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Saudis (Arabic: سعوديُّون, romanized: suʿūdiyyūn; local dialects: سعوديين, suʿūdiyyīn) or Saudi Arabians are the citizen population of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, who speak the Arabic language, a Central Semitic language, and share a common ancestry, history, and culture. They are mainly composed of Arabs and live in the five historical Regions: Najd, Hejaz, Asir, Tihamah and Al-Ahsa; the regions which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was founded on or what was formerly known as the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd in the Arabian Peninsula. Saudis speak one of the dialects of Peninsular Arabic, including the Hejazi, Najdi, Gulf and Southern dialects (e.g. Bareqi), or South Arabian languages (e.g. Faifi) as a mother tongue.[14]

Key Information

Culture

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Main article: Culture of Saudi Arabia

The culture of Saudi Arabia is deeply rooted in Arab traditions and Islamic values. It is generally conservative, religious, traditional, and family-oriented. For example, alcoholic beverages are prohibited, though some social and cultural restrictions have begun to ease in recent years.[15]

Daily life is strongly influenced by Islamic practices and laws. Even non-Muslim residents are expected to respect Islamic customs, including dress codes that meet certain modesty standards. Muslims are called to prayer five times daily from the minarets of mosques across the country. Since Friday is the holiest day in Islam, the weekend is observed on Friday and Saturday.[16]

In accordance with Salafi doctrine, only two religious holidays, Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha, were officially recognized until 2006. That year, a secular national holiday—September 23—commemorating the unification of the kingdom, was reintroduced and became widely celebrated.[17]

Social life and customs

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Urban

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Urban center of Jeddah in the 20th century (1938)
Rijal Almaa historical village in southern Saudi Arabia
Main article: Ancient towns in Saudi Arabia

The original inhabitants of cities and villages are known as (Arabic: حَضَر, romanized: ḥaḍar) sedentary people; they settled in villages, towns and cities across Saudi Arabia. Some of the famous cities of the past and some still remain were Al-Ahsa, Qaryat al-Faw, Dumat al-Jandal, Al-Ukhdud, Al-Ula, Diriyah, Ha'il, Jeddah, Manfouha, Mecca, Medina, Qatif, Madain Saleh, Tabuk, Taif, Tarout island, Tayma, and Thaj.

Most Saudis (whether they were historically sedentary or nomadic) trace their lineage to the different tribes of Arabia, and there are also many prominent Saudis of various origins including Caucasian, Bosniak (e.g. Deputy Minister at Ministry of Tourism; Mohammed Bushnag), Southeast Asian (Jawi) (e.g. former minister of Hajj and Umrah; Muhammad Benten), Turkish (e.g. Dr. Muhammad Khashoggi), Central Asian (Bukhari) (e.g. footballer; Amin Bukhari) and South Asian (e.g. footballer; Abdulbasit Hindi). They are mostly from the cities of Mecca, Medina and Jeddah in the Hejaz region.

Afro-Saudi

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Main article: Afro-Saudis

Many Afro-Saudis belong to tribes that trace their heritage to the Hausa people and also to historical Tekrur and Ghana empire, this is evident in family names such as Hawsawi (e.g. footballer; Osama Hawsawi) , Fallatah, and Bernawi.[18] A number of members of the Afro-Saudi minority are descendants of former slaves, in particular descendants of the slaves who had been freed in 1962.[19] Afro-Saudi activists complain that they are not given media representation and are unable to find opportunities to improve their social condition.[20][circular reference] Many suffer from racial discrimination in employment and education. Many Saudis view them as inferior.[21][22]

Bedouins

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A 20th century photograph from the Hejaz (Bedouins).
Main article: Bedouins

A portion of the original inhabitants of the area that is now Saudi were known as Bedouin (nomads) (Arabic: بَدُو, romanized: badu). They remain a significant and very influential component of the indigenous Saudi population, though many who call themselves "badu" (nomad) no longer engage in "traditional tribal activities" and are instead settled.[23] According to authors Harvey Tripp and Peter North, the Bedouin make up most of the judiciary, religious leaders, and National Guard (which protects the throne) of the country. Bedouin culture is "actively" preserved by the government.[23] Nowadays, most bedouins have been urbanized, living in towns or cities, but they still designate themselves as nomads and speak bedouin dialects as opposed to the dialects of the sedentary tribes or urban centers.

Greetings

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Greetings in Saudi Arabia have been called "formal and proscribed" and lengthy. Saudis (specifically men) tend "to take their time and converse for a bit when meeting". Inquiries "about health and family" are customary, but never about a man's wife, as this "is considered disrespectful."[24][25][better source needed]

Dress

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Main articles: Abaya, Bisht (clothing), and thawb

The religion and customs of Saudi Arabia dictate not only conservative dress for men and women, but a uniformity of dress unique to most of West Asia.[26] Traditionally, the different regions of Saudi have had different dress, but since the re-establishment of Saudi rule these have been reserved for festive occasions, and "altered if not entirely displaced" by the dress of the homeland of their rulers (i.e. Najd). [27]

In Saudi Arabia, women were required to cover in public.[28] However, in March 2018, the Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman claimed that women could choose what to wear in public, provided it met certain standards, when he stated, "The decision is entirely left for women to decide what type of decent and respectful attire she chooses to wear".[29][30] Until late 2019, all women were required to wear an abaya, a long cloak that covers all but the hands, hair, and face in public. Modest dress is compulsory for women in Islam, but the color black for women and white for men is apparently based on tradition not religious scripture.[31] Foreign women were required to wear an abaya, but did not need to cover their hair. Many Saudi women also normally wear a full face veil, such as a niqāb. Women's clothes are often decorated with tribal motifs, coins, sequins, metallic thread, and appliqués.

In recent years it is common to wear Western dress underneath the abaya. Foreign women in Saudi Arabia are "encouraged" by the religious police to wear an abaya, or at least cover their hair, according to the New York Times.[32] Authors Harvey Tripp and Peter North encourage women to wear an abaya in "more conservative" areas of the kingdom, i.e. in the interior.[33]

Saudi woman wearing a niqāb in Riyadh.

Saudi men and boys, whatever their job or social status, wear the traditional dress called a thobe or thawb, which has been called the "Arabic dress".[34] During warm and hot weather, Saudi men and boys wear white thobes. During the cool weather, wool thobes in dark colors are not uncommon. At special times, men often wear a bisht or mishlah over the thobe. These are long white, brown or black cloaks trimmed in gold. A man's headdress consists of three things: the tagia, a small white cap that keeps the gutra from slipping off the head; the gutra itself, which is a large square of cloth; and the igal, a doubled black cord that holds the gutra in place. Not wearing an igal is considered a sign of piety. The gutra is usually made of cotton and traditionally is either all white or a red and white checked. The gutra is worn folded into a triangle and centred on the head.

  • Ghutrah (Arabic: غترة pronounced [ɣʊtra]) is a traditional keffiyeh headdress worn by men in the Arabian peninsula. It is made of a square of usually finer cotton cloth ("scarf"), folded and wrapped in various styles (usually a triangle) around the head. It is commonly worn in areas with an arid climate, to provide protection from direct sun exposure, and also protection of the mouth and eyes from blown dust and sand.
  • Agal (Arabic: عقال pronounced [ʕɪɡaːl]) is an item of Arab headgear constructed of cord which is fastened around the keffiyeh to hold it in place. The agal is usually black in colour.
  • Abaya (Arabic: عباية pronounced [ʕabaːja]) is a women's hijab worn by women when leaving the house. It is a black cloak that covers the entire body except for the head, although some abayas also cover the top of the head.
  • Imama (Arabic: عمامة pronounced [ʕɪmaːma]) is a type of the turban headdress native to the region of Hejaz in modern-day western Saudi Arabia; it is but one version of Arabian turbans that have been worn in the Arabian Peninsula from the pre-Islamic era to the present day, but in general nowadays most Hejazis wear Shumagh (Arabic: شُماغ pronounced [ʃʊmaːɣ]) instead.
  • Thawb (Arabic: ثوب pronounced [θo̞ːb, t-]) is the standard Arabic word for garment. It is ankle length, woven from wool or cotton, usually with long sleeves similar to a robe.
  • Bisht (Arabic: بشت pronounced [bɪʃt]) is a traditional long, white, brown or black Arabic cloak trimmed in gold worn by men. It is usually only worn for prestige on special occasions such as weddings, or in chilly weather.

More recently, Western dress, particularly T-shirts and jeans have become quite common leisurewear, particularly in Jeddah, Riyadh and the Eastern Province.[35] Traditional footwear is leather sandals but most footwear is now imported.[27]

Religion

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Main article: Religion in Saudi Arabia
Abdullaziz ibn Abdullah Alashheikh, Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia from 1999 to 2025
A photograph of the minarets at sunrise in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Islam is the state religion of Saudi Arabia and its law requires that all citizens be Muslims.[36] The government does not legally protect the freedom of religion.[36] Any overseas national attempting to acquire Saudi nationality must convert to Islam.[37] Saudi Arabia has been criticized for its implementation of Islamic law and its poor human rights record.[38][39]

Islam

[edit]
Main article: Islam in Saudi Arabia

The official form of Islam is the Wahhabi version of Sunni Islam. According to official statistics, 90% of Saudi citizens are Sunni Muslims, and 10% Shia.[40] More than 30% of the population is made up of foreign workers[40] who are predominantly but not entirely Muslim. It is unknown how many Ahmadi there are in the country.[41] The two holiest cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina, are in Saudi Arabia. For many reasons, non-Muslims are not permitted to enter the holy cities although some Western non-Muslims have been able to enter, disguised as Muslims.[42][43]

Non-Muslims

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Adel al-Jubeir, Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for Foreign Affairs.

The large number of foreign workers living in Saudi Arabia (7.5 million expatriates in 2013[44]) includes non-Muslims. For Saudis, you cannot be a Saudi citizen without being Muslim.[45]

Policy of exclusion

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According to scholar Bernard Lewis, the Saudi policy of excluding non-Muslims from permanent residence in the country is a continuation of an old and widely accepted Muslim policy.[46] While Saudi Arabia does allow non-Muslims to live in Saudi Arabia to work or do business, they may not practice religion publicly. According to the government of the United Kingdom:

The public practice of any form of religion other than Islam is illegal; as is an intention to convert others. However, the Saudi authorities accept the private practice of religions other than Islam, and you can bring a Bible into the country as long as it is for your personal use. Importing larger quantities than this can carry severe penalties.[47]

Saudi Arabia still gives citizenship to people from other countries.[48]

Census

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The first official population census of Saudi Arabia was in 1974. It had 6,218,361 Saudi nationals and 791,105 non-nationals for a total of 7,009,466. Of those, 5,147,056 people were settled and the number of nomads recorded were 1.86 million.[49]

Until the 1960s, much of the population was nomadic or seminomadic; due to rapid economic and urban growth, more than 95% of the population now is settled. 80% of Saudis live in three major urban centers—Riyadh, Jeddah, or Dammam.[50] Some cities and oases have densities of more than 1,000 people per square kilometer (2,600 people/sq mi).[50] Despite the rapid growth in Saudi Arabia over the past decades, it is experiencing a rapid decline not only in mortality, followed by fertility rates, which fell from about seven children on average per woman in the last century to 2.4 in 2016, based on the latest population survey conducted by the General Authority for Statistics.[51] Saudi Arabia has lagged far behind in increasing its population compared to its neighbors, such as Iraq and Syria.

According to the 2022 census, Saudi nationals represented approximately 18,800,000 making up 58.4% of the total population of Saudi Arabia.[1]

Genetics

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Further information: Genetic studies on Arabs

DNA tests of Y chromosomes from representative sample of Saudis have been analyzed for composition and frequencies of haplogroups: a plurality (71.02%) belong to haplogroup J1-M267. Other frequent haplogroups include haplogroup J2-M172 (2.68%), A (0.83%), B (1.67%), E1b1a (1.50%), E1b1b (11.05%), G (1.34%), H (0.33%), L (1.00%), Q (1.34%), R1a (2.34%), R1b (0.83%), T (2.51%), and P (1.50%).[52]

See also

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Wikimedia Commons has media related to People of Saudi Arabia.

References

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Bibliography

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Saudis

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia

Saudis are the citizens of the Kingdom of , a in the whose name derives from the ruling Al Saud dynasty that unified the region in 1932. Predominantly ethnic of tribal ancestry tracing back to ancient inhabitants of the peninsula, they form the core amid a total exceeding 35 million that includes a substantial workforce comprising about 44 percent. The Saudi population consists of approximately 19.6 million citizens as of mid-2024, with the majority being Sunni Muslims adhering to the of , often influenced by Salafi interpretations that emphasize strict and scriptural literalism. remains deeply conservative, with Islamic as the basis of law and , fostering a patrilineal structure that prioritizes family, tribe, and religious observance over individualistic norms prevalent in Western cultures. Historically, Saudi identity emerged from the alliance between the Al Saud family and the Wahhabi religious movement in the 18th century, which propelled the conquest and consolidation of central Arabia before the establishment of the modern kingdom under Abdulaziz ibn Saud. This foundation has defined Saudis as custodians of Islam's holiest sites in Mecca and Medina, attracting millions of pilgrims annually and reinforcing their role in global Muslim affairs, though it has also sustained a governance model of absolute monarchy intertwined with religious authority. Economic prosperity from vast oil reserves has enabled rapid modernization under initiatives like Vision 2030, yet cultural reforms coexist with persistent enforcement of hudud punishments and restrictions on public religious expression for non-Muslims, reflecting causal tensions between tradition and contemporary pressures.

History

Origins and Tribal Foundations

The Saudi people, primarily ethnic indigenous to the , derive their tribal foundations from ancient Semitic pastoralist groups that inhabited the region for millennia prior to the rise of in the 7th century CE. These groups, known collectively as tribes, were nomadic herders adapted to the arid interior, engaging in camel pastoralism, raiding, and trade routes across , , and eastern oases. Archaeological and textual evidence from Assyrian records dating to the 9th century BCE references Arab tribes such as the Aribi or operating in northern Arabia, indicating early Semitic migrations from the and into central plateaus. Tribal lineages in Saudi Arabia traditionally bifurcate into two primary ancestries: the Qahtani Arabs, originating from southern Yemen and associated with ancient kingdoms like Saba and Himyar, and the Adnani Arabs, linked to northern migrations and purported descent from Ishmael through Adnan. Qahtani tribes, such as Qahtan and Yam, predominated in southern and southwestern regions like Asir, emphasizing sedentary agriculture alongside nomadism, while Adnani confederations like Mudar and Rabi'ah dominated central Najd and Hejaz, fostering expansive Bedouin networks through kinship ties ('asabiyyah) that prioritized collective defense and honor codes. This division shaped pre-Islamic social organization, where tribes formed fluid alliances for survival in resource-scarce environments, as evidenced by Nabataean inscriptions and South Arabian epigraphy documenting inter-tribal conflicts and caravans by the 1st century BCE. Key foundational tribes in what became Saudi territories included in (eastern ), from the Bakr ibn Wa'il branch of Rabi'ah, which later produced the Al Saud dynasty's progenitor Mani' ibn Rabi'ah al-Muraydi around the 15th century CE. Other prominent Adnani groups, such as Harb in and Utaybah in , trace to ancient northern lineages, maintaining oral genealogies that reinforced territorial claims and marriage alliances. These structures persisted through the Islamic era, with tribes providing the social backbone for unification efforts, underscoring a causal continuity from nomadic to modern state loyalty via pacts rather than centralized authority.

Islamic Unification and Ottoman Period

The Emirate of Diriyah, founded by Muhammad bin Saud in 1727 as the nucleus of the First Saudi State, initiated a process of Islamic unification in central Arabia through military consolidation of Najdi tribes under Al Saud leadership. This effort gained ideological cohesion in 1744 via a formal alliance with the reformer Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, whose doctrine emphasized strict monotheism (tawhid), repudiation of saint veneration and shrine rituals, and enforcement of sharia, enabling the Al Saud to rally fractious Bedouin and settled tribes against perceived religious deviations and political rivals. The pact integrated religious authority with tribal governance, with Wahhab serving as chief judge while Muhammad bin Saud provided military protection, fostering expansion from Diriyah as a base. Successive imams pursued unification campaigns, capturing Huraymila as the first major town in the , securing voluntary allegiance from al-Quwayiyah, and incorporating in 1773 after overcoming local emirs; by the late , was largely consolidated, with forces numbering tens of thousands drawn from allied tribes like Utaybah and Qhatani. Under bin Muhammad (r. 1765–1803), expansions reached in the east (1790s) and southern regions, while Saud bin (r. 1803–1814) seized Ta'if in 1802, in 1803, and in 1805–1806, dismantling Ottoman-backed Sharifian rule in the Hijaz and imposing Wahhabi governance on pilgrimage routes. These conquests unified disparate Arab tribes under a shared religious-political framework, extending influence into parts of , , and , though internal revolts and overextension strained cohesion. During the Ottoman era, when the empire exerted nominal suzerainty over Arabia since the 16th century—direct in the Hijaz but lax in arid Najd—the Saudi-Wahhabi ascendancy threatened imperial control over holy sites and trade. Ottoman ulema issued fatwas branding Wahhabism as kharijite heresy, prompting Sultan Mahmud II to authorize Muhammad Ali Pasha of Egypt in 1811 to launch the Ottoman-Wahhabi War. Egyptian-Ottoman forces under Tusun Pasha recaptured Mecca and Medina by 1813, then Ibrahim Pasha invaded Najd, defeating Saudi armies at key engagements like the Battle of Wadi al-Safra (1812) and methodically razing resistant settlements. The campaign peaked with a seven-month siege of Diriyah starting in 1818, ending in its bombardment and destruction on September 9, 1818; Imam Abdullah bin Saud surrendered, was escorted to Cairo and then Istanbul, and executed by beheading and impalement in December 1819. The war's outcome fragmented Saudi unity temporarily, scattering Al Saud remnants and imposing Egyptian administration until 1840, yet the Wahhabi ideology persisted among Najdi tribes, preserving a core Saudi ethnoreligious identity rooted in anti-Ottoman resistance and puritanical reform. Ottoman chronicles and Egyptian records attribute Saudi resilience to desert mobility and tribal , while Saudi traditions emphasize defensive against imperial aggression.

Formation of the Modern Kingdom

The Third Saudi State, which evolved into the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, was established through the military campaigns of ibn Abdul Rahman Al Saud (commonly known as ), beginning with the recapture of on January 15, 1902. Leading a force of approximately 40 men, Abdulaziz seized the city from the Al Rashid dynasty, which had dominated since overthrowing the Second Saudi State in 1891, marking the initial step in restoring Al Saud authority in central Arabia. Over the subsequent decades, Abdulaziz consolidated control over through a series of tribal alliances and battles, including the conquest of key oases such as those in Qassim by 1906, leveraging the —a Wahhabi-inspired militia—to enforce loyalty and expand influence. In 1913, he captured Al-Ahsa (Eastern Province) from Ottoman forces, securing coastal access and resources ahead of , during which British support via the 1915 aided his anti-Ottoman efforts without granting formal protectorate status. By 1921, the defeat of the Al Rashid at the ended their rule over , unifying under Al Saud by 1922. The incorporation of the followed in 1924–1925, when Abdulaziz's forces overran Sharif Hussein's Hashemite kingdom—prompted by Hussein's revolt against Ottoman rule and subsequent British backing—capturing in September 1924 and in October, with falling by December; this ended Hashemite control and integrated Islam's holiest sites. Southern regions like were annexed by 1930 through diplomacy and force against local rulers, completing territorial unification. On September 23, 1932, a royal decree proclaimed the Kingdom of , encompassing , , Al-Ahsa, and under centralized monarchical rule, with as king, reflecting a pragmatic blend of Wahhabi ideology, tribal confederation, and strategic conquests rather than ideological purity alone.

Demographics

Population Statistics and Census

The 2022 census, conducted by the General Authority for Statistics (GASTAT), recorded Saudi Arabia's total population at 32,175,224, with Saudi nationals comprising 18,792,262 individuals, or 58.4% of the total. This marked the first fully digital enumeration in the kingdom, utilizing advanced technologies for across households and administrative regions. Non-Saudi residents, primarily workers, accounted for the remaining 13,382,962, highlighting the significant role of foreign labor in the economy. Post-census estimates from GASTAT show continued growth in the Saudi national . In 2023, Saudi nationals numbered 19,245,929, increasing to 19,635,258 by 2024, representing an approximate annual growth rate of 2% driven by natural increase. The total , including non-nationals, reached 35,300,280 in 2024, with Saudis constituting 55.6%. This decline in the Saudi share reflects higher inflows of expatriates amid economic diversification efforts under Vision 2030. Historical provide context for demographic trends. The 2010 backcasted equivalent yielded a total of approximately 24 million, with Saudi nationals around 15.3 million, indicating a 34% increase in total and substantial growth in nationals by 2022.
YearSaudi NationalsTotal Saudi %
202218,792,26232,175,22458.4
202319,245,92933,702,73157.1
202419,635,25835,300,28055.6
Data compiled from GASTAT estimates; growth in Saudi nationals stems primarily from birth rates exceeding 2.0 children per woman, offset partially by and policy-driven expansions.

Urban Saudis

Urban Saudis comprise the majority of Saudi citizens, concentrated in metropolitan areas that drive the Kingdom's economic and administrative functions. As of , rate reached 85.17% of the total , a figure driven by from rural regions and sustained by oil revenues and investments. With Saudi nationals numbering approximately 19.6 million in , the urban subset dominates, primarily in cities like (6.9 million residents per 2022 census data), (3.7 million), (2.4 million), and (1.4 million), where native Saudis form the core citizenry amid labor concentrations. serves as the political capital and largest urban hub, as the commercial gateway via its port, and the Hijazi cities of and as religious centers drawing seasonal influxes that bolster urban economies. Employment among urban Saudis has shifted toward private sector integration through Saudization policies, which mandate quotas for national hires to reduce reliance on foreign workers, who constitute over 80% of private sector labor historically. In Q1 2025, Saudi unemployment fell to 6.8%, with labor force participation at 49.2%, reflecting gains in urban-based services, retail, and emerging industries like and . These policies, accelerated by Vision 2030, target youth in cities, where job creation in projects like aims to generate 325,000 positions, prioritizing Saudi nationals over expatriates. Urban Saudis thus benefit from higher wages and skill development in diversified sectors, though challenges persist in matching educational outputs to market needs. Lifestyle in urban Saudi settings blends conservative Islamic adherence with state-directed modernization. Vision 2030's Quality of Life Program has introduced urban amenities such as cinemas, concerts, and sports facilities since 2018, elevating entertainment options and aiming to extend life expectancy while curbing emigration of youth. Cities feature extensive shopping malls, high-rise developments, and smart city initiatives, with Riyadh and Jeddah exemplifying rapid urban expansion projected to exceed 86% urbanization by 2030. Despite these shifts, daily life enforces gender segregation in public venues, prayer observances, and modest dress, rooted in Wahhabi-influenced norms that remain prevalent even among urban populations exposed to global media. Reforms like women's workforce participation have risen, yet empirical data indicates persistent cultural conservatism, with Vision 2030's top-down approach yielding measurable infrastructure gains but limited grassroots attitudinal change as of 2025.

Bedouin and Rural Saudis

Bedouins, traditionally nomadic pastoralist tribes of descent, have historically dominated the arid interiors of the , including much of modern , where they herded camels, sheep, and goats while following seasonal migration routes dictated by water and pasture availability. Their economy relied on for milk, meat, wool, and transport, supplemented by trade in oasis markets and, prior to the , intertribal raiding for resources and status. Approximately 1.3 million Bedouins reside in , representing roughly 4% of the national population of about 35 million as of 2023. Saudi government policies initiated under King Abdulaziz in 1912 promoted sedentarization through the establishment of hijra settlements, offering land, subsidies, and security in exchange for allegiance and abandonment of nomadic raiding, which facilitated central state control over tribal militias previously allied via the movement. By the mid-20th century, oil revenues funded , , and fodder imports—such as subsidized barley in the 1980s—that accelerated this shift, reducing pure nomadism to a minority while enabling semi-nomadic or fully settled lifestyles integrated with wage labor in agriculture, herding cooperatives, or urban peripheries. Today, while some groups maintain seasonal herding in remote deserts, most live in purpose-built rural villages with access to modern amenities, though tribal genealogies ('asabiyya) continue to influence , marriage, and dispute resolution. Rural Saudis beyond tribes encompass settled agriculturalists and villagers in oases and regions, totaling about 5 million people or 15% of the in 2023, concentrated in provinces like and Al-Qassim where cultivation and small-scale farming predominate using and . Urbanization driven by oil industrialization has halved the rural share since , from over 30% to under 15%, as migration to cities offers better in services and , yet rural areas retain cultural emphasis on networks and conservative Islamic practices. Economic diversification under Vision 2030 has introduced and to rural zones, but persistent challenges include , over-reliance on subsidies, and youth exodus, with rural rates exceeding urban averages despite state welfare programs.

Ethnic Composition and Minorities

The ethnic composition of Saudi citizens is overwhelmingly , comprising approximately 90% of the roughly 18.8 million Saudi nationals recorded in the 2022 census. These descend from pre-Islamic tribal lineages on the , with key subgroups including the Najdi Arabs of the central plateau, who form the core of the ruling Al Saud family and associated tribes; the Hejazi Arabs of the western Hijaz region, historically tied to trade hubs like and ; and the Hasawi Arabs of the oil-rich Eastern Province. Tribal confederations such as Aniza, , and Harb continue to shape , kinship networks, and regional loyalties, though urbanization has diluted nomadic identities among many. Non-Arab ethnic minorities among citizens account for the remaining 10%, primarily of mixed heritage. This group includes , whose ancestors arrived via historical slave trades from (e.g., , ) during the Ottoman era and earlier Islamic expansions, often settling in Hijazi cities and integrating through and intermarriage. Smaller pockets trace to Baloch migrants from the Makran coast (modern ) who gained citizenship through long-term residence and service, as well as limited Persian-descended families from Gulf trade routes. remains rare and restricted, favoring Arab applicants with tribal ties, which limits non-Arab minority growth. Within the Arab majority, sectarian distinctions mark de facto ethnic-like divides, with Twelver Shia Arabs estimated at 10-15% of Saudi citizens, concentrated in the Eastern Province's oases (, Al-Ahsa) and southwestern . These communities, ethnically but culturally influenced by Persian Shia traditions via historical migrations, face systemic underrepresentation in national institutions dominated by Sunni Najdi elites. Ismaili Shia, numbering fewer than 1% and residing in and , represent another marginalized subgroup with distinct ritual practices. Saudi authorities do not enumerate or in censuses, relying instead on data, which obscures precise minority demographics and enables state narratives of homogeneity.

Genetics

Population Structure and Ancestry

Genetic studies reveal that the Saudi Arabian population displays fine-scale structure, with 12 distinct subclusters identified among over 3,000 individuals, largely aligning with tribal regions such as Central, Western, Northern, Southern, and Eastern provinces; the Western cluster exhibits the greatest differentiation due to historical isolation and admixture. Tribal , reinforced by cultural practices, correlates strongly with genetic clustering, as evidenced by pairwise F_ST values ranging from 0.0024 to 0.04 across 28 tribes, with geographic proximity enhancing similarity. High rates of (up to 58%) elevate runs of homozygosity (38-233 Mb per individual), reducing and amplifying substructure, particularly in isolated groups. Autosomal ancestry in Saudis is predominantly Middle Eastern-like (>66% in most clusters), tracing to ancient sources akin to North African Epipaleolithic proxies like , with substantial Levantine contributions (16-28%) from early farming dispersals. Sub-Saharan African admixture varies regionally (4-16%, highest in Western and some Northern clusters), dated to 11-41 generations ago (~300-1000 years), attributable to the ; one cluster shows up to 60% Ethiopian-like input. Minor European (up to 12.7%) and Central/South Asian influences reflect post- gene flow, though Eastern Saudi groups display elevated South Asian signals (up to 23-26% in broader Peninsula contexts). Paternal lineages, as captured by Y-chromosome haplogroups, underscore patrilocal tribal continuity, with J1-M267 dominating at 42% overall, often subclades like P58 (17%) and L65.2 (15%) linked to Semitic expansions in the Peninsula. J2-M172 follows at 14%, with elevated presence relative to , indicating Levantine or Iranian inputs, while E1b1-M2 (8%) reflects African ; rarer R1a-M17 (5%) and K2-M184 (5%) suggest Eurasian dispersals. Tribal-specific variants, such as higher E1 in certain groups, align with oral histories of African origins, though overall biogeographic ascription is 69% Levantine, 14% African, and 17% Eastern. This structure implies a composite ancestry from indigenous Arabian hunter-gatherers, admixed via pastoralist and Islamic-era migrations, with preserving local diversity amid .

Endogamy and Genetic Diversity

Consanguineous marriages remain prevalent in Saudi Arabia, with rates reported between 40% and 61% across various studies, predominantly involving first or second cousins. This practice is deeply rooted in tribal and familial traditions, where endogamy reinforces social cohesion but limits gene flow between groups. The average inbreeding coefficient (F) for the Saudi population is approximately 0.022 to 0.024, indicating moderate to high levels of relatedness compared to global averages. Endogamy contributes to reduced , fostering population substructure with regional isolation and elevated homozygosity. Genetic analyses reveal that cultural practices like marriages have shaped frequencies, increasing the risk of homozygous recessive conditions. This manifests in higher incidences of autosomal recessive disorders, such as metabolic diseases, hemoglobinopathies, and congenital malformations, with accounting for a significant proportion of pediatric genetic cases. Efforts to mitigate these effects include mandatory premarital genetic screening programs introduced in 2004, which have identified carriers of conditions like sickle cell anemia and , though consanguinity rates show limited decline. Despite awareness campaigns, public knowledge of genetic risks remains variable, with studies indicating persistent preferences for endogamous unions due to socioeconomic and cultural factors. Overall, while endogamy preserves , it causally elevates disease burdens through diminished heterozygosity and amplified expression of deleterious alleles.

Religion

Islam as State Religion

The of Governance, enacted in 1992, establishes as the official religion of , declaring the kingdom a Arab whose consists of the and the of the Prophet Muhammad. This foundational principle mandates that all governance derives from Islamic sources, with no codified civil separate from religious texts. Sharia, derived from the and , serves as the primary legal framework, applied by courts in adjudication of disputes and criminal matters as stipulated in Article 48 of the . The state is obligated to protect the Islamic creed, enforce , and promote moral virtues while prohibiting vices, integrating religious doctrine directly into and administration. The monarch, titled Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, derives significant legitimacy from oversight of and , the , reinforcing the intertwining of royal authority with religious guardianship. Public observance of permeates state functions, with the guiding not only personal conduct but also legislative and executive decisions, ensuring alignment with Islamic principles. While recent initiatives under Crown Prince have aimed to promote "moderate " and curtail extremist influences, the constitutional commitment to as supreme remains unaltered, maintaining 's central role without separation between religious and secular spheres. This structure upholds as both a spiritual and political cornerstone, with deviations from subject to state enforcement through religious police and judicial oversight until partial reforms in 2016 devolved some powers.

Wahhabism and Sectarian Practices

, a puritanical reform movement within emphasizing a return to the practices of the (early Muslim generations), was founded by in the in , central Arabia. It gained political power through a 1744 pact with Muhammad bin Saud, ancestor of the ruling Al Saud family, which provided military support for Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's da'wa (call to faith) in exchange for religious legitimacy, establishing the First Saudi State (1744–1818). This alliance fused religious ideology with state expansion, promoting (strict monotheism) by condemning shirk (polytheism) and (innovations), including veneration of saints and visits to graves, which Wahhabis viewed as idolatrous. Sectarian practices under have historically involved , the declaration of fellow Muslims as apostates for perceived deviations, justifying violence against them as . Early Wahhabi forces demolished shrines and mosques associated with Sufi or Shia figures, such as the 1803 sack of , where thousands of Shia were killed and Imam Husayn's looted, reflecting doctrinal rejection of Shia beliefs in imams as infallible and intercessory. In modern , Wahhabi clerics have issued fatwas denouncing Shia as rafidah (rejectors) and Sufis as mushrikun (associators), fostering against 's estimated 10-15% Shia population, concentrated in the Eastern , through restrictions on public rituals like processions and exclusion from senior religious or political roles. Sunni non-Wahhabis, including those following Ash'ari or Sufi orders, faced similar marginalization, with Wahhabi dominance in education and mosques promoting exclusive adherence to Hanbali literalism. Enforcement of Wahhabi norms has been institutionalized through the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (mutaween), the religious police established in the , which until reforms patrolled public spaces to mandate prayer attendance, gender segregation, modest dress, and bans on or mixed gatherings deemed un-Islamic. Incidents included arrests for idleness during prayer times or interactions between unrelated men and women, with peak activity in the 1980s-2000s aligning with post-1979 oil-funded Wahhabi expansion. Under , reforms since 2017 have curtailed mutaween powers, stripping arrest authority in 2016 and redirecting focus to advisory roles, alongside lifting bans on female driving (), cinemas, and concerts, while arresting hardline clerics and revising textbooks to reduce sectarian rhetoric. These changes, framed as returning to "moderate ," aim to dilute Wahhabi influence for economic diversification, though core doctrines remain embedded in state institutions and councils.

Policies Toward Non-Muslims and Apostasy

Saudi Arabia's legal framework, derived from the of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence under law, prohibits the public practice of any religion other than and bans the construction or operation of non-Muslim places of worship. Private religious observance by non-Muslims, primarily workers, is tolerated in compounds or homes but remains subject to restrictions, including bans on proselytizing, importing religious materials, and displaying non-Islamic symbols publicly; violations can lead to , fines, , or . Non-citizen residents carry identity cards designating them as "non-Muslim," which limits access to certain services and reinforces segregation from public religious life. Naturalization for non-Muslims requires , as stipulated by laws that deem applicants ineligible without affirming Islamic faith. The of Governance declares the , with the and as the , imposing a duty on citizens to defend and prohibiting any legislation contradicting principles. Non-Muslim holidays receive no official recognition, and public observance of them is forbidden, though some private accommodations for expatriates have increased under recent reforms, such as limited interfaith dialogues hosted by the since 2019. These changes, however, do not extend to legal protections for non-Islamic practices, and enforcement remains discretionary, often tied to complaints from religious police or authorities. Apostasy, defined under as renunciation of , is punishable by death if the individual refuses to repent after a period of reconsideration, though Saudi courts have not executed anyone for this offense in recent decades; instead, convictions often result in lengthy prison terms, flogging, or pressure to recant. Without a codified penal code, judges apply classical rulings, where by a male adult warrants execution by beheading, while women may face life imprisonment. Children of Muslim fathers are legally considered Muslim, and any deviation constitutes , potentially stripping or custody. Notable cases illustrate enforcement: In 2017, Saudi national Ahmad al-Shammari received a death sentence for after posting videos questioning on , though his status remains unclear as of 2023. In October 2021, Yemeni resident Ali Abu Luhum was sentenced to 15 years in prison for based on alleged posts promoting . Such prosecutions frequently stem from online activity or denunciations, with the government monitoring digital content via the Cybercrime Law, which criminalizes "insulting " with up to five years and fines. Despite Vision 2030's modernization rhetoric, remains a capital offense without legislative repeal, reflecting the enduring primacy of over secular reforms.

Culture and Customs

Language and Oral Traditions

serves as the of , with functioning as the standardized form for official documents, , and . , the liturgical language of the , remains central to religious practice and formal literary expression, preserving its grammatical complexity and vocabulary distinct from colloquial usage. Colloquial speech relies on regional dialects of Peninsular Arabic, varying by geography and tribal affiliation. Najdi Arabic predominates in the central Najd plateau, spoken by about 14.6 million people and characterized by its guttural phonetics and conservative morphology. Hejazi Arabic prevails in the western Hijaz region, including cities like Mecca and Jeddah, with around 10.3 million speakers and influences from trade and pilgrimage. Gulf Arabic occurs in the eastern oil-producing areas, incorporating loanwords from Persian and English due to historical commerce. These dialects exhibit mutual intelligibility to varying degrees but diverge in pronunciation, vocabulary, and syntax from Modern Standard Arabic, often simplifying case endings and verb conjugations. Oral traditions underpin Saudi cultural identity, especially among tribes, where and narrative recitation transmit history, , and moral codes without reliance on written records. , a vernacular Bedouin genre rooted in since at least the , exemplifies this through extemporaneous composition in dialect, employing simple rhyme schemes and meters suited to camel-back recitation. Themes encompass tribal feuds, hospitality, camel lore, and praise of leaders, as in verses appealing to during the kingdom's formation in the . Preservation efforts intensified in the late , with scholars like Saad Abdullah Sowayan documenting thousands of poems to counter urbanization's erosion of oral practice; his 1985 work catalogs as a living archive of pre-oil society. Women's contributions, often performed in segregated gatherings, voice longing, lamentation, and subtle social critique, as collected in studies of southern bards. These traditions persist in festivals and media, though digital recording risks diluting improvisational authenticity.

Dress, Greetings, and Daily Etiquette

Saudi men traditionally wear the , an ankle-length garment made from cotton or wool, often paired with a ghutra () secured by an agal (black cord rope), reflecting both practical adaptation to desert climates and Islamic emphasis on modesty. Women adhere to principles of , typically donning the , a loose black robe covering the body from shoulders to ankles, along with a headscarf; the (face veil leaving eyes visible) is common among conservative Saudis but not universally mandated. Public dress codes enforce modesty, prohibiting tight, revealing, or Western-style clothing that exposes skin beyond hands and face for women or fails to cover knees and shoulders for men, rooted in interpretations prioritizing communal piety over individual expression. Under Vision 2030 reforms initiated in 2016, the mandatory requirement for Saudi women was lifted in , allowing modest alternatives like long dresses provided they cover the body fully and respect Islamic norms, though enforcement varies by and many women continue traditional attire to signal and avoid social scrutiny. Regional variations persist, with Bedouin-influenced northern and central Saudis favoring plainer styles, while urban coastal areas incorporate embroidered or colored elements. Greetings emphasize respect and Islamic salutations, with (peace be upon you) as the standard verbal exchange, replied to with "Wa alaykum as-salam" (and upon you peace), often accompanied by a among men involving sustained and palm-to-palm contact using the right hand. Same-gender acquaintances may exchange three cheek kisses starting from the right, but physical contact between unrelated men and women is prohibited, defaulting to verbal greetings or nods to uphold gender segregation norms derived from interpretations. Elders receive deference through standing, title usage (e.g., "Sheikh" or "Umm" for mothers), and initiating greetings. Daily etiquette revolves around Islamic rituals and tribal hospitality, including pausing for the five daily prayers (), during which public spaces and businesses halt briefly—typically 10-15 minutes each, announced by the call—reflecting the kingdom's 2017 data showing over 90% mosque attendance rates among Saudis. Meals commence with bismillah (in God's name) and use the right hand exclusively for eating from shared dishes, avoiding left-hand contact due to hygiene customs tied to ablution practices; hosts offer multiple rounds of (qahwa) and dates, refusing prematurely signals rudeness. Public behavior prohibits pointing with fingers, displaying shoe soles (symbolizing disdain), or public displays of affection, enforcing communal harmony; alcohol, , and non-halal items remain banned nationwide per 1932 Wahhabi legal codes, with violations punishable under courts. Guests remove shoes upon entering homes, and prolonged social visits—often unannounced—demonstrate tribal bonds, with premature departure avoided to honor diyafa () valued in heritage. Recent Vision 2030 shifts permit cinemas and concerts since 2018, but conservative persists in mixed-gender settings, prioritizing verbal over physical interaction.

Cuisine and Hospitality

Saudi Arabian cuisine emphasizes locally sourced ingredients such as dates, lamb, rice, wheat, and spices, reflecting the arid environment and nomadic heritage that prioritize preservation and portability. Dates, with over 18 varieties cultivated domestically, serve as a staple for their nutritional value, providing carbohydrates and iron, and are consumed daily or used in dishes to break fasts during . , particularly lamb or chicken prepared , features prominently alongside rice and , with meals adhering to Islamic prohibitions on and alcohol. Prominent dishes include , regarded as the national rice preparation, consisting of spiced rice cooked with lamb or , tomatoes, onions, and a spice blend like , often garnished with nuts and raisins. Mandi, a variant from southern regions, involves meat slow-cooked in underground pits for a smoky flavor, served over rice infused with the meat's juices and spices such as and . Jareesh, a traditional from central areas, combines cracked simmered in lamb or with shredded , , and for a hearty, nutrient-dense . Street foods like mutabbaq, thin pancakes filled with minced , eggs, leeks, and sometimes sweetened with sugar, offer portable snacks fried to crispiness. Beverages center on (qahwa), brewed strong with lightly roasted beans and , poured from a dallah pot into small cups without stirring to symbolize equality among guests. This is typically paired with dates or sweets, while provides a protein-rich alternative to water in rural diets, and herbal teas like mint or sage aid digestion post-meal. Hospitality in Saudi culture, derived from tribal and Islamic norms, mandates generous reception of guests through immediate offerings of qahwa and dates upon arrival, viewed as a sacred duty to provide sustenance and protection. Meals are shared communally from large platters using the right hand, with hosts insisting on abundance to honor visitors, minimizing conversation to focus on eating as a sign of respect. Refusing food can offend, as sharing signifies blessing (baraka) and social bonding, rooted in historical desert survival where provisions were extended without expectation of reciprocity. This practice persists in modern settings, where even brief encounters prompt invitations to dine, reinforcing communal ties over individual reserve.

Society

Family Structure and Tribal Loyalties

Saudi families are predominantly patrilineal and patrilocal, with lineage traced through the male line and brides typically relocating to the husband's family residence upon marriage. This structure reinforces patriarchal authority, where the eldest male, often the father or grandfather, holds decision-making power over family matters, including marriages, finances, and residence. Extended family units remain prevalent, particularly in rural and Bedouin communities, encompassing multiple generations under one household or closely linked compounds, though nuclear families are increasingly common in urban centers due to modernization and employment patterns. The average household size for Saudi-headed families stood at 4.8 persons in 2022, reflecting a decline from 6.45 in 2010 amid and demographic shifts, yet still larger than global norms due to cultural emphasis on familial interdependence. hierarchies prioritize age, gender, and proximity of relation, with senior males exercising authority over younger members and women, fostering for welfare, , and . Family loyalty supersedes individual , manifesting in arranged marriages to strengthen alliances and obligations to support kin financially or socially, which can perpetuate within clans. Tribal affiliations underpin much of Saudi social organization, drawing from heritage where asabiyyah—group solidarity rooted in shared descent—drives mutual defense, resource sharing, and identity. comprises over 100 s, organized into confederations like the Qahtan and , with the Al Saud royal family originating from the , leveraging these ties to consolidate power since the kingdom's founding in 1932. Tribal sheikhs mediate local governance, customs, and conflicts, maintaining influence despite state centralization, as loyalty to often mediates interactions with national institutions. In contemporary Saudi politics and security, tribal loyalties shape recruitment and patronage, notably in the (SANG), established from loyal fighters and expanded to incorporate tribal contingents for regime protection. The SANG, numbering around 100,000 personnel as of recent estimates, prioritizes fighters from vetted tribes to ensure fidelity, countering potential factionalism while distributing oil revenues through tribal subsidies and appointments. This integration tempers asabiyyah's divisive potential—such as inter-tribal rivalries—by aligning it with monarchical stability, though it sustains nepotistic networks that can undermine merit-based administration. State efforts under Vision 2030 seek to dilute exclusive via promotion, yet empirical persistence of these loyalties underscores their causal role in social cohesion and political resilience.

Gender Roles and Recent Reforms

In traditional Saudi society, gender roles have been shaped by interpretations of law emphasizing male guardianship (wilaya), under which adult women require permission from a male relative—typically a father, husband, or brother—for major life decisions, including , abroad, and certain . This system positions men as providers and protectors, with women primarily responsible for domestic duties, child-rearing, and family honor preservation, often reinforced by gender segregation (ikhtilat avoidance) in public spaces and strict dress codes like the for women. Social norms historically limited women's public participation, with pre-2010s female labor force participation below 20%, reflecting cultural expectations of familial seclusion over economic independence. Since Mohammed bin Salman's 2017 ascent and Vision 2030 launch, reforms have targeted women's mobility and economic roles to reduce oil dependency and boost GDP through female workforce integration. A September 2017 royal decree ended the women's driving ban, effective June 24, 2018, allowing over 1 million Saudi women to obtain licenses by 2020 and facilitating greater employment access. In August 2019, regulations permitted women aged 21 and older to travel independently without guardian consent, register births and deaths, and apply for passports or jobs autonomously, though familial disputes can still invoke guardianship. Additional measures included opening cinemas to mixed audiences in 2018, permitting women to attend sports events from 2018, and easing business startup requirements, contributing to female entrepreneurship growth. These changes have driven measurable gains in labor participation, rising from approximately 17% in to 36% by , per official General Authority for Statistics (GASTAT) data, with among Saudi women falling to 13% in 2024 from 19% in 2022. Sectors like retail, healthcare, and saw increased female hires, supported by incentives such as female-only workspaces and training programs, though participation remains lower than the 40% Vision 2030 target. Despite progress, the 2022 Personal Status Law codified guardianship in family matters, requiring male consent for women's marriage and affirming men's authority in divorce, child custody, and inheritance—where women inherit half of male shares—thus perpetuating legal inequalities. Enforcement varies regionally, with conservative areas resisting reforms, and reports indicate ongoing detentions of women's rights advocates, such as those protesting guardianship pre-2019, highlighting tensions between state directives and entrenched tribal-patriarchal norms. Cultural surveys show 29% of Saudi women in 2023 prioritizing traditional roles, up from 21% in 2020, suggesting partial retrenchment amid rapid change.

Education, Employment, and Social Mobility

Saudi Arabia's adult rate reached 98% in 2020, reflecting significant improvements from earlier decades through expanded public initiatives. Primary and enrollment rates are near universal, with gross enrollment exceeding 99% for boys and 96% for girls, supported by policies up to age 15. has expanded rapidly, with approximately 1 million students enrolled in universities and colleges as of recent years, across about 60 institutions, over 70% of which are public. However, international assessments indicate challenges in educational ; in the 2022 tests, Saudi students scored 389 in , 390 in science, and lower in reading, below the average of around 470-480 across subjects, suggesting gaps in and problem-solving skills despite high enrollment. Employment among Saudis has improved markedly under policies, which mandate quotas for national hires in the to reduce reliance on labor. The unemployment rate for Saudi nationals fell to 7% in the fourth quarter of 2024, a historic low achieved ahead of Vision 2030 targets, down from 12.8% in , with nearly 2.5 million Saudis employed in roles. These policies include sector-specific requirements, such as 30% for firms with over 100 employees or certain professions like technical engineering, enforced through the Nitaqat system. Women's labor force participation has risen to 36.2% as of late 2024, with an employment-to-population ratio of 31.3%, driven by reforms easing guardianship restrictions and promoting female inclusion, though female remains higher at 11.9%. Public-sector jobs historically dominate Saudi employment preferences, but diversification under Vision 2030 is shifting patterns toward services and non-oil industries. Social mobility in Saudi society is constrained by factors including and tribal affiliations, which influence access to opportunities, alongside a of 45.6 in 2019 indicating moderate income inequality comparable to many emerging economies. Oil revenues have historically provided subsidies and welfare that mitigate absolute , but intergenerational mobility remains limited, with public-sector often favoring connections over merit. Recent reforms, including merit-based hiring in and expanded vocational , aim to enhance mobility, though empirical on upward movement is sparse; the projected Gini decline to 0.41 by 2025 suggests gradual equalization through economic diversification. Tribal loyalties continue to play a role in and political networks, potentially perpetuating disparities despite policy efforts to prioritize qualifications.

Modern Developments and Controversies

Vision 2030 Reforms

, unveiled on April 25, 2016, by Crown Prince , represents a comprehensive national strategy to reduce oil dependency, enhance economic diversification, and promote social modernization. The framework rests on three pillars—a vibrant society, a thriving , and an ambitious nation—aiming to elevate living standards, expand contributions to GDP from 40% to 65%, and triple to 5.7% of GDP by 2030. Social reforms under the vibrant society pillar have dismantled longstanding restrictions, including the June 2018 decree permitting women to drive, which ended a decades-old and boosted female workforce participation. Cinemas reopened in April 2018 after a 35-year ban, with plans for over 300 theaters by 2030, alongside approvals for public concerts and mixed-gender events that have drawn millions of attendees. These changes, coupled with e-visa programs introduced in 2019, have expanded , targeting 100 million annual visitors by 2030 and generating SAR 1.87 trillion in investments for projects like the development. Education initiatives emphasize quality improvement, with increased enrollment in higher education and programs to align curricula with labor market needs. Economic measures prioritize non-oil growth, achieving sustained annual rates of 4.5-5.5% through sectors like , , and , supported by the National Industrial Development and Logistics Program. fell to 7% by late 2024, reflecting policies that mandate higher citizen hiring quotas in private firms. Mega-projects such as , a planned $500 billion futuristic city, and aim to create jobs and attract investment, though officials acknowledged delays in some initiatives by 2023 due to fiscal adjustments. Despite progress, oil revenues constituted over 60% of budget income in 2024, underscoring persistent challenges in full diversification. The ambitious nation pillar focuses on governance efficiency, with digital transformations and anti-corruption drives enhancing transparency, though implementation has varied across programs. Overall, Vision 2030 has accelerated and regulatory reforms, including enhancements to draw foreign capital, yet analysts note that achieving non-oil dominance requires sustained high investment amid global energy transitions. The is derived from (Islamic law), primarily the of Sunni jurisprudence, with the and (traditions of the Prophet Muhammad) serving as the foundational sources rather than a codified . The judiciary operates under an , where the king holds ultimate authority, and judges (qadis) apply Sharia principles without precedent or jury trials; recent Vision 2030 initiatives have introduced partial codification of laws, such as personal status regulations, while retaining Sharia as the core framework. This system prescribes punishments for offenses like theft (amputation), adultery (stoning or lashing), and (death), though application varies and international scrutiny has prompted some restrictions, such as limiting death penalties to intentional murder or under royal decrees since 2020. Human rights concerns persist due to the system's emphasis on religious conformity and state security over individual liberties. remains prevalent, with executing 345 individuals in 2024—the highest toll in over three decades—primarily for drug offenses, , and , often via beheading; by August 2025, at least 239 executions occurred, including for non-violent drug crimes despite promises to curtail such uses. Flogging, another Sharia-prescribed penalty, continues for acts like public dissent or alcohol consumption, though instances have declined amid reforms; reports from organizations like document cases, but these groups' focus on punitive aspects may overlook contextual enforcement disparities compared to state-reported data. Women's rights are constrained by the male guardianship system, codified in the 2022 Personal Status Law, which requires male approval for marriage, travel (for minors), and certain medical decisions, treating women as legal dependents despite reforms. Progress includes the 2018 lifting of the driving ban, enabling over 2 million women to obtain licenses by 2023, and permissions for women over 21 to travel or work without guardian consent in some cases; however, activists advocating these changes, such as those arrested in 2018, faced imprisonment for "undermining national security," highlighting tensions between reform rhetoric and enforcement. Freedoms of expression and religion face severe restrictions, with public practice limited to and non-Muslims prohibited from ; the U.S. State Department reported ongoing arrests for online criticism in 2023-2024, including death sentences for tweets deemed insulting to the . Trials lack guarantees, such as access to evidence or appeals in specialized courts for , leading to convictions based on confessions potentially obtained under duress; while Vision 2030 has expanded some cultural expressions, remains punishable, as evidenced by the 2024 sentencing of brothers for posts. These practices reflect a prioritization of stability and Islamic , with reports from Western governments and NGOs indicating limited accountability, though Saudi officials attribute high punishment rates to combating crime and extremism.

Economic Role and Global Perceptions

Saudi Arabia's , in which its citizens play a central role as beneficiaries and participants, expanded by 1.3% in , reaching approximately $1.09 in nominal GDP, with non-oil sectors driving 4.3% growth amid a 4.5% contraction in oil activities. Hydrocarbons continue to underpin fiscal stability, contributing 22.3% to GDP and around 55% to government revenues, though non-oil revenues rose to 40% of total government income by as part of diversification efforts. Saudi nationals, comprising about 60% of the , have historically dominated jobs, which provide stable and benefits funded by oil rents, while workers—estimated at over 7 million—fill much of the private sector's labor needs in construction, services, and low-skill roles. This division reflects a rentier where citizens receive subsidies, housing support, and , fostering low incentives for private sector engagement until recent reforms. The policy, formalized under the Nitaqat system since 2011, mandates quotas for Saudi employment in the to reduce reliance on foreign labor and boost national productivity, requiring firms with over 100 employees to maintain at least 30% Saudi nationals and expanding to 269 professions by 2025. Progress under Vision 2030 has increased participation, surpassing targets for private contribution to GDP at 40% by 2024 and reducing overall to 7%, though and rates remain challenges addressed through incentives like higher minimum wages for Saudis compared to expatriates. Expatriates, vital for economic output in oil extraction and , remit billions annually—over $4 billion in May 2025 alone—highlighting their role in sustaining growth while Saudis transition toward higher-value sectors like and . Globally, —led by its citizens in governance and decision-making—commands influence as the world's largest oil exporter and de facto swing producer, holding 11% of global production share in 2024 and shaping prices through coordinated cuts or hikes to balance supply amid demand fluctuations. This position generates substantial revenues, estimated at $179 billion from crude exports in 2024, bolstering into sovereign investments and U.S. Treasury holdings. Perceptions of this role vary: Western economies value Saudi stability for , yet criticize strategies as market-distorting, with surveys showing only 27% U.S. favorability toward as of 2013, linked to overshadowed by geopolitical tensions. In the , views have softened from earlier lows but remain mixed, with Saudi economic reforms under Vision 2030—aiming for a post-oil through projects like —gaining recognition for ambition, though skepticism persists regarding sustainability given persistent oil dependence and fiscal deficits. Overall, Saudis are perceived as stewards of a resource-driven powerhouse transitioning toward diversification, with global partners prioritizing pragmatic energy ties over ideological critiques.

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