rise that outpaced the overall state growth rate.^{[48] [49]} Government assessments attributed much of this shift to illegal immigration, estimating sustained inflows from East Pakistan after the 1947 partition of Bengal, which displaced populations and encouraged settlement in adjacent Arakan townships like Maungdaw and Buthidaung.^[49] The 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War further accelerated entries, with refugees and economic migrants exploiting weak border controls, leading to Muslim majorities in northern Rakhine subdistricts (exceeding 80% in some areas by the late 1970s).^{[4] [37]} These shifts heightened ethnic tensions, as the expanding Muslim communities—often viewed by Burmese authorities and Rakhine Buddhists as non-indigenous Bengali interlopers—encroached on land and resources traditionally held by the Rakhine majority.^[4] While census data confirm the numerical surge, Myanmar officials have emphasized migration over endogenous growth, citing incomplete enumeration of earlier indigenous Muslims (e.g., Kamans) and exclusion of "Rohingya" as a category in official records to underscore foreign origins.^[49] Independent analyses of census trends support a higher Muslim growth rate (approximately 2.5% annually from 1931–1973) compared to non-Muslims, driven partly by inflows that strained local demographics and fueled insurgent activities by groups like the Rohingya Patriotic Front in the 1970s.^{[48] [37]}

Demographics and population dynamics

Current estimates and geographic spread

Estimates of the remaining Rohingya population in Myanmar vary due to restricted access, ongoing conflict, and lack of official census data recognizing the group, but figures from international observers place it at approximately 300,000 to 350,000 individuals, primarily concentrated in northern Rakhine State, including internally displaced persons camps near Sittwe and Maungdaw.^[50] These numbers reflect the aftermath of the 2017 exodus and subsequent displacements amid clashes between the Arakan Army and Myanmar military forces since 2024.^[51] The largest concentration outside Myanmar is in Bangladesh, where over 1.1 million Rohingya refugees reside as of mid-2025, with UNHCR registering 1,133,981 individuals across 235,128 households in Cox's Bazar district camps and Bhasan Char island by April 2025.^[52] This population has grown slightly from 2017 peaks due to continued arrivals fleeing violence, totaling around 1.16 million by late 2024 in 33 camps.^[3] Bangladesh hosts nearly 90% of displaced Rohingya, straining local resources amid monsoon floods and camp overcrowding.^[50] Smaller Rohingya communities exist in diaspora countries, including an estimated 40,000 to 200,000 undocumented in India, many facing detention and deportation risks, with 676 held in immigration facilities as of September 2024.^[53] In Malaysia, tens of thousands live as undocumented migrants, while Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE host historical communities numbering in the thousands to low tens of thousands, often integrated through labor migration or earlier exoduses.^[54] Overall, the global Rohingya population exceeds 2 million, with the majority stateless and dependent on host countries or aid.^[55]

Fertility rates and growth compared to Rakhine Buddhists

The Rohingya Muslim population in Rakhine State demonstrates markedly higher fertility rates than the indigenous Rakhine Buddhist population, contributing to divergent demographic trajectories. Surveys indicate a total fertility rate (TFR) of approximately 3.8 children per woman among Rohingya communities, driven by cultural norms favoring early marriage and larger families, with limited contraceptive use.^[56] In contrast, the TFR for Rakhine State overall was 2.7 children per woman in select districts as of 2014, while the national Myanmar average stood at 2.3, reflecting broader trends of declining fertility influenced by urbanization and education among Buddhist-majority groups.^[57][58] Rakhine Buddhist households typically average 2-3 children, compared to 4-5 for Rohingya households, amplifying the gap through sustained high birth rates.^[59] This disparity manifests in population growth rates, with Rohingya estimates at 3-3.5% annually, approximately 1.5 times faster than the Rakhine State average of around 1.2% or the national rate.^[60][61] Rakhine growth lags at 0.6%, constrained by lower fertility and out-migration, while Rohingya expansion is bolstered by a younger age structure—27% under age 10 in 2012 surveys versus 18.5% nationally—indicating a momentum of future births.^[59] Between 1983 and 2014, Rakhine State population grew 56%, slightly above the national 51%, but Rohingya comprised a growing share, reaching about 40% (~1.2 million) of the state's ~3.2 million by 2014, heightening local concerns over ethnic balance.^[59][20] These trends, rooted in differing religious and socioeconomic factors—such as Islamic emphases on family size versus Buddhist monastic influences and modernization—have fueled Rakhine perceptions of existential demographic threat, though empirical data confirms the faster Rohingya growth independent of migration debates.^[62] Rohingya fertility exceeds even regional Muslim-majority norms like Bangladesh's 2.2 TFR, underscoring endogenous drivers over external pressures.^[59] Without policy interventions like family planning access, projections suggest continued divergence, potentially exacerbating resource strains in Rakhine State.^[56]

Internal displacements within Myanmar

The most significant internal displacements of Rohingya within Myanmar stemmed from the 2012 sectarian violence in Rakhine State. This unrest began on May 28, 2012, when three Rohingya men raped and murdered a 27-year-old Rakhine Buddhist woman in Ramri township, prompting retaliatory killings of ten Muslims traveling by bus on June 3 and igniting widespread riots between Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhists.^[63][64][65] Both communities committed documented atrocities during the clashes, which spread to townships including Sittwe, Maungdaw, and Buthidaung, resulting in at least 78 deaths and the destruction of thousands of homes.^[66] The riots displaced approximately 145,000 individuals, predominantly Rohingya, who were herded into segregated camps in central Rakhine State, such as those near Sittwe and Pauktaw, while many Rakhine were resettled in new housing.^[67] The Myanmar government imposed these relocations citing security imperatives to prevent further communal violence, though restrictions on movement, employment, and marriage persist, confining most Rohingya to camp-like conditions with limited access to services.^[68] By 2024, an estimated 235,862 Rohingya—out of roughly 550,000 stateless persons in Myanmar—remain internally displaced in Rakhine State, comprising about 41% of the remaining Rohingya population there.^[69] Living conditions in these camps are dire, marked by overcrowding, inadequate shelter, food insecurity, and restricted humanitarian aid, exacerbated by ongoing insurgent activities and government controls.^[70] Escalating conflict since November 2023 between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army has triggered additional displacements, affecting an estimated 327,000 people in Rakhine State and adjacent areas, with Rohingya villages caught in crossfire and subjected to forced recruitment or evacuation orders by both sides.^[71] The government attributes such instability to Rohingya-linked militant groups and illegal border movements, framing displacements as necessary countermeasures rather than targeted persecution.^[4]

Language, culture, and religion

Rohingya dialect and linguistic roots

The Rohingya language, known natively as Ruáingga or Ruaingga, is classified as an Eastern Indo-Aryan language within the Bengali-Assamese subgroup of the Indo-European family.^[72] It shares close mutual intelligibility with the Chittagonian dialect spoken in southeastern Bangladesh, reflecting historical migrations and cultural exchanges across the Naf River border.^[73] Linguistic analysis indicates that Rohingya diverged from proto-Bengali-Assamese forms, incorporating phonological and lexical features typical of coastal Bengali varieties, such as simplified consonant clusters and vowel harmony influenced by regional substrates.^[74] Dialectal variation exists across Rakhine State townships, with northern variants in Maungdaw and Buthidaung preserving more archaic Chittagonian traits, while southern forms near Sittwe show greater admixture from neighboring Rakhine Buddhist speech patterns and Burmese loanwords.^[75] The core vocabulary derives predominantly from Bengali roots, with approximately 70-80% lexical overlap with Chittagonian, as evidenced by shared terms for kinship, agriculture, and daily life; for instance, words like báir (outside) and khamar (farm) mirror Chittagong usages.^[76] Phonologically, Rohingya features 20-25 consonant phonemes, including aspirated stops (ph, bh) and retroflex sounds (ṭ, ḍ), alongside a vowel system of 10 monophthongs, distinguishing it from Tibeto-Burman languages like Rakhine but aligning it with eastern Indo-Aryan patterns.^[77] Islamic influences have introduced substantial Arabic and Persian loanwords, comprising up to 15-20% of religious and abstract vocabulary, such as namaz (prayer, from Arabic ṣalāh) and kitab (book, from Persian kitāb), reflecting centuries of religious scholarship and trade contacts rather than direct ethnic descent.^[72] Urdu elements appear in formal registers due to South Asian Muslim interactions, while post-1970s refugee contexts in Bangladesh have accelerated borrowing from standard Bengali and Chittagonian, diluting purer northern dialects among diaspora communities.^[74] Writing systems historically include modified Arabic (Rohingya Farsi), the Hanifi script developed in the 1980s for phonetic representation, and Latin-based Rohingyalish with diacritics for five accented vowels; the language received ISO 639-3 designation as "rhg" in 2007 to formalize its distinct status.^[78] These elements underscore a linguistic profile shaped by Bengali substrate and Islamic superstrate, with limited evidence of pre-Bengali Arakanese substrates, pointing to relatively recent formation through demographic inflows from Bengal.^[79]

Traditional customs and social structure

The Rohingya social structure is organized around extended patriarchal families and clan-based units known as gushti, which traditionally formed the basis of community solidarity and decision-making in village settings.^[80] These clans collectively constituted shomaz (communities), governed by committees of male elders who handled dispute resolution, resource allocation, and social norms through informal councils resembling salish systems influenced by Bengali Muslim traditions.^[80] Kinship ties emphasize patrilineal descent, with eldest sons inheriting primary household authority and responsibilities upon the father's death or incapacity, reinforcing male dominance in family and communal affairs.^[81] Mosques serve as central hubs for social cohesion, where religious leaders (maulvis) advise on ethical and customary matters, blending Sunni Islamic principles with localized practices.^[81] Marriage customs are predominantly arranged by families, adhering to Islamic Sharia law, with love matches discouraged to preserve clan alliances and familial honor.^[82] Ceremonies involve formal contracts (nikah), separate gatherings for men and women, and elaborate rituals including feasts, gold exchanges, and emotional songs (honlas) performed at weddings to express joy or sorrow.^[83] Early marriage is culturally entrenched, with girls typically wed between ages 16 and 20, and boys between 20 and 24, justified by beliefs in premarital purity, economic burdens, and readiness for adult roles, though child marriages under 18 persist due to socio-religious norms.^[84] Dowry practices, including gold, clothing, and household items from the bride's family, underscore the economic dimensions of unions, often leading to indebtedness but strengthening inter-clan bonds.^[85] Gender roles reflect patriarchal norms, with men as primary breadwinners engaged in agriculture, fishing, or labor, while women manage domestic duties, childcare, and sometimes fieldwork, though purdah (seclusion) limits female public participation.^[81] Community customs prioritize collective welfare, such as mutual aid during harvests or funerals, governed by Islamic ethics prohibiting alcohol, pork, and usury, alongside vernacular traditions like thanaka paste application for skincare, symbolizing continuity with Arakanese influences.^[86] Dispute resolution favors mediation by elders over formal courts, emphasizing reconciliation to maintain social harmony within gushti networks.^[80]

Islamic practices and influences

The Rohingya people overwhelmingly adhere to Sunni Islam, characterized by a Sufi-inflected variation that incorporates mystical elements alongside orthodox practices.^[4][87] This blend reflects historical influences from Arab traders who introduced Islam to the Arakan region as early as the 8th century through trade routes, gradually integrating with local customs and later reinforced by migrations from Bengal.^[88] They strictly observe the five pillars of Islam, including salat (daily prayers) performed in mosques that dot most villages and sawm (fasting during Ramadan), with religious adherence emphasized as a core aspect of identity tied to claimed Arab and Pathan ancestries.^[17] Religious education plays a central role, conducted in madrasas where children memorize the Quran and study fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), fostering clerical leadership within communities.^[89] Imams and ustads (religious teachers) wield significant authority, advising on spiritual matters, resolving disputes, and addressing supernatural afflictions like jinn possession through recitations and ruqyah (exorcism prayers), often blending Quranic healing with folk traditions.^[90] These leaders also influence social behavior, promoting conservative norms such as veiling for women and segregation in public spaces, while mosques serve as hubs for communal gatherings during Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha.^[91] Sufi influences manifest in veneration of saints (awliya) and participation in dhikr (remembrance rituals), though recent decades have seen tensions with rising Salafi currents funded externally, potentially eroding traditional syncretic elements amid broader Islamist networking.^[87] Despite Myanmar's restrictions on religious infrastructure, Rohingya piety remains resilient, with underground networks sustaining practices amid displacement, underscoring Islam's role in preserving cultural continuity against assimilation pressures.^[92][91]

Citizenship and political status

Pre-1982 recognition and participation

Under the Union Citizenship Act of 1948, enacted following Burma's independence, citizenship was granted to individuals born within the territory or descended from residents prior to January 1, 1942, encompassing many Rohingya Muslims in Arakan (Rakhine State) who had long-standing presence in the region.^[93] This law established a hybrid regime combining jus soli and jus sanguinis principles, allowing Rohingya to obtain identity documents and equal citizenship status alongside other ethnic groups.^[94] The Burmese government under Prime Minister U Nu officially recognized the term "Rohingya" in official communications, including radio broadcasts aimed at peace-building with ethnic minorities during the democratic period from 1948 to 1962.^[95] Rohingya participated actively in national politics during this era, with full voting rights extended to all citizens in general elections held in 1950, 1956, and 1960.^[95] Voters elected multiple Rohingya representatives to parliament; records indicate at least 17 Rohingya served as members of parliament across various terms up to the early 1960s, including two women and figures such as U Sultan Mahmood, who was appointed a cabinet minister in U Nu's government.^{[96] [97]} In the 1951 elections, Muslim candidates, predominantly Rohingya in Arakan, secured five seats—four in the lower house and one in the upper house—often aligned with the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League or independent lists.^[98] Following the 1962 military coup led by General Ne Win, political participation became more restricted under socialist rule, though formal citizenship rights under the 1948 framework persisted for Rohingya until the enactment of the 1982 Citizenship Law.^[26] During this interim period, Rohingya continued to hold national identity cards and access some public services, but faced increasing administrative hurdles and ethnic tensions exacerbated by mujahideen insurgencies in the 1950s and 1970s.^[95] Burmese authorities at times classified Rohingya as "Arakan Muslims" rather than a distinct ethnic group, reflecting ongoing debates over their indigenous status versus claims of Bengali migration during British colonial rule (1824–1948), yet pre-1982 legal recognition afforded them de jure equality absent the later law's stringent ancestral proof requirements.^[30]

1982 Citizenship Law criteria and exclusions

The 1982 Burma Citizenship Law, promulgated on October 15, 1982, by the Council of State under General Ne Win's regime, delineates three categories of citizenship: full Citizens, Associate Citizens, and Naturalized Citizens, with full citizenship reserved primarily for members of recognized "national races" (taingyintha).^[99][100] Full Citizens are defined as those belonging to ethnic groups—such as Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Chin, Burman, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan—that settled in Burmese territory before 1185 B.E. (1823 A.D.), marking the onset of British colonial influence via the First Anglo-Burmese War.^[99][100] The Council of State holds authority to designate qualifying ethnic groups, effectively limiting automatic citizenship to approximately 135 indigenous races based on ancestral settlement predating colonial migrations.^[100] Citizenship by birth requires both parents to be nationals (full Citizens), while descent-based claims extend to children of at least one full Citizen parent combined with an Associate or Naturalized Citizen parent, provided birth is registered within one year domestically or at a Burmese embassy abroad.^[99] Associate Citizenship applies to individuals who held provisional certificates or applied under the pre-1948 Union Citizenship Act but lacked full processing; eligibility demands an oath of allegiance to the state, with children required to affirm by age 18 or forfeit status.^[100] Naturalized Citizenship targets pre-Independence (January 4, 1948) residents or those meeting post-1982 criteria, including being at least 18 years old, fluent in one of Myanmar's national languages (e.g., Burmese), of good character and sound mind, and having resided continuously for at least three years if married to a Citizen—or longer otherwise—while conforming to loyalty oaths and excluding those with criminal records or security risks.^[99][100] The law prohibits dual citizenship and permits revocation for acquiring foreign nationality, permanent emigration, fraudulent acquisition, or actions endangering state security, such as disloyalty or treason, punishable by fines up to 50,000 kyats and imprisonment.^[99] The Rohingya are systematically excluded from full citizenship as they are not classified among the taingyintha; Myanmar authorities regard them as Bengali migrants from Chittagong (modern Bangladesh) who arrived during British colonial rule or later, lacking verifiable ancestral ties predating 1823.^[26][101] This non-recognition bars automatic birthright claims, while denials of Associate or Naturalized status often stem from insufficient documentation of pre-1948 residency or failure to meet evidentiary standards imposed by local scrutiny committees, which prioritize ethnic indigeneity over individual proofs.^[102] Enacted amid post-1978 refugee returns and security concerns in Rakhine State, the law's ethnic-centric framework has rendered most Rohingya stateless, restricting access to movement, employment, and services, though some with pre-1982 documents initially received temporary Associate-like papers that were later invalidated.^[26][102]

Exclusion from 135 official ethnic groups

The Myanmar government designates 135 ethnic groups as taingyintha (national races), a classification tied to eligibility for full citizenship under the 1982 Citizenship Law, which requires demonstrable settlement in the country's territories prior to 1823, the start of British colonial rule.^[103] These groups encompass sub-ethnicities derived from eight principal races—Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Chin, Burman (Bamar), Mon, Rakhine, and Shan—expanded into 135 categories by the military regime in the early 1980s to enumerate indigenous populations.^[104] The list's compilation, initiated around 1983 by the Tatmadaw (armed forces), lacked rigorous anthropological basis and served administrative purposes, including census enumeration and political control, rather than reflecting historical migrations or self-identification.^[105] Rohingya Muslims are explicitly excluded from this roster, as the government maintains they do not qualify as taingyintha due to origins traced to Bengali-speaking migrants from Chittagong (now in Bangladesh) arriving primarily during or after the British era, rather than pre-1823 indigenous settlement.^[4] This position, articulated in official statements and census policies, contrasts with Rohingya claims of centuries-old presence in Rakhine State, supported by some historical records of Muslim communities predating British rule, but dismissed by Myanmar authorities as fabricated or irrelevant to ethnic indigeneity criteria.^[106] The exclusion perpetuates a hierarchy where non-listed groups, including Rohingya, Chinese, and Indians, face barriers to naturalized or associate citizenship, requiring proof of long-term residency and loyalty oaths that are rarely granted in practice.^[107] In operational terms, the 135-group framework has influenced national censuses, such as the 2014 enumeration, where Rohingya were prohibited from self-identifying as such and instead directed to register as "Bengali," reinforcing their foreign status and ineligibility for ethnic quotas in politics or resources.^[108] Government-aligned narratives, echoed in state media, portray inclusion of Rohingya as a threat to Rakhine Buddhist demographics and national unity, prioritizing ethnic purity over demographic evidence of intermarriage and cultural assimilation.^[109] Critics, including international observers, argue the arbitrary nature of the list—expanded without transparent methodology—systematically marginalizes Muslim minorities, but Myanmar's stance remains that only pre-colonial taingyintha embody the state's foundational races, excluding post-arrival groups regardless of generational tenure.^[110] This policy has contributed to over a million Rohingya lacking citizenship documents, exacerbating vulnerabilities to displacement and rights denial.^[111]

Insurgencies and security threats

Post-WWII mujahideen and separatist movements

Following Burma's independence from Britain on January 4, 1948, Rohingya Muslim leaders in northern Arakan (present-day Rakhine State) initiated an armed insurgency against the central government, seeking to establish an autonomous Islamic region or attach the area to Pakistan.^[112][113] In July 1946, the North Arakan Muslim League had been formed to advocate for the Muslim-majority northern Arakan's secession from Burma, laying groundwork for subsequent militant demands.^[112] The Mujahid Party, established in 1947 by Rohingya elites including religious scholars, formalized these separatist goals, explicitly calling for an independent Islamic state in northern Arakan or its incorporation into Pakistan amid the subcontinent's partition.^[113][114] By 1950, mujahideen fighters—self-identified as holy warriors—launched coordinated attacks, targeting government officials, police stations, and military outposts in townships such as Maungdaw and Buthidaung, where they temporarily seized control of rural areas and established parallel administration.^[115][112] These operations, numbering in the dozens annually during the early 1950s, aimed to exploit post-independence instability and ethnic tensions, with mujahideen drawing support from local Rohingya communities disillusioned by unfulfilled promises of regional autonomy under the Burmese constitution.^[115][116] The insurgency persisted through the 1950s, with mujahideen forces peaking at several hundred armed fighters who coordinated with other ethnic rebels against Yangon's authority.^[116] A 1954 Mujahid conference in Taungbro, Maungdaw Township, reaffirmed demands for an autonomous Muslim state, rejecting integration into Buddhist-majority Burma.^[117] Burmese military operations gradually eroded mujahideen strongholds, culminating in their effective defeat by 1961, after which surviving cadres dispersed or integrated into later Rohingya insurgent formations.^[112][116] This period marked the initial phase of organized Rohingya separatism, driven by irredentist aspirations tied to Islamic identity rather than broader citizenship grievances, and contributed to enduring mutual distrust between Rohingya communities and the Arakanese Buddhist majority.^[112][19]

1970s-1990s rebellions and foreign militant links

In the mid-1970s, the Rohingya Independence Army reorganized as the Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF), led by Muhammad Jafar Habib, continuing low-level guerrilla operations against Burmese forces along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border from bases in refugee camps.^[118] The RPF sought an independent Rohingya state in northern Rakhine, conducting ambushes and sabotage but lacking significant manpower or arms, with activities peaking in the late 1970s before declining amid Burmese counterinsurgency efforts.^[119] By the early 1980s, the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) emerged as a splinter or successor group, establishing training camps in Bangladesh and launching cross-border raids into Myanmar, including attacks on military outposts in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships.^[115] RSO operations intensified in the late 1980s, contributing to heightened tensions that prompted Myanmar's 1991-1992 military operations, which displaced over 250,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh.^[115] These groups fragmented by the mid-1990s due to internal divisions, limited resources, and Burmese suppression, though remnants persisted in exile.^[120] Reports from the period indicate Rohingya militants, particularly RSO factions, developed operational ties with Pakistani jihadist networks in the 1980s and early 1990s, including training in camps linked to Afghan mujahideen veterans returning from the Soviet-Afghan War.^[120] Saudi Arabian funding and proselytizing efforts, channeled through madrasas and refugee aid since the late 1970s, facilitated ideological radicalization and recruitment, with some militants attending religious schools in Saudi Arabia or Pakistan.^[120] By the 1990s, RSO elements reportedly collaborated with Bangladeshi groups like Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), which had indirect connections to Al-Qaeda through shared training pipelines, though direct operational command from transnational jihadists remained unverified and limited in scale.^[121] These links, while not transforming Rohingya insurgencies into full-scale jihadist fronts, introduced external tactics and rhetoric emphasizing Islamic solidarity over purely separatist goals.^[122] Skeptics, including some analysts, argue such connections were exaggerated by Myanmar authorities to justify crackdowns, but refugee testimonies and intercepted militant communications provide corroborating evidence of foreign support.^[123][120]

ARSA formation and 2010s attacks

The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), initially operating under the name Harakah al-Yaqin ("Movement of Faith"), coalesced in the early 2010s among Rohingya communities disillusioned with prior insurgent groups, drawing recruits from displaced populations in Bangladesh and abroad. Its leadership included Ataullah abu Ammar Jununi, a Rohingya raised in Saudi Arabia with reported militant training, who positioned ARSA as a defensive force against perceived Burmese oppression while invoking Islamic rhetoric to mobilize fighters. By 2016, ARSA had organized several hundred lightly armed operatives, primarily young Rohingya men lacking formal military experience, and established clandestine networks for smuggling weapons and explosives across the Bangladesh border.^[124][125] ARSA's debut attacks occurred on October 9, 2016, targeting three border guard police outposts in Maungdaw Township—Kyee Gon Taung, Border Guard Police headquarters, and Thandar Chaung—using knives, sticks, and crude firearms, resulting in the deaths of nine policemen and the seizure of arms and ammunition. The group, numbering around 150-200 fighters in this operation, framed the raids as retaliation for arrests and village restrictions, but the assaults exposed ARSA's tactical limitations, as Myanmar security forces quickly repelled them, killing an estimated 15-20 militants in the ensuing clashes. These events marked the first coordinated Rohingya insurgency since the 1990s, prompting a military lockdown of northern Rakhine State and heightened scrutiny of foreign jihadi influences, though ARSA denied direct ties to groups like al-Qaeda.^[126][127] Escalation peaked on August 25, 2017, when approximately 1,000 ARSA fighters, divided into four waves, simultaneously assaulted over 30 police posts and the 8th Regiment military headquarters in Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Rathedaung townships, employing hit-and-run tactics with machetes, slingshots, and captured weapons. The offensive killed 12-59 security personnel (reports vary by source) and temporarily overran several outposts, but ARSA suffered heavy losses, with Myanmar forces reporting over 150 militants neutralized in the immediate counteraction. Independent investigations later confirmed ARSA's role in contemporaneous civilian atrocities, including the machete killings of 45-99 Hindu villagers in Maungdaw and Chut Pyin, where fighters executed non-combatants after separating them by religion, actions that analysts attribute to ARSA's strategy of ethnic cleansing to consolidate Rohingya-held areas.^[128][129] Sporadic ARSA operations persisted through the late 2010s, including ambushes on patrols and border skirmishes, sustaining low-level insurgency amid military cordons that restricted militant mobility. With an estimated 300-500 active members by 2018, ARSA relied on propaganda videos and fatwas from sympathetic clerics to recruit, but its improvised explosives and small-arms focus limited strategic impact, often serving to provoke disproportionate responses that fueled displacement rather than territorial gains. Myanmar authorities classified ARSA as a terrorist entity in 2017, citing cross-border linkages, while the group's persistence highlighted unresolved grievances over citizenship and land rights in Rakhine.^[130][125]

Rohingya militant activities post-2021 coup

Following the 2021 military coup in Myanmar, Rohingya militant groups, primarily the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), intensified recruitment and cross-border operations from Bangladesh refugee camps into northern Rakhine State, amid escalating clashes between the Myanmar junta and the Arakan Army (AA).^[131] These activities focused on countering AA advances, with militants claiming territorial gains and conducting ambushes, though many assertions remain disputed by AA forces.^[132] Recruitment drives in Cox's Bazar camps surged in 2023, drawing 3,000 to 5,000 fighters—some coerced, including children as young as 13—through promises of land reclamation, citizenship, cash, and weapons offered by the junta.^[131] ARSA fighters began crossing into Maungdaw Township from mid-2023, engaging AA positions in coordination with junta forces to defend areas like Buthidaung after AA captured Rathedaung earlier that year.^[133] A captured junta major, Hlaing Win Tun, claimed in June 2024 that military intelligence orchestrated joint operations with ARSA, forcibly conscripting and training 750 Rohingya youths near Buthidaung for arson and looting against Rakhine Buddhist villages.^[133] These tactics included burning homes and targeting civilians, aligning with broader junta strategies to exploit ethnic tensions post-coup amid its weakening control.^{[133] [134]} In September 2025, ARSA announced the seizure of a junta base near the Bangladesh border, but AA dismissed it as propaganda to bolster recruitment.^[132] By October 23, 2025, Rohingya militants ambushed an AA convoy in Maungdaw, killing two Rakhine civilians, as reported by AA sources. Such incidents have exacerbated intercommunal violence, with militants basing operations in Rohingya villages, complicating AA efforts to differentiate combatants from civilians.^[135] While ARSA's insurgency against AA shows limited success, it has deepened divisions and drawn in camp-based gangs, raising risks of broader destabilization without altering junta or AA territorial dominance significantly.^[135][131]

Major conflicts and operations

1978 Nagamin operation

The Nagamin operation, also known as Operation Dragon King, was a military campaign launched by the Burmese Tatmadaw in early 1978 under the government of General Ne Win to screen for illegal immigrants in Rakhine State (then Arakan), particularly targeting Muslim populations suspected of originating from Bangladesh.^{[115] [106]} The operation's stated purpose was a nationwide registration effort ahead of a census to distinguish citizens from foreigners, with Burmese authorities emphasizing the expulsion of Bengalis who had allegedly entered illegally during British colonial rule (1824–1948) or post-independence, viewing much of the Rohingya population as non-indigenous settlers rather than a recognized ethnic group entitled to citizenship.^[115] This rationale stemmed from demographic concerns in border regions, where influxes from Chittagong had reportedly swelled Muslim numbers, exacerbating tensions with the Buddhist Rakhine majority and fueling insurgent activities.^[136] Military actions involved intensive identity checks, house-to-house searches, and evictions across northern Rakhine townships like Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Sittwe, often escalating into reported manhunts and requisitions of hundreds of Muslim homes for army use.^[137] Refugees later claimed widespread atrocities, including rapes, arbitrary killings, and arson, with one account estimating over 1,700 Muslim assassinations amid a "reign of terror" that implicated local communities.^{[115] [137]} The operation lasted approximately eight weeks, prompting a rapid exodus as families fled to avoid scrutiny or violence, with Burmese officials interpreting the flight as confirmation of illegal status rather than evidence of persecution.^[136] By May 1978, over 200,000 Rohingya had crossed into Bangladesh, swelling makeshift camps near the Naf River and marking the first major refugee crisis involving the group.^{[115] [106]} Bangladesh protested the influx, initially restricting aid and threatening to arm refugees, while international pressure from the UNHCR and ICRC facilitated bilateral negotiations.^[136] Under a July 1978 agreement, Burma committed to repatriating non-criminal returnees screened as pre-1823 residents or eligible citizens, leading to the return of 180,000–190,000 by late 1978 and into 1979 via the UNHCR-monitored Shwe Hintha operation; remaining refugees dispersed to Pakistan or Saudi Arabia.^{[115] [136] [137]} The episode highlighted enduring disputes over Rohingya indigeneity, with repatriated individuals often facing ongoing restrictions that presaged the 1982 Citizenship Law's exclusions.^[115]

1991-1992 refugee outflows

In late 1991, intensified Myanmar military operations in northern Rakhine State, prompted by concerns over potential Islamist insurgent activities and border security following domestic political unrest, escalated into widespread abuses against the Rohingya population, including forced labor, relocations, rapes, and killings.^[138][115] These actions, occurring amid the junta's consolidation of power after the 1988 uprising, triggered a mass flight as Rohingya sought to escape persecution and religious discrimination enforced by army units.^[115] The Myanmar government, viewing many Rohingya as undocumented migrants from Bangladesh rather than indigenous citizens, justified heightened security measures to curb illegal movements and potential rebellions linked to foreign militants, though independent reports documented systematic brutality driving the exodus.^[115] By early 1992, approximately 250,000 to 260,000 Rohingya had crossed into southeastern Bangladesh, primarily via the Naf River, overwhelming local resources and leading to the establishment of makeshift camps near Cox's Bazar.^{[139][138][140]} This outflow marked the largest single Rohingya displacement since 1978, with refugees reporting village burnings, arbitrary arrests, and demands for portering that exacerbated famine risks in the arid region.^[115] Bangladesh, despite its own economic strains, initially provided asylum but imposed movement restrictions to deter permanent settlement and facilitate future returns.^[138] The crisis highlighted longstanding tensions, as Myanmar's 1982 Citizenship Law had already stripped most Rohingya of legal status, rendering them stateless and vulnerable to such crackdowns framed as counter-insurgency efforts.^[115] While human rights organizations emphasized ethnic targeting, Burmese authorities maintained the operations targeted unauthorized border activities, not the population per se, though evidence of widespread evictions contradicted claims of precision.^[115] UNHCR began monitoring the border in response, setting the stage for negotiated repatriations starting in 1992, though many returnees later fled again due to persistent abuses.^[138]

2012 Rakhine-Rohingya riots

The 2012 riots in Rakhine State were precipitated by the rape and murder of a 27-year-old Rakhine Buddhist woman, Ma Thida Htwe, on May 28 near Maungdaw township, allegedly committed by three Rohingya Muslim men who were subsequently arrested.^[65][141] In response to rumors and leaflets about the trial, a Rakhine Buddhist mob attacked a bus carrying Muslim passengers in Taungup on June 3, killing ten.^[142][143] Tensions escalated on June 8 when Rohingya residents in Maungdaw township rioted, killing two police officers, a government official, and one civilian while burning over 20 Rakhine homes.^[144][63] Violence rapidly spread to other townships including Buthidaung, Rathedaung, and Sittwe by June 10-11, involving widespread arson, looting, and clashes between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims, with mobs from both communities targeting neighborhoods of the opposing group.^[145][146] The Myanmar government declared a state of emergency in Rakhine State on June 10, deploying troops and imposing curfews to quell the unrest.^[147] Official figures reported at least 78 deaths, including approximately 49 Rohingya and 16 Rakhine, though independent verification was limited amid the chaos.^[66] The riots resulted in the destruction of thousands of homes, primarily in Rohingya areas, displacing over 140,000 people, the majority Rohingya Muslims who were confined to internal displacement camps segregated from Rakhine communities.^[67][145] Reports documented atrocities by both sides, including killings, rapes, and arson, exacerbating longstanding ethnic and religious tensions rooted in competition for resources and demographic pressures from Rohingya population growth and migration.^[63][143] The government's security measures, while restoring order, involved mass arrests disproportionately targeting Rohingya, with allegations of excessive force by security forces primarily against Muslim populations.^[63]

2016-2017 military clearances

On October 9, 2016, militants from the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), then operating under the name Harakah al-Yaqin, launched coordinated attacks on three border police outposts in Maungdaw Township, northern Rakhine State, killing nine police officers and wounding several others.^{[148] [149]} Myanmar's military, the Tatmadaw, responded with counter-insurgency operations in the area, imposing curfews and conducting sweeps to neutralize the threat, which resulted in clashes killing at least four soldiers and additional militants, with eight attackers reported dead and two captured.^[150] These initial assaults marked ARSA's emergence as an organized force, prompting the government to classify the group as terrorists and escalate security measures amid concerns over cross-border links to Islamist networks.^[151] Tensions persisted through early 2017 with sporadic violence, but escalated dramatically on August 25, 2017, when ARSA militants attacked approximately 30 police posts and one army regiment headquarters across Maungdaw, Rathedaung, and Yotphaing townships, using knives, machetes, and firearms to kill at least 12 security personnel and wound others in the deadliest single assault to date.^{[152] [153]} The Tatmadaw immediately initiated large-scale "clearance operations" (known in Burmese as kye bein) across northern Rakhine, deploying thousands of troops, police, and border guards to dismantle ARSA networks, secure border areas, and prevent further incursions, with the government framing the actions as targeted counter-terrorism to protect national sovereignty rather than ethnic targeting.^{[154] [155]} These operations involved house-to-house searches, village cordons, and destruction of suspected militant hideouts, which Myanmar officials justified as necessary to eliminate armed threats embedded in civilian areas, while denying systematic civilian harm and attributing some fires to ARSA arson or accidental causes.^[156] The clearances triggered massive flight, with over 723,000 Rohingya crossing into Bangladesh by early October 2017, primarily from Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Rathedaung townships, creating the world's largest refugee influx in recent history.^[157] Satellite imagery documented extensive destruction, including the burning or bulldozing of structures in at least 214 to 392 Rohingya villages, with Human Rights Watch estimating near-total demolition in affected sites by September 2017.^{[158] [159]} Casualty figures remain disputed: Myanmar reported killing over 200 ARSA fighters in the initial weeks, with total security force losses at around 30; Rohingya sources and aid groups like Médecins Sans Frontières claimed up to 6,700 deaths from violence, though government investigations acknowledged isolated abuses while rejecting inflated totals as propaganda.^[160] ARSA also perpetrated killings, including a documented massacre of nearly 100 Hindus in Maungdaw in August-September 2017, highlighting insurgent atrocities amid the chaos.^[129] Myanmar's government maintained that the operations disrupted ARSA's operations and restored order, with post-conflict infrastructure like security camps built on cleared sites, but international observers, including UN reports, alleged disproportionate force and potential crimes against humanity, though Myanmar contested these as biased and one-sided, emphasizing the insurgent provocation and lack of evidence for genocidal intent.^{[161] [162]} The clearances effectively neutralized ARSA's immediate capabilities in Rakhine but fueled long-term displacement and radicalization, with the group claiming regrouping abroad.^[4]

Escalations since 2023 Arakan Army clashes

The Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic Rakhine insurgent group, escalated its offensive against the Myanmar military in Rakhine State following the breakdown of a ceasefire in November 2023, capturing significant territory including much of northern Rakhine by mid-2025.^[163][164] This advance placed Rohingya communities in contested areas under direct AA control or crossfire, leading to new restrictions and violence. The AA imposed severe movement controls, forced labor, extortion, and arbitrary arrests on Rohingya populations, framing these measures as security necessities amid perceived threats from Rohingya militants aligned with the junta.^[165] In May 2024, AA forces set fires in Buthidaung township, displacing thousands of Rohingya residents after ordering evacuations, with reports of looting and destruction of homes.^[166] By August 2024, clashes intensified in Maungdaw township, where AA attacks on Rohingya areas resulted in civilian casualties and further displacement. The AA's capture of Maungdaw in December 2024 marked a pivotal escalation, prompting thousands of additional Rohingya to flee toward the Bangladesh border amid ongoing fighting.^[135] Rohingya militant groups, including the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and others, responded by unifying under a November 2024 agreement to counter AA advances, with fighters crossing from Bangladesh refugee camps to engage in combat.^[167][131] Some Rohingya factions allied with the Myanmar military against the AA, complicating the conflict dynamics and leading to reciprocal accusations of collaboration and betrayal. By October 2025, the violence had displaced nearly one million people in Rakhine, with Rohingya facing acute humanitarian needs including food shortages and lack of shelter.^[167][168] Human Rights Watch documented AA abuses such as torture and killings of Rohingya suspected of junta ties, while noting that both AA and military forces have targeted civilians indiscriminately.^[165][166] The International Crisis Group warned of a burgeoning Rohingya insurgency fueled by camp militancy in Bangladesh, predicting spillover effects including cross-border raids and heightened regional instability.^[135] As of October 2025, no resolution appeared imminent, with Rohingya communities enduring the brunt of the multi-front conflict.^[169]

Refugee crises and international displacement

Flows to Bangladesh (1978-present)

The first major influx of Rohingya into Bangladesh occurred in 1978 amid Operation Nagamin (Dragon King), a Myanmar military campaign involving village destructions, forced relocations, and documented atrocities that displaced approximately 200,000 individuals across the border.^{[157] [115]} Bangladesh hosted these arrivals in temporary camps near the Naf River, providing initial shelter despite lacking formal refugee infrastructure. By late 1978, under a bilateral agreement facilitated by the United Nations, around 184,000 had repatriated to Myanmar, though reports indicated many returned to insecure conditions including ongoing restrictions on movement and citizenship.^[138] A second significant wave unfolded between 1991 and 1992, triggered by escalated Myanmar military operations, forced labor impositions, and village burnings, prompting an estimated 250,000 Rohingya to cross into Bangladesh.^{[139] [95]} This exodus strained Bangladeshi resources in Cox's Bazar district, leading to the establishment of camps like Kutupalong and Nayapara, where refugees faced overcrowding and limited aid. Repatriation efforts, again UN-brokered, saw over 230,000 returns by 1997, but Bangladesh retained official recognition for only about 20,000 as refugees, classifying others as undocumented and restricting their rights to work or move freely.^[115] Intermittent smaller flows continued through the 2000s and early 2010s, often via perilous sea routes, with Bangladesh maintaining a policy of non-recognition for new arrivals to deter mass migration; by 2016, an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 unregistered Rohingya lived in makeshift settlements alongside the registered population.^[138] The 2012 Rakhine State riots, involving clashes between Rohingya and Rakhine communities that killed dozens and displaced over 140,000 internally in Myanmar, spurred additional border crossings, though Bangladesh intercepted many boats and refused camp access, resulting in pushbacks and growth of informal hillside camps.^[170] The largest exodus commenced in October 2016 following Rohingya insurgent attacks on police posts, prompting Myanmar clearances that drove about 87,000 across the border by early 2017; this escalated dramatically after August 25, 2017, when coordinated militant assaults triggered a sweeping military response, leading to over 740,000 arrivals in Bangladesh by year's end.^{[171] [172]} The influx overwhelmed existing sites, expanding Kutupalong to become the world's largest refugee settlement, with refugees reporting flight from arson, killings, and rapes in northern Rakhine villages. Bangladesh, without granting formal refugee status and labeling arrivals as Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals, coordinated with UNHCR for registration and aid but imposed movement curbs and repatriation pressures.^[3] Since 2017, flows have been sporadic, with UNHCR documenting around 150,000 additional entries through mid-2025 amid ongoing Rakhine instability, though verification challenges persist due to border porosity and informal crossings.^[173] Natural population growth in camps has compounded numbers, yielding a total refugee population exceeding 1.1 million as of October 2025, predominantly in Cox's Bazar (over 970,000) and Bhasan Char island (about 35,000 relocated since 2021).^{[3] [174]} Repatriation attempts have repeatedly failed due to Myanmar's refusal to guarantee citizenship or safety, leaving the camps in protracted limbo with rising vulnerabilities to crime, floods, and aid shortfalls.^[175]

Conditions in Cox's Bazar camps

The Rohingya refugee camps in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, house approximately 1 million people, forming the world's largest refugee settlement, with refugees confined to 33 congested sites spanning hilly, landslide-prone terrain that heightens vulnerability to natural disasters.^[176][3] Overcrowding remains acute, with inadequate shelter consisting primarily of bamboo structures susceptible to monsoon damage and fire hazards, exacerbating exposure to environmental risks.^[177] Sanitation facilities are limited, contributing to outbreaks of waterborne diseases, while restricted freedom of movement prevents refugees from seeking external remedies or employment.^[178][179] Health challenges persist amid dwindling international aid, including U.S. funding reductions in 2025 that have curtailed access to medical services for chronic conditions like diphtheria and hepatitis.^[180] The World Health Organization's 2025 assessments highlight ongoing efforts to bolster essential health services, yet refugees report persistent gaps in care, with overcrowding facilitating disease transmission.^[181][182] Nutrition insecurity affects vulnerable groups, compounded by aid dependency and limited self-sufficiency options due to Bangladeshi restrictions on formal work.^[183] Security issues have intensified, with organized criminal networks engaging in drug trafficking, extortion, kidnappings, and violent crimes, fostering an environment of fear.^[184] In 2025, evictions within camps surged by 116%, displacing thousands and stripping them of protections, while abductions and gender-based violence remain prevalent, particularly targeting women and children.^[185][186] Reports indicate at least 14 fatalities linked to camp violence in early 2025, amid broader spirals of insecurity that undermine protection mechanisms.^[187] Education and livelihoods face severe constraints, with foreign aid cuts in 2025 disrupting schooling for hundreds of thousands of children, heightening risks of recruitment into criminal activities or militancy.^[187] Refugees lack legal work rights, perpetuating economic stagnation and reliance on humanitarian rations, which have been strained by global funding shortfalls.^[174] Informal economies persist through smuggling and labor violations, but these expose individuals to exploitation without addressing systemic idleness.^[157]

Boat migrations and deaths

Rohingya refugees and migrants have increasingly resorted to irregular sea voyages across the Andaman Sea and Bay of Bengal since the early 2010s, primarily departing from Rakhine State in Myanmar or overcrowded camps in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, aiming for destinations such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. These journeys, facilitated by smugglers charging fees equivalent to years of camp wages, involve unseaworthy vessels overloaded with passengers, leading to frequent capsizings, engine failures, and abandonment at sea. From 2012 to 2015, approximately 170,000 Rohingya undertook such voyages, often mixed with Bangladeshi economic migrants, amid pushbacks by regional navies that exacerbated stranding.^[188] The 2015 Andaman Sea crisis exemplified the perils, with up to 8,000 individuals stranded after traffickers abandoned boats following Thai pushbacks; an estimated 370 died from starvation, dehydration, and disease before limited rescues by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Departures peaked that year, with around 25,000 to 50,000 leaving by boat from January to March alone, driven by Myanmar's citizenship denials and camp restrictions in Bangladesh. Regional governments' "help on the high seas" policy prioritized towing boats back rather than disembarkation, prolonging exposure to elements and trafficker violence.^[188][189] Post-2017 exodus to Bangladesh, secondary migrations from Cox's Bazar camps surged due to intra-camp violence, including kidnappings, murders, and turf wars among armed groups like the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), alongside movement restrictions and aid shortfalls that fostered desperation. Arrivals by boat in Indonesia rose 700% in 2024 compared to prior years, with over 1,500 Rohingya landing in Aceh and other provinces by mid-year. In 2023, at least 569 Rohingya died or went missing at sea—the highest toll since 2014—across more than 140 documented journeys, often from drowning or abuse.^{[190][191][192]} Notable incidents underscore the ongoing risks: On March 21, 2024, a boat carrying 142 Rohingya capsized off Aceh, Indonesia, killing 67, including 27 children. In May 2025, two vessels sank off Myanmar's coast—one on May 9 with 267 aboard (201 presumed dead, 66 survivors) and another with 247 (226 presumed dead)—carrying refugees from Bangladesh camps and Rakhine amid escalating Arakan Army clashes. These events reflect combined push factors: Myanmar's civil war displacements and Bangladesh camp lawlessness, where lack of safe repatriation or third-country resettlement leaves economic survival as a primary motivator for many departures.^{[193][194][195]} Regional non-refoulement gaps and anti-trafficking crackdowns have not curbed voyages, with 2024 marking Asia's deadliest year for migrant sea deaths at over 2,500, though Rohingya-specific figures remain underreported due to unregistered departures. Smugglers' tactics, including withholding food to extract ransoms from families, contribute to fatalities, while host countries like Indonesia provide ad hoc rescues but resist permanent settlement.^[196][197]

Relocation to Bhasan Char and repatriation failures

In response to overcrowding, security threats, and vulnerability to natural disasters in the Cox's Bazar camps hosting over one million Rohingya refugees, the Bangladeshi government initiated relocation to Bhasan Char, a low-lying silt island in the Bay of Bengal approximately 40 kilometers offshore, beginning on December 4, 2020.^[157][198] The project, funded by Bangladesh at an estimated cost exceeding $300 million, involved constructing embankments, multi-story housing blocks, hospitals, schools, and cyclone shelters to accommodate up to 100,000 people, with the government claiming transfers were voluntary and provided superior facilities including reliable electricity, clean water, and reduced exposure to crime and trafficking prevalent on the mainland.^[199][200] By January 2025, around 35,000 refugees had been relocated in phased batches, with ongoing transfers such as the 24th phase in October 2024 involving over 500 individuals.^[3][201] Critics, including human rights organizations, have described Bhasan Char as an "island jail" due to severe movement restrictions enforced by armed security, limited access to the mainland for family visits or medical care, and the island's geological instability as a sedimentary formation prone to erosion, flooding, and cyclones despite mitigation efforts.^[198][202] Bangladesh counters that the isolation enhances security by curbing organized crime, drug smuggling, and militant recruitment that have escalated in Cox's Bazar—issues exacerbated by the camps' proximity to porous borders—and points to resident surveys indicating preferences for the island's structured environment over mainland vulnerabilities.^[203][204] Relocation has proceeded amid reports of initial coercion through incentives like cash payments and threats of aid cuts, though subsequent phases have seen higher voluntary participation rates.^[205] Parallel efforts to repatriate Rohingya to Myanmar have repeatedly failed since the 2017 exodus, despite bilateral agreements signed in 2017 and formalized in a 2018 memorandum of understanding committing Myanmar to verify and accept returnees.^[206] A planned pilot repatriation in November 2017 collapsed when refugees rejected participation without guarantees of citizenship, safe zones, and property restitution, conditions unmet by Myanmar's framework denying Rohingya ethnic status and requiring proof of pre-1823 residency under its 1982 citizenship law, which classifies most as stateless Bengali migrants.^[207][4] Subsequent attempts, including a 2019 initiative for 3,000 returnees, aborted due to similar refusals, with Rohingya leaders citing ongoing risks of violence and lack of legal protections, while Myanmar has repatriated negligible numbers—fewer than 10 individuals by 2023—and conditioned returns on biometric verification excluding ethnic recognition.^[208][209] Failures persist into 2025, fueled by Myanmar's internal civil war eroding control over Rakhine State, where no secure repatriation areas exist, and bilateral negotiations excluding Rohingya input, leading to distrust and non-starter proposals like Myanmar's 2025 "return initiative" lacking enforceable safeguards.^[210][211] Bangladesh has linked Bhasan Char relocations to repatriation incentives, offering improved conditions contingent on cooperation, but core impasses remain: Myanmar's insistence on demographic verification without granting indigenous rights, contrasted by Rohingya demands for full citizenship, rendering large-scale returns infeasible absent third-party verification or political concessions unlikely under current regimes.^[212][213]

Controversies and competing narratives

Genocide allegations versus counter-insurgency claims

The allegations of genocide against the Rohingya people, particularly during the 2017 military operations in northern Rakhine State, were formalized in a 2018 United Nations Fact-Finding Mission report, which concluded that Myanmar's armed forces committed acts including killings, rape, and arson with "genocidal intent" to destroy the group in whole or in part, based on survivor testimonies, satellite imagery of over 350 villages burned, and patterns of sexual violence affecting thousands.^[214] The report estimated at least 10,000 Rohingya deaths and the displacement of over 720,000 to Bangladesh between August and September 2017, framing the violence as systematic rather than isolated.^[215] These claims gained traction in international forums, leading to Gambia's 2019 case at the International Court of Justice accusing Myanmar of breaching the Genocide Convention, with provisional measures ordered in January 2020 to protect remaining Rohingya.^[216] In response, Myanmar's government rejected the genocide label, asserting that the operations were proportionate counter-insurgency actions triggered by coordinated attacks on August 25, 2017, by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), a Rohingya militant group that targeted 30 police outposts and an army base, killing 12 security personnel and injuring others with knives, machetes, and firearms.^{[217] [218]} Myanmar's Anti-Terrorism Central Committee designated ARSA a terrorist organization the same day, citing its ties to transnational jihadist networks and prior smaller-scale attacks in 2016 that killed nine police.^[126] Government statements emphasized that "clearance operations" aimed to dismantle militant infrastructure, with official figures reporting 376 ARSA fighters killed and minimal civilian casualties, while attributing village burnings to crossfire, ARSA arson to draw international sympathy, or local disputes rather than state policy.^[216] A 2017 government-appointed commission similarly found "no evidence" of genocide, highlighting ARSA's role in escalating communal tensions in a region plagued by decades of insurgency and illegal immigration.^[219] Supporting the counter-insurgency narrative, independent reports documented ARSA's own atrocities, including the September 2017 massacre of at least 99 Hindus—mostly women and children—in Maungdaw Township, where militants abducted and executed villagers after demanding they declare allegiance, as verified through witness interviews and forensic evidence.^{[220] [221]} ARSA's leadership admitted to defensive jihad rhetoric and infiltration tactics, slipping fighters across the Bangladesh border for attacks, which Myanmar argued justified area-wide security measures amid intelligence of planned bombings and ambushes.^[222] Critics of the genocide allegations, including Myanmar officials, contend that UN and NGO findings overemphasize Rohingya victimhood while understating militant agency and historical context, such as ARSA's emergence from fragmented Rohingya armed groups active since the 1990s; they note discrepancies in casualty estimates (e.g., Médecins Sans Frontières' 6,700 death toll relied on unverified refugee reports) and lack direct proof of centralized extermination orders beyond battlefield excesses common in asymmetric counter-terrorism.^{[223] [224]} The debate hinges on intent: proponents of genocide cite de facto discrimination via the 1982 Citizenship Law excluding Rohingya and pre-2017 pogroms as evidence of ethnic targeting, whereas Myanmar frames the crisis as a security response in a multi-ethnic conflict zone where Rohingya militants exploited civilian cover, with operations ceasing after ARSA threats subsided and villages cleared of insurgents.^[4] Both narratives acknowledge atrocities—extrajudicial killings and arson by security forces, alongside ARSA's civilian attacks—but diverge on proportionality and motive, with empirical data like satellite burns concentrated in ARSA-active areas supporting claims of tactical necessity, though the scale displaced far beyond militants alone.^[160] International skepticism toward Myanmar's account persists due to restricted access for investigators, yet the government's consistent denial of ethnic cleansing, coupled with ARSA's documented terrorism, underscores counter-insurgency as a plausible causal driver amid biased reporting favoring refugee narratives from advocacy groups.^[219]

Demographic engineering accusations from both sides

Rakhine Buddhists and Myanmar nationalists have accused the Rohingya of pursuing demographic engineering through sustained illegal immigration from Bangladesh and higher fertility rates, aiming to establish Muslim majorities in northern Rakhine State and erode Rakhine ethnic identity.^[225][60] These claims portray Rohingya population growth—estimated at around 1 million prior to the 2017 exodus, concentrated in Muslim-majority townships—as a deliberate strategy akin to "demographic jihad," with historical influxes during British colonial labor migrations (1824–1948) and post-independence waves exacerbating local fears of cultural and territorial displacement.^[14] Myanmar's military regimes have amplified this narrative since the 1980s, citing rapid growth rates (historically 2–3 times higher than the national average) as evidence of existential threat to Buddhist dominance in a state where Rakhine Buddhists comprise roughly 4% of Myanmar's population but face localized outnumbering.^[226][227] Conversely, Rohingya advocates and international observers accuse Myanmar's military and allied Rakhine groups, including the Arakan Army (AA) since 2023 clashes, of demographic engineering via forced expulsions, village destruction, and denial of repatriation rights to consolidate Buddhist control over Rakhine territory.^[228] Post-2017 clearances displaced over 700,000 Rohingya, with reports of systematic burning of 392 villages and prevention of returns to facilitate land reallocation, potentially to non-Muslim settlers, though verified resettlement of other ethnic groups remains limited and disputed.^[229] In AA-controlled areas as of 2025, Rohingya face restrictions on movement, forced labor, and taxation, prompting accusations of indirect displacement to achieve Rakhine homogeneity amid the group's territorial gains covering 90% of Rakhine State.^[165][230] These claims, often from NGOs like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International—which exhibit systemic advocacy biases favoring minority narratives over state security concerns—frame such actions as continuations of ethnic cleansing to reverse perceived Muslim overpopulation.^[165][70] Empirical data underscores the mutual fears: northern Rakhine's Muslim proportion rose from under 20% in early 20th-century censuses to over 50% in disputed 2014 estimates, fueling Rakhine grievances, while Rohingya pre-exodus density (up to 600 per sq km in townships) contrasted with post-clearance depopulation, enabling contested land claims.^[20] Both narratives persist amid civil war dynamics, with Rohingya armed factions like ARSA clashing with AA since 2024, intensifying zero-sum demographic contests without resolution.^[135]

Media and NGO biases in reporting

Reporting on the Rohingya crisis has frequently emphasized narratives of unilateral victimization by Myanmar's military, often omitting or minimizing the role of Rohingya militant groups such as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in precipitating violence. On August 25, 2017, ARSA militants launched coordinated attacks on 30 police posts and an army base in northern Rakhine State, killing at least 12 security personnel and prompting a military counter-operation that escalated the conflict.^[152] While atrocities against civilians occurred during the ensuing clearances, media coverage has tended to frame the events as unprovoked ethnic cleansing, downplaying these initial assaults as a trigger and the broader context of insurgency.^[231] NGOs and international media have relied heavily on refugee testimonies from camps in Bangladesh, which, while documenting real hardships, have contributed to unverified or exaggerated claims of scale. Myanmar's military leadership asserted in October 2017 that reports of mass casualties and systematic destruction were inflated, with independent analyses noting inconsistencies in casualty figures propagated by advocacy groups.^[232] For instance, Amnesty International documented ARSA's massacre of at least 99 Hindu villagers in Maungdaw Township in August-September 2017, including women and children, yet such incidents received limited attention compared to allegations against the Tatmadaw.^[129] Similarly, credible reports exist of Rohingya militants setting fires to homes during clashes, complicating attributions of village burnings solely to security forces, but these nuances are often absent from dominant narratives.^[233] Government restrictions on access to Rakhine State have exacerbated one-sided reporting, with journalists facing arrests—such as the 2017 detention of two Reuters reporters for possessing leaked military documents—and reliance on local fixers or remote sources, fostering repetitive victim-focused stories that stereotype Rakhine Buddhists as perpetrators while sidelining moderate voices or communal tensions.^[234] This dynamic, compounded by limited on-the-ground verification, has perpetuated a binary Muslim-victim versus Buddhist-oppressor framing, hindering understanding of underlying security concerns like cross-border militancy and demographic pressures.^[231] UN fact-finding missions have faced accusations of bias from Myanmar officials, who argue the processes prioritize Rohingya accounts without balanced inquiry into insurgent actions.^[235] Western media and NGOs, influenced by institutional predispositions favoring narratives of minority Muslim persecution in majority-Buddhist contexts, have underreported Rohingya agency in violence, such as ARSA's recruitment and attacks, which international observers link to jihadist influences.^[135] Coverage disparities are evident: while 2017 events garnered extensive attention, similar or greater displacements in other conflicts receive less scrutiny, suggesting selective outrage driven by ideological alignments rather than empirical parity. This pattern risks misinforming policy, as seen in sanctions and genocide designations that overlook counter-insurgency imperatives evidenced by ARSA's ongoing operations.^[231]

Current situation as of 2025

Status in Rakhine State amid civil war

The escalation of Myanmar's civil war in Rakhine State since late 2023 between the Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic Rakhine insurgent group, and the Myanmar military junta has profoundly impacted the remaining Rohingya population, estimated at around 600,000 prior to intensified fighting. The conflict has displaced nearly one million people in Rakhine, with Rohingya communities in northern townships like Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Rathedaung bearing significant brunt due to their concentration there. Both the junta and AA have been accused of targeting civilians, including extrajudicial killings and arson attacks on Rohingya villages, exacerbating pre-existing vulnerabilities from decades of discrimination and the 2017 clearance operations.^{[167][166][236]} By mid-2025, the AA had seized control of much of northern Rakhine, including key areas near the Bangladesh border, establishing a proto-state amid ongoing clashes that left the junta controlling only isolated positions. Reports from human rights organizations detail AA-imposed restrictions on Rohingya movement, forced labor in wartime construction and logistics, and detentions in labor camps, often under threats of violence for non-compliance. For instance, in 2025, dozens of Rohingya were held for months in such facilities before partial releases, with minorities including Hindus also subjected to hazardous duties like frontline portering. These practices, documented through witness interviews, reflect AA efforts to consolidate authority but have fueled fears of ethnic subjugation, despite AA public statements offering inclusion for Rohingya who align with Rakhine autonomy goals.^{[169][165][237][238][239]} The junta, retreating but retaliatory, has continued shelling and airstrikes in Rohingya areas, stoking inter-ethnic tensions by portraying Rohingya as collaborators with rebels, while imposing blockades that worsened food and health crises. Rohingya face acute shortages, with movement curbs preventing access to markets or aid, and forced recruitment by both sides reported. In response, Rohingya militias such as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) have clashed with AA forces, allying with Bangladesh-based groups to counter perceived threats, leading to cycles of reprisals. United Nations assessments describe civilians, including Rohingya, as trapped in a "vortex of violence" from all conflict parties, with over 3,000 civilian casualties in Rakhine since 2023.^{[70][240][135][240]} As of October 2025, the Rohingya's status remains precarious, with no safe zones amid AA dominance in contested areas and junta holdouts in southern Rakhine like Sittwe. Humanitarian access is severely limited, contributing to malnutrition rates exceeding emergency thresholds in displacement sites, and raising concerns over feasibility of repatriation from Bangladesh given ongoing instability. Independent verification is challenged by conflict zones, though patterns of abuse align with historical ethnic fault lines rather than solely counter-insurgency needs.^[169][70]

Violence in Bangladesh refugee camps

Violence in the Rohingya refugee camps in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, has escalated since 2017, driven primarily by intra-community armed groups such as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and criminal gangs engaging in murders, kidnappings, extortion, and forced recruitment.^[241][242] By 2023, Human Rights Watch documented over 50 targeted killings attributed to these groups, including executions of perceived collaborators with Bangladeshi police or rival factions, with ARSA specifically implicated in assassinations like the March 2023 murder of a refugee's brother for aiding authorities.^[241] Extortion rackets demand payments from residents and aid workers, often enforced through threats of violence or arson, contributing to a climate of pervasive fear that has prompted thousands to risk perilous sea voyages.^[243][244] ARSA, designated a terrorist organization by Bangladesh and Myanmar, has intensified recruitment and operations within the camps, using them as bases to launch cross-border attacks into Myanmar's Rakhine State amid the ongoing civil war.^[135][131] In 2024, the group mobilized fighters to combat the Arakan Army, resulting in at least dozens of Rohingya deaths from intra-camp clashes and retaliatory killings, as reported by Fortify Rights in March 2025.^[245][246] Criminal gangs, often overlapping with militants, have shifted toward abductions and drug trafficking by mid-2025, with September reports noting a surge in kidnappings for ransom despite a temporary decline in overt homicides.^[247] ACLED data indicates ARSA's involvement in at least four militant incidents in the camps by March 2025, exacerbating insecurity in settlements housing over 900,000 refugees.^[248] Bangladeshi authorities' efforts to curb the violence, including arrests of over 700 suspects since 2021, have been hampered by the camps' dense, ungoverned terrain and limited refugee cooperation due to distrust of police.^[249][241] Victims rarely report crimes, fearing reprisals, which perpetuates impunity; Amnesty International highlighted in September 2025 that unchecked extortion and assaults undermine any safe repatriation prospects.^[250] This internal strife, rooted in factional power struggles and external insurgent ambitions rather than external aggression, has transformed the camps into hotspots of self-perpetuating conflict, distinct from the initial flight from Myanmar.^[135][251]

International responses and aid challenges

The United Nations has pursued legal accountability through the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where The Gambia instituted proceedings against Myanmar in November 2019 under the Genocide Convention, alleging failure to prevent and punish genocidal acts against the Rohingya; as of July 2025, the case advanced with interventions from seven states and ongoing merits phase following rejection of Myanmar's preliminary objections in 2022.^[252] The ICJ issued provisional measures in January 2020 and July 2022, ordering Myanmar to protect Rohingya communities and preserve evidence, though compliance remains disputed amid continued military operations. UNHCR and other UN agencies have coordinated humanitarian responses, sheltering over 1.2 million Rohingya in Bangladesh camps since the 2017 exodus of approximately 750,000, with operations extending to Myanmar's Rakhine State where access is restricted.^[253] Western governments imposed targeted sanctions on Myanmar's military leadership and entities linked to Rohingya abuses, including U.S. Treasury designations of generals in 2019 and entities in 2022 under Executive Order 14014, alongside EU measures since 2018 prohibiting arms exports and asset freezes on responsible officials.^{[254][255][256]} Canada and others followed with similar arms embargoes and individual sanctions, though enforcement varies and broader ASEAN responses emphasized non-interference, with limited repatriation facilitation.^[257] Aid delivery, led by WFP, UNHCR, and IOM, includes food rations, water, and shelter for camps in Cox's Bazar, but U.S. aid reductions in 2025—framed as bureaucratic streamlining—exacerbated shortfalls, prompting warnings of halved rations without new funds.^[258] Persistent challenges include chronic underfunding, with the 2025-2026 Joint Response Plan facing a $500 million gap for core needs, forcing cuts to education, health, and livelihoods programs amid donor fatigue and competing global crises.^[259] In Bangladesh, host government restrictions on refugee movement, work, and formal education—intended to encourage repatriation—compound vulnerabilities, while camp insecurity from armed groups like ARSA, corruption, and natural disasters like monsoons heighten risks; a 2025 MSF survey found 58% of refugees feeling unsafe in Cox's Bazar camps and 84% unwilling to return to Myanmar due to ongoing threats.^[260] Myanmar's denial of citizenship and blocked access for independent verification impedes safe returns, stalling tripartite agreements, as Rakhine conflict escalates with Arakan Army gains but without Rohingya protections.^[253][261] These dynamics reflect geopolitical caution, with powers like China and India prioritizing stability over enforcement, limiting aid efficacy despite empirical evidence of protracted displacement.^[262]