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Environmental security
Environmental security
Environmental security
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Environmental security examines threats posed by environmental events and trends to individuals, communities or nations. It may focus on the impact of human conflict and international relations on the environment, or on how environmental problems cross state borders.

General

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The Millennium Project assessed definitions of environmental security and created a synthesis definition:

Environmental security is environmental viability for life support, with three sub-elements:

  • preventing or repairing military damage to the environment,
  • preventing or responding to environmentally caused conflicts, and
  • protecting the environment due to its inherent moral value.

It considers the abilities of individuals, communities or nations to cope with environmental risks, changes or conflicts, or limited natural resources. For example, climate change can be viewed a threat to environmental security (see the article climate security for more nuance to the discussion.) Human activity impacts CO2 emissions, impacting regional and global climatic and environmental changes and thus changes in agricultural output. This can lead to food shortages which will then cause political debate, ethnic tension, and civil unrest.[1]

Environmental security is an important concept in three fields: international relations and international development and human security.

Within international development, projects may aim to improve aspects of environmental security such as food security or water security, but also connected aspects such as energy security, that are now recognised as Sustainable Development Goals at UN level.[2] Targets for MDG 7 about environmental sustainability show international priorities for environmental security. Target 7B is about the security of fisheries on which many people depend for food. Fisheries are an example of a resource that cannot be contained within state borders. A conflict before the International Court of Justice between Chile and Peru about maritime borders and their associated fisheries[3] is a case study for environmental security.

History

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The Copenhagen School defines the referent object of environmental security as the environment, or some strategic part of it.[4]

Historically, the definition of international security has varied over time. After World War II, definitions typically focused on the subject of realpolitik that developed during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As tensions between the superpowers eased after the collapse of the Soviet Union, academic discussions of definitions of security significantly expanded, particularly including environmental threats associated with the political implications of resource use or pollution.[5] By the mid-1980s, this field of study was becoming known as "environmental security". Despite a wide range of semantic and academic debates over terms, it is now widely acknowledged that environmental factors play both direct and indirect roles in both political disputes and violent conflicts.

In the academic sphere environmental security is defined as the relationship between security concerns such as armed conflict and the natural environment. A small but rapidly developing field, it has become particularly relevant for those studying resource scarcity and conflict in the developing world. Prominent early researchers in the field include Felix Dodds, Norman Myers, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Michael Renner, Richard Ullman, Arthur Westing, Michael Klare, Thomas Homer Dixon, Geoffrey Dabelko, Peter Gleick, Rita Floyd and Joseph Romm.

Origins

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According to Jon Barnett, environmental security emerged as an important concept in security studies because of some interrelated developments which started in 1960s. The first one was the increasing level of environmental consciousness in so called developed countries.[6] Various occurrences and events triggered the growth of the environmental movement during this period of time. Rachel Carson's well-known book Silent Spring was one of the extraordinary publications of that time and brought greater degree of environmental awareness among ordinary people by warning them of the dangers to all natural systems including animals and food chain from the misuse of chemical pesticides such as DDT. Whilst Carson undoubtedly contributed to public debate at the time she was arguably not amongst the more radical 'social revolutionaries' who were also urging greater public awareness of environmental issues.[7] Moreover, a number of the largest well-known environmental non-governmental organizations such as the World Wildlife Fund (1961), Friends of the Earth (1969), and Greenpeace (1971) were founded during that time.[6] Climate security is an extension of environmental security.

The second notable development which brings the emergence of concept of environmental security was number of scholars started to criticize the traditional notion of security and mainstream security debates in their work from 1970s by emphasizing its inability to handle environmental problems at national and international security level.[6] First commentators were Richard Falk who published 'This Endangered Planet' (1971), and Harold and Margaret Sprout who wrote 'Toward a Politics of Planet Earth' (1971). These two commentators asserted in their book that the notion of security can no longer be centered only on military power, rather nations should collectively take measurements against common environmental problems since they pose threat to national well-being and thus international stability. These main ideas about environmental interdependence between countries and common security threat have remained key themes of environmental security studies.[6][8] However, not until Richard Ullman publishes an academic article named "Redefining Security" (1983), radical departure from the dominant security discourse haven't happened. Ullman offered the following definition of national security threat as "an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state, or to private, nongovernmental entities within the state".[9] Significant other scientists onward also linked the issue of security by focusing on the role of environmental degradation in causing violent conflict. Others, while recognizing the importance of environmental problems, argued that labeling them 'environmental security' was problematic and abandoned analytical rigor for normative and emotional power.[10]

Environmental change and security

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Even though environmental degradation and climate change sometimes cause violent conflict within and between countries and other times not,[11] it can weaken the national security of the state in number of profound ways. Environmental change can undermine the economic prosperity which plays big role in country's military capacity and material power. In some developed countries, and in most developing countries, natural resources and environmental services tend to be important factors for economic growth and employment rate. Income from and employment in primary sectors such as agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining, and from environmentally dependent services like tourism, may all be adversely affected by environmental change. If natural capital base of an economy erodes, then so does the long-term capacity of its armed forces.[6][12] Moreover, changes in environmental condition can exposes people to health threats, it can also undermine human capital and its well-being which are essential factors of economic development and stability of human society.

Climate change also could, through extreme weather events, have a more direct impact on national security by damaging critical infrastructures such as military bases, naval yards and training grounds, thereby severely threatening essential national defense resources.[13]

A 2025 study presented the first global quantitative analysis of the environmental impacts of armed conflict. Combining data from the Environmental Performance Index and Uppsala Conflict Data Program, the study found that countries affected by armed conflict experience significantly lower environmental performance and that recovery can take 20 to 30 years.[14]

Selected early literature

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  • Brown, L. 1977. "Redefining Security," WorldWatch Paper 14 (Washington, D.C.: WorldWatch Institute)
  • Ullman, R.H. 1983. "Redefining Security," International Security 8, No. 1 (Summer 1983): 129–153.
  • Westing, A.H. 1986. "An Expanded Concept of International Security," In Global Resources and International Conflict, ed. Arthur H. Westing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Myers, N. 1986. "The Environmental Dimension to Security Issues." The Environmentalist 6 (1986): pp. 251–257.
  • Ehrlich, P.R., and A.H. Ehrlich. 1988. The Environmental Dimensions of National Security. Stanford, CA: Stanford Institute for Population and Resource Studies.
  • Svensson, U. 1988. "Environmental Security: A Concept." Presented at the International Conference on Environmental Stress and Security, the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Stockholm, Sweden, December 1988.
  • Mathews, J.T. 1989. "Redefining Security," Foreign Affairs 68, No. 2 (Spring 1989): 162–177.
  • Gleick, P H. "The Implications of Global Climate Changes for International Security." Climate Change 15 (October 1989): pp. 303–325.
  • Gleick, P.H. 1990c. "Environment, resources, and international security and politics." In E. Arnett (ed.) Science and International Security: Responding to a Changing World. American Association for the Advancement of Science Press, Washington, D.C. pp. 501–523.
  • Gleick, P.H. 1991b. "Environment and security: The clear connections." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 16–21.
  • Homer-Dixon, T.F. 1991. "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict, International Security 16, No. 2 (Fall 1991): 76-116
  • Romm, Joseph (1992). The Once and Future Superpower: How to Restore America's Economic, Energy, and Environmental Security. New York: William Morrow & Co. ISBN 978-0-688-11868-6. ISBN 0-688-11868-2
  • Romm, Joseph J. 1993. Defining National Security: The Nonmilitary Aspects (New York: Council on Foreign Relations)
  • Levy, M.A. 1995. "Is the Environment a National Security Issue?" International Security 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995)
  • Swain, A (1996). "Displacing the Conflict: Environmental Destruction in Bangladesh and Ethnic Conflict in India". Journal of Peace Research. 33 (2): 189–204. doi:10.1177/0022343396033002005. S2CID 111184119.
  • Wallensteen, P., & Swain, A. 1997. "Environment, Conflict and Cooperation." In D. Brune, D. Chapman, M. Gwynne, & J. Pacyna, The Global Environment. Science, Technology and Management (Vol. 2, pp. 691–704). Weinheim: VCH Verlagsgemeinschaft mbH.
  • Terminski, Bogumil. 2009. "Environmentally-Induced Displacement. Theoretical Frameworks and Current Challenges", CEDEM, Université de Liège.
  • Dabelko, G.D. 1996. "Ideas and the Evolution of Environmental Security Conceptions." Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, San Diego, CA, April 1996.
  • Kobtzeff, Oleg. 2000. "Environmental Security and Civil Society", in- Gardner, Hall, (ed.) Central and South-central Europe in Transition, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2000, pp. 219–296.
  • Dodds, F. Pippard, T. 2005. (edited) "Human and Environmental Security: An Agenda for Change, London. Earthscan.
  • Dodds, F. Higham, A. Sherman, R. 2009. (edited) "Climate Change and Energy Insecurity: The Challenge for Peace, Security and Development", London. Earthscan
  • Djoghlaf, A. Dodds, F. 2010 (edited) "Biodiversity and Ecosystem Insecurity: A Planet in Peril", London, Earthscan
  • Dodds, F. Bartram, J. 2016 (edited) "The Water, Food, Energy and Climate Nexus: Challenges and an agenda for action", London, Routledge

See also

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Environmental security

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from Grokipedia
Environmental security refers to the framework addressing how , resource scarcity, and ecological disruptions can threaten human populations, societal stability, national interests, and international order by exacerbating vulnerabilities such as food insecurity, migration pressures, and conflict risks. Emerging prominently after the , the concept posits environmental factors as "threat multipliers" that amplify existing fragilities rather than as primary drivers of violence, with policies aiming to integrate into security strategies through , disaster preparedness, and transboundary cooperation. Key empirical associations link variables like water stress and to heightened tensions in resource-dependent regions, as evidenced in case studies from arid zones and forested frontiers, though rigorous analyses emphasize indirect causal pathways mediated by failures and economic pressures rather than deterministic environmental triggers. Defining achievements include U.S. governmental initiatives curbing environmental harms in conflict zones and international efforts like the Environment and Security Initiative fostering cross-border assessments, yet controversies persist over conceptual vagueness, potential securitization diverting funds from , and skepticism regarding exaggerated claims of in security analyses, particularly amid institutional tendencies to overstate climate-conflict links without sufficient disaggregated data.

Definition and Conceptual Foundations

Core Definition and Scope

Environmental security denotes the linkages between environmental conditions—such as , degradation, and climatic shifts—and broader concerns, including threats to national stability, , and interstate conflict. Scholars define it as the intersection of environmental stressors with traditional paradigms, where ecological disruptions act as potential catalysts for , migration, or institutional collapse rather than mere policy challenges. This framing emerged from observations that anthropogenic pressures on natural systems can amplify vulnerabilities, particularly in fragile states, by straining adaptive capacities and fostering competition over essentials like or freshwater. The scope extends beyond immediate military implications to encompass dimensions, emphasizing individuals' or communities' ability to withstand or adapt to environmental perturbations without existential threats to livelihoods or societal functions. Key areas include hydrosecurity (conflicts over transboundary ), food insecurity from or , and undermining economic resilience in resource-dependent economies. It also incorporates preventive measures, such as restoring war-damaged ecosystems or mitigating from industrial activities, to safeguard long-term integrity against human-induced risks. However, the concept's breadth invites contention, as it risks conflating with causation; rigorous analyses indicate environmental factors typically interact with preexisting socioeconomic fractures rather than independently precipitating organized . Proponents argue for integrating environmental metrics into security assessments, citing cases where scarcity has intensified tensions, as in the region's pastoralist clashes over grazing lands amid . Yet, empirical scrutiny reveals limited standalone predictive power, with studies underscoring that failures and elite manipulations often dominate causal pathways over raw ecological stress. This delineation underscores environmental security's role as a for , not a deterministic lens, prioritizing verifiable over alarmist narratives prevalent in some institutional discourses.

Key Components and Mechanisms

Environmental security involves interconnected components that link ecological systems to human and state stability, including the management of vital natural resources such as , , and fisheries, which underpin and security. These resources, when depleted or contested, can catalyze social unrest; for instance, has been associated with heightened tensions in regions like the , where transboundary river systems support over 200 million people across multiple nations. represents another core component, as degradation reduces resilience to shocks, with global assessments indicating that 75% of terrestrial environments have been significantly altered by human activity since 1970, amplifying vulnerability to pandemics and famines. Climate change functions as a pivotal component by altering precipitation patterns and sea levels, potentially displacing up to 216 million people internally by 2050 in high-vulnerability regions like and , according to World Bank projections. Energy resource dependencies, including fossil fuels and renewables, form a further element, where supply disruptions—such as those from geopolitical conflicts over resources amid melting ice—threaten economic stability and military readiness. Institutional frameworks, such as international agreements like the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change established in 1992, integrate these components by promoting adaptive to avert cascading failures in resource-dependent societies. Mechanisms linking these components to security outcomes operate through scarcity-induced competition, where population pressures and degradation converge to erode ; empirical models show that a 10% decline in agricultural yields correlates with a 1-2% increase in conflict risk in agrarian economies. Environmental stressors act as "threat multipliers," intensifying pre-existing grievances rather than serving as sole causes, as evidenced in the where a 2006-2011 displaced 1.5 million farmers, compounding failures and sparking unrest. Migration driven by habitat loss creates border pressures, with over 21.5 million people annually displaced by weather-related disasters since 2008, straining host nations' resources and fostering hybrid threats like in migration corridors. Conversely, cooperative mechanisms, such as shared environmental monitoring under treaties like the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, mitigate risks by fostering diplomatic resolutions to transboundary disputes, though adherence varies due to concerns.

Historical Evolution

Early Origins (1970s-1980s)

The concept of environmental security began to take shape in the 1970s as part of broader concerns over resource scarcity and ecological limits, with early linkages to articulated by environmental analysts. , founder of the in 1974, played a pivotal role in this initial framing by emphasizing how environmental deterioration could pose systemic risks comparable to military threats. In his October 1977 Worldwatch Paper 14, Redefining National Security, Brown contended that excessive human demands on natural systems—manifesting in , , forest loss, and early signs of alteration—threatened , , and interstate relations more profoundly than conventional armaments in an interdependent world. He supported this with data on eroding cropland productivity, projecting that without policy shifts, such trends could destabilize global agriculture and fuel resource competitions by the 1980s. Brown's analysis built on empirical observations from the decade's environmental milestones, including the 1972 Limits to Growth report by the , which used modeling to forecast collapse risks from exponential population and consumption growth outpacing finite resources like fisheries and minerals. While not explicitly securitizing the environment, it highlighted causal chains from overuse to societal breakdown, influencing security thinkers to view ecological tipping points as latent conflict multipliers. The 1973 and 1979 oil shocks further demonstrated how environmental and resource constraints could trigger immediate geopolitical crises, as embargoes disrupted global energy supplies and economies, prompting U.S. policy reviews on vulnerability to non-military scarcities. In the , these ideas permeated policy and academic discourse, with growing attention to environmental factors in peace research and . Scientific publications increasingly debated incorporating ecological threats into frameworks, citing evidence from degrading ecosystems in developing regions as precursors to migration, , and border disputes. A landmark endorsement came in 1987 when Soviet General Secretary proposed elevating "ecological security" to a core element of , framing and —exemplified by Chernobyl's 1986 fallout—as transnational hazards demanding cooperative of environmental harms over arms races. This period marked a shift from isolated warnings to institutionalized recognition, though empirical links between environmental stress and outright conflict remained contested, with proponents like relying on correlative data from agrarian societies rather than direct causal models.

Post-Cold War Developments (1990s-2000s)

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked a pivotal shift in international security paradigms, diminishing the primacy of interstate military confrontation and elevating non-traditional threats, including environmental degradation as a potential destabilizer of states and societies. This reconfiguration prompted policymakers and scholars to integrate environmental factors into security analyses, viewing resource scarcity, pollution, and ecosystem collapse as amplifiers of conflict risks in fragile regions. Empirical studies during the decade, such as those examining water disputes in the Middle East and land degradation in sub-Saharan Africa, posited causal links between environmental stress and intra-state violence, though debates persisted on whether scarcity directly precipitated armed conflict or merely exacerbated underlying social tensions. The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro formalized this linkage by embedding sustainable resource management into global agendas via , a non-binding that framed environmental neglect as a threat to human well-being and economic stability, influencing subsequent security doctrines. , adapting its post-Cold War role, expanded environmental security considerations through the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS), established earlier but revitalized in the to address transboundary pollution and disaster response in partner nations, with environmental security explicitly listed in cooperative frameworks by the mid-decade. Concurrently, the (UNEP) and other bodies produced assessments, such as post-conflict environmental audits following the 1991 , highlighting how wartime ecological damage— including oil spills affecting 650 kilometers of coastline—could undermine reconstruction and foster long-term instability. Into the , institutional momentum continued with the 2004 UN Security Council debate on as a security risk, building on 1990s precedents to argue that environmental stressors could displace millions and ignite resource wars, though skeptics countered that such framings risked diluting focus on immediate geopolitical threats. The European Union's 2003 Environment and Initiative (ENVSEC), involving UNEP and other agencies, operationalized these concerns by mapping vulnerabilities in regions like the and , where post-Soviet transitions amplified and rates exceeding 20% in affected areas. These developments reflected a broadening consensus, albeit contested, that environmental warranted preventive and , with annual global funding for related programs rising from negligible levels in the early 1990s to over $1 billion by the late through multilateral channels.

Theoretical Perspectives

Securitization and Framing Approaches

Securitization theory, originating from the School of scholars including and Ole Wæver, posits that security issues are not objective threats but are constructed through discursive processes where actors label phenomena as existential dangers, justifying extraordinary measures beyond routine politics. This "" requires uptake by an audience to legitimize the securitized status, shifting the issue from politicization—open debate—to emergency framing that suspends normal rules. In environmental security, involves portraying ecological degradation, such as resource scarcity or climate impacts, as immediate threats to state survival or societal stability, as seen in U.S. policy discourse post-1991 where were linked to to elevate policy priority. Applied to environmental contexts, has been invoked to address phenomena like water conflicts or by framing them as akin to military threats, potentially mobilizing resources but risking the of environmental management. For instance, efforts to securitize in the early 2000s aimed to integrate it into defense planning, with reports from institutions like the U.S. Department of Defense in 2007 highlighting potential instability from resource wars. However, empirical assessments reveal limited success in translating securitized into effective action, as environmental challenges often demand sustained, multilateral rather than the unilateral, short-term responses securitization enables; studies indicate that over-securitization can entrench top-down interventions, sidelining local strategies. Critiques from within the note that academic and policy circles, often influenced by institutional incentives favoring alarmist narratives, may overestimate securitization's utility without rigorous causal evidence linking environmental framing to conflict prevention. Framing approaches complement securitization by emphasizing how narrative constructions shape perceptions of environmental risks as security matters, influencing policy agendas through selective emphasis on threats versus opportunities. In national security strategies across 93 countries analyzed in 2023, defense ministries predominantly framed environmental change—particularly climate variability—as amplifying conflict drivers like migration or resource disputes, often prioritizing military preparedness over mitigation. Alternative frames, such as human security emphasizing individual vulnerabilities from ecological stress, have gained traction in multilateral forums like the UN, though evidence suggests national security frames dominate due to their alignment with state-centric power structures. Experimental studies confirm framing effects: presenting environmental issues as "security threats" increases public support for defensive policies but can reduce backing for cooperative environmental governance, highlighting causal pathways where threat-based language heightens anxiety without proportionally advancing solutions. Limitations of these approaches arise from their constructivist foundations, which prioritize discourse over verifiable causal mechanisms; while securitization explains agenda-setting, it underperforms in predicting outcomes, as seen in failed attempts to securitize in the 1990s Sahel policies, where framing as a yielded aid spikes but persistent degradation due to underlying socioeconomic factors. Moreover, reliance on sources from policy-oriented academia risks embedding biases toward securitizing narratives to secure funding or influence, potentially distorting assessments of environmental drivers, which first-principles analysis reveals are more often mediated by failures than inherent . Thus, while securitization and framing elevate visibility, their efficacy hinges on integration with evidence-based, non-emergency politics to avoid counterproductive escalations.

Scarcity, Abundance, and Conflict Theories

Scarcity theories within environmental security argue that reductions in the availability of renewable natural resources—such as freshwater, , and fisheries—exacerbate social tensions and contribute to violent conflict, particularly in vulnerable developing societies. These theories, often associated with neo-Malthusian perspectives, identify three primary sources of scarcity: supply-induced from environmental degradation (e.g., or ), demand-induced from rapid , and structural from unequal resource distribution favoring elites. Thomas F. Homer-Dixon's influential framework posits that such scarcities trigger "social effects" including decreased economic productivity, a mismatch between environmental stress and human ingenuity to adapt (the "ingenuity gap"), and sharpened social segmentation along ethnic or class lines, ultimately fostering intrastate violence like insurgencies or civil strife rather than interstate wars. Case studies by Homer-Dixon, drawn from the 1990s across regions like and , illustrate this dynamic; for instance, in Pakistan's , intensified farmer displacement and local disputes, while in South Africa's townships, land and mineral shortages amplified apartheid-era cleavages leading to unrest. However, quantitative analyses have found limited broad support for as a direct conflict driver, with causation often confounded by political and economic factors, and little evidence linking it to large-scale interstate conflicts. In contrast, abundance theories emphasize that plentiful endowments of high-value natural resources, especially non-renewable "point-source" commodities like oil, gas, and gemstones, heighten the risk of civil war by enabling predation, corruption, and rebel financing rather than through depletion. Proponents invoke the "resource curse" hypothesis, where resource rents distort institutions, foster rent-seeking by governments or insurgents, and lower the opportunity costs of rebellion for marginalized groups seeking to capture wealth. Empirical studies, such as those analyzing data from 1960 to 2004, indicate that countries with higher per capita resource stocks experience elevated civil war onset risks, particularly when resources are lootable or concentrated; for example, oil abundance has been linked to a 20-30% increased probability of conflict in resource-dependent states post-1970. Indra de Soysa's research challenges simplistic abundance-conflict links by using discounted resource rent measures, finding that overall abundance may reduce war risk through income effects that bolster state capacity, though dependence on specific extractives like oil still correlates with instability in panel data spanning 1960-2004. This perspective critiques scarcity models for overlooking how abundance incentivizes "greed" over "grievance," with quantitative evidence from datasets like the Correlates of War showing stronger associations between oil rents and civil wars (threshold of 25 battle deaths annually) than renewable scarcities. The debate between scarcity and abundance theories underscores causal complexities in environmental security, where neither fully explains conflict patterns without accounting for mediating factors like governance quality and resource type. Scarcity models, rooted in case-based evidence from the 1990s, highlight micro-level tensions in agrarian societies but falter in large-n studies, which reveal that environmental degradation often accompanies rather than precipitates violence. Abundance frameworks, supported by econometric analyses of post-colonial data, demonstrate that non-renewable wealth—evident in conflicts like Angola's diamond wars (1990s) or Sudan's oil-fueled strife (2000s)—drives more predictable civil war risks, though findings vary by measurement (e.g., rents vs. dependence) and conflict definition. Integrated assessments suggest hybrid dynamics: local scarcity may spark grievances, while abundance provides the means for escalation, with robust institutions mitigating both; meta-analyses of 1970-2013 data affirm abundance's role in onset but urge caution against overgeneralizing causality amid endogeneity issues.
TheoryPrimary ResourcesCausal Pathway to ConflictKey Empirical SupportLimitations
ScarcityRenewables (e.g., water, soil)Degradation + population pressure → social stress → intrastate strifeCase studies (e.g., 1990s Homer-Dixon cases in 10+ countries) showing local violence linksWeak large-n correlations; indirect causation via politics/economy
AbundanceNon-renewables (e.g., oil, minerals)Rents → institutional weakness/rebel finance → civil warQuantitative: Oil linked to 1970-2013 war onsets; resource stocks raise risk in 1960-2004 panelsIncome effects may offset in some models; varies by resource controllability

Empirical Assessments

Evidence of Environmental Drivers in Conflicts

Empirical studies have identified environmental scarcities, such as water shortages and , as contributing factors to violent conflicts in resource-stressed regions, particularly through mechanisms like resource competition and forced migration. A meta-analysis of scholarly literature indicates that droughts and declines are associated with heightened risks of various conflict forms, with effect sizes varying by context but showing consistent positive correlations in and the . Similarly, a of disaster-conflict linkages found that 55% of examined studies report disasters, including those driven by environmental extremes, increasing conflict probabilities, especially for low-intensity communal violence. Case studies from the 1990s onward provide qualitative evidence of environmental drivers amplifying tensions. In Chiapas, Mexico, and the , water scarcity and soil degradation interacted with social inequalities to escalate subnational unrest, as documented in detailed fieldwork where scarcities reduced adaptive capacities and spurred displacement. These findings align with cross-case analyses showing environmental stress causing "cleavages" in societies, leading to when combined with weak institutions. In , , prolonged droughts and from the 1980s exacerbated herder-farmer clashes over dwindling and , contributing to the 2003 conflict outbreak by displacing populations and intensifying ethnic rivalries. of and patterns corroborates that long-term environmental shifts correlated with hotspots, though political remained a proximate trigger. The illustrates drought's role in unrest precursors. The 2007–2010 drought, the severest in instrumental records for the , halved crop yields and displaced 1.5 million rural farmers to urban areas, straining resources and fueling grievances that preceded 2011 protests. Hydrological data link this event to anthropogenic warming, with models attributing 50–100% of the drying trend to , thereby providing a pathway from environmental shock to sociopolitical instability. However, such evidence highlights indirect causation, as policy failures in water management amplified impacts.

Counter-Evidence and Alternative Explanations

Numerous large-scale empirical studies have identified only weak or statistically insignificant direct links between , resource scarcity, and the outbreak of violent conflicts. For example, a global analysis of civil conflicts from to 2000 found that indicators of environmental stress, such as or , do not robustly predict violence when controlling for political and institutional variables. Similarly, econometric models examining climate variability's impact on intrastate wars reveal that temperature or precipitation anomalies explain less than 1% of conflict variation, far overshadowed by factors like regime type and . Case studies frequently invoked to support environmental causation, such as the conflict, illustrate alternative primacy of non-environmental drivers upon closer scrutiny. While droughts intensified resource pressures around 2003, the violence stemmed predominantly from ethnic Arab-non-Arab divisions, Sudanese government-backed militia strategies, and pre-existing disputes manipulated for political gain, rather than ecological collapse alone. In broadly, civil wars show no discernible correlation with metrics like rainfall deficits; instead, low , ethnic fractionalization, and historical grievances account for over 70% of onset variance in regression analyses. Theoretical critiques highlight how scarcity paradigms overlook resource abundance's role in fueling conflict through the "," where oil or mineral wealth correlates with a 20-30% higher risk due to and corruption, independent of degradation. Methodological shortcomings in pro-linkage research, including endogeneity (conflicts degrading environments more than vice versa) and selective case-picking, further undermine causal claims, with meta-reviews confirming that institutional failures and mediate any marginal environmental effects. These alternatives underscore that environmental factors, when influential, amplify pre-existing political instabilities rather than initiate them.

Security Implications

National Security Dimensions

Environmental degradation and resource scarcity can undermine by damaging , disrupting military operations, and exacerbating domestic instabilities that strain defense resources. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) characterizes and associated environmental stressors as "threat multipliers" that amplify existing vulnerabilities rather than serving as primary causes of conflict, affecting readiness through increased events, disruptions, and logistical challenges. For instance, recurrent flooding and storm surges have repeatedly impaired training and operations at key installations, with DoD estimating that unmitigated sea-level rise could render portions of over 128 U.S. military sites inoperable by 2100 under a three-foot rise scenario. Coastal military bases exemplify these risks, with in —home to the U.S. Navy's Atlantic Fleet—identified as one of the most vulnerable due to subsidence, tidal flooding, and projected sea-level rise of up to 4.5 feet by 2100 in the region, leading to billions in potential repair costs and operational downtime. Inland facilities face and heat stresses; bases like in and Fort Irwin in have experienced reduced training days from water shortages and extreme temperatures exceeding 120°F, limiting live-fire exercises and vehicle testing since the 2010s. These impacts extend to overseas bases, where GAO assessments highlight vulnerabilities to typhoons and , complicating power projection and alliance commitments. Resource scarcity further heightens concerns by fostering internal pressures and tensions. Water shortages, intensified by overuse and drought, threaten food production and urban stability; in , River depletion—exacerbated by upstream damming and variability—has strained agricultural output, risking unrest in a reliant on the river for 97% of freshwater as of 2020. Similarly, DoD analyses project that environmental stressors could drive mass migrations, overwhelming security; projections indicate up to 13 million potential climate-displaced persons in by 2050, increasing U.S. southern pressures. Energy vulnerabilities compound this, as reliance on imported resources exposes nations to disruptions from environmental damage in supplier regions, such as hurricanes impacting oil production, which accounted for 15% of U.S. crude imports in 2022. While these dimensions underscore adaptive needs, empirical assessments emphasize that environmental factors interact with governance failures and socioeconomic conditions, not acting in isolation to generate security threats. DoD responses have included resilience investments, such as elevating structures at , though recent policy shifts in 2025 have curtailed some climate-focused programs to prioritize core warfighting capabilities.

International and Geopolitical Ramifications

and resource scarcity have fueled geopolitical tensions by intensifying competition over transboundary assets, though empirical analyses indicate limited direct causation of interstate conflicts. Quantitative studies reviewing post-1945 data find that while natural resources like and fisheries correlate with militarized disputes, they rarely escalate to full-scale , often serving as pretexts amid underlying political or territorial grievances rather than primary drivers. For instance, shared river basins, such as the affecting , , and upstream dam projects in , have prompted diplomatic standoffs and threats of military action, yet international has historically prevented , underscoring cooperation's prevalence over conflict in over 3,600 documented water-related events since 1950. In polar regions, accelerated ice melt due to warming has amplified great-power rivalries by unlocking access to untapped hydrocarbons, minerals, and navigation routes, reshaping strategic postures without yet triggering overt hostilities. Russia's militarization of its coastline, including the deployment of hypersonic missiles and expansion of bases since 2014, responds to estimated 13% of global undiscovered oil and 30% of natural gas reserves in the region, prompting NATO members like the to enhance patrols and invest in icebreakers. China's self-designation as a "near- state" has facilitated investments in polar infrastructure and shipping, heightening concerns over dual-use capabilities that could challenge exclusive economic zones under the UN Convention on the , amid projections of the reducing Asia-Europe transit times by 40% compared to . Critical mineral supply chains exemplify how environmental extraction constraints intersect with geopolitical leverage, particularly China's control over 60-90% of global rare earth processing, which underpins technologies from electric vehicles to defense systems. Beijing's restrictions, such as those imposed in 2023-2025 on , , and magnets in response to U.S. tariffs and tech curbs, have disrupted Western supply chains, elevating risks of economic coercion and prompting diversification efforts like Australia's Lynas Rare Earths expansion and U.S. domestic mining incentives under the 2022 . These dynamics reveal environmental security's role in hybrid threats, where resource dominance enables non-military influence, though diversification reduces vulnerability, as evidenced by non-Chinese rare earth output rising 10% annually since 2020.

Intersections with Climate Change

Distinctions from Climate Security

Environmental security addresses a broad spectrum of ecological stressors impacting human and state stability, including resource scarcity, , , and from diverse anthropogenic and natural causes, whereas narrows the focus to threats arising specifically from observed and projected changes in global climate patterns, such as rising temperatures, altered precipitation, and sea-level rise primarily attributed to . This distinction in scope reflects differing causal emphases: environmental security considers as a potential driver or amplifier of conflict through mechanisms like over finite resources (e.g., freshwater disputes in arid regions unrelated to climatic shifts), independent of long-term atmospheric changes, while posits climate variability as a " multiplier" that exacerbates existing vulnerabilities, though indicates such links are indirect and mediated by socioeconomic and political factors rather than deterministic. Methodologically, environmental security frameworks prioritize assessments of local ecological and sustainable to underpin , drawing from first-generation concerned with and second-generation approaches emphasizing services, in contrast to climate security's reliance on global modeling projections (e.g., IPCC scenarios) that often integrate securitized narratives to advocate for mitigation policies, potentially overlooking non-climatic environmental baselines. Critiques of conflating the two highlight how climate security discourse, emerging prominently post-2007 with reports like the UN Security Council's debate on climate as a security issue, may overshadow broader environmental risks by framing them through a singular anthropogenic lens, despite environmental security's longer history tracing to concerns over population-resource pressures.

Shared Risks and Overlaps

Climate change amplifies , creating shared security risks through intensified resource scarcities and ecosystem disruptions that underpin both environmental and climate security concerns. For instance, rising temperatures and altered precipitation patterns exacerbate and , processes already driven by and , leading to reduced and heightened competition over . This overlap manifests as a "threat multiplier," where climate-induced extremes interact with pre-existing environmental vulnerabilities to elevate instability risks, rather than acting as sole drivers. Water scarcity exemplifies these intersections, as climate variability—such as prolonged droughts—compounds anthropogenic environmental stresses like depletion and , fostering interstate tensions and intrastate conflicts. In the , for example, a 20-30% decline in rainfall since the 1970s, attributed partly to , has overlapped with to displace millions and fuel over pastoral resources, with empirical models showing a 10-20% increased probability of conflict onset following severe droughts in fragile states. Similarly, insecurity risks converge when climate-driven crop failures intersect with from , as seen in East Africa's 2011 drought, which affected 13 million people and strained amid underlying environmental . Human mobility and health threats further highlight overlaps, with climate-exacerbated prompting displacement that overwhelms capacities. Sea-level rise, projected to displace up to 200 million people by 2050 in low-lying areas, intersects with from mangrove loss and , potentially sparking resource disputes in regions like the . Health risks from vector-borne diseases, such as malaria expansion due to warmer temperatures overlapping with degradation, add layers of insecurity, with studies indicating a 5-15% rise in conflict risk in areas of high environmental-climate stress convergence. These dynamics underscore that while distinctions exist—climate security emphasizes long-term atmospheric changes—empirical assessments reveal synergistic pathways where environmental factors mediate climate impacts on security outcomes.

Controversies and Critiques

Debates on Threat Exaggeration

Critics of the environmental security paradigm argue that claims of as a major driver of violent conflict often rely on tenuous causal linkages, with indicating indirect or marginal effects overshadowed by political, ethnic, and economic factors. A quantitative analysis of 128 from 1950 to 2000 found that environmental , including and degradation, acts primarily as a contributory condition rather than a direct trigger, exerting influence through intermediate variables like and inequality rather than independently causing onset. Similarly, cross-national studies reviewing data on have concluded that such factors fail to predict conflict incidence robustly when controlling for quality and historical grievances, suggesting exaggeration in narratives positing environment as a " multiplier." Proponents of threat exaggeration critiques, including analysts like , contend that securitizing environmental issues amplifies perceived risks beyond substantiated impacts, particularly in climate-related projections of mass migration or resource wars that have not materialized at predicted scales. For instance, long-standing forecasts of "water wars" due to scarcity—prominent in environmental security literature—have proven unfounded, with historical data showing interstate cooperation over transboundary rivers in 97% of cases rather than escalation to violence. This pattern holds in regions like the , where conflicts such as those in (2011 onward) are attributable more to regime fragility and sectarian divides than to , despite retrospective environmental attributions. Such debates highlight methodological vulnerabilities in environmental security research, where case studies often infer causation from without rigorous controls, potentially inflating threats to justify interventions. Skeptics note that institutional sources, including UN reports, have historically overstated conflict risks from —e.g., early 2000s predictions of environment-induced civil unrest affecting millions—yet comprehensive reviews of post-Cold War conflicts reveal no surge attributable to ecological factors alone. This overemphasis, critics argue, diverts attention from verifiable security priorities like state failure, while academic tendencies toward —evident in selective citation of outlier events—undermine credibility. Empirical meta-analyses reinforce this, estimating environmental variables' effect sizes on conflict risk as small (odds ratios below 1.2) compared to institutional decay (odds ratios exceeding 3.0).

Methodological and Conceptual Shortcomings

The concept of environmental lacks a unified definition, encompassing disparate phenomena from scarcity-induced to broader of ecological degradation, which undermines its analytical coherence. Scholars have noted that this breadth allows for interpretive flexibility but often results in equivocal claims that conflate environmental stressors with threats without rigorous boundaries. Such conceptual elasticity has been critiqued for diluting traditional paradigms by subsuming under threat discourses, potentially prioritizing policy advocacy over falsifiable hypotheses. Methodologically, environmental security research frequently struggles with causal attribution, as environmental variables like or interact with political, economic, and institutional factors in complex ways that defy isolation. Many studies rely on small-n case analyses, such as those by Thomas Homer-Dixon on scarcity-driven "acute" conflicts, which critics argue suffer from and fail to control for confounders like weak or ethnic tensions. Large-n quantitative efforts, including meta-analyses, reveal only modest or context-dependent associations between resource scarcity and conflict onset, often moderated by socioeconomic conditions rather than environmental factors alone, highlighting the limitations of correlational designs in establishing directionality. A persistent conceptual flaw is the drift toward , positing direct causal chains from degradation to instability while underemphasizing human agency, adaptive capacities, or alternative drivers like resource abundance fueling "resource curses" in rentier states. This approach has been faulted for depoliticizing conflicts by attributing them primarily to ecological pressures, sidelining endogenous factors such as or power asymmetries, as evidenced in critiques of scarcity-focused models applied to cases like the or . Empirical reviews indicate that while environmental stressors may exacerbate vulnerabilities, they rarely suffice as proximate causes without enabling political conditions, underscoring the need for multilevel frameworks over monocausal narratives. Data measurement poses additional hurdles, with proxies for environmental stress—such as rainfall deviations or rates—often imprecise or inconsistently applied across studies, leading to inflated effect sizes. Recent assessments of environmental conflict datasets reveal inconsistencies in baseline definitions and outcome variables, complicating cross-case comparisons and . These issues are compounded by a toward positive findings, where null results on environmental-conflict links receive less attention, potentially skewing the field's evidentiary base toward confirmation of hypothesized threats.

Policy Frameworks and Responses

Institutional Initiatives

The (UNEP) leads efforts in environmental security by examining interactions between environmental degradation, climate variability, and conflict dynamics, with initiatives dating to assessments in post-conflict zones since the early 2000s. UNEP coordinates joint programs with agencies including UN-HABITAT, the (FAO), the (IOM), and the (UNDP) to mitigate root causes of resource-driven instability, such as and , through localized interventions in vulnerable regions. The UN Climate Security Mechanism, operationalized since 2018, facilitates integration of environmental risk analyses into UN peacekeeping and development operations, providing tools for early warning on issues like drought-induced displacement affecting stability in 20 priority countries as of 2024. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) formalized its approach via the Climate Change and Security Action Plan adopted on June 14, 2021, which directs annual climate impact assessments for member states' defense planning and emphasizes adaptation to environmental stressors on military operations, such as extreme weather disrupting logistics. NATO established the Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence in Montreal in 2021 to foster research and training on environmental threats, including participation in multinational exercises simulating resource conflicts. The alliance pledged emission reductions of at least 45% by 2030 from 2019 baselines and net-zero operations by 2050, alongside involvement in the Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC) partnership since 2003 to evaluate transboundary risks like pollution in the Balkans and Arctic. The integrates environmental security into its foreign policy through the (EEAS), which since 2020 has advanced climate risk mainstreaming in the (CSDP), funding projects to counter degradation-amplified instability in areas like the via hybrid threat assessments. EU initiatives prioritize environmental , exemplified by €5 billion in commitments under the 2021-2027 for resilience-building in fragile states, focusing on sustainable to avert scarcity-fueled tensions rather than solely emission cuts. These efforts align with broader frameworks like the Global Climate and Security Action Plan, co-developed with partners including the UN and , to harmonize institutional responses across 30 participating entities as of 2023.

Evaluations of Effectiveness

Assessments of environmental security policies reveal mixed outcomes, with initiatives often succeeding in fostering dialogue and awareness but demonstrating limited causal impact on mitigating security threats such as conflict or instability. A 2010 independent evaluation of the Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC), a partnership involving UNEP, UNDP, OSCE, and others, found its projects in regions like the Balkans and Central Asia to be relevant to transboundary environmental risks and "reasonably effective" in conducting vulnerability assessments and building institutional capacities, yet criticized the lack of sustained funding and follow-up mechanisms, which hindered long-term policy integration and measurable reductions in security risks. Similarly, a UNDP evaluation of ENVSEC activities in South-Eastern Europe highlighted strong coordination among partners and contributions to regional networking, but noted that development outcomes, including conflict prevention, remained unquantified due to the initiative's focus on short-term assessments rather than verifiable security improvements. Empirical studies on broader environmental security measures, such as governance reforms aimed at averting scarcity-driven disputes, indicate weak evidence of conflict reduction. For instance, analyses of post-conflict environmental assessments by UNEP in over 20 war-affected areas, including and the of Congo, identified widespread degradation exacerbating vulnerabilities but found that remedial policies like land rehabilitation yielded localized resilience gains without demonstrably lowering recurrence rates of violence, as political and economic factors predominated. Quantitative reviews, including those correlating ecological threats with conflict incidence, show associations between environmental stress and instability in fragile states but fail to establish policies as effective interveners, with improvements explaining more variance in outcomes than environmental interventions alone. Critiques emphasize methodological shortcomings in evaluating these frameworks, including overreliance on correlational data and neglect of variables like ethnic tensions or weak institutions. A critical of ENVSEC argued that while the initiative advanced conceptual linkages between environment and , its projects often diffused responsibility across partners without rigorous impact metrics, resulting in rhetorical successes but negligible alterations in conflict trajectories, as evidenced by persistent disputes in assessed hotspots like the Ferghana Valley. Institutional biases in bodies like UNEP, which prioritize environmental securitization, may inflate perceived threats, diverting resources from evidence-based alternatives; for example, SIPRI reports advocate deeper integration of environmental risks into agendas but acknowledge failures in transitions due to inadequate addressing of root socio-political drivers. Overall, while policies enhance monitoring and cooperation—e.g., NATO's post-2010 environmental guidelines improved military environmental compliance in exercises—their effectiveness in preempting large-scale threats remains empirically unsubstantiated, with success rates in halting environmentally linked projects below 15% globally per defender-led cases.

Recent Advances and Future Outlook

Post-2020 Developments

In June 2021, adopted its Climate Change and Security Action Plan, which integrates climate-related risks into the alliance's core tasks of deterrence and defense, , and cooperative security. The plan emphasizes four pillars: enhancing awareness through climate monitoring and impact assessments; adaptation by incorporating environmental factors into planning and infrastructure resilience; mitigation via reducing from operations, targeting a 45% cut by 2030 relative to 2019 levels; and international cooperation on technology development. This marked a shift toward operationalizing environmental security within doctrines, with subsequent efforts including climate-informed exercises and domain adaptations amid melting ice opening new strategic routes. The United States incorporated climate change as a central national security imperative in its 2022 National Security Strategy, framing environmental stressors like resource scarcity and extreme weather as amplifiers of geopolitical instability. Complementing this, the UN's Climate Security Mechanism, launched in 2019 but expanded post-2020, supported new initiatives from 2021 onward in regions such as South Sudan (UNMISS mission), the Philippines, and the Lake Chad Basin Commission, focusing on integrating climate risk assessments into peacebuilding and conflict prevention. These frameworks highlight a growing institutional recognition of environmental degradation's role in exacerbating fragility, though empirical evidence links such stressors primarily as conflict multipliers rather than direct causes, often interacting with governance failures and socioeconomic vulnerabilities. Russia's 2022 invasion of underscored environmental security dimensions through widespread ecological damage, including contamination from destroyed infrastructure, , and threats to global food and energy supplies via disrupted Black Sea grain exports and nuclear site risks at . Studies post-invasion documented long-term harms such as , from munitions, and , with armed conflicts shown to degrade environmental performance by up to 20-30% in affected areas based on indices like the . In parallel, research in vulnerable regions like the linked droughts and to heightened , with precipitation declines correlating to a 10-15% increased risk of conflict onset in data from 2020-2024. By 2025, evaluations revealed mixed effectiveness in these responses, with NATO's plan advancing analytical tools but lagging in emission reductions due to operational dependencies on fossil fuels, while UN mechanisms faced funding shortfalls amid rising armed conflicts' environmental tolls, estimated at accelerating habitat loss equivalent to decades of peacetime degradation. Emerging gaps include quantifying cascading risks from compound events, such as simultaneous droughts and conflicts, prompting calls for interdisciplinary models integrating satellite data and socioeconomic indicators.

Emerging Challenges and Research Gaps

One emerging challenge in environmental security is the amplification of geopolitical tensions through resource competition, where melting ice has expanded navigable sea lanes and access to hydrocarbons, prompting militarization by nations including , which increased its Arctic military presence by deploying new bases and submarines since 2020, and NATO members enhancing exercises like Cold Response in . This has raised risks of hybrid conflicts over untapped reserves estimated at 13% of global undiscovered oil and 30% of . Biodiversity loss exacerbates zoonotic disease emergence, as brings humans into closer contact with wildlife reservoirs; for instance, in tropical regions has been linked to heightened spillover risks, with models projecting up to 15,000 potential viral transmissions annually under business-as-usual scenarios. Environmental crimes, such as illegal logging and mining, further undermine state stability in fragile regions like the , where they fund non-state armed groups and degrade ecosystems critical for . Supply chain vulnerabilities to events represent another frontier, with events like the 2021 Texas freeze disrupting production and the 2024 Hurricane Helene damaging U.S. Southeast ports, highlighting how localized environmental shocks can cascade into global economic insecurity affecting . Research gaps persist in quantifying direct causal pathways from environmental stressors to violent conflict, as most studies identify as a "threat multiplier" rather than primary driver, with limited by short-term datasets that fail to isolate variables like quality. Geographical biases in environmental data collection disproportionately affect the Global South, where 80% of hotspots are located but monitoring covers only 20-30% of species, impeding predictive modeling for resource-driven . Interdisciplinary integration remains underdeveloped, with silos between climate adaptation policies and conflict prevention frameworks leading to overlooked synergies, such as how —projected to cause 10 million deaths yearly by 2050—interacts with in conflict zones. Longitudinal studies on non-state actors' roles in environmental are scarce, as are scenario-based analyses incorporating post-2020 geopolitical shifts like energy transitions accelerating rare earth mineral disputes. Addressing these requires enhanced data-sharing protocols and hybrid models blending ecological and security metrics.

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