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Mohammed bin Salman
Mohammed bin Salman
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Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (Arabic: محمد بن سلمان آل سعود, romanizedMuḥammad bin Salmān Āl Su‘ūd; born 31 August 1985), also known as MbS, is the de facto ruler of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,[1] formally serving as Crown Prince and Prime Minister. He is the heir apparent to the Saudi throne, the seventh son of King Salman of Saudi Arabia, and the grandson of the nation's founder, Ibn Saud.

Key Information

Mohammed is the first child of King Salman bin Abdulaziz and his third wife, Fahda bint Falah Al Hithlain. After obtaining a law degree from King Saud University, he became an advisor to his father in 2009. He was appointed deputy crown prince and defense minister after his father became king in 2015, then promoted to crown prince in 2017. Mohammed succeeded his father as prime minister in 2022.

Since his appointment as crown prince in 2017, Mohammed has introduced a series of liberal social and economic reforms; these include curtailing the influence of the Wahhabi religious establishment by restricting the powers of the religious police and improving women's rights, removing the ban on female drivers in 2018, and weakening the male-guardianship system in 2019. However, he also continues to repress women's rights activists.[2][3] His Saudi Vision 2030 program aims to reduce the Saudi economy's reliance on oil through investment in other sectors such as technology and tourism. Despite these attempts at greater economic diversification,[4] the Saudi economy remains heavily reliant on oil.[5]

Under Mohammed, Saudi Arabia has pursued a foreign policy aimed at increasing the country's regional and international influence and attracting greater foreign investment.[6] The Kingdom has coordinated energy policy with Russia, strengthened its relations with China, and expanded diplomatic and commercial relations with emerging economies and regional powers in Africa, South America, and Asia.[6] Mohammed was the architect of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen and was involved in the escalation of the Qatar diplomatic crisis, as well as a 2018 diplomatic dispute with Canada.

Mohammed leads an authoritarian government. Those regarded as political dissidents are systematically repressed through methods including imprisonment and torture; citizens face arrest for social media posts that mildly criticise government policies.[7][8][9] Between 2017 and 2019, he led the purge of competing Saudi political and economic elites, alleging that they were involved in corruption and seizing up to US$800 billion in assets and cash and cementing control over Saudi politics. A 2021 report by the United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) found that Mohammed had ordered the assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.[10]

Early life, education and career

[edit]

Mohammed bin Salman was born on 31 August 1985[11][12][13] to Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz (later King of Saudi Arabia) and his third wife,[14] Fahda bint Falah Al Hithlain. He is the eldest of his mother's six children and the eighth child and seventh son of his father.[14] His full siblings include Prince Turki and Defense Minister Prince Khalid.[15] Mohammed holds a bachelor's degree in law from King Saud University, where he graduated second in his class.[16]

Early career

[edit]

After graduating from university, Mohammed spent several years in the private sector before becoming an aide to his father. He worked as a consultant for the Experts Commission, working for the Saudi Cabinet.[17] On 15 December 2009, at the age of 24, he entered politics as a special advisor to his father when the latter was the governor of Riyadh Province.[18] At this time, Mohammed began to move from one position to another, such as secretary-general of the Riyadh Competitive Council, special advisor to the chairman of the board for the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives, and a member of the board of trustees for Albir Society in the Riyadh region.[19] In October 2011, Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz died. Prince Salman began his ascent to power by becoming second deputy prime minister and minister of defence. He made Mohammed his private advisor.[20]

Chief of the Court

[edit]

In June 2012, Crown Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz died. Mohammed moved up into the number two position in the hierarchy, as his father became the new crown prince and first deputy prime minister. On 2 March 2013, Chief of the Crown Prince Court Saud bin Nayef Al Saud was appointed governor of the Eastern Province, and Mohammed succeeded him as chief of the court. He was also given the rank of minister.[21][22][23] On 25 April 2014, Mohammed was appointed state minister.[19]

Rise to power

[edit]

Minister of Defence

[edit]
With King Salman, Barack Obama and other leaders at the GCC summit in Saudi Arabia, 21 April 2016
With US secretary of state John Kerry (left) and Saudi foreign minister Adel al-Jubeir, 13 June 2016

On 23 January 2015, King Abdullah died and Salman ascended the throne. Mohammed was appointed minister of defence[24] and secretary general of the royal court.[25] In addition, he retained his post as the minister of state.[26][27]

The political unrest in Yemen (which began escalating in 2011) rapidly became a major issue for the newly appointed minister of defence, with Houthis taking control of northern Yemen in late 2014, followed by the resignation of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and his cabinet. Mohammed's first move as minister was to mobilise a pan-GCC coalition to intervene following a series of suicide bombings in the Yemeni capital Sana'a via air strikes against Houthis, and impose a naval blockade.[28] In March 2015, Saudi Arabia began leading a coalition of countries allied against the Houthi rebels.[29] While there was agreement among those Saudi princes heading security services regarding the necessity of a response to the Houthis' seizure of Sana'a, which had forced the Yemeni government into exile, Mohammed launched the intervention without full coordination across security services. Saudi National Guard minister Mutaib bin Abdullah Al Saud, who was out of the country, was left out of the loop of operations.[30] While Mohammed saw the war as a quick win on Houthi rebels in Yemen and a way to put President Hadi back in power, it became a long war of attrition.[31]

In April 2015, King Salman appointed his nephew Muhammad bin Nayef as crown prince and his son Mohammed as deputy crown prince.[32] In late 2015, at a meeting between his father and Barack Obama, Mohammed bin Salman broke protocol to deliver a monologue criticising US foreign policy. When he announced an anti-terrorist military alliance of Islamic countries in December 2015, some countries involved said they had not been consulted.[30]

Regarding his role in the military intervention, Mohammed gave his first on-the-record interview on 4 January 2016 to The Economist, which had called him the "architect of the war in Yemen". Denying the title, he explained the mechanism of the decision-making institutions actually holding stakes in the intervention, including the council of security and political affairs and the ministry of foreign affairs from the Saudi side. He added that the Houthis usurped power in Sana'a before he was minister of defence.[33][34]

Shaking hands with Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe at their meeting in Tokyo, 1 September 2016
Speaking with Donald Trump in Washington, DC, 14 March 2017

In response to the threat from ISIL, Mohammed established the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC), a Saudi-led Islamic alliance against terrorism, in December 2015.[35] The IMCTC's first meeting took place in Riyadh in November 2017 and involved defence ministers and officials from 41 countries.[36]

Crown prince

[edit]

Mohammed was appointed crown prince on 21 June 2017, following the King's decision to depose Muhammad bin Nayef and make his own son the heir to the throne.[37] The change of succession had been predicted in December 2015 by a public memo published by the German Federal Intelligence Service,[38][39] which was subsequently rebuked by the German government.[40]

On the day bin Salman became crown prince, US president Donald Trump called to congratulate him. Trump and Mohammed pledged "close cooperation" on security and economic issues and discussed the need to cut off support for terrorism, the diplomatic dispute with Qatar, and the push for peace between Israel and the Palestinians. [41] Mohammed told The Washington Post in April 2017 that without America's cultural influence on Saudi Arabia, "we would have ended up like North Korea."[42]

In April 2022, Prince Mohammed met with newly elected Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif at the al-Salam palace.[43]

2017 purge

[edit]

In May 2017, Mohammed launched a purge against competing Saudi business and political elites in an anti-corruption campaign. He said, "no one will survive in a corruption case—whoever he is, even if he's a prince or a minister".[44] In November 2017, he ordered some 200 wealthy businessmen and princes to be placed under house arrest in The Ritz-Carlton, Riyadh.[45] On 4 November 2017, the Saudi press announced the arrest of the Saudi prince and billionaire Al-Waleed bin Talal, a frequent English-language news commentator and a major shareholder in Citi, News Corp and Twitter, as well as over 40 princes and government ministers on corruption and money laundering charges.[46] Others arrested or fired in the purge included Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah, head of the Saudi Arabian National Guard; Minister of Economy and Planning Adel Fakeih; and the commander of the Royal Saudi Navy, Admiral Abdullah bin Sultan bin Mohammed Al-Sultan.[46][47]

Those arrested in the Ritz Carlton were the subject of what became called "the night of beating".[48] Most were beaten, and some were tied to walls in stress positions as part of torture by Saudi agents.[48] The interrogators knew very little outside of the victims' assets within Saudi Arabia and wanted to know more about their off-shore holdings, while the victims did not know why they were detained.[48] The detainees were threatened with blackmail.[48] At one point, the interrogators told the victims to contact their bank managers in Geneva and elsewhere and ask for large sums of money, and were surprised due to their inexpertise that the assets were not entirely in cash.[48] Swiss banks identified some of the transactions as under duress and were able to stop some of them.[48] During the proceedings, there was no due process nor plea bargains.[48] US officials described the actions as "coercion, abuse, and torture".[49] Detainees were denied sleep, had their heads covered, and were beaten.[49] Seventeen had to be hospitalised.[49] After many days, the remaining detainees were moved to Al-Ha'ir Prison, while some released are banned from travelling abroad.[49]

The purge helped centralize political powers in the hands of bin Salman and undermine the pre-existing structure of consensus-based governance among Saudi elites.[50][51] The arrests resulted in the final sidelining of the faction of King Abdullah, and bin Salman's consolidation of control of all three branches of the security forces.[52][53] It also cemented bin Salman's supremacy over business elites in Saudi Arabia and resulted in a mass seizure of assets by the bin Salman regime.[51]

The New York Times wrote:

The sweeping campaign of arrests appears to be the latest move to consolidate the power of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the favorite son and top adviser of King Salman. The king had decreed the creation of a powerful new anticorruption committee, headed by the crown prince, only hours before the committee ordered the arrests.[47]

Writing for The Huffington Post, University of Delaware professor of Islam and Global Affairs, Muqtedar Khan, speculated as to whether the removal of Al-Waleed bin Talal, a critic of Donald Trump, amounted to a coup.[54] BBC correspondent Frank Gardner was quoted as saying that "Prince Mohammed is moving to consolidate his growing power while spearheading a reform programme". Yet "[i]t is not clear what those detained are suspected of."[55]

Another hypothesis was that the purge was part of a move towards reform. Steven Mufson of The Washington Post argues that Mohammed "knows that only if he can place the royal family under the law, and not above as it was in the past, can he ask the whole country to change their attitudes relative to taxes [and] subsidies."[56] An analysis from the CBC claimed that "the clampdown against corruption resonates with ordinary Saudis who feel that the state has been asking them to accept belt tightening while, at the same time, they see corruption and the power elite accumulating more wealth".[57] Mohammed's reform agenda is widely supported by Saudi Arabia's burgeoning youth population, but faces resistance from some of the old guard more comfortable with the kingdom's traditions of incremental change and rule by consensus.[58] According to a former British ambassador to Riyadh, Mohammed "is the first prince in modern Saudi history whose constituency has not been within the royal family, it's outside it. It's been young Saudis, particularly younger Saudi men in the street".[59]

Robert W. Jordan, former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia, said that "certainly Saudi Arabia has had a corruption problem for many years. I think the population, especially, has been very unhappy with princes coming in and grabbing business deals, with public funds going to flood control projects that never seem to get built... I would also say it's a classical power grab move sometimes to arrest your rivals, your potential rivals under the pretext of corruption".[60]

Trump expressed support for the move and confidence in the Saudi Arabian leaders, tweeting "Some of those they are harshly treating have been 'milking' their country for years!"[61] French president Emmanuel Macron, who visited Riyadh days after the purge, offered no comment, saying "this is not the role of a president, and similarly I would not expect a leader of a foreign country to come and infringe on domestic matters."[62]

On 30 January 2019, the Anti-Corruption Committee's work was declared complete.[63][64] As many as 500 people were rounded up in the sweep.[65] Saudi Arabian banks froze more than 2,000 domestic accounts as part of the crackdown.[66] According to The Wall Street Journal, the Saudi government targeted cash and assets worth up to $800 billion.[67] The Saudi authorities claimed that amount was composed of assets worth around $300 billion to $400 billion that they can prove was linked to corruption.[68][69]

Prime Minister

[edit]

On 27 September 2022, Mohammed was appointed as Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia by King Salman. Traditionally, the king has held the title of prime minister.[70]

Administration

[edit]

Ideology

[edit]

Mohammed's ideology has been described as nationalist[71][72] and populist,[73][74] with a conservative attitude towards politics, and a liberal stance on economic and social issues.[75][76] It has been heavily influenced by the views of his former adviser Saud al-Qahtani[77][78] and the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed bin Zayed.[79][80] His style of ruling has been described as extremely brutal by journalist Rula Jebreal and authoritarian by Jamal Khashoggi[81] and Theodor Winkler.[76] Mohammed bin Salman has also been championing an Arab nationalist ideology domestically and through foreign policy; with a focus on opposing Islamist movements.[82]

Authoritarianism

[edit]

Mohammed heads a repressive authoritarian government in Saudi Arabia. Human rights activists and women's rights activists in Saudi Arabia have faced abuse and torture by the regime.[83] Critics, journalists and former insiders are tortured and killed.[83][84] The government has targeted Saudi dissidents who are located abroad. Jamal Khashoggi, a columnist of The Washington Post, was murdered by the regime.[84] Mohammed has justified the mass arrests of human rights activists as being as necessary for enacting reforms in Saudi Arabia and for establishing a state based on Arab nationalism.[85][86]

Mohammed has increasingly consolidated power in Saudi Arabia during his tenure as leader.[85] He significantly restricted the powers of the Saudi religious police.[30] On 29 January 2015, Mohammed was named the chair of the newly established Council for Economic and Development Affairs,[87] replacing the disbanded Supreme Economic Commission.[87] In April 2015, Mohammed was given control over Saudi Aramco by royal decree following his appointment as deputy crown prince.[88]

Domestic policies

[edit]

Religious policy

[edit]

According to David Ottaway of the Wilson Center, "[o]f all [Mohammed's] domestic reforms," the most "consequential" has been his work limiting the influence of Saudi Wahhabi clergy, "who still command millions of followers in the country and beyond".[89] Mohammed's inviting of "a constant stream of Western male and female singers, bands, dancers and even American female wrestlers" to perform in Saudi Arabia is in complete conflict with religious conservatives who have spoken "against the opening up of the kingdom to secular Western culture".[89] Under Mohammed, the Saudi government has promoted a new Saudi identity and nationalist history that downplays religious heritage and restricts Islamic influence in the cultural sphere.[90] Journalist Graeme Wood writes, "it is hard to exaggerate how drastically this sidelining of Islamic law will change Saudi Arabia."[91] Gabriella Perez argues that the new social changes implemented by MBS are oriented towards secularist repression, with the potential to adversely impact freedom of religion in the country.[92]

In a 2018 interview with The Atlantic editor-in-chief Jeffrey Goldberg, Mohammed stated regarding his basic approach to religion in Saudi Arabian society:

"We believe we have, in Saudi Arabia, Sunni and Shiite. We believe we have within Sunni Islam four schools of thought, and we have the ulema [the religious authorities] and the Board of Fatwas [which issues religious rulings]... our laws are coming from Islam and the Qur'an, but we have the four schoolsHanbali, Hanafi, Shafi’i, Maliki—and they argue about interpretation. And you will find a Shiite in the cabinet, you will find Shiites in government, the most important university in Saudi Arabia is headed by a Shiite. So we believe that we are a mix of Muslim schools and sects."[93]

Restrictions on religious police

[edit]

In 2016, Mohammed took steps to drastically curtail the powers of the "Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice" (CPVPV), or Islamic religious police.[94][95] The "feared" CPVPV, which had thousands of officers on the streets and powers to arrest, detain, and interrogate those suspected of violating sharia, was banned "from pursuing, questioning, asking for identification, arresting and detaining anyone suspected of a crime".[96] The cinema industry was reinstated, social liberties were expanded, gender mixing and dating have been normalised by the state in the public sphere. Schmidt-Feuerheerd argues that the new state policies are also accompanied by an increasing clampdown on political and religious activities independent of the government.[90]

[edit]

Mohammed has stated that "in Islamic law, the head of the Islamic establishment is wali al-amr[97] (Arabic: وَلِيّ الأمر ), the ruler.[91] While Saudi rulers "have historically stayed away from religion", and "outsourced" issues of theology and religious law to "the big beards", traditionally conservative and orthodox religious scholars, Mohammed has "a law degree from King Saud University" and "flaunts his knowledge and dominance over the clerics", according to Graeme Wood. He is "probably the only leader in the Arab world who knows anything about Islamic epistemology and jurisprudence", according to American historian Professor Bernard Haykel. In an interview televised in Saudi Arabia on 25 April 2021, Mohammed criticised the devotion of Saudi religious leaders to Wahhabi doctrines "in language never before used by a Saudi monarch", saying "there are no fixed schools of thought and there is no infallible person", and that fatwas "should be based on the time, place and mindset in which they are issued", rather than regarded as immutable.[89]

In interviews with Wood, Mohammed

explained that Islamic law is based on two textual sources: the Quran and the Sunnah, or the example of the Prophet Muhammad, gathered in many tens of thousands of fragments from the Prophet's life and sayings. Certain rules—not many—come from the unambiguous legislative content of the Quran, he said, and he cannot do anything about them even if he wants to. But those sayings of the Prophet (called Hadith), he explained, do not all have equal value as sources of law, and he said he is bound by only a very small number whose reliability, 1,400 years later, is unimpeachable. Every other source of Islamic law, he said, is open to interpretation—and he is therefore entitled to interpret them as he sees fit. The effect of this maneuver is to chuck about 95 percent of Islamic law into the sandpit of Saudi history and leave MBS free to do whatever he wants. "He's short-circuiting the tradition," Haykel said. ".. That leaves him to determine what is in the interest of the Muslim community. If that means opening movie theaters, allowing tourists, or women on the beaches on the Red Sea, then so be it.”

As of early 2021, Mohammed has "ordered a codification of Saudi laws that would end the power of individual Wahhabi judges to implement" their own interpretation of Sharia.[89] According to Wood, many conservative clerics strongly appear to have succumbed to "good old-fashioned intimidation" by the government to reverse their religious positions and supporting the government line on issues such as "the opening of cinemas and mass layoffs of Wahhabi imams".[91]

Abaya ban

[edit]

In December 2022, Saudi Arabia's Education and Training Evaluation Commission (ETEC) declared a governmental ban on Muslim female students from wearing the traditional abaya clothing to examination centres, insisting that students should wear only school uniforms.[98][99][100] A later clarification from ETEC reported by The Milli Chronicle stated that the ban on abayas was restricted only for all-female examination centres run by the ETEC.[101]

Economic policy

[edit]

Vision 2030

[edit]

Mohammed took the leadership in the restructuring of Saudi Arabia's economy, which he officially announced in April 2016 when he introduced Vision 2030, the country's strategic orientation for the next 15 years. Vision 2030 plans to reform Saudi Arabia's economy towards a more diversified and privatised structure. It details goals and measures in various fields, from developing non-oil revenues and privatisation of the economy to e-government and sustainable development.[102]

One of the major motives behind this economic restructure through Vision 2030 can be traced back to Saudi Arabia's reliance on a rentier economy, as a limit on oil resources makes its sustainability a problem in the future. While the country claims to own a proven reserve of 266.58 billion barrels of crude oil, the energy analyst Matthew R. Simmons estimates the true number to be far less, as the last non-Saudi report by the General Accounting Office in 1978 only mentioned 110 billion barrels.[103]

At the inaugural Future Investment Initiative conference in Riyadh in October 2017, Mohammed announced plans for the creation of Neom, a linear city powered by renewable energy sources, covering an area of 26,000 square kilometres on Saudi Arabia's Red Sea coast, extending into Jordan and Egypt.[104] Shortly after plans of the project emerged, Bin Salman's project was criticized as unrealistic.[105] Neom's construction entailed substantial environmental harm and human rights violations, with expatriate employees describing abusive working conditions and members of the local Howeitat tribe protesting against their forced expulsion.[106][107] In 2024, the project was reported to have been substantially scaled back from its original plan.[108][109] An internal audit of the megaproject found extensive problems, including "evidence of deliberate manipulation", by the managers of the project.[108] By 2025, new contracts for Neom dried up and there was no mention of Neom in Saudi Arabia's pre-budget statement for 2026.[110]

The announcement followed plans to develop a 34,000 square kilometre area across a lagoon of 50 islands on Saudi Arabia's Red Sea coastline into a luxury tourism destination with laws on a par with international standards.[111][112] In a further effort to boost the tourism industry, in November 2017 it was announced that Saudi Arabia would start issuing tourist visas for foreigners, beginning in 2018.[113]

Mohammed's biggest bet was his plan to restore Saudi dominance in global oil markets by driving the new competition into bankruptcy, by keeping the oil price low enough for a long enough period. Saudi Arabia persuaded OPEC to do the same. A few small players went bankrupt, but American frackers only shut down their less-profitable operations temporarily, and waited for oil prices to go up again. Saudi Arabia, which had been spending $100 billion a year to keep services and subsidies going, had to admit defeat in November 2016. It then cut production significantly and asked its OPEC partners to do the same.

In the last week of September 2018, Mohammed inaugurated the much-awaited $6.7bn high-speed railway line connecting Mecca and Medina, the two holiest cities of Islam. The Haramain Express is 450 km line travelling up to 300 km/h that can transport around 60 million passengers annually. The commercial operations of the railway began on 11 October 2018.[114]

With Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro (left, seated) at the 2019 G20 Osaka summit

In October 2018, Mohammed announced that the Public Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia's assets were approaching $400 billion and would pass $600 billion by 2020.[115]

Mohammed announced a project to build Saudi Arabia's first nuclear reactor in November 2018. The kingdom aims to build 16 nuclear facilities over the next 20 years.[116] Efforts to diversify the Saudi energy sector also include wind and solar, including a 1.8 gigawatt solar plant announced in the same month as part of a long-term project in partnership with SoftBank.[117]

Saudi petroleum industry

[edit]

Saudi Arabia, OPEC's largest producer, has the second-largest amount of oil reserves in the world. On 28 September 2021, Joe Biden's national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, met with Mohammed in Saudi Arabia to discuss the high oil prices.[118] In October 2022 in protest of Saudi Arabia cutting oil production, US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said Saudi Arabia knew the cut would "increase Russian revenues and blunt the effectiveness of sanctions" and accused Saudi Arabia of "coercing" other oil producing countries to agree.[119] The record-high energy prices were driven by a global surge in demand as the world quit the economic recession caused by COVID-19, particularly due to strong energy demand in Asia.[120][121][122]

The relations between Russia and Saudi Arabia evolved under Mohammed, granting the two nations the ability to coordinate in oil export decisions.[123][124]

Sport sector

[edit]

Mohammed has presided over unprecedented spending on sport since becoming Saudi Arabia's de facto ruler in 2017. He has also been assiduous in striking deals to bring top sports events to Saudi, including the FIFA Club World Cup in 2034 and the Asian Games in 2029. In 2023, Mohammed said this approach is central to the country's goal of becoming one of the world's top 10 tourist destinations, stating: "When you want to diversify an economy you have to work in all sectors: mining, infrastructure, manufacturing, transportation, logistics all this… Part of it is tourism and if you want to develop tourism part of it is culture, part of it is your sport sector, because you need to create a calendar."[125]

Domestic reforms

[edit]

Mohammed established an entertainment authority that began hosting comedy shows, professional wrestling events, and monster truck rallies.[30] In 2016, he shared his idea for "Green cards" for non-Saudi foreigners with Al Arabiya journalist Turki Aldakhil.[126] In 2019 the Saudi cabinet approved a new residency scheme (Premium Residency) for foreigners.[127] The scheme will enable expatriates to permanently reside, own property and invest in the Kingdom.[128][129]

The first measures undertaken in April 2016 included new taxes and cuts in subsidies, a diversification plan, the creation of a $2 trillion Saudi sovereign wealth fund, and a series of strategic economic reforms called the National Transformation Programme.[130] Mohammed's plans to raise capital for the sovereign wealth fund included selling off shares of Saudi Aramco, the state-owned petroleum and natural gas company,[88] with the capital to be re-invested in other sectors such as to implement the diversification plans.[131] In October 2017, the plan for Aramco's IPO listing was criticised by The Economist, which called it "a mess".[132] Mohammed slashed the state budget, freezing government contracts and reducing the pay of civil employees as part of drastic austerity measures.[133]

In April 2017, Mohammed announced a project to build one of the world's largest cultural, sports and entertainment cities in Qiddiya, southwest of Riyadh. The plans for a 334-square kilometre city include a safari and a Six Flags theme park.[134][135]

Portraits of King Salman and Prince Mohammed at the Jenadriyah festival

In October 2017, Mohammed said that the ultra-conservative Saudi state had not been "normal" for the past 30 years, blaming rigid doctrines that had governed society in a reaction to the Iranian Revolution, which successive leaders "didn't know how to deal with".[136] He stated that he aimed to have Saudi Arabia start "returning to what we were before—a country of moderate Islam that is open to all religions and to the world".[137] This amounted to telling the country's clerics that the deal the royal family struck with them after the Grand Mosque seizure was to be renegotiated.[138] Building an industrial culture was seen as incompatible with Wahhabism. The Wahhabis were committed to fixed social and gender relationships. These were consistent with an economy built on oil sales, but industrialization requires a dynamic culture with social relations constantly shifting.[139] The regime's commitment to "moderate Islam" and secularization drive through repressive methods has been questioned.[140]

Further cultural transformations followed in December 2017 with Saudi Arabia's first public concert by a female singer, and in January 2018 a sports stadium in Jeddah became the first in the Kingdom to admit women.[141] In April 2018, the first public cinema opened in Saudi Arabia after a ban of 35 years, with plans to have more than 2,000 screens running by 2030.[142][143]

In an interview with a CBS 60 Minutes that aired on 29 September 2019, Mohammed invited people to visit the kingdom to see the transformation, asking for people to meet Saudi citizens for themselves.[144]

On 26 April 2020, the Supreme Judicial Council of Saudi Arabia abolished flogging as a punishment in the country, stating that the decision was "an extension of the human rights reforms introduced under the direction of King Salman and the direct supervision of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman".[145] The following day, the Human Rights Commission of Saudi Arabia reported the enactment of a royal decree abolishing the death penalty for crimes committed by minors.[146]

Human rights

[edit]

Early in his leadership tenure, Mohammed sought to cultivate an image of Saudi Arabia as implementing various reforms. Human rights groups say that repression has worsened under his tenure.[83][85] According to human rights groups, arrests of human rights activists have risen under Mohammed.[147] He has reportedly created the Tiger Squad, a team of assassins that act as a death squad, to target Saudi critics inside and outside Saudi Arabia.[148][149] Among those detained in a wave of arrests in September 2017 were Abdulaziz al-Shubaily, a founding member of the Saudi Civil and Political Rights Association (ACPRA); Mustafa al-Hassan, an academic and novelist; and Essam al-Zamel, an entrepreneur.[150][151] Ahead of the lifting of the ban on women driving in June 2018, 17 women's rights activists were arrested, including the women to drive and anti-male guardianship campaigner Loujain al-Hathloul.[152][153] Eight of the 17 were subsequently released.[154] Hatoon al-Fassi, an associate professor of women's history at King Saud University,[155] was arrested shortly afterwards.[156][157]

In August that year, the human rights activist Israa al-Ghomgham and her husband, both arrested in 2015, were put under legal threat of beheading.[158] Human Rights Watch warned that the al-Ghomgham case set a "dangerous precedent" for other women activists currently detained.[159] HRW's Middle East director Sarah Leah Whitson said, "Any execution is appalling, but seeking the death penalty for activists like Israa al-Ghomgham, who are not even accused of violent behaviour, is monstrous. Every day, the Saudi monarchy's unrestrained despotism makes it harder for its public relations teams to spin the fairy tale of 'reform' to allies and international business."[159][160][161] On 23 April 2019, 37 people, mostly Shia human rights activists involved in the Qatif conflict, were executed in one of the largest mass executions of the minority sect in the kingdom's history.[162]

In August 2019, Loujain al-Hathloul's brother Walid informed the media that his sister was offered release on the condition that she deny the human rights abuses committed against her in Saudi prison. Walid wrote on Twitter that the Saudi state security laid a proposal for Loujain to sign a document and appear on camera to deny that she had been tortured and sexually harassed in jail. He stated that Loujain mentioned to the family that she had been whipped, beaten, electrocuted in a chair, and harassed by masked men, who would wake her up in the middle of the night to shout threats at her in cell. Walid also tweeted that Loujain refused the offer proposed by Saudi authorities and "immediately ripped the document".[163]

In response to foreign criticism and women's rights activism, Mohammed has implemented modest reforms to improve women's rights in Saudi Arabia. In September 2017, he implemented the women to drive movement's multi-decade demand to lift the ban on female drivers.[164] He legislated against some elements of Saudi Arabia's Wali system, also a topic of a decades-long campaign by women's rights activists.[165] In response to the Saudi anti male-guardianship campaign,[166] the Saudi government enacted a law that allows women above 21 years old to obtain passports and travel abroad without needing the permission of their male guardians.[167][168] In February 2018, it became legally possible for Saudi women to open their own business without a male's permission.[169] According to the Saudi Information Ministry, as of March 2018, mothers in Saudi Arabia became authorised to retain immediate custody of their children after divorce without having to file any lawsuits.[170]

In February 2017, Saudi Arabia appointed its first woman to head the Saudi Stock Exchange.[171][172]

Arrest of Muhammad bin Nayef

[edit]

Muhammad bin Nayef was arrested on 6 March 2020, along with his half-brother Nawwaf bin Nayef and King Salman's brother Ahmed bin Abdulaziz. The three princes were charged with treason. The Saudi government claimed the princes were trying to overthrow Mohammed bin Salman.[173]

Accusations of poisoning attempt against King Abdullah

[edit]

In 2021, the former Saudi intelligence official Saad al-Jabri said in an interview with CBS that Mohammed bin Salman mentioned to Interior Minister Muhammad bin Nayef Al Saud plans to kill King Abdullah in 2014. This would allow Mohammed's father to take the throne. Al-Jabri has called Mohammed "a psychopath, killer ... with infinite resources, who poses threat to his people, to the Americans and to the planet".[174] Mohammed has rejected all allegations; the Saudi embassy called al-Jabri "a discredited former government official with a long history of [fabrication]".[175]

Foreign policy

[edit]

Interventions in Syria and Yemen

[edit]

Some have called Mohammed the architect of the war in Yemen.[176][177] On 10 January 2016, The Independent reported that "the BND, the German intelligence agency, portrayed...Saudi defence minister and Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman...as a political gambler who is destabilising the Arab world through proxy wars in Yemen and Syria."[178][34][179] German officials reacted to the BND's memo, saying the published statement "is not the position of the federal government".[40]

Protest in London against Mohammed's state visit to the United Kingdom, 7 March 2018

Mohammed leads the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen against the Houthi rebels, who in 2015 seized Sana'a and ousted the Saudi-backed Hadi government, ending multilateral efforts towards a political settlement following the 2011 Yemeni uprising.[180][181][182] Coalition airstrikes during the intervention have resulted in thousands of civilians killed or injured,[183] prompting accusations of war crimes in the intervention.[184][185][186] Following a Houthi missile attack against Riyadh in December 2017, which was intercepted by Saudi air defence, airstrikes killed 136 Yemeni civilians and injured 87 others in eleven days.[187][188] In August 2018, the United Nations reported that all parties in the conflict were responsible for human rights violations and for actions which could be considered war crimes.[189]

The war and blockade of Yemen has cost Saudi Arabia tens of billions of dollars, further aggravated the humanitarian crisis in the country and destroyed much of Yemen's infrastructure, but failed to dislodge the Shiite Houthi rebels and their allies from the Yemeni capital.[190][133] More than 50,000 children in Yemen died from starvation in 2017. From 2015 to May 2019 the number of total deaths of children is said to be approximately 85,000.[191][192][193][194] The famine in Yemen is the direct result of the Saudi-led intervention and blockade of the rebel-held area.[190][195] In October 2018, Lise Grande, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, warned that 12 to 13 million Yemenis were at risk of starvation if the war continued for another three months.[196] On 28 March 2018, Saudi Arabia, along with its coalition partner the UAE, donated US$930 million to the United Nations which, according to UN secretary-general António Guterres, "...(will) help to alleviate the suffering of millions of vulnerable people across Yemen". The funds cover almost one-third of the $2.96 billion required to implement the UN's 2018 Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan.[197] Following the Houthi missile attack against Riyadh in December 2017, which was intercepted by Saudi air defence,[198] Mohammed retaliated with a ten-day barrage of indiscriminate airstrikes against civilian areas in Yemen held by Houthi forces, killing dozens of children.[199]

With US defense secretary James Mattis (right), 22 March 2018

Following the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi, the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved a resolution to impose sanctions on people blocking humanitarian access in Yemen and suspend arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Senator Lindsey Graham said the Saudi Arabia–United States relationship "is more of a burden than an asset." He also said, "The crown prince [of Saudi Arabia] is so toxic, so tainted, so flawed."[200]

Andrew Smith, of Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT), said that British foreign secretaries Boris Johnson and Jeremy Hunt "have played an utterly central and complicit role in arming and supporting the Saudi-led destruction of Yemen."[201] Hunt's Conservative leadership campaign was partly funded by a close associate to Mohammed.[202][201]

With British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, 19 October 2023

On 16 August 2020, a lawsuit filed by a former top intelligence official, Saad al-Jabri, revealed that in 2015 Mohammed secretly called for Russia to intervene in Syria at a time when Bashar al-Assad's regime was close to falling apart. The Saudi monarchy had been supporting anti-Assad rebels, including Ahrar al-Sham,[203] while Russian and Syrian forces were bombing rebel-held cities in support of Assad, killing tens of thousands of Syrian civilians in the process. Western diplomats say that Mohammed was strongly influenced by Emirati politician Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (who later became ruler of Abu Dhabi). The UAE was pushing for the idea of helping Russia stabilise Syria and enabling the Assad regime in the country.[204] In 2017 it was reported that Saudi Arabia provided weapons to Syrian opposition groups, fighting against the Assad regime. Conflict Armament Research (CAR) reported that these weapons frequently ended up in the hands of the Islamic State members.[205] In 2018, Mohammed reportedly wanted the US military presence to maintain in Syria, despite Donald Trump's declaring the withdrawal of American forces from the war-torn country.[206]

In March 2023, Saudi Arabia began talks to bring Syria back into the Arab League, and provided economic support after the 2023 Turkey–Syria earthquake on 6 February.[207] In May 2023, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad attended the Arab League summit in Jeddah where he was received by Mohammed.[208]

Relations with Israel

[edit]

In December 2017, Mohammed criticised the United States' decision to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.[209] In 2018, he voiced his support for a Jewish homeland of Israel,[210] the first time that a senior Saudi royal has expressed such sentiments publicly.[211][212] In September 2019, Mohammed condemned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's plans to annex the eastern portion of the West Bank known as the Jordan Valley.[213] In 2020, Mohammed met with Netanyahu and Israeli head of the Mossad Yosi Cohen in Neom.[214] The United States had been pushing for Israel's normalization for some years, calling (in this context) the Abraham Accords the "deal of the century", but Riyadh rejected reports of progress. In 2023, there were ongoing U.S. lead negotiations to establish diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel.[215] Mohammed also said that his country was moving steadily closer to normalising relations with Israel as part of the Abraham Accords.[216] Due to the Gaza war, Mohammed called for a global arms embargo against Israel.[217] Amid the Gaza war, according to reporting by The Atlantic, Mohammed told U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in January 2024 that he was open to Saudi normalization with Israel, adding, "Do I care personally about the Palestinian issue? I don't, but my people do."[218][219]

Surveys in the early stages of Israel's war on Gaza showed that over 90 percent of Saudis citizens believed that the Arab states should break off their relations with Israel.[220] In August 2024, Mohammad discussed his fears of facing assassination due to his support for establishing and normalizing Saudi-Israel ties, and the threats he received. He believed for any deal, it was important to include a true path to the State of Palestine, keeping in mind the current Israel-Palestine war.[221] Following the events in Gaza and Israel's attacks in Lebanon and Syria on 17 and 18 September 2024, Mohammad declared during the annual address to the Shura Council on 19 September 2024, that Saudi Arabia would not normalize relations with Israel until Palestine is recognized as a state with East Jerusalem as its capital.[220][222][223] At the Riyadh Summit on 11 November 2024, Mohammed condemned Israel's actions in Gaza as a "collective genocide" and called on Israel to respect Iran's sovereignty.[224][225][226] According to Bernard Haykel of Princeton University, Al Saud admires Israel's economic and technological success, and seeks mutual recognition with a focus on high-tech coordination.[227]

Relations with Russia

[edit]
With Russian president Vladimir Putin (left) in Moscow, 14 June 2018

Under Mohammed's leadership, Saudi Arabia strengthened its relationship with Russian president Vladimir Putin.[228] In 2016, Mohammed signed an agreement to cooperate with Russia in global oil markets.[228] After Mohammed was accused of murdering Jamal Khashoggi, Putin was one of few world leaders to publicly embrace the prince.[229] Russia has also abstained from criticising Saudi-led intervention in Yemen and has supported the United Nations arms embargo against the Houthis in the Security Council.[230][231] In 2021, Mohammed signed a military cooperation agreement with Russia.[232]

Amidst Western isolation following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Mohammed strengthened his personal relationship with Vladimir Putin and expanded Saudi-Russia relations.[86] Russia and Saudi Arabia have since been co-operating through the OPEC to cut oil output and increase oil prices.[233][234] In September 2022, five British and two American POWs captured in Ukraine were released by Russia through Saudi mediation.[235] Russia's new foreign policy concept unveiled in 2023 has given priority to enhancing friendly relations with Saudi Arabia.[236] In December 2023, Putin visited Saudi Arabia and met with Mohammed.[237]

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman hosted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Riyadh on 10 March 2025, ahead of U.S.-Ukraine talks. Saudi Arabia has positioned itself as a neutral mediator in global conflicts, including Ukraine and earlier U.S.-Russia negotiations, reflecting its growing role as a diplomatic power broker.[238]

Relations with Turkey

[edit]

In March 2018, Mohammed referred to Turkey as part of a "triangle of evil" alongside Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood.[239][240] However, Mohammed later led a reconciliation with Turkey in 2022, leading to improved relations between the countries.[241] In July 2023, the Crown Prince and Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan agreed to a major deal for Saudi Arabia to purchase Turkish Baykar Bayraktar Akıncı drones.[242]

Relations with the United States

[edit]

Relations with the first Trump administration

[edit]

In August 2016, Donald Trump Jr., the son of US presidential candidate Donald Trump, had a meeting with an envoy representing Mohammed bin Salman and the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed bin Zayed. The envoy offered help to the Trump campaign.[243] The meeting included Joel Zamel, an Israeli social media expert, Lebanese-American businessman George Nader, and Blackwater founder Erik Prince.[244][243]

With Donald Trump, June 2019

Upon Trump's election, support for Mohammed bin Salman was described as one of the few issues where rival White House advisers Jared Kushner and Steve Bannon agreed.[80] Mohammed, then deputy crown prince, was subsequently invited to the White House and given the treatment typically afforded to foreign heads of state by diplomatic protocol.[245] He subsequently defended the Trump administration's travel ban for nationals of 7 Muslim-majority countries, stating that "Saudi Arabia does not believe that this measure is targeting Muslim countries or the religion of Islam".[246] Kushner also inquired as to how the US could support Mohammed in the succession process.[245] After Mohammed became crown prince, Trump reportedly said, "We've put our man on top".[247] Trump initially supported the Saudi-led blockade of Qatar,[248] despite opposition from US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Secretary of Defense James Mattis,[249] though he later changed his position.[250] Mohammed later reportedly claimed Kushner had provided intelligence assistance on domestic rivals to Mohammed during the 2017–19 Saudi Arabian purge,[251] which Trump had personally expressed support for.[252] The Trump administration also firmly supported Mohammed during global backlash following the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi.[253]

Relations with the Biden administration

[edit]
Arab leaders, Joe Biden and Mohammed (fifth from right) at the GCC+3 summit in Jeddah, 16 July 2022

In 2019, during the Trump administration, Joe Biden criticised Mohammed, describing him as a pariah due to the 2018 killing of Jamal Khashoggi.[254] In July 2021, six months into the Biden presidency, Saudi deputy defence minister Khalid bin Salman Al Saud (Mohammed's brother) visited the United States. It was the first meeting between senior US and Saudi officials after Jamal Khashoggi was murdered in 2018.[255] In September 2021, Biden's national security adviser Jake Sullivan met with Mohammed. In the meeting, Mohammed reportedly ended up shouting at Sullivan after he raised the killing of Khashoggi.[254]

US-Saudi trade relations has also sunk drastically from a height of 76 billion dollars in 2012 to just about 29 billion dollars in 2021. After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Saudi Arabia declined US requests to increase oil production and thus undercut Russia's war finances.[254][256][257] The Wall Street Journal wrote in April 2022 that the US-Saudi relationship was at "its lowest point in decades."[254] In April 2022, CIA director William Burns traveled to Saudi Arabia to meet with Mohammed, asking him to increase the country's oil production. They also discussed Saudi weapons purchases from China.[258]

With US secretary of state Antony Blinken in Jeddah, 7 June 2023

Relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia became weak after OPEC+ announced a cut in oil production by two million barrels a day. The US government was angered by the move, accusing Saudi Arabia of siding with Russia in its war against Ukraine. The Saudi government denied these claims, claiming that the move was not politically motivated but to bring stability in global oil markets.[259] The Saudi government also declined a US request to postpone an OPEC decision until after the 2022 United States elections, leading Biden to threaten "consequences" against Saudi Arabia.[260]

Saudi Arabia's relations with the Biden administration have been strained, especially after Mohammed's refusal to increase oil production in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, the relations have warmed up with Biden's official visit to Saudi Arabia,[261] The Pentagon's approval of a $500m arms deal,[262] a bipartisan group visit of US senators to Saudi Arabia,[263] and relaxing restrictions on offensive weapons sales.[264]

Relations with the second Trump administration

[edit]
With US President Donald Trump and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh, 13 May 2025

From 13 to 16 May 2025, Donald Trump undertook his first major international trip of his second term, visiting Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Trump and Mohammed signed a "strategic economic partnership" agreement.[265] The visit elevated Mohammed's standing within the Saudi government as King Salman, who did not appear during the Saudi visit, has largely receded from public view. In contrast to the 2017 Riyadh summit, Mohammed greeted Trump at King Khalid International Airport, rather than Salman.[266]

Relations with Qatar

[edit]

On 5 June 2017, Saudi Arabia under Mohammed spearheaded a diplomatic crisis with Qatar together with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt, with the countries severing diplomatic relations with Qatar and effectively imposing a blockade on the country. The countries cited Qatar's alleged support for terrorism as the main reason for the actions, also citing Al Jazeera and Qatar's relations with Iran. Reuters reported that Mohammed "said the dispute with Qatar could be long-lasting, comparing it to the US embargo against Cuba imposed 60 years before, but played down its impact, dismissing the Gulf emirate as "smaller than a Cairo street".[240] In August 2018, a report by The Intercept cited unnamed sources claiming that former US secretary of state Rex Tillerson had in June 2017 intervened to stop a Saudi-Emirati plan to invade Qatar, resulting in increased pressure from Saudi Arabia and the UAE for his removal from office.[267]

On 4 January 2021, Qatar and Saudi Arabia agreed to a resolution of the crisis brokered by Kuwait and the United States, which stated that Saudi Arabia will reopen its border with Qatar and begin the process for reconciliation. An agreement and final communiqué signed on 5 January 2021 following a GCC summit at Al-'Ula marks the resolution of the crisis.[268]

Resignation of Saad Hariri

[edit]

In November 2017, Mohammed forced Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri to resign when he visited Saudi Arabia. Mohammed believed that Hariri was in the pocket of Iran-backed Hezbollah, which is a major political force in Lebanon. Hariri eventually was released, went back to Lebanon and annulled his resignation.[45]

Relations with Canada

[edit]

Canada and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have had a generally cordial relationship marred by periods of diplomatic tension. Both countries, however, share robust economic ties: Saudi Arabia is Canada's largest trading partner in the Middle East,[269] and is also one of the largest recipients of Canadian military equipment. In February 2014, the Saudi government had purchased Canadian armaments worth CA$15 billion in total.[270] Until August 2018, there were over 16,000 Saudi students enrolled in Canadian schools on government scholarships.[271]

Since 2018, bilateral relations have gradually soured since a high-profile diplomatic spat began over the Canadian government's public condemnation of the Saudi government's human rights abuses. Canada had called for the immediate release of Saudi activist Raif Badawi and his sister Samar Badawi on 5 August 2018 after they were arrested by Saudi authorities on varying charges. In response, the Canadian government was accused of interfering in Saudi Arabia's internal affairs; the Canadian ambassador in Riyadh was declared persona non grata and expelled from the country, having been given 48 hours to leave. The Saudi ambassador in Ottawa was also recalled,[272] and the Saudi government suspended all new trade (excluding oil sales) with Canada, terminated all flights and services of Saudia to Toronto, and cancelled the scholarships of thousands of Saudi students in Canada.[273]

Chrystia Freeland, Canada's minister of foreign affairs, issued a statement via Twitter on 2 August 2018 expressing Canada's concern over the recent arrest of Samar Badawi, a human rights activist and sister of imprisoned Saudi blogger Raif Badawi, and called for the release of human rights activists.[274] In response to Canada's criticism, Saudi Arabia expelled Canada's ambassador and froze trade with Canada.[275][276] The Toronto Star reported that the consensus among analysts indicated that the actions taken by Mohammed were a "warning to the world — and to Saudi human rights activists — that his Saudi Arabia is not to be trifled with".[277] The diplomatic ties were restored on 24 May 2023.[278]

Relations with China

[edit]

Relations between China and Saudi Arabia have deepened under the leadership of Mohammed; since he became crown prince in 2017, trade between the two countries have increased from $51.5 billion to $87.5 billion in 2021.[279] In February 2019, Mohammed defended China's policies in Xinjiang, where more than 1 million Uyghurs were put into internment camps, saying "China has the right to carry out anti-terrorism and de-extremisation work for its national security.".[280][281][282] Miqdaad Versi, spokesperson for the Muslim Council of Britain, called Mohammed's remarks "disgusting" and a defence of "the use of concentration camps against Uighur Muslims".[283] China has been Saudi Arabia's largest economic partner since 2014 and Saudi Arabia is the biggest source of China's oil imports.[284] In 2019, Chinese officials announced plans to incorporate Saudi Vision 2030 into the Belt and Road Initiative, and expand economic, cultural, strategic and military co-operation.[285]

Since 2021, China has been assisting in Saudi Arabia's ballistic missile programme by transferring technology and making joint ventures for missile production.[286][287] Mohammed hosted Chinese president Xi Jinping in Riyadh for talks on 7–10 December 2022.[288] During the visit, Xi met with numerous Arab leaders, including members of the Gulf Cooperation Council.[288] Xi also signed numerous commercial deals with Saudi Arabia and formally elevated the relationship to comprehensive strategic partnership, highest level in China's formal ranking of relations with other countries.[289] The deal also expanded military and security ties, with both sides agreeing for joint production of UAV systems in Saudi Arabia.[290] Describing the GCC summit as a "milestone event" in the history of Sino-Arab friendship, Xi urged the Gulf countries to start making oil transaction through Renminbi, a move widely seen as China's efforts to establish Renminbi as a world currency.[291]

During the 2022 Airshow China held in Zhuhai, Saudi Arabia and China concluded arms deal worth $4 billion. Under the contract, Saudi Arabia purchased hundreds of Chinese drones, ballistic missiles, Silent Hunter DEWs in addition to technology transfer that enables indigenous manufacturing of various armaments.[292][293] On 10 March 2023, Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to restore diplomatic ties cut in 2016 after a deal brokered between the two countries by China following secret talks in Beijing.[294]

Intimidation of Saad al-Jabri

[edit]

On 9 July 2020, four United States senators urged President Trump to secure the freedom of Saad al-Jabri's children Omar and Sarah, calling it a "moral obligation" to support a man who aided the US intelligence for years and had close ties with key members of the Saudi royal family. The Saudi government detained Omar and Sarah in March 2020 and, to date, their whereabouts remain unknown.[295][296] Saudi Arabia had issued an extradition request and Interpol notices to bring back Saad al-Jabri, who was the US anti-terrorism contact in the Middle East and was staying in Canada since 2018. The Interpol notice against al-Jabri was removed, citing that he was a political opponent of Mohammed.[297]

In August 2020, al-Jabri filed a federal lawsuit in Washington, DC, alleging that Mohammed dispatched a "Tiger Squad" to Canada during October 2018 to assassinate al-Jabri, who was the closest adviser to Mohammed's chief rival, Muhammad bin Nayef. The squad was identified and returned by Canadian authorities.[298][299] Following the lawsuit, the US District Court for the District of Columbia issued the summons against Mohammed bin Salman, along with 11 other people. The summons stated that a judgement would be taken by default against the concerned parties if they fail to respond.[300] Documents filed to the court revealed that Mohammed was served the lawsuit on 22 September 2020 at 4:05 p.m. ET via WhatsApp, and twenty minutes later the message was marked as "read".[301][302]

Hack of Jeff Bezos's phone

[edit]

In March 2019, Gavin de Becker, a security specialist working for Jeff Bezos, accused Saudi Arabia of hacking Bezos's phone.[303] Bezos was the owner of The Washington Post, the leader of the company Amazon, and the world's richest man at the time.[303]

In January 2020, the results of FTI Consulting's forensic investigation of Bezos' phone were made public. The company concluded with "medium to high confidence" that Bezos' phone was hacked by a multimedia message sent in May 2018 from Mohammed's WhatsApp account, after which the phone begun transmitting dramatically higher amounts of data.[304] The report points to circumstantial evidence: first, a November 2018 message from Mohammed to Bezos includes an image resembling the woman Bezos was having an affair with, despite the affair not being public knowledge at the time; second, a February 2019 text from Mohammed to Bezos urges Bezos not to believe everything, after Bezos was briefed on the phone regarding an Internet campaign against him conducted by Saudis.[304]

United Nations special rapporteurs Agnès Callamard and David Kaye reacted that the alleged hack suggests that Mohammed participated "in an effort to influence, if not silence, The Washington Post's reporting on Saudi Arabia".[305] They declared that the alleged hacking was relevant to the issue of whether Mohammed was involved in the killing of Jamal Khashoggi, who worked for The Washington Post.[306]

Environmentalism

[edit]

Under Mohammed's leadership, Saudi Arabia has lobbied to weaken global carbon emissions-reduction agreements.[307] Mohammed has made commitments about Saudi Arabia reaching net zero emissions but they are based primarily on unproven carbon capture and storage technologies.[308]

Assassination of Jamal Khashoggi

[edit]
With US secretary of state Mike Pompeo (left), 16 October 2018
With Major General Ahmad Asiri (right), 2016

In October 2018, Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, a critic of Mohammed, went missing after entering the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Turkish officials reportedly believe that Khashoggi was murdered at the consulate, claiming to have specific video and audio recordings proving that he was first tortured and then murdered, and that a medical forensics expert was part of the 15-man Saudi team seen entering and leaving the consulate at the time of the journalist's disappearance.[309] Saudi Arabia denied the accusations and 13 days later Mohammed invited Turkish authorities to search the building as they "have nothing to hide". Saudi officials said they are "working to search for him".[310] The Washington Post reported that Mohammed had earlier sought to lure Khashoggi back to Saudi Arabia and detain him.[311]

According to Middle East Eye, seven of the fifteen men suspected of killing Khashoggi are members of Mohammed's personal bodyguard.[312] John Sawers, a former head of the British MI6, stated that in his judgment of the evidence it is "very likely" that Mohammed ordered the killing of Khashoggi.[313]

In the aftermath of Khashoggi's death, multiple commentators referred to Mohammed as "Mister Bone Saw", a play on the initials MBS. The name refers to the alleged use of a bone saw to dispose of Khashoggi's remains.[314][315]

Mohammed has denied any involvement in the murder and blamed the assassination on rogue operators. However, Western countries are not convinced and believe this could not have happened without Mohammed's knowledge or approval. Donald Trump described the Saudi response to the killing as "one of the worst in the history of cover-ups." Trump also believes that Mohammed at least knew about the plan, saying that "the prince is running things over there more so at this stage."[316]

After the murder, Mohammed's close confidant Ahmad Asiri was sacked,[317] as was former advisor Saud al-Qahtani.[318][319]

The recording of Khashoggi's killing collected by Turkish intelligence reportedly reveals that one of the members of the kill team instructed someone over the phone to "tell your boss, the deed was done." American intelligence officials believe that "boss" was a reference to the Crown Prince. The person who made the call was identified as Maher Abdulaziz Mutreb, a security officer who is frequently seen travelling with the prince.[320]

Seven weeks after Khashoggi's death, Saudi Arabia, in order to "distance ... Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, from the grisly murder" stated it would pursue the death penalty for five suspects charged with "ordering and executing the crime."[321][322]

On 16 November 2018, it was reported that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had concluded with "high confidence" that Mohammed ordered Khashoggi's murder. The CIA based its conclusion on several pieces of evidence, including an intercepted conversation in which Mohammed's brother Khalid offered Khashoggi assurances that it would be safe for the journalist to enter Saudi Arabia's consulate in Istanbul. Although the CIA reportedly had not determined whether Khalid had any foreknowledge of Khashoggi's ultimate fate upon entering the consulate, it believed that Khalid conveyed this message to Khashoggi at Mohammed's behest. In the CIA's analysis, the killing was most likely motivated by Mohammed's privately stated belief that Khashoggi was an Islamist with problematic connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, a perception that differs markedly from the Saudi government's public remarks on Khashoggi's death.[323]

On 4 December 2018, a group of United States senators were briefed by CIA director Gina Haspel on the murder of Khashoggi. After the briefing, the senators were more than certain that Mohammed played a major role in the killing.[324] Senator Lindsey Graham said, "You have to be willfully blind not to come to the conclusion that this was orchestrated and organised by people under the command of MBS and that he was intrinsically involved in the demise of Mr. Khashoggi." Senator Bob Corker said that the prince "ordered, monitored, the killing" and "If he were in front of a jury, he would be convicted of murder in about 30 minutes."[325] On 5 December 2018, UN Human Rights chief Michelle Bachelet asked for an international investigation to determine who was behind Khashoggi's murder.[326]

A former Saudi intelligence chief and senior member of the Saudi royal family, Prince Turki bin Faisal, dismissed the CIA's reported finding that Mohammed ordered the journalist's killing, saying that "The CIA has been proved wrong before. Just to mention the invasion of Iraq for example."[327]

In March 2019, US senators accused Saudi Arabia for a number of repetitive misdeeds and criticised Mohammed, saying he has gone "full gangster".[328] The senators said the list of human rights violations by Saudi Arabia is too long to comprehend the situation in the kingdom or even work with Mohammed.[329]

In June 2019, a UN report entitled "Annex to the Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions: Investigation into the unlawful death of Mr. Jamal Khashoggi" linked Mohammed to the assassination.[330][331]

In a June 2019 article, The Guardian claimed that after Khashoggi's assassination, the media group became a target of hacking attempts made by a Saudi cybersecurity subdivision, as per an internal order document obtained by the group, with Saud al-Qahtani undersigned.[332] According to an interview in a PBS documentary film recorded in December 2018 and parts released in September 2019, Mohammed bears responsibility for the killing of Khashoggi since it happened under his watch but he denies any knowledge of the murder in advance.[333][334][335] He denied in an interview with CBS' 60 Minutes aired on 29 September 2019 any personal involvement in the killing, adding that "once charges are proven against someone, regardless of their rank, it will be taken to court, no exception made", but said that he had to take "full responsibility for what happened".[144][336]

On 25 February 2021, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a declassified report approved by Director Avril Haines. The report, "Assessing the Saudi Government's Role in the Killing of Jamal Khashoggi" stated that, "We assess that Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman approved an operation in Istanbul, Turkey to capture or kill Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi."[337]

On 26 February 2021, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions Agnès Callamard released a statement urging, "The United States Government should impose sanctions against the Crown Prince, as it has done for the other perpetrators targeting his personal assets but also his international engagements."[338]

On 18 November 2022, due to his new role as the Saudi prime minister, Mohammed got US immunity over Khashoggi's murder. However, Biden's administration emphasized that this was not a determination of innocence.[339]

Personal life

[edit]
From left to right: FIFA president Gianni Infantino, Panamanian president Juan Carlos Varela, Mohammed bin Salman, and former French president Nicolas Sarkozy at the 2018 FIFA World Cup

On 6 April 2008, Mohammed married his first cousin Sara bint Mashour, a daughter of his paternal uncle Mashour bin Abdulaziz. The couple have five children; the first four were named after their grandparents, and the fifth one is named after their great-grandfather King Abdulaziz, the founder of Saudi Arabia.[340][341][342][343] In 2022, The Economist reported that on at least one occasion, Mohammed beat Sara so severely that she required medical treatment.[344]

In 2015, Mohammed purchased the Italian-built and Bermuda-registered yacht Serene from Russian vodka tycoon Yuri Shefler for €500 million.[345][346] In 2015, he purchased the Château Louis XIV in France for over $300 million.[347][348] In 2018, he was ranked by Forbes as the eighth most powerful person in the world, with a personal wealth of at least $25 billion,[349] although his wealth was also estimated at $3.0 billion the same year.[350]

In December 2017, a number of sources reported that Mohammed, using his close associate Prince Badr bin Abdullah bin Mohammed Al Farhan as an intermediary, had bought Salvator Mundi by Leonardo da Vinci; the sale in November at $450 million set a new record price for a work of art.[351][352][353][354] This report has been denied by the auctioneer Christie's, the Saudi Arabian embassy,[355] and the UAE government, which has announced that it is the actual owner of the painting.[356] The painting has not been seen publicly since the auction,[357][358] but is reported to be on Mohammed's yacht Serene.[359][360] Bernard Haykel, a prominent historian who speaks regularly to MBS, said to the BBC that despite rumours that it is hanging "in the prince's yacht or palace", it is actually stored in Geneva and will be hung in a "very large" museum in the Riyadh that is yet been to be built as intended by him to be an "anchor object" that would attract tourists "just like the Mona Lisa does."[361]

Mohammed has been an avid video gamer since childhood. He also enjoys hiking and diving in his spare time.[362]

Honours

[edit]
Country Collar Order Year Ref.
 Bahrain Member Exceptional Class of the Order of Sheikh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa 2018 [363]
 Tunisia Grand Cordon of the Order of the Republic 2018 [364]
 Pakistan Nishan-e-Pakistan 2019 [365]
 Oman Civil First Class of the Order of Oman 2021 [366]
 UAE Collar of the Order of Zayed 2021 [367]
 Jordan Collar of the Order of Al-Hussein bin Ali 2022 [368]
 Ukraine Order of Prince Yaroslav the Wise 1st 2nd and 3rd Class of Ukraine First Class of the Order of Prince Yaroslav the Wise 2023 [369]

Ancestry

[edit]


See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (Arabic: محمد بن سلمان بن عبد العزيز آل سعود; born 31 August 1985) is a Saudi royal and politician serving as Crown Prince since 21 June 2017 and Prime Minister since 27 September 2022, positions that have positioned him as the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia under his father, King Salman. As the architect of Saudi Vision 2030, he has driven economic diversification efforts to lessen dependence on oil revenues, alongside social liberalizations including lifting the ban on women driving in 2018 and promoting public entertainment and tourism sectors. His tenure has featured assertive foreign policy, notably directing the Saudi-led coalition's military intervention in Yemen starting in 2015 to counter Houthi control backed by Iran, a campaign that has achieved restoration of the Yemeni government in parts of the country but drawn scrutiny for civilian casualties and humanitarian impacts. Domestically, MBS consolidated power through the 2017 anti-corruption campaign detaining princes and officials at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in Riyadh, recovering over $100 billion in assets, though critics contend it served to neutralize political opponents. Significant controversies encompass the October 2018 killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, where a Saudi court convicted 11 operatives but acquitted senior officials, while a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency assessment held MBS accountable with high confidence—a conclusion contested by Saudi authorities as lacking direct evidence and influenced by geopolitical tensions. Mohammed bin Salman is regarded as among the most controversial Arab leaders due to scandals including the 2018 Khashoggi killing, the Yemen war's humanitarian crisis, and anti-corruption purges involving detentions and alleged mistreatment at the Ritz-Carlton.

Early Life and Education

Family Background and Upbringing

Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud was born on 31 August 1985 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud—then governor of Riyadh Province—and his third wife, Fahda bint Falah Al Hithlain, a member of the Ajman tribe's Al Hithlain clan. Salman, a son of Saudi Arabia's founder King Abdulaziz Al Saud and one of the Sudairi Seven brothers, had multiple wives and at least 13 sons overall, but Fahda bore him six sons, with Mohammed as the eldest. Raised within the royal household in amid the broader dynasty, which numbers thousands of princes descended from Abdulaziz's 45 sons, Mohammed experienced a privileged yet relatively low-profile existence compared to more prominent royal branches. His father's long tenure as 's governor from 1963 to 2011 immersed the family in provincial administration, fostering Mohammed's early exposure to governance rather than the opulent isolation of some princely upbringings. From childhood, Mohammed shadowed his in duties, cultivating an interest in state affairs that contrasted with the obscurity of his initial position in the succession line, as Salman's elder sons from prior marriages held precedence under traditional . This environment, marked by Salman's pragmatic rule over Riyadh's rapid urbanization and tribal negotiations, shaped Mohammed's formative years without the immediate spotlight of core power contenders.

Formal Education and Initial Influences

Mohammed bin Salman received his primary and at Riyadh Schools, where he ranked among the top ten students nationwide during his secondary years. He enrolled at in to study , earning a in 2007. He graduated second in his class at the College of Law, demonstrating strong academic performance in a program emphasizing , , and administrative principles central to Saudi governance. During his university years, bin Salman worked in the office of his father, Salman bin Abdulaziz, then governor of , gaining early exposure to provincial administration, , and royal processes. This hands-on involvement provided practical insights into bureaucratic operations and , shaping his understanding of state functions beyond theoretical legal studies. His and concurrent administrative experience fostered a pragmatic approach to governance, influenced by the intersection of Islamic jurisprudence and modern administrative demands in .

Rise to Power

Early Appointments and Court Roles

Mohammed bin Salman entered public service in 2009 as a special advisor to his father, Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz, then Governor of Riyadh Province, following his graduation with a bachelor's degree in law from King Saud University. In this capacity, he handled administrative and policy matters within the Riyadh governorate's office, gaining proximity to provincial governance structures. Concurrently, he served as secretary general of the Riyadh Competitiveness Center, an entity focused on enhancing the province's economic edge, and as a special advisor to the chairman of the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives (Darah), contributing to historical and cultural documentation efforts. After Prince Salman's elevation to in June 2012 following the death of Nayef, Mohammed bin Salman was appointed head of the 's Court on March 2, 2013, replacing Prince Saud bin Nayef, with the additional title of special advisor at the rank of minister. This position centralized authority over the 's administrative apparatus, where he oversaw daily operations, personnel, and policy coordination, reportedly streamlining processes and introducing efficiencies aligned with his father's preferences. In April 2014, he received further elevation as , a senior cabinet post without specific portfolio, which amplified his influence in national deliberations under King Abdullah's reign. These court and advisory roles, primarily orbiting his father's orbit, marked Mohammed bin Salman's initial consolidation of influence within the , positioning him to manage key internal dynamics ahead of broader national responsibilities. Sources from Saudi state-affiliated outlets emphasize administrative reforms under his tenure, while Western analyses highlight the roles' function in building loyalty networks among aides.

Minister of Defense (2015–2022)

Mohammed bin Salman was appointed Minister of Defense on 23 January 2015, immediately following the death of King Abdullah and the ascension of his father, King Salman, to the throne. In this capacity, he assumed responsibility for Saudi Arabia's armed forces, which numbered approximately 225,000 active personnel at the time, and directed a defense budget that would expand significantly during his tenure to support procurement and operational needs. His appointment marked a shift toward younger leadership in the ministry, previously held by older royals, and aligned with efforts to centralize control over military decision-making under the royal court. A pivotal early action was the initiation of the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen on 26 March 2015, dubbed Operation Decisive Storm, targeting Houthi forces backed by that had overthrown the Yemeni government and advanced toward the Saudi border. As defense minister, bin Salman personally orchestrated the of ten countries, conducting airstrikes and imposing a naval blockade to restore President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, whose government recognized as legitimate. The campaign, which transitioned to Operation Restoring Hope in April 2015 with ground support, aimed to counter perceived Iranian expansionism but resulted in prolonged conflict, with over 150,000 reported deaths by 2020, including significant civilian casualties from airstrikes documented by groups. Saudi officials attributed Houthi resilience to external support, while critics, including outlets with regional biases, highlighted logistical failures and indiscriminate bombing. During his ministry, bin Salman oversaw substantial military procurement, elevating to the world's fourth-largest arms importer between 2011 and 2020, with key acquisitions including advanced U.S. systems like Patriot missiles and F-15 fighter jets to enhance air superiority and . Defense spending peaked at around $81 billion in 2015, representing over 10% of GDP, funding not only Yemen operations—estimated to cost $200 billion cumulatively—but also domestic reforms such as leadership purges and drives to professionalize the forces. These included appointing new chiefs of staff in 2018 and integrating branches under centralized command, though effectiveness was questioned amid Yemen's . Efforts tied to Vision 2030 emphasized localizing defense manufacturing, targeting 50% of spending on domestic industry by 2030 through entities like the General Authority for Military Industries. Bin Salman retained influence over defense policy post-2017 as , but formally relinquished the ministerial role in 2022 when his brother, Khalid bin Salman, was appointed to the position amid ongoing restructuring. The tenure saw assert greater regional military posture, including bolstering counterterrorism capabilities that dismantled al-Qaeda networks domestically, though Yemen's unresolved status underscored challenges in translating spending into decisive outcomes.

Elevation to Crown Prince (2017)

On June 21, 2017, King Salman bin Abdulaziz issued a royal decree elevating his son, Mohammed bin Salman, from deputy crown prince to , while simultaneously removing Mohammed bin Nayef from the position of and . The decree also appointed Mohammed bin Salman as , consolidating his authority alongside his existing roles as minister of defense and head of the economic and development affairs council. This reshuffle marked a departure from the traditional in Saudi succession, favoring the 31-year-old Mohammed bin Salman over his 57-year-old cousin Mohammed bin Nayef, who had been designated in 2015. The elevation followed Mohammed bin Salman's rapid accumulation of influence since King Salman's accession in January 2015, including his appointment as deputy in April of that year and leadership in launching in 2016 to diversify the economy beyond oil. Mohammed bin Nayef, previously a key figure in counterterrorism efforts and respected in Western intelligence circles for his role in combating , was relieved of duties without public explanation from the royal court, though reports indicated he had been sidelined amid internal family dynamics favoring generational shift. The move was ratified by the , comprising senior princes, though details of the vote remained undisclosed, reflecting the opaque nature of Saudi royal deliberations. This succession adjustment solidified Mohammed bin Salman's position as the ruler, given King Salman's age of 81 at the time, and accelerated his agenda of modernization and centralization, including military interventions in and Yemen and domestic purges that followed later in . International observers noted the shift as a high-stakes consolidation, with potential risks of factional resistance within the extensive Al Saud family, comprising over 15,000 members, though no immediate challenges materialized. The appointment drew endorsements from allies like the , where Mohammed bin Salman had cultivated ties, signaling continuity in strategic partnerships despite the abrupt internal change.

2017 Anti-Corruption Campaign and Purge

On November 4, 2017, King Salman issued a royal decree establishing the Supreme Anti-Corruption Committee, chaired by Mohammed bin Salman, to investigate and address , , and related offenses among senior officials and business leaders. The committee's formation followed Mohammed bin Salman's elevation to in June 2017 and aimed to recover state assets estimated by the attorney general to exceed $100 billion in value lost to and abuse over prior decades. Arrests commenced immediately that weekend, targeting 11 princes, four current or former ministers, and numerous executives, including prominent figures such as billionaire investor Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal and former governor Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah. By November 9, the total number of detainees reached 201, with assets frozen and travel restrictions imposed on an additional 1,200 individuals under investigation. Many high-profile detainees were held at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in , repurposed as a detention facility where interrogations occurred and settlement negotiations were conducted. The campaign involved rapid asset seizures, including yachts, private jets, and bank accounts, with the asserting legal authority to bypass standard judicial processes for settlements in lieu of prosecution. Official updates from general indicated that by early December, 159 individuals remained in custody, most having agreed to financial settlements returning funds and properties to the state. Detainees faced pressure to disclose hidden assets, with reports from associates alleging physical and mistreatment during interrogations, though Saudi authorities denied systematic abuse and framed the measures as necessary for . By , 2019, the committee announced the campaign's conclusion, stating it had recovered approximately $106 billion through settlements, equivalent to assets valued at $300–400 billion linked to proven . Most detainees were released upon compliance, though some charges persisted, and the effort was credited with bolstering state finances amid oil price volatility. Analysts noted the purge's dual role: substantiating claims of entrenched graft among elites, as evidenced by voluntary restitution from figures like Al-Waleed who paid over $6 billion, yet also serving to neutralize potential rivals to Mohammed bin Salman's consolidation of authority by sidelining critics of his Vision 2030 reforms. The operation's extrajudicial elements drew international scrutiny for lacking transparency, contrasting with Saudi assertions of judicial oversight and popular domestic support for addressing .

Appointment as Prime Minister (2022)

On , 2022, King Salman bin Abdulaziz issued a royal decree appointing his son, Mohammed bin Salman, as , a position the king had held since ascending the throne in 2015 and which had been traditionally occupied by the monarch since the kingdom's founding in 1932. This marked the first instance in modern Saudi history where the king relinquished the premiership, consolidating executive authority under the crown prince who already wielded significant power as , defense minister, and overseer of key economic and reform initiatives. The appointment occurred amid a that also saw Prince Khalid bin Salman, the crown prince's brother, elevated to defense minister, replacing Mohammed bin Salman in that role and further aligning key security positions with the ruling family's inner circle. Salman's advancing age—86 at the time—and reported health challenges had increasingly shifted day-to-day governance to the crown prince, rendering the formal transition a logical extension of existing power dynamics rather than a abrupt change. Observers noted the timing's alignment with a U.S. civil filed by Khashoggi's fiancée accusing Mohammed bin Salman of authorizing the journalist's 2018 murder, suggesting the premiership could invoke head-of-government immunity under international legal norms to shield against foreign judicial proceedings. While Saudi officials framed the move as streamlining governance for Vision 2030 reforms, critics in highlighted it as entrenching the crown prince's unaccountable authority, though such interpretations reflect outlets' editorial leanings toward emphasizing accountability deficits in non-Western autocracies. The U.S. Department of Justice later cited the appointment in a November 2022 filing, asserting it did not alter prior findings of linking the crown prince to the killing, underscoring ongoing tensions between Saudi domestic consolidation and international .

Governing Philosophy and Ideology

Saudi Nationalism and Modernization Vision

Mohammed bin Salman's modernization agenda centers on , a comprehensive program unveiled on April 25, 2016, designed to transform the kingdom into a diversified, self-reliant while reducing oil dependency from over 70% of government revenue in 2015 to below 50% by 2030. The initiative rests on three pillars: a vibrant society promoting health, culture, and entertainment; a thriving emphasizing growth, , and ; and an ambitious focused on governmental efficiency, institutional integrity, and national pride. Key targets include increasing non-oil exports' share of non-oil GDP to 50% by 2030, creating 1.3 million new jobs for Saudis, and elevating the kingdom's global competitiveness ranking. This vision intertwines economic reforms with a deliberate revival of Saudi nationalism, shifting emphasis from transnational Islamic ideologies toward a state-centric identity rooted in the achievements of the Al Saud dynasty, particularly founder King Abdulaziz ibn Saud. MBS has championed initiatives to foster national self-reliance, such as mega-projects like —a $500 billion futuristic city—and the Red Sea Project, aimed at positioning as a global hub for and while celebrating indigenous heritage through cultural festivals and historical restorations. In a 2021 interview, he asserted that Saudi identity "is very strong, and we are proud of it," portraying it as citizen-driven rather than imposed by religious authorities. Saudi nationalism under MBS manifests in foreign policy as a "Saudi first" pragmatism, prioritizing economic deals and security over ideological alliances, as seen in normalized relations with Israel precursors and energy market maneuvers. Domestically, it promotes cultural liberalization—such as concerts, cinemas, and sports events—to build a youthful, patriotic populace, with public campaigns invoking Abdulaziz's legacy to unify support for reforms. This approach diminishes the Muslim Brotherhood's influence and Wahhabi globalism, redirecting religious discourse toward national service, though it has drawn criticism for hyper-nationalist elements that demand loyalty to the state and crown prince. By 2025, Vision 2030's progress includes a 30% rise in tourism revenue to $13 billion in 2023 and over 200 entertainment events annually, underscoring the fusion of nationalist fervor with modernization.

Pragmatic Authoritarianism and Power Centralization

Mohammed bin Salman has pursued a governing style characterized by the concentration of executive in his hands, diverging from the traditional Saudi model of among senior royals and consensus-driven decision-making within the Al Saud family. This centralization enables rapid implementation of policies aligned with his Vision 2030 agenda, prioritizing economic diversification and social modernization over fragmented royal input, though it relies on coercive measures to suppress potential rivals. A pivotal mechanism of this consolidation occurred during the November 2017 campaign, when Saudi authorities detained over 200 individuals, including 11 princes, four ministers, and prominent businessmen such as Prince Alwaleed bin Talal, at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in . The operation, overseen by a new committee chaired by bin Salman, resulted in settlements exceeding $106 billion in recovered assets, framed officially as a crackdown on graft but widely interpreted as a strategic purge to neutralize threats to his primacy. Detainees faced interrogation and pressure to relinquish holdings in key sectors like media and finance, thereby transferring economic leverage to state-aligned entities under bin Salman's influence. Bin Salman's authority extends across core state institutions, including direct oversight of the Ministry of Defense since , the Royal Court, and economic bodies tied to Vision 2030 projects such as the , which he chairs. He has sidelined traditional power centers, such as by dismissing former Mohammed bin Nayef in June 2017 and assuming multiple portfolios, including control over interior security and levers. This structure supplants the prior collegial royal council system with a top-down , where bin Salman acts as ruler despite King Salman's nominal headship. The pragmatic dimension of this authoritarianism manifests in bin Salman's selective application of repression to facilitate reforms, such as curbing the influence of conservative religious establishments while advancing secular entertainment initiatives, without dismantling the monarchy's absolute framework. Critics from human rights organizations argue this yields a "reformist authoritarianism" that prioritizes regime stability and modernization over pluralistic governance, as evidenced by ongoing detentions of dissenters post-purge. Supporters, including Saudi state media, contend it fosters accountability and efficiency, citing the purge's financial recoveries as enabling fiscal sustainability amid oil price volatility. Subsequent waves of arrests, such as over 200 in August 2021 targeting businessmen and officials, reinforce this pattern of using anti-corruption rhetoric to preempt challenges.

Domestic Reforms and Policies

Economic Diversification via Vision 2030

Vision 2030, launched by Mohammed bin Salman in April 2016 as Deputy Crown Prince, serves as Saudi Arabia's strategic framework to reduce oil dependency and foster a diversified economy. The program outlines three pillars—a thriving economy, a vibrant society, and an ambitious nation—with economic diversification at its core, targeting increases in private sector contribution to 65% of GDP, foreign direct investment inflows, and non-oil exports. Under bin Salman's oversight as chairman of the Public Investment Fund (PIF) and de facto economic architect, the initiative has driven fiscal reforms, including subsidy reductions on fuel, electricity, and water to curb waste and reallocate resources toward productive sectors. Key initiatives include mega-projects like , a planned $500 billion futuristic city aimed at innovation and ; the Red Sea Project for luxury eco-tourism; and the partial initial public offering (IPO) of in 2019, which raised $29.4 billion and unlocked state assets for private investment. Efforts to boost introduced e-visas in 2019, targeting 100 million annual visitors by 2030, alongside entertainment sector liberalization permitting cinemas and concerts to stimulate domestic spending. programs have transferred over 30 state-owned entities or assets to private hands by 2024, including airports and desalination plants, while special economic zones attract foreign manufacturing in sectors like semiconductors and . Progress metrics reflect measurable gains in non-oil activity: non-oil GDP growth accelerated from 1.82% in 2016 to 4.93% in the first half of 2023, with projections for 3.4% in 2025 and sustained 4.5–5.5% annually over the next decade. Non-oil revenues reached SAR 149.86 billion (approximately $40 billion) in Q2 2025, comprising 49.7% of total government income—a 7% year-on-year increase—and non-oil exports grew 14% in 2024, driven by tourism inflows of $41 billion. The private non-oil sector's GDP share rose to 51% in 2024 from 45% in 2018, while unemployment fell to 7% in Q4 2024, meeting a key target ahead of schedule. Non-oil activity is estimated to account for 57% of total GDP in 2025, though oil fluctuations remain a vulnerability. Challenges persist, including project delays and cost overruns in , which scaled back initial ambitions by 2024, and rising public debt to fund PIF investments exceeding $700 billion in assets. Critics, including analyses from think tanks, argue that centralization of power under bin Salman limits dynamism and , potentially undermining long-term despite short-term fiscal gains. diversification has positively impacted non-oil GDP but correlated with declines in oil GDP share, aligning with goals yet exposing the to global commodity risks. Overall, while Vision 2030 has advanced structural shifts, full realization by 2030 hinges on navigating geopolitical tensions and enhancing transparency to sustain investor confidence.

Social and Women's Rights Advancements

In 2018, lifted its longstanding ban on women driving, effective June 24, following a royal decree issued in September 2017 by King Salman at the direction of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. This reform enabled over 100,000 women to obtain driver's licenses within the first year, facilitating greater mobility and workforce participation amid Vision 2030's emphasis on economic diversification. Further easing of the male guardianship system occurred in August 2019, when regulations permitted women aged 21 and older to obtain passports, travel abroad, register births, marriages, divorces, and conduct other civil transactions without mandatory approval from a male guardian. These changes, enacted via amendments, also prohibited employers from requiring guardian consent for women's job applications, aiming to boost female labor force involvement, which rose from 18% in 2016 to over 33% by 2022. Social liberalization efforts included reopening cinemas in April 2018 after a 35-year prohibition, with the first commercial screenings drawing large audiences and spurring a domestic film industry projected to contribute $1.8 billion to GDP by 2030 under Vision 2030. Public concerts and entertainment events were authorized, exemplified by the 2019 Riyadh Season festival attracting millions, alongside curbs on the religious police's (mutawa) powers through a 2016 decree limiting their arrest and patrol authority to reduce intrusive enforcement of social norms. Additional measures opened non-combat military roles to women in February and expanded sports participation, with Saudi women competing in the Olympics since and increased for athletic programs. These steps aligned with Vision 2030's "vibrant society" pillar, prioritizing youth empowerment and cultural openness, though implementation has varied regionally and enforcement gaps persist due to customary practices.

Religious Moderation and Cultural Liberalization

Mohammed bin Salman articulated a vision for religious moderation in during a , declaring that the kingdom would "return to moderate " open to all religions and the world, attributing the rise of extremism to events around 1979 such as the and the siege of the Grand Mosque in . He blamed the post-1979 strictness partly on Western requests during the Cold War for Saudi Arabia to fund Wahhabi mosques and madrassas to counter Soviet influence. In 2018, he elaborated that the spread of Wahhabism "was done at the request of allies during the Cold War" to counter the USSR, stating "we have to get it all back" to the kingdom's moderate roots. In a 2021 interview, bin Salman criticized the Wahhabi establishment for "faulty interpretations" and enslavement to outdated views, asserting that laws must derive directly from the Quran and Sunnah rather than infallible scholars or rigid hadiths. He further remarked on Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism, that "Ibn Abdul Wahhab is not Saudi Arabia. He was not a prophet... only a scholar," and speculated that if alive today, "he would be the first to object" to being singled out as the sole reference and would fight extremists and terrorists. He positioned these reforms as a reversal of ultra-conservative influences, emphasizing a pre-1979 form of tolerant of diverse traditions, though critics have noted that the official Wahhabi doctrine underpinning the state religious establishment has not undergone fundamental alteration. A key step in curbing religious enforcement came in 2016, when the powers of the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice—commonly known as the religious police—were significantly restricted; they were prohibited from making arrests, enforcing dress codes, or closing businesses, shifting their role to advisory status under the Interior Ministry. This defanging continued into 2019 with further limitations, though a proposed "public decency" law aimed to maintain some regulatory oversight on moral conduct. Cultural liberalization accelerated under bin Salman's direction through the establishment of the General Entertainment Authority in 2016, which organized public concerts, festivals, and artistic events previously deemed incompatible with Wahhabi strictures. Cinemas, banned for 35 years, were permitted starting in 2018, with the first commercial screenings held in in April of that year, marking a shift from outright prohibition despite initial opposition from senior clerics who labeled such venues "harmful and corrupting." Large-scale music events, including electronic festivals like Soundstorm in 2022, became feasible, reflecting a broader embrace of entertainment that would have been unimaginable a decade earlier due to religious police interventions. These initiatives, framed as part of Vision 2030's diversification strategy, have included revisions to religious curricula to excise content promoting intolerance, alongside the abolition of flogging as a judicial punishment by the Supreme Judicial Council. While bin Salman has promoted these changes as eradicating extremism's roots, observers point to persistent executions for offenses like sorcery and as evidence that core punitive elements of application remain intact, suggesting moderation is selective and aligned with consolidating political authority rather than wholesale doctrinal shift.

Anti-Corruption and Governance Measures

In November 2017, King Salman established a supreme committee chaired by Mohammed bin Salman, which initiated a broad purge recovering over $107 billion in assets and settlements from detainees accused of , , and other financial crimes; this effort was formally concluded in January 2019, though subsequent investigations continued under specialized prosecutorial units. Beyond high-profile cases, the (Nazaha), operational since but empowered with expanded investigative powers, has pursued systemic enforcement, including a September 2025 operation arresting over 140 individuals—including government employees and contractors—for , of public office, and contract manipulation, resulting in referrals for prosecution and asset seizures. Nazaha's annual reports highlight prevalent issues like () and public procurement irregularities, with digital reporting platforms enabling public tips that contributed to thousands of investigations by 2023. Governance reforms integrated into broader administrative modernization, such as the 2019 updates to the Government Tenders and Procurement Law mandating electronic bidding and audits to curb favoritism, alongside Vision 2030's emphasis on performance-based evaluations for officials. These measures coincided with Saudi Arabia's score rising from 46/100 in 2016 to 52/100 in 2023 and 59/100 in 2024, per , signaling perceived gains in public sector integrity amid digitization that processed over 90% of services online by 2023 to reduce discretionary dealings. However, has contended that selective prosecutions, including prolonged detentions without trial for some 2017 arrestees, prioritize political consolidation over impartial justice, with Nazaha's focus on lower-level graft contrasting limited accountability for senior royals or allies.
YearCPI Score (out of 100)Global Rank (out of 180)
20164657
20195351
20235254
20245938
This table illustrates the trajectory under bin Salman's oversight, though fluctuations underscore ongoing challenges like deficits noted in assessments. Enforcement has extended to compliance, with 2021 royal decrees imposing fines up to SAR 5 million for in foreign dealings, aligning with OECD-aligned standards to attract investment. Despite these, cautions that authoritarian structures limit whistleblower protections and foster perceptions of uneven application, as evidenced by public surveys identifying as persistent despite crackdowns.

Human Rights and Criticisms

Arrests of Political Rivals and Dissidents

In November 2017, Saudi authorities launched a sweeping campaign, detaining 201 individuals including 11 princes, four current ministers, and numerous former officials and businessmen, under a chaired by Mohammed bin Salman. The operation, often referred to as the Ritz-Carlton purge due to the detention of high-profile figures at the hotel, targeted allegations of and misuse exceeding $100 billion over decades, as stated by the Saudi attorney general. Saudi officials reported recovering approximately $106 billion in assets, including cash, , and company shares, from 87 detainees by January 2019, when the initial phase concluded. While the campaign addressed documented graft in public contracts and state funds, analysts noted its alignment with bin Salman's consolidation of power, as detainees included potential rivals such as Prince Alwaleed bin Talal and former economy minister , sidelining factions loyal to the late Abdullah. Preceding the purge, in September 2017, Saudi security forces arrested dozens of clerics, intellectuals, and activists perceived as opponents to bin Salman's reforms, including preacher and others who had criticized his policies on or in sermons. These detentions, conducted without public charges in many cases, extended to figures like economist Essam al-Zamel, accused of disloyalty for questioning economic strategies. The arrests reflected a broader pattern post-bin Salman's 2015 promotion to defense minister, where dissent against Vision 2030 initiatives or royal centralization was equated with , leading to incommunicado holds and coerced confessions reported by detainees' families. Official rationales emphasized , but the selective targeting of vocal critics—contrasted with leniency toward aligned elites—suggested motives beyond , as evidenced by the purge's role in neutralizing alternative power centers within the royal family. In March 2020, amid fallout from a Russia-Saudi oil price war, authorities arrested Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz, a full brother of King Salman and former interior minister, along with former Mohammed bin Nayef and at least three other royals, on charges of and plotting against the state. claimed the group had incited unrest and conspired with foreign entities, though no trials or evidence were publicly disclosed; sources indicated the detentions followed private criticisms of bin Salman's handling of the and succession risks amid King Salman's health concerns. Prince Ahmed, seen as a potential alternative heir due to his seniority and popularity among tribal leaders, remained in detention without access to lawyers or family as of mid-2020, echoing the opaque processes of prior arrests. These actions, occurring weeks after bin Salman's promotion to , reinforced patterns of preempting intra-family challenges, with outcomes including asset seizures but limited transparency on allegations.

Treatment of Activists and Media Freedom

Under Mohammed bin Salman's leadership, has intensified restrictions on activists, particularly those advocating for and political reforms, often framing such activities as threats to . In May 2018, shortly before the lifting of the women's driving ban, authorities arrested several prominent activists, including , on charges of communicating with foreign entities and attempting to undermine the political system. Al-Hathloul, who had previously campaigned against the guardianship system, was held incommunicado for over a month, reportedly subjected to including beatings and threats of , before being sentenced in December 2020 to five years and eight months in prison by the Specialized Criminal Court; she was released in February 2021 but remained under travel ban and surveillance. Similar detentions targeted at least 10 activists that year, with documenting patterns of arbitrary arrest and ill-treatment despite the activists' alignment with later social reforms. The regime has employed broad and laws to prosecute dissidents, resulting in long sentences for non-violent advocacy. The 2007 Anti-Cyber Crime Law, with its vague provisions on "producing material impinging on public order," has been invoked against online critics, leading to arrests for posts perceived as dissenting. Department reports from 2023 and 2024 highlight credible accounts of enforced disappearances, in detention, and arbitrary detentions of activists, clerics, and intellectuals critical of policies, with little in courts like the Specialized Criminal Court established for cases but used for political offenses. and other monitors note that sentences often exceed a decade, as seen in cases post-2017 power consolidation, where perceived rivals face charges unrelated to violence. Saudi officials maintain these measures target and foreign interference, not legitimate , but independent analyses indicate suppression of domestic voices challenging centralized authority. Media freedom remains severely curtailed, with Saudi Arabia ranking 162 out of 180 in the 2025 Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index, near the bottom due to state control over outlets and imprisonment of journalists. Since bin Salman's 2017 ascent, the number of detained journalists and bloggers has tripled, reaching at least 19 by 2025, including cases like Turki al-Jasser executed in July 2025 for alleged terrorism-linked reporting. At least 33 media professionals were imprisoned as of 2018 under opaque judicial processes, often for content deemed critical of the government. The Press and Publications Law mandates licensing and censorship, while cybercrime statutes penalize "fake news" or content harming national interests, effectively silencing independent journalism; Freedom House classifies the environment as "not free," with self-censorship pervasive among state-aligned media.

Yemen War and Domestic Security Policies

Mohammed bin Salman, as Saudi Minister of Defense, initiated the Saudi-led intervention in on March 26, 2015, launching Operation Decisive Storm to counter Houthi rebels who had ousted the internationally recognized government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and advanced toward the Saudi border. The operation, supported by a coalition of ten states including the , aimed to restore Hadi's authority and neutralize the Houthis—viewed by Saudi leadership as an Iranian proxy posing a direct threat to Saudi through cross-border incursions and attacks. Airstrikes targeted Houthi positions, while a naval sought to prevent arms ; however, ground operations were limited to avoid deep entanglement, reflecting MBS's strategic calculus to contain rather than occupy. The intervention prolonged Yemen's , resulting in a exacerbated by combat, blockades, and disrupted aid flows. By 2021, estimates attributed 377,000 deaths to the conflict, with approximately 60% stemming from indirect causes such as , , and lack of medical access. airstrikes contributed to civilian casualties, with reports documenting nearly 15,000 direct deaths from military action, predominantly in Saudi-led operations targeting populated areas, markets, and . Despite tactical successes in preventing Houthi advances into southern , the campaign achieved limited strategic gains, stalemating by 2018 with Houthis retaining control over and northern territories while escalating drone and missile strikes on Saudi oil facilities and cities, underscoring the intervention's failure to decisively eliminate the perceived Iranian-backed threat. Domestically, MBS has centralized control over Saudi security apparatus to address internal threats, including Shia unrest in the Eastern Province and transnational terrorism from Yemen-based groups like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Policies emphasize robust counter-terrorism measures, such as enhanced intelligence sharing, border fortifications, and deradicalization initiatives that have repatriated Saudi ISIS affiliates for rehabilitation rather than indefinite detention. Saudi security forces, under MBS's oversight, have disrupted multiple plots, contributing to a decline in domestic attacks since pre-2015 peaks, though critics argue broad anti-terrorism laws enable suppression of dissent under the guise of security. These efforts align with Vision 2030's national security pillar, integrating economic diversification with stability to mitigate risks from regional instability spilling into Saudi territory.

Foreign Policy and International Relations

Military Interventions in Yemen and Syria

In March 2015, as Saudi Minister of Defense, Mohammed bin Salman directed the launch of Operation Decisive Storm, a Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen aimed at restoring the internationally recognized government of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi following the Houthi rebels' seizure of Sanaa and advance toward Aden. The coalition, comprising up to 10 Arab and allied states including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Sudan, conducted over 25,000 airstrikes between 2015 and 2022, alongside a naval and air blockade to interdict arms supplies to the Houthis, who receive support from Iran. Ground operations involved Saudi and allied troops, with initial coalition casualties reported as early as April 2, 2015, when a Saudi border guard was killed. The intervention sought to counter the perceived Iranian-backed threat on Saudi Arabia's southern border and prevent Houthi consolidation of power, but it devolved into a protracted marked by high costs. By the end of 2021, the attributed over 377,000 deaths in to the conflict, including direct combat fatalities and indirect causes like and exacerbated by the , with coalition airstrikes alone responsible for approximately 19,200 deaths or injuries as of March . Critics, including organizations, documented instances of disproportionate strikes on infrastructure, such as markets and hospitals, though Saudi officials maintained these targeted Houthi military assets and denied systematic violations. Saudi Arabia announced a cessation of offensive operations in April amid diplomatic pressures and Houthi attacks on oil facilities, shifting toward truce negotiations, though sporadic clashes and Saudi border defenses persisted into 2025. Saudi Arabia's involvement in the under bin Salman's influence was more indirect, focusing on financial and logistical support for Sunni rebel factions opposed to Bashar al-Assad's regime rather than a full-scale . As part of a broader strategy to curb Iranian and expansion, provided funding, weapons, and training to groups like the through intermediaries, estimated in billions of dollars from 2011 onward, without committing Saudi ground forces or leading airstrikes. Bin Salman advocated for escalated international action, including proposals for no-fly zones in –2016, but these were not realized due to Russian and U.S. hesitancy. The approach reflected caution after Yemen's quagmire, prioritizing proxy containment over direct intervention, amid concerns over jihadist elements within rebel ranks. Following the fall of Assad in late and the rise of a transitional government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, bin Salman pivoted Saudi policy toward pragmatic engagement, pledging over $6 billion in investments and by July 2025 to support reconstruction and counter lingering Iranian influence. This included debt relief coordination with and diplomatic overtures, signaling a departure from wartime opposition to stabilization efforts under the new Sunni-leaning leadership. Saudi officials framed the shift as endorsing Syria's against external interference, including Israeli strikes, while avoiding renewed military entanglement.

Gulf Relations and Qatar Blockade

Mohammed bin Salman, as Saudi defense minister and later , pursued an assertive approach to (GCC) relations, emphasizing alignment against perceived threats from and Islamist groups like the . This strategy fostered deepened ties with the () under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, including joint military and economic initiatives, while remained a steadfast ally, hosting Saudi-led interventions during the 2011 Arab Spring unrest. Relations with and , however, were more measured, with Oman maintaining neutrality in Saudi-led efforts and Kuwait mediating regional disputes to preserve GCC cohesion. The emerged as a pivotal flashpoint in MBS's Gulf policy. On June 5, 2017, , alongside the UAE, , and , abruptly severed diplomatic, trade, and travel ties with , imposing a comprehensive land, sea, and air . MBS played a central role in orchestrating the measures, viewing 's foreign policy— including its support for the , close relations with , and Al Jazeera's critical coverage of Saudi leadership—as destabilizing to the region. The quartet issued 13 demands for lifting the , such as closing Al Jazeera, expelling Turkish military personnel from , reducing ties with , and ceasing support for groups designated as terrorists by the coalition. The blockade, intended to coerce into compliance, instead prompted to accelerate economic diversification, forging stronger partnerships with , , and others to mitigate supply disruptions; 's exports, for instance, rebounded and grew despite initial logistical challenges. Efforts at , including U.S. involvement under President Trump—who initially backed the blockade but later urged resolution—failed to yield breakthroughs until GCC internal dynamics shifted. and abstained from the full blockade, highlighting fractures in MBS's push for unified GCC action. Resolution came at the GCC summit on January 5, 2021, where , under Salman's auspices and amid MBS's evolving priorities, agreed to lift the blockade without Qatar meeting the original demands, restoring diplomatic relations and reopening borders and airspace. The accord emphasized GCC "solidarity and stability," though underlying tensions persisted, as evidenced by Qatar's continued independent foreign policy. MBS's subsequent visit to on December 8, 2021—the first since the crisis—signaled tentative , leading to a Saudi-Qatari coordination council to manage bilateral issues, yet analysts noted simmering rivalries over regional influence. The episode underscored the limits of coercive in MBS's Gulf strategy, as Qatar's resilience bolstered its autonomy rather than subordinating it to Saudi-led dominance.

Strategic Partnerships with the United States

Mohammed bin Salman's strategic partnerships with the United States have centered on military cooperation, energy security, and countering Iranian influence, evolving through multiple administrations despite periodic tensions over human rights and the 2018 Khashoggi assassination. Under President Donald Trump, ties strengthened significantly following Trump's May 2017 visit to Riyadh, where he announced a $110 billion arms deal and $350 billion in total investments over a decade, emphasizing Saudi Arabia's role as a bulwark against Iran. These agreements included sales of precision-guided munitions and THAAD missile defense systems, aligning with Saudi-led operations in Yemen. The Trump administration designated the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization in January 2021, partly at Saudi urging, to support Riyadh's campaign against Iran-backed militias, while providing logistical and intelligence assistance to Saudi forces. Economic dimensions included Saudi purchases of U.S. and joint efforts to stabilize oil markets amid + production cuts coordinated with U.S. shale output. However, the partnership faced criticism from U.S. congressional Democrats over civilian casualties in , leading to vetoed attempts to halt arms sales. Under President , relations cooled initially due to campaign pledges to make a "pariah" over Khashoggi and , with the administration pausing offensive arms sales in February 2021 and revoking Houthi terrorist designations in the same month to facilitate peace talks. Yet strategic imperatives prevailed; Biden's July 2022 summit with MBS addressed surging oil prices post-Russia's invasion, yielding Saudi commitments to increase production, though actual cuts followed via + in October 2022. By 2023, the U.S. resumed some munitions transfers for defensive purposes, and intelligence-sharing persisted against shared threats like Iranian drones. Ongoing collaborations include U.S. deployment of forces to Saudi bases for deterrence, as in amid tanker attacks attributed to , and joint cyber defense initiatives. In 2024, discussions advanced on civil nuclear cooperation, with the U.S. supporting Saudi enrichment under safeguards as part of broader normalization incentives with , though progress stalled amid Gaza tensions. These partnerships reflect pragmatic alignment on regional stability, where U.S. access to Saudi oil reserves and basing rights outweighs ideological divergences, substantiated by consistent high-level engagements like Secretary Blinken's 2024 visit. Despite mainstream media portrayals emphasizing frictions—often amplified by sources with left-leaning biases—the empirical record shows sustained exceeding $40 billion annually and flows.

Engagements with Russia, China, and Emerging Powers

Mohammed bin Salman's engagements with Russia have centered on energy cooperation through the OPEC+ framework, established in 2016 to coordinate oil production cuts amid low prices. This alliance has involved repeated agreements on output reductions, such as the 9.7 million barrels per day cut in April 2020, reflecting mutual interest in stabilizing markets despite geopolitical tensions like Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In-person meetings include the 2018 G20 summit where bin Salman and Putin exchanged a high-five, and a December 2023 Riyadh summit discussing oil, Gaza, and Ukraine. Telephone discussions persisted into 2025, with a March call affirming OPEC+ commitments and addressing the Ukraine crisis, and an August exchange covering bilateral ties and U.S. election outcomes. These interactions underscore Saudi Arabia's prioritization of energy revenue over Western sanctions alignment, enabling Russia to sustain war funding via elevated oil prices. Relations with have deepened under bin Salman, aligning with Vision 2030's economic diversification goals through a 2022 comprehensive strategic partnership. This includes synchronizing China's with Saudi projects, fostering investments in technology, renewables, and infrastructure. Key summits feature Xi Jinping's December 2022 visit, where bin Salman hosted a lavish reception, and talks yielding deals on group travel visas and cultural exchanges like the Prince Mohammed bin Salman Award for Cultural Cooperation with . A March 2023 phone call between Xi and bin Salman supported Saudi-Iran reconciliation brokered by , highlighting 's mediating role. Trade volumes have surged, with becoming Saudi Arabia's top oil buyer, and partnerships involving over 700 Chinese entities by 2025. Such ties reflect pragmatic diversification from U.S. reliance, prioritizing non-oil revenue amid global multipolarity. Bin Salman's outreach to emerging powers emphasizes economic , notably through engagement. Invited to join the expanded bloc in 2023 alongside , , , and the UAE, attended the 2024 summit but has hedged formal membership into 2025, citing U.S. ties and regional dynamics like the Gaza conflict. This ambivalence allows pursuit of trade benefits— nations account for 40% of global population and significant GDP—without alienating Western partners. Bilateral ties with , , and have advanced via investment forums and energy deals; for instance, - trade discussions in January 2025 highlighted as Brasília's top partner. Such moves position as a bridge in multipolar orders, leveraging oil diplomacy for investment inflows and market access.

Normalization Efforts with Israel and Regional Diplomacy

Under Mohammed bin Salman, pursued normalization with as an extension of the framework, which facilitated ties between and several Arab states including the UAE and , though held back from formal participation. In September 2023, bin Salman stated that normalization was "getting closer," reflecting quiet diplomatic engagements such as intelligence sharing and Israeli overflights of Saudi airspace permitted since 2020. These efforts aligned with bin Salman's Vision 2030 economic diversification goals, viewing Israeli technological and security expertise as complementary to Saudi ambitions in AI, cybersecurity, and regional stability. Progress stalled following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel and the ensuing Gaza war, with suspending talks and emphasizing a Palestinian state as a prerequisite for any deal. In February 2025, publicly rejected U.S. President Donald Trump's assertion of imminent ties, insisting on "an independent Palestinian state with as its capital" via a . Bin Salman positioned the kingdom as a champion of Palestinian rights amid the conflict, while privately conveying to U.S. officials a willingness for broader beyond limited normalization, including potential full . By mid-2025, Saudi diplomats informed U.S. counterparts to exclude normalization from agendas, wary of domestic backlash from younger and regional . Despite setbacks, momentum reemerged in late 2025, with bin Salman planning his first visit since 2018 to seek a U.S. potentially linked to normalization and Gaza reconstruction. Analysts noted alignment of Gulf interests, including shared threats from , could facilitate a deal, though bin Salman's calculus prioritizes U.S. security guarantees over immediate Israeli ties. This pragmatic approach underscores bin Salman's strategy of leveraging normalization for strategic gains, evidenced by unofficial Saudi-Israeli cooperation in countering Iranian proxies. In parallel, bin Salman's regional diplomacy emphasized de-escalation with adversaries to refocus on domestic reforms. A landmark March 10, 2023, agreement brokered by restored full diplomatic relations with , severed since 2016, and reactivated a pact, reducing proxy conflicts in and . The deal, negotiated over months with Chinese assurances against Iranian aggression, reflected Riyadh's shift from confrontation to coexistence, enabling bin Salman to scale back Saudi military involvement abroad and prioritize economic ties. This extended to Gulf reconciliation, building on the 2021 Al-Ula agreement ending the , and fostered broader Arab coordination on issues like and countering . Such moves, while criticized by some U.S. observers for empowering Beijing's influence, empirically lowered regional tensions and supported Saudi stability.

Major Controversies

Jamal Khashoggi Assassination (2018)

On October 2, 2018, Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist and Washington Post columnist critical of the Saudi government, entered the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey, to obtain documents for his marriage; he was never seen leaving alive. Turkish intelligence recorded audio evidence indicating that a 15-member Saudi team, including forensic experts and individuals close to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), strangled Khashoggi and dismembered his body with a bone saw inside the consulate. The operation was premeditated, with the team arriving in Istanbul via multiple flights on the day of the killing. A U.S. released in February 2021 concluded with high confidence that MBS approved the operation to capture or kill Khashoggi, citing his absolute control over Saudi security decisions, the direct involvement of his close aides such as (a key advisor dismissed after the incident), and prior intelligence indicating MBS's pattern of targeting dissidents. The CIA had reached a similar conclusion in November 2018, assessing that MBS ordered the based on intercepted communications and the operational details. However, the assessment noted no of MBS's verbal order, relying instead on circumstantial factors like his responsibility for the team's composition and his history of ruthlessness toward critics. Saudi Arabia initially denied any wrongdoing for over two weeks, claiming Khashoggi had left the consulate. On October 20, 2018, the Saudi public prosecutor announced that Khashoggi died during an interrogation that turned into a brawl, attributing it to a "rogue operation" by the agents without high-level authorization. By November 2018, Saudi officials revised this to admit a premeditated , leading to the of 18 suspects and the dismissal of al-Qahtani. In a closed-door concluded in December 2019, Saudi courts sentenced five individuals to 20 years in (commuted from penalties), three to seven years, and five to unspecified terms, while acquitting 14 others, including senior officials; the kingdom rejected international calls for transparency, maintaining the killings violated Saudi law but occurred without MBS's direct involvement. MBS stated in a 2019 interview that the killing occurred "under my watch" but denied ordering it, taking responsibility as ruler. Saudi officials dismissed the U.S. intelligence report as "negative, false, and unacceptable." The assassination prompted international condemnation and sanctions on involved Saudi officials by the U.S., , and others, including travel bans and asset freezes, though MBS himself faced no direct penalties from major powers. European countries like , , and halted arms sales to temporarily. Despite the fallout, U.S.-Saudi relations persisted, with the Biden administration releasing the intelligence report but prioritizing strategic interests over further action against MBS. The incident highlighted tensions between Saudi domestic security priorities under MBS and global norms on press freedom, with Khashoggi's critiques focusing on the crown prince's consolidation of power and record.

Allegations of Extrajudicial Actions and Intimidation

In November 2017, Saudi authorities under Mohammed bin Salman's direction launched an campaign that resulted in the detention of at least 381 individuals, including princes, ministers, and businessmen, many held at the Ritz-Carlton hotel in without formal charges or trials. Detainees reportedly faced , , and coerced financial settlements totaling over $107 billion, which Saudi officials described as voluntary restitution for illicit gains, though groups characterized the process as extrajudicial due to the lack of judicial oversight and use of unofficial detention sites. The campaign, overseen by a chaired by bin Salman, ended in January 2019, but critics, including Western analysts, viewed it as a mechanism for consolidating power by neutralizing potential rivals rather than purely addressing graft. In 2018, shortly before the lifting of Saudi Arabia's female driving ban on June 24, authorities arrested at least 13 activists, including , Eman al-Nafjan, and , on charges of undermining national security, with allegations of prior advocacy for driving rights cited as justification. Detainees reported , including beatings and , during interrogations, leading to international condemnation from groups like , which labeled the arrests as retaliation against those who contributed to the policy change. Al-Hathloul was sentenced to nearly six years in prison in December 2020 for her activism, despite royal pardons reducing terms for some; Saudi officials maintained the detentions targeted threats to stability, not reform efforts. Bin Salman has been linked to a covert Saudi unit, known as the Rapid Intervention Group, formed around 2017 to target dissidents abroad through , abduction, and , predating the 2018 Khashoggi killing. Operations included attempts to repatriate critics from and the , such as the 2017 detention and forced return of Saudis in and the 2018 abduction of activist Loujain al-Hathloul's relatives to pressure her, as documented in U.S. intelligence assessments and lawsuits. In November 2017, Lebanese Prime Minister was effectively detained in and coerced into a televised , which Saudi Arabia initially denied but later attributed to security concerns. These actions, reported by outlets like based on insider accounts, reflect a pattern of transnational , though Saudi spokespeople have rejected claims of orchestration by bin Salman, asserting they address legitimate national security risks.

Jeff Bezos Phone Hack and Cyber Incidents

In May 2018, Jeff Bezos, CEO of Amazon and owner of The Washington Post, received a WhatsApp message from a telephone number attributed to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, containing a video file that forensic analysis later linked to the compromise of his iPhone X. The message exploited a zero-day vulnerability in WhatsApp, allowing remote infiltration without user interaction, with data extraction occurring shortly thereafter. A forensic examination conducted by FTI Consulting in 2019, commissioned by Bezos' private investigators, determined with "medium to high confidence" that the intrusion originated from the suspicious WhatsApp transmission, resulting in the exfiltration of approximately 47 megabytes of data, including personal photographs and potentially sensitive communications. This hack preceded by months the National Enquirer's publication of compromising details about Bezos' personal life, which Bezos alleged stemmed from leaked data obtained via the breach, amid The Washington Post's coverage of Saudi policies. United Nations special rapporteurs, citing the FTI report, urged an independent investigation in January 2020, connecting the incident to broader patterns of Saudi digital surveillance against critics, including journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Saudi officials, including the kingdom's embassy in , rejected the allegations as "absurd" and without evidence, asserting that does not engage in such cyber operations and attributing claims to unsubstantiated motives tied to U.S.-Saudi tensions over Khashoggi's 2018 killing. Independent cybersecurity experts have noted that while the forensic linkage to the MBS-associated number provides of state involvement, definitive attribution to the Crown Prince personally requires additional chain-of-custody verification, as accounts can be impersonated or compromised. No criminal charges have resulted from the incident, and 's parent company, Meta (then ), confirmed the exploit's technical feasibility but did not publicly attribute it. Broader cyber incidents under Mohammed bin Salman's leadership include Saudi-linked operations using tools like Pegasus spyware from Israel's NSO Group, deployed against journalists and activists, though direct ties to the Bezos case remain unproven beyond the initial vector. Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in offensive cyber capabilities since 2017, with reports of state-sponsored hacks targeting Qatari media and dissidents, reflecting a strategy of digital deterrence amid regional rivalries. These activities align with documented Saudi cyber doctrine emphasizing rapid response to perceived threats, but evidentiary thresholds for international accountability have limited formal repercussions.

Alleged Association with Jeffrey Epstein

Claims circulating online assert the existence of a photograph depicting Mohammed bin Salman with Jeffrey Epstein, but no credible or authentic image of the two together has been verified. Such claims are unsubstantiated and typically rely on fabricated, photoshopped, or misidentified images. Reliable news sources, court documents, and Epstein-related records, such as flight logs and contact books, contain no evidence of any direct connection between Mohammed bin Salman and Jeffrey Epstein.

Speculation as Antichrist in Christian Prophecy

Mohammed bin Salman is considered by some Christians in end-times prophecy communities to be a potential Antichrist figure, based on interpretations of biblical prophecies linking his rise to power, regional influence, and projects like NEOM to end-times events.

Personal Life and Public Image

Family and Private Relationships

Mohammed bin Salman is the son of King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud and Fahda bint Falah bin Sultan Al Hithlain, his father's third wife from the Ajman tribe. Born on August 31, 1985, in Riyadh, he is the eldest of his mother's six children and the seventh son overall of King Salman, who has fathered at least 13 children across multiple wives. His mother, Fahda, maintains a low public profile, with limited verifiable details on her background beyond her tribal affiliation and role in the royal household. Among his full siblings—sharing both parents—are Prince Turki bin Salman, former chairman of the , and Prince Khalid bin Salman, who serves as Saudi Arabia's Minister of Defense since 2022. Reports indicate no public disputes between Mohammed bin Salman and his full brothers, with sources describing their relationships as stable amid the broader dynamics of the Al Saud family's extensive kinship network. He also has numerous half-siblings from King Salman's other marriages, including half-brother Prince bin Salman, retained as Minister of Energy for his expertise despite shifts in royal power. Family ties within the , numbering thousands of princes, have historically influenced succession, though Mohammed bin Salman's rapid ascent bypassed older relatives through direct paternal appointments. On April 6, 2008, Mohammed bin Salman married Sara bint Mashour bin Al Saud, his first cousin and daughter of his paternal uncle Mashour bin , in a private ceremony. The couple has five children: sons Salman, Mashour, and , and daughters Fahda and Noura. Sara maintains a reclusive public presence, rarely appearing in official media, consistent with traditions limiting visibility of royal consorts. No verified accounts detail tensions in the marriage, though unconfirmed reports from sources allege strains linked to Mohammed bin Salman's demanding schedule and political focus. Details on Mohammed bin Salman's private relationships beyond remain sparse and unverified, shaped by Saudi royal customs emphasizing discretion and state protocols. Allegations of extramarital associations, such as rumored contacts with foreign celebrities, circulate in opposition media but lack empirical corroboration from primary sources. His intersects with public duties through family-influenced appointments, yet verifiable interpersonal dynamics prioritize loyalty within core kin over broader revelations.

Wealth, Investments, and Lifestyle

Mohammed bin Salman's personal wealth is estimated at $25 billion as of 2025, encompassing royal family holdings, direct investments, and influence over state-controlled entities, though precise figures remain opaque due to the intertwined nature of personal and sovereign assets. Alternative assessments place it lower, at around $5.3 billion, reflecting conservative valuations of verifiable properties and stakes. As chairman of Saudi Arabia's (PIF) since 2015, bin Salman directs a with assets under management surpassing $1 trillion by 2025, up from $700 billion in 2022, aimed at diversifying the economy beyond oil under Vision 2030. The PIF's portfolio emphasizes global diversification, including a $23.8 billion U.S. holdings shift toward semiconductors, healthcare, and AI, exemplified by the launch of Humain, a PIF-backed AI firm for centers and in 2025. Major deals include up to $12 billion in commitments with U.S. asset managers in May 2025 and a proposed $55 billion acquisition of , potentially closing in early 2027, signaling aggressive expansion into gaming and tech. Bin Salman's lifestyle reflects substantial personal expenditure on luxury assets, including the 440-foot superyacht Serene, purchased for $500 million and equipped with multiple swimming pools, hot tubs, two helipads, and a . He reportedly owns a $300 million chateau in France's and has rented private islands in the for extended stays. In the megaproject, plans include a fortified complex with 10 helipads, private airstrips, and advanced features, underscoring integration of opulence with state-backed development. These acquisitions occur amid PIF-driven in public spending, though critics question the opacity of funding sources linking personal gains to the 2017 , which recovered over $100 billion in settlements directed toward national funds.

Honors, Awards, and Global Recognition

Mohammed bin Salman has been conferred various foreign orders and decorations, primarily from Arab and Muslim-majority states, acknowledging his contributions to bilateral ties, economic cooperation, and regional stability. These awards often coincide with state visits or diplomatic summits. In 2018, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa of Bahrain awarded him the Order of Sheikh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa (Premium Class), Bahrain's highest honor, for advancing Saudi-Bahraini relations. Later that year, Tunisian President Beji Caid Essebsi presented the Order of the Republic (Grand Cordon, highest rank) during a state visit, recognizing support for Tunisia's development and security. The following year, on February 18, 2019, Pakistani President bestowed the , Pakistan's highest civilian award, after agreements on $20 billion in investments, citing bin Salman's role in enhancing economic and security partnerships. In 2021, he received Oman's Order of Sultan Qaboos (First Class) from Sultan for deepening fraternal cooperation; the UAE's (First Class) from Abu Dhabi's Crown Prince; and Kuwait's Order of Mubarak the Great from Emir , both emphasizing strengthened Gulf ties. On June 21, 2022, Jordan's King Abdullah II granted the , Jordan's premier civil decoration, for enduring bilateral relations. In November 2022, in conferred an honorary doctorate for contributions to . More recently, in 2024, the awarded the 'Leader' Medal to bin Salman, presented by Speaker Adel Al-Asoumi, for advocacy on Arab interests. Beyond state honors, bin Salman has garnered international media recognitions. Time magazine named him its 2017 Person of the Year via reader poll and included him in the 2018 TIME 100 list of most influential people. Forbes ranked him eighth on its 2018 World's Most Powerful People list, highlighting his geopolitical influence, and selected him for its 2017 Global Game Changers roster. Earlier accolades include Forbes Middle East's 2013 Leadership Personality of the Year for entrepreneurship support and Foreign Policy's 2015 Top 100 Global Thinkers for visionary leadership.
YearAwardIssuing EntityCitation
2013Leadership Personality of the YearForbes Middle East
2015Top 100 Global ThinkersForeign Policy
2017Person of the Year (Readers' Choice)Time
2017Global Game ChangersForbes
2018TIME 100Time

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