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Emperor Xuanzong of Tang
Emperor Xuanzong of Tang
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Key Information

Emperor Xuanzong of Tang
"Xuanzong of Tang" in Chinese characters
Chinese唐玄宗
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinTáng Xuánzōng
Wade–GilesT'ang2 Hsüan2-tsung1
IPA[tʰǎŋ ɕɥɛ̌n.tsʊ́ŋ]
Yue: Cantonese
JyutpingTong4 Jyun4-zung1
Middle Chinese
Middle Chinesedang ɦwen-tswong
Tang Minghuang[7]
Chinese唐明皇
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinTáng Mínghuáng
Middle Chinese
Middle Chinesedang mjæng-ɦwang
Li Longji
Chinese李隆基
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinLǐ Lōngjī
Middle Chinese
Middle ChineselɨX lɨung-kɨ
Third alternative Chinese name
Chinese明皇帝
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinMíng Huángdì
Middle Chinese
Middle Chinesemjæng ɦwang-teiH
Li Sanlang
Chinese李三郎
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinLǐ Sānláng
Middle Chinese
Middle ChineselɨX sam-lang

Emperor Xuanzong of Tang ([ɕwǎn.tsʊ́ŋ];[8] 8 September 685[5][9] – 3 May 762[6]), personal name Li Longji,[10] was an emperor of the Tang dynasty of China, reigning from 712 to 756. His reign of 44 years was the longest during the Tang dynasty. Through two palace coups, he seized the throne and inherited an empire still in its golden age. He was initially assisted by capable chancellors like Yao Chong, Song Jing and Zhang Yue who were already serving as government officials before Xuanzong ascended the throne. However, under Emperor Xuanzong, the empire reached its turning point and went into sharp decline and near collapse, due to numerous political missteps throughout his long reign, such as over-trusting chancellors Li Linfu, Yang Guozhong and general An Lushan, with Tang's golden age ending in the An Lushan rebellion.[11]

Background

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Li Longji was born at the Tang dynasty eastern capital Luoyang in 685, during the first reign of his father Emperor Ruizong (Li Dan) – but at that time, Emperor Ruizong's mother Empress Dowager Wu (later known as Wu Zetian), not Emperor Ruizong, was in actual control of power as empress dowager and regent. Li Longji was the third son of Emperor Ruizong, and his mother was Emperor Ruizong's concubine Consort Dou, who was highly ranked in the bureaucracy. In 687, as the emperor's son, he was created the Prince of Chu. It was said that he was handsome, with an appearance that was "majestic and beautiful", and was talented in music.[12] He had two older brothers – Li Chengqi, born of Emperor Ruizong's wife Empress Liu, and Li Chengyi (李成義), as well as three younger brothers – Li Longfan (李隆範), Li Longye (李隆業), and Li Longti (李隆悌). He had two full younger sisters, Princess Jinxian (金仙公主) and Princess Yuzhen (玉真公主), who later became Taoist nuns.[13]

During Wu Zetian's reign

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In 690, Empress Dowager Wu had her son Emperor Ruizong yield the throne to her, and she took the throne as empress regnant of a new Zhou dynasty, interrupting Tang. She imposed upon Ruizong and his family the surname Wu () to match hers.[10] In 692, Li Longji and his brothers were allowed to have residences outside the palace and were given staffs at their mansions.[12] In 693, both his mother Consort Dou and Li Dan's wife Crown Princess Liu (Li Dan's having been reduced to crown prince rank at that point) were killed by Wu Zetian inside the palace after Wu Zetian's lady-in-waiting Wei Tuan'er (韋團兒) falsely accused them of using witchcraft against Wu Zetian – and not even their bodies were recovered.[14] Subsequently, all of Li Dan's sons were reduced in title, and Li Longji's title was reduced to Prince of Linzi. He and his brothers, along with their cousins Li Guangshun (李光順) the Prince of Yifeng, Li Shouli the Prince of Yong, and Li Shouyi (李守義) the Prince of Yong'an (the sons of their uncle Li Xián, formerly crown prince but who had been forced by Wu Zetian to commit suicide in 684), were kept inside the palace and not allowed to have contact with outsiders[15] until 699, when they were allowed to leave the palace and take up residences outside.[16]

During Emperor Zhongzong's second reign: under Empress Wei's shadow

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In 705, Wu Zetian was overthrown in a coup (Shenlong Coup [zh]), and Li Longji's uncle Li Xiǎn (note different person than the father of Li Guangshun, Li Shouli, and Li Shouyi), who was at that time crown prince (Li Dan having yielded that title to him in 698 and taken the title of Prince of Xiang), who had been briefly emperor prior to Li Dan, returned to the throne (as Emperor Zhongzong). Li Longji was made the deputy minister of military supplies (衛尉少卿, Weiwei Shaoqing). In 708, he was made the secretary general of Lu Prefecture (潞州, roughly modern Changzhi, Shanxi). In 710, he was recalled to the capital Chang'an to attend to Emperor Zhongzong when Emperor Zhongzong was sacrificing to heaven and earth. Meanwhile, sorcerers engaged by Emperor Zhongzong believed that there was an aura of an emperor at the area of Chang'an where the mansions Li Longji and his uncles were, and Emperor Zhongzong tried to fulfill the vision by visiting Li Longji's mansion and attending a feast there.[12] While Li Longji was back in Chang'an, he spent time to cultivate relationships with imperial guard commanders, as he believed that Emperor Zhongzong's powerful wife Empress Wei, who was in charge of government affairs, would bring harm to the Tang dynasty.[17]

Coup against Empress Dowager Wei

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In summer 710, Emperor Zhongzong died suddenly—a death that traditional historians believed to be a poisoning by Empress Wei and her daughter Li Guo'er the Princess Anle so that Empress Wei could become "emperor" like Wu Zetian and Li Guo'er could become crown princess. For the time being, Emperor Zhongzong's son by a concubine, Li Chongmao the Prince of Wen, was named emperor (as Emperor Shang), but Empress Wei retained actual power as empress dowager and regent. Originally, Empress Dowager Wei's clan members, along with Zong, Li Guo'er's husband Wu Yanxiu, and other officials Zhao Lüwen (趙履溫) and Ye Jingneng (葉靜能) were advising her to take the throne, like Wu Zetian did, and they also advised her to eliminate Li Dan and Princess Taiping. The official Cui Riyong leaked their plan to Li Longji. Li Longji responded by conspiring with Princess Taiping, Princess Taiping's son Xue Chongjian (薛崇簡), as well as several low-level officials close to him—Zhong Shaojing, Wang Chongye (王崇曄), Liu Youqiu, and Ma Sizong (麻嗣宗)—to act first. Meanwhile, Empress Wei's nephews Wei Bo (韋播) and Gao Song (高嵩), who had recently been put in command of imperial guards and who had tried to establish their authority by dealing with the guards harshly, had alienated the guards, and the guard officers Ge Fushun (葛福順), Chen Xuanli (陳玄禮), and Li Xianfu (李仙鳧) thereafter also joined the plot.[17]

Without first informing Li Dan, the conspirators enacted their plan on 21 July 710, first killing Wei Bo, Gao, and Empress Wei's cousin Wei Gui (韋璿). They then began their attack on the palace, causing Empress Dowager Wei to flee to an imperial guard camp, where a guard beheaded her. Li Guo'er, Wu Yanxiu, and Lady Helou were killed as well. Li Longji soon slaughtered a number of officials in Empress Dowager's faction as well as her clan, while displaying Empress Dowager Wei's body on the street. At the urging of Princess Taiping, Li Longji, and Li Longji's brother Li Chengqi, Li Dan soon took the throne from Li Chongmao and again became emperor (as Emperor Ruizong).[17]

During Emperor Ruizong's second reign: under Princess Taiping's shadow

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The Summer Palace of Emperor Ming (Xuanzong), as imagined by painter Guo Zhongshu (929–977 CE)

Emperor Ruizong once again ascended to the throne, which is different from the first time he was a puppet. This time he truly mastered the power and quickly used it handily. Emperor Ruizong was immediately faced with the issue of whom to make crown prince—as Li Chengqi, as the oldest son overall and the oldest son of his wife, was the appropriate heir under Confucian principles of succession, but Li Longji had been the one whose accomplishments had allowed him to retake the throne. He hesitated. Li Chengqi declined consideration to be crown prince—stating to his father:

If the state were secure, then consideration should be first given to the oldest son of the wife. If the state were in danger, then consideration should be first given for achievement. If you did not follow this principle, the people of the entire empire will be disappointed. I would rather die than to be placed above the Prince of Ping [(i.e., Li Longji, whose title had been changed to Prince of Ping by this point)].

Li Chengqi wept and begged to yield for several days, and after further persuasion by the chancellor Liu Youqiu—who had been part of Li Longji's coup plans—Emperor Ruizong agreed and created Li Longji crown prince. Li Longji submitted a petition offering to yield to Li Chengqi, but Emperor Ruizong rejected it. After he came to the throne, whenever the chancellors and officials discussed political affairs with him, the first sentence he asked was: "Have you ever discussed with Princess Taiping? "If the answer is yes, he will continue to ask: "Have you ever discussed with Li Longji?" If both people have clear opinions, he will make a decision based on this, as a result, he relies heavily on Princess Taiping and Li Longji. Because of his achievements, having the crown prince title and the emperor's trust, Li Longji was active and powerful in the politics of Emperor Ruizong's reign, but, also, whenever Emperor Ruizong called a court meeting, Princess Taiping would listen to the courtiers' conversations with the emperor about the government behind a pearl curtain and had the government under her hands.[17]

Under her ample reputation in the previous reigns, her great achievements in two coups, the trust of Emperor Ruizong's, the vast privileges, attention, independence and wealth that Emperor Ruizong bestowed on her, and having countless allies, Princess Taiping has decision-making power on many serious events in the court and the country matters and was so powerful that she even surpassed Emperor Ruizong. She could often decide the promotion or demotion, deportation or summons of officials with a single sentence, and if the subject was undecided, it was changed or determined by a sentence from her, so most chancellors, forbidden troops, civil and military officials, regional warlords and senior servants of the Imperial palace were her associates. Initially, Princess Taiping agreed to Li Longji's ascension as crown prince despite the fact that Li Longji was not Emperor Ruizong's oldest son and was not born of Emperor Ruizong's wife Empress Liu (Li Chengqi was both—and therefore pursuant to Confucian principles of succession should have been crown prince) as she believed that Li Longji was young (25 at the time he was made crown prince) and would be easy to control. However, once she began to see that Li Longji was strong-willed and criticized her influences, she became apprehensive and often had officials close to her publicly opine that Li Longji was an improper crown prince. She even spread rumors throughout the empire and tried to cause discontent among the common people, saying: Li Longji is not the eldest son of the emperor, so he should not become the crown prince. She further often paid Li Longji's staff members to spy on him to try to find faults with him. She associated with a group of officials, including the chancellors Dou Huaizhen, Xiao Zhizhong, and Cen Xi, intending to find some way to remove Li Longji, but was unable to get two other chancellors—Wei Anshi and Song Jing—to join her group. When Princess Taiping tried to depose Li Longji in two actions, one with Emperor Ruizong himself and another time by summoning the chancellors at Xuanwu Gate and publicly accusing Li Longji of treason or incompetence, but it did not achieve the desired result.[18]

In 711, Song and another chancellor, Yao Yuanzhi, tried to persuade Emperor Ruizong to carry out a plan that they believed would end her plotting and influence. They proposed that the two princes who arguably had superior claims on the throne than Li Longji—Li Chengqi and Li Shouli (whose father Li Xian (note different character than Emperor Zhongzong) was an older brother to both Emperors Zhongzong and Ruizong)—be sent out of the capital Chang'an to serve as prefectural prefects, while Princess Taiping and Wu Youji be sent to live in Luoyang. They also proposed that Li Longji be put in charge of most affairs of state. Emperor Ruizong initially agreed and made the orders as Song and Yao suggested, except that he believed that Luoyang was too far and therefore sent Princess Taiping and Wu Youji only to Pu Prefecture (蒲州, roughly modern Yuncheng, Shanxi). After Princess Taiping found out that the plan was conceived by Song and Yao, however, she was incensed and let Li Longji know her anger, and she mobilized her group to attack Song and Yao and oppose Emperor Ruizong's decision. In fear, Li Longji submitted a petition accusing Song and Yao of alienating him from his brothers Li Chengqi and Li Shouli (who was actually a cousin but was raised with Emperor Ruizong's sons) and aunt Princess Taiping, asking that the two be put to death. Emperor Ruizong, in response, demoted Song and Yao and recalled Princess Taiping, Li Chengqi, and Li Shouli to the capital. In the aftermaths, Li Longji submitted another request to yield the crown prince position to Li Chengqi, but Emperor Ruizong declined it. Also in 711, Emperor Ruizong posthumously honored both Empress Liu and Li Longji's mother Consort Dou as empresses and built a temple for them to be worshipped, but was unable to locate their bodies for reburial, and therefore had to give them a ceremonial reburial without the bodies. But this posthumous honor for Li Longji's mother further displeased Princess Taiping. Emperor Ruizong also ordered that all minor matters be decided by Li Longji, and with this, Emperor Ruizong established Li Longji as his sole successor, but diverted his participation in important matters and focused more on the advice of his sister, Princess Taiping.[18]

By winter 711 Princess Taiping had become even more powerful than before. Because of her recommendations, Emperor Ruizong carried out a major reorganization of his administration, relieving the chancellors Wei, Guo Yuanzhen, Dou, Li Rizhi, and Zhang Yue of their chancellor positions, instead commissioning a number of chancellors that she recommended — Liu Youqiu, Wei Zhigu, Cui Shi, and Lu Xiangxian. (Cui was a lover of Princess Taiping, and when she offered to recommend him as chancellor, because he admired Lu, he requested to be made chancellor along with Lu, even though Lu was not an associate of Princess Taiping. It was said that Emperor Ruizong, however, was initially unwilling to make Cui chancellor, but relented after Princess Taiping begged in tears, although the account may be somewhat discountable in that neither Liu nor Wei was an associate of Princess Taiping either, and both were close associates of Li Longji.)

In 712, Princess Taiping had astrologers warn Emperor Ruizong that the constellation that symbolized the imperial throne, Dizuo (帝座), showed that there would be a change in the emperor's position—believing that Emperor Ruizong would suspect Li Longji of plotting a coup and that she could remove Li Longji this way. Instead, Emperor Ruizong, reasoning that the change in the emperor's position could be accounted by an orderly transition, offered to pass the throne to Li Longji. Princess Taiping fervently opposed it, and Li Longji initially declined, but at Emperor Ruizong's insistence finally accepted and took the throne on 8 September[2] (as Emperor Xuanzong). However, at Princess Taiping's suggestion, Emperor Ruizong retained much of the imperial power as Taishang Huang (retired emperor), and his edicts continued to carry greater force than Emperor Xuanzong's.[18]

As emperor

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Xiantian era (712–713)

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A Tributary Horse for Emperor Xuanzong, painted in the 12th century during the subsequent Song dynasty

Emperor Xuanzong made his wife Crown Princess Wang empress. Meanwhile, Princess Taiping continued to be listening to politics with curtains in the court, highly extremely influential in governmental matters through Emperor Ruizong, the group of chancellors openly frequented her house and most chancellors, forbidden troops, officials and warlords were her associates. (Of the seven chancellors at the time, five – Dou Huaizhen, Xiao Zhizhong, Cen Xi, Cui Shi, and Lu Xiangxian – were made chancellors at her recommendation, although Lu was not considered a member of her party.) As a result, the war between her and him continued more seriously. Liu Youqiu and the general Zhang Wei (張暐), with Emperor Xuanzong's approval, planned to mobilize the imperial guards to kill several of those chancellors – Dou Huaizhen, Cui Shi and Cen Xi. However, after Zhang told the plan to the imperial censor Deng Guangbin (鄧光賓), the news was leaked. At the request of Princess Taiping's, Emperor Ruizong issued an order to arrested Liu, and initially set to be executed. But Emperor Xuanzong interceded on his behalf with Emperor Ruizong, and Liu, Zhang, and Deng were spared but exiled.[18]

Later in 712, in one of Princess Taiping's plans to oust him, at her request, Emperor Ruizong decreed that Emperor Xuanzong lead a group of soldiers to examine the northern border. However, the group of conscripted soldiers was disbanded in spring 713, and the plan was never carried out.[18]

By summer 713, it was said that Princess Taiping, Dou, Cen, Xiao, Cui; along with other officials Xue Ji, Li Jin (李晉) the Prince of Xinxing (a grandson of Li Deliang (李德良), a cousin of Tang's founder Emperor Gaozu), Li You (李猷), Jia Yingfu (賈膺福), Tang Jun (唐晙); the generals Chang Yuankai (常元楷), Li Ci (李慈), and Li Qin (李欽); and the monk Huifan, were plotting to overthrow Emperor Xuanzong. It was further said that they discussed, with the lady-in-waiting Lady Yuan, to poison the gastrodia elata that Emperor Xuanzong routinely took as an aphrodisiac. When this alleged plot was reported to Emperor Xuanzong by Wei Zhigu, Emperor Xuanzong, who had already received advice from Wang Ju (王琚), Zhang Shuo, and Cui Riyong to act first, did so. He convened a meeting with his brothers Li Longfan the Prince of Qi and Li Longye the Prince of Xue (who had changed their names to Li Fan and Li Ye by this point to observe naming taboo for Emperor Xuanzong), Guo Yuanzhen, along with a number of his associates – the general Wang Maozhong (王毛仲), the officials Jiang Jiao (姜皎) and Li Lingwen (李令問), his brother-in-law Wang Shouyi (王守一), the eunuch Gao Lishi, and the military officer Li Shoude (李守德) – and decided to act first. On 29 July,[19] Emperor Xuanzong had Wang Maozhong take 300 soldiers to the imperial guard camp to behead Chang and Li Ci. Then, Jia, Li You, Xiao, and Cen were arrested and executed as well. Dou fled into a canyon and committed suicide by hanging. Xue Ji was forced to commit suicide. When Emperor Ruizong heard about this, he quickly ascended the tower at Chengtian Gate (承天門) to ascertain what was happening. Guo reported to him Emperor Xuanzong's intentions, and Emperor Ruizong felt compelled to affirm Emperor Xuanzong's actions in an edict. The next day, on 30 July, Emperor Ruizong issued an edict transferring all authorities to Emperor Xuanzong. Meanwhile, Princess Taiping, hearing what happened to her associates, fled into a temple in the mountains, only appearing three days later. Emperor Ruizong asked Emperor Xuanzong for her pardon, but he refused. Emperor Xuanzong ordered her to commit suicide at home, and put to death her sons and associates, except for Xue Chongjian. Princess Taiping's assets were confiscated, and it was said that there was so much treasure, livestock, and real estate that it took several years: more than thirty years for the accounting to be complete. Emperor Ruizong moved to a secondary palace, Baifu Hall (百福殿) and would remain there until his death in 716.[18][20]

Kaiyuan era (713–741)

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Emperor Xuanzong's Kaiyuan era is usually viewed as one of the golden ages of Chinese history – a period of political stability, peace in society, and economic prosperity, in addition to advances in education, literature, music, painting, sculpture, and religion.[21]

Early Kaiyuan era

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Spring Outing of the Tang Court, by Xuanzong era artist Zhang Xuan, 8th century original

Meanwhile, Zhang Yue and Liu Youqiu served as chancellors, but they were soon displaced by Yao Yuanzhi (who then changed his name to Yao Chong) and Lu Huaishen. Changing the system of having a large group of chancellors simultaneous, as had been the case throughout Tang, Emperor Xuanzong reduced the numbers to two (or sometimes three) for the rest of his reign.[22] Yao was considered a highly capable administrator, and with him ruling on most important matters and Lu assisting, the government was said to be highly efficient.[20]

In 714, Emperor Xuanzong carried out a series of political reprisals against the cruel secret police officials of Wu Zetian's reign, exiling the ones that were still alive and eventually barring their descendants from holding political offices. At the urging of Jiang Jiao's brother Jiang Hui (姜誨), he also exiled a number of chancellors – Wei Sili, Wei Anshi, Zhao Yanzhao, and Li Jiao – from Emperor Zhongzong's reign whom Jiang accused of being unable to curb Empress Wei's abuse of power.[20]

Also in 714, Emperor Xuanzong, wanting to punish the Khitan and the Xi for having defeated Tang forces during Emperor Zhongzong's reign, commissioned the general Xue Ne to attack them, but Xue suffered another devastating loss to them, at the casualty rate of 80–90%. However, later in the year, when the Tibetan Empire attacked, Emperor Xuanzong again commissioned Xue to defend against the attack, and Xue was able to repel the Tibetan forces. Subsequently, though, although both sides tried to invoke the marriage between Li Shouli's daughter Princess Jincheng and Me Agtsom, emperor of the Tibetan Empire, in seeking peace, the two sides could not reach an agreement and remained in border conflict yearly. In response, Emperor Xuanzong established the office of jiedushi (military governor) of Longyou Circuit (隴右, headquartered in what is now Haidong, Qinghai), with a centralized command of 12 prefectures under a single military general.[20] Eventually, the establishment of jiedushi would be extended to other parts of the empire.[23]

Also in 714, Emperor Xuanzong created Li Siqian, his second son and the son of his then-favorite concubine Consort Zhao, crown prince. (Emperor Xuanzong's wife Empress Wang was sonless.)[20]

Meanwhile, the Tang relationship with Qapaghan Qaghan of the Göktürks had fluctuated during the first few years of the Kaiyuan era, as minor hostilities occurred at the borders as well as contests over vassals' loyalty for the two states, but they were also at times friendly to each other, with Qapaghan requesting at times to marry a Tang princess and Emperor Xuanzong agreeing to the proposal. In 716, however, Qapaghan was killed in battle against the Bayegu (拔野古), and from that point on, lacking his efficient leadership, the Göktürks, while remaining an important regional power, posed much less of a threat to China,[20] although at times still capable of dealing serious defeats to Tang forces, as was the case in 720 when the Göktürk general Tonyukuk defeated the Tang garrison at Liang Prefecture (涼州, roughly modern Wuwei, Gansu) and the Tang vassal Basmyl.[24] Meanwhile, Tang, the Tibetan Empire, and the Umayyad Caliphate were constantly engaging in a three-way tug of war for influence in the Xiyu (i.e., modern Xinjiang and former Soviet Central Asia) region. In 715, for example, when the king of Bahanna (拔汗那) was expelled by a new king supported by the Tibetan Empire and the Umayyad Caliphate, Tang forces commanded by the general Zhang Xiaosong [zh] (張孝嵩) attacked the new king and restored the old king.[20] General Tang Jiahui led the Chinese to defeat the following Arab-Tibetan attack in the Battle of Aksu (717).[25] The attack on Aksu was joined by Turgesh Khan Suluk.[26][27] Both Uch Turfan and Aksu were attacked by the Turgesh, Arab, and Tibetan force on 15 August 717. Qarluqs serving under Chinese command, under Arsila Xian, a Western Turkic Qaghan serving under the Chinese Assistant Grand Protector General Tang Jiahui defeated the attack. Al-Yashkuri, the Arab commander and his army fled to Tashkent after they were defeated.[28][29]

The Great Mosque of Xi'an, one of China's oldest mosques, built during the reign of Emperor Xuanzong.

In and around 716, there was a major locust infestation in the central China region. At Yao's suggestion, Emperor Xuanzong ordered an extensive campaign of extermination, which was said to reduce the impact of the infestation and ward off a major famine. Later in 716, however, due to a corruption scandal involving Yao's sons and his associate Zhao Hui (趙誨), Yao incurred displeasure from Emperor Xuanzong and offered to resign. He and Yuan Qianyao, who replaced Lu after Lu's death earlier in 716, were removed from their offices and replaced with Song Jing and Su Ting, with Song making more of the important decisions and Su assisting. Yao would not return to the chancellorship, but would remain influential as a key advisor for Emperor Xuanzong until Yao's death in 721. Contrary to the practical and flexible Yao, Song was more interested in emphasizing integrity and rule of law in governance, and it was said that while Yao's and Song's emphases were different, they were both regarded as instrumental in establishing the rule of Kaiyuan and that subsequent chancellors could not compare to them.[20]

Meanwhile, Song and Su had carried out a stern campaign against the use of coins that were not officially forged by the government, which brought popular resentment that Emperor Xuanzong found problematic. In 720, he removed Song and Su from chancellor offices and replaced them with Yuan and Zhang Jiazhen, and in 721 added Zhang Yue as a chancellor as well.[24]

Meanwhile, by 722, Empress Wang, who had contributed to Emperor Xuanzong's reign by providing suggestions, had begun to lose favor to Consort Wu, a great-grandniece of Emperor Xuanzong's grandmother Wu Zetian. Emperor Xuanzong secretly discussed with Jiang Jiao the possibility of deposing her, but Jiang Jiao careless leaked the discussion. At the urging of Zhang Jiazhen, who was friendly with Empress Wang's brother Wang Shouyi (王守一), advocated that Jiang Jiao be punished and exiled, and Jiang died in exile.

Meanwhile, at Zhang Yue's suggestion, the Tang northern border defense forces, which had about 600,000 men at that time, was reduced by 200,000 men to allow the soldiers to return home. Further, seeing that the Tang conscription system, due to abuses against the soldiers at the time, was near a collapse, as the soldiers were forced into long tours of duty but their families were not exempt from taxes, thus causing great numbers of desertions, Zhang suggested a switch to a recruitment-based system where soldiers were paid salaries. This allowed, for a time, Tang's soldier supply to be replenished. (Some later historians condemned Zhang for the abolition of the conscription system, believing the abolition to be the root of Tang's later fracturing, but some others, such as the modern historian Bo Yang, argued that Zhang's actions not only were necessary to restore the supply of soldiers but saved many lives.[30])

Middle Kaiyuan era

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Emperor Xuanzong giving audience to Zhang Guo, by Ren Renfa (1254–1327)

In 723, Zhang Jiazhen was demoted on account of a corruption scandal involving his brother Zhang Jiayou (張嘉祐). His position was filled by Wang Jun, who was soon himself demoted over suspicions, never proven, that he was plotting treason.[31] With Zhang Yue thus effectively being the senior chancellor, Zhang Yue promoted literary studies, which Emperor Xuanzong also favored. In 724, he also commissioned the chief imperial astronomer Nangong Shuo (南宮說) to carry out a major astronomical survey to observe the sun and the North Star at various points of the empire.[24]

Also in 724, it was discovered that Wang Shouyi had engaged sorcerers to make amulets for Empress Wang to wear, hoping that the use of magic would allow her to have a son. Empress Wang was deposed and reduced to commoner rank, while Wang Shouyi was exiled and subsequently ordered to commit suicide in exile. Empress Wang died later in the year, and it was said that the eunuchs and the ladies in waiting mourned her bitterly and Emperor Xuanzong much regretted his treatment of her.[24] Still, after Empress Wang's removal and death, Consort Wu became undisputed mistress of the palace and was treated inside the palace like an empress would be. Still, in 726, when Emperor Xuanzong considered creating her empress, he encountered oppositions from officials on two grounds – that her Wu clan was hated by the people and that as she had her own sons, the position of Li Siqian the Crown Prince (whose name had been changed to Li Hong by this point) would be threatened. As a result, Emperor Xuanzong never created her empress. But Consort Wu's was a chief favorite of the emperor and undisputed mistress of the palace until her death and had political power.[32]

In winter 725, Emperor Xuanzong, at Zhang Yue's urging, carried out a magnificent ceremony at Mount Tai to offer sacrifices to heaven and earth.[24]

On 11 May 726, Zhang Yue was accused of corruption by several officials that he had blocked the advances of – Cui Yinfu (崔隱甫), Yuwen Rong, and Li Linfu – and was found to have committed corruption. At the intercession of Gao Lishi, however, Zhang Yue was removed only from his chancellor post on 18 May[33] and permitted to maintain his title and a number of other posts. He was replaced by Li Yuanhong on 15 May, and subsequently, Du Xian was also added as a chancellor.[32]

In 727, at the suggestion of the general Wang Junchuo (王君㚟), Emperor Xuanzong commissioned Wang Junchuo to attack the Tibetan Empire, and after a Tibetan incursion in late 726, Wang counterattacked and inflicted losses on Tibetan forces commanded by the general Xinuoluogonglu (悉諾邏恭祿). Later in the year, though, Xinuoluogonglu and another general, Zhulongmangbuzhi (燭龍莽布支) attacked and captured Wang's home prefecture Gua Prefecture (瓜州, roughly modern Jiuquan, Gansu), taking Wang's father Wang Shou (王壽) captive. As a result, Wang Junchuo did not dare to counterattack, and subsequently blamed the defeat on a number of tribal chiefs in the area and had them exiles. In response, Yaoluoge Hushu (藥羅葛護輸), the nephew of one of the chiefs so exiled, Yaoluoge Chengzong (藥羅葛承宗), ambushed Wang Junchuo and killed him, and while Yaoluoge Hushu was forced to flee thereafter, for several years Tang did not engage in any offensive campaigns in the region.[32]

Around the same time, Emperor Xuanzong began to build a residential complex in the palace for imperial clan members, known as the Mansion of the Ten Princes (十王院), to centralize their residence. Thereafter, imperial princes, including the crown prince, would rarely live outside the palace complex.[32]

On 6 December 728,[34] Emperor Xuanzong added the general Xiao Song as a chancellor. Subsequently, in 729, with Yuan, even though he was senior chancellor, unable to curb the disputes between Li Yuanhong and Du, Emperor Xuanzong removed all three from chancellor positions, promoting Yuwen and Pei Guangting to be chancellors in their stead – in Yuwen's case, for his abilities to find ways to add to the imperial treasury by imposing special taxes and levies. Later in the year, though, Yuwen made false accusations against the general Li Hui (李褘) the Prince of Xin'an (Emperor Xuanzong's second cousin) and was exiled, and subsequently died in exile. Still, it was said that it was starting from Yuwen's times that Emperor Xuanzong began to pay attention on taxes to replenish the imperial treasury, which traditional historians viewed as the start of his inflicting financial burdens on the people. Further, with Pei in charge of the civil service system, it was said that due to Pei's strict adherence to seniority, the Tang civil service system began to lose its ability to find talented people to serve in offices.[32]

In 730, the Khitan general Ketugan (可突干) killed the king Li Shaogu (李邵固) and took over the reign of the Khitan and the Xi personally, forcing the king of the Xi, Li Lusu (李魯蘇) to flee to Tang for protection. Tang sent an army to attack the Khitan, but meanwhile made peace with the Tibetan Empire. Initially, the campaign against the Khitan did not succeed, but in 732, with Li Hui in command, Tang forces dealt Ketugan a serious defeat and causing many of Ketugan's subordinates to defect and submit to Tang, although Ketugan was not captured.

Late Kaiyuan era

[edit]
Xuanzong's Journey to Shu, in the manner of the mid 8th century Tang artist Li Zhaodao, an 11th-century Song dynasty remake

Meanwhile, Tang also began to have periodic conflicts with Balhae, and in 733 Emperor Xuanzong tried to commission Dae Mun-ye (大門藝), the brother of Balhae's King Mu, to attack Balhae, along with forces from Silla, but the attack was not successful.[32]

Also in 733, Pei Guangting died, and at the recommendation of Xiao Song, he was replaced with Han Xiu, but soon, Song and Han were in repeated conflicts, and late in 733, both were removed and replaced with Pei Yaoqing, who became known for improving the food distribution system, and Zhang Jiuling, known for his integrity.[32][35] In 734, Emperor Xuanzong added Li Linfu, a close associate of Consort Wu, as a chancellor as well.[35]

Around the new year 735, Ketuhan was killed in an internal Khitan power struggle, and Khitan became a vassal again, although it would not stay so permanently.[35]

By 736, Emperor Xuanzong was described as having been tired of important affairs of state and beginning to become wasteful and exuberant in his lifestyle. Zhang tried to curb his behavior but thus began to lose favor, while Li Linfu was gaining power due to his association with Consort Wu. Further, Zhang supported Li Hong (whose name had been changed to Li Ying by this point), while Li Linfu and Consort Wu supported her son Li Mao (李瑁) the Prince of Shou and tried to have Li Mao made crown prince. In 736, due to Li Linfu's machinations that made Emperor Xuanzong believed that Zhang and Pei Yaoqing were improperly engaging in factionalism, Zhang and Pei Yaoqing were removed and replaced by Niu Xianke, who closely followed Li Linfu's will, and thereafter, Li Linfu would dominate the imperial government almost to the end of Emperor Xuanzong's reign. Li Linfu did all he could to stay in power, and carried out many dirty tricks against actual or potential threats to his power. He also severely discouraged criticism, ending the relative freedom that officials had to make proposals to Emperor Xuanzong. This was often viewed by traditional historians as the turning point of Emperor Xuanzong's reign, which up to that point was considered a golden age in Chinese history, toward a path of degeneration. The Song dynasty historian Sima Guang, in his Zizhi Tongjian, for example, commented:[35]

Of the chancellors that the Emperor commissioned after he took the throne, Yao Chong emphasized flexibility, Song Jing emphasized the rule of law, Zhang Jiazhen emphasized administrative abilities, Zhang Shuo emphasized literary talent, Li Yuanhong and Du Xian emphasized frugality, and Han Xiu and Zhang Jiuling emphasized honesty. All of them had their different talents. After Zhang Jiuling was demoted, however, the officials were all concerned about keeping their positions, and honest words no longer had a place in government.

In 737, with Zhang no longer in the government to protect him, Li Ying was deposed and subsequently forced to commit suicide. However, with Consort Wu dying later in the year, Emperor Xuanzong did not immediately accept Li Linfu's proposal to have Li Mao made crown prince. Rather, he chose an older son, Li Yu the Prince of Zhong, in 738.

Tianbao era (742–756)

[edit]
Emperor Xuanzong's Journey to Sichuan, a late Ming dynasty painting after Qiu Ying (1494–1552).

Historians said that Emperor Xuanzong forced tens of thousands of beautiful women to live in his palace to please him, more than many other Tang emperors.[36] And he did not allow many to be set free even when they were old.[37] As Emperor Xuanzong turned his attention to pleasure-seeking with his favorite concubine Yang Guifei and her family, he paid less and less attention to the running of his empire, and much of his power fell into the hands of the corrupt Li Linfu (who was succeeded by Lady Yang's dissolute cousin Yang Guozhong) and the eunuch Gao Lishi.

At the same time, 751 saw the loss of the Battle of Talas against the Abbasid Caliphate. As a consequence, the Tang dynasty temporarily lost some of its influence in Central Asia to the emerging Abbasid Caliphate, as several Tang tributaries turned to the Abbasids.

Meanwhile, the jiedushi (military governors), most of whom were non-Han took more and more regional power into their own hands. Some successful generals included Geshu Han, known for victories over the Tibetan Empire; Gao Xianzhi, who conquered city states of the Xiyu region, eventually battling the Abbasids at Talas; and An Lushan who defeated and once again vassalized the Khitan. Eventually, in 755, An Lushan started the Anshi Rebellion at Fanyang. The rebels quickly seized the eastern capital Luoyang, and then the imperial capital Chang'an six months later. Emperor Xuanzong fled to Sichuan during the war and abdicated the throne to Li Yu (whose name had been changed to Li Heng at that point) (as Emperor Suzong).

Early Tianbao era

[edit]

Meanwhile, at Li Linfu's encouragement, Emperor Xuanzong began to promote non-Han generals to command large border armies, believing Li Linfu's assertion that non-Han generals were more likely to be personally loyal to Emperor Xuanzong himself and would not have clan entanglements, even though Li Linfu's own personal motivation was to prevent Han officials from going through the border command route to become chancellors, thus threatening him.[38] Such generals who rose in ranks included An Lushan, An Sishun, Geshu Han, and Gao Xianzhi.[35][38] By 742, the main Tang forces were all concentrated on the border, at nine different military circuits and one special military district (Lingnan), as well as three special coast defense districts (Changle, Donglai, and Dongmou):[38]

Name of circuit/district Headquarters location Responsibility Garrison strength
Anxi (安西) Qiuzi (龜茲, in modern Aksu Prefecture, Xinjiang) pacify the Western Regions (Xiyu) 24,000
Beiting (北庭) Beiting (in modern Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture, Xinjiang) defend against the Tuqishi and Jiankun 20,000
Hexi (河西) Liang Prefecture (涼州, roughly modern Wuwei, Gansu) cut off communications between the Tibetan Empire and Eastern Tujue 73,000
Shuofang (朔方) Ling Prefecture (靈州, roughly modern Yinchuan, Ningxia) defend against Eastern Tujue 64,700
Hedong (河東) Taiyuan Municipality defend against Eastern Tujue 55,000
Fanyang (范陽) You Prefecture (幽州, roughly modern Beijing) defend against the Xi and the Khitan 91,400
Pinglu (平盧) Ying Prefecture (營州, roughly modern Chaoyang, Liaoning) defend against the Shiwei and the Mohe 37,500
Longyou (隴右) Shan Prefecture (鄯州, roughly modern Haidong, Qinghai) defend against the Tibetan Empire 75,000
Jiannan (劍南) Yi Prefecture (益州, roughly modern Chengdu, Sichuan) defend against the Tibetan Empire and tribes to the south 30,900
Lingnan (嶺南) Guang Prefecture (廣州, roughly modern Guangzhou, Guangdong) pacify the non-Han tribes in the region 15,400
Changle (長樂) Fu Prefecture (福州, roughly modern Fuzhou, Fujian) coast watch 1,500
Donglai (東萊) Lai Prefecture (萊州) coast watch 1,000
Dongmou (東牟) Deng Prefecture (登州, in modern Yantai as well) coast watch 1,000

Meanwhile, it was said that Emperor Xuanzong had paid less attention to increasing revenues after Yuwen Rong's fall, but by 742 he was again interested in doing so, and such officials as Wei Jian (韋堅, a brother-in-law of Li Yu, whose name was changed by this point to Li Heng), Wang Hong (王鉷), and Yang Shenjin (楊慎矜) became favored, and often, matters having to do with finances were stripped out of other officials' responsibilities and given to them as special commissions.[38]

Late in 742, Niu Xianke died and was replaced by Li Shizhi.[38]

In 744, Eastern Tujue, after a series of internal turmoil and rebellions from its vassals, finally collapsed. Its vassal Huige rose and became the dominant power of the region, but formally submitted to Tang as a vassal.[38]

Yang Yuhuan mounting a horse, by Qian Xuan (1235–1305)

Meanwhile, after Consort Wu's death, Emperor Xuanzong had been depressed. When he saw his son Prince of Shou Li Mao's wife (his daughter-in-law) Yang Yuhuan (Princess of Shou, by virtue of marriage), he was infatuated with her, and he had her become a Taoist nun and gave Li Mao the wife of the general Wei Zhaoxun (韋昭訓) as his new wife and princess. Meanwhile, he secretly took the nun, Yang, into the palace. She became his senior-ranking concubine (guifei), known as Yang Guifei, and soon became so powerful that officials were bribing her family members to get preferential treatment. She was referred to inside the palace as "the Lady" and treated like an empress (as was consort Wu until her death).[38] He abducted more than 40000 women in his palace.[39] Some were not set free even after they were over 60 years old.[40][41][42][43]

Meanwhile, Li Linfu was beginning to conflict with Li Shizhi and Wei Jian, who were allies. Li Linfu, who engaged a group of secret police officials to investigate and manufacture evidence against political enemies, was able to get Wei and Li Shizhi demoted and exiled in 746. (Li Shizhi was replaced by Chen Xilie, who gained favor from Emperor Xuanzong for his knowledge in Taoism and sorcery.) In 747, Li Linfu further carried out a campaign of terror against exiled officials, and among the officials executed were Wei, Li Yong (李邕) and Pei Dunfu (裴敦復). Li Shizhi and Wang Ju, who had been instrumental in Emperor Xuanzong's initial actions against Princess Taiping, committed suicide.[38]

Meanwhile, in 747, Emperor Xuanzong wanted to expand the government's talent pool, and so issued an edict ordering that the people who had unusual talents to come to Chang'an to be examined by himself. Li Linfu, fearing that these examinees might accuse him of improprieties when they get to meet the emperor, suggested that these examinees go through two levels of preliminary examinations – by the local governments, and then by the executive bureau. As a result, no one passed the first two levels of preliminary examinations, and Li Linfu subsequently submitted a note to Emperor Xuanzong congratulating him that no talent has been overlooked by the imperial administration.[38]

Tang territories and Tang provinces by 742.

Meanwhile, also as of 747, An Lushan had become greatly favored by Emperor Xuanzong due to his military achievements and his willingness to flatter Emperor Xuanzong, Consort Yang, and her family members. Further, Li Linfu, apprehensive about the general Wang Zhongsi, who at that time was in command of four circuits (Hexi, Longyou, Shuofang, and Hedong), deprecated Wang in favor of An Lushan. In 747, after Li Linfu implicated Wang in hindering a campaign against the Tibetan Empire and further accused Wang of plotting a coup to overthrow Emperor Xuanzong and replace him with Li Heng, Wang was arrested and demoted, escaping death only at the pleas of Geshu, who was Wang's deputy and who subsequently was given the commands of Hexi and Longyou. An Lushan, who had already been in command of Fanyang and Pinglu Circuits, was also given Hedong, and thereafter was in command of the most elite troops of the empire.[38] Meanwhile, the ethnically Goguryeo general Gao Xianzhi had become prominent in the Xiyu region, expanding Tang power to the west.[44]

By 748, Consort Yang's cousins Yang Guozhong, Yang Xian (楊銛) and Yang Qi (楊錡), as well as her three sisters (who were created the Ladies of Han, Guo, and Qin), had become exceedingly wealthy and powerful due to the favors that Emperor Xuanzong showed them. It was said that their wealth topped all households in Chang'an. It was also said that by 749, the empire was so wealthy that Emperor Xuanzong viewed treasures as expendable and so awarded them without limit.[44]

Late Tianbao era

[edit]

Meanwhile, Li Linfu had a tight grip on power and favors from Emperor Xuanzong throughout the years, but as of 750, Yang Guozhong and Chen Xilie had allied with each other and were finding ways to eliminate Li Linfu's allies from government.[44]

As of 751, Tang was also facing defeats on two different external fronts – Yunnan and Central Asia. As Nanzhao king Geluofeng (閤羅鳳) was angry about unreasonable demands that the Zhang Qiantuo (張虔陀) the governor of Yunnan Commandery (雲南, roughly modern Chuxiong Yi Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan) and Zhang's subsequent false accusations that he was planning to rebel, he launched the Tianbao War, capturing Yunnan Commandery. A major attack by the general Xianyu Zhongtong (鮮于仲通) against Nanzhao failed terribly in 751, and subsequent defeats by Tang forces eventually led to a total of some 200,000 casualties among Tang troops. On the western front, Gao Xianzhi suffered a major defeat at the Abbasid forces at the Battle of Talas in 751 as well, ending the Tang expansion to the west.[44]

In 752, Wang Hong's brother Wang Han (王銲) was accused of treason after his associates rose in a failed coup at Chang'an. In the aftermaths, Wang Hong was forced to commit suicide, and Yang Guozhong, Chen, and Geshu Han further tried to implicate Li Linfu in the plot as well. After Li Linfu died in winter 752, Yang Guozhong succeeded him, and almost immediately accused Li Linfu of having been complicit in the rebellion of another general, Li Xianzhong (李獻忠). Li Linfu was posthumously disgraced, and his family was exiled.[44]

A rivalry soon developed between Yang Guozhong and An Lushan, and Yang Guozhong began to repeatedly warn Emperor Xuanzong that An was plotting rebellion. Emperor Xuanzong ignored the warnings. In 754, Yang Guozhong suggested that if An were summoned to the capital, he would surely refuse, and Emperor Xuanzong decided to try An – and An arrived in Chang'an immediately after being summoned. After this incident, Emperor Xuanzong no longer believed that An was plotting rebellion. Nevertheless, because of Yang Guozhong's opposition, he did not make An chancellor, as he was planning. Also in 754, with Yang Guozhong also trying to squeeze Chen out of the government, Chen resigned and was replaced by Wei Jiansu.[45]

Xuanzong with Consort Yang on a terrace with their attendants, by Japanese artist Kanō Eitoku (1543–1590)

In 755, Yang Guozhong further provoked An, who was then back at his post in Fanyang, by surrounding An's mansion at Chang'an and arresting and executing An's staff members. An, in fear and anger, rebelled in winter 755, and quickly reached and captured Luoyang after defeating Feng Changqing's undersupplied army. Subsequently, Emperor Xuanzong, believing in reports from the eunuch Bian Lingcheng (邊令誠) that Feng was cowardly and that Feng's superior Gao Xianzhi was corrupt, executed both Feng and Gao and replaced Gao with Geshu in defending Tong Pass from An's advances. An declared himself emperor of a new state of Yan at Luoyang, but with Geshu defending Tong Pass, An's advances stalled, while Tang forces commanded by Li Guangbi and Guo Ziyi made advances against An-controlled territory north of the Yellow River.[45] Meanwhile, though, Yang Guozhong, fearing that Geshu had designs against him, convinced Emperor Xuanzong to order Geshu to attack despite Geshu's warnings that doing so was risky. Geshu was subsequently defeated by An's forward commander Cui Qianyou (崔乾祐), and Tong Pass fell. With An's forces advancing on Chang'an, on 14 July 756,[46] Emperor Xuanzong, with Yang Guozhong suggesting that they flee to Jiannan Circuit, abandoned Chang'an and fled with Gao Lishi, Yang Guozhong, Wei, Li Heng, Consort Yang, and her family. The following day, 15 July, the imperial guards accompanying the emperor, angry at Yang Guozhong, rose and killed him and forced Emperor Xuanzong to kill Consort Yang as well. Subsequently, Emperor Xuanzong continued on to Jiannan, but Li Heng did not, but rather went to Lingwu, where, on 12 August,[4] Li Heng was declared emperor (as Emperor Suzong). Meanwhile, without knowledge that Emperor Suzong had claimed the throne, Emperor Xuanzong, while still on his way to Chengdu, the capital of Jiannan Circuit, issued an edict that gave several of his sons various responsibility areas, under Li Heng's command overall; until this edict was issued, most of the realm only knew that Chang'an had fallen and had not known where Emperor Xuanzong had fled. When the news of Emperor Suzong's ascension reached Emperor Xuanzong at Chengdu on 10 September,[47] he recognized Emperor Suzong as the new emperor, and thereafter took the title of Taishang Huang (retired emperor) – although his edict recognizing Emperor Suzong appeared to still indicate desire to retain control like his father Emperor Ruizong did early in his reign:[48]

From now on, my edicts (敕, chi) shall be referred to as gao (誥), and submissions to me shall address me as Taishang Huang. All matters relating to the military or the state throughout the realm shall first be submitted to the Emperor before being submitted to me. After the capital is recaptured, I will no longer oversee the affairs of state.

However, perhaps to avoid the impression that he was keeping a rival government to Emperor Suzong, he sent the several chancellors that he had retained or created while on the journey to or after he arrived in Chengdu – Wei, Fang Guan, and Cui Huan – to Lingwu to formally invest imperial power on Emperor Suzong and to serve under Emperor Suzong.[48]

As retired emperor

[edit]
Tailing (泰陵), the tomb of Emperor Xuanzong, in Pucheng County, Shaanxi

Emperor Xuanzong, after becoming retired emperor, largely allowed Emperor Suzong to coordinate the campaign against Yan, but at times nevertheless stepped in to make decisions. For example, in spring 757, apparently without first consulting Emperor Suzong, he named Li Lin chancellor, although he subsequently sent both Li Lin and another chancellor, Cui Yuan, whom he had not sent to Emperor Suzong previously, to Emperor Suzong. He also posthumously honored Emperor Suzong's mother Consort Yang (not Yang Yuhuan) as an empress. Meanwhile, remembering Zhang Jiuling had previously warned about An Lushan, Emperor Xuanzong sent messengers to Zhang's tomb to offer sacrifices to him.[49]

Late in 757, Emperor Suzong, with aid from Huige, recaptured Chang'an from Yan, then ruled by An Lushan's son An Qingxu, who had killed An Lushan earlier in 757 and taken over the throne himself. After Emperor Suzong recaptured Chang'an, he sent messengers to Emperor Xuanzong requesting that he return to Chang'an and offering the throne back to Emperor Xuanzong. Emperor Xuanzong, apprehensive of the offer, initially not only declined but further requested to remain in Jiannan. Only after Emperor Suzong, at the suggestion of his strategist Li Mi, had the government officials make a joint submission to Emperor Xuanzong no longer mentioning the return of the throne, did Emperor Xuanzong agree to depart Jiannan to return to Chang'an.[50] On the way back to Chang'an, he had Gao Lishi try to dig up Consort Yang Yuhuan's body for reburial, but her body had already decomposed; only her fragrance bag remained. Emperor Xuanzong took the fragrance bag back to Chang'an and visited it daily, as if Consort Yang were still alive.[51] On 17 January 758,[52] he arrived at Chang'an, and in a grand ceremony where Emperor Suzong offered the throne back to him again, he formally declined again and personally put the yellow robe symbolizing imperial status on Emperor Suzong, commenting, "I had been the Son of Heaven for 50 years, and I did not consider it a great honor. Now, I am truly honored to be the father to the Son of Heaven." He took up residence at Xingqing Palace, a palace that was remodelled from the residence that he and his brothers had when they were imperial princes.[12][50]

After Emperor Xuanzong was back in Chang'an, he largely stayed out of policy decisions, although he at times still exerted his influence on Emperor Suzong. For example, Emperor Suzong had wanted to spare Zhang Shuo's sons Zhang Jun (張均) and Zhang Ji (張垍), who had previously submitted to An Lushan, because of Zhang Shuo's contributions and Zhang Jun's and Zhang Ji's prior efforts to protect him from Li Linfu's machinations, but Emperor Xuanzong deeply hated them for having surrendered to An, and at Emperor Xuanzong's insistence, Zhang Jun was executed, and Zhang Ji was exiled to Lingnan.[50]

Meanwhile, after a while, Emperor Xuanzong settled into a routine at Xingqing Palace, with Chen Xuanli and Gao Lishi attending to him. Also often attending to him were his daughter Li Chiying (李持盈), the Princess Yuzhen, the lady in waiting Ru Xianyuan (如仙媛), and the eunuchs Wang Cheng'en (王承恩) and Wei Yue (魏悅). The imperial musicians often played for him, and he often climbed up Changqing Tower (長慶樓) to receive well wishes from the populace. He also often held feasts for generals and people from Jiannan, with Li Chiying and Ru serving as hostesses. Meanwhile, though, Emperor Xuanzong's attendants looked down at the powerful eunuch Li Fuguo, who had served Emperor Suzong throughout the campaign against Yan. To retaliate, Li Fuguo began to try to convince Emperor Suzong that Emperor Xuanzong and his attendants were plotting to seize power back. In 760, with Emperor Suzong's tacit, although not explicit, approval, on one occasion when Emperor Xuanzong was out riding, Li Fuguo intercepted him and forced him to move back to the main palace. Even on that occasion, however, Gao would not submit to Li Fuguo, and even yelled at Li Fuguo to force him to get off his horse and to escort Emperor Xuanzong on foot, along with Gao. Soon after Emperor Xuanzong was forcibly moved, Li Fuguo forced Chen to retire, Li Chiying to return to her temple (she had become an ordained Taoist nun in 711), and exiled Gao, Wang, Wei, and Ru.[53]

After Emperor Xuanzong was forcibly moved back to the main palace, Emperor Suzong tried to please him by offering him the best of all of the tributes of the land first, but Emperor Xuanzong became depressed and rarely ate meat, and quickly became ill. Emperor Suzong had his daughters Princesses Wan'an and Xianyi attend to their grandfather, and initially frequently personally visited Emperor Xuanzong, but after some time became ill himself and could not visit Emperor Xuanzong. He began to regret forcibly moving Emperor Xuanzong and considered killing Li Fuguo, but as Li Fuguo wielded command of the imperial guards at this time, he did not dare to try to do so.[53] Emperor Xuanzong died, in that depressed state, on 3 May 762.[6][54]

Emperor Xuanzong was deeply criticized by later historians for his wastefulness and for his appointing of Li Linfu, Yang Guozhong, and An to prominent offices.[55] The strength that Xuanzong had allowed the military governors to have, which was perpetuated after Tang had defeated Yan, led to a period of increasing conflict and instability which set the stage for the decline of the Tang dynasty and the ensuing Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period.[56]

Poetry

[edit]

Xuanzong had one poem collected in the famous poetry anthology Three Hundred Tang Poems, in the style of the five-character-regular-verse (wulu) form and in the huaigu genre, and which was translated by Witter Bynner as "I Pass Through the Lu Dukedom with a Sigh and a Sacrifice for Confucius". This poem refers to the philosopher-sage Confucius and to Confucius' home state of Lu, during the by-then long-gone Spring and Autumn period, and expresses sadness for what is past and beyond recall, thus reflecting on the transience of mortal existence.

The Ode on Pied Wagtails, the only known surviving example of Xuanzong's calligraphy

Chancellors during reign

[edit]

Consorts and issue

[edit]
  • Empress, of the Wang clan of Taiyuan (皇后 太原王氏; d. 724)
  • Empress Zhenshun, of the Wu clan (貞順皇后 武氏/贞顺皇后 武氏; 699–737), third cousin
    • Li Yi, Prince Dao of Xia (夏悼王 李一; 716–717), ninth son
    • Princess Shangxian (上仙公主)
    • Li Min, Prince Ai of Huai (懷哀王 李敏/怀哀王 李敏; 719–720), 15th son
    • Li Mao, Prince Shou (壽王 李瑁/寿王 李瑁; 720–775), 18th son
    • Li Qi, Prince Sheng (盛王 李琦; d. 764), 21st son
    • Princess Xianyi (咸宜公主;722–784)
      • Married Yang Hui of Hongnong (弘農 楊洄/弘农 杨洄; d. 761) in 735, and had issue (one son)
      • Married Cui Song of Boling (博陵 崔嵩) in 761
    • Princess Taihua (太華公主/太华公主), 21st daughter
      • Married Yang Qi of Hongnong (弘農 楊錡/弘农 杨锜) in 745
  • Empress Yuanxian, of the Yang clan of Hongnong (元獻皇后 弘農楊氏/元献皇后 弘农杨氏; 699–729)
    • Li Heng, Emperor Suzong (肅宗 李亨/肃宗 李亨; 711–762), 3rd son
    • Princess Qi (齊公主/齐国公主), 8th daughter
      • Married Zhang Ji (張垍/张垍), the second son of Zhang Yue, in 728, and had issue (one daughter)
      • Married Pei Ying of Hedong (河東 裴潁/河东 裴颍) in 730
      • Married Yang Dun of Hongnong (弘農 楊敦/弘农 杨敦)
  • Noble Consort Yang, of the Yang clan of Hongnong (貴妃 弘農楊氏/贵妃 弘农杨氏; 719–756)
  • Noble Consort, of the Dong clan (貴妃 董氏/贵妃 董氏)
  • Noble Consort, of the Xiang clan (貴妃 項氏/贵妃 项氏)
    • Unnamed daughter
  • Noble Consort Yang, of the Yang clan of Hongnong (淑妃 弘農楊氏/淑妃 弘农杨氏), personal Zhenyi (真一)
  • Pure Consort, of the Huangfu clan of Anding (淑妃 安定皇甫氏; 694–735)
    • Li Yao, Prince E (鄂王 李瑤; d. 737), 5th son
    • Princess Linjin (臨晉公主/临晋公主; d. 773), 2nd daughter
      • Married Zheng Qianyao of Xingyang (滎陽 鄭潛曜/荥阳 郑潜曜) in 740
  • Virtuous Consort, of the Qian clan (德妃 錢氏/钱氏)
    • Li Yan, Prince Di (棣王 李琰; d. 752), 4th son
  • Elegant Consort, of the Zhao clan (麗妃 趙氏/丽妃 赵氏; 693–726)
    • Li Ying, Crown Prince (皇太子 李瑛; d. 737), 2nd son
  • Splendid Consort, of the Liu clan (華妃 劉氏/华妃 刘氏)
    • Li Cong, Emperor Fengtian (奉天皇帝 李琮; d. 752), 1st son
    • Li Wan, Crown Prince Jinggong (靖恭皇太子 李琬; d. 755), 6th son
    • Li Sui, Prince Yi (儀王 李璲/仪王 李璲; d. 765), 12th son
  • Imperial Concubine of the First Rank, of the Lin clan (昭儀/昭仪 林氏)
    • Princess Yichun (宜春公主)
  • Imperial Concubine of the Fourth Rank, of the Guo clan (順儀/顺仪 郭氏)
    • Li Lin, Prince Yong (永王 李璘; d. 757), 16th son[90]
  • Imperial Concubine of the Third Rank, of the Wu clan (賢儀/贤仪 武氏), third cousin
    • Li Xuan, Prince Liang (涼王 李璿; d. 774), 29th son
    • Li Jing, Prince Ai of Bian (汴哀王 李璥; d. 736), 30th son
  • Imperial Concubine of the Sixth Rank, of the Dong clan (芳儀/芳仪 董氏), personal name Fangyi (芳仪)
    • Princess Guangning (廣寧公主/广宁公主)
      • Married Cheng Changyin (程昌胤; 725–784)
      • Married Su Kezhen (蘇克貞/苏克贞)
  • Fairness Lady, of the Liu clan of Hedong (婕妤 河東柳氏/婕妤 河东柳氏)
    • Princess Qi (齊公主), 1st daughter
      • Married Wang Yao of Langya, Duke Langya (琊瑯 王繇/瑯琊公 王徭) in 723, and had issue (one son)
    • Li Bin, Prince Yan (延王 李玢; d. 784), 20th son
  • Fairness Lady of the Gao clan (婕妤 高氏; 694–739)
    • Li Jiao, Prince Ying (潁王 李璬/颍王 李璬; 718–783), 13th son
    • Princess Changle (昌樂公主/昌乐公主)
      • Married Dou E of Henan (河南 竇鍔/河南 窦锷) in 737
  • Beauty, of the Zhong clan (美人 鍾氏/钟氏)
    • Li Huan, Prince Ji (濟王 李環/济王 李环; d. 768), 22nd son
  • Beauty, of the Lu clan (美人 盧氏/卢氏)
    • Li Huang, Prince Xin (信王 李瑝; 725–774), 23rd son
  • Beauty, of the Wang clan (美人 王氏)
    • Li Gui, Prince Chen (陳王 李珪/陈王 李珪; 725–784), 25th son
  • Beauty, of the Du clan (美人 杜氏)
    • Princess Wanchun (萬春公主/万春公主; 732–770), 24th daughter
      • Married Yang Fei of Hongnong (弘農 楊朏/弘农 杨朏; d. 756), a son of Yang Guozhong, in 754
      • Married Yang Qi of Hongnong (弘農 楊錡/弘农 杨锜) in 756
  • Talented Lady, of the Liu clan (才人 劉氏/刘 氏)
    • Li Ju, Prince Guang (光王 李琚; d. 737), 8th son
  • Talented Lady, of the Yan clan (才人 閻氏/阎氏)
    • Princess Xincheng (信成公主)
      • Married Dugu Ming of Henan (河南 獨孤明/独孤明) in 737, and had issue (one daughter)
    • Li Ci, Prince Yi (義王 李玼/义王 李玼; 725–784), 24th son
  • Talented Lady, of the Chen clan (才人 陳氏/陈氏)
    • Li Gong, Prince Feng (豐王 李珙/丰王 李珙; d. 763), 26th son
  • Talented Lady, of the Zheng clan (才人 鄭氏/郑氏)
    • Li Tian, Prince Heng (恆王 李瑱/恒王 李瑱), 27th son
  • Talented Lady, of the Zhao clan (才人 趙氏/赵氏)
    • Princess Shouguang (壽光公主/寿光公主; 726–750), 22nd daughter
      • Married Guo Ye of Jingzhao (京兆 郭液) in 746, and had issue (one son)
  • Talented Lady, of the Chang clan (才人 常氏)
    • Princess Xinping (新平公主; d. 775)
      • Married Pei Jian of Hedong (河東 裴玪/河东 裴玪), and had issue (one son)
      • Married Jiang Qingchu of Tianshui, Duke Chu (天水 姜慶初/姜庆初; d. 767) in 751
  • Lady, of the Caoyena clan (曹野那氏)
    • Princess Shou'an (壽安公主/寿安公主), personal name Chongniang (蟲娘/虫娘)
      • Married Su Fa (蘇發/苏发)
  • Unknown
    • Li Xun, Prince An (安王 李洵)
    • Princess Changfen (常芬公主), 2nd daughter
      • Married Zhang Qushe, Count Fanyang (張去奢/张去奢; 688–747) in 731
    • Princess Xiaochang (孝昌公主), 3rd daughter
    • Princess Tangchang (唐昌公主), 4th daughter
      • Married Xue Xiu of Hedong (河東 薛銹/河东 薛锈; d. 737) in 728 and issue (one son)
    • Princess Lingchang (靈昌公主/灵昌公主), 5th daughter
    • Princess Changshan (常山公主), 6th daughter
      • Married Xue Tan of Hedong (河東 薛譚/河东 薛谭; d. 728) in 728
      • Married Dou Ze of Henan (河南 竇澤/窦泽) in 728
    • Princess Wan'an (萬安公主/万安公主)
    • Princess Huaisi (懷思公主/怀思公主)
    • Princess Jin (晉公主/晋公主), 11th daughter
      • Married Cui Huitong of Qinghe (清河 崔惠童) in 737
    • Princess Xinchang (新昌公主)
      • Married Xiao Heng of Lanling (蘭陵 蕭衡/兰陵 箫衡; d. 747), a son of Xiao Song, and had issue (five sons, one daughter)
    • Princess Wei (衛公主/卫公主)
      • Married Doulu Jian of Changli, Duke Rui (昌黎 豆盧建/昌黎 豆卢建; 706–744) in 737
      • Married Yang Shuo of Hongnong (弘農 楊說/弘农 杨说) in 744
    • Princess Zhenyang (真陽公主/真阳公主)
      • Married Yuan Qing of Henan (河南 源清) in 740
      • Married Su Zhen, Duke Qi (蘇震/苏震)
    • Princess Chu (楚公主)
      • Married Wu Chengjiang, Duke Puyang (吳澄江), and had issue (one son)
    • Princess Yongning (永寧公主/永宁公主), 17th daughter
      • Married Pei Qiqiu of Hedong (河東 裴齊丘/河东 裴齐丘) in 738
    • Princess Song (宋公主), 19th daughter
      • Married Wen Xihua (溫西華/温西华) in 747
      • Married Yang Hui (楊徽/杨徽)
    • Princess Lecheng (樂城公主/乐城公主), 23rd daughter
      • Married Xue Lüqian of Hedong (河東 薛履謙/河东 薛履谦; d. 761) in 746

Religious views

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Xuanzong "ordered his four brothers to worship in the Chang'an Nestorian church", but also asked that paintings of him and the four previous emperors be kept in the church there.[91]

In literature

[edit]
  • 'The Smile that cost an Empire' (1950, revised 1953), a long "dialogue" poem by F. L. Lucas, set in 755, in which Emperor Xuanzong of Tang discusses Yang Guifei with elderly court poet Yuan Shen, followed by a narrative coda set in 756.[92]

See also

[edit]

References

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Emperor Xuanzong of Tang (Chinese: 唐玄宗; 8 September 685 – 3 May 762), born Li Longji (李隆基), was the seventh emperor of China's Tang dynasty (618–907), reigning from 712 to 756 in a rule spanning 44 years, the longest of any Tang monarch. Ascending via two palace coups that ousted rivals including his aunt Empress Wei and nephew Emperor Shang, Xuanzong initially presided over a golden age of Tang prosperity, implementing financial reforms, bolstering Silk Road security, abolishing the death penalty, and fostering peaks in arts, literature, and economic stability with low inflation. His later years saw indulgence in personal pleasures, favoritism toward consort Yang Guifei and eunuchs, reliance on corrupt ministers like Li Linfu, and empowerment of frontier general An Lushan, culminating in the devastating An Lushan Rebellion of 755 that forced Xuanzong's flight to Sichuan, the execution of Yang Guifei, and his abdication in favor of his son Suzong amid the empire's near-collapse. Despite the dynasty's subsequent turmoil, Xuanzong's era epitomized Tang cultural zenith, with advancements in poetry, music, and painting, though his governance lapses sowed seeds of peasant unrest through landlord encroachments and military overreach.

Early Life and Background

Birth and Family Origins

Li Longji, later known as Emperor Xuanzong, was born on September 8, 685, in , the eastern capital of the , during the brief initial reign of his father, Emperor Ruizong (Li Dan). His mother was Consort Dou (Dou De妃), a favored concubine of Ruizong who held significant bureaucratic rank and influence within the palace. At the time of his birth, effective power rested with his grandmother, , who had orchestrated Ruizong's ascension in 684 following the death of her husband, Emperor Gaozong (Li Zhi), but she soon dominated the court, rendering Ruizong a figurehead. As the third son of Ruizong, Li Longji belonged to the Li imperial clan, which traced its paternal lineage to , the foundational Daoist philosopher, a claim formalized in Tang genealogies to legitimize rule through cultural and philosophical continuity. His older brothers included Li Chengqi, born to Ruizong's primary wife Empress Liu, and Li Chengyi, while his younger full brothers from Consort Dou were Li Longfan, Li Longye, and Li Longwen. Consort Dou's death in 693, amid the purges associated with Wu Zetian's consolidation of power, left young Li Longji under the broader imperial family's oversight, with his upbringing shaped by the factional intrigues between Wu Zetian's allies and the Li princes. This early environment of dynastic tension, rooted in Wu Zetian's unprecedented female regency and her elevation over the Li lineage, marked the foundational instability of his familial origins.

Initial Positions and Education Under Wu Zetian

Li Longji was born on 8 September 685 in , the eastern capital of the , as the third son of Li Dan (later Emperor Ruizong) and his consort Dou, during a period of political turbulence under the influence of his grandmother, . In 687, at the age of two, he was enfeoffed as Prince of Chu, a nominal reflecting his status as a grandson in the imperial Li family line amid the fragile restoration of Tang rule following Wu Zetian's earlier dominance. Wu Zetian's formal usurpation of the throne in 690, establishing the and demoting the Li clan, led to further restrictions on the family; in 693, during the Changshou era, Li Longji's title was changed to Prince of Linzi as part of broader reductions in status for Li Dan's sons, signaling Wu's favoritism toward her own Wu clan relatives and her consolidation of power through clan-based appointments. This reenfeoffment occurred when Li Longji was eight years old, marking his initial formal position under Wu Zetian's regime, though it carried limited administrative authority given his youth and the empress's centralization of control. Under Wu Zetian's rule until 705, Li Longji and his brothers experienced palace isolation, confined within the imperial residences with restricted access to outsiders, a measure likely intended to prevent Li loyalist intrigues amid Wu's purges of potential rivals. This seclusion shaped his early development, providing immersion in palace-based tutelage focused on Confucian classics, history, and courtly skills such as and , essential for imperial heirs despite the politically suppressed environment. The confinement curtailed broader societal exposure but fostered resilience, as evidenced by Li Longji's later adeptness in navigating court factions, honed through observation of Wu's manipulative governance style.

Rise to Power Amid Dynastic Instability

Involvement in Zhongzong's Court and Coup Against Empress Wei

Li Longji, the future Emperor Xuanzong, served in Emperor Zhongzong's court during the latter's second reign (705–710), holding key administrative and military roles that honed his influence within the imperial guard system. Appointed deputy minister of military supplies shortly after Zhongzong's restoration, he later became secretary-general of Lu Prefecture (in modern ) before being recalled to the capital and elevated to general of the imperial guards (Yulin Army) by 710, positions that positioned him to command elite troops amid growing court factionalism. Zhongzong's sudden death on July 3, 710, precipitated a , with traditional histories alleging by Empress Wei to enable her regency, though contemporary analyses question this attribution due to lack of conclusive evidence and potential bias in official annals favoring Li imperial narratives. Wei swiftly enthroned Zhongzong's underage son, Li Chongmao, as Emperor Shang, while maneuvering with her daughter, , to dominate the court through corruption, office sales, and elimination of rivals, including threats to Li Longji's father, the deposed Ruizong (Li Dan). Fearing eradication, Li Longji allied with his aunt, —a influential figure with ties to Wu Zetian's era—and covertly mobilized loyal Feathered Forest Guards (Yulinjun) without initially informing Ruizong, launching the Tanglong Coup on July 21, 710. Leading approximately 1,000 soldiers in a nighttime on the palace, he overpowered Wei's defenses, personally overseeing the execution of Empress Wei (who attempted flight but was slain by her own guards turned against her) and , alongside the purge of over 10 Wei faction members, effectively dismantling their network in a swift, low-casualty operation. The coup's success compelled Li Chongmao's abdication after 17 days on the throne, restoring Ruizong as emperor and elevating Li Longji's status, though his pivotal military command foreshadowed tensions with Taiping's political ambitions in subsequent years.

Service Under Ruizong and Confrontation with Princess Taiping

Following the successful coup against Empress Wei on July 21, 710, which Li Longji orchestrated alongside Princess Taiping using imperial guards under his command, Emperor Ruizong ascended the throne, restoring Li family rule after the brief reign of the child emperor Li Chongmao. Li Longji, then the Prince of Linzi, retained significant military authority, supervising palace troops and leveraging his control over armed forces to maintain stability in the capital amid factional rivalries. This role positioned him as a counterweight to Princess Taiping's dominance in civilian administration, where she influenced key chancellor appointments and policy through her extensive network of allies, including figures like Xiao Zhizhong and Cui Xuanwei. Tensions between Li Longji and intensified during Ruizong's reign (710–712), as the princess sought to elevate her son Xue Chongjian and block Li Longji's ascent, viewing him as a threat to her authority derived from her mother Wu Zetian's legacy and her advisory role to Ruizong. Li Longji, backed by loyalists and gaining Ruizong's personal favor, advocated for merit-based governance over Taiping's patronage system, which fueled mutual suspicions and plots. By mid-712, these rivalries culminated in Ruizong's decision to abdicate; on September 8, 712, he transferred the throne to Li Longji, who became Emperor Xuanzong, despite Taiping's vehement opposition and attempts to sway the emperor toward her preferred successors. The confrontation escalated into open conflict in 713, as Xuanzong uncovered intelligence of an imminent coup plotted by Taiping and her faction, including plans to assassinate him and reinstall Ruizong or install a puppet ruler. On July 20, 713, Xuanzong preemptively mobilized loyal troops to arrest and execute over a dozen high officials aligned with Taiping, such as chancellors Dou Huaizhen and岑羲, effectively dismantling her power base in a single night of s. Taiping retreated to her residence but, facing inevitable capture and trial, chose suicide on August 2, 713, marking the end of her influence and allowing Xuanzong to consolidate absolute control without further dynastic challenges from imperial kin. This claimed around 1,000 lives among Taiping's supporters, underscoring the depth of entrenched factionalism inherited from prior reigns.

Seizure of the Throne in 712

In the midst of persistent court intrigues following the 710 coup that restored Emperor Ruizong, political tensions escalated between factions loyal to Ruizong's sister, , and those supporting Li Longji. , who had wielded substantial influence since the era of , advocated for policies and appointments that maintained her network's dominance, often clashing with Li Longji's growing authority derived from his military and administrative roles. By mid-712, Ruizong, weary of factional strife and interpreting astrological omens as signaling the necessity for imperial transition, decided to abdicate. On September 8, 712, Ruizong formally abdicated the throne to Li Longji, his third son, who ascended as Emperor Xuanzong at age 27. This transfer was facilitated by the deference of Ruizong's eldest son, Li Chengqi (Prince of Song), who declined succession on grounds that Li Longji's proven merits—particularly his orchestration of the 710 palace coup against Empress Wei and her allies—made him the more suitable heir for stabilizing the dynasty. Li Longji's rapid rise reflected not merely familial concession but his command of loyal troops and allies, including key generals like Ge Fushun and Zhang Yue, which deterred potential opposition and ensured a bloodless transition. Ruizong retained the title of (retired emperor), nominally overseeing state matters from the palace, while Princess Taiping persisted in directing bureaucratic appointments and policy through her partisans. This dual authority structure, intended to preserve continuity, instead amplified rivalries, as Xuanzong moved cautiously to consolidate power without immediate confrontation. Historical accounts, drawing from Tang-era chronicles like the , emphasize that Xuanzong's ascension marked a pivotal shift toward merit-based , though Taiping's lingering sway delayed full until the following year.

Early Reign: Consolidation and Kaiyuan Reforms (712–741)

Xiantian Era: Immediate Stabilization Measures

Upon ascending the throne on September 8, 712, following Emperor Ruizong's abdication, Xuanzong (Li Longji) initially maintained his father's influence by honoring him as Taishang Huang (retired emperor), a move that helped legitimize the transition and avert immediate factional unrest within the imperial family. This arrangement preserved continuity amid recent coups, including the 710 overthrow of Empress Wei's faction, which had positioned Li Longji as a key player but left lingering power struggles. The paramount threat to stability stemmed from , Ruizong's powerful sister and Wu Zetian's daughter, who had backed Li Longji's rise but anticipated controlling the young emperor through her extensive network of allies in the and military. In the Xiantian era (proclaimed December 712), Xuanzong adopted a cautious approach, granting Taiping honors and titles to feign alliance while quietly building support among loyal guards and officials. By mid-713, intelligence of her plotting a coup—allegedly involving and replacement with a puppet—prompted preemptive action; on July 20, 713, Xuanzong mobilized imperial forces, executed over a dozen of her high-ranking partisans (including chancellors like Dou Lu Jian and officials in the ), and issued edicts condemning her faction's corruption and disloyalty. Taiping fled to a but surrendered after three days, choosing on August 2, 713, to avoid formal execution; this purge dismantled her influence, eliminating the final major internal rival and securing Xuanzong's unchallenged authority. Concurrently, Xuanzong appointed the experienced administrator Yao Chong as (chancellor) around this period, leveraging his expertise to address urgent governance issues, including early and bureaucratic oversight, which laid groundwork for broader reforms without immediate overhauls. These measures prioritized political consolidation over expansive policy shifts, restoring order after dynastic turbulence while minimizing elite defections; historical accounts note that Taiping's death marked the end of female-dominated intrigue tracing to Wu Zetian's era, enabling a male-line Li imperial focus. No large-scale fiscal or military campaigns occurred in Xiantian, as efforts centered on internal pacification to prevent relapse into the instability of Ruizong's regency.

Administrative Purges and Merit-Based Appointments

Upon assuming full authority in late 713 following the suicide of , Emperor Xuanzong dismissed numerous officials aligned with her faction to eliminate lingering threats and restore centralized control. This purge targeted supporters of Taiping and remnants of corrupt networks from the reigns of and Zhongzong, including the exile of several chancellors appointed under Zhongzong and punishment of holdovers from Wu's era deemed corrupt. These actions, conducted in 713–714, aimed to dismantle patronage-based appointments that had proliferated, reducing bureaucratic bloat by simplifying institutions and eliminating superfluous posts to curb extravagance and inefficiency. Xuanzong appointed Yao Chong as chancellor in 713, who submitted ten strategies for governance emphasizing the dismissal of incompetent officials and the promotion of talent regardless of background. Yao advocated rewarding honest remonstrance, limiting interference by imperial relatives and eunuchs, and implementing oversight mechanisms like retaining circuit inspectors to monitor local governance. Complementing this, Song Jing, succeeding Yao in 716, enforced strict legalism by investigating corruption in , executing ringleaders and thereby deterring malfeasance among officials. These chancellors collectively oversaw the review and removal of thousands of "slanted-sealed officials"—irregular appointees from Zhongzong's time lacking proper credentials—through examination bureau scrutiny, reversing favoritism-driven proliferation. To institutionalize , Xuanzong reinforced examinations, testing candidates rigorously and prioritizing competent county magistrates via annual evaluations. He dispatched surveillance commissioners each to assess local administration, ensuring promotions hinged on performance rather than lineage, which stabilized the and contributed to the Kaiyuan era's until around 741. This shift from to ability-based selection drew on precedents like Wu Zetian's talent scouting but applied more systematically, fostering a cadre of capable administrators like Zhang Jiuling later in the period.

Fiscal Reforms and Economic Stabilization

Under chancellors Yao Chong (in office 713–716) and Song Jing (716–721), Emperor Xuanzong pursued fiscal reforms emphasizing administrative streamlining to curb excessive expenditures and restore revenue streams disrupted by prior dynastic instability. Yao Chong advocated dismissing redundant officials and curtailing imperial luxuries, thereby reducing the court's fiscal drain and reallocating resources toward essential governance. These measures addressed inherited budgetary shortfalls from Empress Wu's and Emperor Zhongzong's eras, where bloated bureaucracies and favoritism had eroded central finances, promoting instead merit-based appointments to enhance tax collection efficiency. Economic stabilization relied on bolstering the (juntianfa), which allocated arable land to peasant households in exchange for labor and taxes paid in grain and cloth, thereby securing a predictable agricultural tax base. Efforts under Xuanzong's early rule included enforcing land surveys and redistributing holdings encroached upon by elites and monasteries, which had previously evaded taxation and concentrated wealth. Song Jing extended these by lightening peasant burdens through moderated tax rates and penalties, while promoting in underutilized regions, which expanded cultivable acreage and mitigated risks via revitalized state granaries. By 725, a registered approximately 41 million individuals, reflecting recovery and enabling more accurate household-based taxation, though actual figures likely exceeded this due to underreporting. These policies fostered Kaiyuan prosperity, with grain prices stabilizing at low levels—often below 1 cash per dou—and trade flourishing in commodities like and salt, supported by reduced in local fiscal administration. Currency stability was maintained through the widespread circulation of coins, cast in high-quality to prevent and facilitate . Overall, the reforms prioritized agrarian output over speculative ventures, yielding sustained revenue growth that funded military expansions without immediate inflationary pressures, though later land concentration foreshadowed vulnerabilities.

Military Reorganizations and Frontier Campaigns

During the early years of Emperor Xuanzong's reign, particularly in the Kaiyuan era (713–741), the Tang military underwent significant structural changes to address the declining effectiveness of the traditional fubing (militia) system, which had been strained by prolonged frontier duties and economic pressures. Starting around 711–712, regular professional troops began replacing fubing garrisons along the northern and northwestern borders, supplemented by mercenary soldiers (changzheng jian'er) recruited for long-term service. This shift aimed to create more reliable frontier defenses, as the fubing farmers-soldiers were increasingly unable to fulfill rotational duties without disrupting agriculture. By 737, Xuanzong abolished the three-year conscription cycle for border troops, instituting long-service professional soldiers to enhance combat readiness and reduce turnover-related inefficiencies. To oversee these frontiers, Xuanzong appointed ten (military commissioners or circuit commanders) responsible for key border regions, granting them authority over mixed forces of regulars, mercenaries, and local auxiliaries; this decentralized command structure strengthened rapid response capabilities but sowed seeds for later regional autonomy. The palace guards (jinjun) were also professionalized, drawing from kuoji and changcong suwei units of career soldiers rather than conscripts, ensuring loyalty and readiness for central interventions. Border defenses were further bolstered by establishing state-run farms (tuntian) to provision garrisons self-sufficiently, minimizing fiscal strain while expanding military presence. These reforms contributed to an estimated force of around 500,000 enlisted troops by the early 740s, reflecting a transition toward a more standing professional army. Frontier campaigns during this period focused on securing Tang influence against nomadic threats from the Khitans, Tibetans, and Western Turks, yielding territorial gains and arrangements. In 714, Tang forces achieved a victory near against Western Turk rebels, reasserting control over parts of . Against the Khitans in the northeast, initial expeditions around 725 faced setbacks due to harsh terrain and supply issues, but by 732, General Li Hui led successful operations that subdued Khitan resistance, extracting oaths of submission and . In the west, campaigns targeted Tibetan incursions; in 722, Tang armies captured the Valley (in modern ) from Tibetan control, though Tibetans briefly recaptured it in 737 before Tang forces under restored dominance. Further offensives from 736 to the early 740s suppressed Turkish khan rebellions in the Ili Valley, consolidating protectorates and facilitating security. These victories, often involving of and , expanded Tang hegemony, with nomads like the and Turks providing auxiliary troops and horses in exchange for recognition. However, the reliance on ambitious frontier generals foreshadowed vulnerabilities exploited in later decades.

Kaiyuan Prosperity: Peak Achievements (713–741)

Territorial Expansions and Defense Against Nomads

During the Kaiyuan era, Emperor Xuanzong strengthened Tang frontier defenses through military reforms, including the appointment of (military commissioners) to unified command over border regions and the shift to professional mercenary soldiers (changzheng jian'er) in place of conscript levies, enabling more effective responses to nomadic incursions. State-run farms were established in border areas to provision garrisons, bolstering logistical sustainability for prolonged operations against nomads. Key campaigns targeted northeastern threats from Khitan and Eastern Turkic remnants. General Zhang Shougui, as of Fanyang Circuit, oversaw repeated engagements to repel Khitan raids; in the early 730s, his subordinate led cavalry raids that inflicted heavy losses on Göktürk forces, exploiting tribal disturbances to disrupt their cohesion. By 732, Tang forces under General Li Hui decisively defeated Khitan leader Ketuyu, compelling submission from several Khitan clans and curtailing their incursions into and Liaodong, thereby consolidating Tang dominance in the northeast without major territorial annexations but through enforced vassalage. In the northwest and southwest, defenses focused on containing Tibetan expansions and maintaining protectorates amid Turkic khaganate fragments. Regular garrisons along the and Anxi Protectorate deterred nomadic alliances, while diplomatic maneuvers alongside military pressure integrated Uyghur auxiliaries against shared foes, preserving Tang suzerainty over Central Asian oases up to the Ferghana Valley. These efforts, combining and systems, minimized large-scale invasions during the era, contributing to internal stability and economic flourishing.

Cultural Patronage and Intellectual Advancements

Emperor Xuanzong actively patronized music and performance arts, establishing institutions that trained thousands of musicians and dancers during the Kaiyuan era. Patronage of court music reached its zenith under his rule from 712 to 756, with the Imperial Music Academy enrolling thousands of students and employing hundreds of performers daily to refine musical traditions. He personally engaged in musical training, founding the Pear Garden academy near Chang'an, where approximately 300 musicians and dancers were instructed in ensemble performances blending Chinese and foreign influences. In literature, Xuanzong supported poetic talent by summoning renowned poets to the court, notably inviting in 742 to serve in the , an institution he formalized around 725 for scholarly drafting and literary counsel. This academy drew erudite figures for composing edicts and advancing textual scholarship, fostering an environment where poetry flourished amid imperial favor. Xuanzong's court became a hub for such creatives, though Li Bai's tenure was brief due to his nonconformist habits, yet it exemplified the era's elevation of literary genius. Intellectually, Xuanzong commissioned compilations that standardized rituals and knowledge, such as the Da-Tang kaiyuan li ritual canon supervised by Xiao Song around 732, which codified state ceremonies drawing on classical precedents. He promoted Taoist scholarship by granting exalted titles to Laozi and incorporating Daoist texts into civil examinations, reflecting a preference for Taoist philosophy over rival doctrines during his early reign. Astronomical works like the Kaiyuan zhanjing also emerged under his auspices, integrating traditional Chinese divination with calendrical science. These efforts, grounded in empirical ritual practice and textual collation, sustained Confucian-Taoist synthesis amid cultural expansion, though later indulgences shifted focus from rigorous scholarship.

Agrarian Policies and Population Growth

Xuanzong actively promoted agricultural development by issuing edicts that urged local officials to prioritize farming, mulberry planting for , and crop cultivation, while deploying imperial censors to inspect and enforce these directives across provinces. These initiatives aimed to bolster grain output and sustain the (juntian zhi), which assigned approximately 100 mu of per adult male —80 mu as state-granted fields returned upon death and 20 mu as inheritable family holdings—to ensure and military conscription. However, by the Kaiyuan era (713–741), the system's efficacy waned as population pressures reduced available state land per capita, prompting peasants to sell allotments to wealthy families or monasteries, thereby evading labor and taxes under the zu-yong-diao framework. Technological and infrastructural improvements further supported agrarian output, including the widespread adoption of the curved-shaft plow (quyuan li) for deeper tilling and irrigation devices like water wheels (longlu), which expanded cultivable acreage in arid northern regions. Xuanzong's fiscal measures, such as integrating temple estate taxes into state revenues and curbing monastic land accumulation by laicizing excess , redirected resources toward productive farming households rather than exempt institutions. These policies yielded surplus production in staple crops like , millet, and , particularly in the fertile plain and emerging southern frontiers, fostering economic stability during the era's peak. The resultant agricultural abundance underpinned substantial , with registered households expanding amid stabilized northern demographics and migration to underutilized lands; estimates place the empire's population below 60 million by the mid-8th century, reflecting recovery from prior wars and sustained by enhanced yields. This demographic surge, however, exacerbated land scarcity—state fields dwindled as private sales proliferated—and sowed seeds of inequality, as tenant farming rose and through household concealment (kuohu) became rampant, undermining the equal-field allocations. By the late Kaiyuan period, these dynamics shifted many peasants into dependency on aristocratic estates, prefiguring the system's formal replacement with the two-tax law (liangshui fa) decades later.

Diplomatic Relations and Tributary System Enhancements

During the Kaiyuan era (713–741), Emperor Xuanzong's emphasized military consolidation of frontiers alongside diplomatic overtures, which bolstered the Tang tributary system by securing from diverse regions including , the Korean peninsula, , and . Military campaigns under generals such as reclaimed strategic territories like the Gilgit Valley from in 722, enhancing Tang leverage to extract and trade concessions from oasis kingdoms in the via the Anxi . These efforts refined tributary protocols, integrating foreign rulers through titles and missions that exchanged , horses, and ceremonial gifts, thereby reinforcing Tang's hierarchical prestige without direct annexation costs. Relations with Tibet (Tubo) combined conflict and negotiation; after initial recoveries, a major Tang offensive in 747–751 defeated a Tibetan-Khitan , temporarily stabilizing the southwest frontier and prompting tributary submissions from subjugated polities. In , the establishment and fortification of protectorates like Beiting ensured regular tribute flows, including prized Ferghana horses vital for cavalry, while diplomatic recognition of Uyghur leaders as "Huairen Khaghan" fostered against common threats like the Western Turks. Korean state maintained tributary ties post its 668 unification with Tang aid, sending missions that exchanged cultural and technical knowledge. Japanese kentōshi missions, numbering among the 19 dispatched to Tang between 607 and 839, peaked in frequency during Xuanzong's reign, delivering while absorbing administrative and cultural models that influenced reforms like the . Southeast Asian engagement advanced with the 738 investiture of Nanzhao's king in as a Tang , extending the system's reach amid oscillating loyalties between Tang and . Even distant contacts, such as Abbasid trade via the and the 751 —though a military setback—sustained indirect -like exchanges of goods and envoys, underscoring the era's cosmopolitan . These enhancements, grounded in frontier stability, elevated Tang's , with missions symbolizing deference and enabling economic inflows that supported Kaiyuan .

Tianbao Era: Onset of Decline (742–756)

Elevation of Favorites and Administrative Neglect

In the Tianbao era (742–756), Emperor Xuanzong increasingly delegated administrative responsibilities while elevating personal favorites, particularly , whose influence grew after she was bestowed the title of Precious Consort (Guifei) in 745. This favoritism extended to her relatives, with her cousin rising rapidly through court ranks to become chief minister (chancellor) in 752 following the death of the previous incumbent, Li Linfu. 's tenure was characterized by rampant , including and nepotistic appointments, which undermined fiscal discipline and military readiness. Xuanzong's preoccupation with pleasures, such as music performances, Daoist rituals, and retreats to the Xingqing Palace, contributed to his administrative neglect, as he rarely engaged in routine governance or consultations with capable officials. Traditional histories, drawing from primary annals like the , attribute this shift to the emperor's infatuation, which allowed unworthy favorites to dominate policy decisions and exacerbate factional strife. Specific examples include the unchecked expansion of palace expenditures on luxuries and the ignoring of frontier reports, fostering resentment among military commanders like . By prioritizing personal indulgences over merit-based oversight, Xuanzong's policies eroded the institutional checks that had sustained the Kaiyuan prosperity, setting the stage for systemic vulnerabilities.

Corruption in Military Commands and An Lushan's Rise

During the Tianbao era (742–756), corruption permeated the Tang frontier military commands, as (military governors) exploited their to engage in , , and the sale of commissions, undermining and among troops who often went unpaid and resorted to plunder. Li Linfu (in office 737–752), who dominated policy under Xuanzong, exacerbated this by favoring illiterate, non-Han generals amenable to manipulation over educated Han officials, reasoning that "scholar-officials are verbose and argumentative, while Hu (barbarian) generals are straightforward and obedient," thereby prioritizing personal control over meritocratic oversight. This approach neglected systemic abuses, such as officers hoarding supplies and falsifying muster rolls, which eroded central authority and allowed regional armies to function as semi-independent fiefdoms. An Lushan, born around 703 to a Sogdian father and Turkic mother, exemplified this flawed system, rising from a lowly camp servant and horse trader through displays of martial prowess and calculated flattery. By 736, as a general under jiedushi Zhang Shougui, he led campaigns defeating Khitan and Xi tribes, earning initial recognition despite his obesity, illiteracy, and reputation for brutality. In 742, he received appointment as military commissioner of Pinglu, a northeastern command, followed by Fanyang in 744 upon Li Linfu's recommendation, who cultivated An's loyalty through bribes and ignored reports of his embezzlement and soldier abuses. By 751, secured joint command of Hedong, consolidating control over three vital circuits—Fanyang, Pinglu, and Hedong—with approximately 180,000 troops, an unprecedented aggregation enabled by Li Linfu's suppression of rivals and Xuanzong's misplaced trust, including adopting An as a foster son. This favoritism stemmed from An's feigned deference, such as weeping before the and gifting rarities, amid broader graft where promotions depended on rather than competence; earlier warnings from officials like He Zhizhang about An's "wolfish ambitions" were dismissed as jealousy. The resulting power imbalance, rooted in corrupt appointments, positioned An to exploit frontier discontent for rebellion in 755, as unchecked authority transformed defensive bulwarks into threats to the throne.

Economic Strain from Indulgences and Land Concentration

During the Tianbao era (742–756), Emperor Xuanzong's growing indulgence in luxuries and favoritism toward consort and her relatives strained imperial finances. The emperor's obsession with music, dance, and elaborate entertainments, coupled with promotions of the Yang family to high positions regardless of merit, diverted resources from administrative efficiency. Financial officials increasingly adopted exploitative tax measures to sustain court extravagance and fund the emperor's frequent inspection tours across the realm. Concurrently, progressive land concentration undermined the Tang fiscal base. The equal-field system, which allocated approximately 100 mu of land per adult male for taxation and subsistence, disintegrated by the mid-eighth century as aristocratic clans, officials, the imperial household, and Buddhist monasteries accumulated vast estates through annexation and purchase. This reduced the pool of state-controlled taxable land, leading to widespread by "hidden households" and a shrinking despite estimated at over 50 million by 755. Xuanzong's efforts to counteract this, such as forcing idle monks back into lay society for taxation and prohibiting new monasteries to curb clerical land holdings, proved inadequate against entrenched interests. The combined pressures of imperial prodigality and agrarian inequality fostered peasant discontent and fiscal insolvency, as miscellaneous levies on salt, , and failed to offset core tax shortfalls. Regional commanders, granted fiscal autonomy to maintain armies, further fragmented central authority, exacerbating economic disparities between prosperous south and war-torn north. These dynamics eroded the prosperity of the Kaiyuan era, priming the empire for the disruptions of the in 755.

Prelude to Rebellion: Warnings Ignored

In 736, during the Kaiyuan era, Chancellor Zhang Jiuling urged Emperor Xuanzong to execute after the general publicly disobeyed orders from his superior, arguing that An's temperament indicated future treason. Xuanzong rejected the advice, viewing An as loyal and capable, and instead demoted Zhang while promoting An's military career, allowing him to gain command of the vital Fanyang Circuit by 742. This decision reflected Xuanzong's growing preference for charismatic frontier commanders over cautious bureaucratic counsel, prioritizing perceived personal loyalty amid expanding border defenses. By the Tianbao era (742–756), An Lushan's influence expanded dramatically; in 751, Xuanzong appointed him (military governor) of the combined Pinglu, Fanyang, and Hedong circuits, granting control over approximately 180,000 troops in the northeast—far exceeding central forces. Chancellor , elevated to power in 752 following the death of Li Linfu, repeatedly warned Xuanzong of An's ambitions, citing his massive armies, non-Han origins, and rivalrous posturing as signs of impending revolt. These alerts intensified after An's 754 summons to the capital, where he delayed by feigning illness and dispatched his adopted son in his place, yet Xuanzong dismissed them, influenced by An's flattery, lavish gifts to , and the emperor's own iron certificate of 748 guaranteeing An's safety short of proven treason. Xuanzong's administrative neglect compounded the peril: increasingly detached in his later years, he delegated authority to eunuchs and favorites while indulging in Taoist pursuits and palace entertainments, weakening oversight of frontier garrisons and ignoring reports of An's stockpiling and indiscipline. Financial strains from prolonged campaigns against Tibetans and , coupled with the equal-land system's collapse as elites accumulated holdings, eroded central revenues without prompting reforms, leaving the court unprepared for internal threats. Only post-rebellion, in 756, did Xuanzong express regret over Zhang Jiuling's unheeded foresight, sacrificing at his tomb amid the empire's unraveling. This pattern of overridden warnings—rooted in overconfidence from decades of prosperity and favoritism toward non-meritocratic allies—enabled An's unchallenged consolidation, culminating in his declaration of on December 16, 755.

An Lushan Rebellion and Abdication (755–756)

Outbreak and Initial Imperial Response

On 16 December 755, , the (military governor) of three northeastern circuits—Fanyang, Pinglu, and Hedong—launched a rebellion from his base at Fanyang (modern ), commanding an army estimated at 150,000 to 200,000 troops primarily composed of frontier cavalry and infantry loyal to him. He justified the uprising as a campaign to eliminate the corrupt influence of Chancellor , whom he accused of monopolizing imperial power, while proclaiming himself emperor of a new Yan dynasty. An's forces advanced southward rapidly, exploiting the Tang dynasty's decentralized military structure where frontier commands like his held significant autonomy and troops were often non-Han ethnic soldiers with divided loyalties. Emperor Xuanzong's initial response underestimated the threat, as An controlled key northeastern defenses and the Tang central armies were understrength due to prior reliance on jiedushi for border security. Xuanzong dispatched Feng Changqing with approximately 60,000 hastily assembled and untrained troops to intercept the rebels near , the eastern capital; this force suffered defeat in early engagements, forcing Feng to retreat westward to Tong Pass (Tongguan), joined by reinforcements under . Influenced by slanders from court eunuchs and Chancellor Yang Guozhong's intrigues, Xuanzong ordered the execution of both Feng and Gao on charges of incompetence and treason, depriving the defense of experienced leadership. In response to the rebels' swift capture of by January 756—achieved with minimal resistance as local officials surrendered or fled—Xuanzong appointed the veteran general Geshu Han to command the defense of Tong Pass, a strategic chokepoint guarding the approach to , the western capital. Geshu Han fortified the position with around 60,000 elite troops, but Yang Guozhong's pressure for an offensive sortie undermined a defensive , leading to a disastrous battle in late spring 756 where Tang forces were routed, opening the road to . This sequence of missteps reflected Xuanzong's detachment from military realities after decades of prosperity, compounded by factional court politics that prioritized personal rivalries over coordinated imperial mobilization.

Flight to Sichuan and Forced Abdication

As An Lushan's rebel forces captured in January 756 and advanced toward the Tang capital of , Emperor Xuanzong faced mounting pressure from the collapsing defenses. On July 14, 756, urged by Chancellor , Xuanzong abandoned with a small entourage, including his favorite consort , heading southwest along the route to the Jiannan Circuit in present-day province. The flight route traversed difficult terrain, covering approximately 1,500 kilometers over several weeks, with the imperial party relying on loyal guards amid widespread desertions. En route, at the Mawei Station near present-day Xingping on July 15, 756, imperial troops mutinied, attributing the rebellion's success to the Yang clan's corruption and influence over court decisions. The soldiers executed and demanded Yang Guifei's death; Xuanzong, aged 71 and powerless to resist, consented to her strangulation to prevent further unrest. This incident marked a dramatic end to the emperor's personal indulgences, as the entourage, now pacified, continued westward under duress. The imperial party reached , the administrative center of Jiannan, in late August 756, seeking refuge in the more defensible Shu region historically known for resisting northern invasions. There, Xuanzong learned that his third son, Li Heng, had mobilized loyalist forces in Lingwu and proclaimed himself Emperor Suzong on August 12, 756, to rally resistance against the rebels. Facing unified demands from officials and military leaders who viewed his rule as discredited by favoritism and neglect, Xuanzong formally abdicated on August 12, 756, or shortly thereafter, adopting the title of (retired emperor) while nominally retaining influence. This forced transition shifted authority to Suzong, enabling coordinated counteroffensives, though Xuanzong's abdication underscored the rebellion's causal link to decades of administrative decay under his later reign.

Casualties and Immediate Tang Losses

The initial phase of the An Lushan Rebellion from late 755 to mid-756 inflicted severe military defeats on Tang forces, though precise casualty figures remain undocumented in contemporary records. Rebel armies under , advancing from Fanyang with forces estimated at over 150,000, rapidly overran northeastern commanderies where local governors either surrendered or fled, minimizing organized resistance but leading to the collapse of Tang authority in . At , the eastern capital, Tang commander Feng Changqing's army of approximately 60,000 hastily recruited and untrained soldiers was decisively defeated, facilitating the city's capture in January 756 without detailed reports of specific losses. Further Tang reversals occurred at Tongguan Pass in June 756, where general Geshu Han's defensive forces suffered a crushing after a failed offensive, resulting in heavy casualties among elite guards and opening the route to the western capital, . This battle marked the loss of key frontier troops and the execution of prominent generals and Feng Changqing on imperial orders, exacerbating command disarray. Civilian casualties in the sacked cities of and were substantial due to plunder, massacres, and flight, though quantitative estimates for this period are absent; the rapid rebel occupation displaced hundreds of thousands and initiated widespread famine precursors through disrupted agriculture. Immediate Tang losses extended beyond battlefield deaths to encompass territorial control over northern China, including the vital Hebei circuit, which remained under rebel sway and severed tax revenues from prosperous regions. The fall of Chang'an in July 756 compelled Emperor Xuanzong's evacuation to , abandoning imperial treasuries and administrative centers to looting, with rebels under Sun Xiaozhe occupying the palace. Politically, this precipitated the emperor's in August 756, undermining central authority and forcing reliance on provincial warlords, while economically, the disruption halted commerce and concentrated landholdings among survivors, foreshadowing long-term decline.

Later Years as Retired Emperor (756–762)

Role During Ongoing Rebellion and Return to Chang'an

Following his abdication on 12 August 756 in , Xuanzong adopted the title of (retired emperor) and initially resided there amid the escalating , which saw rebel forces under capture in early 756 and advance toward recaptured territories. His role shifted to a largely ceremonial and advisory one, providing symbolic continuity for Tang legitimacy while Emperor Suzong coordinated military campaigns from Lingwu and, after November 757, from following its partial recovery. Xuanzong maintained a separate court with loyal attendants, including the influential Gao Lishi, who bridged communications and conveyed occasional counsel on strategic matters, though direct command authority rested with Suzong to avoid dual-power conflicts. Tensions arose from factional rivalries, particularly between Xuanzong's retainers and Suzong's eunuch Li Fuguo, who viewed Gao Lishi's persistent access to the retired emperor as a to Suzong's during critical phases of the , such as Shi Siming's resurgence in 757–758. Xuanzong exerted limited but notable influence, for instance, urging aggressive maneuvers against Yan (rebel) forces at Xiangzhou in 758, which aligned with Suzong's eventual victories despite initial hesitations from advisors. This reflected a traditional Chinese imperial dynamic where the offered guidance without overt interference, preserving familial hierarchy amid crisis. In late 757, Suzong repeatedly invited Xuanzong's return to to bolster imperial prestige and unify command symbolism, but Xuanzong delayed, citing health and logistical concerns during ongoing rebel threats like Shi Siming's campaigns. He commenced the journey northward in 758, arriving in by early that year, where he was received with honors but firmly declined Suzong's offers to restore him to the , reaffirming to stabilize succession. Settling in the Xingqing , Xuanzong adopted a reclusive posture for the remainder of the rebellion (which persisted until 763 under Shi Chaoyi), focusing on personal reflection, Daoist practices, and sporadic input rather than active governance, as rebel incursions continued to ravage northern provinces. This depiction of Xuanzong's evokes his secluded later years post-return, amid the rebellion's shadow. By 762, with Tang forces gradually reclaiming territory through alliances like those with Uighurs, Xuanzong's influence waned further, overshadowed by Suzong's chancellors and the war's attritional demands; he died on 3 May 762 in at age 76, before the rebellion's full resolution, leaving a legacy of earlier prosperity contrasted by perceived detachment in crisis.

Final Policies and Succession Arrangements

Following his forced abdication on August 12, 756, amid the , Xuanzong adopted the title and withdrew to in Jiannan Circuit (modern ), ceding effective control to his son Li Heng, who had unilaterally proclaimed himself Emperor Suzong earlier that month at Lingwu. This succession lacked prior formal designation by Xuanzong, stemming instead from the rebellion's disruption of central authority; the prior , Li (titled Rang Gong), had been demoted and confined years earlier due to perceived disloyalty, leaving no clear heir during the imperial flight from . The arrangement prioritized military continuity over dynastic protocol, as troops mutinied en route, executing Chancellor and compelling the suicide of Consort at Mawei Station, underscoring Xuanzong's eroded command. As , Xuanzong implemented no major policies, maintaining seclusion even after relocating to the recovered capital of in late 759, once Suzong's forces, bolstered by Uyghur cavalry, had retaken it from Yan rebels. His influence remained peripheral, with governance devolving to Suzong's chancellors and (military governors), who navigated ongoing fiscal strain from war indemnities and land losses totaling over 20 prefectures. Further succession arrangements were absent; Suzong independently named his eldest son, Li Yu, as in 758, who ascended unopposed as Emperor Daizong upon Suzong's death on August 17, 762—months after Xuanzong's own passing on May 3, 762—amid intrigues but without retired imperial intervention. This hands-off posture reflected causal realities of post-rebellion fragmentation, where central edicts yielded to provincial autonomy, hastening Tang decline.

Death and Burial

Emperor Xuanzong died on May 3, 762, at the age of 76, in , following a period of seclusion and declining health after his forced abdication and the traumas of the . His final years were marked by profound grief over the execution of his favored consort in 756 and the empire's devastation, which contributed to his withdrawn state and inability to engage actively in affairs despite his son's restoration of Tang control over the capital in 757. He was interred in March 763 in the Tailing Mausoleum (泰陵), a site he personally selected during his reign for its auspicious features within Mount Jinsu, located approximately 130 kilometers northeast of in Jingmusi Village, Baonan Township, Pucheng County, Province. The mausoleum complex includes a 409-meter-long and 55-meter-wide spirit way (shendao) flanked by stone statues depicting mythical and real figures, such as winged horses, ostriches, saddled horses, ornamental columns, and 16 officials, symbolizing imperial authority and cosmic order. The tomb chamber, carved deep into the mountain, was later looted after the Tang dynasty's fall in 907 but was reburied and renovated in 973 under the Northern to restore its integrity.

Personal Life and Interests

Consorts, Children, and Succession Intrigues

Xuanzong's consorts included Empress Wang, installed in 713 and deceased without issue in 724, followed briefly by Empress Xiao from 724 until her deposition in 725. Consort Wu (Wu Huifei), noted for her beauty and political maneuvering, bore him , Prince of Shou, and gained significant influence through alliances with eunuchs. In 745, Yang Yuhuan—previously married to —was elevated to the rank of Precious Consort (Guifei) following the prince's death, becoming Xuanzong's favored companion amid his later infatuation, which began around 741 when she entered the palace. Xuanzong fathered numerous children, including at least 26 recorded sons and several daughters from various consorts, though exact counts vary in historical accounts. Prominent sons were Li Ying (designated in 718), Li Yao (Prince of Fu), Li Jun (Prince of Guang), Li Mao (Prince of Shou, born to Consort Wu), and Li Heng (later Emperor Suzong, born 711 to Consort Yang). Succession was plagued by intrigues, particularly in the 730s. In 737, Consort Wu, seeking to advance her son , reportedly colluded with eunuchs to fabricate charges of , sorcery, and disloyalty against Li Ying, leading Xuanzong to order the execution of Li Ying alongside Li Yao and Li Jun on the same day. This purge created a vacuum; was favored but never formally named due to bureaucratic opposition fearing further Wu clan dominance. Xuanzong thereafter avoided designating an heir to prevent similar conflicts, a decision that contributed to instability during the . In 756, amid flight from rebels, military pressure forced Xuanzong's in favor of Li Heng as Suzong, bypassing other candidates despite Li Heng's lack of prior designation. wielded indirect influence via family promotions, such as her cousin Yang Guozhong's chancellorship, but historical records do not attribute direct meddling in heir selection to her.

Contributions to Poetry and Music

Xuanzong personally composed poetry, demonstrating literary talent that earned inclusion of his works in prominent Tang anthologies. His verses, often in regulated forms, reflected courtly themes and personal reflections, such as a poem mourning Imperial Consort Mei inscribed on her portrait following her death in 737. As a patron, he fostered the Tang poetic golden age by summoning talents like Li Bai to the court in 742, tasking the poet with creating lyrics adaptable to musical settings for imperial performances. In music, Xuanzong established the Pear Garden (Liyuan) academy around 714 as China's first imperial conservatory for , training approximately 300 musicians, dancers, and actors in yanyue (banquet ensemble music) and dramatic forms. He personally instructed students there, playing instruments like the barrel drum and composing tunes such as "Good Spring," while integrating Central Asian influences through renamed foreign pieces and mandated use of exotic instruments in rituals. These reforms, enacted multiple times during his reign, standardized , expanded ensembles, and elevated popular genres, profoundly shaping subsequent traditions where performers became known as "disciples of the Pear Garden." His direct engagement, including leveraging tributary musicians from vassal states, amplified Tang cosmopolitanism in the arts until excesses contributed to later critiques of decadence.

Religious Policies: Daoism, Buddhism, and State Control

Emperor Xuanzong elevated Daoism to a position of imperial favor, declaring , the foundational figure of Daoism, as the Tang imperial ancestor's progenitor in an edict issued in 725 CE, thereby linking the dynasty's legitimacy to Daoist cosmology. This policy reflected Xuanzong's personal devotion, as he consulted prominent Daoist adepts like Sima Chengzhen and integrated Daoist rituals into court ceremonies, including the establishment of the Perfected Man of the Way title for state-sanctioned Daoist practitioners around 721 CE. By 742 CE, he formalized Daoist studies by creating the Institute for the Veneration of the Mysterious and the True at the capital, mandating the compilation and dissemination of Daoist texts, which elevated Daoism's status above other faiths in official orthodoxy. While Xuanzong extended patronage to through the construction of temples and support for scriptural translation, he simultaneously imposed stringent regulations to curb its institutional autonomy and economic influence. In 713 CE, shortly after ascending the throne, he decreed that all monastic ordinations required imperial approval and limited the number of new and to prevent unchecked expansion of tax-exempt . Further measures in the 720s included the closure of unauthorized village shrines and the redirection of their assets to state-supervised monasteries in 727 CE, alongside edicts in 732 CE prohibiting private copying and sale of Buddhist sutras to centralize control over religious dissemination. These actions, coupled with heavier taxation on Buddhist properties compared to Daoist ones, aimed to integrate into the state apparatus rather than allow it independent wealth accumulation, which had grown to encompass vast landholdings by the mid-Tang period. Xuanzong's overarching approach to religious governance emphasized state supremacy, subordinating both Daoism and to imperial authority as tools for social stability and dynastic legitimacy rather than permitting sectarian rivalry. He appointed court-supervised leaders for major faiths, such as the Daoist Commissioner for Merit and the Buddhist Superintendent of Monks, ensuring loyalty oaths and financial audits of religious institutions to extract revenue for military and infrastructural needs. This framework extended to foreign religions like , which faced outright bans in 732 CE for perceived heterodoxy, while tolerating limited Nestorian Christian and Zoroastrian communities under strict oversight. By privileging Daoism as the ritual core of the state cult—evident in its inclusion in examinations alongside Confucian classics—Xuanzong fostered a syncretic orthodoxy that reinforced Tang without ceding political control, though it sowed seeds for later fiscal resentments against unregulated religious estates.

Governance Structure

Key Chancellors and Their Influences

During the Kaiyuan era (713–741), Emperor Xuanzong's administration benefited from chancellors Yao Chong (in office 713–716) and Song Jing (716–720), who enacted reforms to curb bureaucratic excess, lighten tax and corvée burdens on peasants, mitigate severe punishments, and bolster fiscal reserves through efficient revenue collection, fostering and agricultural recovery after prior dynastic turmoil. These measures, grounded in pragmatic rather than ideological overhauls, enabled surplus granaries and reduced banditry, as evidenced by contemporary records of increased and state revenues exceeding 10 million shi of annually by the 720s. Zhang Jiuling (chancellor 736–740) emphasized meritocratic selection in official appointments, opposing and advocating restraint in frontier expansions to avoid overextension of supply lines and fiscal strain, while warning against undue reliance on non-Han generals whose loyalties might prioritize personal ambition over imperial control. His policies promoted scholarly talent over aristocratic privilege, contributing to refined legal codes and cultural patronage, though Xuanzong's increasing detachment from court affairs diminished his sway by 740, allowing factional influences to erode these principles. From 737 onward, Li Linfu held unchallenged chancellorship until 752, systematically sidelining rivals through fabricated charges and palace intrigue, while favoring the appointment of barbarian auxiliaries—such as Sogdians and Turks—to high military commands, ostensibly to avert coups but effectively decentralizing loyalty and inflating border garrisons to over 500,000 troops by the 740s. This approach, prioritizing short-term imperial security over long-term integration, masked administrative rot and enabled unchecked expansion into , diverting resources from core provinces and sowing seeds of resentment among sidelined Han officers. Yang Guozhong, elevated to chancellor in 752 following Li's death, leveraged his kinship with Consort to monopolize policy, exacerbating corruption through land enclosures for elite estates and provocative maneuvers against frontier commanders like , whose three-circuit forces numbered around 180,000 by 755. His tenure accelerated fiscal imbalances, with court expenditures surging amid favoritism, directly catalyzing the as aggrieved generals exploited perceived central neglect.

Central Bureaucracy and Provincial Administration

The Tang central bureaucracy under Emperor Xuanzong (r. 712–756) adhered to the Three Departments and Six Ministries framework inherited from the Sui dynasty, which emphasized functional separation to prevent power concentration. The Department of State Affairs (Shangshu sheng) executed policies through its Six Ministries: Personnel (Libu) for appointments and examinations; Revenue (Hubu) for taxation and treasury; Rites (Libu) for ceremonies and education; War (Bingbu) for military logistics; Justice (Xingbu) for legal administration; and Works (Gongbu) for infrastructure and engineering. Complementing this were the Secretariat (Zhongshu sheng), responsible for drafting edicts, and the Chancellery (Menxia sheng), which reviewed proposals for errors or conflicts, ensuring a deliberative process. Xuanzong initiated reforms in the Kaiyuan era (713–741) to address bureaucratic bloat and inefficiency, dismissing redundant officials and streamlining hierarchies under chancellors Yao Chong (in office 713–716) and Song Jing (722–726), who prioritized merit over and reduced the influence of eunuchs in administrative roles. By 737, he formalized multiple chancellors sharing the Counsellor-in-Chief (zaixiang) duties, distributing authority to accelerate decisions while curbing individual dominance. Additionally, Xuanzong elevated the as an advisory body of scholars for confidential policy input, bypassing formal channels to enhance responsiveness amid growing administrative complexity from territorial expansion. These measures temporarily bolstered efficiency, supporting fiscal stability with registered households rising from 9.1 million in 714 to over 10 million by 742 through reregistration drives. Provincial administration divided the empire into circuits (dao), initially 10 but expanded to 15 by the 740s, each comprising prefectures (zhou) and counties (xian) for local governance, with civil officials (cishi) handling taxation, , and under central oversight. Military authority in frontier circuits, however, devolved to (military commissioners), a system Xuanzong expanded from 713 onward to counter nomadic incursions, appointing figures like to command hybrid cavalry forces totaling around 500,000 troops across 10 key commands by 745. integrated civil, military, fiscal, and surveillance roles, enabling rapid border defense but eroding central control as they amassed personal armies funded by local revenues, setting precedents for autonomy that intensified after 755.

Economic and Social Impacts

Trade Routes, Commerce, and Urban Prosperity

The Tang Empire under Emperor Xuanzong (r. 712–756) witnessed intensified utilization of overland and maritime trade routes, underpinning economic expansion. The , reopened following conquests of Turkic tribes, facilitated booming exchanges with , Persia, and the Mediterranean, where Sogdian intermediaries transported Chinese silk, , and paper in return for , glassware, and precious metals. This network, spanning postal routes totaling 32,100 kilometers serviced by horses and boats, supported and commercial caravans, with checkpoints enforcing tariffs and security. Maritime commerce, administered through commissioners at ports like , extended to , , the , and , yielding imports of spices, ivory, rhinoceros horn, and exotic animals while exporting ceramics and textiles. Xuanzong's establishment of a permanent enhanced naval capabilities, safeguarding sea lanes and enabling direct voyages that reduced reliance on intermediaries. Domestic commerce thrived via merchant guilds (hang), which standardized pricing, quality control, and taxation, fostering market stability in burgeoning urban economies. Foreign merchant communities, including , , and Sogdians, settled in cities, introducing technologies like glassmaking and Zoroastrian practices, while contributing to fiscal revenues through regulated . Chang'an, the capital, epitomized urban prosperity as the world's largest city, its grid-planned wards accommodating diverse markets, workshops, and residential quarters for over a million inhabitants during the Kaiyuan era (713–741). Enhanced transportation infrastructure, including canals and roads, integrated provincial surpluses into metropolitan consumption, sustaining low and elevated living standards until the disrupted networks in 755.

Social Mobility, Examinations, and Elite Formation

During the , the system (keju) served as a mechanism for , theoretically opening bureaucratic positions to talented individuals beyond hereditary , though practical mobility remained constrained by educational access and familial networks. Under Emperor Xuanzong (r. 712–756), particularly during the Kaiyuan era (713–741), the system emphasized classical Confucian learning, poetry, and policy analysis, with the prestigious degree awarded to successful metropolitan examinees after rigorous provincial and capital tests. Xuanzong personally reviewed candidates and expanded categories to include Daoist scriptures alongside traditional subjects, aiming to bolster meritocratic selection amid economic prosperity and administrative needs. Analysis of over 4,000 excavated tomb epitaphs from Tang male elites reveals substantial social mobility, with patterns mirroring mid-20th-century United States society: approximately 50% of elites lacked titled fathers, indicating recruitment from non-aristocratic backgrounds, while paternal education levels rose and father-son occupational correlations weakened over the dynasty. This shift accelerated in the high Tang period under Xuanzong, as expanded schooling and keju success enabled commoner sons to attain official ranks, with education acting as a primary causal driver of upward mobility rather than land or military service alone. However, aristocratic clans retained influence through private academies and recommendation systems (yin), limiting full democratization; jinshi passers numbered typically 20–30 per triennial exam, yielding fewer than 10 annual entrants relative to a bureaucracy of thousands. Elite formation thus blended emerging scholar-gentry (shidafu) with residual , fostering a professional administrative class versed in and that sustained Kaiyuan-era stability. Successful examinees often hailed from provincial families investing in Confucian tutelage, forming networks via and mentorship that perpetuated status across generations, though without the rigid of European . Post-674 reforms, including under Xuanzong's predecessors and continued by him, correlated with increased inter-clan marriages for low-status men, further eroding pure in favor of achievement-based legitimacy. This merit infusion contributed to efficient provincial administration but sowed tensions when later favoritism undermined exam integrity.

Legacy and Assessments

Achievements: Foundations of Tang Zenith

Emperor Xuanzong's early reign, particularly the Kaiyuan from 713 to 741 CE, featured administrative reforms that streamlined governance and enhanced efficiency. He appointed capable chancellors such as Yao Chong (in office 713–721 CE) and Song Jing (in office 713–721 CE and later), who implemented policies to alleviate tax burdens, mitigate harsh criminal penalties, and foster wealth generation through bureaucratic streamlining. These efforts included establishing a Chancellery (menxia sheng) with six departments paralleling the Six Ministries, which improved policy deliberation and reduced administrative bloat by favoring ad-hoc offices and scholars over entrenched officials. Economic policies under Xuanzong reinforced prosperity by updating household registrations (kuohu) to capture unreported taxpayers and permitting exemptions via monetary payments, thereby expanding the tax base and revenue. Reorganization of grain transportation via relay systems and state granaries (zhengcang and yicang) lowered costs for supplying the capital from the lower region, stabilizing food supplies and supporting urban growth. These measures, coupled with frugality mandates and land distribution adjustments, contributed to a period of marked economic expansion, with the empire achieving political stability and resource abundance that defined the Tang zenith. Militarily, Xuanzong fortified borders by instituting ten military commissioners () from 711 CE onward, deploying professional troops (changzhen jian'er) to northern and northwestern frontiers, replacing less reliable palace guards with standing professional forces. Border defenses were bolstered through military buildups and state-run farms, enhancing logistical self-sufficiency and enabling effective deterrence against nomadic threats. These foundations ensured territorial security, allowing internal development and trade along routes like the to flourish without major disruptions during the era's peak.

Criticisms: Personal Indulgences and Governance Failures

In the later phase of his reign, particularly from around 743 onward, Emperor Xuanzong became deeply enamored with Yang Yuhuan (later known as Yang Guifei), leading to excessive personal indulgences that distracted him from imperial responsibilities. He elevated her to the status of imperial consort in 745, fostering a court environment rife with extravagance centered on their relationship. This preoccupation contributed to his withdrawal from daily governance, as he increasingly delegated authority amid advancing age and senility. Xuanzong's favoritism extended to Yang Guifei's relatives, notably appointing her cousin as chief minister in 752, despite the latter's reputation for venality and incompetence. This exacerbated factional strife at court, with 's alienating key military figures, including the powerful frontier commander . Earlier reliance on chancellors like Li Linfu (serving 722–752) had already centralized power in unreliable hands, fostering bureaucratic inertia and unchecked provincial militarization. The culmination of these governance lapses was the , launched in December 755 from Fanyang, where commanded over 150,000 troops as military commissioner of three key circuits. Rivalries between and , unchecked by Xuanzong's neglect, directly precipitated the uprising, which rapidly captured and threatened the capital . In 756, as imperial guards mutinied during the flight westward, they demanded and executed at Mawei Station, blaming her influence for the regime's decay; Xuanzong abdicated shortly thereafter in favor of his son Suzong. These failures eroded central authority, enabling provinces to devolve into semi-autonomous fiefs under military governors and marking the onset of Tang decline, with lasting economic disruption and territorial losses.

Historiographical Debates: Personal vs. Structural Causes of Decline

Traditional , exemplified in works like the compiled by in the , attributes the Tang dynasty's downturn primarily to Emperor Xuanzong's personal moral and administrative lapses after the Kaiyuan era (713–741 CE). During the earlier period, Xuanzong implemented reforms that stabilized the bureaucracy and economy, but by the Tianbao era (742–756 CE), chroniclers depict him as withdrawn into Daoist pursuits, theater, and devotion to Consort , whom he elevated in 745 CE despite her low status. This favoritism allegedly blinded him to corruption among relatives like Chancellor , appointed in 753 CE, and prompted reckless promotions of frontier generals such as , granted three key commands (Fanyang, Pinglu, Hedong) by 751 CE despite reports of his ambitions. Such personal indulgences, historians in this tradition argue, eroded central oversight, culminating in An Lushan's rebellion on December 16, 755 CE, when 150,000–200,000 troops marched on , exploiting Xuanzong's neglect of metropolitan defenses, which had dwindled to under 100,000 effective guards by the 750s. In contrast, modern analyses often prioritize structural vulnerabilities inherent to Tang institutions, viewing Xuanzong's errors as accelerators rather than origins of decline. The (military commissioner) system, formalized under Xuanzong's predecessor Emperor Ruizong but vastly expanded during his reign to counter threats from Tibetans, Uighurs, and Khitans, decentralized authority by 742 CE, with border armies numbering 490,000 troops—outpacing central forces—and controlling fiscal, civil, and military affairs in 10 autonomous circuits. This militarization, driven by the obsolescence of the fubing equal-field militia system amid land concentration and population growth to over 50 million by 755 CE, fostered warlordism, as amassed hereditary troops and revenues independent of court audits. Scholars contend that fiscal strains, including tax evasions by elites and war costs exceeding 10 million strings of cash annually in the 740s, weakened enforcement, making rebellion inevitable regardless of Xuanzong's vigilance; An Lushan's success stemmed from pre-existing enmities, like his feud with , and weak garrisons at Tong Pass, lost on June 15, 756 CE due to systemic underfunding rather than isolated misjudgments. The debate hinges on causality: personalist interpretations, echoed in some contemporary accounts like the Old Tang History (Jiu Tangshu, compiled 945 CE), fault Xuanzong's execution of competent generals and Feng Changqing in 755 CE on eunuch slanders and his flight to on July 14, 756 CE—prompting Yang Guifei's strangulation by mutinous troops—as decisive blows to legitimacy, with the claiming up to 36 million lives (13–16% of global population) and never fully reversed. Structural advocates counter that these were manifestations of deeper rot, including ethnic reliance on non-Han generals like (Sogdian-Turkic) for their prowess against nomads, a policy yielding short-term gains but long-term fragmentation; Xuanzong's 713–741 reforms temporarily masked issues like equal-field erosion, but by 750 CE, revenue shortfalls and clique rivalries (e.g., Li Linfu's 20-year chancellorship, 734–752 CE, favoring sycophants) rendered the system brittle. Recent reassessments, informed by archaeological data on border fortifications, suggest hybrid causation, where Xuanzong's abdication amplified but did not originate the entrenchment that persisted post-rebellion, enabling regional autonomy until 907 CE.

Modern Interpretations and Archaeological Evidence

In contemporary , Emperor Xuanzong's reign is frequently characterized as the Tang dynasty's zenith during the Kaiyuan (712–741), marked by fiscal reforms, , and cultural that sustained a estimated at around 50 million and bolstered central authority through merit-based bureaucracy enhancements. Scholars attribute this prosperity to Xuanzong's early suppression of factionalism and promotion of Confucian scholars like Yao Chong and Song Jing, which temporarily mitigated the administrative disarray inherited from prior rulers. However, assessments of the Tianbao (742–756) highlight a shift toward autocratic , including the elevation of consort and eunuchs, which traditional sources like the portray as catalyzing favoritism toward general and precipitating the 755 rebellion; modern analyses, drawing on fiscal records, counter that systemic strains—such as the breakdown of the amid land concentration by elites and overreliance on semi-autonomous frontier armies—predisposed the empire to instability irrespective of personal lapses. This structural perspective, advanced in studies of Tang military , posits that Xuanzong's policies amplified rather than originated vulnerabilities from prior expansions against Tibetans and Uighurs, challenging purely biographical blame. Archaeological excavations in have unearthed over 1,240 tombs linked to Xuanzong's relatives and officials, yielding nearly 4,000 artifacts including gilt-bronze figurines, fragments, and that attest to elite wealth and refined craftsmanship during his rule. Epitaphs from these sites, such as those in the Dong family , provide inscriptions detailing political appointments and familial ties, offering empirical corroboration for dynastic of intrigue and shifts in the 740s. A notable 2024 discovery of a prime minister's wife's from the Xuanzong period revealed bi discs and indicative of standardized funerary rites, reflecting social hierarchies and rather than the later enforced post-rebellion. Further, murals like the "figure under the tree" from a depict cosmopolitan attire and motifs blending Central Asian influences, aligning with textual accounts of commerce and validating interpretations of Tang openness under Xuanzong without evidence of pre-decline decay in material culture. These finds, analyzed through and provenance studies, underscore causal continuity in from the Kaiyuan reforms, tempering narratives of abrupt personal-induced collapse.

References

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