Hubbry Logo
South CaucasusSouth CaucasusMain
Open search
South Caucasus
Community hub
South Caucasus
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
South Caucasus
South Caucasus
South Caucasus
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

South Caucasus
1994 map of Caucasus region prepared by the U.S. State Department
Coordinates42°15′40″N 44°07′16″E / 42.26111°N 44.12111°E / 42.26111; 44.12111
Countries
Related areas
Time ZonesUTC+04:00, UTC+03:30 and UTC+03:00
Highest mountainShkhara (5,203 metres (17,070 ft))

The South Caucasus, also known as Transcaucasia, or the Transcaucasus, is a geographical region on the border of Eastern Europe and West Asia, straddling the southern Caucasus Mountains.[1][2] The South Caucasus roughly corresponds to modern Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, which are sometimes collectively known as the Caucasian States. The total area of these countries measures about 186,100 square kilometres (71,850 square miles).[3] The South Caucasus and the North Caucasus together comprise the larger Caucasus geographical region that divides Eurasia.

Geography

[edit]

The South Caucasus spans the southern portion of the Caucasus Mountains and their lowlands, straddling the border between the continents of Europe and Asia, and extending southwards from the southern part of the Main Caucasian Range of southwestern Russia to the Turkish and Armenian borders, and from the Black Sea in the west to the Caspian Sea coast of Iran in the east. The area includes the southern part of the Greater Caucasus mountain range, the entire Lesser Caucasus mountain range, the Colchis Lowlands, the Kura-Aras Lowlands, Qaradagh, the Talysh Mountains, the Lankaran Lowland, Javakheti and the eastern portion of the Armenian Highlands.

All of present-day Armenia is in the South Caucasus; the majority of present-day Georgia and Azerbaijan, including the exclave of Nakhchivan, also fall within the region.[citation needed] Parts of Iran and Turkey are also included within the region of the South Caucasus.[4][which?] Goods produced in the region include oil, manganese ore, tea, citrus fruits, and wine. It remains one of the most politically tense regions in the post-Soviet area, and contains two heavily disputed areas: Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Between 1878 and 1917, the Russian-controlled province of Kars Oblast and the county of Surmalu uezd (present-day Iğdır Province) were also incorporated into administrative regions of the South Caucasus.[citation needed]

Etymology

[edit]

Nowadays, the region is referred to as the South Caucasus or Southern Caucasia (Armenian: Հարավային Կովկաս, romanized: Haravayin Kovkas; Azerbaijani: Cənubi Qafqaz; Abkhaz: Агырҭ Кавказ, romanized: Agyrt Kavkaz; Georgian: სამხრეთ კავკასია, romanized: samkhret k'avk'asia; Russian: Южный Кавказ, romanized: Yuzhnyy Kavkaz). The former name of the region, Transcaucasia, is a Latin rendering of the Russian-language word Zakavkazye (Закавказье), meaning "[the area] beyond the Caucasus".[3] This implies a Russian vantage point, and is analogous to similar terms such as Transnistria and Transleithania. Other, rarer forms of this word include Trans-Caucasus and Transcaucasus (Russian: Транскавказ, romanized: Transkavkaz).

History

[edit]

Prehistory

[edit]

Herodotus, a Greek historian who is known as 'the Father of History' and Strabo, a Greek geographer, philosopher, and historian, spoke about autochthonous peoples of the Caucasus in their books. In the Middle Ages, various people, including Scythians, Alani, Huns, Khazars, Arabs, Seljuq Turks, and Mongols settled in Caucasia. These invasions influenced on the culture of the peoples of the South Caucasus. In parallel Middle Eastern influence disseminated the Iranian languages and Islamic religion in Caucasus.[3]

Contemporary political map of the Caucasus (including unrecognized states)
Administrative map of Caucasus in the USSR, 1957–1991.

Located on the peripheries of Iran, Russia and Turkey, the region has been an arena for political, military, religious, and cultural rivalries and expansionism for centuries. Throughout its history, the region has come under control of various empires, including the Achaemenid, Neo-Assyrian Empire,[5] Parthian, Roman, Sassanian, Byzantine, Umayyad, Abbassid, Mongol, Ottoman, successive Iranian (Safavid, Afsharid, Qajar), and Russian Empires, all of which introduced their faiths and cultures.[6] Throughout history, most of the South Caucasus was usually under the direct rule of the various in-Iran based empires and part of the Iranian world.[7] In the course of the 19th century, Qajar Iran had to irrevocably cede the region (alongside its territories in Dagestan, North Caucasus) as a result of the two Russo-Persian Wars of that century to Imperial Russia.[8]

Ancient kingdoms of the region included Colchis, Urartu, Iberia, Armenia and Albania, among others. These kingdoms were later incorporated into various Iranian empires, including the Achaemenid Empire, the Parthian Empire, and the Sassanid Empire, during which Zoroastrianism became the dominant religion in the region. However, after the rise of Christianity and conversion of Caucasian kingdoms to the new religion, Zoroastrianism lost its prevalence and only survived because of Persian power and influence still lingering in the region. Thus, the South Caucasus became the area of not only military, but also religious convergence, which often led to bitter conflicts with successive Persian empires (and later Muslim-ruled empires) on the one side and the Roman Empire (and later the Byzantine Empire and Russian Empire) on the other side.

The Iranian Parthians established and installed several eponymous branches in the South Caucasus, namely the Arsacid dynasty of Armenia, the Arsacid dynasty of Iberia, and the Arsacid dynasty of Caucasian Albania.

Middle ages and Russian rule

[edit]

In the middle of the 8th century, with the capture of Derbend by the Umayyad armies during the Arab–Khazar wars, most of the South Caucasus became part of the Caliphate and Islam spread throughout[dubious – discuss] the region.[9] Later, the Orthodox Christian Kingdom of Georgia dominated most of the South Caucasus. The region was then conquered by the Seljuk, Mongol, Turkic, Safavid, Ottoman, Afsharid and Qajar dynasties.

After two wars in the first half of the 19th century, namely the Russo-Persian War (1804-1813) and the Russo-Persian War (1826-1828), the Russian Empire conquered most of the South Caucasus (and Dagestan in the North Caucasus) from the Iranian Qajar dynasty, severing historic regional ties with Iran.[7][10] By the Treaty of Gulistan that followed after the 1804-1813 war, Iran was forced to cede modern-day Dagestan, Eastern Georgia, and most of the Azerbaijan Republic to Russia. By the Treaty of Turkmenchay that followed after the 1826-1828 war, Iran lost all of what is modern-day Armenia and the remainder of the contemporary Azerbaijani Republic that remained in Iranian hands. After the 1828-1829 war, the Ottomans ceded Western Georgia (except Adjaria, which was known as Sanjak of Batum), to the Russians, who populated this new southern boundary mostly with undesirable citizens and tolerated heretics (sektanty).[11]

In 1844, what comprises present-day Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan were combined into a single czarist government-general, which was termed a vice-royalty in 1844-1881 and 1905–1917. Following the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War, Russia annexed Kars, Ardahan, Agri and Batumi from the Ottomans, joined to this unit, and established the province of Kars Oblast as its most south-westerly territory in the South Caucasus.

Modern era

[edit]
Members of the Eastern Partnership

After the fall of the Russian Empire in 1918, the South Caucasus region was unified into a single political entity twice, as the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic from 9 April 1918 to 26 May 1918,[12] and as the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic from 12 March 1922 to 5 December 1936.

Both times these Transcaucasian entities dissolved, although the region would remain politically bound together in the Soviet Union in the form of the three separate Soviet Socialist Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.[13] When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, all three emerged as internationally recognized sovereign states. Transit through the South Caucasus has been hampered since 1989 due to the ongoing Turkish–Azeri blockade of Armenia.

The Russo-Georgian War took place in 2008 across the South Caucasus, contributing to further instability in the region, which is as intricate as the Middle East, due to the complex mix of religions (mainly Muslim and Orthodox Christian) and ethno-linguistic groups.

Since their independence, the three countries have had varying degrees of success in their relations with Russia and other countries. In Georgia, after the Rose Revolution in 2004, the country, like the Baltic states, began integrating into wider European society by opening up relations with NATO and the European Union. Armenia continues to foster relations with Russia, while also developing ties with the EU. Azerbaijan relies less on Russia, strategically partnering with Turkey. All three South Caucasus countries are members of the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the European Political Community, and participate in the EU's Eastern Partnership and Euronest Parliamentary Assembly. All three South Caucasus countries are also members of NATO's Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace.

On 8 November 2023, the European Commission issued an official recommendation to grant EU candidate status to Georgia, which was confirmed on 14 December 2023. Georgia, thus becoming, the first country in the South Caucasus to receive EU candidate status.[14] On 12 March 2024, the European Parliament passed a resolution confirming Armenia meets Maastricht Treaty Article 49 requirements and that the country may apply for EU membership.[15] On 12 February 2025, Armenia's parliament approved a bill officially endorsing Armenia's EU accession.[16]

Demographics

[edit]
Development of life expectancy in the countries of the South Caucasus
Development of life expectancy in the countries of the South Caucasus and in the neighboring countries
Historical population of the South Caucasus
Year Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Total
1897 798,853[17] [better source needed] 1,806,700[18] 1,919,400[19] 4,524,953
1908 877,322[17] [better source needed] 2,014,300[18]
1914 1,014,255[17] [better source needed] 2,278,245 2,697,500[20] 5,990,000[21]
1916–17 993,782[17] [better source needed] 2,353,700[18] 2,357,800[20] 5,705,282
First World War and Russian Revolution
1920–22 780,000 1,863,000 2,677,000 5,321,000[21]
1926 880,464 2,314,571 2,666,494 5,861,529[22]
1929 6,273,000[21]
1931 1,050,633[17] [better source needed] 6,775,000[21]
1932 6,976,000[21]
1933 7,110,000[21]
1939 1,282,338 3,205,150 3,540,023 8,027,511[23]
1956 9,000,000[21]
1959 1,763,048 3,697,717 4,044,045 9,504,810[24]
1970 2,491,873 5,117,081 4,686,358 12,295,312[25]
1979 3,037,259 6,026,515 4,993,182 14,056,956[26]
1989 3,304,776 7,037,867 5,400,841 15,743,484[27]
1999–2002 3,213,011[28] 7,953,400[18] 3,991,300[29] 15,157,711
2009–14 3,018,854[30] 8,922,000[18] 3,713,804[31] 15,654,658

Wine

[edit]

The South Caucasus, in particular where modern-day Turkey, Georgia, Armenia and Iran are located, is one of the native areas of the wine-producing vine Vitis vinifera.[32] Some experts speculate that the South Caucasus may be the birthplace of wine production.[33] Archaeological excavations and carbon dating of grape seeds from the area have dated back to 8000–5000 BC.[34] Wine found in Iran has been dated to c. 7400 BC[32] and c. 5000 BC,[35] while wine found in Georgia has been dated to c. 8000 BC.[36][37][38] The earliest winery, dated to c. 4000 BC, was found in Armenia.[32]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

South Caucasus

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The South Caucasus, also referred to as Transcaucasia, is a geopolitical region comprising the sovereign states of , , and Georgia, positioned between the to the west and the to the east, straddling the southern flanks of the Mountains and serving as a historical crossroads between , , and the . The region covers roughly 186,000 square kilometers and supports a of approximately 17.2 million , characterized by diverse ethnic groups, languages, and religions including in and Georgia and Islam in . Since gaining independence from the in 1991, the South Caucasus has been defined by protracted ethnic conflicts—such as those over between and , and separatist movements in involving Georgia—that have hindered economic development and drawn in external powers like . However, recent military victories by in 2020 and 2023 have shifted dynamics, culminating in a U.S.-brokered peace agreement in August 2025 between and , signaling a transition from frozen conflicts toward normalization and reduced Russian influence. Strategically vital for energy security, the region hosts key pipelines like the , transporting Caspian hydrocarbons to and bypassing , bolstering Azerbaijan's role as an energy exporter while fostering across the area amid projections of moderated GDP expansion in 2025.

Geography

Physical Features and Borders

The South Caucasus occupies the area south of the mountain range, positioned between the to the west and the to the east, primarily comprising the states of Georgia, , and . This region features predominantly mountainous terrain shaped by the range, which extends across southern Georgia, Armenia, and , creating deep valleys, high plateaus, and limited lowland areas. Elevations in the typically range below 3,000 meters, with the highest peak, in Armenia, reaching 4,090 meters. Major rivers define hydrological features, including the Kura River, which originates in the mountains of Georgia, flows 1,515 kilometers through Azerbaijan, and discharges into the Caspian Sea, draining a basin of 188,000 square kilometers. The Aras River, approximately 1,070 kilometers long, originates in eastern Turkey, forms sections of the Armenia-Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan-Iran borders, and joins the Kura near its mouth. These waterways, fed by snowmelt and precipitation from surrounding highlands, support agriculture in valleys but are prone to seasonal flooding and erosion in the rugged landscape. The borders of South Caucasus states reflect their enclosed geography, with no direct access to open oceans—Armenia is fully landlocked, while Georgia and Azerbaijan touch inland seas. Georgia's northern boundary follows the with , spanning about 894 kilometers; its southwestern frontier abuts (273 km), southern with (219 km), and southeastern with (480 km). Armenia borders Georgia (221 km) to the north, (1,011 km, including disputed segments) to the east, (44 km) to the south, and (277 km) to the west. Azerbaijan shares frontiers with Georgia (605 km) and (390 km, including the Nakhchivan exclave) to the northwest, to the west, and (765 km) to the south, enclosing the coast. Disputed territories alter de facto control: , recognized internationally as Georgian but administered separately with Russian military presence since 2008, occupy northwestern Georgia along the and central highlands. The enclave, historically contested between and , came under full Azerbaijani control after offensives in 2020 and September 2023, prompting ethnic Armenian exodus; subsequent delimitation in May 2024 saw Armenia cede four border villages totaling 12.7 kilometers to align with Soviet-era lines. These areas, amid ongoing peace talks, highlight persistent tensions over physical boundaries drawn largely from 1920s Soviet delineations.

Climate and Natural Resources

The South Caucasus features diverse climates shaped by its topography, including the Greater and Lesser Caucasus Mountains, which create barriers to moisture and temperature moderation. Armenia predominantly experiences a highland continental climate, characterized by hot summers with mean temperatures around 25°C and cold winters averaging -5°C, transitioning to more arid conditions in lower elevations and alpine influences in higher mountains. Georgia's climate varies from Mediterranean-like warmth along the Black Sea coast, with mild winters and annual precipitation exceeding 1,000 mm, to continental conditions in the east, where summers are warmer and drier. Azerbaijan's climate is largely dry and semiarid steppe in the central lowlands, with hot summers up to 30°C and mild winters, while the southeastern Talish Mountains receive humid subtropical conditions with up to 1,725 mm of annual rainfall. Recent data indicate warming trends across the region, with recording an average temperature rise of 1.23°C from 1929 to 2016, and similar increases in and Georgia exacerbating and agricultural variability. is uneven, concentrated in western Georgia due to influences, while eastern areas and are prone to droughts, influencing agriculture and hydropower reliability. Natural resources in the South Caucasus include hydrocarbons concentrated in , which holds proven reserves and major fields on the Apsheron Peninsula and Caspian shelf, underpinning its economy with exports exceeding 1 million barrels of oil per day as of recent production figures. features small deposits of , , molybdenum, zinc, and bauxite, with contributing modestly to GDP through operations like the Zangezur Copper-Molybdenum Combine. Georgia relies on timber, hydropower from rivers like the Kura, and mineral deposits including manganese (world's fifth-largest reserves at ), iron ore, and , though exploitation is limited by infrastructure. Forests cover about 10-12% of land in Armenia and Georgia, serving as key resources for wood products and , while all three countries harness potential from mountainous terrain, generating over 80% of electricity in Georgia and Armenia. Arable land supports , with irrigation drawing from shared rivers like the Aras, but resource extraction has raised environmental concerns, including pollution from Azerbaijan's oil fields and pressures in Georgia.

Definition and Scope

Constituent Territories

The South Caucasus consists of the territories of three sovereign states: , , and Georgia, which emerged as independent nations following the in 1991. These states collectively cover approximately 186,000 square kilometers and are home to over 17 million people as of 2025. The region's boundaries are shaped by the mountains to the north, the to the south, and the to the west, with extending eastward to the . Disputed enclaves, including within Georgia and the region within , complicate territorial claims, though they are internationally recognized as integral to the respective sovereign states. Armenia occupies 29,743 square kilometers of mountainous terrain, rendering it landlocked and reliant on neighbors for trade access. Its population stands at 2,945,438 as of October 2025, with the vast majority ethnic Armenians. The capital, , serves as the political, economic, and cultural hub, housing over one million residents. Armenia's territory has remained stable since independence, though border demarcations with remain contentious following the 2020 and 2023 conflicts over . Azerbaijan spans 86,600 square kilometers, including the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan separated by , and possesses substantial [Caspian Sea](/page/Caspian Sea) coastline. The population is estimated at 10,397,713 in mid-2025, predominantly ethnic , with as the capital and largest city, boasting over 2.4 million inhabitants. Azerbaijan's territory expanded de facto after regaining control of in 2023, where approximately 30,000 to 40,000 had returned by late 2025 amid ongoing reconstruction, following the exodus of over 100,000 ethnic Armenians. The region, internationally affirmed as Azerbaijani sovereign territory, was administered separately by ethnic Armenian authorities until its dissolution in September 2023. Georgia encompasses 69,700 square kilometers, featuring diverse landscapes from coastlines to highland plateaus. Its population is 3,704,500 as of January 2025, excluding independent regions, with as the capital hosting about 1.1 million people. Internationally, Georgia's territory includes (8,665 square kilometers, population around 244,000) and (3,900 square kilometers, population 56,520), both of which declared independence in the early and gained control after the 2008 , with recognition limited to and four other states. These entities maintain separate administrations, currencies tied to the , and military presence dominated by Russian forces, despite Georgia's constitutional claims and UN resolutions affirming their integral status.

Etymology and Alternative Names

The name "Caucasus" originates from the Kaúkasos (Καύκασος), adopted into Latin as Caucasus, with its ultimate roots possibly tracing to the Hittite term Kaz-kaz, referring to a people on the southern shore of the , or to words evoking "white" or "shining" in reference to the snow-capped peaks. The specifier "South" denotes the portion of this mountain system and adjacent lowlands lying south of the main range, encompassing the modern states of , , and Georgia, as distinct from the within . Historically, the region has been termed Transcaucasia (or Transcaucasus), a Latinized form of the Russian Zakavkaz'ye (Закавказье), meaning "the land beyond the " from a northern, Russian imperial vantage point, a prominent during the 19th and 20th centuries under Tsarist and Soviet rule. This exonym implies a peripheral status relative to and has been critiqued for its Eurocentric bias, prompting post-Soviet adoption of the neutral geographic descriptor "South " in international discourse since the . Less commonly, variants like "Southern Caucasia" or, among some Azerbaijani perspectives, "Central " appear, though the latter reframes Iranian territories as southern extensions.

Historical Overview

Prehistory and Ancient Civilizations

The earliest evidence of hominin presence in the South Caucasus dates to the period, with fossils from the site in southern Georgia representing some of the oldest well-dated remains outside , aged approximately 1.85 to 1.77 million years. These include skulls and tools attributed to early or related forms, indicating a population with small brain sizes and a mix of primitive and derived traits adapted to diverse environments. Additional sites, such as Azykh Cave in , yield stone tools like choppers from comparable early periods, suggesting widespread occupations across the region. Neolithic developments emerged around 6000 BCE with the Shulaveri-Shomu culture in the Kura River basin spanning modern Georgia and Azerbaijan, featuring early pottery, mud-brick architecture, and proto-agricultural practices including animal domestication. By the Early Bronze Age, the Kura-Araxes culture (ca. 4000–2000 BCE) dominated the South Caucasus, characterized by black-burnished pottery, fortified hilltop settlements, and metallurgical advancements in copper and arsenic alloys, with expansions into eastern Anatolia and northern Mesopotamia reflecting mobile pastoralist economies. Sites like those in the Aras Valley show continuity in burial practices and obsidian trade networks. In the , distinct polities arose amid influences from neighboring empires. The Kingdom of , centered around in the from the 9th to 6th centuries BCE, developed hydraulic engineering, massive fortresses, and inscriptions detailing military campaigns against , with its core territory encompassing parts of modern , eastern , and northwestern . To the west, in the eastern Black Sea region of Georgia, emerging by the late 2nd millennium BCE, was known for , advanced bronze work, and interactions with Greek colonists from the BCE onward, supplying resources like hides and linen. Eastern Georgia hosted the Kingdom of Iberia (Kartli), with roots in settlements and consolidation by the 6th century BCE, featuring Zoroastrian influences and alliances against Persian expansion. In the southeast, , occupying territories in modern from the 4th century BCE, maintained a Caucasian language and early Christian temples by the CE, distinct from Indo-European neighbors. These entities shared metallurgical traditions but diverged in and governance, setting patterns for later regional dynamics.

Medieval Kingdoms and Invasions

Following the Arab conquests of the , which incorporated much of the South Caucasus into the Umayyad and later Abbasid caliphates, local principalities began asserting autonomy by the through tribute arrangements and revolts against caliphal authority. In , the , tracing origins to the but rising prominently after Arab domination, secured recognition from the Abbasid caliph in 884 when Ashot I Bagratuni was crowned king, establishing the Bagratid Kingdom of Armenia (885–1045) centered in , which flourished as a and cultural hub with Byzantine and Islamic influences. This kingdom reached its zenith under kings like Gagik I (990–1020), who expanded territories westward toward the , though internal divisions and external pressures fragmented it by the mid-11th century. In Georgia, the , a branch of the same Bagratuni line, unified eastern and western principalities—the Kingdom of Iberia () and the Kingdom of —under Bagrat III around 1008, forming the Kingdom of Georgia that extended influence over parts of and . The kingdom's Golden Age commenced under David IV (r. 1089–1125), who reformed the military, resettled populations from the to bolster defenses, and decisively defeated a larger Seljuk Turkish force at the on August 12, 1121, reclaiming and much of southern Georgia from Turkic incursions that had intensified since the 1040s under leaders like . David's successor, Tamar (r. 1184–1213), oversaw territorial expansion to the and Caspian, fostering a cultural with patronage of Georgian Orthodox monasteries and literature, though her reign marked the empire's peak before Mongol arrivals. In the Azerbaijan region, the emerged as an independent Muslim dynasty around 861 under the Rawadid (Mazyadid) family, ruling from and later as semi-autonomous vassals of caliphs, Seljuks, and , maintaining Persianate administration and Zoroastrian-influenced amid Turkic migrations. Their longevity—spanning nearly a until 1538—stemmed from strategic alliances and fortifications, with peaks under figures like Manuchahr II (r. 1027–1054), who navigated Seljuk pressures by intermarrying with incoming Turkic elites. Turkic invasions, particularly by the Seljuks from the 11th century, disrupted these kingdoms through raids and conquests, with Alp Arslan's forces capturing in 1064 and imposing on Georgia until IV's victories shifted momentum. The Mongol invasions of the 13th century proved more devastating: initial raids under and in 1220–1221 devastated Georgia and , followed by Batu Khan's campaigns in 1236–1240 that subjugated the region, forcing King Ulu (r. 1247–1270) to submit as a , extracting heavy and depopulating areas through massacres and enslavement estimated in the tens of thousands. Subsequent Ilkhanid rule integrated the South Caucasus into the Mongol-Persian sphere, eroding local sovereignty until Timurid disruptions in the late further fragmented remnants of these medieval polities.

Russian Empire and Soviet Integration

The 's expansion into the South Caucasus began with the annexation of the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti (eastern Georgia) on January 18 (30), 1801, via a issued by Paul I, which abolished the Georgian monarchy and incorporated the territory directly into the empire, overriding prior protective arrangements like the 1783 . This move followed Georgian appeals for Russian protection against Persian and Ottoman incursions but resulted in full subjugation, with subsequent annexations of western Georgian principalities, such as in 1810. Further conquests targeted territories held by Persia, culminating in the Russo-Persian War of 1804–1813, ended by the on October 24, 1813, which ceded to the khanates of northern (including , , , , and Sheki) along with and the Baku region. The subsequent Russo-Persian War of 1826–1828 concluded with the on February 22, 1828, transferring eastern (Erivan Khanate), Nakhchivan, and Talysh to Russian control, completing the empire's hold over the South Caucasus core while sparking local resistance integrated into the broader (1817–1864). Following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution and the empire's collapse, the South Caucasus briefly achieved independence as the (May 1918), (May 1918), and (May 1918), amid the and regional chaos. The 's invasions swiftly reversed this: fell on April 27, 1920, after Bolshevik forces seized ; on November 29, 1920, via the 11th ; and Georgia in February 1921, with the invasion commencing February 11–16, leading to the overthrow of the Menshevik government by March 18. These military actions, justified by Lenin as aiding proletarian uprisings but executed through direct force, established Soviet socialist republics in each territory. In March 1922, the three republics federated into the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (TSFSR), formalized as a constituent of the USSR upon its creation, with Tiflis () as capital; this structure centralized control under while nominally preserving ethnic units. The TSFSR dissolved on December 5, 1936, under the Stalin Constitution, elevating , , and Georgia to full union republics directly subordinate to the USSR, a shift attributed to administrative streamlining and intensified centralization. Soviet integration emphasized economic exploitation—Azerbaijan's oil fields supplied over 70% of Soviet production by the 1940s—alongside policies like korenizatsiya (indigenization), which promoted local languages and cadres until the late 1930s, followed by , forced collectivization causing famines (e.g., 1932–1933 affecting Georgia), and deliberate border delineations fostering inter-ethnic dependencies, such as assigning Armenian-majority to in 1923 to ensure loyalty to . These measures suppressed but sowed seeds for post-Soviet conflicts by prioritizing imperial control over ethnic .

Post-Independence Era and Conflicts

Following the in December 1991, the republics of , , and Georgia emerged as independent states in the South Caucasus, inheriting ethnic and territorial disputes from the Soviet era. These new governments faced immediate challenges from separatist movements and interstate conflicts, exacerbated by weak institutions, , and external interventions, particularly from , which sought to maintain influence through support for breakaway regions. Independence initially brought optimism for but quickly devolved into violence, displacing hundreds of thousands and hindering . The dominated the post-independence period, pitting against over the ethnic Armenian-majority enclave of , which had been administratively part of Soviet despite its demographic composition. Tensions erupted into the from 1988 to May 1994, culminating in an Armenian-backed offensive that secured control of and seven adjacent districts, at a cost of roughly 30,000 lives and over 1 million refugees and internally displaced persons, primarily Azerbaijanis expelled from the seized territories. A brokered by in 1994 froze the lines but left underlying grievances unresolved, with sporadic clashes, including the 2016 Four-Day War that killed hundreds on both sides. The conflict's roots lay in Soviet nationalities policy, which drew borders to foster interdependence and suppress , but post-1991 power vacuums allowed ethnic mobilization to prevail over legal claims to . Escalation resumed with Azerbaijan's military modernization, funded by oil revenues, leading to the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War from September 27 to November 10, 2020. Azerbaijani forces recaptured most occupied territories and parts of proper, inflicting heavy losses on Armenian forces and resulting in around 6,000 Azerbaijani and over 4,000 Armenian military deaths, alongside civilian casualties. A Russia-mediated deployed 1,960 Russian peacekeepers to monitor the and remaining Armenian-held areas, but violations persisted, including Azerbaijan's blockade of the corridor from December 2022. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a rapid offensive, prompting the dissolution of the Republic and the exodus of nearly 100,000 ethnic Armenians to , effectively ending Armenian control after three decades. This outcome underscored 's superior military capabilities and the erosion of Russian leverage, as peacekeepers withdrew amid 's pivot toward Western partnerships. In Georgia, separatist conflicts in similarly undermined sovereignty post-1991. The 1992-1993 Abkhazian War saw Abkhaz forces, backed by Russian irregulars and , expel Georgian troops and civilians, resulting in 8,000-10,000 deaths and the flight of over 200,000 Georgians, establishing de facto independence under Russian protection. experienced parallel fighting in 1991-1992, displacing thousands and solidifying a monitored by Russian-led forces. These "frozen conflicts" served Russian strategic interests by keeping Georgia unstable and dependent, culminating in the August 2008 , triggered by Georgia's attempt to reassert control over . Russian forces swiftly overran Georgian positions, occupied buffer zones, and recognized and South Ossetia's independence, with Georgia suffering around 400 military deaths and significant territorial losses. The war highlighted Russia's use of ethnic kin as pretexts for intervention, entrenching military bases in the separatist entities and blocking Georgia's aspirations. By 2025, the South Caucasus saw tentative shifts toward stabilization, driven by Azerbaijan's battlefield successes and Armenia's reevaluation of Russian alliances amid the war's distractions. Border delimitation talks advanced, with agreements on partial troop withdrawals and transport links, though full peace remained elusive due to disputes over enclaves and constitutional references to in . Georgia pursued EU integration, ratified in 2024 despite domestic protests, while maintaining fragile truces in its occupied regions, where Russian influence persisted through economic ties and troop presence. External actors like bolstered Azerbaijan, while the and U.S. offered incentives, potentially reshaping the region from confrontation to connectivity, contingent on resolving irredentist claims through pragmatic compromises rather than maximalist demands.

Political Structures

Sovereign States

The South Caucasus is composed of three internationally recognized sovereign states: , , and Georgia. These nations declared independence from the between April and September 1991, amid its dissolution, and were admitted to the in 1992 as full members. Each maintains diplomatic relations with the majority of UN member states, though territorial disputes—such as those involving , —have strained interstate ties and prompted divergent foreign policy orientations, with Georgia aligning toward European integration, leveraging energy exports for influence, and navigating post-Soviet alliances. A U.S.-brokered agreement between and on August 8, 2025, marked progress toward normalization, including border delimitation and economic cooperation frameworks. Armenia, with a 2025 estimated population of 2,952,365, operates as a . Its capital is , and legislative power resides in the 105-member unicameral , elected for five-year terms via . The holds executive authority, while the president serves a largely ceremonial role following constitutional reforms in 2015 and 2018 that shifted from a semi-presidential system. Armenia's sovereignty has been tested by the 2020–2023 Nagorno-Karabakh war, culminating in Azerbaijan's military restoration of control over the region in September 2023, after which Armenia ceased support for the breakaway entity in 2024. Azerbaijan, estimated at 10,397,713 people in 2025, functions as a unitary presidential with a concentrated around its capital, . The president, directly elected for seven-year terms, wields extensive executive powers, including command of the armed forces and direction, under a adopted in 1995. was proclaimed on August 30, 1991, restoring the short-lived of 1918–1920. Azerbaijan's hydrocarbon resources have bolstered its regional leverage, particularly post-2023 when it reintegrated , prompting refugee returns and infrastructure reconstruction by 2025. Georgia, with a 2025 population of approximately 3,704,500, is a centered in . It declared independence on April 9, 1991, following a March , and transitioned to its current system via 2017–2018 constitutional amendments that curtailed presidential powers in favor of a prime minister-led government and unicameral elected every four years. Georgia pursues Euro-Atlantic integration, having signed an EU Association Agreement in 2014 and receiving candidate status in 2023, despite Russian occupation of since the 2008 , which controls about 20% of its territory.

Disputed and Separatist Regions

The primary disputed and separatist regions in the South Caucasus are , which broke away from Georgia amid ethnic conflicts in the early 1990s, and the former enclave within , which maintained de facto Armenian control until 2023. These territories emerged from the Soviet Union's collapse, fueled by ethnic tensions and irredentist claims, leading to wars and frozen conflicts that drew intervention. Internationally, are recognized as independent only by and a handful of allies like , , and , while the vast majority of states, including the members, view them as integral to Georgia. , historically an Azerbaijani with an ethnic Armenian majority under Soviet administrative policy, never achieved formal recognition as the self-proclaimed and was reintegrated into following military operations in 2020 and 2023. Abkhazia, located along Georgia's coast, covers approximately 8,660 square kilometers and declared in 1992 after clashes with Georgian forces displaced tens of thousands, culminating in a 1992-1993 that killed around 8,000 and ethnically cleansed much of the Georgian population from the region. A 1994 ceasefire brokered by established a neutral force, but tensions escalated in the 2008 , after which recognized Abkhazia's and stationed thousands of troops there, effectively controlling key decisions and infrastructure. As of 2025, Russian entities dominate Abkhazia's through tax exemptions on investments and basing rights, while local governance exhibits limited autonomy amid growing and a "partly free" status due to restricted . South Ossetia, a landlocked enclave of about 3,900 square kilometers in Georgia's north, similarly sought separation in 1991-1992, sparking a that resulted in Georgian withdrawal and de facto under Russian-backed forces, with an estimated 1,000 deaths and significant displacements. Russian recognition followed the 2008 , where Moscow's intervention routed Georgian troops, leading to the deployment of over 5,000 Russian border guards along the administrative boundary line, which remains disputed and militarized. In 2025, maintains de facto but relies heavily on Russian subsidies covering up to 90% of its budget, with limited border reopenings to Georgia signaling minor de-escalation efforts amid predictions of potential reintegration by 2030 from Georgian officials. Nagorno-Karabakh, an 4,400-square-kilometer mountainous area in , was controlled by ethnic Armenian forces from 1994 until Azerbaijan's recapture of surrounding territories in the 2020 Second Karabakh War, which killed over 6,000 and shifted the military balance decisively toward . A September 2023 Azerbaijani offensive, described by its government as an "anti-terror operation" to dismantle remaining separatist structures, prompted the dissolution of the Artsakh Republic on January 1, 2024, and the exodus of nearly all 100,000 ethnic Armenians, averting prolonged insurgency but raising humanitarian concerns over displacement. Peace talks between and Azerbaijan advanced in 2024-2025, including Armenia's cession of four border villages, though border demarcations and returns remain unresolved, with Azerbaijan asserting full sovereignty over the region.

Ethnic Conflicts and Controversies

Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

The arose from ethnic tensions between and in the region, legally part of since the Soviet era but predominantly inhabited by ethnic . In 1921-1923, Soviet authorities established the (NKAO) within the (SSR), despite constituting 89% of the population in 1926 and maintaining a majority through the Soviet period, declining to about 77% by 1989 due to policies favoring Azeri settlement. historically sought unification with , citing cultural and demographic ties, while asserted sovereignty based on administrative borders drawn by Soviet decree, which later upheld post-independence. Tensions escalated in February 1988 when the NKAO regional soviet petitioned to transfer the oblast to the Armenian SSR, sparking pogroms against Armenians in Azerbaijani cities like and , displacing thousands and killing hundreds. This ignited the (1988-1994), involving Armenian forces from and against , resulting in approximately 30,000 deaths, including civilians, and the displacement of around 800,000 from the region and adjacent areas. By May 1994, Armenian forces controlled not only the NKAO but also seven surrounding Azerbaijani districts, comprising about 20% of 's territory, in what and most international observers classified as an occupation violating and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. A was signed on May 12, 1994, but without a comprehensive , leaving the conflict frozen. The , co-chaired by the , , and , was established in 1992 to mediate a settlement based on principles including , non-use of force, and equal rights for peoples, but talks stalled over core issues like the status of and the sequence of troop withdrawals versus self-determination referenda. Periodic clashes persisted, including the 2016 Four-Day War from April 2-5, which killed dozens and tested defenses but ended in a shaky truce. Azerbaijan invested heavily in modernization, including Turkish-supplied drones and , reversing the prior asymmetry where Armenian forces held defensive advantages in mountainous terrain. The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War erupted on September 27, 2020, lasting 44 days until a Russia-brokered ceasefire on November 9, 2020, which mandated Armenian withdrawal from occupied districts, Azerbaijan's retention of gains, and deployment of 1,960 Russian peacekeepers to secure the Lachin corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan recaptured all seven surrounding districts and about one-third of Nagorno-Karabakh proper, including the strategically vital city of Shusha (Shushi), using precision strikes from Bayraktar TB2 drones and loitering munitions that neutralized Armenian armor and air defenses, causing an estimated 3,000-4,000 military deaths on both sides. The outcome restored Azerbaijani control over most pre-1988 borders, diminishing the viability of an independent Armenian enclave, though Russian peacekeepers' mandate faced challenges from subsequent incidents. Azerbaijan intensified pressure in 2022-2023 via a blockade of the Lachin corridor starting December 12, 2022, halting supplies and prompting humanitarian concerns, though Azerbaijan framed it as countering illicit arms smuggling. On September 19, 2023, Azerbaijan launched a rapid offensive, overwhelming remaining Armenian defenses in hours and prompting the surrender of the self-declared Republic of Artsakh; official reports cited 192 Armenian military deaths and 200 total casualties, including civilians. Approximately 100,000 ethnic Armenians—over 99% of the remaining population—fled to Armenia within days, citing fears of persecution despite Azerbaijani offers of citizenship and rights under its constitution; Azerbaijan rejected ethnic cleansing claims, attributing the exodus to panic incited by separatist leaders and unresolved distrust from mutual atrocities in the 1990s. The Republic of Artsakh dissolved on January 1, 2024, ending its unrecognized existence, while Azerbaijan began reintegrating the territory as its East Zangezur province, with ongoing bilateral peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan addressing border delimitation and transport links. The OSCE Minsk Group was formally dissolved on September 1, 2025, by mutual agreement, reflecting the conflict's resolution through Azerbaijani military success rather than negotiated compromise.

Abkhazia and South Ossetia Disputes

The disputes over stem from separatist movements in these autonomous regions of Soviet-era Georgia, which intensified following Georgia's from the on April 9, 1991. , located along the coast, and , in the central , had been granted autonomous status within the , fostering distinct ethnic identities among and , who share linguistic and cultural ties with populations in . Tensions escalated as Georgia moved to centralize control, prompting referendums and declarations of independence by the regions: on December 21, 1991, and maintaining separation after initial autonomy demands. The First South Ossetia War (January 1991–June 1992) involved clashes between Georgian forces and Ossetian militias, resulting in approximately 1,000 deaths and the displacement of around 100,000 people, primarily ethnic Georgians. A ceasefire was brokered in Sochi on June 24, 1992, establishing a Joint Control Commission and peacekeeping forces comprising Georgian, Ossetian, and Russian troops to monitor the ceasefire line. In Abkhazia, conflict erupted on August 14, 1992, when Georgian National Guard units entered the region to secure infrastructure amid rising separatist violence, leading to the War in Abkhazia (1992–1993). Abkhaz forces, bolstered by North Caucasian volunteers and tacit Russian support, captured key cities including Sukhumi by September 1993, displacing over 200,000 ethnic Georgians—who comprised about 45% of Abkhazia's pre-war population of roughly 525,000—and resulting in thousands of civilian deaths amid documented atrocities on both sides. The conflicts froze after 1993, with Russia maintaining influence through peacekeeping mandates under the , though Georgia accused Moscow of bias toward the separatists. Escalation resumed in August 2008 during the , triggered by Georgian artillery strikes on on August 7–8 in response to separatist shelling, prompting a Russian ground invasion from the north and rapid advances into Georgian territory. The five-day conflict ended with a French-brokered on August 12, but Russian forces pushed beyond the regions, occupying buffer zones until partial withdrawal. On August 26, 2008, formally recognized as independent states, a move echoed by , , , and , but rejected by the and most nations as a violation of Georgia's . As of 2025, function as states with Russian-backed governments, hosting permanent Russian military bases totaling around 7,000 troops, formalized by defense pacts allowing Russian basing rights in exchange for security guarantees. These arrangements have integrated the regions economically and militarily with , including passportization and usage, while restricting Georgia's access and contributing to ongoing displacement, with over 20% of Georgia's territory under Russian occupation. The ruled in 2021 (upheld in appeals) that bears responsibility for violations in the regions since 2008, ordering compensation, underscoring the disputes' persistence amid Georgia's EU and aspirations opposed by .

Broader Ethnic Tensions and Resolutions

In Georgia, the Armenian-populated Samtskhe-Javakheti region has experienced persistent ethnic tensions stemming from demands for greater cultural autonomy, Armenian-language , and local , exacerbated by economic underdevelopment and historical grievances from Soviet-era border adjustments. These issues peaked in the early 2000s with protests against policies perceived as assimilatory, raising fears of influenced by external actors like or . Similarly, Georgia's Azerbaijani minority, concentrated in and comprising about 6.5% of the population as of recent censuses, faces integration barriers including limited access to Georgian-language and political underrepresentation, though intercommunal violence remains rare due to shared economic interests and historical coexistence. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war briefly heightened frictions between Armenian and Azerbaijani communities in Georgia through sporadic clashes, underscoring spillover risks from regional conflicts. In Azerbaijan, (approximately 1.7% of the population) and Talysh (0.9%) have voiced grievances over cultural suppression, including restrictions on native-language and , alongside allegations of economic marginalization in northern and southern areas. Historical Soviet-era assimilation policies have evolved into post-independence state emphasis on Azerbaijani identity, leading to activism among Talysh groups for and against perceived , as seen in arrests of cultural figures in the 2010s. , straddling the Azerbaijan-Russia , have raised concerns about cross-border family separations and cultural erosion, though no organized separatist movements have materialized. Armenians, once a significant minority, were largely displaced following the 1988-1994 Nagorno-Karabakh war and associated pogroms, reducing their presence to negligible numbers and eliminating major intra-state Armenian-Azerbaijani tensions. Armenia hosts smaller minorities such as Yezidis (around 35,000) and , with occasional reports of socioeconomic exclusion but minimal organized conflict; Azerbaijani communities, numbering over 180,000 in 1989, were expelled or fled amid reciprocal ethnic violence in the late 1980s and early 1990s, leaving virtually none today. Resolution efforts have focused on domestic integration rather than formal treaties. Georgia has implemented bilingual education reforms and infrastructure investments in since the mid-2000s, reducing overt protests while fostering economic ties with to mitigate autonomy demands. Azerbaijan maintains strict state control over minority activism, with limited concessions like Talysh-language media outlets, but international observers note ongoing concerns without escalation to violence. Regional stability is bolstered by Azerbaijan-Georgia , exemplified by joint energy projects, which discourages minority mobilization along ethnic lines. International bodies like the OSCE and promote monitoring and confidence-building, yet broader resolutions remain elusive amid geopolitical rivalries, with no comprehensive inter-state framework addressing these sub-state dynamics as of 2025.

Demographics

Population Distribution

The South Caucasus region, encompassing , , and Georgia along with disputed territories, has an estimated total population of approximately 17 million as of 2024. Armenia's population stands at around 3 million, Azerbaijan at 10.2 million, and Georgia at 3.9 million, reflecting varied demographic trends influenced by , low birth rates, and recent influxes from conflict zones. Population densities differ markedly: Armenia averages about 100 people per square kilometer across its 29,743 km², Azerbaijan 118 per km² in 86,600 km², and Georgia 56 per km² in 69,700 km², with concentrations higher in fertile lowlands and urban centers. Urbanization rates are moderate, with 64% of , 58% of , and 61% of residing in urban areas as of recent estimates, driven by economic opportunities in capitals. houses over one-third of Armenia's (approximately 1.1 million), nearly 25% of Azerbaijan's (about 2.3 million), and around 30% of Georgia's (1.1 million), underscoring heavy reliance on these hubs for services and industry. Rural areas, particularly in mountainous terrains, face depopulation due to outmigration to cities or abroad.
Country/RegionPopulation (2024 est.)Area (km²)Density (people/km²)Urban %
3,000,00029,743~10164
10,200,00086,60011858
Georgia3,900,00069,700~5661
Disputed regions host smaller populations: around 245,000, about 56,500, and fewer than 1,000 ethnic Armenians following the 2023 exodus of over 100,000 residents amid Azerbaijani military operations, with now promoting resettlement primarily by ethnic . These areas exhibit low densities ( ~28/km², ~14/km²) and ethnic concentrations tied to separatist control, complicating regional distribution. remains a key factor, with net losses in and Georgia offset partially by remittances and return migration, while experiences modest growth from oil revenues and returnees.

Ethnic and Linguistic Composition

The South Caucasus exhibits significant ethnic homogeneity within its three primary states, shaped by historical migrations, Soviet-era policies, and post-independence conflicts that prompted population displacements. is overwhelmingly ethnic Armenian, comprising 98.1% of the population as of the 2022 , with minorities including Yezidis (1.2%), (0.5%), and smaller groups such as , Assyrians, and totaling under 1%. Azerbaijan features a dominant Azerbaijani (Turkic) majority of 94.8% according to the 2019 , alongside (1.7%), (0.7%), Talysh (0.9%), Avars (0.5%), and Turks (0.4%); the Armenian population has dwindled to negligible levels (effectively 0%) due to mutual expulsions during the wars. Georgia's 2014 records ethnic (Kartvelians, including subgroups like and ) at 86.8%, with (6.3%) concentrated in the southeast, (4.5%) in the south, and smaller minorities including (0.7%), (0.4%), and Yezidis (0.3%).
CountryDominant Ethnic Group (% of Population)Key Minorities
Armenia (98.1%)Yezidis (1.2%), (0.5%), Kurds/Assyrians (<0.5%)
(94.8%) (1.7%), Talysh (0.9%), (0.7%)
Georgia (86.8%) (6.3%), (4.5%), (0.7%)
In disputed territories, ethnic compositions reflect unresolved conflicts and control. Abkhazia's 2011 census (latest available) shows at 50.7%, (primarily ) at 17.9%, at 17.4%, and at 9.2%, following the 1992-1993 war that displaced over 200,000 . South Ossetia's demographics, per 2024 estimates, indicate (Iranian-speaking) at 66.2% and at 29%, with the latter reduced after the 2008 war. , reintegrated into after the September 2023 military operation, saw the exodus of nearly all its 120,000 ethnic to , leaving the area now predominantly resettled by as of 2024. Linguistically, the region displays three distinct, unrelated families corresponding to titular groups: Indo-European Armenian (official in , spoken by 97.9% as ), Turkic Azerbaijani (official in , with Oghuz dialects), and Kartvelian Georgian (official in Georgia, unique to the with agglutinative structure and its own script). Russian serves as a in urban areas and among older generations due to Soviet legacy, while minority languages include Northeast Caucasian tongues like Lezgian and Avar in , Ossetian (Indo-Iranian) in and Georgia's north, and Northwest Caucasian Abkhaz in . Post-conflict shifts have marginalized Armenian in and Georgian in separatist enclaves, with state policies promoting titular languages in education and media.

Religious Affiliations

The South Caucasus exhibits a sharp religious divide, with and Georgia predominantly Christian and overwhelmingly Muslim. In , approximately 92.6% of the population adheres to the , which has been the dominant faith since the kingdom's adoption of as its in 301 CE, with smaller groups including 1% Evangelical Christians and 2.4% other faiths. This Christian majority aligns closely with the ethnic Armenian population, which constitutes 98.1% of residents as of 2025. Azerbaijan, by contrast, is 97.3% Muslim as of 2020 estimates, with Shia Muslims comprising 65% and Sunnis 35%, reflecting the region's historical Safavid-era conversion and subsequent Soviet secularization that tempered overt religiosity. Christians, primarily Russian Orthodox and other denominations, account for 2.6%, concentrated among non-Azeri ethnic minorities. In Georgia, Eastern Orthodox prevails at 83.4%, formalized as the state church and intertwined with since the 4th century CE conversion under King Mirian III. form 10.7%, mainly among ethnic Azeris in the southeast and in the southwest, while Armenian Apostolic adherents (2.9%) cluster in and Samtskhe-Javakheti regions.
Country/RegionDominant ReligionPercentageSource
Armenian Apostolic92.6%CIA World Factbook (2011 est.)
(Shia majority)97.3%CIA World Factbook (2020 est.)
GeorgiaEastern Orthodox83.4%CIA World Factbook (2014 est.)
Disputed territories mirror parental affiliations with variations. Abkhazia's population is predominantly Eastern Orthodox (around 60% per de facto surveys), with 16% Muslim and syncretic pagan elements among ethnic Abkhaz, though jurisdictional disputes persist between the Georgian and Russian Orthodox churches. South Ossetia is primarily Eastern Orthodox, with its "constitution" privileging Orthodox Christianity alongside traditional Ossetian beliefs, and a small Muslim minority. Nagorno-Karabakh, historically 99% Armenian Apostolic prior to 2023, saw nearly all ethnic Armenians (Christians) flee following Azerbaijan's military offensive in September 2023, leaving the region under Azerbaijani administration with resettling Muslim populations. This demographic shift underscores religion's role in ethnic conflicts, as Armenian heritage sites face documented destruction post-2023.

Economy

Energy Resources and Pipelines

The South Caucasus region's energy resources are dominated by Azerbaijan's substantial hydrocarbon deposits in the basin, including the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli (ACG) oil fields and the , while and Georgia possess negligible fossil fuel reserves and depend heavily on imports for such needs. As of January 1, 2025, Azerbaijan's proven oil reserves stood at 7 billion barrels and reserves at 60 trillion cubic feet. In 2024, Azerbaijan produced 29.1 million tonnes of oil, equivalent to an average of approximately 580,000 barrels per day, alongside 50.3 billion cubic meters of , with significant output from (27.8 billion cubic meters) and ACG (13.3 billion cubic meters). imports all its fossil fuels, primarily from and , accounting for over 80% of its imports in recent years, supplemented by nuclear and hydroelectric power. Georgia similarly lacks domestic fossil fuels, importing mainly from via pipeline and relying on for about 80% of its electricity generation. Azerbaijan's energy infrastructure centers on export-oriented pipelines that traverse Georgia to reach and , circumventing Russian routes to enhance regional and European supply security. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, operational since 2005, spans 1,768 kilometers from Azerbaijan's Sangachal terminal through Georgia to 's port, with a capacity of 1 million barrels per day. An earlier route, the Baku-Supsa pipeline to Georgia's terminal, facilitated initial exports but has been supplemented by BTC for larger volumes. For natural gas, the (SCP), a 692-kilometer line from through to the Turkish border completed in 2006, forms the initial segment of the with an initial capacity of 16.2 billion cubic meters per year, expandable to 31 billion. The Southern Gas Corridor integrates SCP with Turkey's Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP, 1,811 kilometers, operational since 2018) and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) to Albania and Italy (operational since 2020), enabling Azerbaijani gas deliveries to Europe. By 2024, cumulative gas transported via the corridor exceeded 73 billion cubic meters since inception, with annual European deliveries rising from 8.2 billion cubic meters in 2021 to over 12.9 billion in 2023, driven by post-2022 demand for non-Russian supplies. Branches from SCP supply gas directly to Georgia, bolstering its energy ties with Azerbaijan, while expansion plans aim to increase corridor capacity amid ongoing European diversification efforts. These pipelines have positioned the South Caucasus as a key transit hub, though Armenia remains excluded from major routes due to geopolitical tensions, relying instead on alternative imports.

Agriculture, Wine Production, and Trade

Agriculture in the South Caucasus contributes modestly to the regional economies, with shares of gross domestic product (GDP) ranging from 5.7% in Azerbaijan to approximately 8% in Armenia and Georgia, reflecting a shift toward services and energy sectors while facing challenges from arid climates, soil degradation, and post-Soviet structural inefficiencies. In Armenia, agriculture employs about 35% of the workforce and focuses on fruits, vegetables, and livestock, with key outputs including tomatoes (over 36,000 tons exported annually in recent years), apricots, and preserved produce. Azerbaijan's sector emphasizes cotton, grains, tobacco, and citrus in subtropical areas like Lankaran, supported by irrigation from the Kura River, though it accounts for only 5.7% of GDP in 2024 amid oil dominance. Georgia's agriculture features diverse crops such as grapes (260,000 tons), potatoes (237,000 tons), maize (194,000 tons), and apples (82,000 tons), with hazelnuts and tea as notable exports, though fragmented landholdings limit productivity. Wine production stands out as a cultural and economic hallmark, particularly in Georgia, where archaeological evidence traces viticulture back over 8,000 years using unique qvevri fermentation methods. Georgia produced 1.9 million hectoliters of wine in 2023, down 3% from the prior year but supporting over 1,000 commercial producers and exports valued at $259 million, or 4.1% of total exports. Armenia prioritizes viticulture with indigenous grapes like Areni, yielding boutique outputs including reds from Nagorno-Karabakh varieties, though production volumes remain smaller at around 10-15 million liters annually. Azerbaijan has revived its wine sector, achieving 1.27 million decaliters in 2023—a 34.9% increase—focusing on European varietals in regions like Ganja and Sheki, alongside emerging wine tourism. Agricultural in the South Caucasus emphasizes exports of fruits, nuts, and beverages to neighbors like (41.9% of Georgia's agri-food market) and the , with Georgia's agri-food exports reaching $1.118 billion in the first eight months of 2025, up 3.4% year-on-year. and export preserved vegetables, fruits, and wines, but face barriers from closed borders and sanctions; for instance, agri-food imports from the region totaled modest volumes in 2024, dominated by nuts and beverages. Regional volumes hit $26.1 billion in exports for 2025 estimates, though intra-South Caucasus flows remain limited by geopolitical tensions, with diversification efforts targeting and the . Challenges include vulnerability to variability and reliance on , prompting investments in sustainable practices to boost yields.

Infrastructure and Regional Connectivity

The South Caucasus region's infrastructure faces challenges from its mountainous terrain and historical conflicts, which have resulted in closed borders between and since 1991 and between and since 1993, severely limiting cross-border transport and trade. Georgia serves as a primary transit hub, leveraging its ports such as and for maritime connectivity, while benefits from access for energy exports. Railways and roads remain underdeveloped in parts, with Soviet-era networks requiring modernization; for instance, Georgia has prioritized railway upgrades under international programs to handle increased freight volumes. Energy pipelines represent a cornerstone of regional connectivity, designed to export Caspian hydrocarbons to global markets while circumventing Russian routes. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, operational since 2005, spans 1,768 kilometers from Azerbaijan's Sangachal terminal through Georgia to Turkey's port, with a capacity of 1.2 million barrels per day. Complementing it, the transports from Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz field, enhancing for and . These projects, backed by consortia including , have transported over 4 billion barrels of oil cumulatively by 2023, fostering economic ties among , Georgia, and despite regional tensions. Transport corridors aim to integrate the region into broader Eurasian networks. The EU-supported initiative, launched in 1993, promotes multimodal links via roads, railways, and ferries to connect with , with Georgia's Anaklia deep-sea port development as a key node for container traffic. China's has invested in complementary projects, including railway expansions in Georgia and , positioning the South Caucasus as a link between and amid disruptions to northern routes. Cargo volumes along these corridors surged post-2022, with Middle Corridor rail freight from China to via the Caspian reaching 2.7 million TEUs in 2023, though bottlenecks persist due to limited rail capacity and customs delays. Post-2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict developments have spurred connectivity proposals. Azerbaijan advocates the Zangezur Corridor to link its mainland with the Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia's Syunik province, envisioning rail, road, and pipeline infrastructure without customs checks, as outlined in the 2020 ceasefire agreement. By 2025, evolving peace talks have advanced the TRIPP (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity) project, incorporating railways, highways, pipelines, and power lines through southern Armenia, potentially transforming the region into a key East-West transit artery. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated in October 2025 that TRIPP, alongside regional peace, could elevate the South Caucasus as a primary route, though implementation hinges on border delimitation and sovereignty concerns raised by Armenia and Iran. Georgia continues modernization of its east-west rail lines to support these shifts, with new ports and digital infrastructure enhancing overall resilience.

Geopolitical Relations

Influence of Neighboring Powers

Russia maintains a historically dominant position in the South Caucasus through military bases, peacekeeping forces, and alliances, but its influence has significantly declined since Azerbaijan's recapture of in September 2023. In Georgia, Russia occupies the breakaway regions of following the 2008 war, hosting military contingents and leveraging ethnic Russian populations to deter aspirations. , traditionally reliant on via the (CSTO) and a base in , has grown disillusioned after Russian peacekeepers failed to prevent Azerbaijani advances in 2023, prompting to suspend CSTO participation and seek Western arms by 2025. Russia's mediation role in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, including the 2020 ceasefire, yielded to irrelevance by August 2025, when a preliminary peace agreement excluded entirely. Turkey exerts substantial leverage, particularly over , through military, economic, and cultural ties framed as "one nation, two states." During the 2020 , Turkish drones and advisors bolstered Azerbaijan's victory, reshaping regional borders and enabling the Zangezur corridor project to connect Azerbaijan proper with its Nakhchivan exclave via Armenian territory. This axis has positioned and Azerbaijan as de facto leaders in the South Caucasus post-2023, with promoting connectivity initiatives like the Middle Corridor to bypass and for Eurasian trade. Relations with Georgia remain cooperative on energy pipelines and Black Sea trade, though strained by historical Ottoman legacies, while ties with have thawed modestly since 2022 border openings, contingent on resolving disputes without third-party involvement. Iran's influence centers on border and economic lifelines, sharing a 44-kilometer frontier with that serves as Yerevan's sole non-blockaded access post-2020 war. has pursued neutrality in the -Azerbaijan conflict but harbors deep suspicions toward Baku's growing Israeli and Turkish partnerships, viewing them as threats to its 15-20 million ethnic Azeri and potential pan-Turkic encroachments. Post-2023, opposed Azerbaijani territorial gains and corridor plans that could isolate it from , fearing diminished transit revenues and heightened Western-Israeli presence; this unease intensified with the U.S.-brokered -Azerbaijan peace framework in August 2025, which sidelined Iranian objections. Despite covert support for to counterbalance Azerbaijan-Turkey dominance, 's regional clout wanes amid internal economic pressures and competition from Turkish infrastructure projects.

Western and International Engagement

The European Union's primary framework for engagement in the South Caucasus is the (EaP), launched in 2009 to foster political association, economic integration, and mobility with , , and Georgia. Georgia signed an Association Agreement in 2014, which entered into force in 2016 and includes a Deep and Comprehensive , aligning its economy closer to EU standards. Armenia concluded a Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement in 2017, emphasizing reforms in , , and trade, though its membership in the limits deeper integration. Azerbaijan maintains a more focused on energy cooperation, avoiding value-based convergence due to governance differences. The pursues strategic interests in the region through bilateral aid, military cooperation, and diplomatic mediation, aiming to counter Russian influence and promote energy diversification. In 2025, the U.S. conducted Eagle Partner military drills with , signaling Yerevan's diversification from Russian-led security structures following perceived failures in . U.S. policy emphasizes regional connectivity, including support for the Middle Corridor trade route, while navigating tensions like Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which restricts aid to over past Armenia- conflicts but faces repeal calls to enable broader energy partnerships. Diplomatic efforts culminated in the August 2025 Washington Declaration, where and committed to peace principles under U.S. auspices, focusing on border delimitation and non-aggression. NATO engages all three countries through the program, initiated in 1994 for and Georgia, and 1994 for , providing training, exercises, and interoperability support without membership prospects for due to its non-alignment. Georgia benefits from the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package since 2014, enhancing defense capabilities amid Russian occupation of . has intensified ties since 2022, participating in exercises like Noble Partner in Georgia in 2025 and hosting parliamentary seminars, reflecting a strategic reorientation. cooperates on and counter-terrorism but prioritizes bilateral ties with members. International organizations like the OSCE and UN play mediation roles, though with waning influence post-2023 Nagorno-Karabakh resolution. The , co-chaired by the U.S., , and , facilitated prior ceasefires but has been sidelined as bilateral talks advance. The EU launched a Civilian Monitoring Mission along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border in 2023, deploying over 200 observers to prevent escalation. UN involvement remains marginal, limited to observer roles in frozen conflicts like , where resolutions affirm Georgia's territorial integrity but lack enforcement. These efforts underscore Western prioritization of stability and de-Russification amid regional realignments.

Recent Developments and Strategic Shifts

In August 2025, and signed a preliminary peace agreement brokered by the , marking a significant step toward resolving the long-standing . The deal, facilitated during a involving Armenian Prime Minister and Azerbaijani President , includes commitments to border delimitation, the exchange of enclaves, and non-aggression principles, though full ratification remains pending due to disputes over constitutional amendments in and transport corridor access for . This U.S.-led represents a departure from prior Russian dominance in regional diplomacy, with Moscow's role minimized following the 2023 Azerbaijani military operation in and the subsequent withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers in May 2024. Russia's influence in the South Caucasus has notably eroded since its 2022 invasion of , as military overextension and credibility losses have prompted to diversify security ties toward the West and , while has deepened alliances with and , including arms deals and joint exercises in 2024. Tensions peaked in December 2024 with the downing of Flight 8243 near , attributed by to Russian air defenses, leading to reciprocal diplomatic expulsions and 's reduced reliance on Russian transit routes. This vacuum has accelerated multipolar dynamics, with emerging as a regional energy hub by boosting exports to —reaching 12.66 billion cubic meters in 2024 via the —and pursuing green hydrogen initiatives targeting EU markets by 2026. In Georgia, a political crisis intensified after the October 2024 parliamentary elections, widely criticized for irregularities and resulting in the party's disputed victory, prompting mass protests and opposition boycotts. The government's passage of a "foreign agents" in May 2024, modeled on Russian legislation, and subsequent suspension of EU accession talks in November 2024 have strained relations with , leading the EU to freeze €30 million in aid and halt Georgia's candidate status progress. These shifts underscore Georgia's pivot toward , evidenced by resumed direct flights and trade, contrasting with public support for at around 70% in 2024 polls, and highlighting internal divisions that weaken Western engagement amid Russian hybrid pressures.

References

  1. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2019/02/a-brief-guide-to-understanding-the-countries-of-the-south-caucasus?lang=en
  2. https://graphsearch.epfl.ch/en/concept/353358
  3. https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2025-09-15/three-special-cases-demographic-processes-south-caucasus
  4. https://www.csis.org/regions/russia-and-eurasia/south-caucasus
  5. https://www.gmfus.org/news/who-will-fill-strategic-gap-south-caucasus
  6. https://baku.ws/en/politics/azerbaijan-and-armenia-historical-path-from-conflict-to-peace
  7. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2025/07/30/energy-as-a-driver-of-politics-in-the-south-caucasus/
  8. https://dgap.org/en/resarch/publications/southern-gas-corridor-and-south-caucasus-0
  9. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/georgia/overview
  10. https://www.ultimatekilimanjaro.com/caucasus-mountains-everything-you-need-to-know/
  11. https://armchairmountaineer.com/caucasus-mountains
  12. https://www.worldatlas.com/rivers/kura-river.html
  13. https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/major-rivers-of-azerbaijan.html
  14. https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-countries-border-armenia.html
  15. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/24/armenia-returns-four-border-villages-to-azerbaijan-as-part-of-deal
  16. https://www.visionofhumanity.org/armenia-azerbaijan-peace-for-a-longstanding-conflict/
  17. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/armenia/
  18. https://bluegreenatlas.com/climate/armenia_climate.html
  19. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/georgia/
  20. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/azerbaijan/
  21. https://www.britannica.com/place/Azerbaijan
  22. https://caspianpolicy.org/research/water-security/the-climate-crisis-has-come-to-the-south-caucasus
  23. https://tehran.mfa.gov.az/en/content/45/nature-and-resources
  24. https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/276551579864694145/south-caucasus-armenia-azerbaijan-and-georgia-private-enterprises-in-the-forest-sector-a-survey-of-the-private-sector-in-wood-production-and-processing
  25. https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/armenia-population/
  26. https://www.britannica.com/place/Armenia
  27. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17398605
  28. https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/azerbaijan-population/
  29. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17043424
  30. https://www.rferl.org/a/photos-aerial-nagorno-karabakh-azerbaijan-armenia-great-return/33566856.html
  31. https://civil.ge/archives/677760
  32. https://www.britannica.com/place/Georgia
  33. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17301647
  34. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18175030
  35. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18269210
  36. https://www.britannica.com/place/Caucasus
  37. https://www.etymonline.com/word/Caucasus
  38. https://www.britannica.com/place/Transcaucasia
  39. https://encyclopedia.pub/entry/35929
  40. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08865655.2023.2200782
  41. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3127884/
  42. https://humanorigins.si.edu/evidence/human-fossils/fossils/d3444
  43. https://azerbaijan.az/en/related-information/141
  44. https://prehistorypodcast.com/2022/08/01/episode-25-transcaucasia-goes-neolithic/
  45. https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/43506/chapter/364132196
  46. https://www.persee.fr/doc/paleo_0153-9345_2014_num_40_2_5636
  47. https://www.metmuseum.org/essays/urartu
  48. https://www.worldhistory.org/article/1192/colchis--iberia-in-antiquity/
  49. https://www.ancient-origins.net/ancient-places-asia/early-temples-and-monuments-alban-people-ancient-azerbaijan-002593
  50. https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/bagratids-dynasty/
  51. http://fmg.ac/Projects/MedLands/ARMENIA.htm
  52. https://fmg.ac/Projects/MedLands/GEORGIA.htm
  53. http://www.visions.az/en/news/159/cdc770e3/
  54. https://www.azerbaijans.com/content_375_en.html
  55. https://fmg.ac/Projects/MedLands/ARMENIA.htm
  56. https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/master/frd/frdcstdy/ar/armeniaazerbaija00curt/armeniaazerbaija00curt.pdf
  57. https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/Armenia%2C%2520Azerbaijan%2C%2520and%2520Georgia%2520Study_1.pdf
  58. https://www.prlib.ru/en/history/618993
  59. https://gfsis.org.ge/files/library/pdf/English-2792.pdf
  60. https://www.kas.de/documents/259121/37272391/EN_kas_ai_02-2025_Malerius_Binder_Web.pdf
  61. https://karabakh.org/treaties/gulustan-treaty/
  62. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Treaty-of-Golestan
  63. https://www.prlib.ru/en/history/619048
  64. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Treaty-of-Turkmenchay
  65. https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1921-2/transcaucasia/
  66. https://russiasperiphery.pages.wm.edu/transcaucasia/general/transcaucasian-socialist-federative-soviet-republic/
  67. https://iccn.ge/index.php?article_id=323&clang=1
  68. https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=9169&context=etd
  69. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/394386903_Consequences_Of_Soviet_Ethnic_Federalism_In_The_South_Caucasus
  70. https://www.cmi.no/publications/8911-changing-geopolitics-of-the-south-caucasus-after-the-second-karabakh-war
  71. https://besacenter.org/the-armenian-azerbaijani-conflict-the-end-of-the-beginning-or-the-beginning-of-the-end/
  72. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/nagorno-karabakh-conflict
  73. https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/next-steps-armenia-azerbaijan-peace-luke-coffey
  74. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/armenia/unlikely-road-peace-armenia-and-azerbaijan
  75. https://quincyinst.org/research/the-threat-of-new-wars-in-the-caucasus-a-good-case-for-u-s-restraint/
  76. https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/updates/2025-SU-SCaucasus-WEB-03.pdf
  77. https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/armenia/101208.htm
  78. https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2909.htm
  79. https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5253.htm
  80. https://www.britannica.com/place/Armenia/Government-and-society
  81. https://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/armenia/government
  82. https://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/azerbaijan/government
  83. https://president.az/en/pages/view/azerbaijan/population
  84. https://www.geostat.ge/media/70049/Number-of-Population-as-of-January-1%252C-2025.pdf
  85. https://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/georgia/government
  86. https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/georgia-population/
  87. https://www.britannica.com/place/South-Ossetia
  88. https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/01/a-frozen-conflict-boils-over-nagorno-karabakh-in-2023-and-future-implications/
  89. https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/02/russia-abkhazia-new-pressure?lang=en
  90. https://abkhazworld.com/aw/current-affairs/2982-abkhazia-maintains-partly-free-status-in-2025-freedom-house-report
  91. https://jamestown.org/program/russias-plans-for-abkhazia-are-expanding/
  92. https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-ossetia/freedom-world/2024
  93. https://platformraam.nl/artikelen/2922-south-ossetias-struggle-in-a-changing-caucasus
  94. https://lieber.westpoint.edu/complete-defeat-end-non-recognized-state-nagorno-karabakh/
  95. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/armenian-azerbaijani-conflict/armenia-and-azerbaijan-getting-peace-agreement-across-finish-line
  96. https://karabakhfacts.com/demographics-statistics-in-nagorno-karabakh-during-the-soviet-azerbaijani-rule/
  97. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18270325
  98. https://dornsife.usc.edu/armenian/initiatives/resources-on-karabakh/chronology-of-events/
  99. https://www.osce.org/mg/108305
  100. https://www.crisisgroup.org/visual-explainers/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-visual-explainer
  101. https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2023/01/31/693ac148/21-655-nagorno-karabakh-2020-conflict-catalog-aug-21-public.pdf
  102. https://humanrightsnetwork.shorthandstories.com/we-are-no-one/we-are-no-one-all-chapters/chapter-8-the-last-voices-from-artsakh/index.html
  103. https://www.osce.org/mg
  104. https://pesd.princeton.edu/node/706
  105. https://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo/393/1
  106. https://www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/military-occupation-of-georgia-by-russia
  107. https://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/g/georgia/georgia953.pdf
  108. https://www.cnn.com/2014/03/13/europe/2008-georgia-russia-conflict
  109. https://jamestown.org/program/abkhazia-works-to-deepen-ties-with-syria/
  110. https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/10/15/russia-owes-georgia-275-million-for-war-crimes-under-the-ecthr-ruling/
  111. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/08/georgia-meeting-under-any-other-business-5.php
  112. https://civil.ge/archives/696208
  113. https://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/redakteure/publications/pdf/brief_6.pdf
  114. https://jamestown.org/program/is-georgias-javakhetia-region-on-the-brink-of-explosion/
  115. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/06/georgias-minorities-breaking-down-barriers-to-integration?lang=en
  116. https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Georgia/Armenia-Azerbaijan-conflict-the-risks-for-Georgia-205802
  117. https://minorityrights.org/country/azerbaijan/
  118. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.13098?af=R
  119. https://minorityrights.org/communities/talysh/
  120. https://bbcrussian.substack.com/p/azerbaijan-ethnic-minorities-coexistence
  121. https://www.politicon.co/en/essays/177/factors-leading-to-positive-peace-in-azerbaijan-georgia-relations
  122. https://minorityrights.org/south-caucasus-paths-to-conflict-resolution/
  123. https://civil.ge/archives/688689
  124. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/about/archives/2022/field/urbanization
  125. https://www.prb.org/international/indicator/urban/
  126. https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/10/1141782
  127. https://www.gov.am/en/demographics/
  128. https://minorityrights.org/country/armenia/
  129. https://migration.commission.ge/files/census_release_eng_2016.pdf
  130. https://minorityrights.org/country/georgia/
  131. https://www.nationalia.info/new/11576/the-end-of-nagorno-karabakh-and-the-future-of-unresolved-conflicts-arising-from-the-ussrs-
  132. https://www.indexmundi.com/armenia/demographics_profile.html
  133. https://www.carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/06/georgias-minorities-breaking-down-barriers-to-integration?lang=en
  134. https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2023-05/Azerbaijan.pdf
  135. https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-report-on-international-religious-freedom/georgia
  136. https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/georgia
  137. https://freedomhouse.org/country/nagorno-karabakh/freedom-world/2024
  138. https://www.hudson.org/religious-freedom/artsakh-final-days-christian-community-lila-gilbert
  139. https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-report-on-international-religious-freedom/armenia
  140. https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/regions-of-interest/Caspian_Sea
  141. https://www.iea.org/reports/armenia-energy-profile/overview
  142. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/07/01/amid-growing-worries-about-energy-security-and-climate-change-the-south-caucasus-countries-adapt/
  143. https://report.az/en/energy/azerbaijan-s-proved-oil-reserves-estimated-at-7-billion-barrels
  144. https://www.itiger.com/news/2503699049
  145. https://minenergy.gov.az/en/xeberler-arxivi/00448
  146. https://www.iea.org/reports/georgia-energy-profile/energy-security
  147. https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/AZE/background
  148. https://www.gem.wiki/Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan_Pipeline
  149. https://www.sgc.az/en/project/scp
  150. https://minenergy.gov.az/en/layiheler/cenub-qaz-dehlizi_2196
  151. https://www.tanap.com/en/tanap-project
  152. https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/azerbaijans-supplies-on-southern-gas-corridor-exceed-73-bcm-2024-12-2-4/
  153. https://minenergy.gov.az/en/xeberler-arxivi/00495
  154. https://www.economy.ge/uploads/files/2017/energy/sos_statement_for_natural_gas/sos_gas_report_2024_eng.pdf
  155. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS
  156. https://www.statista.com/statistics/457577/share-of-economic-sectors-in-the-gdp-in-azerbaijan/
  157. https://evnreport.com/understanding-the-region/understanding-the-region-agriculture-in-the-south-caucasus/
  158. https://www.fao.org/4/i1687e/i1687e02.pdf
  159. https://www.oiv.int/sites/default/files/2024-04/OIV_STATE_OF_THE_WORLD_VINE_AND_WINE_SECTOR_IN_2023.pdf
  160. https://geoecohub.ge/en/2024/08/20/alcoholic-beverages-wine-industry-in-2024/
  161. https://www.fao.org/armenia/our-office/armenia-at-a-glance/en
  162. https://caliber.az/en/post/azerbaijan-s-wine-tourism-gains-momentum
  163. https://www.trend.az/business/4093615.html
  164. https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Georgia%2520Exporter%2520Guide_Tbilisi_Georgia%2520-%2520Republic%2520of_GG2025-0002.pdf
  165. https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-05/agrifood-south-caucasus-3_en.pdf
  166. https://gnomonwise.org/en/publications/reports/288
  167. https://www.progreen.info/countries/knowledge/south-caucasus
  168. https://www.trade.gov/market-intelligence/south-caucasus-infrastructure-development
  169. https://www.bp.com/en_az/azerbaijan/home/who-we-are/operationsprojects/pipelines/btc.html
  170. https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2023RP09/
  171. https://caucasuswatch.de/en/insights/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-in-the-south-caucasus-a-region-moving-from-the-margins-to-the-spotlight.html
  172. https://bakuresearchinstitute.org/en/middle-corridor-from-western-initiated-traceca-to-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/
  173. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-zangezur-corridor-a-key-trade-link-in-the-south-caucasus/
  174. https://astanatimes.com/2025/10/how-armenia-azerbaijan-deal-reconfigurates-eurasias-connectivity-balance-of-power/
  175. https://arka.am/en/news/politics/regional-peace-and-the-tripp-project-will-make-the-south-caucasus-a-key-transit-route-pashinyan/
  176. https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/armenia-azerbaijan-russia/
  177. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/what-new-geopolitical-shifts-mean-for-the-south-caucasus/
  178. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/seizing-moment-western-opportunities-amid-change-south-caucasus
  179. https://kyivindependent.com/as-russian-influence-wanes-in-south-caucasus-azerbaijan-emerges-as-regional-hegemon/
  180. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_s-relations-with-southern-caucasus.en.mfa
  181. https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/new-masters-in-the-south-caucasus/
  182. https://trendsresearch.org/insight/turkiye-in-the-caucasus-from-security-to-integration/
  183. https://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/738-with-the-tripp-turkey-is-set-to-benefit-most-in-the-south-caucasus.html
  184. https://gulfif.org/shifting-power-dynamics-in-the-south-caucasus-irans-uncertain-future-in-the-region/
  185. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/08/analysis-armenia-azerbaijan-deal-worries-iran.php
  186. https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/iran-concerned-noori/
  187. https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13889-armenia-azerbaijan-peace-what-is-iran-really-afraid-of?.html
  188. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eastern-partnership_en
  189. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/172/three-eastern-partnership-neighbours-in-the-south-caucasus
  190. https://www.specialeurasia.com/2025/08/14/armenia-us-eagle-partner-25/
  191. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/time-to-adjust-the-us-approach-to-the-south-caucasus/
  192. https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2025-08-12/washington-declaration-moving-closer-to-peace-south-caucasus
  193. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50101.htm
  194. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84336.htm
  195. https://www.thearmenianreport.com/post/armenia-joins-nato-military-drills-in-georgia
  196. https://www.osce.org/whatistheosce
  197. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/armenian-azerbaijani-conflict/98-armenia-and-azerbaijan-hard-road-lasting-peace
  198. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/south-caucasus-shifts-from-russian-hegemony-to-multipolarity
  199. https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijans-energy-relations-with-eu-experiencing-bout-of-uncertainty
  200. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/addressing-georgias-slide-away-from-european-integration/
  201. https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/06/georgia-new-way-europe?lang=en
  202. https://www.ceps.eu/the-fight-for-georgia-is-still-a-fight-for-europe/
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.