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National Police of Colombia
Policía Nacional de Colombia
Emblem of the National Police of Colombia
Emblem of the National Police of Colombia
Flag of the National Police of Colombia
Flag of the National Police of Colombia
Roundel of the National Police of Colombia
Roundel of the National Police of Colombia
MottoDios y Patria
God and Fatherland
Agency overview
FormedNovember 5, 1891
Employees140,000 (2018)
Annual budgetUS$ 3.6 to 4 billion (Col$49.210 billion) (2008)[1]
Jurisdictional structure
National agencyColombia
Operations jurisdictionColombia
General nature
Operational structure
HeadquartersBogotá, Colombia
Elected officer responsible
  • Ministry of Defense, Pedro Arnulfo Sánchez Suárez
Agency executive
  • William Oswaldo Rincón Zambrano, Major General
Parent agencyColombian Ministry of Defense
Direcciones
8
  • Seguridad Ciudadana
  • Carabineros y Seguridad Rural
  • Investigación Criminal
  • Inteligencia Policial
  • Antinarcóticos
  • Protección y Servicios Especiales
  • Antisecuestro y Antiextorsión
  • Tránsito y Transporte
Regions and Departmental Commands
List
  • 5 Metropolitan Police
  • 32 Department (State) Police
  • 8 Police Regions
Facilities
Airbases5
Website
policia.gov.co
Colors: White and Green
March: Hymn of the National Police of Colombia Source:[2]


The National Police of Colombia (Spanish: Policía Nacional de Colombia) is the national police force of the Republic of Colombia. It is controlled by the Ministry of Defense, and is the only civilian police force in Colombia.

The force's official responsibilities are to protect the Colombian nation, enforce the law by constitutional mandate, maintain and guarantee the necessary conditions for public freedoms and rights and to ensure peaceful cohabitation among the population.

History

[edit]
Main articles: History of Colombia and History of the Colombian National Police

Creation in the 19th century

[edit]

During the second half of the 19th century, Colombia went through many political changes and struggled to define itself as a nation. Tensions between the two main political parties, the Colombian Liberal Party and the Colombian Conservative Party, escalated into numerous civil as they debated the establishment of a political system based on either between federalism or centralism, among other major differences.

The National Police of Colombia was established by Law 90 of 1888, under government orders, as a dependency of the then Ministry of Government. It was intended to function as a gendarmerie for Bogotá. The new institution was planned to be a force of 300 gendarmes divided into three companies, commanded by a captain, two lieutenants and a second lieutenant, all overseenby two high-ranking officers.

On October 23, 1890, acting president Carlos Holguín Mallarino sanctioned a law authorizing the hiring of qualified trainers from either the United States or Europe to organize and train the newly established National Police. Colombian officials selected a French commissioner named Jean Marie Marcelin Gilibert. The institution was formally established by decree 1000 of November 5, 1891.

The initial mission of the National Police was to preserve public tranquility and protect people, as well as public and private properties. By constitutional law, the institution was required to enforce and guarantee the rights of the people, uphold the constitution and its laws, and obey their authority. Its function also included the authority to take action to prevent crimes and prosecute and arrest lawbreakers. The National Police was intended to recognize no privileges or distinctions among the general population, with the only exception being for international treaties established in the Constitution that granted immunity to members of diplomatic missions.

  • President Roberto Urdaneta Arbelaez
    President Roberto Urdaneta Arbelaez
  • Oficial de Transportes, 1957
    Oficial de Transportes, 1957
  • First motorcycle squad, 1953
    First motorcycle squad, 1953
  • First Emergency Vehicle Ford March 1952
    First Emergency Vehicle Ford March 1952
  • Class Cadetes Carlos Holguin 1951 Escuela General Santander
    Class Cadetes Carlos Holguin 1951 Escuela General Santander
  • Centinela, magazine from class Cadetes Carlos Holguin, 1951
    Centinela, magazine from class Cadetes Carlos Holguin, 1951

After a civil war broke out in 1895 during the presidency of Rafael Núñez, the president went absent and Miguel Antonio Caro temporarily assumed office. Caro declared a general state of emergency, in which authority over the National Police was transferred to the Ministry of War on January 21, 1896, and its members received the same privileges as military personnel.

When the aged president Manuel Antonio Sanclemente was replaced by Vice President José Manuel Marroquín, who assumed the presidency, the National Police was restructured and organized in a military manner. It was then transferred back to the Ministry of Government. To guarantee the security of Bogotá, the National Police was divided into seven districts to cover the entire city. A mutual fund called Caja de Gratificaciones was set up to pay benefits to service members, financed by the penalties imposed on the civilian population. By 1899, the National Police had a force of 944 agents divided into eight divisions.

20th century

[edit]
Main article: Thousand Days' War

When the most intense of the civil wars broke out, known as the Thousand Days' War (1899–1902), the National Police was once again assigned to the Ministry of War until September 6, 1901. Under the Decree 1380 of September 16, 1902 the National Police created the Presidential Palace Honor Guard Corps with the name Guardia Civil de la Ciudad de Bogotá (Civil Guard of the City of Bogotá).

During the presidency of Rafael Reyes, the government authorized by decree 743 of 1904, the transfer of the Police to the Ministry of War, with the president micro-managing the institution. By authorization of Law 43 the Judicial Commissary of Police was established under the dependency of the General Command of the National Police to investigate crimes within its jurisdiction.

From 1906 to 1909 the government created a cloned institution with similar functions to the National Police named the National Gendarmerie Corps (Cuerpo de Gendarmeria Nacional) intended to function decentralized from the National Police command and more militarized regime, managed by the Ministry of War. When General Jorge Holguín suppressed the National Gendarmerie Corps, the province governors were given the authority to organize police services at their own will.

Law 14 signed on November 4, 1915 defined the National Police functions to "preserve public tranquility in Bogotá and any other place where needed to execute its functions, protect citizens and aid the constitutional law by enforcing it and the judicial branch of government." The institution was divided into three groups; the first in charge of security and vigilante functions, a second group acting as civil gendarmerie guard whose main responsibility was protecting the postal service and controlling the prison system. The third group functioned as the judicial police.

In 1916 the institution was trained by the Spanish Guardia Civil in their doctrine, mainly related to criminology. They were restructured by Decree 1628 of October 9 of 1918, assigning the direction, sub-direction and Inspector General duties to officers seconded from the National Army of Colombia - thus the basis for the Prussian style dress uniforms used today. Later the same year, as authorized by a Law 74 of November 19, 1919, the Colombian president hired a French instructor and chief of detectives, who was an expert in the anthropometric system to train the National Police.

In 1924 the Criminal Investigation School was founded to update personnel working in this area. In 1929 the Colombian government in agreement with the Argentine government, hired Enrique Medina Artola to train the Colombian Police in dactylography to replace the anthropometric system. In 1934 in an agreement with the Spanish government the National Police was trained in scientific identification until 1948.

On July 7, 1937 by Decree 1277, the government authorized the creation of the General Santander Academy, which began operating in 1940 as an institute for every police recruit in the force. In 1939 the Colombian government receives the first cooperation agreement with the United States, through a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) committee headed by agent Edgar K. Thompson.

El Bogotazo and La Violencia

[edit]
Main articles: Bogotazo and La Violencia

In 1948 when the civil unrest known as "El Bogotazo" broke out, after the assassination of the popular presidential candidate Jorge Eliecer Gaitán, the stability of the country was abruptly interrupted. This generated a period of civil unrest known as La Violencia, which lasted for almost a decade. The government then decided to restructure the institution once again, with the cooperation and advice from the British. The English mission was composed of Colonel Douglas Gordon, Colonel Eric M. Roger, Lieutenant Colonel Bertrand W.H. Dyer, Major Frederick H. Abbot and Major William Parham, primarily assisted by Colombian lawyers Rafael Escallón, Timoleón Moncada, Carlos Losano Losano, Jorge and Enrique Gutiérrez Anzola.

By Decree 0446 of February 14, 1950 the National Police created the Gonzálo Jiménez de Quesada Non-Commissioned School to train mid-level enlisted staff under the management of the General Santander National Police Academy.

Military dictator, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla

[edit]

On June 13, 1953 Lieutenant General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla seized power in a coup d'etat, assuming functions as President of Colombia. In an attempt to better organize the military forces, President Rojas declared the Decree 1814 on the same day officially renaming and revamping the General Command of the Military Forces of Colombia under the name of General Command of the Armed Forces of Colombia. It defined the conformation of the Armed Forces as comprising the Army, Navy, Aerospace Force and the National Police, the last assigned to the Ministry of War once again as a fourth military power, functioning with its own independent budget and organization, separate from the other branches as established by law.

The Ministry of War was later renamed as the Ministry of Defense. Many Police Academies were planned and constructed in other cities of Colombia. In 1953, the Antonio Nariño Police Academy in Barranquilla and the Alejandro Gutiérrez Police Academy in Manizales were opened, followed by a social plan for retirement and social security called Caja de Sueldos de la Policia Nacional by Decree 417 of 1954. The Eduardo Cuevas Academy later opened in 1955 in the city of Villavicencio and the Carlos Holguín Academy in Medellín was opened in 1958. During this year a cooperation mission arrived from Chile to reorganize and train the Carabinier Corps in urban and rural surveillance.

As established in Law 193 of December 30, 1959, the Colombian nation assumed full financial responsibility for the National Police.

Colombian armed conflict

[edit]
See also: Colombian conflict and Plan Colombia
Luis Hernando Gomez-Bustamante, also known as "Rasguño", arrest performed by the National Police of Colombia

In 1964, as mandated by the Decree 349 of February 19, the Police Superior Academy was founded to indoctrinate officers with the rank of Major to the grade of Lieutenant Colonels. By 1977 the institution had created the first course for female officers.

During the 1960s and 1970s the National Police started facing guerrilla threats which were emerging during these years as a backlash from the political bipartisan struggle of the La Violencia years. There was also the growing problem of contraband and illegal drug trafficking and the involvement of the United States with the implementation of the Plan LASO as a proxy war plan against the expansion of Communism during the Cold War.

Later, the declaration of the war on drugs and the Plan Colombia would eventually help develop the present and ongoing Colombian Armed Conflict involving mainly guerrillas: the FARC-EP including its Patriotic Union Party, ELN, EPL, M-19, among many others; the Drug Cartels such as the Medellín Cartel, Cali Cartel, and others; paramilitarism and the AUC. The Colombian National Police have been fighting against these many threats, tainted or involved in some cases of corruption and accusations of human rights violations, amid the efforts of the majority of the institution to change its image.

Police corruption in Colombia during the Pablo Escobar era (late 1970s–1993)

[edit]

During the 1980s and early 1990s, Colombia was heavily impacted by the drug trade, primarily driven by the infamous Medellín Cartel led by Pablo Escobar. This period was marked by significant police corruption, as the vast wealth and influence of drug cartels infiltrated many levels of Colombian society, including law enforcement.[3][4]

The influence of drug cartels

[edit]

Pablo Escobar, known for his ruthlessness and wealth, used his financial power to corrupt officials and law enforcement agents across Colombia. The Medellín Cartel, at its height, generated billions of dollars annually from the cocaine trade. This immense wealth allowed Escobar to exert considerable influence over police officers through a combination of bribery and intimidation, often summarized by the phrase "plata o plomo" (silver or lead), meaning officers could accept a bribe or face violence.[5][6] Escobar's cartel routinely bribed police officers to look the other way or actively assist in the cartel's operations.[3] Many officers were offered substantial sums of money to provide intelligence, ignore drug trafficking activities, or facilitate the cartel’s logistics.[7] Those who refused were often met with threats or violence. As a result, many police officers felt they had little choice but to comply with the cartel's demands.

Systemic corruption

[edit]

The systemic nature of corruption during this era extended beyond individual officers to higher levels of law enforcement and government.[4][8] Several high-ranking officials were implicated in corruption scandals, highlighting the widespread reach of Escobar's influence.[5] This systemic corruption severely undermined the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts to combat drug trafficking and contributed to the instability and violence that plagued Colombia during this period.[7][9]

Efforts to combat corruption

[edit]

The Colombian government, with assistance from international partners, made concerted efforts to combat police corruption and the influence of drug cartels.[8] These efforts included purging corrupt officers, implementing stricter accountability measures, and enhancing training programs to instill ethical standards.[9] Despite these efforts, the pervasive corruption fostered by Escobar’s cartel left a lasting impact on Colombian law enforcement and highlighted the challenges of addressing organized crime in a context of widespread corruption.[10]

Late 1990s improvement drive

[edit]
Former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell during a visit to Colombia greeted by a Colombian National Police patroller.

During successive weak presidencies, some Colombian National Police members were accused of being involved in many corruption cases, including guerrilla collaboration; paramilitarism and the cleansing of the leftist Patriotic Union Party, among other cases; and the corruption generated by the drug cartels' illegal money or other criminal activities. The CNP became untrusted by the general population of Colombia and the country was facing an intense conflict or a full scale civil war.

To prevent this situation the institution began a process of change focusing on reinvigorating the values and principles of the institution, mostly led by General Rosso Jose Serrano. Colombia's problems were demanding a strong government with strong institutions to face the numerous violations to the constitution and the population in general. The first steps towards this path was the relegation of bad policemen inside the force and targeting the major criminal organizations. The institution also focused on providing better benefits for the policemen and their families; and a particular effort to restore the trust of the community for the police force, emphasizing preventing crime, educating the population and the policemen on cordial relationships, neighborhood watch, cooperation, and community development.

Since 1995 the National Police has begun to change norms, structures, and standard operating procedures, essentially on policemen's judgment toward accomplishing missions and encouraging those who are willing to work with selfless service, integrity, leadership, and a vision of improving the population in general.

The National Police continues to have some corruption and human rights problems but the improvement has been considerable, including the education of personnel in other countries' law enforcement institutions and educational institutions through cooperation agreements. The institution is also highly involved in the Plan Colombia.

21st century

[edit]
Traffic police officer, 2018.

The Colombian National Police, operating under the Ministry of Defense, is responsible for internal law enforcement in Colombia. The Migration Directorate, part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, manages immigration-related matters. Law enforcement investigatory responsibilities are shared between the National Police and the Attorney General’s Corps of Technical Investigators. While the army primarily focuses on defending the country against external threats, it also provides logistical support and security for criminal investigations in high-conflict or remote areas. Civilian authorities generally maintain effective control over security forces, though there have been reports of abuses by security force members.[11]

2007 wiretapping scandal

[edit]

In May 2007, Revista Semana released transcripts of illegal wiretaps of incarcerated paramilitary leaders. After admitting his knowledge of the taps, commanding general Jorge Daniel Castro was asked to resign, along with General Guillermo Chavez Ocana, the intelligence chief. General Oscar Naranjo Trujillo, a relatively junior general, was named to replace Castro. Due to police rules, Naranjo's appointment required the additional retirement of 10 senior generals.[12]

Ongoing controversies

Recent developments in Colombia have highlighted ongoing challenges, including reports of unlawful killings, torture, and arbitrary detention by security forces and armed groups. The country has experienced serious abuses related to its ongoing conflict, criminalization of libel, government corruption, and violence against marginalized groups such as Afro-Colombians and Indigenous persons, LGBTQ+ individuals, and trade unionists. Despite efforts by the government to investigate, prosecute, and punish those responsible for human rights abuses, many cases encounter prolonged delays. These cases often originate from the armed conflict dating back to the 1960s. The government also works to combat official corruption.[11] Recent reforms have focused on improving transparency and accountability, with measures such as mandatory body cameras for officers and increased community oversight.[11]

Ranks

[edit]

Officers

[edit]
Main article: Colombian National Police officer rank insignia

The Officer Corps of the Colombian National Police forms the commanding level of the institution, starting with the rank of sub-lieutenant, and ascending through lieutenant, captain, major, lieutenant colonel, colonel, brigadier general, major general, lieutenant general to the final and top grade of general. This branch is in charge of the administrative area of the institution and its public relations.

Rank badges

[edit]

Executives

[edit]
Main article: Colombian National Police executive rank insignia

The executive branch is formed by chief officers of the Colombian National Police, who are commissioned to political appointee duties, and may or may not actually be professional police officers. In these circumstances, there is often a professional chief of police in charge of day-to-day operations.

Rank Badges

[edit]

Enlisted

[edit]
Main article: Colombian National Police enlisted rank insignia

This branch of the Colombian National Police is in charge of executing operations and functions under the command of the officers.

Auxiliary Police

[edit]
  • Auxiliar de Policía : Auxiliary Police: Military conscripts serving their compulsory military service in the National Police for (18) eighteen months, performing any other activities as a professional member of the institution. They use small arms, side-handle batons (Tonfa), and in areas of public policing or are guards of the police station, using long range weapons (rifles).
  • Auxiliar de Policía Bachiller: Auxiliary Police Bachelor: Provides his compulsory military service in the National Police for (12) twelve months performing community activities, such as regulating traffic and other primary activities of police. Does not use firearms.

Organization

[edit]

The National Police is an armed police service that is civilian in nature, with a hierarchical structure, similar to that of the Military Forces of Colombia. The CNP is headed by the General of the National Police, who is appointed by the President of the Republic, and must be a General officer of the institution.

Because their jurisdiction is national, the police distributed in its coverage: (8) Regional Police, (5) Metropolitan Police and (34) Police Departments, including the region of Uraba.

The Directorate General (DIPON), is divided into six directorates support services (administrative), eight operational direction, a direction of educational counselors and five offices:

  • Operational Level:
    • Dirección de Seguridad Ciudadana (DISEC) - Directorate for Citizens Security (DISEC)
    • Dirección de Carabineros y Seguridad - Directorate of Carabiners and Rural Security
    • Dirección de Investigación Criminal e Interpol (DICIL) - Directorate of Criminal Investigation and Interpol
    • Dirección de Inteligencia Policial (DIPOL) - Police Intelligence Directorate (DIPOL)
    • Dirección de Antinarcóticos (DIRAN) - Anti-Narcotics Directorate (DIRAN)
    • Dirección de Protección y Servicios Especiales (DIPRO) - Directorate for Protection and Special Services (DIPRO)
    • Dirección Antisecuestro y Antiextorsión - Directorate for Anti-kidnapping and Anti Extortion
    • Dirección de Tránsito y Transporte - Directorate of Traffic and Transportation
  • Administrative level:
    • Dirección Administrativa y Financiera (DIRAF) - Directorate for Administration and Finance
    • Dirección de Talento Humano (DITAH) - Directorate of Human Capability
    • Dirección de Sanidad (DISAN) - Directorate of Health
    • Dirección de Bienestar Social (DIBIE) - Directorate of Social Welfare
    • Dirección de Incorporación (DINCO) - Directorate of Incorporation
  • Advisory offices:
    • Inspección General (INSGE) - Inspector General
    • Oficina de Planeación (OFPLA) - Planning Office
    • Secretaria General (SEGEN) - Secretary General
    • Oficina de Telemática (OFITE) - Office of TeleCommunications
    • Oficina de Comunicaciones Estratégicas (COEST) - Office of Strategic Communications

Special Groups

[edit]
See also: Search Bloc
GAULA officers

The following Grupos especiales or Special Groups exist within the CNP:

  • (COPES) Comando de Operaciones Especiales (Commando group)
  • (GOES) Grupo de Operaciones Especiales (SWAT)
  • (CORAM) Comando de Reacción Motorizada (Motorized reaction group)
  • (JUNGLA) Comandos Jungla Antinarcóticos (counter narcotics)
  • (CEAT) Cuerpo Especial Antiterrorista (Anti and counter terror)
  • (EMCAR) Escuadrón Móvil de Carabineros (Rural vigilance)
  • (ESMAD) Escuadrón Móvil Antidisturbios (Riot police)
  • (GRATE) Grupo Antiterrorista (Anti terror)
  • (BLAUR) Grupo Bloque Antiterrorista Urbano (Urban Anti Terror)
  • (UNIR) Unidad de Intervención y Reacción (Quick reaction force)
  • (FUCUR) Fuerza de Control Urbano (urban control)
  • (GAULA) Grupos de Acción Unificada por la Libertad personal (Unified Action Group for Liberty) (Counter kidnap, counter extortion, and hostage rescue)

Regional organization

[edit]
  • Police Regions
  1. Región de Policía No. 1 - Police Region 1 headquartered in Bogota
  2. Región de Policía No. 2 - Police Region 2 headquartered in Neiva
  3. Región de Policía No. 3 - Police Region 3 headquartered in Pereira
  4. Región de Policía No. 4 - Police Region 4 headquartered in Cali
  5. Región de Policía No. 5 - Police Region 5 headquartered in Cucuta
  6. Región de Policía No. 6 - Police Region 6 headquartered in Medellin
  7. Región de Policía No. 7 - Police Region 7 headquartered in Villavicencio
  8. Región de Policía No. 8 - Police Region 8 headquartered in Barranquilla
  • Policía Metropolitana - Metropolitan Police - There are 17 metropolitan police commands in Bogota, Tunja, Medellin, Cali, Barranquilla, Cartagena, Cucuta, Pereira, Bucaramanga, Santa Marta, Valle de Aburrá, Pereira, Ibagué, Neiva, Villavicencio, Pasto and Popayán. These are led by either Colonels or Brigadier Generals.
  • Departamento de Policía - Departmental Police - Each of the 32 departments of Colombia have a full Departmental Police Command with a Colonel as Commanding officer, with Uraba and Magdalena Medio having their own departmental police commands bringing the total number to 34.

Both are subdivided as follows:

  1. Comando Operativo de Seguridad Ciudadana - Operational command of Public Safety
  2. Distrito de Policía - Police District
  3. Estación de Policía - Police Station
  4. Subestación de Policía - Police Substation
  5. Comandos de Atención Inmediata – CAI - immediate attention Commands
  6. Puesto de Policía - Police Posts

Schools

[edit]
Colombian National Police School locations in Colombia.
Motorcycle used by the Colombian National Police

The Colombian National Police has 18 different educational facilities throughout Colombia.

General Santander Academy

[edit]
Main article: General Santander National Police Academy

The General Santander National Police Academy is the main educational center for the Colombian National Police. The academy functions as a university for the formation of its force, focusing primarily on officers. It is located in Bogotá.

National Police NCO School "Gonzalo Jimenez de Quesada"

[edit]

Based in Sibaté, Cundinamarca Department, the National Police NCO School trains all active non-commissioned personnel of the National Police in the police sciences, basic police training and proper methods in policing.

National Carabinier School "Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo"

[edit]

The National Carabinier School with its campus in Facatativá in Cundinamarca trains the Colombian Carabiniers, the mounted and rural branch of the National Police dedicated towards keeping law and order in the nation's rural communities, and one of its oldest components, having been set up in 1846, 45 years before the advent of the National Police.

National Police Staff College

[edit]

Stationed in Bogota, the national capital city, this institution trains all senior grade officers of the National Police in preparation for them to receive more higher responsibilities.

Bogota Metropolitan Police Academy "Lieutenant Colonel Julián Ernesto Guevara Castro"

[edit]

The Bogota Metropolitan Police Academy trains all officers, executive staff and policemen for service in the capital city.

Sumapaz Provincial Police Academy

[edit]

With campus in Fusagasugá, Sumapaz Province, Cundinamarca, it is one of the foremost departamental police academies of the National Police, training men and women in public security and police skills in the province and throughout the Greater Bogota area.

Antonio Nariño Police Academy

[edit]

Stationed in Soledad, Atlántico, this police academy trains future non-commissioned police agents and executive staff in service in the Greater Barranquilla area.

National Police Air Training School

[edit]

Located in the municipality of Mariquita, Tolima, it trains police agents, executive service staff, and officers for service in the Police Air Service.

National Police School of Criminal Investigation and Detection

[edit]

Based in Bogota it is the primary center for the education of police personnel in the processes of criminal investigation.

Equipment

[edit]

Transport

[edit]
Police pickup truck
  1. Armed speedboats.
  2. Transport trucks.
  3. Armored vehicles.
  4. Riot control vehicles
  5. Pick-Up Trucks for rural transport.
  6. Toyota Prado and Toyota Fortuner Trucks for officers transport.
  7. Vans to transport prisoners and metropolitan work.
  8. Buses to transport prisoners and police officers.
  9. Nissan Versa work for metropolitan and prosecution.
  10. High-powered motorcycles.
Armored Riot control vehicle with water cannon ISBI

Personal weapons

[edit]

Grenade launchers:

Machine Guns:

Rifles:

Submachine guns:

Handguns:

Aircraft inventory

[edit]
Blackhawk helicopter (with crew) of the Colombian National Police

Servicio Aéreo de Policia (SAPOL) operates 39 fixed wing aircraft and 65 helicópters[13]

Fixed-wing

Helicopters

Bell 407/407 GX Bell Huey II

Historic Civil Guards now abolished

[edit]
  • Civil Guard (Colombia), created in 1902

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

National Police of Colombia

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The (Policía Nacional de Colombia) is a uniformed force responsible for internal security, , , and public order maintenance throughout the nation. Established on 5 1891 as a professional agency under authority, it operates as a dependency of the Ministry of National Defense, with its director appointed by the president, and maintains a hierarchical structure akin to the while remaining in nature. As of recent official figures, it comprises approximately 179,000 uniformed personnel organized into regions, departments, and specialized units for nationwide deployment. The force's core missions encompass narcotics interdiction, operations against guerrilla groups like the FARC and ELN, protection of constitutional rights, and response to urban and rural threats, evolving from early 20th-century urban policing to a key component of national defense amid decades of internal conflict. Significant achievements include substantial contributions to security gains under , which facilitated the 2016 FARC demobilization by weakening insurgent capabilities through sustained operations, leading to reduced homicide rates and territorial control reclamation in previously guerrilla-dominated areas. Despite these successes, the National Police has been embroiled in controversies, particularly allegations of violations such as excessive use of force, arbitrary detentions, and complicity in extrajudicial killings during counterinsurgency efforts, with reports documenting persistent issues like police brutality even in recent years. These challenges, often linked to high-pressure performance metrics in conflict zones, have prompted internal reforms and international scrutiny, underscoring tensions between operational imperatives and accountability in a context of ongoing threats from armed dissidents and criminal organizations.

History

Origins in the 19th Century

The establishment of formal policing in during the emerged amid the instability following independence from in 1819 and the formation of the in . In the early republican period, relied on decentralized, ad-hoc arrangements, including local militias, army detachments, and municipal guards in urban areas such as and Cartagena, which handled basic order maintenance, crime prevention, and crowd control during frequent political upheavals and civil wars like the War of the Supremes (1839–1842). These early forces lacked national coordination, often blending military duties with civilian policing, and were insufficient for addressing , , and inter-regional conflicts exacerbated by the federation's loose structure under the 1830 and constitutions. Centralization efforts gained momentum during the Regeneration era after the 1886 constitution consolidated power under a stronger executive. On , 1888, Law 90 created the Corps (Cuerpo de Gendarmería Nacional), a uniformed body intended for "high national police services" and special government missions, organized on military lines with three companies, each comprising a , two lieutenants, a , a , four sergeants, eight corporals, two drummers, and 100 gendarmes. This marked the first attempt at a unified national police entity dependent on the Ministry of Government, aimed at professionalizing internal security beyond local jurisdictions. However, the force faced organizational challenges and was short-lived, being derogated by Law 23 of March 19, 1890, which authorized the importation of foreign expertise to reform and train personnel. The foundational organization of what became the National Police occurred in 1891 under President Carlos Holguín's administration. On August 26, 1891, French police commissioner Juan María Marcelino Gilibert was appointed director following a for advisory services, leading to the restructuring via decrees including 1000 of 1891. The initial contingent numbered 450 officers and agents, rigorously selected for physical robustness, in reading, writing, and arithmetic, absence of criminal records, and freedom from vices such as or , emphasizing discipline and moral integrity. Confined initially to under the Governor of Cundinamarca, this force focused on urban order, preventive patrols, and administrative duties, setting precedents for professional standards influenced by European models while adapting to Colombia's partisan violence and rural insecurities.

Early 20th Century Developments and La Violencia

In the early 20th century, the Colombian police underwent gradual centralization and professionalization efforts amid political shifts. Under President Rafael Reyes, Decree 743 of 1904 reassigned the police to the Ministry of War, enhancing national oversight but tying it closer to military structures. A second French advisory mission arrived in 1920 to update surveillance and operational methods, reflecting ongoing European influence on training and tactics. By the 1920s, Decree 1646 of 1928 allowed police chiefs to pursue advanced studies abroad in countries like , , and the , emphasizing and technical skills. The 1930s marked intensified reforms to curb local partisanship and modernize the force. Law 72 of 1930 prohibited police from voting, aiming to insulate the institution from electoral pressures. Decree 1237 and Law 15 of 1935 advanced nationalization, reducing departmental autonomy and political interference in appointments. Decree 1715 of 1936 reorganized the police as a civilian body with military discipline, while Decree 1277 of July 7, 1937, established the Escuela General Santander for officer and agent training, incorporating anthropometry and criminal intelligence techniques. These changes responded to rising urban disorders and bipartisan tensions, though the police remained vulnerable to use as a tool in political disputes. La Violencia erupted on April 9, 1948, with the assassination of Liberal leader , triggering the riots in that killed approximately 3,000 people; police response was hampered by internal confusion, with some officers joining protesters and others withdrawing, exacerbating the chaos. Decree 1268 of April 18, 1948, imposed military functions on the police to restore order, leading to the dismissal of 's force and disarming in amid partisan strife. In response, Decree 1403 of April 30, 1948, redefined the police as a technical, apolitical entity with military-style discipline, independent of parties. Throughout the period, faced acute challenges from bipartisan rural , limited resources (with national strength at only 15,000 by 1948), and subordination to Conservative-led governments, including the of "chulavitas"—informal rural enforcers—who enabled repression but fueled accusations of . 3599 of November 15, 1949, created the Rural Police to bolster countryside presence against bandolerismo and guerrilla emergence, while 2136 of July 18, 1949, formalized duties in safeguarding life, honor, property, and public order. Attacks intensified, such as the 1952 ambush killing six officers in Rovira, Tolima, and the January 7, 1958, assassination of Lieutenant Luis María González Becerra; stations in regions like Cauca and Norte de Santander endured frequent guerrilla raids targeting uniformed personnel. Funding shortfalls from departments further strained operations, as noted in 3565 of November 30, 1950. Militarization accelerated under General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla's 1953 coup, with Decree 1814 of June 10, 1953, nationalizing the police under the Ministry of War and integrating it into the armed forces for unified command against escalating threats. This shift, building on prior Chilean advisory influences from 1930-1936, emphasized combat readiness but blurred civilian-military lines. By May 8, 1958, following Rojas Pinilla's ouster, the police reverted to civilian control under Director Saulo Gil Ramírez Sendoya, amid the National Front's bipartisan pact to end the violence. Overall, the era saw the force evolve from urban-focused to a more expansive, though beleaguered, national entity, with national deaths from 1945-1965 estimated at 100,000-300,000.

Mid-20th Century Military Influences and Reforms

The period of (1948–1958), a bipartisan civil conflict between Liberal and Conservative partisans, severely strained Colombia's police forces, which were ill-equipped to manage widespread rural and urban violence that resulted in an estimated 200,000 deaths. This crisis prompted initial reforms aimed at enhancing police capabilities through militarization, including the creation of specialized mobile units such as the Escuadrón de del Sur del Tolima in to combat guerrilla-like partisan bands in rural areas. By Decree 0446 of February 14, , the National Police established the Non-Commissioned Officers School to train mid-level personnel, reflecting a shift toward more structured, military-style education to bolster operational effectiveness. General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla's military coup on June 13, 1953, intensified these influences by integrating national and local police under the unified command of the armed forces, subordinating them directly to military oversight. Rojas, as a career army officer, imposed strict on the police, reorganizing them into a more hierarchical and combat-oriented structure to suppress ongoing violence, including the formation of additional carabinero squadrons and the Escuela de Carabineros General Alejandro Gutiérrez in 1953 for anti-guerrilla operations. This era marked a pivotal , as police units adopted , equipment, and chains of command, departing from their civilian origins to function as an auxiliary arm of the in countering partisan warfare. Following Rojas Pinilla's ouster in 1957 amid public protests, the militarized framework persisted into the National Front era (1958–1974), where emerging guerrilla threats from groups like the FARC necessitated continued police-military alignment. By 1960, the National Police was formally placed under the Ministry of National Defense, solidifying its status as a militarized institution dependent on defense policy rather than independent civilian justice oversight. These reforms, driven by the causal imperative of internal security threats, enhanced police firepower and mobility—evident in the introduction of motorcycle squads and early emergency vehicles in the early —but also entrenched a hybrid civil-military identity that prioritized order maintenance over purely law-enforcement roles.

Era of Cartel Influence and Corruption (1970s–1990s)

The expansion of cocaine production and exportation from Colombia in the 1970s introduced nascent drug trafficking networks that began testing the integrity of the National Police, with early instances of low-level bribery reported among rural and urban officers tasked with intercepting precursor chemicals and small shipments. By the early 1980s, the formation of consolidated cartels, particularly the led by , amplified these pressures, as traffickers sought to protect laboratories, routes, and distribution points through systematic corruption and intimidation of . The 's dominance in the relied on a dual strategy of financial inducements and targeted violence, famously encapsulated in Escobar's "" (silver or lead) ultimatum to police personnel, compelling many to accept payoffs or face assassination. permeated ranks in cartel strongholds like , where officers leaked operational details or abandoned patrols in exchange for cartel funds, exacerbating institutional vulnerabilities amid low salaries and inadequate oversight. The , by contrast, emphasized bribery over violence, maintaining 64 National Police officers on its payroll during the early 1990s, with payments scaling from $1,550 weekly for privates to $15,000 for generals, enabling control over key plazas without overt confrontation. Escalation peaked in August 1989 following Colombia's ratification of an extradition treaty with the , prompting the to declare open war on the state; Escobar offered escalating bounties for police killings—initially as low as $100 per officer, rising to $4,000 generally and $27,000 for elite [Search Bloc](/page/Search Bloc) members—which fueled a wave of executions resulting in over 300 National Police deaths in the ensuing period. In alone, cartel hitmen killed 125 officers by mid-1990 and 153 more through 1993, prompting mass resignations such as 40 in June 1990 amid the terror campaign. Overall, cartels and allied guerrillas accounted for more than 2,834 police fatalities across the 1980s and 1990s, with Medellín-linked violence claiming around 550 officers by its collapse. These dynamics exposed systemic flaws, including fragmented command structures and insufficient vetting, allowing cartel infiltration to hinder major operations and foster impunity; for instance, leaked intelligence repeatedly compromised raids on Escobar's strongholds until U.S.-backed elite units bypassed routine channels. The cartels' fall—Medellín after Escobar's death on December 2, 1993, and by mid-1995—diminished centralized influence but fragmented corruption into smaller networks, prompting initial reform efforts like the failed civilian oversight proposal and partial purges, though pervasive graft persisted into the decade's end.

Democratic Security Policy and Counter-Insurgency Gains (2002–2010)

The Democratic Security Policy, initiated by President upon taking office on August 7, 2002, prioritized restoring state authority through expanded security forces, intelligence integration, and offensive operations against insurgent and paramilitary groups, with the National Police playing a central role in urban control, rural extension, and civilian protection as part of a "security tripod" alongside the military and judiciary. The policy leveraged U.S. assistance under , which from 2000 onward provided training, equipment, and funding—totaling over $7 billion by 2010—to bolster police capabilities, including the establishment of rural stations and anti-kidnapping units. This enabled the police to shift from defensive postures to proactive counter-insurgency, focusing on dismantling financing networks for groups like the FARC and ELN through arrests and seizures. Police personnel grew from approximately 115,000 in to over 150,000 by , allowing deployment to previously ungoverned areas and achieving presence in all 1,300 municipalities by the end of the , up from hundreds lacking any state . Specialized units, such as the anti-kidnapping group GAULA, conducted thousands of operations, contributing to the demobilization of the (AUC), where over 30,000 paramilitaries laid down arms between 2003 and 2006 amid intensified pressure from joint police-military actions. Against leftist guerrillas, police intelligence led to the capture of hundreds of mid-level FARC and ELN commanders, disrupting urban support cells and rackets that funded rural insurgencies. These efforts yielded measurable reductions in violence: annual homicides fell from over 28,000 in to around 15,000 by 2010, a decline of roughly 40-50 percent, while the national rate dropped from 69 per 100,000 inhabitants to about 33. Kidnappings, a hallmark of guerrilla financing, plummeted from nearly 3,000 reported cases in to 213 by , reflecting successful rescues and deterrence through GAULA interventions and territorial gains. Terrorist attacks similarly decreased by over 80 percent, as police expanded checkpoints, patrols, and community networks that eroded insurgent mobility and recruitment. By 2010, these gains had reclaimed significant territory from FARC control, reducing their active fronts and enabling economic recovery in formerly contested regions, though full eradication required sustained pressure.

Post-Conflict Challenges and Modernization (2010–2022)

Following the signing of the 2016 peace accord with the (FARC), the National Police encountered heightened operational challenges from FARC dissident factions, the National Liberation Army (ELN), and drug-trafficking organizations like the , which filled territorial vacuums left by demobilized guerrillas and intensified activities in production and . These groups contributed to persistent rural insecurity, with armed actors responsible for 98 security force deaths, including 40 police officers, between January 1 and July 31, 2022. In response, the police shifted toward peacebuilding roles, establishing the Police Unit for Peacebuilding (UNIPEP) on April 1, 2016, to support stabilization, , and reintegration in former conflict zones through initiatives like victim assistance and territorial control recovery. Institutional challenges included addressing the legacy of accumulated during decades of , which had blurred the police's civilian mandate and strained relations with communities, particularly in rural areas where armed groups continued to perpetrate massacres and forced displacements. Efforts to demilitarize and refocus on preventive policing faced resistance due to ongoing threats, as evidenced by sustained operations against dissidents; for example, police actions disrupted ELN and networks, though implementation of accord-mandated rural security reforms lagged amid slow progress in crop substitution and state presence. Modernization accelerated under President Iván Duque's administration (2018–2022), prompted by widespread 2021 protests against tax reforms that escalated into riots, drawing international scrutiny over police conduct. On June 6, 2021, Duque announced reforms to "comprehensively transform" the force, emphasizing training, enhanced oversight via independent inspectors, and technological upgrades for , such as body cameras and data analytics for threat assessment. These measures culminated in Law 2196 of January 18, 2022, which introduced a new disciplinary statute replacing military-style codes with civilian-oriented procedures to reduce impunity and align with post-conflict civilian policing norms. Despite these steps, critics argued reforms disproportionately targeted urban units, neglecting rural who bore the brunt of armed group confrontations, while operational results included over 12,000 campaigns sensitizing 437,000 citizens in 2022 alone.

Developments Under Recent Administrations (2022–2025)

Upon assuming office in August 2022, President initiated a reorganization of Colombia's security apparatus, replacing the director of the National Police with General Henry Sanabria Martínez, selected for lacking accusations of violations, as part of a broader -oriented shift in policing. This purge extended to senior police leadership, marking an unprecedented effort to align the force with Petro's "total peace" policy, which prioritized negotiations with armed groups over confrontational tactics, though it drew criticism for potentially undermining operational effectiveness. Petro's administration pursued structural police reforms, including proposals to dismantle the Mobile Anti-Disturbance Squadron (ESMAD) and transition it to a civilian unit, alongside regulations on issued in October 2024 to address excesses during the 2021 protests. In April 2024, Petro publicly denounced police with low-level traffickers, launching a "New Model of Service Oriented Policing" to enhance , while police funding from seized criminal assets dropped 53% between 2023 and 2024, redirecting resources toward social programs. reported a decline in security force violations since 2022, attributing it to these adjustments, though implementation faced resistance from police ranks and stalled in . Under the "total peace" framework, the National Police shifted toward supporting ceasefires with groups like the ELN and dissidents, reducing direct engagements but correlating with rising violence; kidnappings increased 79% and extortions 96% during Petro's tenure through early 2025, per independent analyses, amid a January 2025 violence wave that prompted policy reevaluation. Official police statistics indicated a 1.6% rate decline in 2024 to the lowest in four years, continuing a post-2010 downward trend, though discrepancies with forensic institute data highlighted underreporting concerns, and massacres rose to 76 in 2024 from 59 in 2020. In October 2025, amid operational failures including poor planning in anti-crime missions, Petro removed Carlos Fernando Triana, who had led since 2022, and appointed General R. William Rincón to prioritize combating , narcotrafficking, and internal transparency reforms. Critics, including security analysts, argued that the administration's de-emphasis on military-style policing empowered armed actors, exacerbating rural insecurity despite urban reductions.

Constitutional and Statutory Basis

The constitutional foundation of the National Police of Colombia is Article 218 of the 1991 Constitution, which mandates that the law shall organize the police body and defines the National Police as a permanent armed corps of nature under national authority, with the primary objective of maintaining conditions necessary for the exercise of public rights and freedoms and ensuring peaceful coexistence among Colombians. This provision subordinates the Police to the Ministry of National Defense, distinguishing it from the military while emphasizing its role in public order and security as a institution. Statutory regulation stems principally from Law 62 of August 12, 1993, which establishes comprehensive norms for the Police's organization, career , disciplinary , and welfare provisions, including the creation of a social security entity for police personnel and their families. This law operationalizes the constitutional mandate by detailing administrative, operational, and personnel frameworks, such as recruitment, promotion, and resource allocation, while reinforcing civilian oversight. Subsequent statutes, including Law 1801 of 2016 (National Police Code and Coexistence), further delineate police powers, procedures for interventions, and measures for order maintenance, ensuring proportionality in actions like preventive policing and sanctions for disturbances. These frameworks position the Police as an administrative authority rather than a judicial or one, with its actions subject to constitutional protections and control, as affirmed in interpreting Article 218. Reforms through , such as , continue to align operations with these bases by updating and requirements for personnel.

Primary Responsibilities and Operational Doctrine

The National Police of Colombia serves as the primary agency for internal security, with responsibilities centered on preventing crime, maintaining public order, and ensuring the exercise of constitutional rights and freedoms. Under Article 218 of the 1991 Colombian , it functions as a permanent armed body of civilian nature, tasked with guaranteeing conditions for public liberties, re-establishing them amid disturbances, and collaborating with judicial authorities to administer justice effectively. Its mandate includes applying police norms transparently and efficiently, encompassing traffic regulation, protection of vulnerable populations, and environmental enforcement. Core operational duties involve , intelligence gathering, and proactive crime control, often in coordination with specialized units for counter-narcotics and anti-terrorism efforts amid Colombia's historical challenges with armed groups and illicit economies. The force conducts patrols, responds to emergencies, and supports forensic analysis through its Directorate of Criminal Investigation and (DIJIN). In fiscal year 2023, these activities contributed to a reported reduction in rates to 25.5 per 100,000 inhabitants, attributed to intensified urban policing and rural security operations. The operational doctrine, formalized through the National Policing Model (Modelo Nacional de Vigilancia, MNV) since 2010, prioritizes evidence-based, community-oriented strategies over reactive enforcement alone. Known as "Plan Cuadrantes," it divides territories into geographic quadrants for localized, intelligence-driven patrols, fostering citizen-police collaboration to identify risks and prevent delinquency, with empirical evaluations showing improved trust and crime clearance in pilot areas. This framework integrates risk analysis, technology for , and graduated use-of-force protocols, as outlined in the Police Code and updated manuals emphasizing proportionality and necessity. Recent doctrinal reforms, accelerated post-2022 under administrative directives, incorporate international standards into training and field operations, including protocols for less-lethal weapons and protest management to align with constitutional limits on force. The Jefatura Nacional del Servicio de Policía oversees implementation, evaluating performance metrics like response times and community satisfaction surveys to refine tactics, though independent assessments note persistent challenges in rural zones where military coordination supplements police efforts.

Relationship to Military and Civilian Oversight

The National Police of Colombia is constitutionally defined as a permanent armed body of civilian nature tasked with upholding public order and enabling the exercise of rights, distinct from the Armed Forces yet forming part of the public force alongside the Army, Navy, and Air Force (Constitution, Article 216 and 218). Despite this civilian designation, the police operates under the direct administrative and operational authority of the Ministry of National Defense, which coordinates all national security entities to address intertwined internal threats like insurgency and organized crime. This subordination, entrenched since the 1991 Constitution and reinforced by subsequent laws, integrates the police into a defense framework that prioritizes unified command over fragmented civilian policing, reflecting Colombia's historical reliance on centralized security amid prolonged civil conflict. The of the National Police is appointed by the President, who holds ultimate civilian authority, while the civilian Minister of Defense exercises oversight through policy directives, budgeting, and strategic planning shared with military branches. In practice, this enables close coordination with the military in joint operations—such as counter-narcotics raids and territorial control against groups like the ELN—without formal merger, as the police retains primary responsibility for urban and preventive policing, whereas the military focuses on rural combat and external defense. Civilian supremacy has persisted without major interruptions, evidenced by the absence of military-led coups since the and consistent executive direction during transitions between administrations, though blurred lines in high-threat environments have prompted debates on operational autonomy. Civilian oversight mechanisms emphasize judicial and prosecutorial accountability rather than a dedicated independent inspectorate; investigations into police abuses, including excessive force, are handled by the Attorney General's Office and civilian courts, with internal discipline managed through the police's Professional Responsibility Unit. Reforms, such as the introduction of civilian review experiments, aimed to enhance external scrutiny but have not evolved into a standalone oversight body, leaving reliance on executive and judicial branches amid documented challenges in addressing systemic issues like or protest-related violence. This structure underscores a trade-off: strengthened capacity against non-state armed actors at the potential cost of diluted separation from military norms, as critiqued in analyses of 's securitized .

Organization and Structure

National Command and Leadership

The National Police of Colombia operates under a centralized command structure headed by the , who holds ultimate responsibility for the institution's strategic direction, operational coordination, and administrative oversight. The Director General is appointed by the , typically on the recommendation of the Minister of Defense, and serves at the pleasure of the executive, ensuring alignment with priorities. This position oversees approximately 200,000 personnel across 29 regional commands and specialized units, with authority derived from statutes such as Decreto 2203 de 1993, which defines the organic structure including the Dirección General, Subdirección General, and supporting secretariats. The President exercises supreme command over the Police as part of the armed forces, delegating authority through the Ministry of Defense to maintain civilian oversight while preserving the institution's operational autonomy in and public order functions. The Subdirector General, the , assists in daily management, assumes duties in the Director's absence, and focuses on internal discipline, logistics, and personnel development. Key leadership roles extend to heads of national directorates, such as the Dirección de Seguridad Ciudadana and Dirección de Investigación Criminal (DIJIN), which report directly to the for policy implementation and resource allocation. As of October 25, 2025, William Rincón Zambrano serves as , having assumed office following a possession ceremony led by President on October 24, 2025, replacing the prior incumbent amid a routine high command transition. Rincón, with prior experience in operational commands, emphasized institutional priorities including enhanced transparency and public trust upon taking office. Leadership transitions at this level occur periodically, often tied to presidential administrations, with the required to hold the rank of and demonstrate expertise in counter-narcotics, counter-insurgency, and urban policing derived from decades of institutional evolution under Decree-Law 062 of 1993.

Regional and Metropolitan Commands

The National Police of Colombia organizes its territorial operations through eight regional commands, each supervising multiple departmental police units to coordinate security across broader geographic areas, including rural and inter-departmental threats. These commands handle , sharing, and for their jurisdictions, adapting national doctrines to local conditions such as narcotrafficking corridors or border vulnerabilities. Complementing the regional structure, metropolitan commands—totaling 17—operate in principal urban centers, emphasizing , urban crime suppression, and traffic enforcement in high-population densities. Examples include the , which manages the capital's districts; in Valle del Cauca; and in Atlántico, each led by a under regional oversight. Regional commands, such as Región de Policía No. 1 (headquartered in Facatativá, Cundinamarca) and Región de Policía No. 4 (in , Valle), integrate departmental stations into cohesive operational frameworks, facilitating rapid response to and internal security operations. Metropolitan units, by contrast, maintain dedicated stations (estaciones de policía) and quadrantes tailored to city layouts, with direct lines to national specialized directorates for support in investigations or emergencies. This dual-layered command system, established to balance centralized authority with decentralized execution, has evolved to address Colombia's asymmetric threats, enabling scalability from routine patrols to joint military-police actions in contested zones. Commanders at both levels report through the national operational directorate, ensuring alignment with the police's constitutional mandate for public order maintenance.

Specialized Units and Groups

The National Police of Colombia operates several specialized directorates and groups designed to counter specific criminal threats, including narcotics trafficking, , , and rural insecurity, often in coordination with judicial authorities and international partners. These units emphasize tactical expertise, intelligence-driven operations, and rapid response capabilities, reflecting the country's historical challenges with and insurgent groups. Key among them is the Directorate of Criminal Investigation and (DIJIN), established to plan, direct, and execute judicial, criminalistic, and criminological investigations, including the management of Interpol notices and international cooperation on cross-border crimes. DIJIN analysts collaborate with entities like the Attorney General's Office to dismantle criminal networks, as evidenced by joint training initiatives involving over 200 participants in 2025 to enhance analytical methodologies against evolving threats. The Directorate of Anti-Kidnapping and Anti-Extortion (DISE), operating through Unified Action Groups for Personal Freedom (GAULA), focuses on preventing, investigating, and resolving kidnapping and extortion cases nationwide, with regional commands in departments such as Quindío and a national emergency line (#165) for immediate response. GAULA units have conducted operations leading to arrests and rescues, prioritizing victim recovery and disruption of financing for illegal armed groups, with a structure that includes specialized tactical teams trained for high-stakes interventions. Rural and environmental security fall under the Directorate of Carabineros and Environmental Protection, which deploys mounted patrols and K9 units to secure remote areas, combat , wildlife trafficking, and agricultural crimes, drawing on traditions dating to 1841 but restructured in 1993 for modern threats. operate from basic units in rural municipalities, emphasizing community presence in terrains inaccessible to vehicles, and have expanded to include 15 years of dedicated environmental enforcement by 2025, including rescues of species like wild birds in regions such as Antioquia. Additional specialized groups include the Anti-Narcotics Directorate (DIRAN), tasked with eradicating cultivation and intercepting drug shipments, and elite tactical units like the Special Operations Group (GOES) for high-risk scenarios such as rescues and counter-terrorism. These formations maintain rigorous standards, often integrating international support to sustain operational effectiveness amid persistent narco-insurgent pressures.

Training Institutions and Professional Development

The Dirección de Educación Policial (DIEPO) oversees the formation and continuous professionalization of personnel within the National Police of Colombia, emphasizing ethical training, , and adaptation to security challenges through docencia, research, and social projection. DIEPO coordinates multiple specialized schools to ensure standardized curricula aligned with needs, including a transition toward university-level accreditation in collaboration with the Ministry of Education. Initial training for officers occurs primarily at the Escuela de Cadetes General (ECSAN) in , established as the foundational institution for commissioning professional police leaders through rigorous academic and practical programs. Subofficer and executive-level formation is handled by the Escuela de Suboficiales y Nivel Ejecutivo Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada (ESJIM), which prepares mid-level commanders via integrated executive and patrol training modules. Patrol officers (patrulleros) receive basic formation across regional schools such as the Escuela Carlos Eugenio Restrepo (ESCER), Escuela Metropolitana de (ESMEB), Escuela Gabriel González (ESGON), and Escuela de Yuto (ESMAC), focusing on operational skills and territorial adaptation. Professional development emphasizes ongoing specialization and promotion pathways, with the Escuela de Postgrados de Policía “Miguel Antonio Lleras Pizarro” (ESPOL) offering advanced degrees such as master's in strategic thinking and doctorates in police sciences to enhance and . The Escuela Internacional de Entrenamiento de la Policía de Colombia (CENOP) provides specialized and international courses in areas like and operational tactics, supporting continuous competency validation. As of 2024, over 11,000 patrol officers were enrolled in technology programs for promotion to subintendente rank, reflecting DIEPO's focus on scalable, tech-integrated advancement amid evolving threats. The Facultad de Especialidades del Servicio de Policía further supports this through pre-degree programs in police administration and specializations in , ensuring personnel meet validated professional standards via regular training updates.

Ranks and Personnel

Officer Corps Structure

The officer corps of the National Police of Colombia forms the institution's command echelon, encompassing commissioned officers who hold leadership roles across operational, administrative, and strategic levels. Entry into the corps occurs through rigorous selection and training, primarily via the Escuela de Cadetes de Policía General (ECSAN) in , established as the dedicated academy for forming professional police officers. Candidates, typically bachilleres (high school graduates) aged 18 to 27 or professionals up to age 30, undergo a multi-year program emphasizing discipline, police administration, legal knowledge, and tactical skills, culminating in commissioning as subtenientes upon graduation. The structure divides officers into categories: junior officers (subalternos), comprising subtenientes, tenientes, and capitanes; senior officers (superiores), including mayores, tenientes coroneles, and coroneles; and general officers (directivos), ranging from brigadier generals to generals. Administrative officers within the corps are capped at the rank of coronel, while the primary professional track allows advancement to the highest levels based on merit, time-in-grade requirements (e.g., three years for mayor general, five years for coronel), and evaluations. Promotions are formalized through annual ceremonies presided over by the President or delegated authorities, with congressional approval required for senior ranks to ensure oversight. In 2025, for instance, ascensos included elevations for over 600 officers, such as 180 mayores to teniente coroneles and 240 capitanes to mayores, reflecting performance in counter-narcotics and operations. The , currently a , exemplifies the corps' apex role in national command.
Officer CategoryRanks (Spanish/English Equivalent)Typical Time in Grade for Promotion
General OfficersGeneral/General; Teniente General/Lieutenant General; Mayor General/Major General; Brigadier General/Brigadier GeneralVaries; 3 years for Mayor General
Senior OfficersCoronel/Colonel (5 years); Teniente Coronel/Lieutenant Colonel; Mayor/Major5 years for Coronel
Junior OfficersCapitán/Captain; Teniente/First Lieutenant; Subteniente/Second Lieutenant (4 years initial)4 years for Subteniente post-formation

Non-Commissioned Officers and Enlisted Ranks

The non-commissioned officers, known as suboficiales, constitute the primary supervisory cadre in the National Police of Colombia, bridging executive-level commands and enlisted personnel by leading tactical teams, enforcing discipline, and implementing operational orders in field activities such as patrols and . These ranks emphasize practical leadership developed through specialized training at institutions like the Escuela de Suboficiales Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada. Promotion within suboficiales requires minimum service periods, performance evaluations, and completion of required courses, as regulated by the career framework established in Decreto 1791 de 2000.
Rank (Spanish/English Equivalent)Role and Responsibilities
Sargento Mayor (Sergeant Major)Senior NCO advisor to commanders; oversees suboficial training and unit readiness; highest suboficial rank with potential for distinguished service designations.
Sargento Primero (First Sergeant)Leads squads in high-risk operations; manages logistics for patrols; requires 5 years minimum time-in-grade for promotion.
Sargento Viceprimero (Vice First Sergeant)Assists in squad leadership; focuses on tactical execution and personnel mentoring; 5-year service minimum.
Sargento Segundo (Second Sergeant)Supervises small teams in routine duties like traffic control; entry to senior NCO progression after 5 years.
Cabo Primero (First Corporal)Junior NCO directing basic patrols; handles immediate response tasks; foundational leadership role.
Cabo Segundo (Second Corporal)Entry-level NCO; supports senior cabos in operational support and initial team coordination.
Enlisted ranks, comprising agentes and patrulleros, form the operational backbone, performing direct duties including foot patrols, checkpoints, and initial incident response. Agentes, positioned above patrulleros, often specialize in areas like investigations or , requiring prior experience and validation of competencies for advancement. Patrulleros, established as a distinct category by Ley 2179 de 2021 effective December 30, 2021, represent professionalized entry-level personnel who undergo mandatory initial training to replace prior informal recruit structures, ensuring standardized skills in urban and rural policing. This category integrates approximately 20,000 former basic personnel into a formalized path with defined benefits and promotion criteria, aiming to enhance retention and effectiveness amid Colombia's security challenges. Enlisted promotions are merit-based, tied to service length and evaluations, with agentes eligible for suboficial ascension after meeting educational and experiential thresholds.

Auxiliary and Support Personnel

The auxiliary police personnel, known as auxiliares de policía, consist of conscripts fulfilling mandatory within the National Police of Colombia, incorporated through an administrative act following a selection that includes preinscription, , and registration. These individuals serve temporarily without establishing a labor , typically for periods aligned with military service requirements, such as an 18-month option, and are managed by the Dirección de Talento Humano. Their recruitment emphasizes obligations under No. 1861 of 2017, prioritizing youth contributions to public order without granting public servant status in operational capacities. Training for auxiliary personnel involves a basic police formation course focused on behavioral standards, operational support skills, and enhancement, delivered through institutions under the Dirección de Educación Policial. Duties are strictly supportive and preventive, including assistance in security patrols, , environmental protection tasks (with at least 10% allocation per contingent), and logistical aid under direct supervision of uniformed professionals; they are prohibited from independent or arms unless specifically certified. Performance is evaluated via standardized formats assessing conduct as excellent, good, or deficient, conducted 30 days prior to discharge, with oversight ensuring compliance with institutional discipline. Complementing the auxiliaries, non-uniformed support personnel form the civilian administrative backbone of the National Police, organized into three distinct plants: the Dirección General plant (approximately 3,244 personnel as per Decree 4165/2007), handling administrative, security, intelligence, and advisory functions; the Dirección de Bienestar Social y Familia (DIBIE, 1,094 personnel per Decree 4170/2007), responsible for welfare, family support, education, and recreational programs; and the Dirección de Sanidad (DISAN, 1,321 personnel per Decree 2727/2010), providing health services to police members. These roles span hierarchical levels from directivo to asistencial, supporting core policing through logistics, human resources, and specialized assistance, with historical roots in post-independence civilian staffing formalized by Law 108 of 1946. Ongoing unification proposals aim to equalize benefits across plants, addressing disparities such as activity bonuses exclusive to the Dirección General cohort.

Equipment and Capabilities

Small Arms and Personal Weapons

The standard-issue sidearm of the Colombian National Police is the SP2022 9mm pistol, adopted in 2006 to replace older revolvers and semi-automatic pistols such as the and Colt models previously in service. Initial procurement included 55,890 units under a multi-year valued at $306 million, with additional orders of at least 20,000 units approved in 2023 to sustain the force's inventory amid ongoing operational demands. This polymer-framed, striker-fired pistol features a 15-round capacity, modular rail for accessories, and is selected for its reliability in high-threat environments like urban policing and counter-narcotics operations. For longer-range engagements, the primary assault rifle remains the IWI Galil series, including models like the Galil ACE-21 in 5.56x45mm caliber, manufactured under license by Colombia's state-owned for both military and police use. The Galil, introduced in the 1980s and locally produced since, provides selective-fire capability, a 35-round magazine, and adaptability for jungle and urban combat, with variants emphasizing durability against Colombia's humid, rugged terrain. In 2025, unveiled a domestically developed replacement rifle—lighter, more cost-effective, and slated for series production in 2026—to phase out the Galil, driven by supply chain disruptions and a push for self-reliance following halted imports from and the . Specialized units, such as the Mobile Anti-Riot Squadron (ESMAD), employ additional small arms including submachine guns like the or MP5 variants for close-quarters control, and M4 carbines for tactical operations, though these are not force-wide standards. Shotguns, primarily and Remington 870 models in 12-gauge, are used for breaching and less-lethal munitions deployment in crowd management and entry scenarios. All personnel weapons adhere to regulations under Resolution 02903 of 2017, which governs employment criteria to minimize lethality while ensuring operational effectiveness against armed threats from narcotics traffickers and residual guerrilla elements.

Vehicles and Ground Transport

The ground transport fleet of the National Police of Colombia consists of approximately 16,093 automobiles and 33,310 motorcycles, forming the core of its terrestrial mobility assets as of November . This inventory supports nationwide patrolling, rapid intervention, traffic enforcement, and logistical operations, though roughly 20% of the overall vehicle fleet—including ground units—remains out of service due to maintenance and age-related issues, marking the lowest operational readiness in a decade. Standard patrol vehicles include SUVs, sedans, and vans procured via institutional specifications for passenger and cargo transport, such as conversions and pick-up trucks designed for rugged terrain. Motorcycles dominate urban and highway duties, enabling high maneuverability in congested areas; the force has integrated electric models like Zero Police variants for patrols and received bulk deliveries, such as 483 units in 2011 to bolster capital security. Specialized units feature armored vehicles for high-threat environments, including Hunter TR-12-23 mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) platforms adopted since 2023 for police in counter-narcotics and protection missions. Riot control assets incorporate armored carriers with water cannons and non-lethal systems for crowd management during protests and public disorders. Rescue vehicles, equipped for accident response and victim extraction on national roads, complement the fleet alongside rural pick-ups for remote operations. Modernization initiatives, including a 2024-2025 influx of technology-enhanced vehicles for improved and response, aim to address fleet decay, alongside a resolution updating vehicle for better institutional identification across all terrestrial units. These efforts prioritize durability in Colombia's diverse terrain, from urban centers to conflict-prone rural zones, though resource constraints persist.

Aviation Assets and Technological Support

The aviation assets of the Colombian National Police are managed by the Aviación Policial unit, a strategic component of the Anti-Narcotics Directorate (DIRAN) that supports operations including , aerial , humanitarian aid, prisoner transfers, and environmental protection such as wildfire mitigation. The unit operates from five companies located in , , Mariquita, Guaymaral, and , enabling rapid deployment across the country's diverse terrain. As of 2025, the National Police maintains a fleet of approximately 125 aircraft, comprising 89 owned assets and 37 on loan, including 22 helicopters provided through U.S. support for anti-narcotics efforts. Fixed-wing aircraft include models such as the ATR-42 for transport, Beechcraft variants (C-99, King Air 1900, 200, 300, 350) for surveillance and logistics, Cessna series (152, 172XP, 206, Caravan) for training and patrol, and specialized types like the Air Tractor AT-802 for crop eradication, DASH-8, DC-3-TP, Piper PA, and Twin Otter. Rotary-wing assets feature Bell helicopters (206, 212, 407, 412, Huey II), Hughes 500, and UH-60L Black Hawk for tactical support, search and rescue, and armed operations.
CategoryKey Models
Fixed-WingATR-42, C-99/K1900/K200/K300/K350, /172XP/206/Caravan, , DASH-8, DC-3-TP, Piper PA, Twin Otter
Helicopters/212/407/412/Huey II, Hughes 500, UH-60L Black Hawk
Technological support enhances operational effectiveness through integration of remotely piloted aircraft systems, including Vector and Sky Dio drones for aerial and intelligence gathering in anti-narcotics and urban security missions. The Halcón urban air unit employs these technologies for real-time monitoring and public safety enhancement. In response to threats from criminal groups using armed drones for attacks—including a 2025 incident downing a police Black Hawk helicopter killing 12 officers—the National Police has deployed its own armed drones to counter drug gangs monitoring crops, labs, and ambushing forces. Earlier applications include drones for detecting elevated body temperatures during enforcement in 2020 and city since 2013.

Operations and Effectiveness

Counter-Narcotics and Anti-Trafficking Operations

The National Police of Colombia, through its Directorate of Anti-Narcotics (Dirección Antinarcóticos y Antilavado de Activos), conducts operations targeting production, processing labs, and trafficking routes, including maritime, aerial, and land seizures at ports, airports, and borders. These efforts involve manual , lab destructions, and arrests of high-value targets, often in coordination with the Colombian and international partners like the U.S. (DEA). In 2024, police-led operations resulted in the seizure of 889 tons of , the highest annual figure recorded, alongside the dismantling of over 1,200 processing labs. Seizure volumes continued to escalate into 2025, with 601 tons confiscated by August, equivalent to an estimated 1.5 billion doses prevented from reaching markets and inflicting approximately $1 trillion in losses on traffickers. This marked a 20% increase over the first semester of 2024, with June 2025 alone yielding 213 tons—a 33% rise year-over-year—supported by enhanced intelligence and joint task forces. Arrests have been substantial, exceeding 165,000 for drug-related offenses since August 2022, targeting members of cartels such as the and dissident guerrilla factions involved in trafficking. U.S.-supported has bolstered these capabilities, with Colombian police seizing hundreds of tons annually and arresting thousands of traffickers through joint operations funded via programs like . The U.S. State Department's International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports highlight the police's pivotal role in disrupting transnational networks, though they note persistent challenges from precursor chemical imports and . Despite record interdictions, empirical data from the Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) indicate coca cultivation reached 230,000 hectares in 2023, with potential production surging 53% to 1,738 metric tons, underscoring limitations in eradication amid policy shifts toward voluntary substitution and reduced forced interventions. Police involvement in manual eradication has intensified in response, but violence against operations persists, driven by armed groups protecting crops. These trends reflect causal factors including geographic advantages for cultivation and global demand, rather than solely enforcement shortfalls.

Counter-Insurgency and Anti-Guerrilla Campaigns

The National Police of Colombia has participated in counter-insurgency efforts primarily through intelligence gathering, urban captures, territorial consolidation, and disruption of guerrilla financing via anti-kidnapping and anti-extortion operations, complementing the Colombian military's direct combat role against groups such as the (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). These activities intensified during the administration of President Vélez (2002–2010), under the Democratic Security Policy, which prioritized expanding police presence into rural areas previously dominated by insurgents to reestablish state authority and reduce guerrilla mobility. Police personnel grew from approximately 114,000 in 2002 to over 160,000 by 2006, enabling the recovery of more than 700 municipalities from insurgent control by , with corresponding declines in guerrilla attacks on and villages. In coordination with U.S.-backed (initiated in 2000), the police received training and equipment to conduct counter-narcotics operations that indirectly undermined guerrilla revenues, as FARC and ELN derived significant funding from taxing cultivation and processing—estimated at up to 60% of their income in affected regions. Police-led aerial eradication and efforts, supported by over $1 billion in U.S. aid by 2010, contributed to a 50% reduction in cultivation acreage between 2000 and 2006, pressuring insurgents economically and facilitating joint operations that captured or neutralized hundreds of mid-level commanders involved in narco-trafficking networks. The policy's emphasis on treating as a issue shifted some operations from military to police jurisdiction, enhancing rapid response in populated areas where guerrillas sought refuge or logistical support. Specialized units like the GAULA (Grupos de Acción Unificada por la Libertad Personal), established in 1996, have focused on rescuing hostages and dismantling kidnapping rings operated by guerrillas, which served as a primary revenue source for FARC and ELN—accounting for thousands of abductions annually in the and early . By 2010, GAULA operations had rescued over 1,000 victims and captured more than 2,000 suspects linked to insurgent financing, including ELN members involved in high-profile attacks such as the 2019 car bombing of the General Santander National Police Academy in , which killed 23 and prompted subsequent police-led arrests of eight perpetrators in 2020. These efforts persisted post-2016 FARC peace accord, targeting ELN strongholds and FARC dissident factions; for instance, between 2017 and 2022, police operations resulted in the capture of over 500 dissident combatants and financiers in urban hideouts. Despite these gains, guerrillas have repeatedly targeted police as softer targets for attrition, with over 2,000 officers killed in ambushes and bombings since 1964, underscoring the force's frontline exposure in securing contested territories. Joint Fuerza Pública operations—integrating police and military—have yielded verifiable results, such as the neutralization of ELN fronts in Arauca province through intelligence-driven raids, though persistent insurgent control in remote border areas highlights limitations in purely police-centric approaches without sustained military support.

Crime Reduction and Public Security Metrics

The homicide rate in Colombia declined from a peak of approximately 80 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1991 to 25 per 100,000 in 2023, reflecting broader improvements in public security driven by National Police initiatives alongside military and judicial efforts. This long-term reduction, which halved rates since the , correlates with enhanced police capacity-building under starting in 2000, including expanded training, equipment, and urban patrols that disrupted networks. The 2020 rate reached a historic low of 24.3 per 100,000, attributed partly to sustained police operational results amid the peace process with FARC and temporary mobility restrictions, though rates rose slightly to 26.1 in 2022 before stabilizing. Implementation of the Modelo Nacional de Vigilancia Comunitaria por Cuadrantes (MNVCC) in 2010, a community-oriented policing framework dividing urban areas into patrol quadrants with dedicated officers, has been linked to localized crime drops. Empirical analysis of police infrastructure investments shows visible police presence reducing violent crimes by 20% and property crimes by 40% in targeted municipalities, with effects concentrated within 1-2 km of stations. In Bogotá, higher police density per quadrant—averaging 5.63 officers in 2016—correlated with lower theft rates, as cuadrante deployments prioritized high-crime zones through data-driven hotspot policing.
YearHomicide Rate (per 100,000)Key Police Contribution
200060.0Early aerial interdiction and urban security buildup
201033.0MNVCC rollout and increased patrols
201625.5Sustained quadrant policing amid FARC demobilization
202024.3Operational peaks in captures and seizures
202325.0Continued emphasis on preventive metrics despite post-peace fluctuations
Property crimes like hurto () have shown variable but net downward trends in police-monitored urban areas, with official delictiva tracking reductions in hurto a personas and residencias through SIEDCO system data, though extortion cases rose 55% in intrafamilial subsets by 2023, highlighting uneven progress. National Police operational reports from the Ministry of Defense document over 26,500 international trainees from 2009-2014, bolstering capabilities that supported these metrics via intelligence-led arrests exceeding annual targets in high-impact delitos. Despite these gains, Colombia's rates remain elevated regionally, with ongoing challenges from residual armed groups and urban microtrafficking underscoring the need for sustained empirical evaluation over perceptual surveys.

International Cooperation and Capacity Building

The Colombian National Police has engaged extensively with the through the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), which provides training, equipment, and technical assistance to enhance investigative and prosecutorial capabilities against . This cooperation, rooted in initiated in 2000, has included U.S. advisors delivering specialized training to police units for counternarcotics operations, with over $10 billion in total U.S. aid allocated across security sectors by 2020, a portion directed to police professionalization. Under the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation, Colombian police have reciprocated by training forces in and the , exporting expertise in anti-trafficking tactics developed domestically. Partnerships with have focused on joint operations targeting environmental crimes, fugitives, and security, exemplified by Operation GAIA in 2025, which resulted in 225 arrests across , including Colombian contributions to intelligence sharing on and trafficking. Project TERMINUS, launched by Washington in 2023, bolstered Colombian controls through enhanced data exchange and capacity for detecting cross-border threats. European Union initiatives, such as EL PACCTO and a 2023 pilot with , have facilitated information exchange on , enabling Colombian police to pursue extraditions and dismantle networks spanning and . Capacity-building efforts have emphasized institutional strengthening, with OECD-supported projects since the 2010s integrating police training into broader rule-of-law reforms, focusing on compliance and governance. U.S. INL programs have supplied virtual platforms for interagency coordination and advanced technologies, contributing to a reported increase in CNP's operational effectiveness, as evidenced by higher seizure rates in counternarcotics actions post-assistance. Recent bilateral meetings in March 2025 reaffirmed commitments to sustain these exchanges amid evolving threats like trafficking.

Controversies, Criticisms, and Reforms

Historical Corruption and Cartel Infiltration

During the 1980s and early 1990s, the , led by , extensively infiltrated the Colombian National Police through a combination of , threats, and assassinations, corrupting large numbers of officers particularly in and surrounding areas. Low police salaries, estimated at around $200–300 monthly in the late 1980s, made officers vulnerable to cartel offers of payments equivalent to years of wages for providing protection, tipping off raids, or destroying evidence. The cartel's strategy included systematic killings, with over 500 police officers murdered in alone during the height of its activities from to , creating an environment of fear that coerced compliance or collaboration. The employed subtler tactics, favoring widespread bribery over violence to embed informants and protectors within police ranks, particularly in judicial and institutions by the early . This infiltration extended to high-level officials; for instance, in 1992, Colombian courts probed involving Arturo Casadiego, the second-in-command of the federal police, alongside politicians and others linked to drug trafficking networks. U.S. intelligence assessments from the era documented a U.S.-compiled of over 100 allegedly corrupt Colombian officials, including police commanders, presented to President in the late , underscoring the depth of institutional compromise driven by cartel resources exceeding billions in annual revenues. Such corruption manifested in operational failures, such as leaked intelligence enabling escapes and the sabotage of efforts, with empirical data from U.S. reports indicating that up to 20–30% of police units in cartel strongholds were compromised by the mid-1980s. Despite occasional purges, like the dismissal of hundreds of officers following major scandals, the cartels' economic dominance—generating profits that dwarfed Colombia's national —sustained this infiltration until the cartels' dismantlement post-1993. This era's dynamics highlight causal factors including inadequate state for and the unchecked growth of narco-economies, rather than isolated moral failings, as evidenced by comparative analyses of police vulnerability in high-corruption drug transit states.

Human Rights Allegations and Contextual Factors

The National Police of Colombia has been accused of committing violations, including arbitrary killings, , and excessive use of force, primarily documented in responses to public protests and security operations. The U.S. Department of State's 2023 Country Reports on Practices noted credible reports of unlawful killings and cruel treatment by police, alongside harsh conditions and for past abuses. Similarly, the 2024 report highlighted ongoing issues of and degrading treatment by security forces, with limited accountability for violations. A focal point of allegations arose during the 2021 national strikes, where police, including the Mobile Anti-Disturbance Squadron (ESMAD), employed lethal weapons against demonstrators, contributing to at least 68 deaths according to official figures, though NGOs estimated higher tolls from excessive force. Human Rights Watch reviewed video and forensic evidence indicating deliberate targeting of peaceful protesters, including shootings at close range. Amnesty International documented over 100 cases of gender-based violence, including sexual assaults by officers, during these events, attributing them to a pattern of impunity within the force. Such reports from international NGOs, while detailed, have faced criticism for emphasizing state actions over comparable abuses by non-state actors in Colombia's asymmetric conflicts. These incidents must be viewed against Colombia's entrenched armed conflict and narcotics-driven violence, where police confront guerrilla groups like ELN dissidents and FARC remnants, alongside cartels controlling territories through extortion and massacres. Post-2016 FARC peace accord, armed groups perpetrated over 170 killings of social leaders and 30 ex-combatants in 2024 alone, often using civilian areas for operations that provoke . In regions like Arauca, insurgents impose via kidnappings, child recruitment, and extrajudicial executions, forcing police into reactive, high-threat engagements where distinguishing combatants from civilians is complicated by guerrilla tactics. Homicide rates, exceeding 25 per 100,000 in conflict zones, underscore the causal pressures on security forces, where restraint risks territorial losses to narco-insurgents profiting from coca cultivation yielding up to 293% returns. In response, the National Police has pursued doctrinal reforms, including manuals tailored to armed conflict contexts and a 2021-2025 transformation process emphasizing and . monitoring in 2024 noted some progress in protest protocols but persistent challenges from impunity rates exceeding 90% for officer-involved violations. Contextual factors, including under-resourced rural policing amid dissident expansions, highlight that while abuses warrant investigation, they partly stem from operational necessities in a theater where non-state actors commit symmetric or greater harms.

Excessive Force Claims in Protests and Responses

During the 2021 National Strike protests, which commenced on April 28 against a proposed bill and broadened to encompass demands for social and economic reforms, the Colombian National Police faced accusations of employing excessive force against demonstrators. documented 34 deaths linked to the protest context by June 2021, including two police officers and one alleged member, with evidence indicating that police fired live and less-lethal weapons indiscriminately, contributing to at least 19 civilian fatalities. Reports from the organization detailed instances of beatings, by officers, and the use of resulting in over 100 eye injuries nationwide, often described as stemming from "intentional" targeting. The U.S. State Department's 2021 human rights report corroborated credible accounts of unlawful killings and arbitrary detention by security forces during these events. However, the protests were not uniformly peaceful; significant violence emanated from demonstrators and third parties, including , against , and road blockades that disrupted supply chains and exacerbated and shortages. The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime reported a total of 74 deaths amid the unrest, with 45 attributed to state forces but others linked to clashes involving criminal elements and armed groups such as ELN guerrillas and dissidents who exploited the chaos for territorial gains and extortion. Police operations contended with attacks using improvised explosives and firearms, resulting in injuries to hundreds of officers and complicating in urban hotspots like and . In response, President withdrew the tax reform on May 2, 2021, and announced police restructuring measures in July, including enhanced training in non-lethal tactics and accountability protocols, amid international pressure from entities like the , which called for protest policing reforms following documented killings and maimings. The National Police initiated internal investigations into alleged abuses, asserting that force was proportionate to threats posed by rioters, though critics, including , highlighted persistent impunity with few prosecutions. Subsequent administrations, including that of , proposed a truth commission in 2025 to probe the repression, reflecting ongoing debates over the balance between public order maintenance—rooted in the force's counterinsurgency history—and civilian protections. Non-governmental reports, while detailing state excesses, have been critiqued for underemphasizing protester-initiated escalations that causal analyses link to broader polarization and criminal opportunism in Colombia's post-conflict environment.

Anti-Corruption Measures and Institutional Reforms

In response to widespread corruption scandals and public discontent in the early 1990s, the Colombian National Police underwent significant institutional reforms enacted through Ley 62 of July 27, 1993, which established norms for police organization, created a public social security and welfare entity for officers, and introduced mechanisms for enhanced civilian oversight, including the role of police commissioners to investigate citizen complaints against agents. These changes aimed to professionalize the force, improve leadership and community-oriented service through a cultural transformation plan from 1993 to 1997, and address systemic issues like inadequate disciplinary controls that predated the 1991 Constitution. Subsequent anti-corruption efforts included targeted purges of corrupt elements. In 2014, authorities arrested 19 police officers and 27 civilians in operations against and networks within the force. By May 2016, under a "" policy articulated by then-Director General Jorge Hernando Nieto, the police had dismissed hundreds of officers and arrested 254 more for corruption-related offenses, as part of broader efforts to dismantle internal networks influenced by . More recently, the Proceso de Transformación Integral, launched in 2020, has emphasized risk identification, ethical training, and service enhancements to bolster institutional integrity. The 2023 Plan Anticorrupción y de Atención al Ciudadano outlines specific strategies, including management of 36 identified risks (such as resource shortages and external trafficking pressures) through 1,843 preventive actions, 26 transparency initiatives aligned with digital government tools, and 274 measures to monitor complaints via 75 offices and 1,362 service points. Complementary reforms include rationalization of eight key administrative procedures (e.g., vehicle certifications and pensions) to reduce opportunities, 518 actions involving audits and citizen input, and reinforcement of disciplinary frameworks under Ley 2196 of 2022 and via Ley 2179 of 2021. The force also operates an hotline and citizen complaint to facilitate reporting, though outcomes depend on judicial follow-through.

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