Recent from talks
Nothing was collected or created yet.
Mohammed bin Salman
View on Wikipedia
Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (Arabic: محمد بن سلمان آل سعود, romanized: Muḥammad bin Salmān Āl Su‘ūd; born 31 August 1985), also known as MbS, is the de facto ruler of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,[1] formally serving as Crown Prince and Prime Minister. He is the heir apparent to the Saudi throne, the seventh son of King Salman of Saudi Arabia, and the grandson of the nation's founder, Ibn Saud.
Key Information
Mohammed is the first child of King Salman bin Abdulaziz and his third wife, Fahda bint Falah Al Hithlain. After obtaining a law degree from King Saud University, he became an advisor to his father in 2009. He was appointed deputy crown prince and defense minister after his father became king in 2015, then promoted to crown prince in 2017. Mohammed succeeded his father as prime minister in 2022.
Since his appointment as crown prince in 2017, Mohammed has introduced a series of liberal social and economic reforms; these include curtailing the influence of the Wahhabi religious establishment by restricting the powers of the religious police and improving women's rights, removing the ban on female drivers in 2018, and weakening the male-guardianship system in 2019. However, he also continues to repress women's rights activists.[2][3] His Saudi Vision 2030 program aims to reduce the Saudi economy's reliance on oil through investment in other sectors such as technology and tourism. Despite these attempts at greater economic diversification,[4] the Saudi economy remains heavily reliant on oil.[5]
Under Mohammed, Saudi Arabia has pursued a foreign policy aimed at increasing the country's regional and international influence and attracting greater foreign investment.[6] The Kingdom has coordinated energy policy with Russia, strengthened its relations with China, and expanded diplomatic and commercial relations with emerging economies and regional powers in Africa, South America, and Asia.[6] Mohammed was the architect of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen and was involved in the escalation of the Qatar diplomatic crisis, as well as a 2018 diplomatic dispute with Canada.
Mohammed leads an authoritarian government. Those regarded as political dissidents are systematically repressed through methods including imprisonment and torture; citizens face arrest for social media posts that mildly criticise government policies.[7][8][9] Between 2017 and 2019, he led the purge of competing Saudi political and economic elites, alleging that they were involved in corruption and seizing up to US$800 billion in assets and cash and cementing control over Saudi politics. A 2021 report by the United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) found that Mohammed had ordered the assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.[10]
Early life, education and career
[edit]Mohammed bin Salman was born on 31 August 1985[11][12][13] to Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz (later King of Saudi Arabia) and his third wife,[14] Fahda bint Falah Al Hithlain. He is the eldest of his mother's six children and the eighth child and seventh son of his father.[14] His full siblings include Prince Turki and Defense Minister Prince Khalid.[15] Mohammed holds a bachelor's degree in law from King Saud University, where he graduated second in his class.[16]
Early career
[edit]After graduating from university, Mohammed spent several years in the private sector before becoming an aide to his father. He worked as a consultant for the Experts Commission, working for the Saudi Cabinet.[17] On 15 December 2009, at the age of 24, he entered politics as a special advisor to his father when the latter was the governor of Riyadh Province.[18] At this time, Mohammed began to move from one position to another, such as secretary-general of the Riyadh Competitive Council, special advisor to the chairman of the board for the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives, and a member of the board of trustees for Albir Society in the Riyadh region.[19] In October 2011, Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz died. Prince Salman began his ascent to power by becoming second deputy prime minister and minister of defence. He made Mohammed his private advisor.[20]
Chief of the Court
[edit]In June 2012, Crown Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz died. Mohammed moved up into the number two position in the hierarchy, as his father became the new crown prince and first deputy prime minister. On 2 March 2013, Chief of the Crown Prince Court Saud bin Nayef Al Saud was appointed governor of the Eastern Province, and Mohammed succeeded him as chief of the court. He was also given the rank of minister.[21][22][23] On 25 April 2014, Mohammed was appointed state minister.[19]
Rise to power
[edit]Minister of Defence
[edit]

On 23 January 2015, King Abdullah died and Salman ascended the throne. Mohammed was appointed minister of defence[24] and secretary general of the royal court.[25] In addition, he retained his post as the minister of state.[26][27]
The political unrest in Yemen (which began escalating in 2011) rapidly became a major issue for the newly appointed minister of defence, with Houthis taking control of northern Yemen in late 2014, followed by the resignation of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and his cabinet. Mohammed's first move as minister was to mobilise a pan-GCC coalition to intervene following a series of suicide bombings in the Yemeni capital Sana'a via air strikes against Houthis, and impose a naval blockade.[28] In March 2015, Saudi Arabia began leading a coalition of countries allied against the Houthi rebels.[29] While there was agreement among those Saudi princes heading security services regarding the necessity of a response to the Houthis' seizure of Sana'a, which had forced the Yemeni government into exile, Mohammed launched the intervention without full coordination across security services. Saudi National Guard minister Mutaib bin Abdullah Al Saud, who was out of the country, was left out of the loop of operations.[30] While Mohammed saw the war as a quick win on Houthi rebels in Yemen and a way to put President Hadi back in power, it became a long war of attrition.[31]
In April 2015, King Salman appointed his nephew Muhammad bin Nayef as crown prince and his son Mohammed as deputy crown prince.[32] In late 2015, at a meeting between his father and Barack Obama, Mohammed bin Salman broke protocol to deliver a monologue criticising US foreign policy. When he announced an anti-terrorist military alliance of Islamic countries in December 2015, some countries involved said they had not been consulted.[30]
Regarding his role in the military intervention, Mohammed gave his first on-the-record interview on 4 January 2016 to The Economist, which had called him the "architect of the war in Yemen". Denying the title, he explained the mechanism of the decision-making institutions actually holding stakes in the intervention, including the council of security and political affairs and the ministry of foreign affairs from the Saudi side. He added that the Houthis usurped power in Sana'a before he was minister of defence.[33][34]
In response to the threat from ISIL, Mohammed established the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC), a Saudi-led Islamic alliance against terrorism, in December 2015.[35] The IMCTC's first meeting took place in Riyadh in November 2017 and involved defence ministers and officials from 41 countries.[36]
Crown prince
[edit]Mohammed was appointed crown prince on 21 June 2017, following the King's decision to depose Muhammad bin Nayef and make his own son the heir to the throne.[37] The change of succession had been predicted in December 2015 by a public memo published by the German Federal Intelligence Service,[38][39] which was subsequently rebuked by the German government.[40]
On the day bin Salman became crown prince, US president Donald Trump called to congratulate him. Trump and Mohammed pledged "close cooperation" on security and economic issues and discussed the need to cut off support for terrorism, the diplomatic dispute with Qatar, and the push for peace between Israel and the Palestinians. [41] Mohammed told The Washington Post in April 2017 that without America's cultural influence on Saudi Arabia, "we would have ended up like North Korea."[42]
In April 2022, Prince Mohammed met with newly elected Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif at the al-Salam palace.[43]
2017 purge
[edit]In May 2017, Mohammed launched a purge against competing Saudi business and political elites in an anti-corruption campaign. He said, "no one will survive in a corruption case—whoever he is, even if he's a prince or a minister".[44] In November 2017, he ordered some 200 wealthy businessmen and princes to be placed under house arrest in The Ritz-Carlton, Riyadh.[45] On 4 November 2017, the Saudi press announced the arrest of the Saudi prince and billionaire Al-Waleed bin Talal, a frequent English-language news commentator and a major shareholder in Citi, News Corp and Twitter, as well as over 40 princes and government ministers on corruption and money laundering charges.[46] Others arrested or fired in the purge included Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah, head of the Saudi Arabian National Guard; Minister of Economy and Planning Adel Fakeih; and the commander of the Royal Saudi Navy, Admiral Abdullah bin Sultan bin Mohammed Al-Sultan.[46][47]
Those arrested in the Ritz Carlton were the subject of what became called "the night of beating".[48] Most were beaten, and some were tied to walls in stress positions as part of torture by Saudi agents.[48] The interrogators knew very little outside of the victims' assets within Saudi Arabia and wanted to know more about their off-shore holdings, while the victims did not know why they were detained.[48] The detainees were threatened with blackmail.[48] At one point, the interrogators told the victims to contact their bank managers in Geneva and elsewhere and ask for large sums of money, and were surprised due to their inexpertise that the assets were not entirely in cash.[48] Swiss banks identified some of the transactions as under duress and were able to stop some of them.[48] During the proceedings, there was no due process nor plea bargains.[48] US officials described the actions as "coercion, abuse, and torture".[49] Detainees were denied sleep, had their heads covered, and were beaten.[49] Seventeen had to be hospitalised.[49] After many days, the remaining detainees were moved to Al-Ha'ir Prison, while some released are banned from travelling abroad.[49]
The purge helped centralize political powers in the hands of bin Salman and undermine the pre-existing structure of consensus-based governance among Saudi elites.[50][51] The arrests resulted in the final sidelining of the faction of King Abdullah, and bin Salman's consolidation of control of all three branches of the security forces.[52][53] It also cemented bin Salman's supremacy over business elites in Saudi Arabia and resulted in a mass seizure of assets by the bin Salman regime.[51]
The New York Times wrote:
The sweeping campaign of arrests appears to be the latest move to consolidate the power of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the favorite son and top adviser of King Salman. The king had decreed the creation of a powerful new anticorruption committee, headed by the crown prince, only hours before the committee ordered the arrests.[47]
Writing for The Huffington Post, University of Delaware professor of Islam and Global Affairs, Muqtedar Khan, speculated as to whether the removal of Al-Waleed bin Talal, a critic of Donald Trump, amounted to a coup.[54] BBC correspondent Frank Gardner was quoted as saying that "Prince Mohammed is moving to consolidate his growing power while spearheading a reform programme". Yet "[i]t is not clear what those detained are suspected of."[55]
Another hypothesis was that the purge was part of a move towards reform. Steven Mufson of The Washington Post argues that Mohammed "knows that only if he can place the royal family under the law, and not above as it was in the past, can he ask the whole country to change their attitudes relative to taxes [and] subsidies."[56] An analysis from the CBC claimed that "the clampdown against corruption resonates with ordinary Saudis who feel that the state has been asking them to accept belt tightening while, at the same time, they see corruption and the power elite accumulating more wealth".[57] Mohammed's reform agenda is widely supported by Saudi Arabia's burgeoning youth population, but faces resistance from some of the old guard more comfortable with the kingdom's traditions of incremental change and rule by consensus.[58] According to a former British ambassador to Riyadh, Mohammed "is the first prince in modern Saudi history whose constituency has not been within the royal family, it's outside it. It's been young Saudis, particularly younger Saudi men in the street".[59]
Robert W. Jordan, former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia, said that "certainly Saudi Arabia has had a corruption problem for many years. I think the population, especially, has been very unhappy with princes coming in and grabbing business deals, with public funds going to flood control projects that never seem to get built... I would also say it's a classical power grab move sometimes to arrest your rivals, your potential rivals under the pretext of corruption".[60]
Trump expressed support for the move and confidence in the Saudi Arabian leaders, tweeting "Some of those they are harshly treating have been 'milking' their country for years!"[61] French president Emmanuel Macron, who visited Riyadh days after the purge, offered no comment, saying "this is not the role of a president, and similarly I would not expect a leader of a foreign country to come and infringe on domestic matters."[62]
On 30 January 2019, the Anti-Corruption Committee's work was declared complete.[63][64] As many as 500 people were rounded up in the sweep.[65] Saudi Arabian banks froze more than 2,000 domestic accounts as part of the crackdown.[66] According to The Wall Street Journal, the Saudi government targeted cash and assets worth up to $800 billion.[67] The Saudi authorities claimed that amount was composed of assets worth around $300 billion to $400 billion that they can prove was linked to corruption.[68][69]
Prime Minister
[edit]On 27 September 2022, Mohammed was appointed as Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia by King Salman. Traditionally, the king has held the title of prime minister.[70]
Administration
[edit]Ideology
[edit]Mohammed's ideology has been described as nationalist[71][72] and populist,[73][74] with a conservative attitude towards politics, and a liberal stance on economic and social issues.[75][76] It has been heavily influenced by the views of his former adviser Saud al-Qahtani[77][78] and the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed bin Zayed.[79][80] His style of ruling has been described as extremely brutal by journalist Rula Jebreal and authoritarian by Jamal Khashoggi[81] and Theodor Winkler.[76] Mohammed bin Salman has also been championing an Arab nationalist ideology domestically and through foreign policy; with a focus on opposing Islamist movements.[82]
Authoritarianism
[edit]Mohammed heads a repressive authoritarian government in Saudi Arabia. Human rights activists and women's rights activists in Saudi Arabia have faced abuse and torture by the regime.[83] Critics, journalists and former insiders are tortured and killed.[83][84] The government has targeted Saudi dissidents who are located abroad. Jamal Khashoggi, a columnist of The Washington Post, was murdered by the regime.[84] Mohammed has justified the mass arrests of human rights activists as being as necessary for enacting reforms in Saudi Arabia and for establishing a state based on Arab nationalism.[85][86]
Mohammed has increasingly consolidated power in Saudi Arabia during his tenure as leader.[85] He significantly restricted the powers of the Saudi religious police.[30] On 29 January 2015, Mohammed was named the chair of the newly established Council for Economic and Development Affairs,[87] replacing the disbanded Supreme Economic Commission.[87] In April 2015, Mohammed was given control over Saudi Aramco by royal decree following his appointment as deputy crown prince.[88]
Domestic policies
[edit]Religious policy
[edit]According to David Ottaway of the Wilson Center, "[o]f all [Mohammed's] domestic reforms," the most "consequential" has been his work limiting the influence of Saudi Wahhabi clergy, "who still command millions of followers in the country and beyond".[89] Mohammed's inviting of "a constant stream of Western male and female singers, bands, dancers and even American female wrestlers" to perform in Saudi Arabia is in complete conflict with religious conservatives who have spoken "against the opening up of the kingdom to secular Western culture".[89] Under Mohammed, the Saudi government has promoted a new Saudi identity and nationalist history that downplays religious heritage and restricts Islamic influence in the cultural sphere.[90] Journalist Graeme Wood writes, "it is hard to exaggerate how drastically this sidelining of Islamic law will change Saudi Arabia."[91] Gabriella Perez argues that the new social changes implemented by MBS are oriented towards secularist repression, with the potential to adversely impact freedom of religion in the country.[92]
In a 2018 interview with The Atlantic editor-in-chief Jeffrey Goldberg, Mohammed stated regarding his basic approach to religion in Saudi Arabian society:
"We believe we have, in Saudi Arabia, Sunni and Shiite. We believe we have within Sunni Islam four schools of thought, and we have the ulema [the religious authorities] and the Board of Fatwas [which issues religious rulings]... our laws are coming from Islam and the Qur'an, but we have the four schools—Hanbali, Hanafi, Shafi’i, Maliki—and they argue about interpretation. And you will find a Shiite in the cabinet, you will find Shiites in government, the most important university in Saudi Arabia is headed by a Shiite. So we believe that we are a mix of Muslim schools and sects."[93]
Restrictions on religious police
[edit]In 2016, Mohammed took steps to drastically curtail the powers of the "Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice" (CPVPV), or Islamic religious police.[94][95] The "feared" CPVPV, which had thousands of officers on the streets and powers to arrest, detain, and interrogate those suspected of violating sharia, was banned "from pursuing, questioning, asking for identification, arresting and detaining anyone suspected of a crime".[96] The cinema industry was reinstated, social liberties were expanded, gender mixing and dating have been normalised by the state in the public sphere. Schmidt-Feuerheerd argues that the new state policies are also accompanied by an increasing clampdown on political and religious activities independent of the government.[90]
Changes to legal system
[edit]Mohammed has stated that "in Islamic law, the head of the Islamic establishment is wali al-amr[97] (Arabic: وَلِيّ الأمر ), the ruler.[91] While Saudi rulers "have historically stayed away from religion", and "outsourced" issues of theology and religious law to "the big beards", traditionally conservative and orthodox religious scholars, Mohammed has "a law degree from King Saud University" and "flaunts his knowledge and dominance over the clerics", according to Graeme Wood. He is "probably the only leader in the Arab world who knows anything about Islamic epistemology and jurisprudence", according to American historian Professor Bernard Haykel. In an interview televised in Saudi Arabia on 25 April 2021, Mohammed criticised the devotion of Saudi religious leaders to Wahhabi doctrines "in language never before used by a Saudi monarch", saying "there are no fixed schools of thought and there is no infallible person", and that fatwas "should be based on the time, place and mindset in which they are issued", rather than regarded as immutable.[89]
In interviews with Wood, Mohammed
explained that Islamic law is based on two textual sources: the Quran and the Sunnah, or the example of the Prophet Muhammad, gathered in many tens of thousands of fragments from the Prophet's life and sayings. Certain rules—not many—come from the unambiguous legislative content of the Quran, he said, and he cannot do anything about them even if he wants to. But those sayings of the Prophet (called Hadith), he explained, do not all have equal value as sources of law, and he said he is bound by only a very small number whose reliability, 1,400 years later, is unimpeachable. Every other source of Islamic law, he said, is open to interpretation—and he is therefore entitled to interpret them as he sees fit. The effect of this maneuver is to chuck about 95 percent of Islamic law into the sandpit of Saudi history and leave MBS free to do whatever he wants. "He's short-circuiting the tradition," Haykel said. ".. That leaves him to determine what is in the interest of the Muslim community. If that means opening movie theaters, allowing tourists, or women on the beaches on the Red Sea, then so be it.”
As of early 2021, Mohammed has "ordered a codification of Saudi laws that would end the power of individual Wahhabi judges to implement" their own interpretation of Sharia.[89] According to Wood, many conservative clerics strongly appear to have succumbed to "good old-fashioned intimidation" by the government to reverse their religious positions and supporting the government line on issues such as "the opening of cinemas and mass layoffs of Wahhabi imams".[91]
Abaya ban
[edit]In December 2022, Saudi Arabia's Education and Training Evaluation Commission (ETEC) declared a governmental ban on Muslim female students from wearing the traditional abaya clothing to examination centres, insisting that students should wear only school uniforms.[98][99][100] A later clarification from ETEC reported by The Milli Chronicle stated that the ban on abayas was restricted only for all-female examination centres run by the ETEC.[101]
Economic policy
[edit]Vision 2030
[edit]Mohammed took the leadership in the restructuring of Saudi Arabia's economy, which he officially announced in April 2016 when he introduced Vision 2030, the country's strategic orientation for the next 15 years. Vision 2030 plans to reform Saudi Arabia's economy towards a more diversified and privatised structure. It details goals and measures in various fields, from developing non-oil revenues and privatisation of the economy to e-government and sustainable development.[102]
One of the major motives behind this economic restructure through Vision 2030 can be traced back to Saudi Arabia's reliance on a rentier economy, as a limit on oil resources makes its sustainability a problem in the future. While the country claims to own a proven reserve of 266.58 billion barrels of crude oil, the energy analyst Matthew R. Simmons estimates the true number to be far less, as the last non-Saudi report by the General Accounting Office in 1978 only mentioned 110 billion barrels.[103]
At the inaugural Future Investment Initiative conference in Riyadh in October 2017, Mohammed announced plans for the creation of Neom, a linear city powered by renewable energy sources, covering an area of 26,000 square kilometres on Saudi Arabia's Red Sea coast, extending into Jordan and Egypt.[104] Shortly after plans of the project emerged, Bin Salman's project was criticized as unrealistic.[105] Neom's construction entailed substantial environmental harm and human rights violations, with expatriate employees describing abusive working conditions and members of the local Howeitat tribe protesting against their forced expulsion.[106][107] In 2024, the project was reported to have been substantially scaled back from its original plan.[108][109] An internal audit of the megaproject found extensive problems, including "evidence of deliberate manipulation", by the managers of the project.[108] By 2025, new contracts for Neom dried up and there was no mention of Neom in Saudi Arabia's pre-budget statement for 2026.[110]
The announcement followed plans to develop a 34,000 square kilometre area across a lagoon of 50 islands on Saudi Arabia's Red Sea coastline into a luxury tourism destination with laws on a par with international standards.[111][112] In a further effort to boost the tourism industry, in November 2017 it was announced that Saudi Arabia would start issuing tourist visas for foreigners, beginning in 2018.[113]
Mohammed's biggest bet was his plan to restore Saudi dominance in global oil markets by driving the new competition into bankruptcy, by keeping the oil price low enough for a long enough period. Saudi Arabia persuaded OPEC to do the same. A few small players went bankrupt, but American frackers only shut down their less-profitable operations temporarily, and waited for oil prices to go up again. Saudi Arabia, which had been spending $100 billion a year to keep services and subsidies going, had to admit defeat in November 2016. It then cut production significantly and asked its OPEC partners to do the same.
In the last week of September 2018, Mohammed inaugurated the much-awaited $6.7bn high-speed railway line connecting Mecca and Medina, the two holiest cities of Islam. The Haramain Express is 450 km line travelling up to 300 km/h that can transport around 60 million passengers annually. The commercial operations of the railway began on 11 October 2018.[114]

In October 2018, Mohammed announced that the Public Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia's assets were approaching $400 billion and would pass $600 billion by 2020.[115]
Mohammed announced a project to build Saudi Arabia's first nuclear reactor in November 2018. The kingdom aims to build 16 nuclear facilities over the next 20 years.[116] Efforts to diversify the Saudi energy sector also include wind and solar, including a 1.8 gigawatt solar plant announced in the same month as part of a long-term project in partnership with SoftBank.[117]
Saudi petroleum industry
[edit]Saudi Arabia, OPEC's largest producer, has the second-largest amount of oil reserves in the world. On 28 September 2021, Joe Biden's national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, met with Mohammed in Saudi Arabia to discuss the high oil prices.[118] In October 2022 in protest of Saudi Arabia cutting oil production, US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said Saudi Arabia knew the cut would "increase Russian revenues and blunt the effectiveness of sanctions" and accused Saudi Arabia of "coercing" other oil producing countries to agree.[119] The record-high energy prices were driven by a global surge in demand as the world quit the economic recession caused by COVID-19, particularly due to strong energy demand in Asia.[120][121][122]
The relations between Russia and Saudi Arabia evolved under Mohammed, granting the two nations the ability to coordinate in oil export decisions.[123][124]
Sport sector
[edit]Mohammed has presided over unprecedented spending on sport since becoming Saudi Arabia's de facto ruler in 2017. He has also been assiduous in striking deals to bring top sports events to Saudi, including the FIFA Club World Cup in 2034 and the Asian Games in 2029. In 2023, Mohammed said this approach is central to the country's goal of becoming one of the world's top 10 tourist destinations, stating: "When you want to diversify an economy you have to work in all sectors: mining, infrastructure, manufacturing, transportation, logistics all this… Part of it is tourism and if you want to develop tourism part of it is culture, part of it is your sport sector, because you need to create a calendar."[125]
Domestic reforms
[edit]Mohammed established an entertainment authority that began hosting comedy shows, professional wrestling events, and monster truck rallies.[30] In 2016, he shared his idea for "Green cards" for non-Saudi foreigners with Al Arabiya journalist Turki Aldakhil.[126] In 2019 the Saudi cabinet approved a new residency scheme (Premium Residency) for foreigners.[127] The scheme will enable expatriates to permanently reside, own property and invest in the Kingdom.[128][129]
The first measures undertaken in April 2016 included new taxes and cuts in subsidies, a diversification plan, the creation of a $2 trillion Saudi sovereign wealth fund, and a series of strategic economic reforms called the National Transformation Programme.[130] Mohammed's plans to raise capital for the sovereign wealth fund included selling off shares of Saudi Aramco, the state-owned petroleum and natural gas company,[88] with the capital to be re-invested in other sectors such as to implement the diversification plans.[131] In October 2017, the plan for Aramco's IPO listing was criticised by The Economist, which called it "a mess".[132] Mohammed slashed the state budget, freezing government contracts and reducing the pay of civil employees as part of drastic austerity measures.[133]
In April 2017, Mohammed announced a project to build one of the world's largest cultural, sports and entertainment cities in Qiddiya, southwest of Riyadh. The plans for a 334-square kilometre city include a safari and a Six Flags theme park.[134][135]

In October 2017, Mohammed said that the ultra-conservative Saudi state had not been "normal" for the past 30 years, blaming rigid doctrines that had governed society in a reaction to the Iranian Revolution, which successive leaders "didn't know how to deal with".[136] He stated that he aimed to have Saudi Arabia start "returning to what we were before—a country of moderate Islam that is open to all religions and to the world".[137] This amounted to telling the country's clerics that the deal the royal family struck with them after the Grand Mosque seizure was to be renegotiated.[138] Building an industrial culture was seen as incompatible with Wahhabism. The Wahhabis were committed to fixed social and gender relationships. These were consistent with an economy built on oil sales, but industrialization requires a dynamic culture with social relations constantly shifting.[139] The regime's commitment to "moderate Islam" and secularization drive through repressive methods has been questioned.[140]
Further cultural transformations followed in December 2017 with Saudi Arabia's first public concert by a female singer, and in January 2018 a sports stadium in Jeddah became the first in the Kingdom to admit women.[141] In April 2018, the first public cinema opened in Saudi Arabia after a ban of 35 years, with plans to have more than 2,000 screens running by 2030.[142][143]
In an interview with a CBS 60 Minutes that aired on 29 September 2019, Mohammed invited people to visit the kingdom to see the transformation, asking for people to meet Saudi citizens for themselves.[144]
On 26 April 2020, the Supreme Judicial Council of Saudi Arabia abolished flogging as a punishment in the country, stating that the decision was "an extension of the human rights reforms introduced under the direction of King Salman and the direct supervision of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman".[145] The following day, the Human Rights Commission of Saudi Arabia reported the enactment of a royal decree abolishing the death penalty for crimes committed by minors.[146]
Human rights
[edit]Early in his leadership tenure, Mohammed sought to cultivate an image of Saudi Arabia as implementing various reforms. Human rights groups say that repression has worsened under his tenure.[83][85] According to human rights groups, arrests of human rights activists have risen under Mohammed.[147] He has reportedly created the Tiger Squad, a team of assassins that act as a death squad, to target Saudi critics inside and outside Saudi Arabia.[148][149] Among those detained in a wave of arrests in September 2017 were Abdulaziz al-Shubaily, a founding member of the Saudi Civil and Political Rights Association (ACPRA); Mustafa al-Hassan, an academic and novelist; and Essam al-Zamel, an entrepreneur.[150][151] Ahead of the lifting of the ban on women driving in June 2018, 17 women's rights activists were arrested, including the women to drive and anti-male guardianship campaigner Loujain al-Hathloul.[152][153] Eight of the 17 were subsequently released.[154] Hatoon al-Fassi, an associate professor of women's history at King Saud University,[155] was arrested shortly afterwards.[156][157]
In August that year, the human rights activist Israa al-Ghomgham and her husband, both arrested in 2015, were put under legal threat of beheading.[158] Human Rights Watch warned that the al-Ghomgham case set a "dangerous precedent" for other women activists currently detained.[159] HRW's Middle East director Sarah Leah Whitson said, "Any execution is appalling, but seeking the death penalty for activists like Israa al-Ghomgham, who are not even accused of violent behaviour, is monstrous. Every day, the Saudi monarchy's unrestrained despotism makes it harder for its public relations teams to spin the fairy tale of 'reform' to allies and international business."[159][160][161] On 23 April 2019, 37 people, mostly Shia human rights activists involved in the Qatif conflict, were executed in one of the largest mass executions of the minority sect in the kingdom's history.[162]
In August 2019, Loujain al-Hathloul's brother Walid informed the media that his sister was offered release on the condition that she deny the human rights abuses committed against her in Saudi prison. Walid wrote on Twitter that the Saudi state security laid a proposal for Loujain to sign a document and appear on camera to deny that she had been tortured and sexually harassed in jail. He stated that Loujain mentioned to the family that she had been whipped, beaten, electrocuted in a chair, and harassed by masked men, who would wake her up in the middle of the night to shout threats at her in cell. Walid also tweeted that Loujain refused the offer proposed by Saudi authorities and "immediately ripped the document".[163]
In response to foreign criticism and women's rights activism, Mohammed has implemented modest reforms to improve women's rights in Saudi Arabia. In September 2017, he implemented the women to drive movement's multi-decade demand to lift the ban on female drivers.[164] He legislated against some elements of Saudi Arabia's Wali system, also a topic of a decades-long campaign by women's rights activists.[165] In response to the Saudi anti male-guardianship campaign,[166] the Saudi government enacted a law that allows women above 21 years old to obtain passports and travel abroad without needing the permission of their male guardians.[167][168] In February 2018, it became legally possible for Saudi women to open their own business without a male's permission.[169] According to the Saudi Information Ministry, as of March 2018[update], mothers in Saudi Arabia became authorised to retain immediate custody of their children after divorce without having to file any lawsuits.[170]
In February 2017, Saudi Arabia appointed its first woman to head the Saudi Stock Exchange.[171][172]
Arrest of Muhammad bin Nayef
[edit]Muhammad bin Nayef was arrested on 6 March 2020, along with his half-brother Nawwaf bin Nayef and King Salman's brother Ahmed bin Abdulaziz. The three princes were charged with treason. The Saudi government claimed the princes were trying to overthrow Mohammed bin Salman.[173]
Accusations of poisoning attempt against King Abdullah
[edit]In 2021, the former Saudi intelligence official Saad al-Jabri said in an interview with CBS that Mohammed bin Salman mentioned to Interior Minister Muhammad bin Nayef Al Saud plans to kill King Abdullah in 2014. This would allow Mohammed's father to take the throne. Al-Jabri has called Mohammed "a psychopath, killer ... with infinite resources, who poses threat to his people, to the Americans and to the planet".[174] Mohammed has rejected all allegations; the Saudi embassy called al-Jabri "a discredited former government official with a long history of [fabrication]".[175]
Foreign policy
[edit]Interventions in Syria and Yemen
[edit]Some have called Mohammed the architect of the war in Yemen.[176][177] On 10 January 2016, The Independent reported that "the BND, the German intelligence agency, portrayed...Saudi defence minister and Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman...as a political gambler who is destabilising the Arab world through proxy wars in Yemen and Syria."[178][34][179] German officials reacted to the BND's memo, saying the published statement "is not the position of the federal government".[40]

Mohammed leads the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen against the Houthi rebels, who in 2015 seized Sana'a and ousted the Saudi-backed Hadi government, ending multilateral efforts towards a political settlement following the 2011 Yemeni uprising.[180][181][182] Coalition airstrikes during the intervention have resulted in thousands of civilians killed or injured,[183] prompting accusations of war crimes in the intervention.[184][185][186] Following a Houthi missile attack against Riyadh in December 2017, which was intercepted by Saudi air defence, airstrikes killed 136 Yemeni civilians and injured 87 others in eleven days.[187][188] In August 2018, the United Nations reported that all parties in the conflict were responsible for human rights violations and for actions which could be considered war crimes.[189]
The war and blockade of Yemen has cost Saudi Arabia tens of billions of dollars, further aggravated the humanitarian crisis in the country and destroyed much of Yemen's infrastructure, but failed to dislodge the Shiite Houthi rebels and their allies from the Yemeni capital.[190][133] More than 50,000 children in Yemen died from starvation in 2017. From 2015 to May 2019 the number of total deaths of children is said to be approximately 85,000.[191][192][193][194] The famine in Yemen is the direct result of the Saudi-led intervention and blockade of the rebel-held area.[190][195] In October 2018, Lise Grande, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, warned that 12 to 13 million Yemenis were at risk of starvation if the war continued for another three months.[196] On 28 March 2018, Saudi Arabia, along with its coalition partner the UAE, donated US$930 million to the United Nations which, according to UN secretary-general António Guterres, "...(will) help to alleviate the suffering of millions of vulnerable people across Yemen". The funds cover almost one-third of the $2.96 billion required to implement the UN's 2018 Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan.[197] Following the Houthi missile attack against Riyadh in December 2017, which was intercepted by Saudi air defence,[198] Mohammed retaliated with a ten-day barrage of indiscriminate airstrikes against civilian areas in Yemen held by Houthi forces, killing dozens of children.[199]

Following the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi, the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved a resolution to impose sanctions on people blocking humanitarian access in Yemen and suspend arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Senator Lindsey Graham said the Saudi Arabia–United States relationship "is more of a burden than an asset." He also said, "The crown prince [of Saudi Arabia] is so toxic, so tainted, so flawed."[200]
Andrew Smith, of Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT), said that British foreign secretaries Boris Johnson and Jeremy Hunt "have played an utterly central and complicit role in arming and supporting the Saudi-led destruction of Yemen."[201] Hunt's Conservative leadership campaign was partly funded by a close associate to Mohammed.[202][201]

On 16 August 2020, a lawsuit filed by a former top intelligence official, Saad al-Jabri, revealed that in 2015 Mohammed secretly called for Russia to intervene in Syria at a time when Bashar al-Assad's regime was close to falling apart. The Saudi monarchy had been supporting anti-Assad rebels, including Ahrar al-Sham,[203] while Russian and Syrian forces were bombing rebel-held cities in support of Assad, killing tens of thousands of Syrian civilians in the process. Western diplomats say that Mohammed was strongly influenced by Emirati politician Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (who later became ruler of Abu Dhabi). The UAE was pushing for the idea of helping Russia stabilise Syria and enabling the Assad regime in the country.[204] In 2017 it was reported that Saudi Arabia provided weapons to Syrian opposition groups, fighting against the Assad regime. Conflict Armament Research (CAR) reported that these weapons frequently ended up in the hands of the Islamic State members.[205] In 2018, Mohammed reportedly wanted the US military presence to maintain in Syria, despite Donald Trump's declaring the withdrawal of American forces from the war-torn country.[206]
In March 2023, Saudi Arabia began talks to bring Syria back into the Arab League, and provided economic support after the 2023 Turkey–Syria earthquake on 6 February.[207] In May 2023, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad attended the Arab League summit in Jeddah where he was received by Mohammed.[208]
Relations with Israel
[edit]In December 2017, Mohammed criticised the United States' decision to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.[209] In 2018, he voiced his support for a Jewish homeland of Israel,[210] the first time that a senior Saudi royal has expressed such sentiments publicly.[211][212] In September 2019, Mohammed condemned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's plans to annex the eastern portion of the West Bank known as the Jordan Valley.[213] In 2020, Mohammed met with Netanyahu and Israeli head of the Mossad Yosi Cohen in Neom.[214] The United States had been pushing for Israel's normalization for some years, calling (in this context) the Abraham Accords the "deal of the century", but Riyadh rejected reports of progress. In 2023, there were ongoing U.S. lead negotiations to establish diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel.[215] Mohammed also said that his country was moving steadily closer to normalising relations with Israel as part of the Abraham Accords.[216] Due to the Gaza war, Mohammed called for a global arms embargo against Israel.[217] Amid the Gaza war, according to reporting by The Atlantic, Mohammed told U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in January 2024 that he was open to Saudi normalization with Israel, adding, "Do I care personally about the Palestinian issue? I don't, but my people do."[218][219]
Surveys in the early stages of Israel's war on Gaza showed that over 90 percent of Saudis citizens believed that the Arab states should break off their relations with Israel.[220] In August 2024, Mohammad discussed his fears of facing assassination due to his support for establishing and normalizing Saudi-Israel ties, and the threats he received. He believed for any deal, it was important to include a true path to the State of Palestine, keeping in mind the current Israel-Palestine war.[221] Following the events in Gaza and Israel's attacks in Lebanon and Syria on 17 and 18 September 2024, Mohammad declared during the annual address to the Shura Council on 19 September 2024, that Saudi Arabia would not normalize relations with Israel until Palestine is recognized as a state with East Jerusalem as its capital.[220][222][223] At the Riyadh Summit on 11 November 2024, Mohammed condemned Israel's actions in Gaza as a "collective genocide" and called on Israel to respect Iran's sovereignty.[224][225][226] According to Bernard Haykel of Princeton University, Al Saud admires Israel's economic and technological success, and seeks mutual recognition with a focus on high-tech coordination.[227]
Relations with Russia
[edit]
Under Mohammed's leadership, Saudi Arabia strengthened its relationship with Russian president Vladimir Putin.[228] In 2016, Mohammed signed an agreement to cooperate with Russia in global oil markets.[228] After Mohammed was accused of murdering Jamal Khashoggi, Putin was one of few world leaders to publicly embrace the prince.[229] Russia has also abstained from criticising Saudi-led intervention in Yemen and has supported the United Nations arms embargo against the Houthis in the Security Council.[230][231] In 2021, Mohammed signed a military cooperation agreement with Russia.[232]
Amidst Western isolation following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Mohammed strengthened his personal relationship with Vladimir Putin and expanded Saudi-Russia relations.[86] Russia and Saudi Arabia have since been co-operating through the OPEC to cut oil output and increase oil prices.[233][234] In September 2022, five British and two American POWs captured in Ukraine were released by Russia through Saudi mediation.[235] Russia's new foreign policy concept unveiled in 2023 has given priority to enhancing friendly relations with Saudi Arabia.[236] In December 2023, Putin visited Saudi Arabia and met with Mohammed.[237]
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman hosted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Riyadh on 10 March 2025, ahead of U.S.-Ukraine talks. Saudi Arabia has positioned itself as a neutral mediator in global conflicts, including Ukraine and earlier U.S.-Russia negotiations, reflecting its growing role as a diplomatic power broker.[238]
Relations with Turkey
[edit]In March 2018, Mohammed referred to Turkey as part of a "triangle of evil" alongside Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood.[239][240] However, Mohammed later led a reconciliation with Turkey in 2022, leading to improved relations between the countries.[241] In July 2023, the Crown Prince and Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan agreed to a major deal for Saudi Arabia to purchase Turkish Baykar Bayraktar Akıncı drones.[242]
Relations with the United States
[edit]Relations with the first Trump administration
[edit]In August 2016, Donald Trump Jr., the son of US presidential candidate Donald Trump, had a meeting with an envoy representing Mohammed bin Salman and the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed bin Zayed. The envoy offered help to the Trump campaign.[243] The meeting included Joel Zamel, an Israeli social media expert, Lebanese-American businessman George Nader, and Blackwater founder Erik Prince.[244][243]

Upon Trump's election, support for Mohammed bin Salman was described as one of the few issues where rival White House advisers Jared Kushner and Steve Bannon agreed.[80] Mohammed, then deputy crown prince, was subsequently invited to the White House and given the treatment typically afforded to foreign heads of state by diplomatic protocol.[245] He subsequently defended the Trump administration's travel ban for nationals of 7 Muslim-majority countries, stating that "Saudi Arabia does not believe that this measure is targeting Muslim countries or the religion of Islam".[246] Kushner also inquired as to how the US could support Mohammed in the succession process.[245] After Mohammed became crown prince, Trump reportedly said, "We've put our man on top".[247] Trump initially supported the Saudi-led blockade of Qatar,[248] despite opposition from US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Secretary of Defense James Mattis,[249] though he later changed his position.[250] Mohammed later reportedly claimed Kushner had provided intelligence assistance on domestic rivals to Mohammed during the 2017–19 Saudi Arabian purge,[251] which Trump had personally expressed support for.[252] The Trump administration also firmly supported Mohammed during global backlash following the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi.[253]
Relations with the Biden administration
[edit]
In 2019, during the Trump administration, Joe Biden criticised Mohammed, describing him as a pariah due to the 2018 killing of Jamal Khashoggi.[254] In July 2021, six months into the Biden presidency, Saudi deputy defence minister Khalid bin Salman Al Saud (Mohammed's brother) visited the United States. It was the first meeting between senior US and Saudi officials after Jamal Khashoggi was murdered in 2018.[255] In September 2021, Biden's national security adviser Jake Sullivan met with Mohammed. In the meeting, Mohammed reportedly ended up shouting at Sullivan after he raised the killing of Khashoggi.[254]
US-Saudi trade relations has also sunk drastically from a height of 76 billion dollars in 2012 to just about 29 billion dollars in 2021. After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Saudi Arabia declined US requests to increase oil production and thus undercut Russia's war finances.[254][256][257] The Wall Street Journal wrote in April 2022 that the US-Saudi relationship was at "its lowest point in decades."[254] In April 2022, CIA director William Burns traveled to Saudi Arabia to meet with Mohammed, asking him to increase the country's oil production. They also discussed Saudi weapons purchases from China.[258]

Relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia became weak after OPEC+ announced a cut in oil production by two million barrels a day. The US government was angered by the move, accusing Saudi Arabia of siding with Russia in its war against Ukraine. The Saudi government denied these claims, claiming that the move was not politically motivated but to bring stability in global oil markets.[259] The Saudi government also declined a US request to postpone an OPEC decision until after the 2022 United States elections, leading Biden to threaten "consequences" against Saudi Arabia.[260]
Saudi Arabia's relations with the Biden administration have been strained, especially after Mohammed's refusal to increase oil production in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, the relations have warmed up with Biden's official visit to Saudi Arabia,[261] The Pentagon's approval of a $500m arms deal,[262] a bipartisan group visit of US senators to Saudi Arabia,[263] and relaxing restrictions on offensive weapons sales.[264]
Relations with the second Trump administration
[edit]
From 13 to 16 May 2025, Donald Trump undertook his first major international trip of his second term, visiting Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Trump and Mohammed signed a "strategic economic partnership" agreement.[265] The visit elevated Mohammed's standing within the Saudi government as King Salman, who did not appear during the Saudi visit, has largely receded from public view. In contrast to the 2017 Riyadh summit, Mohammed greeted Trump at King Khalid International Airport, rather than Salman.[266]
Relations with Qatar
[edit]On 5 June 2017, Saudi Arabia under Mohammed spearheaded a diplomatic crisis with Qatar together with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt, with the countries severing diplomatic relations with Qatar and effectively imposing a blockade on the country. The countries cited Qatar's alleged support for terrorism as the main reason for the actions, also citing Al Jazeera and Qatar's relations with Iran. Reuters reported that Mohammed "said the dispute with Qatar could be long-lasting, comparing it to the US embargo against Cuba imposed 60 years before, but played down its impact, dismissing the Gulf emirate as "smaller than a Cairo street".[240] In August 2018, a report by The Intercept cited unnamed sources claiming that former US secretary of state Rex Tillerson had in June 2017 intervened to stop a Saudi-Emirati plan to invade Qatar, resulting in increased pressure from Saudi Arabia and the UAE for his removal from office.[267]
On 4 January 2021, Qatar and Saudi Arabia agreed to a resolution of the crisis brokered by Kuwait and the United States, which stated that Saudi Arabia will reopen its border with Qatar and begin the process for reconciliation. An agreement and final communiqué signed on 5 January 2021 following a GCC summit at Al-'Ula marks the resolution of the crisis.[268]
Resignation of Saad Hariri
[edit]In November 2017, Mohammed forced Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri to resign when he visited Saudi Arabia. Mohammed believed that Hariri was in the pocket of Iran-backed Hezbollah, which is a major political force in Lebanon. Hariri eventually was released, went back to Lebanon and annulled his resignation.[45]
Relations with Canada
[edit]Canada and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have had a generally cordial relationship marred by periods of diplomatic tension. Both countries, however, share robust economic ties: Saudi Arabia is Canada's largest trading partner in the Middle East,[269] and is also one of the largest recipients of Canadian military equipment. In February 2014, the Saudi government had purchased Canadian armaments worth CA$15 billion in total.[270] Until August 2018, there were over 16,000 Saudi students enrolled in Canadian schools on government scholarships.[271]
Since 2018, bilateral relations have gradually soured since a high-profile diplomatic spat began over the Canadian government's public condemnation of the Saudi government's human rights abuses. Canada had called for the immediate release of Saudi activist Raif Badawi and his sister Samar Badawi on 5 August 2018 after they were arrested by Saudi authorities on varying charges. In response, the Canadian government was accused of interfering in Saudi Arabia's internal affairs; the Canadian ambassador in Riyadh was declared persona non grata and expelled from the country, having been given 48 hours to leave. The Saudi ambassador in Ottawa was also recalled,[272] and the Saudi government suspended all new trade (excluding oil sales) with Canada, terminated all flights and services of Saudia to Toronto, and cancelled the scholarships of thousands of Saudi students in Canada.[273]Chrystia Freeland, Canada's minister of foreign affairs, issued a statement via Twitter on 2 August 2018 expressing Canada's concern over the recent arrest of Samar Badawi, a human rights activist and sister of imprisoned Saudi blogger Raif Badawi, and called for the release of human rights activists.[274] In response to Canada's criticism, Saudi Arabia expelled Canada's ambassador and froze trade with Canada.[275][276] The Toronto Star reported that the consensus among analysts indicated that the actions taken by Mohammed were a "warning to the world — and to Saudi human rights activists — that his Saudi Arabia is not to be trifled with".[277] The diplomatic ties were restored on 24 May 2023.[278]
Relations with China
[edit]Relations between China and Saudi Arabia have deepened under the leadership of Mohammed; since he became crown prince in 2017, trade between the two countries have increased from $51.5 billion to $87.5 billion in 2021.[279] In February 2019, Mohammed defended China's policies in Xinjiang, where more than 1 million Uyghurs were put into internment camps, saying "China has the right to carry out anti-terrorism and de-extremisation work for its national security.".[280][281][282] Miqdaad Versi, spokesperson for the Muslim Council of Britain, called Mohammed's remarks "disgusting" and a defence of "the use of concentration camps against Uighur Muslims".[283] China has been Saudi Arabia's largest economic partner since 2014 and Saudi Arabia is the biggest source of China's oil imports.[284] In 2019, Chinese officials announced plans to incorporate Saudi Vision 2030 into the Belt and Road Initiative, and expand economic, cultural, strategic and military co-operation.[285]
Since 2021, China has been assisting in Saudi Arabia's ballistic missile programme by transferring technology and making joint ventures for missile production.[286][287] Mohammed hosted Chinese president Xi Jinping in Riyadh for talks on 7–10 December 2022.[288] During the visit, Xi met with numerous Arab leaders, including members of the Gulf Cooperation Council.[288] Xi also signed numerous commercial deals with Saudi Arabia and formally elevated the relationship to comprehensive strategic partnership, highest level in China's formal ranking of relations with other countries.[289] The deal also expanded military and security ties, with both sides agreeing for joint production of UAV systems in Saudi Arabia.[290] Describing the GCC summit as a "milestone event" in the history of Sino-Arab friendship, Xi urged the Gulf countries to start making oil transaction through Renminbi, a move widely seen as China's efforts to establish Renminbi as a world currency.[291]
During the 2022 Airshow China held in Zhuhai, Saudi Arabia and China concluded arms deal worth $4 billion. Under the contract, Saudi Arabia purchased hundreds of Chinese drones, ballistic missiles, Silent Hunter DEWs in addition to technology transfer that enables indigenous manufacturing of various armaments.[292][293] On 10 March 2023, Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to restore diplomatic ties cut in 2016 after a deal brokered between the two countries by China following secret talks in Beijing.[294]
Intimidation of Saad al-Jabri
[edit]On 9 July 2020, four United States senators urged President Trump to secure the freedom of Saad al-Jabri's children Omar and Sarah, calling it a "moral obligation" to support a man who aided the US intelligence for years and had close ties with key members of the Saudi royal family. The Saudi government detained Omar and Sarah in March 2020 and, to date, their whereabouts remain unknown.[295][296] Saudi Arabia had issued an extradition request and Interpol notices to bring back Saad al-Jabri, who was the US anti-terrorism contact in the Middle East and was staying in Canada since 2018. The Interpol notice against al-Jabri was removed, citing that he was a political opponent of Mohammed.[297]
In August 2020, al-Jabri filed a federal lawsuit in Washington, DC, alleging that Mohammed dispatched a "Tiger Squad" to Canada during October 2018 to assassinate al-Jabri, who was the closest adviser to Mohammed's chief rival, Muhammad bin Nayef. The squad was identified and returned by Canadian authorities.[298][299] Following the lawsuit, the US District Court for the District of Columbia issued the summons against Mohammed bin Salman, along with 11 other people. The summons stated that a judgement would be taken by default against the concerned parties if they fail to respond.[300] Documents filed to the court revealed that Mohammed was served the lawsuit on 22 September 2020 at 4:05 p.m. ET via WhatsApp, and twenty minutes later the message was marked as "read".[301][302]
Hack of Jeff Bezos's phone
[edit]In March 2019, Gavin de Becker, a security specialist working for Jeff Bezos, accused Saudi Arabia of hacking Bezos's phone.[303] Bezos was the owner of The Washington Post, the leader of the company Amazon, and the world's richest man at the time.[303]
In January 2020, the results of FTI Consulting's forensic investigation of Bezos' phone were made public. The company concluded with "medium to high confidence" that Bezos' phone was hacked by a multimedia message sent in May 2018 from Mohammed's WhatsApp account, after which the phone begun transmitting dramatically higher amounts of data.[304] The report points to circumstantial evidence: first, a November 2018 message from Mohammed to Bezos includes an image resembling the woman Bezos was having an affair with, despite the affair not being public knowledge at the time; second, a February 2019 text from Mohammed to Bezos urges Bezos not to believe everything, after Bezos was briefed on the phone regarding an Internet campaign against him conducted by Saudis.[304]
United Nations special rapporteurs Agnès Callamard and David Kaye reacted that the alleged hack suggests that Mohammed participated "in an effort to influence, if not silence, The Washington Post's reporting on Saudi Arabia".[305] They declared that the alleged hacking was relevant to the issue of whether Mohammed was involved in the killing of Jamal Khashoggi, who worked for The Washington Post.[306]
Environmentalism
[edit]Under Mohammed's leadership, Saudi Arabia has lobbied to weaken global carbon emissions-reduction agreements.[307] Mohammed has made commitments about Saudi Arabia reaching net zero emissions but they are based primarily on unproven carbon capture and storage technologies.[308]
Assassination of Jamal Khashoggi
[edit]

In October 2018, Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, a critic of Mohammed, went missing after entering the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Turkish officials reportedly believe that Khashoggi was murdered at the consulate, claiming to have specific video and audio recordings proving that he was first tortured and then murdered, and that a medical forensics expert was part of the 15-man Saudi team seen entering and leaving the consulate at the time of the journalist's disappearance.[309] Saudi Arabia denied the accusations and 13 days later Mohammed invited Turkish authorities to search the building as they "have nothing to hide". Saudi officials said they are "working to search for him".[310] The Washington Post reported that Mohammed had earlier sought to lure Khashoggi back to Saudi Arabia and detain him.[311]
According to Middle East Eye, seven of the fifteen men suspected of killing Khashoggi are members of Mohammed's personal bodyguard.[312] John Sawers, a former head of the British MI6, stated that in his judgment of the evidence it is "very likely" that Mohammed ordered the killing of Khashoggi.[313]
In the aftermath of Khashoggi's death, multiple commentators referred to Mohammed as "Mister Bone Saw", a play on the initials MBS. The name refers to the alleged use of a bone saw to dispose of Khashoggi's remains.[314][315]
Mohammed has denied any involvement in the murder and blamed the assassination on rogue operators. However, Western countries are not convinced and believe this could not have happened without Mohammed's knowledge or approval. Donald Trump described the Saudi response to the killing as "one of the worst in the history of cover-ups." Trump also believes that Mohammed at least knew about the plan, saying that "the prince is running things over there more so at this stage."[316]
After the murder, Mohammed's close confidant Ahmad Asiri was sacked,[317] as was former advisor Saud al-Qahtani.[318][319]
The recording of Khashoggi's killing collected by Turkish intelligence reportedly reveals that one of the members of the kill team instructed someone over the phone to "tell your boss, the deed was done." American intelligence officials believe that "boss" was a reference to the Crown Prince. The person who made the call was identified as Maher Abdulaziz Mutreb, a security officer who is frequently seen travelling with the prince.[320]
Seven weeks after Khashoggi's death, Saudi Arabia, in order to "distance ... Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, from the grisly murder" stated it would pursue the death penalty for five suspects charged with "ordering and executing the crime."[321][322]
On 16 November 2018, it was reported that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had concluded with "high confidence" that Mohammed ordered Khashoggi's murder. The CIA based its conclusion on several pieces of evidence, including an intercepted conversation in which Mohammed's brother Khalid offered Khashoggi assurances that it would be safe for the journalist to enter Saudi Arabia's consulate in Istanbul. Although the CIA reportedly had not determined whether Khalid had any foreknowledge of Khashoggi's ultimate fate upon entering the consulate, it believed that Khalid conveyed this message to Khashoggi at Mohammed's behest. In the CIA's analysis, the killing was most likely motivated by Mohammed's privately stated belief that Khashoggi was an Islamist with problematic connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, a perception that differs markedly from the Saudi government's public remarks on Khashoggi's death.[323]
On 4 December 2018, a group of United States senators were briefed by CIA director Gina Haspel on the murder of Khashoggi. After the briefing, the senators were more than certain that Mohammed played a major role in the killing.[324] Senator Lindsey Graham said, "You have to be willfully blind not to come to the conclusion that this was orchestrated and organised by people under the command of MBS and that he was intrinsically involved in the demise of Mr. Khashoggi." Senator Bob Corker said that the prince "ordered, monitored, the killing" and "If he were in front of a jury, he would be convicted of murder in about 30 minutes."[325] On 5 December 2018, UN Human Rights chief Michelle Bachelet asked for an international investigation to determine who was behind Khashoggi's murder.[326]
A former Saudi intelligence chief and senior member of the Saudi royal family, Prince Turki bin Faisal, dismissed the CIA's reported finding that Mohammed ordered the journalist's killing, saying that "The CIA has been proved wrong before. Just to mention the invasion of Iraq for example."[327]
In March 2019, US senators accused Saudi Arabia for a number of repetitive misdeeds and criticised Mohammed, saying he has gone "full gangster".[328] The senators said the list of human rights violations by Saudi Arabia is too long to comprehend the situation in the kingdom or even work with Mohammed.[329]
In June 2019, a UN report entitled "Annex to the Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions: Investigation into the unlawful death of Mr. Jamal Khashoggi" linked Mohammed to the assassination.[330][331]
In a June 2019 article, The Guardian claimed that after Khashoggi's assassination, the media group became a target of hacking attempts made by a Saudi cybersecurity subdivision, as per an internal order document obtained by the group, with Saud al-Qahtani undersigned.[332] According to an interview in a PBS documentary film recorded in December 2018 and parts released in September 2019, Mohammed bears responsibility for the killing of Khashoggi since it happened under his watch but he denies any knowledge of the murder in advance.[333][334][335] He denied in an interview with CBS' 60 Minutes aired on 29 September 2019 any personal involvement in the killing, adding that "once charges are proven against someone, regardless of their rank, it will be taken to court, no exception made", but said that he had to take "full responsibility for what happened".[144][336]
On 25 February 2021, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a declassified report approved by Director Avril Haines. The report, "Assessing the Saudi Government's Role in the Killing of Jamal Khashoggi" stated that, "We assess that Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman approved an operation in Istanbul, Turkey to capture or kill Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi."[337]
On 26 February 2021, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions Agnès Callamard released a statement urging, "The United States Government should impose sanctions against the Crown Prince, as it has done for the other perpetrators targeting his personal assets but also his international engagements."[338]
On 18 November 2022, due to his new role as the Saudi prime minister, Mohammed got US immunity over Khashoggi's murder. However, Biden's administration emphasized that this was not a determination of innocence.[339]
Personal life
[edit]
On 6 April 2008, Mohammed married his first cousin Sara bint Mashour, a daughter of his paternal uncle Mashour bin Abdulaziz. The couple have five children; the first four were named after their grandparents, and the fifth one is named after their great-grandfather King Abdulaziz, the founder of Saudi Arabia.[340][341][342][343] In 2022, The Economist reported that on at least one occasion, Mohammed beat Sara so severely that she required medical treatment.[344]
In 2015, Mohammed purchased the Italian-built and Bermuda-registered yacht Serene from Russian vodka tycoon Yuri Shefler for €500 million.[345][346] In 2015, he purchased the Château Louis XIV in France for over $300 million.[347][348] In 2018, he was ranked by Forbes as the eighth most powerful person in the world, with a personal wealth of at least $25 billion,[349] although his wealth was also estimated at $3.0 billion the same year.[350]
In December 2017, a number of sources reported that Mohammed, using his close associate Prince Badr bin Abdullah bin Mohammed Al Farhan as an intermediary, had bought Salvator Mundi by Leonardo da Vinci; the sale in November at $450 million set a new record price for a work of art.[351][352][353][354] This report has been denied by the auctioneer Christie's, the Saudi Arabian embassy,[355] and the UAE government, which has announced that it is the actual owner of the painting.[356] The painting has not been seen publicly since the auction,[357][358] but is reported to be on Mohammed's yacht Serene.[359][360] Bernard Haykel, a prominent historian who speaks regularly to MBS, said to the BBC that despite rumours that it is hanging "in the prince's yacht or palace", it is actually stored in Geneva and will be hung in a "very large" museum in the Riyadh that is yet been to be built as intended by him to be an "anchor object" that would attract tourists "just like the Mona Lisa does."[361]
Mohammed has been an avid video gamer since childhood. He also enjoys hiking and diving in his spare time.[362]
Honours
[edit]| Country | Collar | Order | Year | Ref. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Member Exceptional Class of the Order of Sheikh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa | 2018 | [363] | ||
| Grand Cordon of the Order of the Republic | 2018 | [364] | ||
| Nishan-e-Pakistan | 2019 | [365] | ||
| Civil First Class of the Order of Oman | 2021 | [366] | ||
| Collar of the Order of Zayed | 2021 | [367] | ||
| Collar of the Order of Al-Hussein bin Ali | 2022 | [368] | ||
| First Class of the Order of Prince Yaroslav the Wise | 2023 | [369] |
Ancestry
[edit]| Ancestors of Mohammed bin Salman[370] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
See also
[edit]References
[edit]- ^ "Mohammed bin Salman". Encyclopædia Britannica. 11 October 2024.
- ^ Alam, Radina Gigova, Hande Atay (2 May 2024). "Saudi women's rights activist sentenced to 11 years in jail, rights groups say". CNN.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ^ Kalin, Stephen; Said, Summer (28 December 2020). "Saudi Women's Rights Activist Sentenced to Nearly Six Years in Prison". The Wall Street Journal. ISSN 0099-9660.
- ^ "IMF Staff Country Reports Volume 2023 Issue 323: Saudi Arabia: 2023 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Informational Annex (2023)". IMF eLibrary. Retrieved 2 July 2024.
- ^ Dept, International Monetary Fund Middle East and Central Asia (17 August 2022). "Saudi Arabia: Selected Issues". IMF Staff Country Reports. 2022 (275). doi:10.5089/9798400217548.002.A001 (inactive 12 July 2025).
{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: DOI inactive as of July 2025 (link) - ^ a b Understanding Saudi Arabia's Recalibrated Foreign Policy | Crisis Group
- ^ "The High Cost of Change". Human Rights Watch. 4 November 2019.
- ^ "Saudi Crown Prince Immunity Highlights US Failure to Seek Justice | Human Rights Watch". 21 November 2022. Retrieved 22 November 2024.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia: 20-Year Sentence for Tweets | Human Rights Watch". 9 July 2024. Retrieved 22 November 2024.
- ^ "Assessing the Saudi Government's Role in the Killing of Jamal Khashoggi" (PDF). Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 11 February 2021. Archived from the original (PDF) on 26 February 2021.
- ^ "Ministries". Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia – Washington, D.C. 30 April 2003. Archived from the original on 1 December 2017. Retrieved 2 January 2018.
- ^ "Who is Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed?". BBC News. 6 November 2017. Archived from the original on 14 October 2017. Retrieved 2 January 2018.
- ^ Tisdall, Simon (24 June 2017). "Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud: The young hothead who would be king". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 26 October 2017. Retrieved 2 January 2018.
- ^ a b Kirkpatrick, David D. (6 June 2015). "Surprising Saudi Rises as a Prince Among Princes". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 6 September 2015. Retrieved 29 October 2015.
- ^ Alexander Bligh (2018). "Changes in the Domestic-Foreign Policies Relationship in the Saudi Context in the Wake of the Change of the Guard". The Journal of the Middle East and Africa. 9 (1): 110. doi:10.1080/21520844.2018.1450015. S2CID 170051189. Archived from the original on 15 February 2023. Retrieved 23 April 2022.
- ^ "Profile: Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman". Arab News. 22 June 2017. Retrieved 19 September 2023.
- ^ "Profile of Prince Mohammed bin Salman - Defense Minister of Saudi Arabia". 23 December 2015. Archived from the original on 23 December 2015. Retrieved 16 September 2022.
- ^ "HRH Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz to inaugurate Cityscape Riyadh 2011". AMEinfo.com. 31 October 2011. Archived from the original on 1 November 2011. Retrieved 2 March 2013.
- ^ a b "Chairman of the Board". MISK.org.sa. Misk Foundation. Archived from the original on 28 January 2015. Retrieved 25 January 2015.
- ^ "Prince Sultan arrives to Bahrain to attend Bahrain Grand Prix". Bahrain News Agency. 22 April 2012. Archived from the original on 27 September 2013. Retrieved 23 April 2012.
- ^ "Leadership's trust in me is my motivation – Muhammad". Saudi Gazette. 3 March 2013. Archived from the original on 20 August 2014. Retrieved 2 March 2013.
- ^ "Prince Mohammed appointed president of crown prince court". Saudi Business News. 2 March 2013. Archived from the original on 11 April 2013. Retrieved 2 March 2013.
- ^ "Prince Mohammed bin Salman appointed Special Advisor to Crown Prince". Asharq Alawsat. 3 March 2013. Archived from the original on 11 March 2013. Retrieved 12 April 2013.
- ^ "Saudi King Abdullah passes away". Al Arabiya. 23 January 2015. Archived from the original on 23 January 2015. Retrieved 23 January 2015.
- ^ "Saudi Prince Mohammad bin Salman named defense minister". Al Arabiya English. 23 January 2015. Archived from the original on 25 February 2021. Retrieved 16 September 2022.
- ^ "Profile: Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud". Al Arabiya. 27 January 2015. Archived from the original on 2 April 2015. Retrieved 28 February 2015.
- ^ Cordesman, Anthony H. (24 January 2015). "Saudi Succession: The King Is Dead, Long Live the King". Newsweek. Archived from the original on 26 January 2015. Retrieved 26 January 2015.
- ^ "Yemen profile - Timeline". BBC News. 6 November 2019. Archived from the original on 30 January 2016. Retrieved 16 September 2022.
- ^ "Saudi and Arab allies bomb Houthi positions in Yemen". Al Jazeera. 26 March 2015. Archived from the original on 26 March 2015.
- ^ a b c d Mazzetti, Mark; Hubbard, Ben (16 October 2016). "Rise of Saudi Prince Shatters Decades of Royal Tradition". The New York Times. p. A1. Archived from the original on 16 October 2016. Retrieved 17 October 2016.
- ^ Law, Bill (8 January 2016). "The most dangerous man in the world?". The Independent. Archived from the original on 15 June 2017.
- ^ Osborne, Samuel (22 January 2016). "King Salman: The man in charge of the 'most dangerous man in the world'". The Independent. Archived from the original on 15 June 2017.
- ^ "Transcript: Interview with Muhammad bin Salman". The Economist. 6 January 2016. Archived from the original on 10 January 2016. Retrieved 11 January 2016.
- ^ a b "Prince Mohammed bin Salman: Naive, arrogant Saudi prince is playing with fire". The Independent. 10 January 2016. Archived from the original on 10 January 2016.
- ^ Browning, Noah; Irish, John (15 December 2015). "Saudi Arabia announces 34-state Islamic military alliance against terrorism". Reuters. Archived from the original on 8 June 2018. Retrieved 5 July 2018.
- ^ McKernan, Bethan (27 November 2017). "More than 40 Islamic countries just met and vowed to wipe terrorism off the map". The Independent. Archived from the original on 18 March 2018. Retrieved 5 July 2018.
- ^ "Mohammed bin Salman named Saudi Arabia's crown prince". Al Jazeera. 21 June 2017. Archived from the original on 21 June 2017.
- ^ Huggler, Justin (2 December 2015). "Saudi Arabia 'destabilising Arab world', German intelligence warns". The Telegraph. Archived from the original on 9 January 2016.
- ^ Cockburn, Patrick (9 January 2016). "Prince Mohammed bin Salman: Naive, arrogant Saudi prince is playing with fire: German intelligence memo shows the threat from the kingdom's headstrong defence minister". The Independent. Archived from the original on 10 January 2016.
- ^ a b Smaledec, Alison (3 December 2015). "Germany Rebukes Its Own Intelligence Agency for Criticizing Saudi Policy". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 7 July 2017.
- ^ Miller, Jake (21 June 2017). "Trump congratulates newly-elevated Saudi Arabian crown prince". CBS News. Archived from the original on 12 August 2019. Retrieved 12 August 2019.
- ^ Ignatius, David (20 April 2017). "A young prince is reimagining Saudi Arabia. Can he make his vision come true?". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 10 July 2017.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince welcomes Pakistan's new prime minister". Al Arabiya News. 30 April 2022. Retrieved 24 November 2024.
- ^ Waldman, Peter; Carey, Glen (9 November 2017). "The Saudi Purge Isn't Just a Power Grab". Bloomberg Businessweek. Archived from the original on 11 November 2017. Retrieved 12 November 2017.
- ^ a b Bergen, Peter (17 November 2018). "Trump's uncritical embrace of MBS set the stage for Khashoggi crisis". CNN. Archived from the original on 4 November 2018. Retrieved 13 January 2019.
- ^ a b "Alwaleed bin Talal, two other billionaires tycoons among Saudi arrests". Daily Sabah. 4 November 2017. Archived from the original on 5 November 2017.
- ^ a b Kirkpatrick, David D. (4 November 2017). "Saudi Arabia Arrests 11 Princes, Including Billionaire Waleed bin Talal". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 8 November 2017.
- ^ a b c d e f g "'Night of the beating': details emerge of Riyadh Ritz-Carlton purge". The Guardian. 19 November 2020. Archived from the original on 19 October 2021. Retrieved 19 October 2021.
- ^ a b c d "How Saudi Arabia's crown prince crushed his rivals at the Ritz". NBC News. 3 November 2018. Archived from the original on 19 October 2021. Retrieved 19 October 2021.
- ^ Alhussein, Eman (2023), "Saudi Arabias centralized political structure: prospects and challenges", Handbook of Middle East Politics, Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 144–157, ISBN 978-1-80220-563-3
- ^ a b Davidson, Christopher M. (2021), "Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (a.k.a. "MBS"): King in all but name (born 1985)", Dictators and Autocrats, Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781003100508-23, ISBN 978-1-003-10050-8
- ^ "Saudi Arabia's unprecedented shake-up". The Economist. 5 November 2017. Retrieved 6 November 2017.
- ^ "The world should push the crown prince to reform Saudi Arabia, not wreck it". The Economist. 9 November 2017. Retrieved 11 November 2017.
- ^ Khan, Muqtedar (4 November 2017). "Power Consolidation Or Failed Coup In Saudi Arabia?". HuffPost. Archived from the original on 5 November 2017. Retrieved 6 November 2017.
- ^ Gardner, Frank (5 November 2017). "Saudi princes among dozens detained in anti-corruption purge". BBC. Archived from the original on 5 November 2017.
- ^ Mufson, Steven (6 November 2017). "What the royal purge means for Saudi Arabia — and its oil". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 6 November 2017. Retrieved 6 November 2017.
- ^ Stoffel, Derek (6 November 2017). "Saudi Arabia 'at a crossroads': What the arrests of several princes mean for the kingdom's future". CBC. Archived from the original on 6 November 2017. Retrieved 6 November 2017.
- ^ Pfeffer, Anshel (8 November 2017). "The Saudi purge: The real reason behind Mohammed bin Salman's unprecedented crackdown". Middle East News. Archived from the original on 11 November 2017. Retrieved 11 November 2017.
- ^ Malsin, Jared (6 November 2017). "Inside the Arrest of Saudi Arabia's Alwaleed bin Talal". Time. Archived from the original on 9 November 2017. Retrieved 11 November 2017.
- ^ Belvedere, Matthew J. (6 November 2017). "Saudi crackdown 'would be like' the US arresting Warren Buffett". CNBC. Archived from the original on 8 November 2017. Retrieved 11 November 2017.
- ^ Trump, Donald J. (6 November 2017). "I have great confidence in King Salman and the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, they know exactly what they are doing....Some of those they are harshly treating have been 'milking' their country for years!". Twitter. Archived from the original on 10 November 2017. Retrieved 11 November 2017.
- ^ Al-Shihri, Abdullah; Batrawyi, Aya (25 October 2017). "More than 200 detained in Saudi Arabia in $100 billion corruption sweep". Chicago Tribune. Associated Press. Archived from the original on 11 November 2017. Retrieved 11 November 2017.
- ^ "Statement by the Royal Court: Anti Corruption Committee Concludes Its Tasks The official Saudi Press Agency". spa.gov.sa. Archived from the original on 31 January 2019. Retrieved 25 February 2019.
- ^ "Saudi king presented with final corruption crackdown report, $107 bln recovered". Al Arabiya. 30 January 2019. Archived from the original on 3 February 2019. Retrieved 25 February 2019.
- ^ Nicholas Kulish (6 November 2017). "Ritz-Carlton Has Become a Gilded Cage for Saudi Royals". The New York Times.
- ^ Exclusive: Saudi prince detention holds up loan to investment firm - sources Reuters
- ^ "The Saudi purge will spook global investors and unsettle oil markets". The Economist. 9 November 2017. Retrieved 11 November 2017.
- ^ Said, Summer; Stancati, Margherita (17 November 2017). "Saudi Arabia Pursues Cash Settlements as Crackdown Expands". Wall Street Journal. ISSN 0099-9660. Archived from the original on 17 November 2017. Retrieved 18 November 2017.
- ^ Pavel Golovkin (17 November 2017). "Saudi Crackdown Escalates With Arrests of Top Military Officials". MSN. Archived from the original on 1 December 2017. Retrieved 18 November 2017.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince to become Kingdom's Prime Minister: Royal decree". Al Arabiya English. 27 September 2022. Archived from the original on 27 September 2022. Retrieved 27 September 2022.
- ^ "Beating Up on Canada Again: the Canada Letter". The New York Times. 10 August 2018. Archived from the original on 12 August 2018. Retrieved 12 August 2018.
Prince Mohammed is a Saudi nationalist
- ^ "Saudi Arabia's Dark Nationalism". The Atlantic. 2 June 2018. Archived from the original on 12 August 2018. Retrieved 12 August 2018.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia's Populist King in Waiting". Politico. 22 September 2017. Archived from the original on 24 November 2017. Retrieved 23 November 2017.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia's corruption crackdown risks scaring off investors". Financial Times. 30 January 2018. Archived from the original on 12 August 2018. Retrieved 12 August 2018.
MbS, who also controls foreign and defence policy, has combined populism at home with hawkish nationalism abroad
- ^ "Heir's modernising vision risks conservative discontent". The Times. 22 June 2017. Archived from the original on 12 August 2018. Retrieved 12 August 2018.
Prince Mohammed's vision is conservative in a political sense — he will be an autocratic king — but it is socially more liberal.
- ^ "How the man behind Khashoggi murder ran the killing via Skype". Reuters. 22 October 2018. Archived from the original on 26 November 2018. Retrieved 10 January 2019.
- ^ "Spotlight: Inside the stricken court of crown prince Mohammed Bin Salman". GQ. 27 December 2018. Archived from the original on 13 January 2019. Retrieved 10 January 2019.
- ^ "Meet the Two Princes Reshaping the Middle East". Politico. 13 June 2017. Archived from the original on 3 July 2018. Retrieved 12 August 2018.
- ^ a b "A Saudi Prince's Quest to Remake the Middle East". The New Yorker. 9 April 2018. Archived from the original on 9 August 2018. Retrieved 12 August 2018.
- ^ Rula, Jebreal (19 October 2018). "Jamal Khashoggi Secret Interview: The Saudi Journalist's Views of Islam, America and the 'Reformist' Prince Implicated in His Murder". Newsweek. Archived from the original on 21 October 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
- ^ Duran, Burhanettin (31 October 2017). "Is "Moderate Islam" just another Way of saying Arab Nationalism?". SETA. Archived from the original on 28 February 2018.
- ^ a b c "Critics cite worsening Saudi repression two years after journalist's gruesome slaying". Los Angeles Times. 1 October 2020. Archived from the original on 6 August 2021. Retrieved 18 July 2021.
- ^ a b "Saudi Arabia Case Study | Understanding Transnational Repression". Freedom House. Archived from the original on 18 July 2021. Retrieved 18 July 2021.
- ^ a b c "The High Cost of Change". Human Rights Watch. 4 November 2019. Archived from the original on 18 July 2021. Retrieved 18 July 2021.
- ^ a b Chulov, Martin (5 October 2022). "Putin and the prince: fears in west as Russia and Saudi Arabia deepen ties". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 8 October 2022.
- ^ a b Simeon Kerr (30 January 2015). "Saudi king stamps his authority with staff shake-up and handouts". Financial Times. Riyadh. Archived from the original on 1 February 2015. Retrieved 1 February 2015.
- ^ a b Waldman, Peter (21 April 2016). "Project to Get Saudi Arabia's Economy Off Oil". Bloomberg Businessweek. Archived from the original on 15 October 2016. Retrieved 17 October 2016.
- ^ a b c d Ottaway, David (6 May 2021). "Saudi Crown Prince Lambasts His Kingdom's Wahhabi Establishment". Wilson Center, Viewpoint Series. Archived from the original on 7 May 2021. Retrieved 4 March 2022.
- ^ a b Holleis, Jennifer (10 March 2023). "Saudi Arabia rebrands as Ramadan approaches". Deutsche Welle. Archived from the original on 11 March 2023.
- ^ a b c Wood, Graeme (3 March 2022). "ABSOLUTE POWER". The Atlantic. Archived from the original on 3 August 2022. Retrieved 4 March 2022.
- ^ Perez, Gabriella (15 September 2022). "The Saudi Mirage of Religious Freedom". Archived from the original on 18 December 2022.
- ^ "What did Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman say about Shiites in Saudi Arabia?". Al Arabiya News. 2018. Archived from the original on 17 October 2021.
- ^ "Haia can't chase, arrest suspects". arabnews.com. 14 April 2016. Archived from the original on 21 June 2016. Retrieved 14 April 2016.
- ^ Commins, David Dean (2015). Islam in Saudi Arabia. I.B. Tauris. p. 66. ISBN 9781848858015. Archived from the original on 15 February 2023. Retrieved 4 March 2022.
- ^ Bashraheel, Aseel (22 September 2019). "Rise and fall of the Saudi religious police". Arab News. Archived from the original on 3 December 2020. Retrieved 28 February 2021.
- ^ Brown, Nathan J. (5 March 2019). "Who or What Is the Wali al Amr: the Unposed Question". SSRN. SSRN 3346372. Archived from the original on 5 March 2022. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia bans abaya in exam halls". Arabian Business. 21 December 2022. Archived from the original on 24 December 2022.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia bans abayas in examination halls". Gulf Business. 21 December 2022. Archived from the original on 21 December 2022.
- ^ Fatima, Sakina (19 December 2022). "Saudi Arabia bans abaya in exam halls". The Siasat Daily. Archived from the original on 19 December 2022.
- ^ "EXPLAINED: 'Saudi Arabia bans Hijab in Exam Halls'—How far it's true?". Milli Chronicle. 26 December 2022. Archived from the original on 26 December 2022.
- ^ "Full text of Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030". Al Arabiya. Saudi Vision 2030. 13 May 2016. Archived from the original on 24 May 2016. Retrieved 23 May 2016.
- ^ Alboaouh, Kamel; Mahoney, Jon. "Religious and Political Authority in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Challenges and Prospects". Manas Journal for Social Studies: 248. Archived from the original on 14 September 2022. Retrieved 25 January 2021 – via dergipark.org.
- ^ Al Omran, Ahmed; Kerr, Simeon; Raval, Anjli (24 October 2017). "Saudis aim to diversify economy with new $500bn city". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 10 February 2018. Retrieved 1 February 2018.
- ^ "End of The Line: how Saudi Arabia's Neom dream unravelled". Financial Times. 2025.
- ^ "En Arabie saoudite, la mégalopole du futur Neom engendre déjà ses condamnés à mort". France 24 (in French). 14 October 2022. Retrieved 9 May 2024.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia: UN experts alarmed by imminent executions linked to NEOM project". Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 3 May 2023.
- ^ a b Jones, Eliot Brown and Rory (2025). "What Went Wrong at Saudi Arabia's Futuristic Metropolis in the Desert". Wall Street Journal.
- ^ Turak, Natasha (29 April 2024). "Saudi Arabia says all NEOM megaprojects will go ahead as planned despite reports of scaling back". CNBC. Retrieved 30 April 2024.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia Says Less Neom, More AI in New Pitch to Wall Street". Bloomberg. 23 October 2025.
- ^ Shahine, Alaa; Nereim, Vivian (1 August 2017). "Saudi Arabia plans a huge Red Sea Beach tourism project". Bloomberg. Archived from the original on 27 January 2018. Retrieved 1 February 2018.
- ^ "Saudi crown prince launches mega Red Sea tourism project". Arab News. 1 August 2017. Archived from the original on 4 October 2017. Retrieved 1 February 2018.
- ^ "Saudi aims to issue tourist visas next year, official says". Reuters. 23 November 2017. Archived from the original on 2 January 2018. Retrieved 1 February 2018.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia opens high-speed railway linking holy cities". BBC News. 25 September 2018. Archived from the original on 25 September 2018. Retrieved 25 September 2018.
- ^ "Saudi crown prince says sovereign wealth fund will surpass $600 billion target by 2020". Reuters. 5 October 2018. Archived from the original on 6 October 2018. Retrieved 9 October 2018.
- ^ "Saudi's Mohammed bin Salman launches project for kingdom's first nuclear plant". The National. 6 November 2018. Archived from the original on 6 November 2018. Retrieved 13 November 2018.
- ^ Martin, Matthew; Nair, Dinesh (6 November 2018). "SoftBank Is Planning a $1.2 Billion Solar Plant in Saudi Arabia". Bloomberg News. Archived from the original on 8 November 2018. Retrieved 13 November 2018.
- ^ "Top White House aide discussed oil prices with Saudi Arabia". Reuters. 1 October 2021. Archived from the original on 26 October 2021. Retrieved 26 October 2021.
- ^ Northam, Jackie (13 October 2022). "The White House accuses Saudi Arabia of aiding Russia and coercing OPEC oil producers". NPR. Archived from the original on 13 October 2022. Retrieved 14 October 2022.
- ^ "Energy crunch: How high will oil prices climb?". Al-Jazeera. 27 September 2021. Archived from the original on 28 October 2021. Retrieved 26 October 2021.
- ^ "Oil analysts predict a prolonged rally as OPEC resists calls to ramp up supply". CNBC. 5 October 2021. Archived from the original on 26 October 2021. Retrieved 26 October 2021.
- ^ "OPEC-Plus in Driver's Seat As Global Energy Crisis Intensifies". Natural Gas Intelligence. 6 October 2021. Archived from the original on 28 October 2021. Retrieved 26 October 2021.
- ^ "Exclusive: Saudi Arabia doubles second-quarter Russian fuel oil imports for power generation". Reuters. 15 July 2022. Archived from the original on 7 September 2022. Retrieved 31 July 2022.
- ^ "Putin discusses oil market with Saudi crown prince who hosted Biden last week". Reuters. 21 July 2022. Archived from the original on 28 September 2022. Retrieved 31 July 2022.
- ^ "Mohammed bin Salman says he will 'continue doing sport washing' for Saudi Arabia | Sport | the Guardian". TheGuardian.com. 21 September 2023.
- ^ Salman, Mohammed bin. "Interview of Prince Mohammed bin Salman – His vision for the future Saudi Arabia". Interviewed by Turki Al-Dakhil. Al Arabia. Archived from the original on 10 November 2016 – via mohammadbinsalman.com.
- ^ "Saudi cabinet approves new expatriate residency scheme". ArabNews.com. 14 May 2019. Archived from the original on 16 July 2019. Retrieved 15 July 2019.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia to Give "Green Card" Residency Permit for the First Time in 2019". mohammadbinsalman.com. Archived from the original on 8 July 2019. Retrieved 8 July 2019.
- ^ "Rights and benefits of the Saudi 'Green Card'". Arab News. 20 May 2019. Archived from the original on 14 July 2019. Retrieved 8 July 2019.
- ^ Ian Black (25 April 2016). "Saudi Arabia approves ambitious plan to move economy beyond oil". The Guardian. United Kingdom. Archived from the original on 17 May 2016. Retrieved 23 May 2016.
- ^ Saad Al-Qahtani, Saudi Aramco IPO part of Kingdom's diversification plan Archived 7 July 2017 at the Wayback Machine, Thomsonreuters.com, 10 May 2017
- ^ "Saudi Aramco's IPO is a mess". The Economist. 19 October 2017. Archived from the original on 20 October 2017.
- ^ a b "Rise of Prince Mohammed bin Salman rattles Saudi Arabia". The Times of India. 17 October 2016. Archived from the original on 2 February 2017.
- ^ "Prince Mohammed bin Salman announces Saudi plans for largest entertainment city". Al Arabiya. 8 April 2017. Archived from the original on 28 December 2017. Retrieved 1 February 2018.
- ^ "World-class entertainment park coming up in Al-Qiddiya". Saudi Gazette. 26 October 2017. Archived from the original on 9 February 2018. Retrieved 1 February 2018.
- ^ Chulov, Martin (24 October 2017). "I will return Saudi Arabia to moderate Islam, says crown prince". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 5 November 2017. Retrieved 5 November 2017.
- ^ "Kingdom a country of moderate Islam". saudigazette.com.sa. 24 October 2017. Archived from the original on 25 October 2017. Retrieved 5 November 2017.
- ^ Denning, Liam (5 November 2017). "Saudi Sweep Is a Double-Edged Sword". Bloomberg News. Archived from the original on 6 November 2017. Retrieved 6 November 2017.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia's Saturday Night Massacre". Geopolitical Futures. 8 November 2017. Archived from the original on 15 November 2017.
- ^ Uniacke, Robert (2020). "Authoritarianism in the information age: state branding, depoliticizing and 'de-civilizing' of online civil society in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates". British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. 48 (5): 979–999. doi:10.1080/13530194.2020.1737916. ISSN 1353-0194. S2CID 216323924.
- ^ Smith, Lydia (9 December 2017). "Saudi Arabia hosts first-ever concert by female performer". The Independent. Archived from the original on 10 February 2018. Retrieved 1 February 2018.
- ^ Ellyat, Holly (18 April 2018). "Saudi Arabia brings back movie theaters — and 'staggering' demand is expected". CNBC. Archived from the original on 12 June 2018. Retrieved 10 June 2018.
- ^ Reid, David (11 December 2017). "Saudi Arabia to reopen public cinemas for the first time in 35 years". CNBC. Archived from the original on 25 January 2018. Retrieved 1 February 2018.
- ^ a b "Mohammad bin Salman denies ordering Khashoggi murder, but says he takes responsibility for it". cbsnews.com. 29 September 2019. Archived from the original on 2 October 2019. Retrieved 30 September 2019.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia to end flogging as a form of punishment". The Guardian. 25 April 2020. ISSN 0261-3077. Archived from the original on 29 April 2020. Retrieved 30 April 2020.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia ends death penalty for crimes committed by minors". The Guardian. 27 April 2020. ISSN 0261-3077. Archived from the original on 29 April 2020. Retrieved 30 April 2020.
- ^ "Rights groups condemn Saudi arrests as crackdown on dissent". Reuters. 15 September 2017. Archived from the original on 18 September 2018. Retrieved 3 October 2018.
- ^ "REVEALED: The Saudi death squad MBS uses to silence dissent". Middle East Eye. 22 October 2018. Archived from the original on 22 October 2018. Retrieved 22 October 2018.
- ^ "Is Saudi Arabia safe in Mohammed bin Salman's hands?". Middle East Eye. 22 October 2018. Archived from the original on 22 October 2018. Retrieved 22 October 2018.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia: Arrest of two prominent activists a deadly blow for human rights". Amnesty International. 18 September 2017. Archived from the original on 14 December 2017. Retrieved 14 December 2017.
- ^ Al Omran, Ahmed; Kerr, Simon (19 September 2017). "Saudi security forces clamp down on dissent". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 22 October 2018. Retrieved 3 October 2018.
- ^ Batrawy, Aya; Al-Shihri, Abdullah (3 June 2018). "Saudi Prosecutor Says 17 Detained in Case Against Activists". Bloomberg. Riyadh. Archived from the original on 16 October 2018. Retrieved 3 October 2018.
- ^ McKernan, Bethan (23 May 2018). "Saudi police arrest three more women's rights activists". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 24 May 2018. Retrieved 23 May 2018.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia releases eight people held in activist crackdown". Reuters. Riyadh. 2 June 2018. Archived from the original on 16 October 2018. Retrieved 3 October 2018.
- ^ al-Fassi, Hatoon Ajwad (2011). "Dr Hatoon Ajwad al-Fassi هتون أجواد الفاسي". King Saud University. Archived from the original on 29 August 2011. Retrieved 29 May 2011.
- ^ Dadouch, Sarah (27 June 2018). "Prominent Saudi women's rights activist detained as driving ban lifted: sources". Reuters. Riyadh. Archived from the original on 16 October 2018. Retrieved 3 October 2018.
- ^ "Saudis arrest another women's right activist". Al Jazeera. 27 June 2018. Archived from the original on 27 June 2018. Retrieved 27 June 2018.
- ^ Graham-Harrison, Emma (22 August 2018). "Saudi Arabia seeks death penalty against female human rights activist". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 1 October 2018. Retrieved 3 October 2018.
- ^ a b "Saudi Arabia 'seeks death penalty for woman activist'". BBC News. 22 August 2018. Archived from the original on 23 August 2018. Retrieved 22 August 2018.
- ^ "Saudi Prosecution Seeks Death Penalty for Female Activist". Human Rights Watch. 21 August 2018. Archived from the original on 23 August 2018. Retrieved 23 August 2018.
- ^ Brennan, David (21 August 2018). "Who Is Israa al-Ghomgham? Female Saudi Activist May Be Beheaded After Death Sentence". Newsweek. Archived from the original on 24 August 2018. Retrieved 24 August 2018.
- ^ "Saudi gentrifies Shiite old quarter after crushing revolt". Al-Monitor. 4 June 2019. Archived from the original on 5 June 2019. Retrieved 5 June 2019.
- ^ "A jailed Saudi activist was told she would be released if she denied being tortured, her family says. She refused". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 2 January 2020. Retrieved 15 August 2019.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia will finally allow women to drive". The Economist. 27 September 2017. Archived from the original on 28 September 2017.
- ^ "At last Saudi women will be allowed to take the wheel". The Economist. 30 September 2017. Archived from the original on 29 September 2017.
- ^ al-Rasheed, Madawi (2 August 2019). "Saudi women can now travel without consent – but this progress is fragile". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 2 August 2019. Retrieved 2 August 2019.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia Gives Women Travel Rights in Major Policy Shakeup". bloomberg.com. 1 August 2019. Archived from the original on 4 September 2020. Retrieved 1 August 2019.
- ^ Jessie Yeung and Hamdi Alkhshali. "Saudi Arabian women finally allowed to hold passports and travel independently". CNN. Archived from the original on 2 August 2019. Retrieved 2 August 2019.
- ^ "Saudi women to start own business without male permission". Al Arabiya. 18 February 2018. Archived from the original on 31 March 2018. Retrieved 30 March 2018.
- ^ "Divorced Saudi women win right to get custody of children". CNN. Archived from the original on 22 March 2018. Retrieved 30 March 2018.
- ^ "Saudi stock exchange appoints first female chair". Reuters. Archived from the original on 31 March 2018. Retrieved 30 March 2018.
- ^ "Saudi Stock Exchange appoints first female chief in history of the kingdom". Independent. Archived from the original on 31 March 2018. Retrieved 30 March 2018.
- ^ Summer Said; Justin Scheck; WarrenStrobel. "Top Saudi Royal Family Members Detained". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 30 March 2021. Retrieved 6 March 2020.
- ^ Pelley, Scott (24 October 2021). "Former Saudi official calls Mohammed bin Salman a "psychopath," says Saudi crown prince fears what he knows". CBS News. Archived from the original on 25 October 2021. Retrieved 25 October 2021.
- ^ "Saudi crown prince suggested killing King Abdullah, ex-official says". BBC News. 25 October 2021. Archived from the original on 25 October 2021. Retrieved 25 October 2021.
- ^ "The war in Yemen is disastrous. America is only making things worse". The Guardian. 11 June 2018. Archived from the original on 20 October 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
- ^ "Saudi Crown Prince Aids Yemen as He Hits It With Airstrikes". Time. 6 April 2018. Archived from the original on 26 April 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
- ^ "Risk-taking Saudi prince gambling with stability". London Free Press. 8 February 2017. Archived from the original on 14 August 2017. Retrieved 27 January 2019.
- ^ "Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Salman has Western leaders very worried". News. 13 January 2016. Archived from the original on 25 July 2016.
- ^ Robertson, Nic (21 June 2018). "Mohammed bin Salman is on a make or break mission". CNN. Archived from the original on 31 August 2018. Retrieved 1 September 2018.
- ^ <!—Staff writer(s); no by-line.—> (23 January 2015). "Yemen crisis: President resigns as rebels tighten hold". BBC. Archived from the original on 20 August 2018. Retrieved 1 September 2018.
{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ^ Carapico, Sheila (25 February 2015). "Yemen on brink as Gulf Co-operation Council initiative fails". BBC. Archived from the original on 31 August 2018. Retrieved 1 September 2018.
- ^ Raghavan, Sudarsan (29 July 2018). "US allies have killed thousands of Yemenis – including 22 at a wedding". The Independent. Archived from the original on 30 July 2018. Retrieved 1 September 2018.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia accused of Yemen war crimes as crown prince completes UK visit". The Herald. 10 March 2018. Archived from the original on 20 October 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
- ^ MacAskill, Ewen (27 January 2016). "UN report into Saudi-led strikes in Yemen raises questions over UK role". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 2 February 2016.
- ^ "Airstrikes hit Médecins Sans Frontières hospital in Yemen Archived 29 December 2016 at the Wayback Machine". The Guardian. 27 October 2015.
- ^ Paul, Katie; El Gamal, Rania (19 December 2017). "Saudi Arabia intercepts Houthi missile fired toward Riyadh; no reported casualties". Reuters. Riyadh. Archived from the original on 1 October 2018. Retrieved 3 October 2018.
- ^ <!—Not stated—> (19 December 2017). "Over 130 civilians killed in 11 days in airstrikes in Yemen, reports UN rights office". United Nations. Archived from the original on 27 September 2018. Retrieved 3 October 2018.
- ^ Vonberg, Judith; Elbagir, Nima (28 August 2018). "All sides in Yemen conflict could be guilty of war crimes, says UN". CNN. Archived from the original on 30 August 2018. Retrieved 1 September 2018.
- ^ a b Kristof, Nicholas (31 August 2017). "The Photos the U.S. and Saudi Arabia Don't Want You to See". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 24 May 2018. Retrieved 24 May 2018.
- ^ Kara Fox. "85,000 children under 5 may have died of starvation in Yemen war". CNN. Archived from the original on 7 June 2019. Retrieved 3 July 2019.
- ^ Wintour, Patrick (16 November 2017). "Saudis must lift Yemen blockade or 'untold' thousands will die, UN agencies warn". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 23 December 2017. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
- ^ "50,000 children in Yemen have died of starvation and disease so far this year, monitoring group says". Chicago Tribune. Associated Press. 16 November 2017. Archived from the original on 1 November 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
- ^ "Is Intentional Starvation the Future of War?". The New Yorker. 11 July 2018. Archived from the original on 20 October 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
- ^ "In blocking arms to Yemen, Saudi Arabia squeezes a starving population". Reuters. 11 October 2017. Archived from the original on 15 December 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
- ^ Summers, Hannah (15 October 2018). "Yemen on brink of 'world's worst famine in 100 years' if war continues". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 21 October 2018. Retrieved 21 October 2018.
- ^ "UN receives nearly $1 billion from Saudi Arabia and UAE for humanitarian response to Yemen crisis". United Nations. 28 March 2018. Archived from the original on 29 March 2018. Retrieved 30 March 2018.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia says it intercepts Houthi missile fired toward Riyadh, no reported damage". CNBC. 19 December 2017. Archived from the original on 3 September 2018. Retrieved 22 October 2018.
- ^ Emily Thornberry (7 March 2018). "Britain's red carpet for the Saudi ruler is shameless". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 23 November 2018. Retrieved 22 October 2018.
- ^ "Menendez and Graham announce resolution on Saudi Arabia in wake of Khashoggi killing". Fox News Channel. 12 December 2018. Archived from the original on 13 December 2018. Retrieved 13 December 2018.
- ^ a b "Jeremy Hunt and Boris Johnson accused of 'central role' in arming Saudi Arabia as UK's relationship with Riyadh reaches crossroads". iNews. 5 July 2019. Archived from the original on 15 July 2019. Retrieved 15 July 2019.
- ^ "Jeremy Hunt's bid for prime minister is being funded by a close ally of Saudi prince Mohammed Bin Salman". Business Insider. 5 July 2019. Archived from the original on 14 August 2021. Retrieved 15 July 2019.
- ^ Butler, Desmond (7 May 2015). "Turkey Officials Confirm Pact With Saudi Arabia To Help Rebels Fighting Syria's Assad". Huffington Post. AP. Archived from the original on 8 May 2015.
- ^ "Saudi strongman 'encouraged' Russia intervention in Syria, lawsuit claims". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 16 August 2020. Retrieved 1 August 2020.
- ^ "Arms supplied by U.S., Saudi ended up with Islamic State, researchers say". Reuters. 14 December 2017. Archived from the original on 14 December 2017. Retrieved 14 December 2017.
- ^ "Saudi Crown Prince Says U.S. Troops Should Stay in Syria". Time. Archived from the original on 11 October 2018. Retrieved 30 March 2018.
- ^ "Analysis: How important is Syria's return to the Arab League?". Al Jazeera. 19 May 2023.
- ^ "Syria's Assad wins warm welcome at Arab summit after years of isolation". Reuters. 19 May 2023.
- ^ "Who's Speaking Out Against Trump's Jerusalem Move". J Street. 12 December 2017. Archived from the original on 7 July 2019. Retrieved 18 September 2019.
- ^ "Saudi crown prince says Israelis have right to their own land". Reuters. 3 April 2018. Archived from the original on 14 June 2018. Retrieved 25 June 2018.
- ^ "Saudi crown prince recognizes Israel's right to exist, talks up future ties". The Times of Israel. Archived from the original on 25 June 2018. Retrieved 25 June 2018.
- ^ Goldberg, Jeffrey (2 April 2018). "Saudi Crown Prince: Iran's Supreme Leader 'Makes Hitler Look Good". The Atlantic. Archived from the original on 24 June 2018. Retrieved 25 June 2018.
- ^ "UN condemns Israeli PM's West Bank annexation plans". CBC News. 11 September 2019. Archived from the original on 11 September 2019. Retrieved 18 September 2019.
- ^ אייכנר, איתמר; בלומנטל, איתי (23 November 2020). "נתניהו המריא לסעודיה ונפגש בחשאי עם יורש העצר בן סלמאן". Ynet (in Hebrew). Retrieved 23 March 2024.
- ^ Nissenbaum, Dion; Lieber, Dov; Kalin, Stephen (9 March 2023). "Saudi Arabia Seeks U.S. Security Pledges, Nuclear Help for Peace With Israel". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 16 May 2023.
- ^ "Saudi Crown Prince MBS says Israel normalisation getting 'closer'".
- ^ "Saudi Crown Prince calls on all countries to stop arms exports to Israel". Al Arabiya. 21 November 2023.
- ^ "Saudi crown prince says he doesn't care about 'Palestinian issue'". Jewish News Syndicate. 29 September 2024.
- ^ Foer, Franklin (25 September 2024). "The War That Would Not End". The Atlantic. Retrieved 22 November 2024.
- ^ a b "Saudi crown prince said he personally 'doesn't care' about Palestinian issue". Middle East Eye. 27 September 2024. Retrieved 27 September 2024.
- ^ "Israel deal concerns lead Saudi Arabia's MBS to 'fear for his life'". Dawn. 15 August 2024. Retrieved 15 August 2024.
- ^ "Saudi crown prince says no Israel ties without Palestinian state". France 24. 19 September 2024. Retrieved 27 September 2024.
- ^ "On Behalf of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, HRH the Crown Prince Inaugurates First Year of Ninth Session of Shura Council". Saudi Press Agency. 19 September 2024. Retrieved 27 September 2024.
- ^ "At Riyadh summit, Saudi crown prince backs Iran, accuses Israel of genocide". The Times of Israel. 11 November 2024.
- ^ Gardner, Frank; Khalil, Hafsa (11 November 2024). "Saudi crown prince says Israel committing 'genocide' in Gaza". BBC.
- ^ Salem, Mostafa (12 November 2024). "Saudi crown prince accuses Israel of committing 'collective genocide' in Gaza". CNN. Retrieved 22 November 2024.
- ^ Normalization with Israel? The Saudi crown prince has much bigger plans
- ^ a b Klippenstein, Ken (23 February 2022). "Saudi-Russia Collusion Is Driving Up Gas Prices — and Worsening Ukraine Crisis". The Intercept. Archived from the original on 23 February 2022. Retrieved 25 February 2022.
- ^ Kerr, Simeon; Al-Atrush, Samer; England, Andrew (28 February 2022). "Gulf states' neutrality on Ukraine reflect deeper Russian ties". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 2 January 2020. Retrieved 28 February 2022.
- ^ "UN Security Council extends Yemen arms embargo to all Houthis". Al Jazeera. 28 February 2022. Archived from the original on 28 February 2022.
- ^ Nichols, Michelle (28 February 2022). "U.N. arms embargo imposed on Yemen's Houthis amid vote questions". Reuters. Archived from the original on 13 May 2022.
- ^ "How could the Ukraine crisis affect the Middle East? | DW | 16 February 2022". Deutsche Welle. Archived from the original on 16 February 2022. Retrieved 25 February 2022.
- ^ Chulov, Martin (5 October 2022). "Putin and the prince: fears in west as Russia and Saudi Arabia deepen ties". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 8 October 2022.
- ^ "Putin and Saudi crown prince discuss OPEC+ cooperation to maintain price stability -Kremlin". Reuters. 30 January 2023. Archived from the original on 31 January 2023.
- ^ Sabbagh, Dan (22 September 2022). "Aiden Aslin among 10 international 'prisoners of war' released by Russian authorities". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 24 September 2022.
- ^ "The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation". Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union. 1 March 2023. Archived from the original on 10 April 2023.
- ^ "Russia's Putin meets leaders of Saudi Arabia, UAE on whistle-stop Gulf tour". France 24. 6 December 2023.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia rebrands as mediator for global crises – DW – 03/10/2025". dw.com. Retrieved 11 March 2025.
- ^ "Iran dismisses Saudi talk of 'triangle of evil' as 'childish'". Al-Monitor. 8 March 2018. Archived from the original on 11 March 2018. Retrieved 20 December 2018.
- ^ a b "Saudi prince says Turkey part of 'triangle of evil': Egyptian media". Reuters. 7 March 2018. Archived from the original on 20 December 2018. Retrieved 20 December 2018.
- ^ "Saudi crown prince visits Turkey as relations thaw after Khashoggi murder". The Guardian. 22 June 2022.
- ^ Al-Atrush, Samer; Samson, Adam; England, Andrew (18 July 2023). "Saudi Arabia agrees deal to buy Turkish drones". Financial Times. Retrieved 15 August 2023.
- ^ a b Mazzetti, Mark; Bergman, Ronen; Kirkpatrick, David D. (19 May 2018). "Trump Jr. and Other Aides Met With Gulf Emissary Offering Help to Win Election". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on 3 February 2020. Retrieved 16 September 2022.
- ^ "Trump Jr. met Gulf princes' emissary in 2016 who offered campaign help". Reuters. 19 May 2018. Archived from the original on 3 April 2019. Retrieved 16 September 2022.
- ^ a b "The Wooing of Jared Kushner: How the Saudis Got a Friend in the White House". The New York Times. 8 December 2018. Archived from the original on 4 April 2019. Retrieved 4 April 2019.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia Has High Hopes for Trump". The Atlantic. 20 May 2017. Archived from the original on 4 April 2019. Retrieved 4 April 2019.
- ^ "'We put our man on top', Trump said on MBS, book claims". Al-Jazeera. 5 January 2018. Archived from the original on 4 April 2019. Retrieved 4 April 2019.
- ^ "Donald Trump tweets support for blockade imposed on Qatar". The Guardian. 6 June 2017. Archived from the original on 2 February 2021. Retrieved 4 April 2019.
- ^ "Qatar blockade exposes rifts in Trump administration's 'peculiar' foreign policy". The Guardian. 24 June 2017. Archived from the original on 4 April 2019. Retrieved 4 April 2019.
- ^ "Qatar Charm Offensive Appears to Have Paid Off, U.S. Officials Say". The New York Times. 9 April 2018. Archived from the original on 4 April 2019. Retrieved 4 April 2019.
- ^ "Saudi Crown Prince Boasted That Jared Kushner Was "In His Pocket"". The Intercept. 21 March 2018. Archived from the original on 4 April 2019. Retrieved 4 April 2019.
- ^ "Trump praises Saudi purge, voices confidence in King, Crown Prince". Reuters. 7 November 2017. Archived from the original on 4 April 2019. Retrieved 4 April 2019.
- ^ "Trump says US stands with Saudi Arabia despite journalist Khashoggi's killing". CNBC. 20 November 2018. Archived from the original on 4 April 2019. Retrieved 4 April 2019.
- ^ a b c d Kalin, Stephen; Said, Summer; Cloud, David S. (19 April 2022). "How U.S.-Saudi Relations Reached the Breaking Point". The Wall Street Journal. ISSN 0099-9660. Archived from the original on 29 August 2022. Retrieved 20 April 2022.
- ^ Gardner, Frank (14 July 2021). "Khashoggi murder: US softens towards Saudi leader". BBC News. Archived from the original on 17 November 2021. Retrieved 17 November 2021.
- ^ Lonas, Lexi (8 March 2022). "Saudi, UAE leaders declined calls with Biden amid Ukraine conflict: report". The Hill. Archived from the original on 13 March 2022. Retrieved 22 May 2022.
- ^ "Mohammed bin Salman Has Leverage on Biden—and Is Using It". Foreign Policy. 24 March 2022. Archived from the original on 14 May 2022. Retrieved 22 May 2022.
- ^ "Inside the Secret Meeting Between the CIA Director and Saudi Crown Prince". The Intercept. 13 May 2022. Archived from the original on 11 October 2022. Retrieved 22 May 2022.
- ^ "US accuses Opec+ of aligning with Russia, Gulf states deny politics at play: report". Middle East Eye. 5 October 2022. Archived from the original on 20 October 2022. Retrieved 21 October 2022.
- ^ "Saudi oil power play bruises U.S. ties but won't break them". Reuters. 13 October 2022.
- ^ "Biden arrives in Saudi Arabia, holds 'important discussions' with king, crown prince". Arab News. 15 July 2022. Retrieved 1 January 2024.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia – Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement (CLSSA) Program, Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) II | Defense Security Cooperation Agency". www.dsca.mil. Retrieved 1 January 2024.
- ^ "Collins, Bipartisan Senate Delegation Arrive in Saudi Arabia | U.S. Senator Susan Collins of Maine". www.collins.senate.gov. 20 October 2023. Retrieved 1 January 2024.
- ^ Kelly, Kate; Wong, Edward; Nereim, Vivian (22 December 2023). "U.S. Prepares to Lift Ban on Sales of Offensive Weapons to Saudi Arabia". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 1 January 2024.
- ^ Broadwater, Luke (13 May 2025). "To applause in the royal court, Trump and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman signed an agreement of "strategic economic partnership."". The New York Times. Retrieved 13 May 2025.
- ^ Naar, Ismaeel (13 May 2025). "Saudi Arabia's King Salman has been absent so far from Trump state visit". The New York Times. Retrieved 13 May 2025.
- ^ Emmons, Alex (1 August 2018). "Saudi Arabia planned to invade Qatar last summer. Rex Tillerson's efforts to stop it may have cost him his job". The Intercept. Archived from the original on 13 October 2018. Retrieved 15 October 2018.
- ^ "Gulf states agree to end three year Qatar blockade". Independent. 5 January 2021. Archived from the original on 8 January 2021. Retrieved 5 January 2021.
- ^ "Canada-Saudi Arabia Relations". Government of Canada. 26 August 2021.
- ^ Brewster, Murray (19 March 2018). "Canada's arms deal with Saudi Arabia includes 'heavy assault' vehicles". CBC. Retrieved 7 August 2018.
- ^ "Fast Facts". Saudi Arabian Cultural Bureau in Canada. Archived from the original on 25 May 2015. Retrieved 9 August 2018.
- ^ "Foreign Ministry 🇸🇦 on Twitter". Twitter. Retrieved 6 August 2018.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia has frozen all trade investment with Canada". Retrieved 6 August 2018.
- ^ Jon Gambrell (5 August 2018). "Saudi Arabia expels Canadian ambassador, freezes trade in human rights dispute". Toronto Star. Associated Press. Archived from the original on 24 August 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
- ^ "'We don't have a single friend': Canada's Saudi spat reveals country is alone". The Guardian. 11 August 2018. Archived from the original on 22 October 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
- ^ "U.S. refuses to back Canada in Saudi Arabia dispute". The Globe and Mail. 7 August 2018. Archived from the original on 30 October 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
- ^ "On Saudi Arabia, Canada's stance is principled — but conflicted". Toronto Star. 10 August 2018. Archived from the original on 10 August 2018. Retrieved 11 August 2018.
- ^ Wicary, Stephen (24 May 2023). "Canada, Saudi Arabia Restore Ties Broken Before Khashoggi Crisis". Bloomberg News. Retrieved 25 May 2023.
- ^ Bartenstein, Ben; Westall, Sylvia (6 December 2022). "Saudis Roll Out Red Carpet for Xi Jinping as Gulf Looks Past US". Bloomberg News. Archived from the original on 3 May 2023. Retrieved 10 March 2023.
- ^ Ensor, Josie (22 February 2019). "Saudi crown prince defends China's right to put Uighur Muslims in concentration camps". The Daily Telegraph. Archived from the original on 14 November 2019. Retrieved 10 March 2019.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia's Mohammed bin Salman Defends China's Use of Concentration Camps for Muslims During Visit to Beijing". Newsweek. 22 February 2019. Archived from the original on 10 October 2019. Retrieved 10 March 2019.
- ^ "Saudi crown prince defended China's imprisonment of a million Muslims in internment camps, giving Xi Jinping a reason to continue his 'precursors to genocide'". Business Insider. 23 February 2019. Archived from the original on 14 September 2019. Retrieved 10 March 2019.
- ^ "Saudi crown prince defends China's right to fight 'terrorism'". al-Jazeera. 23 February 2019. Archived from the original on 19 June 2019. Retrieved 10 March 2019.
- ^ Bartenstein, Ben; Westall, Sylvia (6 December 2022). "Saudis Roll Out Red Carpet for Xi Jinping as Gulf Looks Past US". Bloomberg News. Archived from the original on 3 May 2023.
- ^ Al Hamawi, Lama (8 December 2022). "How China became Saudi Arabia's top trading partner, revived ancient Silk Road". Arab News. Archived from the original on 1 January 2023.
- ^ Salami, Mohammad (3 April 2022). "Saudi-Chinese Cooperation in the Production of Ballistic Missiles". Archived from the original on 1 January 2023.
- ^ Malsin, Jared; Said, Summer; Strobel, Warren P. "Saudis Begin Making Ballistic Missiles With Chinese Help: The effort is raising new worries about a Middle East arms race". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 26 December 2021.
- ^ a b Gambrell, John (10 December 2022). "China's Xi vows to buy more Mideast oil as US focus wanes". Associated Press. Retrieved 11 December 2022.
- ^ Kalin, Stephen (8 December 2022). "China's Xi Jinping Deepens Saudi Ties in Pivotal Trip". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 11 December 2022.
- ^ "Factbox: Saudi-China energy, trade and investment ties". Reuters. 9 December 2022. Archived from the original on 1 January 2023.
- ^ El Dahan, Maha; El Yaakoubi, Aziz (10 December 2022). "China's Xi calls for oil trade in yuan at Gulf summit in Riyadh". Reuters. Archived from the original on 1 January 2023.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia, China, and defense deals during Zhuhai Air Show 2022". 24 November 2022. Archived from the original on 5 May 2023.
- ^ "Saudi gets huge arms deal from China worth $4 billion". Leaders. 29 November 2022. Archived from the original on 31 January 2023.
- ^ Kalin, Stephen; Faucon, Benoit (10 March 2023). "Saudi Arabia, Iran Restore Relations in Deal Brokered by China". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 10 March 2023.
- ^ Kirchgaessner, Stephanie (3 June 2020). "'Sarah and Omar have disappeared': children of ex-Saudi official missing since March". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 7 July 2020. Retrieved 18 August 2020.
- ^ "Senators Press Trump to Help Free Children of Saudi Ex-Official". Bloomberg.com. 9 July 2020. Archived from the original on 19 July 2020. Retrieved 9 July 2020.
- ^ "Saudi Arabia Wants Its Fugitive Spymaster Back". The Wall Street Journal. 17 July 2020. Archived from the original on 18 July 2020. Retrieved 17 July 2020.
- ^ Ignatius, David. "The Saudi crown prince, Interpol and an alleged assassination plot". The Washington Post. No. 7 August 2020. Archived from the original on 7 August 2020. Retrieved 7 August 2020.
- ^ "Aljabri Complaint: Case 1:20-cv-02146-TJK Document 1" (PDF). Court House News. Archived (PDF) from the original on 16 August 2020. Retrieved 7 August 2020.
- ^ "US court issues summons for Saudi Arabia's Mohammed bin Salman". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 10 August 2020. Retrieved 10 August 2020.
- ^ Haroun, Azmi. "Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman got served a lawsuit via WhatsApp. Court documents show that he received and read the message". Business Insider. Archived from the original on 4 November 2020. Retrieved 3 November 2020.
- ^ "Exhibit A filled with US Court" (PDF). DocumentCloud (PDF). 29 October 2020. Archived (PDF) from the original on 30 August 2021. Retrieved 3 November 2020.
- ^ a b Bond, Shannon (31 March 2019). "Saudis hacked Amazon CEO's phone, says Bezos security chief". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 31 March 2019. Retrieved 2 March 2021.
- ^ a b Zetter, Kim; Cox, Joseph (23 January 2020). "Here Is the Technical Report Suggesting Saudi Arabia's Prince Hacked Jeff Bezos' Phone". Motherboard. Archived from the original on 28 June 2020. Retrieved 2 March 2021.
- ^ O'Neill, Patrick (22 January 2020). "UN calls for investigation of Saudis allegedly hacking Jeff Bezos". MIT Technology Review. Archived from the original on 12 May 2020. Retrieved 2 March 2021.
- ^ Bowman, Verity (22 January 2020). "Jeff Bezos phone hacking: UN calls for investigation after Saudi Crown Prince implicated". The Daily Telegraph. Archived from the original on 17 March 2020. Retrieved 2 March 2021.
- ^ "How real is Saudi Arabia's interest in renewable energy?". The Guardian. 12 October 2019. Archived from the original on 9 October 2021. Retrieved 9 October 2021.
- ^ Kakenmaster, William (2024). "The Fossil-Fueled Roots of Climate Inaction in Authoritarian Regimes". Perspectives on Politics. 23 (2): 415–433. doi:10.1017/S1537592724000793. ISSN 1537-5927.
- ^ "Turkey 'has recording proving Saudi murder'". BBC News. 12 October 2018. Archived from the original on 12 October 2018. Retrieved 12 October 2018.
- ^ "Jamal Khashoggi: Turkey says journalist was murdered in Saudi consulate". BBC News. 7 October 2018. Archived from the original on 9 October 2018. Retrieved 7 October 2018.
- ^ Harris, Shane (10 October 2018). "Crown prince sought to lure Khashoggi back to Saudi Arabia and detain him, U.S. intercepts show". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 15 October 2018. Retrieved 15 October 2018.
- ^ "EXCLUSIVE: Seven of Mohammed's bodyguards among Khashoggi suspects". Middle East Eye. 17 October 2018. Archived from the original on 18 October 2018.
- ^ Sawers, John (19 October 2018). "Evidence suggests crown prince ordered Khashoggi killing, says ex-MI6 chief". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 20 October 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
- ^ Rutenberg, Jim (14 October 2018). "Reality Breaks Up a Saudi Prince Charming's Media Narrative". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 21 October 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
- ^ Lhatoo, Yonden (20 October 2018). "What's the life of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi to US President Donald Trump? Nothing". South China Morning Post. Archived from the original on 20 October 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
- ^ "Jamal Khashoggi: Trump says if anyone knew about plot to kill journalist 'it would be Mohammed bin Salman'". The Independent. Archived from the original on 24 October 2018. Retrieved 24 October 2018.
- ^ "Who is Ahmed al-Asiri, the sacked Saudi intelligence chief?". Al Jazeera. 19 October 2018. Archived from the original on 8 November 2018. Retrieved 7 November 2018.
- ^ Benner, Katie; Mazzetti, Mark; Hubbard, Ben; Isaac, Mike (20 October 2018). "Saudis' Image Makers: A Troll Army and a Twitter Insider". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 6 November 2018. Retrieved 7 November 2018.
- ^ Jacinto, Leela (25 October 2018). "Saudi 'Mr. Hashtag' becomes fall guy in Khashoggi case, but is he really down?". France 24. Archived from the original on 7 November 2018. Retrieved 7 November 2018.
- ^ Barnes, Julian E.; Schmitt, Eric; Kirkpatrick, David D. (12 November 2018). "'Tell Your Boss': Recording Is Seen to Link Saudi Crown Prince More Strongly to Khashoggi Killing". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 12 November 2018. Retrieved 12 November 2018.
- ^ "Saudis shield crown prince as death penalty sought over Khashoggi murder". The Guardian. 15 November 2018. Archived from the original on 15 November 2018. Retrieved 15 November 2018.
- ^ "Saudi prosecutor seeks death penalty for Khashoggi murder, says journalist was killed by sedative overdose". CNN. 15 November 2018. Archived from the original on 15 November 2018. Retrieved 15 November 2018.
- ^ Harris, Shane; Miller, Greg; Dawsey, Josh (16 November 2018). "CIA concludes Saudi crown prince ordered Jamal Khashoggi's assassination". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 17 November 2018. Retrieved 17 November 2018.
- ^ "Khashoggi murder: Saudi crown prince crazy, says US senator". BBC News. 4 December 2018. Archived from the original on 4 December 2018. Retrieved 4 December 2018.
- ^ "Saudi crown prince 'ordered, monitored' killing of Khashoggi, Corker says". CNN. 4 December 2018. Archived from the original on 5 December 2018. Retrieved 5 December 2018.
- ^ "U.N. rights boss Bachelet seeks international inquiry into Khashoggi murder". Reuters. Archived from the original on 13 January 2019. Retrieved 5 December 2018.
- ^ "Saudi Prince Slams CIA Assessment Report on Khashoggi Murder". Bloomberg. 24 November 2018. Archived from the original on 28 November 2018. Retrieved 5 December 2018.
- ^ "U.S. senators say Saudi crown prince has gone 'full gangster'". Reuters. 6 March 2019. Archived from the original on 6 March 2019. Retrieved 6 March 2019.
- ^ Gaouette, Nicole; Conte, Michael (7 March 2019). "Saudi prince has gone 'full gangster,' says Rubio, as lawmakers decry kingdom's abuses". CNN. Archived from the original on 7 March 2019. Retrieved 7 March 2019.
- ^ "'Credible evidence' ties Saudi prince to Khashoggi murder, UN expert says". Times of Israel. 19 June 2019. Archived from the original on 19 June 2019.
- ^ Callamard, Agnes. "Annex to the Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions: Investigation into the unlawful death of Mr. Jamal Khashoggi" (PDF). United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR). Archived (PDF) from the original on 30 April 2020. Retrieved 26 February 2021.
- ^ "Guardian told it was target of Saudi hacking unit after Khashoggi killing". The Guardian. 19 June 2019. Archived from the original on 19 June 2019. Retrieved 19 June 2019.
- ^ Malsin, Jared (26 September 2019). "Saudi Crown Prince Says Khashoggi Was Killed 'Under My Watch'". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 27 September 2019. Retrieved 28 September 2019.
- ^ "Mohammad Bin Salman: Jamal Khashoggi murder 'happened under my watch,' Saudi crown prince tells PBS". The Times of India. Reuters. 26 September 2010. Archived from the original on 26 September 2019. Retrieved 26 September 2019.
- ^ "Mohammed bin Salman accepts responsibility for Jamal Khashoggi murder". Salon. 26 September 2019. Archived from the original on 28 September 2019. Retrieved 28 September 2019.
- ^ Christina Maxouris. "Mohammed bin Salman denies personal involvement in Khashoggi killing in '60 Minutes' interview but says it was carried out by Saudi officials". CNN.com. Archived from the original on 1 October 2019. Retrieved 30 September 2019.
- ^ "Assessing the Saudi Government's Role in the Killing of Jamal Khashoggi" (PDF). Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 11 February 2021. Archived from the original (PDF) on 26 February 2021.
- ^ "U.S. should sanction MbS, lead bid for justice in Khashoggi murder – U.N. expert". Reuters. 26 February 2021. Archived from the original on 26 February 2021. Retrieved 26 February 2021.
Agnes Callamard, U.N. investigator for summary executions, in a statement posted on Twitter after a declassified U.S. intelligence assessment was released, urged the U.S. government to impose sanctions on Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman "targeting his personal assets but also his international engagements."
- ^ "Mohammed bin Salman: Saudi leader given US immunity over Khashoggi killing". BBC News. 18 November 2022. Archived from the original on 18 November 2022. Retrieved 18 November 2022.
- ^ "Profile: Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman". Al Jazeera. 21 June 2017. Archived from the original on 22 June 2017. Retrieved 2 January 2018.
- ^ Al Ahmed, Ali (16 March 2018). "Reports of Saudi Crown Prince's Domestic Violence Emerge". GulfInstitute.org. Archived from the original on 27 November 2020. Retrieved 17 November 2020.
- ^ Langer, Marko (5 November 2017). "Saudi Arabia's Mohammed bin Salman: Reformer and hard-liner". Deutsche Welle. Archived from the original on 17 January 2018. Retrieved 16 January 2018 – via dw.com.
- ^ Kurtz, Steve (15 March 2018). "Mohammed bin Salman – the reformer behind Saudi Arabia's shakeup". FoxNews.com. Archived from the original on 25 March 2020. Retrieved 27 May 2019.
- ^ Pelham, Nicolas (28 July 2022). "MBS: despot in the desert". The Economist. ISSN 0013-0613. Archived from the original on 28 July 2022. Retrieved 28 July 2022.
- ^ "A 30-year-old Saudi prince could jump-start the kingdom – or drive it off a cliff". The Washington Post. 28 June 2016. Archived from the original on 29 June 2016.
- ^ Mazzetti, Mark; Hubbard, Ben (15 October 2016). "Rise of Saudi Prince Shatters Decades of Royal Tradition". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 1 February 2017.
- ^ Kulish, Nicholas; Forsythe, Michael (16 December 2017). "World's Most Expensive Home? Another Bauble for a Saudi Prince". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 21 March 2018. Retrieved 28 March 2018.
- ^ Mulholland, Rory (16 December 2017). "Pro-austerity Saudi prince buys world's most expensive home". The Telegraph. Archived from the original on 24 May 2019. Retrieved 24 May 2019.
- ^ "Who Is Mohammed Bin Salman Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud And What Is His Total Net Worth?". zeenews.india.com. Retrieved 15 August 2023.
- ^ "Prince Mohammed books out hotel to dine with Murdoch". The Sydney Morning Herald. 4 April 2018. Archived from the original on 23 May 2018.
- ^ Harris, Shane; Crow, Kelly; Said, Summer (7 December 2017). "Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Identified as Buyer of Record-Breaking da Vinci". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 7 December 2017. Retrieved 7 December 2017.
- ^ Meixler, Eli (7 December 2017). "The Mystery Buyer of a $450 Million Leonardo da Vinci Painting Was a Saudi Prince". Fortune. Archived from the original on 7 December 2017. Retrieved 7 December 2017.
- ^ Kirkpatrick, David D. (6 December 2017). "Mystery Buyer of $450 Million 'Salvator Mundi' Was a Saudi Prince". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 17 April 2018. Retrieved 30 March 2018.
- ^ "Mystery buyer of famed da Vinci is Saudi prince: Report". CBS News. 6 December 2017. Archived from the original on 31 March 2018. Retrieved 30 March 2018.
- ^ "Embassy Statement on Art Work Purchase". saudiembassy.net. Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Archived from the original on 28 March 2018. Retrieved 28 March 2018.
- ^ "Louvre Abu Dhabi: UAE has acquired Da Vinci's Salvator Mundi". The National. 9 December 2017. Archived from the original on 28 March 2018. Retrieved 28 March 2018.
- ^ "The $450 million question: Where is Leonardo da Vinci's 'Salvator Mundi'?". CNN.com. Archived from the original on 8 July 2019. Retrieved 8 July 2019.
- ^ Krause, Amanda (12 June 2019). "The $450 million Leonardo da Vinci painting that's said to be sitting on a Saudi prince's yacht was once bought for just $1,000. Here's how it took over the art world". Insider.com. Archived from the original on 15 February 2023. Retrieved 3 March 2022.
- ^ Sharma, Neha Tandon (28 April 2022). "Saudi prince MBS bought this $400 million megayacht from a Russian Oligarch and immediately kicked him out". Luxury launches. Archived from the original on 28 April 2022. Retrieved 29 April 2022.
The 439 feet long vessel has two helipads, a submarine, and a nightclub. The royal has also hung a $450M painting in it.
- ^ Kazakina, Katya (11 June 2019). "Missing Salvator Mundi 'turns up on MBS yacht'". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 20 May 2024.
- ^ "Mohammed bin Salman: Spies and diplomats reveal inside story of the Saudi crown prince". www.bbc.com. Retrieved 24 December 2024.
- ^ Uddin, Raydhan (21 September 2023). "Eleven things we learned from Saudi crown prince interview". Middle East Eye. Retrieved 26 August 2025.
- ^ Saudi Gazette [@saudi_gazette] (25 November 2018). "King Hamad of #Bahrain decorates the #Saudi #CrownPrince #MuhammadBinSalman with the Order of Sheikh Isa Bin Salman Al-Khalifa of the Exceptional Class" (Tweet). Retrieved 8 March 2020 – via Twitter.
- ^ "Tunisie: Mohamed Ben Salmane honoré au Palais de Carthage". directinfo.webmanagercenter.com. 28 November 2018. Archived from the original on 26 February 2019. Retrieved 4 May 2019.
- ^ "President of Pakistan Dr Arif Alvi confers Nishan-e-Pakistan on Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman". Express Tribune. 18 February 2019. Archived from the original on 12 August 2019. Retrieved 18 February 2019.
- ^ "His Majesty bestows Oman Civil Order on HRH Prince Mohammed bin Salman". Times of Oman. Archived from the original on 7 December 2021. Retrieved 7 December 2021.
- ^ Bashir, Hassan (7 December 2021). "Mohamed bin Zayed, Mohamed bin Salman review bilateral ties, regional issues". Emirates News Agency. Archived from the original on 29 December 2021. Retrieved 19 September 2022.
- ^ "Jordan confers highest civilian award on Crown Prince". Saudi Gazette. 22 June 2022. Archived from the original on 21 June 2022. Retrieved 2 August 2022.
- ^ "Zelensky decorates Rama with a state award". KOHA. 30 December 2023. Retrieved 4 January 2024.
- ^ "Royal Family Directory". Datarabia. Retrieved 21 October 2025.
External links
[edit]- Official Profile at House of Saud website
- Ben Hubbard; Mark Mazzetti; Eric Schmitt (18 July 2017). "Saudi King's Son Plotted Effort to Oust His Rival". The New York Times.
- "The Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia". Frontline. Season 38. Episode 2. 1 October 2019. PBS. WGBH. Retrieved 3 October 2023.
- Appearances on C-SPAN
Mohammed bin Salman
View on GrokipediaEarly Life and Education
Family Background and Upbringing
Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud was born on 31 August 1985 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud—then governor of Riyadh Province—and his third wife, Fahda bint Falah Al Hithlain, a member of the Ajman tribe's Al Hithlain clan.[1][6][8] Salman, a son of Saudi Arabia's founder King Abdulaziz Al Saud and one of the Sudairi Seven brothers, had multiple wives and at least 13 sons overall, but Fahda bore him six sons, with Mohammed as the eldest.[9][10] Raised within the royal household in Riyadh amid the broader House of Saud dynasty, which numbers thousands of princes descended from Abdulaziz's 45 sons, Mohammed experienced a privileged yet relatively low-profile existence compared to more prominent royal branches.[11][8] His father's long tenure as Riyadh's governor from 1963 to 2011 immersed the family in provincial administration, fostering Mohammed's early exposure to governance rather than the opulent isolation of some princely upbringings.[10] From childhood, Mohammed shadowed his father in official duties, cultivating an interest in state affairs that contrasted with the obscurity of his initial position in the succession line, as Salman's elder sons from prior marriages held precedence under traditional agnatic seniority.[12] This environment, marked by Salman's pragmatic rule over Riyadh's rapid urbanization and tribal negotiations, shaped Mohammed's formative years without the immediate spotlight of core power contenders.[11]Formal Education and Initial Influences
Mohammed bin Salman received his primary and secondary education at Riyadh Schools, where he ranked among the top ten students nationwide during his secondary years.[13] He enrolled at King Saud University in Riyadh to study law, earning a bachelor's degree in 2007.[14] [6] [15] He graduated second in his class at the College of Law, demonstrating strong academic performance in a program emphasizing Sharia, public law, and administrative principles central to Saudi governance.[6] [15] [13] During his university years, bin Salman worked in the office of his father, Salman bin Abdulaziz, then governor of Riyadh Province, gaining early exposure to provincial administration, policy implementation, and royal decision-making processes.[6] This hands-on involvement provided practical insights into bureaucratic operations and resource management, shaping his understanding of state functions beyond theoretical legal studies.[6] His education and concurrent administrative experience fostered a pragmatic approach to governance, influenced by the intersection of Islamic jurisprudence and modern administrative demands in Saudi Arabia.[6]Rise to Power
Early Appointments and Court Roles
Mohammed bin Salman entered public service in 2009 as a special advisor to his father, Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz, then Governor of Riyadh Province, following his graduation with a bachelor's degree in law from King Saud University.[16] In this capacity, he handled administrative and policy matters within the Riyadh governorate's office, gaining proximity to provincial governance structures.[6] Concurrently, he served as secretary general of the Riyadh Competitiveness Center, an entity focused on enhancing the province's economic edge, and as a special advisor to the chairman of the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives (Darah), contributing to historical and cultural documentation efforts.[13][14] After Prince Salman's elevation to Crown Prince in June 2012 following the death of Crown Prince Nayef, Mohammed bin Salman was appointed head of the Crown Prince's Court on March 2, 2013, replacing Prince Saud bin Nayef, with the additional title of special advisor at the rank of minister.[13][6] This position centralized authority over the Crown Prince's administrative apparatus, where he oversaw daily operations, personnel, and policy coordination, reportedly streamlining processes and introducing efficiencies aligned with his father's preferences.[17] In April 2014, he received further elevation as Minister of State, a senior cabinet post without specific portfolio, which amplified his influence in national deliberations under King Abdullah's reign.[18] These court and advisory roles, primarily orbiting his father's orbit, marked Mohammed bin Salman's initial consolidation of influence within the royal hierarchy, positioning him to manage key internal dynamics ahead of broader national responsibilities. Sources from Saudi state-affiliated outlets emphasize administrative reforms under his tenure, while Western analyses highlight the roles' function in building loyalty networks among aides.[13][19]Minister of Defense (2015–2022)
Mohammed bin Salman was appointed Minister of Defense on 23 January 2015, immediately following the death of King Abdullah and the ascension of his father, King Salman, to the throne.[1] [15] In this capacity, he assumed responsibility for Saudi Arabia's armed forces, which numbered approximately 225,000 active personnel at the time, and directed a defense budget that would expand significantly during his tenure to support procurement and operational needs.[20] His appointment marked a shift toward younger leadership in the ministry, previously held by older royals, and aligned with efforts to centralize control over military decision-making under the royal court.[21] A pivotal early action was the initiation of the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen on 26 March 2015, dubbed Operation Decisive Storm, targeting Houthi forces backed by Iran that had overthrown the Yemeni government and advanced toward the Saudi border.[22] [1] As defense minister, bin Salman personally orchestrated the coalition of ten countries, conducting airstrikes and imposing a naval blockade to restore President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, whose government Saudi Arabia recognized as legitimate.[23] The campaign, which transitioned to Operation Restoring Hope in April 2015 with ground support, aimed to counter perceived Iranian expansionism but resulted in prolonged conflict, with over 150,000 reported deaths by 2020, including significant civilian casualties from coalition airstrikes documented by human rights groups.[24] Saudi officials attributed Houthi resilience to external support, while critics, including outlets with regional biases, highlighted logistical failures and indiscriminate bombing.[25] During his ministry, bin Salman oversaw substantial military procurement, elevating Saudi Arabia to the world's fourth-largest arms importer between 2011 and 2020, with key acquisitions including advanced U.S. systems like Patriot missiles and F-15 fighter jets to enhance air superiority and missile defense.[26] Defense spending peaked at around $81 billion in 2015, representing over 10% of GDP, funding not only Yemen operations—estimated to cost $200 billion cumulatively—but also domestic reforms such as leadership purges and recruitment drives to professionalize the forces.[20] These included appointing new chiefs of staff in 2018 and integrating security branches under centralized command, though effectiveness was questioned amid Yemen's stalemate.[27] Efforts tied to Vision 2030 emphasized localizing defense manufacturing, targeting 50% of spending on domestic industry by 2030 through entities like the General Authority for Military Industries.[28] Bin Salman retained influence over defense policy post-2017 as crown prince, but formally relinquished the ministerial role in 2022 when his brother, Khalid bin Salman, was appointed to the position amid ongoing restructuring.[29] The tenure saw Saudi Arabia assert greater regional military posture, including bolstering counterterrorism capabilities that dismantled al-Qaeda networks domestically, though Yemen's unresolved status underscored challenges in translating spending into decisive outcomes.Elevation to Crown Prince (2017)
On June 21, 2017, King Salman bin Abdulaziz issued a royal decree elevating his son, Mohammed bin Salman, from deputy crown prince to crown prince, while simultaneously removing Mohammed bin Nayef from the position of crown prince and interior minister.[30][31][32] The decree also appointed Mohammed bin Salman as deputy prime minister, consolidating his authority alongside his existing roles as minister of defense and head of the economic and development affairs council.[33][34] This reshuffle marked a departure from the traditional agnatic seniority in Saudi succession, favoring the 31-year-old Mohammed bin Salman over his 57-year-old cousin Mohammed bin Nayef, who had been designated heir apparent in 2015.[35][36] The elevation followed Mohammed bin Salman's rapid accumulation of influence since King Salman's accession in January 2015, including his appointment as deputy crown prince in April of that year and leadership in launching Saudi Vision 2030 in 2016 to diversify the economy beyond oil.[31][16] Mohammed bin Nayef, previously a key figure in counterterrorism efforts and respected in Western intelligence circles for his role in combating al-Qaeda, was relieved of duties without public explanation from the royal court, though reports indicated he had been sidelined amid internal family dynamics favoring generational shift.[32][37] The move was ratified by the Allegiance Council, comprising senior princes, though details of the vote remained undisclosed, reflecting the opaque nature of Saudi royal deliberations.[30][38] This succession adjustment solidified Mohammed bin Salman's position as the de facto ruler, given King Salman's age of 81 at the time, and accelerated his agenda of modernization and centralization, including military interventions in Yemen and Yemen and domestic purges that followed later in 2017.[39][40] International observers noted the shift as a high-stakes consolidation, with potential risks of factional resistance within the extensive Al Saud family, comprising over 15,000 members, though no immediate challenges materialized.[35][41] The appointment drew endorsements from allies like the United States, where Mohammed bin Salman had cultivated ties, signaling continuity in strategic partnerships despite the abrupt internal change.[32]2017 Anti-Corruption Campaign and Purge
On November 4, 2017, King Salman issued a royal decree establishing the Supreme Anti-Corruption Committee, chaired by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, to investigate and address corruption, money laundering, and related offenses among senior officials and business leaders.[42] The committee's formation followed Mohammed bin Salman's elevation to crown prince in June 2017 and aimed to recover state assets estimated by the attorney general to exceed $100 billion in value lost to embezzlement and abuse over prior decades.[43] Arrests commenced immediately that weekend, targeting 11 princes, four current or former ministers, and numerous executives, including prominent figures such as billionaire investor Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal and former Riyadh governor Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah.[44] By November 9, the total number of detainees reached 201, with assets frozen and travel restrictions imposed on an additional 1,200 individuals under investigation.[45] Many high-profile detainees were held at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in Riyadh, repurposed as a detention facility where interrogations occurred and settlement negotiations were conducted.[46] The campaign involved rapid asset seizures, including yachts, private jets, and bank accounts, with the committee asserting legal authority to bypass standard judicial processes for settlements in lieu of prosecution.[47] Official updates from the attorney general indicated that by early December, 159 individuals remained in custody, most having agreed to financial settlements returning funds and properties to the state.[48] Detainees faced pressure to disclose hidden assets, with reports from associates alleging physical coercion and mistreatment during interrogations, though Saudi authorities denied systematic abuse and framed the measures as necessary for accountability.[49][50] By January 29, 2019, the committee announced the campaign's conclusion, stating it had recovered approximately $106 billion through settlements, equivalent to assets valued at $300–400 billion linked to proven corruption.[51] Most detainees were released upon compliance, though some charges persisted, and the effort was credited with bolstering state finances amid oil price volatility.[52] Analysts noted the purge's dual role: substantiating claims of entrenched graft among elites, as evidenced by voluntary restitution from figures like Al-Waleed who paid over $6 billion, yet also serving to neutralize potential rivals to Mohammed bin Salman's consolidation of authority by sidelining critics of his Vision 2030 reforms.[53][54] The operation's extrajudicial elements drew international scrutiny for lacking transparency, contrasting with Saudi assertions of judicial oversight and popular domestic support for addressing corruption.[55]Appointment as Prime Minister (2022)
On September 27, 2022, King Salman bin Abdulaziz issued a royal decree appointing his son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, as Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia, a position the king had held since ascending the throne in 2015 and which had been traditionally occupied by the monarch since the kingdom's founding in 1932.[56][57] This marked the first instance in modern Saudi history where the king relinquished the premiership, consolidating executive authority under the crown prince who already wielded significant de facto power as heir apparent, defense minister, and overseer of key economic and reform initiatives.[58][59] The appointment occurred amid a cabinet reshuffle that also saw Prince Khalid bin Salman, the crown prince's brother, elevated to defense minister, replacing Mohammed bin Salman in that role and further aligning key security positions with the ruling family's inner circle.[3] King Salman's advancing age—86 at the time—and reported health challenges had increasingly shifted day-to-day governance to the crown prince, rendering the formal transition a logical extension of existing power dynamics rather than a abrupt change.[60][57] Observers noted the timing's alignment with a U.S. civil lawsuit filed by Jamal Khashoggi's fiancée accusing Mohammed bin Salman of authorizing the journalist's 2018 murder, suggesting the premiership could invoke head-of-government immunity under international legal norms to shield against foreign judicial proceedings.[61][62] While Saudi officials framed the move as streamlining governance for Vision 2030 reforms, critics in Western media highlighted it as entrenching the crown prince's unaccountable authority, though such interpretations reflect outlets' editorial leanings toward emphasizing accountability deficits in non-Western autocracies.[58][63] The U.S. Department of Justice later cited the appointment in a November 2022 filing, asserting it did not alter prior findings of probable cause linking the crown prince to the killing, underscoring ongoing tensions between Saudi domestic consolidation and international scrutiny.[1]Governing Philosophy and Ideology
Saudi Nationalism and Modernization Vision
Mohammed bin Salman's modernization agenda centers on Saudi Vision 2030, a comprehensive program unveiled on April 25, 2016, designed to transform the kingdom into a diversified, self-reliant economy while reducing oil dependency from over 70% of government revenue in 2015 to below 50% by 2030.[64] The initiative rests on three pillars: a vibrant society promoting health, culture, and entertainment; a thriving economy emphasizing private sector growth, tourism, and innovation; and an ambitious nation focused on governmental efficiency, institutional integrity, and national pride.[64] Key targets include increasing non-oil exports' share of non-oil GDP to 50% by 2030, creating 1.3 million new jobs for Saudis, and elevating the kingdom's global competitiveness ranking.[65] This vision intertwines economic reforms with a deliberate revival of Saudi nationalism, shifting emphasis from transnational Islamic ideologies toward a state-centric identity rooted in the achievements of the Al Saud dynasty, particularly founder King Abdulaziz ibn Saud.[66] MBS has championed initiatives to foster national self-reliance, such as mega-projects like NEOM—a $500 billion futuristic city—and the Red Sea Project, aimed at positioning Saudi Arabia as a global hub for tourism and technology while celebrating indigenous heritage through cultural festivals and historical restorations.[67] In a 2021 interview, he asserted that Saudi identity "is very strong, and we are proud of it," portraying it as citizen-driven rather than imposed by religious authorities.[68] Saudi nationalism under MBS manifests in foreign policy as a "Saudi first" pragmatism, prioritizing economic deals and security over ideological alliances, as seen in normalized relations with Israel precursors and energy market maneuvers.[69] Domestically, it promotes cultural liberalization—such as concerts, cinemas, and sports events—to build a youthful, patriotic populace, with public campaigns invoking Abdulaziz's legacy to unify support for reforms.[70] This approach diminishes the Muslim Brotherhood's influence and Wahhabi globalism, redirecting religious discourse toward national service, though it has drawn criticism for hyper-nationalist elements that demand loyalty to the state and crown prince.[71][72] By 2025, Vision 2030's progress includes a 30% rise in tourism revenue to $13 billion in 2023 and over 200 entertainment events annually, underscoring the fusion of nationalist fervor with modernization.[73]Pragmatic Authoritarianism and Power Centralization
Mohammed bin Salman has pursued a governing style characterized by the concentration of executive authority in his hands, diverging from the traditional Saudi model of distributed power among senior royals and consensus-driven decision-making within the Al Saud family.[74][75] This centralization enables rapid implementation of policies aligned with his Vision 2030 agenda, prioritizing economic diversification and social modernization over fragmented royal input, though it relies on coercive measures to suppress potential rivals.[76][77] A pivotal mechanism of this consolidation occurred during the November 2017 anti-corruption campaign, when Saudi authorities detained over 200 individuals, including 11 princes, four ministers, and prominent businessmen such as Prince Alwaleed bin Talal, at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in Riyadh.[78][79] The operation, overseen by a new anti-corruption committee chaired by bin Salman, resulted in settlements exceeding $106 billion in recovered assets, framed officially as a crackdown on graft but widely interpreted as a strategic purge to neutralize threats to his primacy.[80][81][82] Detainees faced interrogation and pressure to relinquish holdings in key sectors like media and finance, thereby transferring economic leverage to state-aligned entities under bin Salman's influence.[83] Bin Salman's authority extends across core state institutions, including direct oversight of the Ministry of Defense since 2011, the Royal Court, and economic bodies tied to Vision 2030 projects such as the Public Investment Fund, which he chairs.[75][84] He has sidelined traditional power centers, such as by dismissing former Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef in June 2017 and assuming multiple portfolios, including de facto control over interior security and foreign policy levers.[16][85] This structure supplants the prior collegial royal council system with a top-down hierarchy, where bin Salman acts as de facto ruler despite King Salman's nominal headship.[86][77] The pragmatic dimension of this authoritarianism manifests in bin Salman's selective application of repression to facilitate reforms, such as curbing the influence of conservative religious establishments while advancing secular entertainment initiatives, without dismantling the monarchy's absolute framework.[87][88] Critics from human rights organizations argue this yields a "reformist authoritarianism" that prioritizes regime stability and modernization over pluralistic governance, as evidenced by ongoing detentions of dissenters post-purge.[89][90] Supporters, including Saudi state media, contend it fosters accountability and efficiency, citing the purge's financial recoveries as enabling fiscal sustainability amid oil price volatility.[8][91] Subsequent waves of arrests, such as over 200 in August 2021 targeting businessmen and officials, reinforce this pattern of using anti-corruption rhetoric to preempt challenges.[82]Domestic Reforms and Policies
Economic Diversification via Vision 2030
Vision 2030, launched by Mohammed bin Salman in April 2016 as Deputy Crown Prince, serves as Saudi Arabia's strategic framework to reduce oil dependency and foster a diversified economy.[65][92] The program outlines three pillars—a thriving economy, a vibrant society, and an ambitious nation—with economic diversification at its core, targeting increases in private sector contribution to 65% of GDP, foreign direct investment inflows, and non-oil exports.[64][65] Under bin Salman's oversight as chairman of the Public Investment Fund (PIF) and de facto economic architect, the initiative has driven fiscal reforms, including subsidy reductions on fuel, electricity, and water to curb waste and reallocate resources toward productive sectors.[93] Key initiatives include mega-projects like NEOM, a planned $500 billion futuristic city aimed at innovation and tourism; the Red Sea Project for luxury eco-tourism; and the partial initial public offering (IPO) of Saudi Aramco in 2019, which raised $29.4 billion and unlocked state assets for private investment.[4][94] Efforts to boost tourism introduced e-visas in 2019, targeting 100 million annual visitors by 2030, alongside entertainment sector liberalization permitting cinemas and concerts to stimulate domestic spending.[65] Privatization programs have transferred over 30 state-owned entities or assets to private hands by 2024, including airports and desalination plants, while special economic zones attract foreign manufacturing in sectors like semiconductors and green hydrogen.[64][95] Progress metrics reflect measurable gains in non-oil activity: non-oil GDP growth accelerated from 1.82% in 2016 to 4.93% in the first half of 2023, with projections for 3.4% in 2025 and sustained 4.5–5.5% annually over the next decade.[96][97][98] Non-oil revenues reached SAR 149.86 billion (approximately $40 billion) in Q2 2025, comprising 49.7% of total government income—a 7% year-on-year increase—and non-oil exports grew 14% in 2024, driven by tourism inflows of $41 billion.[99][100] The private non-oil sector's GDP share rose to 51% in 2024 from 45% in 2018, while unemployment fell to 7% in Q4 2024, meeting a key target ahead of schedule.[100][65] Non-oil activity is estimated to account for 57% of total GDP in 2025, though oil fluctuations remain a vulnerability.[101] Challenges persist, including project delays and cost overruns in NEOM, which scaled back initial ambitions by 2024, and rising public debt to fund PIF investments exceeding $700 billion in assets.[102][73] Critics, including analyses from think tanks, argue that centralization of power under bin Salman limits private sector dynamism and accountability, potentially undermining long-term sustainability despite short-term fiscal gains.[102][103] Export diversification has positively impacted non-oil GDP but correlated with declines in oil GDP share, aligning with goals yet exposing the economy to global commodity risks.[104] Overall, while Vision 2030 has advanced structural shifts, full realization by 2030 hinges on navigating geopolitical tensions and enhancing transparency to sustain investor confidence.[102]Social and Women's Rights Advancements
In 2018, Saudi Arabia lifted its longstanding ban on women driving, effective June 24, following a royal decree issued in September 2017 by King Salman at the direction of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.[105][106] This reform enabled over 100,000 women to obtain driver's licenses within the first year, facilitating greater mobility and workforce participation amid Vision 2030's emphasis on economic diversification.[107] Further easing of the male guardianship system occurred in August 2019, when regulations permitted women aged 21 and older to obtain passports, travel abroad, register births, marriages, divorces, and conduct other civil transactions without mandatory approval from a male guardian.[108][109] These changes, enacted via Council of Ministers amendments, also prohibited employers from requiring guardian consent for women's job applications, aiming to boost female labor force involvement, which rose from 18% in 2016 to over 33% by 2022.[110][111] Social liberalization efforts included reopening cinemas in April 2018 after a 35-year prohibition, with the first commercial screenings drawing large audiences and spurring a domestic film industry projected to contribute $1.8 billion to GDP by 2030 under Vision 2030.[112][4] Public concerts and entertainment events were authorized, exemplified by the 2019 Riyadh Season festival attracting millions, alongside curbs on the religious police's (mutawa) powers through a 2016 decree limiting their arrest and patrol authority to reduce intrusive enforcement of social norms.[112][93] Additional measures opened non-combat military roles to women in February 2018 and expanded sports participation, with Saudi women competing in the Olympics since 2012 and increased funding for female athletic programs.[113] These steps aligned with Vision 2030's "vibrant society" pillar, prioritizing youth empowerment and cultural openness, though implementation has varied regionally and enforcement gaps persist due to customary practices.[64]Religious Moderation and Cultural Liberalization
Mohammed bin Salman articulated a vision for religious moderation in Saudi Arabia during a 2017 interview, declaring that the kingdom would "return to moderate Islam" open to all religions and the world, attributing the rise of extremism to events around 1979 such as the Iranian Revolution and the siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. He blamed the post-1979 strictness partly on Western requests during the Cold War for Saudi Arabia to fund Wahhabi mosques and madrassas to counter Soviet influence.[114][115][116] In 2018, he elaborated that the spread of Wahhabism "was done at the request of allies during the Cold War" to counter the USSR, stating "we have to get it all back" to the kingdom's moderate roots.[117] In a 2021 interview, bin Salman criticized the Wahhabi establishment for "faulty interpretations" and enslavement to outdated views, asserting that laws must derive directly from the Quran and Sunnah rather than infallible scholars or rigid hadiths. He further remarked on Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism, that "Ibn Abdul Wahhab is not Saudi Arabia. He was not a prophet... only a scholar," and speculated that if alive today, "he would be the first to object" to being singled out as the sole reference and would fight extremists and terrorists.[118][119] He positioned these reforms as a reversal of ultra-conservative influences, emphasizing a pre-1979 form of Islam tolerant of diverse traditions, though critics have noted that the official Wahhabi doctrine underpinning the state religious establishment has not undergone fundamental alteration.[87] A key step in curbing religious enforcement came in 2016, when the powers of the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice—commonly known as the religious police—were significantly restricted; they were prohibited from making arrests, enforcing dress codes, or closing businesses, shifting their role to advisory status under the Interior Ministry.[120][12] This defanging continued into 2019 with further limitations, though a proposed "public decency" law aimed to maintain some regulatory oversight on moral conduct.[121] Cultural liberalization accelerated under bin Salman's direction through the establishment of the General Entertainment Authority in 2016, which organized public concerts, festivals, and artistic events previously deemed incompatible with Wahhabi strictures.[122] Cinemas, banned for 35 years, were permitted starting in 2018, with the first commercial screenings held in Riyadh in April of that year, marking a shift from outright prohibition despite initial opposition from senior clerics who labeled such venues "harmful and corrupting."[123][124] Large-scale music events, including electronic dance festivals like Soundstorm in 2022, became feasible, reflecting a broader embrace of entertainment that would have been unimaginable a decade earlier due to religious police interventions.[125] These initiatives, framed as part of Vision 2030's diversification strategy, have included revisions to religious curricula to excise content promoting intolerance, alongside the 2020 abolition of flogging as a judicial punishment by the Supreme Judicial Council.[88][126] While bin Salman has promoted these changes as eradicating extremism's roots, observers point to persistent executions for offenses like sorcery and apostasy as evidence that core punitive elements of Sharia application remain intact, suggesting moderation is selective and aligned with consolidating political authority rather than wholesale doctrinal shift.[127][87]Anti-Corruption and Governance Measures
In November 2017, King Salman established a supreme anti-corruption committee chaired by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, which initiated a broad purge recovering over $107 billion in assets and settlements from detainees accused of corruption, money laundering, and other financial crimes; this effort was formally concluded in January 2019, though subsequent investigations continued under specialized prosecutorial units.[128][129] Beyond high-profile cases, the Oversight and Anti-Corruption Authority (Nazaha), operational since 2011 but empowered with expanded investigative powers, has pursued systemic enforcement, including a September 2025 operation arresting over 140 individuals—including government employees and contractors—for bribery, abuse of public office, and contract manipulation, resulting in referrals for prosecution and asset seizures.[130][131] Nazaha's annual reports highlight prevalent issues like nepotism (wasta) and public procurement irregularities, with digital reporting platforms enabling public tips that contributed to thousands of investigations by 2023.[132] Governance reforms integrated anti-corruption into broader administrative modernization, such as the 2019 updates to the Government Tenders and Procurement Law mandating electronic bidding and audits to curb favoritism, alongside Vision 2030's emphasis on performance-based evaluations for officials.[133] These measures coincided with Saudi Arabia's Corruption Perceptions Index score rising from 46/100 in 2016 to 52/100 in 2023 and 59/100 in 2024, per Transparency International, signaling perceived gains in public sector integrity amid e-government digitization that processed over 90% of services online by 2023 to reduce discretionary dealings.[134][135] However, Human Rights Watch has contended that selective prosecutions, including prolonged detentions without trial for some 2017 arrestees, prioritize political consolidation over impartial justice, with Nazaha's focus on lower-level graft contrasting limited accountability for senior royals or allies.[50]| Year | CPI Score (out of 100) | Global Rank (out of 180) |
|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 46 | 57 |
| 2019 | 53 | 51 |
| 2023 | 52 | 54 |
| 2024 | 59 | 38 |
Human Rights and Criticisms
Arrests of Political Rivals and Dissidents
In November 2017, Saudi authorities launched a sweeping anti-corruption campaign, detaining 201 individuals including 11 princes, four current ministers, and numerous former officials and businessmen, under a committee chaired by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.[129] [43] The operation, often referred to as the Ritz-Carlton purge due to the detention of high-profile figures at the Riyadh hotel, targeted allegations of embezzlement and misuse exceeding $100 billion over decades, as stated by the Saudi attorney general.[43] Saudi officials reported recovering approximately $106 billion in assets, including cash, real estate, and company shares, from 87 detainees by January 2019, when the initial phase concluded.[51] [128] While the campaign addressed documented graft in public contracts and state funds, analysts noted its alignment with bin Salman's consolidation of power, as detainees included potential rivals such as Prince Alwaleed bin Talal and former economy minister Mohammed al-Jadaan, sidelining factions loyal to the late King Abdullah.[53] [79] Preceding the purge, in September 2017, Saudi security forces arrested dozens of clerics, intellectuals, and activists perceived as opponents to bin Salman's reforms, including preacher Salman al-Ouda and others who had criticized his policies on social media or in sermons.[138] These detentions, conducted without public charges in many cases, extended to figures like economist Essam al-Zamel, accused of disloyalty for questioning economic strategies.[138] The arrests reflected a broader pattern post-bin Salman's 2015 promotion to defense minister, where dissent against Vision 2030 initiatives or royal centralization was equated with sedition, leading to incommunicado holds and coerced confessions reported by detainees' families.[50] Official rationales emphasized national security, but the selective targeting of vocal critics—contrasted with leniency toward aligned elites—suggested motives beyond anti-corruption, as evidenced by the purge's role in neutralizing alternative power centers within the royal family.[139] In March 2020, amid fallout from a Russia-Saudi oil price war, authorities arrested Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz, a full brother of King Salman and former interior minister, along with former Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef and at least three other royals, on charges of treason and plotting against the state.[140] [141] State media claimed the group had incited unrest and conspired with foreign entities, though no trials or evidence were publicly disclosed; sources indicated the detentions followed private criticisms of bin Salman's handling of the energy crisis and succession risks amid King Salman's health concerns.[142] [143] Prince Ahmed, seen as a potential alternative heir due to his seniority and popularity among tribal leaders, remained in detention without access to lawyers or family as of mid-2020, echoing the opaque processes of prior arrests.[144] These actions, occurring weeks after bin Salman's promotion to prime minister, reinforced patterns of preempting intra-family challenges, with outcomes including asset seizures but limited transparency on allegations.[145][146]Treatment of Activists and Media Freedom
Under Mohammed bin Salman's leadership, Saudi Arabia has intensified restrictions on activists, particularly those advocating for human rights and political reforms, often framing such activities as threats to national security. In May 2018, shortly before the lifting of the women's driving ban, authorities arrested several prominent women's rights activists, including Loujain al-Hathloul, on charges of communicating with foreign entities and attempting to undermine the political system. Al-Hathloul, who had previously campaigned against the guardianship system, was held incommunicado for over a month, reportedly subjected to torture including beatings and threats of sexual assault, before being sentenced in December 2020 to five years and eight months in prison by the Specialized Criminal Court; she was released in February 2021 but remained under travel ban and surveillance. Similar detentions targeted at least 10 activists that year, with Human Rights Watch documenting patterns of arbitrary arrest and ill-treatment despite the activists' alignment with later social reforms.[147][148][50] The regime has employed broad counterterrorism and cybercrime laws to prosecute dissidents, resulting in long sentences for non-violent advocacy. The 2007 Anti-Cyber Crime Law, with its vague provisions on "producing material impinging on public order," has been invoked against online critics, leading to arrests for social media posts perceived as dissenting. U.S. State Department reports from 2023 and 2024 highlight credible accounts of enforced disappearances, torture in detention, and arbitrary detentions of activists, clerics, and intellectuals critical of crown prince policies, with little due process in courts like the Specialized Criminal Court established for terrorism cases but used for political offenses. Amnesty International and other monitors note that sentences often exceed a decade, as seen in cases post-2017 power consolidation, where perceived rivals face charges unrelated to violence. Saudi officials maintain these measures target extremism and foreign interference, not legitimate activism, but independent analyses indicate suppression of domestic voices challenging centralized authority.[148][149][150] Media freedom remains severely curtailed, with Saudi Arabia ranking 162 out of 180 in the 2025 Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index, near the bottom due to state control over outlets and imprisonment of journalists. Since bin Salman's 2017 ascent, the number of detained journalists and bloggers has tripled, reaching at least 19 by 2025, including cases like Turki al-Jasser executed in July 2025 for alleged terrorism-linked reporting. At least 33 media professionals were imprisoned as of 2018 under opaque judicial processes, often for content deemed critical of the government. The Press and Publications Law mandates licensing and censorship, while cybercrime statutes penalize "fake news" or content harming national interests, effectively silencing independent journalism; Freedom House classifies the environment as "not free," with self-censorship pervasive among state-aligned media.[151][152][153]Yemen War and Domestic Security Policies
Mohammed bin Salman, as Saudi Minister of Defense, initiated the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen on March 26, 2015, launching Operation Decisive Storm to counter Houthi rebels who had ousted the internationally recognized government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and advanced toward the Saudi border.[23] [154] The operation, supported by a coalition of ten states including the United Arab Emirates, aimed to restore Hadi's authority and neutralize the Houthis—viewed by Saudi leadership as an Iranian proxy posing a direct threat to Saudi territorial integrity through cross-border incursions and missile attacks.[155] [156] Airstrikes targeted Houthi military positions, while a naval blockade sought to prevent arms smuggling; however, ground operations were limited to avoid deep entanglement, reflecting MBS's strategic calculus to contain rather than occupy.[157] The intervention prolonged Yemen's civil war, resulting in a humanitarian crisis exacerbated by combat, blockades, and disrupted aid flows. By 2021, United Nations estimates attributed 377,000 deaths to the conflict, with approximately 60% stemming from indirect causes such as starvation, disease, and lack of medical access.[158] Coalition airstrikes contributed to civilian casualties, with reports documenting nearly 15,000 direct deaths from military action, predominantly in Saudi-led operations targeting populated areas, markets, and infrastructure.[159] [160] Despite tactical successes in preventing Houthi advances into southern Yemen, the campaign achieved limited strategic gains, stalemating by 2018 with Houthis retaining control over Sanaa and northern territories while escalating drone and missile strikes on Saudi oil facilities and cities, underscoring the intervention's failure to decisively eliminate the perceived Iranian-backed threat.[156] [157] Domestically, MBS has centralized control over Saudi security apparatus to address internal threats, including Shia unrest in the Eastern Province and transnational terrorism from Yemen-based groups like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).[161] Policies emphasize robust counter-terrorism measures, such as enhanced intelligence sharing, border fortifications, and deradicalization initiatives that have repatriated Saudi ISIS affiliates for rehabilitation rather than indefinite detention.[85] Saudi security forces, under MBS's oversight, have disrupted multiple plots, contributing to a decline in domestic attacks since pre-2015 peaks, though critics argue broad anti-terrorism laws enable suppression of dissent under the guise of security.[162] [163] These efforts align with Vision 2030's national security pillar, integrating economic diversification with stability to mitigate risks from regional instability spilling into Saudi territory.[164]Foreign Policy and International Relations
Military Interventions in Yemen and Syria
In March 2015, as Saudi Minister of Defense, Mohammed bin Salman directed the launch of Operation Decisive Storm, a Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen aimed at restoring the internationally recognized government of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi following the Houthi rebels' seizure of Sanaa and advance toward Aden.[23][16] The coalition, comprising up to 10 Arab and allied states including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Sudan, conducted over 25,000 airstrikes between 2015 and 2022, alongside a naval and air blockade to interdict arms supplies to the Houthis, who receive support from Iran.[165][154] Ground operations involved Saudi and allied troops, with initial coalition casualties reported as early as April 2, 2015, when a Saudi border guard was killed.[166] The intervention sought to counter the perceived Iranian-backed threat on Saudi Arabia's southern border and prevent Houthi consolidation of power, but it devolved into a protracted stalemate marked by high civilian costs.[156] By the end of 2021, the United Nations attributed over 377,000 deaths in Yemen to the conflict, including direct combat fatalities and indirect causes like famine and disease exacerbated by the blockade, with coalition airstrikes alone responsible for approximately 19,200 civilian deaths or injuries as of March 2022.[167][165] Critics, including human rights organizations, documented instances of disproportionate strikes on civilian infrastructure, such as markets and hospitals, though Saudi officials maintained these targeted Houthi military assets and denied systematic violations.[166][167] Saudi Arabia announced a cessation of offensive operations in April 2022 amid diplomatic pressures and Houthi attacks on oil facilities, shifting toward truce negotiations, though sporadic clashes and Saudi border defenses persisted into 2025.[156] Saudi Arabia's involvement in the Syrian Civil War under bin Salman's influence was more indirect, focusing on financial and logistical support for Sunni rebel factions opposed to Bashar al-Assad's regime rather than a full-scale military deployment.[168] As part of a broader strategy to curb Iranian and Hezbollah expansion, Riyadh provided funding, weapons, and training to groups like the Free Syrian Army through intermediaries, estimated in billions of dollars from 2011 onward, without committing Saudi ground forces or leading airstrikes.[169] Bin Salman advocated for escalated international action, including proposals for no-fly zones in 2015–2016, but these were not realized due to Russian and U.S. hesitancy.[155] The approach reflected caution after Yemen's quagmire, prioritizing proxy containment over direct intervention, amid concerns over jihadist elements within rebel ranks.[168] Following the fall of Assad in late 2024 and the rise of a transitional government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, bin Salman pivoted Saudi policy toward pragmatic engagement, pledging over $6 billion in investments and aid by July 2025 to support reconstruction and counter lingering Iranian influence.[170] This included debt relief coordination with Qatar and diplomatic overtures, signaling a departure from wartime opposition to stabilization efforts under the new Sunni-leaning leadership.[171][172] Saudi officials framed the shift as endorsing Syria's sovereignty against external interference, including Israeli strikes, while avoiding renewed military entanglement.[171]Gulf Relations and Qatar Blockade
Mohammed bin Salman, as Saudi defense minister and later crown prince, pursued an assertive approach to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) relations, emphasizing alignment against perceived threats from Iran and Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. This strategy fostered deepened ties with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, including joint military and economic initiatives, while Bahrain remained a steadfast ally, hosting Saudi-led interventions during the 2011 Arab Spring unrest. Relations with Oman and Kuwait, however, were more measured, with Oman maintaining neutrality in Saudi-led efforts and Kuwait mediating regional disputes to preserve GCC cohesion.[173][174] The Qatar blockade emerged as a pivotal flashpoint in MBS's Gulf policy. On June 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia, alongside the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt, abruptly severed diplomatic, trade, and travel ties with Qatar, imposing a comprehensive land, sea, and air blockade. MBS played a central role in orchestrating the measures, viewing Qatar's foreign policy— including its support for the Muslim Brotherhood, close relations with Iran, and Al Jazeera's critical coverage of Saudi leadership—as destabilizing to the region. The quartet issued 13 demands for lifting the blockade, such as closing Al Jazeera, expelling Turkish military personnel from Qatar, reducing ties with Iran, and ceasing support for groups designated as terrorists by the coalition.[175][176][177] The blockade, intended to coerce Qatar into compliance, instead prompted Doha to accelerate economic diversification, forging stronger partnerships with Turkey, Iran, and others to mitigate supply disruptions; Qatar's liquefied natural gas exports, for instance, rebounded and grew despite initial logistical challenges. Efforts at mediation, including U.S. involvement under President Trump—who initially backed the blockade but later urged resolution—failed to yield breakthroughs until GCC internal dynamics shifted. Oman and Kuwait abstained from the full blockade, highlighting fractures in MBS's push for unified GCC action.[177][178] Resolution came at the Al-Ula GCC summit on January 5, 2021, where Saudi Arabia, under King Salman's auspices and amid MBS's evolving priorities, agreed to lift the blockade without Qatar meeting the original demands, restoring diplomatic relations and reopening borders and airspace. The accord emphasized GCC "solidarity and stability," though underlying tensions persisted, as evidenced by Qatar's continued independent foreign policy. MBS's subsequent visit to Doha on December 8, 2021—the first since the crisis—signaled tentative rapprochement, leading to a Saudi-Qatari coordination council to manage bilateral issues, yet analysts noted simmering rivalries over regional influence. The episode underscored the limits of coercive diplomacy in MBS's Gulf strategy, as Qatar's resilience bolstered its autonomy rather than subordinating it to Saudi-led dominance.[179][180][181][182]Strategic Partnerships with the United States
Mohammed bin Salman's strategic partnerships with the United States have centered on military cooperation, energy security, and countering Iranian influence, evolving through multiple administrations despite periodic tensions over human rights and the 2018 Khashoggi assassination. Under President Donald Trump, ties strengthened significantly following Trump's May 2017 visit to Riyadh, where he announced a $110 billion arms deal and $350 billion in total investments over a decade, emphasizing Saudi Arabia's role as a bulwark against Iran. These agreements included sales of precision-guided munitions and THAAD missile defense systems, aligning with Saudi-led operations in Yemen. The Trump administration designated the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization in January 2021, partly at Saudi urging, to support Riyadh's campaign against Iran-backed militias, while providing logistical and intelligence assistance to Saudi forces. Economic dimensions included Saudi purchases of U.S. liquefied natural gas and joint efforts to stabilize oil markets amid OPEC+ production cuts coordinated with U.S. shale output. However, the partnership faced criticism from U.S. congressional Democrats over civilian casualties in Yemen, leading to vetoed attempts to halt arms sales. Under President Joe Biden, relations cooled initially due to campaign pledges to make Saudi Arabia a "pariah" over Khashoggi and Yemen, with the administration pausing offensive arms sales in February 2021 and revoking Houthi terrorist designations in the same month to facilitate Yemen peace talks. Yet strategic imperatives prevailed; Biden's July 2022 Jeddah summit with MBS addressed surging oil prices post-Russia's Ukraine invasion, yielding Saudi commitments to increase production, though actual cuts followed via OPEC+ in October 2022. By 2023, the U.S. resumed some munitions transfers for defensive purposes, and intelligence-sharing persisted against shared threats like Iranian drones. Ongoing collaborations include U.S. deployment of forces to Saudi bases for deterrence, as in 2019 amid tanker attacks attributed to Iran, and joint cyber defense initiatives. In 2024, discussions advanced on civil nuclear cooperation, with the U.S. supporting Saudi enrichment under safeguards as part of broader normalization incentives with Israel, though progress stalled amid Gaza tensions. These partnerships reflect pragmatic alignment on regional stability, where U.S. access to Saudi oil reserves and basing rights outweighs ideological divergences, substantiated by consistent high-level engagements like Secretary Blinken's 2024 Riyadh visit. Despite mainstream media portrayals emphasizing human rights frictions—often amplified by sources with left-leaning biases—the empirical record shows sustained bilateral trade exceeding $40 billion annually and military aid flows.Engagements with Russia, China, and Emerging Powers
Mohammed bin Salman's engagements with Russia have centered on energy cooperation through the OPEC+ framework, established in 2016 to coordinate oil production cuts amid low prices.[183] This alliance has involved repeated agreements on output reductions, such as the 9.7 million barrels per day cut in April 2020, reflecting mutual interest in stabilizing markets despite geopolitical tensions like Russia's invasion of Ukraine.[184] In-person meetings include the 2018 G20 summit where bin Salman and Putin exchanged a high-five, and a December 2023 Riyadh summit discussing oil, Gaza, and Ukraine.[185] [186] Telephone discussions persisted into 2025, with a March call affirming OPEC+ commitments and addressing the Ukraine crisis, and an August exchange covering bilateral ties and U.S. election outcomes.[187] [188] These interactions underscore Saudi Arabia's prioritization of energy revenue over Western sanctions alignment, enabling Russia to sustain war funding via elevated oil prices.[189] Relations with China have deepened under bin Salman, aligning with Vision 2030's economic diversification goals through a 2022 comprehensive strategic partnership.[190] This includes synchronizing China's Belt and Road Initiative with Saudi projects, fostering investments in technology, renewables, and infrastructure.[191] Key summits feature Xi Jinping's December 2022 Riyadh visit, where bin Salman hosted a lavish reception, and talks yielding deals on group travel visas and cultural exchanges like the Prince Mohammed bin Salman Award for Cultural Cooperation with China.[192] [193] A March 2023 phone call between Xi and bin Salman supported Saudi-Iran reconciliation brokered by Beijing, highlighting China's mediating role.[194] Trade volumes have surged, with China becoming Saudi Arabia's top oil buyer, and partnerships involving over 700 Chinese entities by 2025.[195] Such ties reflect pragmatic diversification from U.S. reliance, prioritizing non-oil revenue amid global multipolarity.[196] Bin Salman's outreach to emerging powers emphasizes economic multilateralism, notably through BRICS engagement. Invited to join the expanded BRICS bloc in 2023 alongside Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE, Saudi Arabia attended the 2024 Brazil summit but has hedged formal membership into 2025, citing U.S. ties and regional dynamics like the Gaza conflict.[197] [198] This ambivalence allows pursuit of trade benefits—BRICS nations account for 40% of global population and significant GDP—without alienating Western partners.[199] Bilateral ties with India, Brazil, and South Africa have advanced via investment forums and energy deals; for instance, Brazil-Saudi trade discussions in January 2025 highlighted Riyadh as Brasília's top Middle East partner.[200] Such moves position Saudi Arabia as a bridge in multipolar orders, leveraging oil diplomacy for investment inflows and market access.[201]Normalization Efforts with Israel and Regional Diplomacy
Under Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia pursued normalization with Israel as an extension of the Abraham Accords framework, which facilitated ties between Israel and several Arab states including the UAE and Bahrain, though Riyadh held back from formal participation. In September 2023, bin Salman stated that normalization was "getting closer," reflecting quiet diplomatic engagements such as intelligence sharing and Israeli overflights of Saudi airspace permitted since 2020.[202][203] These efforts aligned with bin Salman's Vision 2030 economic diversification goals, viewing Israeli technological and security expertise as complementary to Saudi ambitions in AI, cybersecurity, and regional stability.[204] Progress stalled following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel and the ensuing Gaza war, with Saudi Arabia suspending talks and emphasizing a Palestinian state as a prerequisite for any deal. In February 2025, Riyadh publicly rejected U.S. President Donald Trump's assertion of imminent ties, insisting on "an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital" via a two-state solution.[205][206] Bin Salman positioned the kingdom as a champion of Palestinian rights amid the conflict, while privately conveying to U.S. officials a willingness for broader peace beyond limited normalization, including potential full diplomatic recognition.[203] By mid-2025, Saudi diplomats informed U.S. counterparts to exclude normalization from agendas, wary of domestic backlash from younger Saudis and regional optics.[207] Despite setbacks, momentum reemerged in late 2025, with bin Salman planning his first White House visit since 2018 to seek a U.S. defense pact potentially linked to Israel normalization and Gaza reconstruction. Analysts noted alignment of Gulf interests, including shared threats from Iran, could facilitate a deal, though bin Salman's calculus prioritizes U.S. security guarantees over immediate Israeli ties.[208][204] This pragmatic approach underscores bin Salman's strategy of leveraging normalization for strategic gains, evidenced by unofficial Saudi-Israeli cooperation in countering Iranian proxies.[209] In parallel, bin Salman's regional diplomacy emphasized de-escalation with adversaries to refocus on domestic reforms. A landmark March 10, 2023, agreement brokered by China restored full diplomatic relations with Iran, severed since 2016, and reactivated a 2001 security cooperation pact, reducing proxy conflicts in Yemen and Lebanon.[210][211] The deal, negotiated over months with Chinese assurances against Iranian aggression, reflected Riyadh's shift from confrontation to coexistence, enabling bin Salman to scale back Saudi military involvement abroad and prioritize economic ties.[212] This détente extended to Gulf reconciliation, building on the 2021 Al-Ula agreement ending the Qatar blockade, and fostered broader Arab coordination on issues like energy security and countering extremism.[213] Such moves, while criticized by some U.S. observers for empowering Beijing's influence, empirically lowered regional tensions and supported Saudi stability.[214]Major Controversies
Jamal Khashoggi Assassination (2018)
On October 2, 2018, Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist and Washington Post columnist critical of the Saudi government, entered the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey, to obtain documents for his marriage; he was never seen leaving alive.[215] Turkish intelligence recorded audio evidence indicating that a 15-member Saudi team, including forensic experts and individuals close to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), strangled Khashoggi and dismembered his body with a bone saw inside the consulate.[216] The operation was premeditated, with the team arriving in Istanbul via multiple flights on the day of the killing.[217] A U.S. intelligence assessment released in February 2021 concluded with high confidence that MBS approved the operation to capture or kill Khashoggi, citing his absolute control over Saudi security decisions, the direct involvement of his close aides such as Saud al-Qahtani (a key advisor dismissed after the incident), and prior intelligence indicating MBS's pattern of targeting dissidents.[217] [218] The CIA had reached a similar conclusion in November 2018, assessing that MBS ordered the assassination based on intercepted communications and the operational details.[219] However, the assessment noted no direct evidence of MBS's verbal order, relying instead on circumstantial factors like his responsibility for the team's composition and his history of ruthlessness toward critics.[217] Saudi Arabia initially denied any wrongdoing for over two weeks, claiming Khashoggi had left the consulate.[215] On October 20, 2018, the Saudi public prosecutor announced that Khashoggi died during an interrogation that turned into a brawl, attributing it to a "rogue operation" by the agents without high-level authorization.[220] By November 2018, Saudi officials revised this to admit a premeditated murder, leading to the arrest of 18 suspects and the dismissal of al-Qahtani.[216] In a closed-door trial concluded in December 2019, Saudi courts sentenced five individuals to 20 years in prison (commuted from death penalties), three to seven years, and five to unspecified terms, while acquitting 14 others, including senior officials; the kingdom rejected international calls for transparency, maintaining the killings violated Saudi law but occurred without MBS's direct involvement.[215] MBS stated in a 2019 interview that the killing occurred "under my watch" but denied ordering it, taking responsibility as de facto ruler.[221] Saudi officials dismissed the U.S. intelligence report as "negative, false, and unacceptable."[222] The assassination prompted international condemnation and sanctions on involved Saudi officials by the U.S., EU, and others, including travel bans and asset freezes, though MBS himself faced no direct penalties from major powers.[223] European countries like Germany, Finland, and Denmark halted arms sales to Saudi Arabia temporarily.[215] Despite the fallout, U.S.-Saudi relations persisted, with the Biden administration releasing the intelligence report but prioritizing strategic interests over further action against MBS.[224] The incident highlighted tensions between Saudi domestic security priorities under MBS and global norms on press freedom, with Khashoggi's critiques focusing on the crown prince's consolidation of power and human rights record.[225]Allegations of Extrajudicial Actions and Intimidation
In November 2017, Saudi authorities under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's direction launched an anti-corruption campaign that resulted in the detention of at least 381 individuals, including princes, ministers, and businessmen, many held at the Ritz-Carlton hotel in Riyadh without formal charges or trials.[49] Detainees reportedly faced physical abuse, sleep deprivation, and coerced financial settlements totaling over $107 billion, which Saudi officials described as voluntary restitution for illicit gains, though human rights groups characterized the process as extrajudicial due to the lack of judicial oversight and use of unofficial detention sites.[55] [50] The campaign, overseen by a committee chaired by bin Salman, ended in January 2019, but critics, including Western analysts, viewed it as a mechanism for consolidating power by neutralizing potential rivals rather than purely addressing graft.[54] In 2018, shortly before the lifting of Saudi Arabia's female driving ban on June 24, authorities arrested at least 13 women's rights activists, including Loujain al-Hathloul, Eman al-Nafjan, and Samar Badawi, on charges of undermining national security, with allegations of prior advocacy for driving rights cited as justification.[226] [227] Detainees reported torture, including beatings and electrocution, during interrogations, leading to international condemnation from groups like Amnesty International, which labeled the arrests as retaliation against those who contributed to the policy change.[228] Al-Hathloul was sentenced to nearly six years in prison in December 2020 for her activism, despite royal pardons reducing terms for some; Saudi officials maintained the detentions targeted threats to stability, not reform efforts.[227] Bin Salman has been linked to a covert Saudi unit, known as the Rapid Intervention Group, formed around 2017 to target dissidents abroad through surveillance, abduction, and coercion, predating the 2018 Khashoggi killing.[229] Operations included attempts to repatriate critics from Europe and the United States, such as the 2017 detention and forced return of Saudis in Canada and the 2018 abduction of activist Loujain al-Hathloul's relatives to pressure her, as documented in U.S. intelligence assessments and lawsuits.[230] In November 2017, Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri was effectively detained in Riyadh and coerced into a televised resignation, which Saudi Arabia initially denied but later attributed to security concerns.[231] These actions, reported by outlets like The New York Times based on insider accounts, reflect a pattern of transnational intimidation, though Saudi spokespeople have rejected claims of orchestration by bin Salman, asserting they address legitimate national security risks.[229]Jeff Bezos Phone Hack and Cyber Incidents
In May 2018, Jeff Bezos, CEO of Amazon and owner of The Washington Post, received a WhatsApp message from a telephone number attributed to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, containing a video file that forensic analysis later linked to the compromise of his iPhone X.[232][233] The message exploited a zero-day vulnerability in WhatsApp, allowing remote infiltration without user interaction, with data extraction occurring shortly thereafter.[234][235] A forensic examination conducted by FTI Consulting in 2019, commissioned by Bezos' private investigators, determined with "medium to high confidence" that the intrusion originated from the suspicious WhatsApp transmission, resulting in the exfiltration of approximately 47 megabytes of data, including personal photographs and potentially sensitive communications.[232][233] This hack preceded by months the National Enquirer's publication of compromising details about Bezos' personal life, which Bezos alleged stemmed from leaked data obtained via the breach, amid The Washington Post's coverage of Saudi policies.[234][236] United Nations special rapporteurs, citing the FTI report, urged an independent investigation in January 2020, connecting the incident to broader patterns of Saudi digital surveillance against critics, including journalist Jamal Khashoggi.[235][237] Saudi officials, including the kingdom's embassy in Washington, D.C., rejected the allegations as "absurd" and without evidence, asserting that Riyadh does not engage in such cyber operations and attributing claims to unsubstantiated motives tied to U.S.-Saudi tensions over Khashoggi's October 2018 killing.[238][239] Independent cybersecurity experts have noted that while the forensic linkage to the MBS-associated number provides circumstantial evidence of state involvement, definitive attribution to the Crown Prince personally requires additional chain-of-custody verification, as WhatsApp accounts can be impersonated or compromised.[234] No criminal charges have resulted from the incident, and WhatsApp's parent company, Meta (then Facebook), confirmed the exploit's technical feasibility but did not publicly attribute it.[240] Broader cyber incidents under Mohammed bin Salman's leadership include Saudi-linked operations using tools like Pegasus spyware from Israel's NSO Group, deployed against journalists and activists, though direct ties to the Bezos case remain unproven beyond the initial vector.[234] Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in offensive cyber capabilities since 2017, with reports of state-sponsored hacks targeting Qatari media and dissidents, reflecting a strategy of digital deterrence amid regional rivalries.[241] These activities align with documented Saudi cyber doctrine emphasizing rapid response to perceived threats, but evidentiary thresholds for international accountability have limited formal repercussions.[242]Alleged Association with Jeffrey Epstein
Claims circulating online assert the existence of a photograph depicting Mohammed bin Salman with Jeffrey Epstein, but no credible or authentic image of the two together has been verified. Such claims are unsubstantiated and typically rely on fabricated, photoshopped, or misidentified images. Reliable news sources, court documents, and Epstein-related records, such as flight logs and contact books, contain no evidence of any direct connection between Mohammed bin Salman and Jeffrey Epstein.Speculation as Antichrist in Christian Prophecy
Mohammed bin Salman is considered by some Christians in end-times prophecy communities to be a potential Antichrist figure, based on interpretations of biblical prophecies linking his rise to power, regional influence, and projects like NEOM to end-times events.[243]Personal Life and Public Image
Family and Private Relationships
Mohammed bin Salman is the son of King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud and Fahda bint Falah bin Sultan Al Hithlain, his father's third wife from the Ajman tribe.[18] Born on August 31, 1985, in Riyadh, he is the eldest of his mother's six children and the seventh son overall of King Salman, who has fathered at least 13 children across multiple wives.[244] His mother, Fahda, maintains a low public profile, with limited verifiable details on her background beyond her tribal affiliation and role in the royal household.[12] Among his full siblings—sharing both parents—are Prince Turki bin Salman, former chairman of the Saudi Research and Media Group, and Prince Khalid bin Salman, who serves as Saudi Arabia's Minister of Defense since 2022.[9] Reports indicate no public disputes between Mohammed bin Salman and his full brothers, with sources describing their relationships as stable amid the broader dynamics of the Al Saud family's extensive kinship network.[9] He also has numerous half-siblings from King Salman's other marriages, including half-brother Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, retained as Minister of Energy for his expertise despite shifts in royal power.[84] Family ties within the House of Saud, numbering thousands of princes, have historically influenced succession, though Mohammed bin Salman's rapid ascent bypassed older relatives through direct paternal appointments.[11] On April 6, 2008, Mohammed bin Salman married Sara bint Mashour bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, his first cousin and daughter of his paternal uncle Mashour bin Abdulaziz, in a private ceremony.[245] The couple has five children: sons Salman, Mashour, and Abdulaziz, and daughters Fahda and Noura.[245] Sara maintains a reclusive public presence, rarely appearing in official media, consistent with traditions limiting visibility of royal consorts.[246] No verified accounts detail tensions in the marriage, though unconfirmed reports from dissident sources allege strains linked to Mohammed bin Salman's demanding schedule and political focus.[247] Details on Mohammed bin Salman's private relationships beyond immediate family remain sparse and unverified, shaped by Saudi royal customs emphasizing discretion and state security protocols. Allegations of extramarital associations, such as rumored contacts with foreign celebrities, circulate in opposition media but lack empirical corroboration from primary sources.[247] His personal life intersects with public duties through family-influenced appointments, yet verifiable interpersonal dynamics prioritize loyalty within core kin over broader revelations.Wealth, Investments, and Lifestyle
Mohammed bin Salman's personal wealth is estimated at $25 billion as of 2025, encompassing royal family holdings, direct investments, and influence over state-controlled entities, though precise figures remain opaque due to the intertwined nature of personal and sovereign assets.[248][249] Alternative assessments place it lower, at around $5.3 billion, reflecting conservative valuations of verifiable properties and stakes.[250] As chairman of Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund (PIF) since 2015, bin Salman directs a sovereign wealth fund with assets under management surpassing $1 trillion by 2025, up from $700 billion in 2022, aimed at diversifying the economy beyond oil under Vision 2030.[251][252] The PIF's portfolio emphasizes global diversification, including a $23.8 billion U.S. holdings shift toward semiconductors, healthcare, and AI, exemplified by the launch of Humain, a PIF-backed AI firm for data centers and cloud infrastructure in 2025.[253][254] Major deals include up to $12 billion in commitments with U.S. asset managers in May 2025 and a proposed $55 billion acquisition of Electronic Arts, potentially closing in early 2027, signaling aggressive expansion into gaming and tech.[255][256] Bin Salman's lifestyle reflects substantial personal expenditure on luxury assets, including the 440-foot superyacht Serene, purchased for $500 million and equipped with multiple swimming pools, hot tubs, two helipads, and a submarine.[257] He reportedly owns a $300 million chateau in France's Loire Valley and has rented private islands in the Maldives for extended stays.[258] In the Neom megaproject, plans include a fortified palace complex with 10 helipads, private airstrips, and advanced security features, underscoring integration of opulence with state-backed development.[259] These acquisitions occur amid PIF-driven austerity in public spending, though critics question the opacity of funding sources linking personal gains to the 2017 anti-corruption purge, which recovered over $100 billion in settlements directed toward national funds.[260]Honors, Awards, and Global Recognition
Mohammed bin Salman has been conferred various foreign orders and decorations, primarily from Arab and Muslim-majority states, acknowledging his contributions to bilateral ties, economic cooperation, and regional stability. These awards often coincide with state visits or diplomatic summits.[261] In 2018, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa of Bahrain awarded him the Order of Sheikh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa (Premium Class), Bahrain's highest honor, for advancing Saudi-Bahraini relations.[261] Later that year, Tunisian President Beji Caid Essebsi presented the Order of the Republic (Grand Cordon, highest rank) during a state visit, recognizing support for Tunisia's development and security.[262] [261] The following year, on February 18, 2019, Pakistani President Arif Alvi bestowed the Nishan-e-Pakistan, Pakistan's highest civilian award, after agreements on $20 billion in investments, citing bin Salman's role in enhancing economic and security partnerships.[263] [264] In 2021, he received Oman's Order of Sultan Qaboos (First Class) from Sultan Haitham bin Tariq for deepening fraternal cooperation; the UAE's Order of Zayed (First Class) from Abu Dhabi's Crown Prince; and Kuwait's Order of Mubarak the Great from Emir Nawaf Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, both emphasizing strengthened Gulf ties.[265] [261] On June 21, 2022, Jordan's King Abdullah II granted the Order of Al-Hussein bin Ali, Jordan's premier civil decoration, for enduring bilateral relations.[261] In November 2022, Kasetsart University in Thailand conferred an honorary doctorate for contributions to sustainable development.[261] More recently, in 2024, the Arab Parliament awarded the 'Leader' Medal to bin Salman, presented by Speaker Adel Al-Asoumi, for advocacy on Arab interests.[261] Beyond state honors, bin Salman has garnered international media recognitions. Time magazine named him its 2017 Person of the Year via reader poll and included him in the 2018 TIME 100 list of most influential people.[266] [267] Forbes ranked him eighth on its 2018 World's Most Powerful People list, highlighting his geopolitical influence, and selected him for its 2017 Global Game Changers roster.[268] [261] Earlier accolades include Forbes Middle East's 2013 Leadership Personality of the Year for entrepreneurship support and Foreign Policy's 2015 Top 100 Global Thinkers for visionary leadership.[261]| Year | Award | Issuing Entity | Citation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2013 | Leadership Personality of the Year | Forbes Middle East | [261] |
| 2015 | Top 100 Global Thinkers | Foreign Policy | [261] |
| 2017 | Person of the Year (Readers' Choice) | Time | [267] |
| 2017 | Global Game Changers | Forbes | [261] |
| 2018 | TIME 100 | Time | [266] |
.jpg)