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One-state solution
One-state solution
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The one-state solution is a proposed approach to the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. It stipulates the establishment of a single state within the boundaries of the former Mandatory Palestine, today consisting of the combined territory of modern-day Israel (excluding the annexed Golan Heights) and Palestine.[1][2] The term one-state reality describes the belief that the current situation of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict on the ground is that of one de facto country.[3] The one-state solution is sometimes referred to as the bi-national state, owing to the hope that it would successfully deliver self-determination to Israelis and Palestinians in one country, thus granting both peoples independence as well as absolute access to all of the land.

Various models have been proposed for implementing the one-state solution.[4]

  • One such model is the unitary state, which would comprise a single government with citizenship and equal rights for every ethnic and religious group in the land,[4] similar to the legal arrangement of the British Mandate for Palestine. Some Israelis advocate a version of this model in which Israel annexes the West Bank (but not the Gaza Strip) and grants Israeli citizenship to all of the Palestinians living there, thereby integrating the region and gaining a larger Arab minority, but remaining a Jewish and democratic state.[5]
  • A second model calls for Israel to annex the West Bank and integrate it as a Palestinian autonomous region.[4] 
  • A third model involves creating a federal state with a central government and federative districts, some of which would be Israeli and others Palestinian.[5][6]
  • A fourth model, described by the Israeli–Palestinian peace movement A Land for All, involves the establishment of a confederation in which independent Israeli and Palestinian states share powers in some areas, and giving Israelis and Palestinians residency rights in each other's states.[7][8]

Though increasingly debated in academic circles, the one-state solution has remained outside the range of official diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict, as it has historically been eclipsed by the two-state solution. According to the most recent joint survey of the Palestinian–Israeli Pulse in 2023, support for a democratic one-state solution stands at 23% among Palestinians and 20% among Israeli Jews. A non-equal non-democratic one-state solution remains more popular among both populations, supported by 30% of Palestinians and 37% of Israeli Jews.[9] A Palestinian poll in September 2024 revealed that only 10% of respondents supported a single state that would provide equal rights for both Israelis and Palestinians.[10]

Overview

[edit]
Map of Israel, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights

The "one-state solution" refers to a resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict through the creation of a unitary, federal or confederate Israeli–Palestinian state, which would encompass all of the present territory of Israel, the West Bank including East Jerusalem, and potentially the Gaza Strip and Golan Heights. Depending on various points of view, a one-state solution is presented as a situation in which Israel would ostensibly lose its character as a Jewish state and the Palestinians would fail to achieve their national independence within a two-state solution,[11] or as the best, most just, and only way to resolve the conflict.

Historical background

[edit]

Antiquity until World War I

[edit]

The area between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River has been controlled by various national groups throughout history. A number of groups, including the Canaanites, the Israelites (who later became the Jews),[12] the Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Jews, Romans, Byzantines, Umayyads, Abbasids, Seljuk Turks, Crusaders, Mamluks, Ottomans, the British, Israelis, Jordanians, and Egyptians have controlled the region at one time or another. From 1516 until the end of World War I, the region was controlled by the Ottoman Empire.[13]

Ottoman and later British control

[edit]

From 1915 to 1916, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, corresponded by letters with Sayyid Hussein bin Ali, the father of Pan Arabism. These letters were later known as the Hussein–McMahon Correspondence. McMahon promised Hussein and his Arab followers the territory of the Ottoman Empire in exchange for assistance in driving out the Ottoman Turks. Hussein interpreted these letters as promising the region of Palestine to the Arabs. McMahon and the Churchill White Paper maintained that Palestine had been excluded from the territorial promises,[14] but minutes of a Cabinet Eastern Committee meeting held on 5 December 1918 confirmed that Palestine had been part of the area that had been pledged to Hussein in 1915.[15]

In 1916, Britain and France signed the Sykes–Picot Agreement, which divided the colonies of the Ottoman Empire between them. Under this agreement, the region of Palestine would be controlled by Britain.[16] In a 1917 letter from Arthur James Balfour to Lord Rothschild, known as the Balfour Declaration, the British government "view[ed] with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people", but at the same time required "that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine".[17]

In 1922, the League of Nations granted Britain a mandate for Palestine. Like all League of Nations Mandates, this mandate derived from article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, which called for the self-determination of former Ottoman Empire colonies after a transitory period administered by a world power.[18] The Palestine Mandate recognized the Balfour Declaration and required that the mandatory government "facilitate Jewish immigration" while at the same time "ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced".[19]

Resentment over Zionist plans led to an outbreak of Arab-Jewish violence in the Palestine Riots of 1920. Violence erupted again the following year during the Jaffa Riots. In response to these riots, Britain established the Haycraft Commission of Inquiry. The British Mandatory authorities put forward proposals for setting up an elected legislative council in Palestine. In 1924 the issue was raised at a conference held by Ahdut Ha'avodah at Ein Harod. Shlomo Kaplansky, a veteran leader of Poalei Zion, argued that a Parliament, even with an Arab majority, was the way forward. David Ben-Gurion, the emerging leader of the Yishuv, succeeded in getting Kaplansky's ideas rejected.[20] Violence erupted again in the form of the 1929 Palestine riots. After the violence, the British led another commission of inquiry under Sir Walter Shaw. The report of the Shaw Commission, known as the Shaw Report or Command Paper No 3530, attributed the violence to "the twofold fear of the Arabs that, by Jewish immigration and land purchase, they might be deprived of their livelihood and, in time, pass under the political domination of the Jews".[21]

How UN members voted on the partition of Mandatory Palestine in 1947
  In favour
  Abstained
  Against
  Absent

Violence erupted again during the 1936–39 Arab revolt in Palestine. The British established the Peel Commission, which recommended partition of Palestine. While the Jewish community largely supported the concept of partition, but the Arab community entirely rejected the Peel Partition Plan. The partition plan was abandoned, and Britain issued its White Paper of 1939, which sought to accommodate Arab demands regarding Jewish immigration by placing a quota of 10,000 Jewish immigrants per year over a five-year period from 1939 to 1944. It also required Arab consent for further Jewish immigration. The White Paper was seen by the Jewish community as a revocation of the Balfour Declaration, and due to Jewish persecution in the Holocaust, Jews continued to immigrate illegally in what has become known as Aliyah Bet.[22]

Continued violence and the heavy cost of World War II prompted Britain to turn over the issue of Palestine to the United Nations in 1947. In its debates, the UN divided its member States into two subcommittees: one to address options for partition and a second to address all other options. The Second Subcommittee, which included all the Arab and Muslim States members, issued a long report arguing that partition was illegal according to the terms of the Mandate and proposing a unitary democratic state that would protect rights of all citizens equally.[23] The General Assembly instead voted for partition and in UN General Assembly Resolution 181 recommended that the Mandate territory of Palestine be partitioned into a Jewish state and an Arab state. The Jewish community accepted the 1947 partition plan, and declared independence as the State of Israel in 1948. The Arab community rejected the partition plan, and army units from five Arab countries – Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Transjordan, and Egypt – contributed to a united Arab army that attempted to invade the territory, resulting in the 1948 Arab–Israeli War.

Establishment of Israel

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The 1948 Arab–Israeli War resulted in Israel's establishment as well as the flight or expulsion of over 700,000 Palestinians from the territory that became Israel. During the following years, a large population of Jews living in Arab nations (close to 800,000) left or were expelled from their homes in what has become known as the Modern Jewish Exodus and subsequently resettled in the new State of Israel.

By 1948, in the wake of the Holocaust, Jewish support for partition and a Jewish state had become overwhelming. Nevertheless, some Jewish voices still argued for unification. The International Jewish Labor Bund was against the UN vote on the partition of Palestine and reaffirmed its support for a single binational state that would guarantee equal national rights for Jews and Arabs and would be under the control of superpowers and the UN. The 1948 New York Second world conference of the International Jewish Labor Bund condemned the proclamation of the Jewish state, because the decision exposed the Jews in Palestine to danger. The conference was in favour of a binational state built on the base of national equality and democratic federalism.[24]

A one-state, one-nation solution where Arabic-speaking Palestinians would adopt a Hebrew-speaking Israeli identity (although not necessarily the Jewish religion) was advocated within Israel by the Canaanite movement of the 1940s and 1950s, as well as more recently in the Engagement Movement led by Tsvi Misinai.

Palestinian views on a binational state

[edit]

Prior to the 1960s, no solution to the conflict in which Arabs and Jews would share a binational state was accepted among Palestinians. The only viable solution from the Palestinian point of view would be an Arab state in which European immigrants would have second-class status. The Palestinian position evolved following Israel's victory in the Six-Day War, when it became no longer realistic to expect the militarily powerful and densely populated Jewish state to disappear. Eventually, Palestinian leadership committed to the idea of a two-state solution.[25] But according to a poll taken by the Palestine Center for Public Opinion in 2020, around 10% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza believe that working towards a binational state should be a top priority.[26]

One-state debate since 2009

[edit]

A poll conducted in 2010 by Israel Democracy Institute suggested that 15% of right-wing Jewish Israelis and 16% of left-wing Jewish Israelis support a binational state solution over a two states solution based on 1967 lines. According to the same poll, 66% of Jewish Israelis preferred the two-state solution.[27]

Some Israeli government spokespeople have also proposed that Palestinian-majority areas of Israel, such as the area around Umm el-Fahm, be annexed to the new Palestinian state. As this measure would cut these areas off permanently from the rest of Israel's territory, including the coastal cities and other Palestinian towns and villages, Palestinians view this with alarm. Many Palestinian citizens of Israel would therefore prefer a one-state solution because this would allow them to sustain their Israeli citizenship.[28]

Some Israeli Jews and Palestinians who oppose a one-state solution have nevertheless come to believe that it may come to pass.[11] Israeli Prime Minister Olmert argued, in a 2007 interview with the Israeli daily Ha'aretz, that without a two-state agreement Israel would face "a South African-style struggle for equal voting rights" in which case "Israel [would be] finished".[29] This echoes comments made in 2004 by Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei, who said that if Israel failed to conclude an agreement with the Palestinians, that the Palestinians would pursue a single, bi-national state.[30] In November 2009, Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat proposed the adoption of the one-state solution if Israel did not halt settlement construction: "[Palestinians must] refocus their attention on the one-state solution where Muslims, Christians and Jews can live as equals. ... It is very serious. This is the moment of truth for us."[31]

Support for a one-state solution is increasing[when?] as Palestinians, frustrated by lack of progress in negotiations aiming to establish the two-state solution, increasingly see the one-state solution as an alternative way forward.[32][33] In 2016, then-U.S. Vice President Joe Biden said that due to expanding settlements, an eventual "one-state reality" was the most likely outcome.[34]

In a 2021 survey of experts on the Middle East, 59 percent described the current situation as "a one-state reality akin to apartheid" and an additional 7 percent "one-state reality with inequality, but not akin to apartheid". If a two-state solution is not achieved, 77 percent predict "a one-state reality akin to apartheid" and 17 percent "one-state reality with increasing inequality, but not akin to apartheid"; just 1 percent think a binational state with equal rights for all inhabitants is likely. 52 percent say that the two-state solution is no longer possible.[35]

Arguments

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In favor

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Today, the proponents for the one-state solution include Palestinian author Ali Abunimah, Palestinian writer and political scientist Abdalhadi Alijla, Palestinian-American producer Jamal Dajani, Palestinian lawyer Michael Tarazi,[36] American-Israeli anthropologist Jeff Halper, Israeli writer Dan Gavron,[37] Lebanese-American academic Saree Makdisi,[38] and Israeli journalist Gideon Levy.[39][40] In an op-ed for The New York Times in 2004, Tarazi opined that the expansion of the Israeli settler movement, especially in the West Bank, was a rationale for bi-nationalism and the increased infeasibility of the two-state alternative:

"Support for one state is hardly a radical idea; it is simply the recognition of the uncomfortable reality that Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories already function as a single state. They share the same aquifers, the same highway network, the same electricity grid and the same international borders... The one-state solution... neither destroys the Jewish character of the Holy Land nor negates the Jewish historical and religious attachment (although it would destroy the superior status of Jews in that state). Rather, it affirms that the Holy Land has an equal Christian and Muslim character. For those who believe in equality, this is a good thing."[41]

Advocates of this solution push for a secular and democratic state while still maintaining a Jewish presence and culture in the region.[42] They concede that this alternative will erode the dream of Jewish supremacy in terms of governance in the long run.[42]

Hamas has at times ruled out a two-state solution, and at other times endorsed the possibility of a two-state solution.[43][44] Hamas co-founder Mahmoud Al-Zahar has been cited saying he "did not rule out the possibility of having Jews, Muslims and Christians living under the sovereignty of an Islamic state."[45] The Palestinian Islamic Jihad, for its part, rejects a two-state solution; its leader Khalid al-Batsh stated that "The idea cannot be accepted and we believe that the entire Palestine is Arab and Islamic land and belongs to the Palestinian nation."[46]

In 2003, Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi proposed a one-state solution known as the Isratin proposal.[1] Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei and former president Ebrahim Raisi both expressed their support for a one-state solution, in which Palestine would become the sole legitimate government of Israel.[47][48]

John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago argues that continued settlement expansion has made a two-state solution unlikely, leading toward a de facto binational state. He contends that U.S. policy regarding Israeli settlements has contributed to this outcome and could create long-term demographic and political challenges for Israel.[49]

The left

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Since 1999, interest has been renewed in bi-nationalism or a unitary democratic state. That year, Palestinian activist Edward Said wrote, "[A]fter 50 years of Israeli history, classic Zionism has provided no solution to the Palestinian presence. I therefore see no other way than to begin now to speak about sharing the land that has thrust us together, sharing it in a truly democratic way with equal rights for all citizens."[50]

In October 2003, New York University scholar Tony Judt broke ground in his article, "Israel: The Alternative" in the New York Review of Books, in which he argued that Israel is an "anachronism" in sustaining an ethnic identity for the state and that the two-state solution is fundamentally doomed and unworkable.[51] The Judt article engendered considerable debate in the UK and the US, and The New York Review of Books received more than 1,000 letters per week about the essay. A month later, political scientist Virginia Tilley published "The One-State Solution" in the London Review of Books (followed by a book with the same title in 2005), arguing that West Bank settlements had made a two-state solution impossible and that the international community must accept a one-state solution as the de facto reality.[52][53]

Leftist journalists from Israel, such as Haim Hanegbi and Daniel Gavron, have called for the public to "face the facts" and accept the binational solution. On the Palestinian side, similar voices have been raised.

In 2013, professor Ian Lustick wrote in The New York Times that the "fantasy" of a two-state solution prevented people from working on solutions that might really work. Lustick argued that people who assume Israel will persist as a Zionist project should consider how quickly the Soviet, Pahlavi Iranian, apartheid South African, Baathist Iraqi and Yugoslavian states unraveled. Lustick concludes that while it may not arise without "painful stalemates", a one-state solution may be a way to eventual Palestinian independence.[54]

The Israeli right

[edit]
Area C of the West Bank, controlled by Israel, in blue and red, December 2011

In recent years, some politicians and political commentators on the right have advocated for annexing the West Bank and extending Israeli citizenship to its Palestinian residents while maintaining Israel's identity as a Jewish state with recognized minority rights. These proposals typically exclude the Gaza Strip, due to its large and generally hostile Palestinian population and its lack of any Israeli settlements or permanent military presence.[55] Prominent political figures who have supported some form of a one-state solution include former defense minister Moshe Arens,[56] former President Reuven Rivlin[57] and Uri Ariel.[58]

Likud MK Tzipi Hotovely has argued that Jordan was originally intended as the Arab state in the British Mandate of Palestine and has called for Israel to annex the West Bank as part of the historic Land of Israel.[59] Naftali Bennett, later Prime Minister and a figure in many Likud-led coalitions, has proposed annexing Area C of the West Bank, which comprises about 60% of the West Bank land and is currently under Israeli control as per the Oslo Accords.[60]

Debates over the feasibility of annexation have often included discussions about Palestinian demographics. According to a Begin–Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) study,[61] the 2004 Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza stood at 2.5 million and not the 3.8 million claimed by the Palestinians. Some commentators, including journalist Caroline Glick in her 2014 book The Israeli Solution, have questioned the accuracy of population figures provided by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). Glick argued that earlier surveys overestimated the Palestinian population by including people living abroad, double-counting Jerusalem residents, and projecting birthrates and immigration that did not materialize. Based on this critique, Glick contended that annexation would not significantly alter Israel’s Jewish majority and could provide a framework for protecting minority rights under a single political system rooted in Jewish values.[62] However, the demographic data from the PCBS are generally supported by Israeli demographers backed by Arnon Soffer and align closely with official Israeli estimates. In 2015, Sergio DellaPergola reported 5,698,500 Arabs living in Israel and the Palestinian territories, compared to a core Jewish population of 6,103,200.[63]

Against

[edit]

Critics[which?] argue that it would make Israeli Jews an ethnic minority[64][65] in the territory of Israel, currently a Jewish State legally defined as a "nation-state of the Jewish people". The high total fertility rate among Palestinians accompanied by a return of Palestinian refugees, would quickly render Jews a minority, according to Sergio DellaPergola, an Israeli demographer and statistician.[66]

Critics[which?] have also argued that Jews, like any other nation, have the right to self-determination, and that due to still existing antisemitism, there is a need for a Jewish national home.[67][68]

The Reut Institute expands on these concerns of many Israeli Jews and says that a one-state scenario without any institutional safeguards would negate Israel's status as a homeland for the Jewish people.[11] When proposed as a political solution by non-Israelis, the assumption is that the idea is probably being put forward by those who are politically motivated to harm Israel and, by extension, Israeli Jews.[11] They argue that the absorption of millions of Palestinians, along with a right of return for Palestinian refugees, and the generally high birthrate among Palestinians would quickly render Jews an ethnic minority and eliminate their rights to self-determination.[11]

Israeli historian and politician Shlomo Ben-Ami, who served as Foreign Minister of Israel, dismissed the one-state solution as "ivory tower nonsense" and said that it creates a "South Africa situation without a South Africa solution."[69]

In an interview with Jeffrey Goldberg, Hussein Ibish claimed that it is not realistic for Israel to be compelled to accept a binational solution with full right of return for refugees through international pressure or sanctions. According to Ibish, if a one state solution was to happen, it would come as a result of the status quo continuing, and the result would be a protracted civil war, with each intifada more violent than the last, and the conflict growing more and more religious in nature. Ibish speculated that in such a scenario, it could even go beyond an ethno-national war between Israelis and Palestinians into a religious war between Jews and Muslims, with Israeli Jews ending up under siege and relying on their nuclear weapons for protection.[70]

Academia

[edit]

Former New Historian Benny Morris has argued that the one-state solution is not viable because of Arab unwillingness to accept a Jewish national presence in the Middle East.[71] Morris argues any such state would be an authoritarian, fundamentalist state with a persecuted Jewish minority, citing the racism and persecution minorities face throughout the Arab and Muslim world, and writing that "Western liberals [...] refuse to recognize that peoples, for good historical, cultural, and social reasons are different and behave differently in similar or identical sets of circumstances." He notes the differences between Israeli Jewish society, which remains largely Westernized and secular, and Palestinian society, which according to Morris is increasingly Islamic and fundamentalist. He pointed to Hamas' 2007 takeover of Gaza, during which Fatah prisoners were shot in the knees and thrown off buildings, and the regular honor killings of women that permeate Palestinian and Israeli-Arab society, as evidence that Palestinian Muslims have no respect for Western values. He thus claimed that "the mindset and basic values of Israeli Jewish society and Palestinian Muslim society are so different and mutually exclusive as to render a vision of binational statehood tenable only in the most disconnected and unrealistic of minds."[citation needed]

According to Morris, the goal of a "secular democratic Palestine" was invented to appeal to Westerners, and while a few supporters of the one-state solution may honestly believe in such an outcome, the realities of Palestinian society mean that "the phrase objectively serves merely as camouflage for the goal of a Muslim Arab–dominated polity to replace Israel." Morris argued that should a binational state ever emerge, many Israeli Jews would likely emigrate to escape the "stifling darkness, intolerance, authoritarianism, and insularity of the Arab world and its treatment of minority populations", with only those incapable of finding new host countries to resettle in and Ultra-Orthodox Jews remaining behind.[72][page needed]

Some argue that Jews would face the threat of genocide. Writing on Arutz Sheva, Steven Plaut referred to the one-state solution as the "Rwanda Solution", and wrote that the implementation of a one-state solution in which a Palestinian majority would rule over a Jewish minority would eventually lead to a "new Holocaust".[73] Morris argued that while the Palestinians would have few moral inhibitions over the destruction of Israeli-Jewish society through mass murder or expulsion, fear of international intervention would probably stymie such an outcome.[72]

Some critics[which?][74] argue that unification cannot happen without damaging or destroying Israel's democracy. The vast majority of Israeli Jews as well as Israeli Druze, some Israeli Bedouin, many Israeli Christian Arabs and even some non-Bedouin Israeli Muslim Arabs fear the consequences of amalgamation with the mostly Muslim Palestinian population in the occupied territories, which they perceive as more religious and conservative. (All Israeli Druze men and small numbers of Bedouin men serve in the Israel Defense Forces and there are sometimes rifts between these groups and Palestinians).[75] [failed verification] One poll found that, in a future Palestinian state, 23% of Palestinians want civil law only, 35% want both Islamic and civil law, and 38% want Islamic law only.[76] This negative view of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza prompts some critics to argue that the existing level of rights and equality for all Israeli citizens would be put in jeopardy with unification.[77] Benny Morris echoes these claims, arguing that Palestinian Muslims, who would become the ruling majority in any such state, are deeply religious and do not have any tradition of democratic governance.

In response to the common argument given by proponents of the one state solution that Israel's settlements have become so entrenched in the West Bank that a Palestinian state is effectively impossible, scholars such as Norman Finkelstein and Noam Chomsky have countered that it is far more unrealistic to expect Israel to accept a one-state solution that would spell the end of Zionism than it is to expect it to dismantle some settlements. Nathan Thrall has argued that Israel could implement a unilateral withdrawal at any time of its choosing and that the facts on the ground suggest that a single state is a remote possibility, writing that:

Israelis and Palestinians are now farther from a single state than they have been at any time since the occupation began in 1967. Walls and fences separate Israel from Gaza and more than 90% of the West Bank. Palestinians have a quasi-state in the occupied territories, with its own parliament, courts, intelligence services and foreign ministry. Israelis no longer shop in Nablus and Gaza the way they did before the Oslo accords. Palestinians no longer travel freely to Tel Aviv. And the supposed reason that partition is often claimed to be impossible – the difficulty of a probable relocation of more than 150,000 settlers – is grossly overstated: in the 1990s, Israel absorbed several times as many Russian immigrants, many of them far more difficult to integrate than settlers, who already have Israeli jobs, fully formed networks of family support and a command of Hebrew.[78]

Rashid Khalidi argued in 2011 that Israel and the Palestinian territories already functioned as a single state exercising control over populations with unequal legal status. He attributed the failure of the peace process to continued Israeli settlement expansion and expressed skepticism about the feasibility of a two-state solution.[79]

Shaul Arieli has likewise argued that the settlement enterprise has failed to create the appropriate conditions to prevent a contiguous Palestinian state or to implement the annexation of the West Bank. He has noted that the settlers comprise only 13.5% of the West Bank's population and occupy 4% of its land, and that the settlement enterprise has failed to build up a viable local economic infrastructure. He noted that only about 400 settler households were engaged in agriculture, with the amount of settler-owned farmland comprising only 1.5% of the West Bank. In addition, he wrote that there are only two significant industrial zones in the West Bank settlements, with the vast majority of workers there Palestinian, and that the vast majority of settlers live near the border, in areas that can be annexed by Israel with relative ease in territorial exchanges, while still allowing for the formation of a viable Palestinian state. According to Arieli, 62% of the settler workforce commutes over the Green Line into Israel proper for work while another 25% works in the heavily subsidized education system of the settlements, with only a small percent working in agriculture and industry. About half of the settlements have populations fewer than 1,000 and only 15 have populations greater than 5,000. According to Arieli, the settlement movement has failed to create facts on the ground precluding an Israeli withdrawal, and it is possible to implement a land exchange that would see about 80% of the settlers stay in place, necessitating the evacuation of only about 30,000 settler households, in order to establish a viable and contiguous Palestinian state in the West Bank.[80][81][82]

This sentiment has been echoed by Shany Mor, who argued that in 2020, the geographical distribution of settlers in the West Bank had not materially changed since 1993, and that a two-state solution is actually more feasible now than it was in the past due to the disentanglement of the Israeli and Palestinian economies in the 1990s. According to Mor, nearly all the population growth in the settlements between 2005 and 2020 was concentrated in the Haredi settlements of Beitar Illit and Modi'in Illit, due to their high birth rates.[83]

Journalists

[edit]

One major argument against the one-state solution is that it would endanger the safety of the Jewish minority, because it would require assimilation with what critics fear would be an extremely hostile Muslim ruling majority.[11] In particular, Jeffrey Goldberg points to a 2000 Haaretz interview with Edward Said, whom he describes as "one of the intellectual fathers of one-statism". When asked whether he thought a Jewish minority would be treated fairly in a binational state, Said replied that "it worries me a great deal. The question of what is going to be the fate of the Jews is very difficult for me. I really don't know."[84]

Imagining what might ensue with unification, some critics[85] of the one-state model believe that rather than ending the Arab–Israeli conflict, it would result in large-scale ethnic violence and possibly civil war, pointing to violence during the British Mandate period, such as in 1920, 1921, 1929, and 1936–39 as examples. In this view, violence between Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews is inevitable and can only be forestalled by partition. These critics also cite the 1937 Peel Commission, which recommended partition as the only means of ending the conflict.[86][original research?] Critics also cite bi-national arrangements in Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Bosnia, Cyprus, and Pakistan, which failed and resulted in further internal conflicts. Similar criticisms appear in The Case for Peace.[87]

Left-wing Israeli journalist Amos Elon argued that while Israel's settlement policy was pushing things in the direction of a one-state solution, should it ever come to pass, "the end result is more likely to resemble Zimbabwe than post-apartheid South Africa".[88] Echoing these sentiments, Palestinian-American journalist Ray Hanania wrote that the idea of a single state where Jews, Muslims, and Christians can live side by side is "fundamentally flawed." In addition to the fact that Israel would not support it, Hanania noted that the Arab and Muslim world don't practice it, writing "Exactly where do Jews and Christians live in the Islamic World today side-by-side with equality? We don't even live side-by-side with equality in the Palestinian Diaspora."[89]

On the aftermath of any hypothetical implementation of a one-state solution, Gershom Gorenberg wrote: "Palestinians will demand the return of property lost in 1948 and perhaps the rebuilding of destroyed villages. Except for the drawing of borders, virtually every question that bedevils Israeli–Palestinian peace negotiations will become a domestic problem setting the new political entity aflame.... Two nationalities who have desperately sought a political frame for cultural and social independence would wrestle over control of language, art, street names, and schools." Gorenberg wrote that in the best case, the new state would be paralyzed by endless arguments, and in the worst case, constant disagreements would erupt into violence.[84]

Gorenberg wrote that in addition to many of the problems with the one-state solution described above, the hypothetical state would collapse economically, as the Israeli Jewish intelligentsia would in all likelihood emigrate, writing that "financing development in majority-Palestinian areas and bringing Palestinians into Israel's social welfare network would require Jews to pay higher taxes or receive fewer services. But the engine of the Israeli economy is high-tech, an entirely portable industry. Both individuals and companies will leave." As a result, the new binational state would be financially crippled.[84]

Public opinion

[edit]
Demonstration against Israeli annexation of the West Bank, Rabin Square, Tel Aviv-Yafo, June 6, 2020

A multi-option poll by Near East Consulting (NEC) in November 2007 found the bi-national state to be less popular than either "two states for two people" or "a Palestinian state on all historic Palestine" with only 13.4% of respondents supporting a binational solution.[90] However, in February 2007, NEC found that around 70% of Palestinian respondents backed the idea when given a straight choice of either supporting or opposing "a one-state solution in historic Palestine where Muslims, Christians and Jews have equal rights and responsibilities".[91]

In March 2010, a survey by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem found that Palestinian support had risen to 29 percent.[92]

In April 2010, a poll by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre also found that Palestinian support for a "bi-national" solution had jumped from 20.6 percent in June 2009 to 33.8 percent.[93] If this support for a bi-national state is combined with the finding that 9.8 percent of Palestinian respondents favour a "Palestinian state" in "all of historic Palestine", this poll suggested about equal Palestinian support for a two-state and one-state solution in mid-2010.[92][93]

In 2011, a poll by Stanley Greenberg and the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion and sponsored by the Israel Project revealed that 61% of Palestinians reject a two state solution, while 34% said they accepted it.[94] 66% said the Palestinians’ real goal should be to start with a two-state solution but then move to it all being one Palestinian state.

Views of current situation

[edit]

In a 2021 survey of experts on the Middle East, 59 percent described the current situation as "a one-state reality akin to apartheid".[35]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
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The one-state solution proposes resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the establishment of a single sovereign state over the combined territories of Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, granting full and equal civil and political rights to all residents irrespective of Jewish or Arab identity. This approach, often framed as a binational or democratic state with one person, one vote, emerged as an alternative to the two-state model amid persistent negotiation failures and territorial changes like settlement expansion. Proponents, including certain Palestinian intellectuals and international activists, argue it addresses inequities in land and rights more equitably than partition schemes. However, it encounters staunch opposition from Israeli majorities who view it as incompatible with Zionism's goal of Jewish self-determination, potentially transforming Israel into a state without a Jewish majority or character. Demographic realities underscore the proposal's contentious nature: as of 2022, Jews constitute approximately 47 percent of the population across Israel and the Palestinian territories, with around 7 million Jews facing a comparable number of Arabs, implying an inevitable shift away from Jewish-majority governance in a unified state. Critics highlight risks of ethnic conflict or Arab dominance, drawing on historical patterns of intercommunal violence and differing national aspirations that have fueled the dispute since the early 20th century. While some analyses suggest feasibility through constitutional power-sharing, empirical assessments of similar binational experiments elsewhere indicate frequent instability absent strong mutual trust, which remains absent here given ongoing rejection of coexistence by segments of Palestinian society. The idea's revival post-Oslo Accords failures reflects pessimism over two-state viability but lacks broad endorsement, with polls showing minimal support among Israelis and divided Palestinian views favoring separate statehood.

Conceptual Framework

Definition and Core Principles

The one-state solution refers to a proposed framework for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by establishing a single sovereign state over the combined territory of Israel proper, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip—encompassing the historic Mandate Palestine area from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. Under this model, Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs would share equal citizenship, legal rights, and political participation, typically through a democratic system of one person, one vote, without internal borders or partitioned sovereignty. This contrasts with the two-state paradigm by prioritizing territorial unity and civic integration over national separation, positing that coexistence under unified governance could neutralize irredentist claims and end occupation dynamics. Core principles center on egalitarian democracy, requiring the dismantlement of ethno-national privileges, such as Israel's Law of Return for Jews or differential legal statuses for Palestinians, in favor of universal civil rights and non-discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, or national origin. Proponents argue this fosters mutual respect and equity, drawing analogies to post-apartheid South Africa's transition to inclusive citizenship, though implementation would necessitate absorbing the Palestinian Authority and other institutions into a singular governmental structure. Binational interpretations, historically advocated by figures like Rabbi Judah Magnes, incorporate power-sharing or consociational elements to accommodate dual Jewish and Arab national identities, potentially via veto rights or proportional representation to safeguard minority interests amid demographic parity—roughly 7 million Jews and 7 million Arabs in the area as of recent estimates. Critics, including Zionist perspectives, contend that equal enfranchisement would erode Israel's character as a Jewish-majority refuge, yielding an Arab electoral majority that undermines Jewish self-determination through first-principles of demographic realism. The solution's viability hinges on causal assumptions of assimilation over enduring enmity, rejecting partition as infeasible due to intertwined settlements, security interdependencies, and resource scarcity, while presuming that shared sovereignty could enforce peace via institutional incentives rather than geographic division. Empirical precedents, such as Lebanon's confessional system or Yugoslavia's federalism, are invoked by skeptics to highlight risks of sectarian paralysis or civil strife in ethnically polarized binational setups, underscoring the tension between aspirational equality and historical patterns of zero-sum conflict.

Variants and Interpretations

The one-state solution encompasses a spectrum of proposals differing in governance structures, rights allocation, and national identity preservation. Unitary democratic variants envision a single sovereign state across the territory of pre-1967 Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip, with universal citizenship, equal legal rights, and majority-rule democracy irrespective of ethnic or religious background. Advocates such as Ali Abunimah, in his 2006 book One Country, propose this as a means to dismantle discriminatory legal frameworks and foster civic integration, drawing parallels to multiethnic democracies while rejecting partition as unviable due to settlement expansion and territorial fragmentation. Virginia Tilley, in analyses from the early 2000s, similarly frames it as a secular polity transcending rival nationalisms through constitutional protections for individual rights and minority cultural safeguards, though implementation would require resolving property claims from 1948 displacements. These models, often rooted in anti-colonial critiques, prioritize ending differential legal statuses—such as military rule over Palestinians versus civilian law for Israelis—but face challenges from demographic realities, with Palestinian Arabs and their descendants projected to comprise 49-51% of the population without right-of-return implementations. Binational interpretations, by contrast, seek to institutionalize dual national self-determination within one state, typically via federalism, consociational power-sharing, or parity-based veto rights for Jewish and Palestinian collectives. Historical precursors include interwar Jewish intellectuals like those in Brit Shalom, who advocated cultural autonomy for both groups under a common framework; modern echoes appear in academic discussions distinguishing this from unitary models by embedding group rights to mitigate majority dominance. Proponents argue this preserves collective identities—such as Hebrew as a national language alongside Arabic—while enabling shared sovereignty, potentially through cantonal divisions akin to Switzerland's linguistic federalism. However, Palestinian discourse on binationalism remains inconsistent, with some viewing it as a transitional step toward unitary equality, while others critique it for entrenching ethno-national divisions rather than civic universalism. Right-wing Israeli variants emphasize extending full Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria (West Bank) and potentially Gaza, often without extending citizenship to all Palestinian residents, instead offering personal autonomy, residency permits, or municipal self-governance to maintain Jewish demographic majorities and security control. Groups like the Ribonut movement and settler-aligned parties, influential in coalitions post-2022 elections, frame annexation as reclaiming biblical lands while applying Israeli law selectively to settlements, as evidenced by Knesset preliminary approvals in October 2025 for sovereignty declarations in Area C. These approaches, advanced by figures in Benjamin Netanyahu's governments since 2023, prioritize halting territorial concessions and countering terrorism over parity, with surveys indicating 29% of one-state supporters favoring Palestinian transfer to achieve Jewish primacy. Critics from human rights perspectives label such models as perpetuating apartheid-like disparities, given the 3 million Palestinians under indefinite military administration as of 2024. Hybrid confederation proposals, sometimes classified under one-state umbrellas, involve two entities with sovereign institutions but integrated economies, open borders, and joint security, as floated in Israeli policy circles since the 2010s. These differ from strict unitarism by retaining separate national flags and militaries while addressing practical interdependencies, though empirical polling shows limited traction, with only 42% of Israelis viewing any one-state variant as viable amid settlement growth exceeding 700,000 residents by 2023. Across interpretations, feasibility hinges on reconciling irreconcilable aspirations: Jewish state security versus Palestinian liberation from occupation, with institutional biases in Western academia often amplifying egalitarian models while understating enforcement challenges in majority-minority dynamics.

Historical Development

Pre-Mandate Period and Early Ideas

During the late Ottoman period, Palestine lacked a distinct political identity as a unified territory, instead comprising the Mutasarrifate of Jerusalem and portions of the vilayets of Beirut and Damascus, with an estimated total population of around 600,000 by 1914, predominantly Arab Muslims and Christians. Jewish residents numbered approximately 24,000 in 1882, rising to about 60,000 by the eve of World War I through immigration spurred by pogroms in Eastern Europe and early Zionist initiatives, though Jews remained a small minority comprising less than 10% of the population. Initial waves of Jewish settlement during the First Aliyah (1882–1903) involved land purchases from absentee landlords and the establishment of agricultural colonies, fostering some economic cooperation with local Arabs through labor and trade, but also generating tensions over tenant displacements and cultural differences. Theodor Herzl's publication of Der Judenstaat in 1896 and the First Zionist Congress in 1897 articulated the goal of a Jewish national home in Palestine "secured by public law," prioritizing sovereignty amid rising European antisemitism, yet without explicit proposals for binational governance. In response, Yusuf Diya al-Khalidi, a Jerusalem notable and former Ottoman parliamentarian, wrote to Herzl on March 1, 1899, expressing personal sympathy for Jewish persecution while cautioning that Palestinian Arabs, as the land's indigenous majority, would resist any arrangement displacing them, urging negotiation with Arab leaders rather than unilateral claims and suggesting Jews seek refuge elsewhere if sovereignty proved unattainable. Herzl's reply dismissed these concerns, asserting that Jewish settlement would benefit Arabs materially under European-style administration, reflecting optimism unsubstantiated by local realities. Cultural Zionist Asher Zvi Hirsch Ginsberg (Ahad Ha'am) offered an alternative vision after visiting Palestine in 1891, critiquing political Zionism's focus on mass settlement and state-building in essays like "Truth from Eretz Israel," where he warned of inevitable conflict if Jewish immigrants treated Arabs with arrogance or ignored their national sentiments, advocating instead for a spiritual and cultural Jewish center emphasizing ethical coexistence and Hebrew revival over territorial dominance. Ahad Ha'am argued that Jews must demonstrate moral superiority through just treatment of Arabs to sustain long-term presence, predicting enmity if settlers adopted a conqueror's mentality, though his ideas prioritized Jewish cultural autonomy within a shared land rather than formal binational equality. These pre-Mandate perspectives highlighted nascent awareness of demographic realities and mutual rights but lacked concrete institutional proposals, as Ottoman authorities restricted both Zionist land acquisitions and emerging Arab nationalist expressions amid broader imperial decline.

British Mandate and Partition Debates

The British Mandate for Palestine, established by the League of Nations in 1920 following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, incorporated the 1917 Balfour Declaration's commitment to a "national home for the Jewish people" while pledging to safeguard the rights of existing non-Jewish communities. This dual obligation fueled demographic shifts, with Jewish immigration rising from about 85,000 in 1922 to over 400,000 by 1939 amid European persecution, exacerbating Arab fears of marginalization in a territory where Arabs constituted roughly two-thirds of the 1.3 million population in 1931. Tensions culminated in the 1936–1939 Arab Revolt, prompting British inquiries into governance alternatives, including binational arrangements versus territorial division. Early binational proposals emerged among Jewish intellectuals skeptical of partition's feasibility. The Brit Shalom group, formed in 1925 by figures like Hugo Bergman and Gershom Scholem, advocated a single state with parity between Jewish and Arab national groups, emphasizing cultural autonomy and cooperation to avert conflict. Judah Magnes, an American-born rabbi and pacifist who relocated to Palestine in 1922 and became chancellor of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1935, extended this vision, proposing a binational commonwealth grounded in constitutional limits on majority rule, mutual recognition of national identities, and rejection of demographic dominance by either side. Magnes argued that partition would entrench enmity, favoring instead a federated structure preserving both peoples' rights amid Palestine's intertwined histories. These ideas, however, remained marginal; mainstream Zionists prioritized a sovereign Jewish state, while Arab leaders dismissed binationalism as incompatible with their majority status and demands for self-determination. The Peel Royal Commission, dispatched in 1936 to address the revolt, marked the first formal partition proposal in July 1937, recommending a small Jewish state (about 20% of Mandate territory, excluding Transjordan) alongside a larger Arab state federated with Transjordan, with Britain retaining control of Jerusalem and holy sites. The commission deemed a unitary state unworkable due to "irreconcilable" national claims, citing Arab violence against Jewish development and Jewish insistence on immigration rights. As alternatives, it floated "palliative" measures like cantonization or a single Arab-ruled state granting Jews religious autonomy and capped immigration, but concluded these would fail to resolve underlying hostilities. The Arab Higher Committee, led by Haj Amin al-Husseini, rejected partition outright, asserting Arabs' 93% land ownership (by 1936 estimates) and historical precedence entitled them to unitary independence without Jewish sovereignty or unlimited settlement. Zionist Congress debates in 1937 accepted partition in principle as a pragmatic foothold but sought expanded borders, highlighting internal divisions over conceding territory. Subsequent British efforts faltered. The 1938 Woodhead Technical Commission assessed Peel's plan and variants, finding partition logistically unviable due to economic interdependence and geographic fragmentation, effectively shelving division. Facing war in Europe, Britain issued the 1939 White Paper, curtailing Jewish immigration to 75,000 over five years and envisioning a single independent state within a decade, with legislative parity once Jews reached one-third of the population—a de facto binational tilt prioritizing Arab consent. Arabs condemned it for permitting any Jewish influx, while Jews decried it as a betrayal of Balfour amid the Holocaust's onset. These Mandate-era debates exposed the one-state model's fragility: binationalism appealed to minorities fearing domination but collapsed against Arab rejection of power-sharing and Zionist aspirations for self-rule, paving the way for the United Nations' 1947 partition resolution, which Arabs again refused.

Post-1948 Arab and Palestinian Positions

Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Arab states and Palestinian representatives uniformly rejected Israel's establishment and pursued objectives aligned with establishing undivided Arab sovereignty over the territory of former Mandatory Palestine. Arab armies, coordinated by the Arab League, entered the conflict with the explicit goal of blocking partition and preventing a Jewish state, as articulated in pre-war statements emphasizing the indivisibility of Palestine under Arab rule. In September 1948, amid the war, the All-Palestine Government was proclaimed in Gaza under Egyptian auspices, claiming jurisdiction over the entirety of Palestine including areas controlled by Israel, though it exercised authority only in Gaza and served largely as a symbolic rejection of partition. This entity received nominal recognition from Arab League members but lacked military or administrative capacity, reflecting a unified Arab preference for reclaiming all territory rather than acquiescing to divided states. Subsequent territorial outcomes underscored this stance: Jordan formally annexed the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, on April 24, 1950, integrating it into the Hashemite Kingdom and extending citizenship to residents, while Egypt maintained military administration over Gaza without establishing statehood or independence. Neither action created a sovereign Palestinian state in these areas, nor did Arab leaders propose partitioning them from Israel to form a separate entity; instead, the territories were absorbed or held as bargaining leverage for broader Arab claims, consistent with pre-war rejection of the 1947 UN partition as an infringement on Arab rights to the whole land. The 1967 Six-Day War intensified this framework, after which the Arab League's Khartoum Summit on September 1 adopted the "three no's"—no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiation with Israel—reaffirming commitment to recovering all occupied territories, including those held by Israel since 1948, through unified Arab insistence on Palestinian rights without compromising on Israel's legitimacy. This resolution implicitly endorsed a single-state outcome under Arab control, as it precluded any diplomatic accommodation of Israel's existence and prioritized the "inalienable rights of the Palestinian people" across historic Palestine. Palestinian organizations formalized this position through the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), founded in 1964, whose Palestinian National Charter—revised and adopted in July 1968—declared Palestine an "indivisible" Arab territorial unit (Article 2), nullified the 1947 partition and Israel's founding as "entirely illegal" (Article 19), and mandated armed struggle to dismantle the "Zionist invasion" and establish Arab liberation over the full homeland. The charter rejected Jewish immigration as colonial and limited residency rights to pre-Zionist Jewish communities, envisioning a unitary state defined by Arab national identity rather than binational equality. This document, endorsed by the Palestinian National Council, encapsulated mainstream Palestinian aims through the 1970s, with groups like Fatah emphasizing phased military recovery of all Palestine. While tactical adaptations emerged in the late 1970s—such as the PLO's 1974 endorsement of a "national authority" in parts of Palestine as an interim step—the core charter's one-state Arab framework persisted until amendments in the 1990s following the Oslo Accords. The 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Independence marked a pivotal shift, implicitly accepting a two-state arrangement by referencing UN Resolution 242 and limiting claims to territories occupied in 1967, though rejectionist factions like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine continued advocating full liberation of historic Palestine. Throughout the period, Arab and Palestinian positions prioritized nullifying Israel's statehood over coexistence, driven by ideological commitments to Arab unity and historical claims that precluded partition as a viable resolution.

Israeli Perspectives from 1948 to Late 20th Century

Following Israel's declaration of independence on May 14, 1948, and the subsequent Arab-Israeli War, mainstream Zionist leaders, led by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, prioritized consolidating a sovereign Jewish-majority state within the armistice lines established in 1949, rejecting any binational framework that would dilute Jewish self-determination. Ben-Gurion emphasized the necessity of a Jewish population exceeding 60% to ensure the state's viability as a Jewish homeland, viewing binationalism as incompatible with Zionism's core aim of reversing historical Jewish vulnerability through demographic and institutional dominance. This stance reflected first-hand experience of Arab rejection of the 1947 UN Partition Plan and the ensuing invasion by Arab states, which Israeli leaders interpreted as existential threats incompatible with power-sharing in a single state. From 1948 to 1967, Israeli policy focused on absorbing over 700,000 Jewish immigrants, many from Arab countries, to bolster the Jewish majority—reaching approximately 80% by the mid-1950s—while managing the 150,000-200,000 Arab citizens under military administration until 1966, prioritizing security over equal integration amid ongoing border skirmishes. Proposals for a one-state solution, often framed as binationalism by fringe intellectuals, garnered negligible support; Ben-Gurion dismissed them as naive, arguing they ignored Arab irredentism and the causal link between demographic parity and Jewish minority subjugation, as evidenced by pre-state violence like the 1929 riots. The 1967 Six-Day War, resulting in Israel's capture of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and other territories inhabited by about 1 million Arabs, intensified debates but reinforced opposition to a full one-state model with equal rights, due to projections of an imminent Arab majority eroding Jewish sovereignty. Labor-led governments, under Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir, advanced the Allon Plan in 1967, proposing annexation of sparsely populated strategic areas (about 10% of the West Bank) while granting autonomy to densely Arab regions, explicitly to avert demographic swamping without conceding statehood. Right-wing factions, including Menachem Begin's Herut party (precursor to Likud), invoked historical and biblical claims to "Judea and Samaria" (West Bank), founding the Movement for Greater Israel in 1967 to advocate territorial retention, yet pragmatically eschewed granting citizenship to preserve Jewish control. Begin, as prime minister from 1977, asserted Israeli rights over the West Bank in 1982 but pursued the Camp David Accords' autonomy framework in 1978, offering administrative self-rule without sovereignty or demographic integration, citing security precedents from 1948-1967 wars where Arab states' aggression validated separation over amalgamation. Religious-nationalist groups like Gush Emunim, emerging in the 1970s, accelerated settlements—reaching over 100 by 1990—but framed Arab residents as perpetual non-citizens under Israeli sovereignty, avoiding the one-state equality that would, per demographic data, yield Arab electoral dominance within decades given higher birth rates (Arab fertility ~6-7 vs. Jewish ~3 in the 1970s-1980s). By the late 1980s, amid the First Intifada (1987-1993), Israeli perspectives across the spectrum—evident in Knesset debates and public discourse—coalesced around rejecting one-state viability, attributing infeasibility to irreconcilable national aspirations and historical violence, with polls showing over 70% favoring retention or negotiated partition over binationalism. Marginal left-wing voices, such as the Matzpen group, advocated binationalism but faced ostracism for disregarding empirical risks of civil strife in a forced unity state, underscoring the causal realism prioritizing Jewish survival over ideological parity.

Arguments Supporting Viability

Equality and Moral Imperatives

Proponents argue that the one-state solution fulfills a moral imperative by establishing a single democratic state with equal citizenship for all residents between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, thereby ending the current system of differential legal treatment where Israeli settlers in the West Bank operate under civil law while adjacent Palestinians fall under military jurisdiction. This unification of legal frameworks is presented as essential to upholding principles of non-discrimination and equality before the law, core tenets of international human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Advocates contend that such equality extends to political rights, including universal suffrage and representation, which would rectify the exclusion of approximately 5 million Palestinians in the territories from voting in Israeli elections despite living under Israeli control. Morally, this is framed as a rejection of ethnic nationalism in favor of civic nationalism, where state identity derives from shared rights rather than demographic dominance, potentially accommodating the return of Palestinian refugees—estimated at over 5 million descendants—through integration without threatening minority protections if democratic institutions are robust. Legal scholars employing a rights-based approach assert that the one-state model maximizes human rights realization compared to a two-state alternative, which often compromises on refugee returns and equality for Israel's 1.8 million Arab citizens who face documented socioeconomic disparities. The moral transformative power of equal rights is emphasized as fostering reconciliation, with historical precedents like post-apartheid South Africa invoked to suggest that integration under equality can supersede division, though such analogies overlook differences in group sizes and conflict histories. Critics of two-state viability highlight its perpetuation of segregation as morally akin to endorsing separate development, arguing that one-state integration incentivizes mutual investment in governance and resource sharing, such as water and land access, to avert humanitarian crises and extremism fueled by disenfranchisement. This perspective prioritizes universal moral duties to human dignity over ethno-religious state exclusivity, positing that true peace demands equal agency for all affected populations rather than partitioned sovereignties that entrench inequality.

Critiques of Two-State Feasibility

The expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank has created significant obstacles to establishing a territorially contiguous Palestinian state, as these settlements, along with associated infrastructure like bypass roads and security barriers, fragment Palestinian-controlled areas into isolated enclaves. By the end of 2024, approximately 503,732 Israeli settlers resided in the West Bank excluding East Jerusalem, with an additional 233,600 in East Jerusalem, totaling over 737,000 settlers across more than 250 settlements and outposts. This demographic reality renders large-scale evacuation politically untenable for Israeli governments, as evidenced by the domestic backlash following the 2005 Gaza disengagement, where only about 8,000 settlers were relocated. Further complicating contiguity, proposed developments such as the E1 settlement bloc east of Jerusalem would sever the West Bank from East Jerusalem and bisect Palestinian population centers, effectively preventing the formation of a viable state with a functional capital. Reuters analysis indicates that settlement construction has already reduced available Palestinian land, isolating towns and cities while restricting access to resources like water and arable territory, thereby undermining economic self-sufficiency. Palestinian areas, particularly under fragmented Area A and B jurisdictions, are hemmed in by Area C—comprising 60% of the West Bank—where Israeli military control limits development and expansion. From a security perspective, Israel's 2005 unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, which dismantled 21 settlements and removed all military presence, failed to yield stability and instead facilitated Hamas's electoral victory in 2006 and violent takeover in 2007, leading to sustained rocket barrages and multiple conflicts thereafter. This outcome has heightened Israeli skepticism toward territorial concessions in the West Bank, where strategic highlands overlook major population centers like Tel Aviv, posing amplified risks of militarization and attack compared to Gaza's coastal position. Analyses from security-focused think tanks emphasize that without robust demilitarization and enforcement mechanisms—provisions often rejected in past negotiations—any Palestinian state could replicate Gaza's trajectory as a launchpad for hostilities. Empirical data on public opinion further erodes feasibility, with only 33% of Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem supporting a two-state solution in a 2025 poll, against 55% opposition, reflecting entrenched rejectionism amid ongoing incitement and governance failures by the Palestinian Authority. On the Israeli side, post-October 7, 2023, events have similarly diminished backing, with majorities viewing concessions as threats to survival given historical precedents of violence following withdrawals. These mutual distrusts, compounded by unresolved issues like Jerusalem's status and refugee claims, have stalled negotiations since the early 2000s, rendering the two-state framework increasingly detached from ground realities.

Potential from Right-Wing Annexation Views

Right-wing Israeli advocates for annexation of the West Bank, referred to as Judea and Samaria, view the extension of Israeli sovereignty over these territories as a pathway to a unified state under Jewish-majority control, effectively realizing a one-state outcome without conceding land for a separate Palestinian entity. This perspective posits that formal annexation would resolve longstanding territorial ambiguities, consolidate security by eliminating zones of partial control, and affirm historical and biblical claims to the land, thereby enhancing the viability of a single Israeli state. Proponents argue that such measures, including the application of Israeli civil law to settlers and strategic areas, could foster economic integration and development, potentially encouraging Palestinian emigration or acceptance of resident status rather than full citizenship to preserve demographic balances. Naftali Bennett's 2012 Israel Stability Initiative exemplified early right-wing proposals by advocating annexation of Area C, comprising approximately 60% of the West Bank and home to most Israeli settlers, while granting limited autonomy to densely populated Palestinian areas in a non-contiguous framework disconnected from Gaza. Bennett contended that this approach would "shrink the conflict" by focusing on separation in urban enclaves, improving Palestinian living standards through economic ties to Israel, and avoiding the risks of statehood that could enable militarization or irredentism. Supporters of similar plans assert that annexation stabilizes the region by removing incentives for violence tied to unresolved sovereignty, as evidenced by reduced terror incidents in annexed areas like East Jerusalem post-1967, where infrastructure investments correlated with lower unrest rates compared to unannexed zones. More recent iterations, such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich's September 2025 proposal to annex over 82% of the West Bank, aim to isolate remaining Palestinian population centers into enclaves, explicitly rejecting a Palestinian state and prioritizing Israeli sovereignty to prevent territorial fragmentation. Smotrich's plan, which includes mapping for immediate application of law in settlement blocs, is framed as a defensive measure against perceived existential threats, with advocates citing post-October 7, 2023, escalations as underscoring the need for undivided control to neutralize Hamas-linked networks in the territory. This view holds that comprehensive annexation enables proactive governance, including settlement expansion and resource allocation, which could incrementally integrate compliant populations while marginalizing rejectionist elements, thus sustaining a Jewish state's long-term viability amid demographic pressures estimated at roughly 2.8 million Palestinians in the West Bank as of 2023. Critics within and outside Israel contend that such annexation entrenches inequality by withholding citizenship from most Arabs, potentially violating international law and inciting resistance, yet right-wing proponents counter that empirical precedents like the Golan Heights annexation in 1981 demonstrate successful sovereignty extension without demographic swamping, as Arab residents there number under 25,000 and exhibit integration rates higher than in contested areas. These views emphasize causal links between sovereignty assertion and deterrence of aggression, arguing that partial or full annexation averts the two-state alternative's pitfalls, such as indefensible borders, while leveraging Israel's administrative superiority for conflict management.

Arguments Against Feasibility

Demographic Imbalances and Jewish State Survival

In a hypothetical one-state solution encompassing Israel proper, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, the combined population would total approximately 15.5 million as of 2025, with Jews numbering about 7.2 million and Arabs around 7.7 million, yielding a Jewish plurality of roughly 46%. Israel's Arab citizens account for 2.13 million of the Arab total, while the Palestinian Authority territories contribute the remaining 5.5 million, nearly all Arab. This near parity already challenges the Jewish demographic edge, as Israeli Jews in West Bank settlements—numbering 529,000—are included in Israel's population figures but reside amid a Palestinian majority in those areas. Fertility dynamics exacerbate the imbalance: Jewish total fertility rates in Israel averaged 3.03 births per woman in recent years, exceeding the 2.75 rate among Israeli Arabs, reflecting a convergence driven by declining Arab rates and rising Jewish ones, particularly among ultra-Orthodox communities. However, Palestinian fertility in the West Bank (approximately 3.0) and Gaza (3.4) remains elevated, sustaining higher natural increase in the territories. Net migration further tilts the scales, with Jewish immigration (aliyah) adding tens of thousands annually to Israel but minimal inflows to Palestinian areas, alongside emigration pressures on younger Palestinians. Demographer Sergio DellaPergola's analyses project that, absent territorial separation, the Arab population share in a unified entity would surpass Jews within decades, potentially dropping the Jewish proportion below 45% by 2030 due to these compounded factors. Such projections underpin arguments that a one-state arrangement imperils Israel's viability as the Jewish people's nation-state, where demographic majority underpins sovereignty, preferential Jewish immigration under the Law of Return (enacted 1950), and institutional primacy of Hebrew culture and symbols. Loss of this majority in a democratic framework—granting equal enfranchisement to all residents—would enable Arab voters to dominate elections, repeal Jewish-specific laws, and facilitate mass Palestinian "return," effectively transforming the state into a binational or majority-Arab polity incompatible with Zionism's core aim of Jewish self-determination. Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have repeatedly invoked these risks, stating in 2014 that a one-state solution would mean "the end of the Jewish state" due to inevitable majority shifts. While optimists like Yoram Ettinger highlight Israel's internal trends as potentially sustainable even with annexations, empirical data on territorial integration underscores the causal link between demographics and the erosion of Jewish political control.

Security Risks and Historical Precedents of Violence

In a one-state framework encompassing Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, Israeli security forces would likely relinquish exclusive control over internal borders, external defenses, and counterterrorism operations, potentially enabling unchecked militant activities akin to those during periods of partial Palestinian autonomy. The U.S. State Department's 2022 Country Reports on Terrorism documented 305 shooting attacks against Israelis by Palestinian actors, a threefold increase from 91 in 2021, underscoring the persistent threat even under current segmented governance. Integrating populations with a documented history of asymmetric warfare—such as suicide bombings and rocket launches—into a shared polity could amplify vulnerabilities, as evidenced by the failure of the Palestinian Authority to suppress groups like Hamas during the Oslo process, leading to escalated attacks rather than deterrence. Demographic projections exacerbate these risks, with Palestinian Arabs projected to constitute a near-majority or slim majority in a unified state by mid-century due to higher fertility rates and potential refugee influxes, shifting electoral power toward factions historically opposed to Jewish sovereignty. This could manifest in policies diluting Israel's defensive capabilities, such as disbanding the IDF or importing hostile elements, mirroring concerns articulated by security analysts who view such shifts as existential threats to Jewish self-preservation. In the Institute for National Security Studies' assessment, even a sovereign Palestinian state poses demographic and infiltration risks; a binational merger would compound these by embedding armed non-state actors within Israel's core territory. Historical precedents from multi-ethnic states in the Middle East and Balkans highlight the volatility of power-sharing amid ethnic rivalries and demographic imbalances. Lebanon's 1975–1990 civil war, triggered by Palestinian refugee influxes altering sectarian demographics and empowering militias, resulted in state fragmentation, over 150,000 deaths, and the rise of Hezbollah as a de facto power, demonstrating how minority protections erode when armed factions exploit confessional divides. Similarly, Yugoslavia's dissolution in the 1990s devolved into ethnic cleansing and wars killing over 140,000, as federal structures failed to contain nationalist violence once demographic majorities sought dominance, with religion amplifying fissures among Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. These cases illustrate causal patterns where initial coexistence unravels into systemic violence when one group perceives threats to its identity or security, a dynamic paralleled by Arab riots against Jewish communities during the 1920s–1930s British Mandate in Palestine, which killed hundreds and foreshadowed partition's necessity.

Cultural and Governance Incompatibilities

Israel maintains a parliamentary democracy with regular elections, an independent judiciary, and protections for civil liberties, earning a "Free" rating of 73 out of 100 from Freedom House in its 2025 assessment, though scores reflect ongoing debates over judicial reforms and minority rights. In contrast, the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank operates under authoritarian constraints, with President Mahmoud Abbas retaining power since 2005 without elections, while Hamas's rule in Gaza since 2007 features no competitive elections, suppression of dissent, and fusion of governance with militant activities, resulting in "Not Free" ratings for both territories—1/100 for Gaza and 11/100 for the West Bank in Freedom House's 2025 reports. These disparities highlight foundational governance mismatches: Israel's emphasis on rule of law and institutional accountability versus the PA's patronage networks and Hamas's theocratic enforcement, where security forces prioritize factional loyalty over public service. Corruption further exacerbates these divides, with the PA historically scoring low on transparency metrics; Palestine's last inclusion in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index in 2005 yielded a 26/100, signaling pervasive public-sector graft, including aid diversion and nepotism under both Fatah and Hamas administrations. Israel, by comparison, scores 62/100 in the 2023 index, reflecting stronger anti-corruption mechanisms despite internal challenges. Integrating such systems into a single state would demand reconciling Israel's merit-based civil service with Palestinian entities marred by cronyism, as evidenced by recurrent scandals like the PA's "pay-for-slay" stipends to militants' families, which undermine impartial governance. Culturally, stark value divergences compound these issues. A 2013 Pew Research survey found 89% of Palestinian Muslims favoring sharia as official law, with majorities endorsing corporal punishments like stoning for adultery and execution for apostasy—stances at odds with Israel's secular legal framework, which prioritizes individual rights and separates religion from state authority, even as it accommodates religious observance. Arab Barometer data from 2023 reveals limited enthusiasm for liberal democracy among Palestinians, with preferences for a "strong leader" over parliamentary systems and institutional checks, reflecting collectivist orientations that prioritize communal or Islamist solidarity over pluralistic individualism more prevalent in Israeli society. Cross-cultural studies underscore further rifts, such as Israelis' higher valuation of personal autonomy and innovation against Palestinians' stronger emphasis on tradition and conformity, fostering mutual distrust; joint surveys indicate Palestinians often attribute Israeli policies to inherent cultural hostility, while Israelis perceive Palestinian society as prone to honor-based violence and rejection of coexistence.
AspectIsraelPalestinian Territories
Democratic ElectionsMulti-party, frequent (e.g., Knesset every 4 years max)None since 2006; Abbas in power 20+ years; Hamas unopposed in Gaza
Judicial IndependenceHigh; Supreme Court checks executiveLow; PA/Hamas courts serve regime interests
Religious Law PreferenceSecular with Jewish elements; sharia optional for Muslims89% favor sharia as state law
Tolerance for Out-GroupsArab citizens vote, serve in Knesset; tensions exist but legal equalityPolls show majority opposition to Jewish equality; Hamas charter antisemitic
These incompatibilities suggest a one-state framework would strain Israel's democratic norms, as Palestinian majorities in polls consistently prioritize Islamist governance and armed resistance—57% supported the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack per a December 2023 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research poll—over shared liberal institutions, risking institutional collapse akin to multi-ethnic failures elsewhere.

Public Opinion and Empirical Data

Polling Among Israelis

Support for a one-state solution among Israelis, defined as a single democratic state granting equal rights to Jews and Arabs, remains consistently low, particularly among Jewish Israelis who constitute the majority of the population. A joint poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) and Tel Aviv University in September 2024 found that only 14% of Israeli Jews favored such a single democratic state, reflecting skepticism toward arrangements that would dilute Jewish self-determination amid ongoing security concerns. This figure aligns with broader trends of declining faith in binational models, as Israeli Arabs showed higher but still minority support at around 20-25% in similar surveys. Post-October 7, 2023, attitudes have hardened further, with polls emphasizing preferences for Israeli sovereignty without granting full Palestinian civil rights rather than egalitarian integration. An Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) survey in March 2025 revealed that 31% of Israelis supported a one-state framework conditional on denying Palestinians full civil rights, a position predominantly held by right-wing respondents who prioritize security and demographic preservation over equality. In contrast, explicit endorsement of a rights-equalizing one-state model garnered negligible backing, often below 10% in Jewish samples, as respondents cited fears of governance instability and loss of Jewish-majority status.
Poll SourceDateSupport for Democratic One-State (Israeli Jews)Support for One-State without Palestinian Civil RightsNotes
PCPSR-Tel Aviv University Joint PollSeptember 202414%Not specifiedFocus on single democratic state with equal rights.
INSS Swords of Iron SurveyMarch 2025<10% (implied low)31%Right-wing dominance in non-equal model; overall Israeli sample.
These findings underscore a causal link between historical violence, including the October 7 attacks, and Israeli aversion to frameworks risking internal Arab majorities or veto power over security decisions, with no major polling institute like the Israel Democracy Institute reporting viable support for binational equality. Even among left-leaning Jews, preferences lean toward two-state remnants or status quo maintenance over one-state risks.

Polling Among Palestinians

Support for a one-state solution entailing equal rights for Israelis and Palestinians in a single democratic state remains low among Palestinians. In a July 2024 joint poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) and Tel Aviv University, 25% of Palestinians expressed support for such a "single democratic state" option, up slightly from 23% in 2022. This figure reflects responses to a scenario emphasizing equality for all citizens regardless of ethnicity or religion, conducted among 1,270 Palestinians with a margin of error of approximately ±3%. In contrast, support for a one-state alternative without equal rights—framed as a "single Palestinian state" with limited rights for Jews—stood at 33% in the same July 2024 poll, an increase from 30% in 2022. A May 2025 PCPSR poll reported even lower endorsement for equality-based one-state at 14%, with variations by region: 12% in the West Bank and 18% in Gaza. These polls distinguish between democratic binationalism and Palestinian-majority dominance, highlighting that the latter garners more backing, often aligned with rejection of Israel's existence as a Jewish state. For context, support for the two-state solution in these surveys hovered around 40%, exceeding endorsement of the equal-rights one-state model but trailing combined preferences for non-democratic alternatives. PCPSR data from October 2024 notes that while two-state viability is viewed skeptically (53% deem it unfeasible), one-state options do not command majority favor, with confederation arrangements attracting 35% in the July poll.
Political SolutionPalestinian Support (%) - July 2024 PCPSR PollNotes
Two-state solution40Rise of 7 points since 2022; higher than single democratic state.
Single democratic state (equal rights)25Slight increase from 23% in 2022.
Single Palestinian state (limited Jewish rights)33Up from 30% in 2022; implies dominance.
Confederation35Open to variations in implementation.
Regional disparities persist, with Gazans showing marginally higher openness to equality-based models amid ongoing conflict dynamics, though overall trends indicate entrenched opposition to frameworks preserving Jewish self-determination. Independent analyses of PCPSR methodology affirm its representativeness via random sampling, though question framing can influence responses toward conflict-oriented outcomes. Post-October 7, 2023, polling reflects heightened polarization, with one-state advocacy often conflated with armed resistance preferences (41% in May 2025).

International and Diaspora Views

Official positions from major international bodies emphasize the two-state solution over a one-state framework. The United Nations has consistently advocated for two states living side-by-side in peace and security, with UN Secretary-General António Guterres stating in September 2025 that there is "no alternative" to this approach, warning that a de facto one-state reality risks perpetuating Israeli domination without equal rights. The European Union similarly prioritizes a reformed Palestinian Authority and two-state viability, as articulated by EU Commissioner Dubravka Šuica in July 2025, viewing one-state proposals as incompatible with sustainable peace. The Arab League, in a unanimous statement on July 30, 2025, condemned the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks and urged Hamas to disarm while endorsing two-state negotiations, reflecting a regional preference for Palestinian statehood alongside Israel rather than binational integration. Public opinion polls in Western countries show limited support for a one-state solution. In a 2023 YouGov survey across Western Europe, majorities ranging from 66% to 76% favored a two-state outcome, while backing for a single state hovered between 25% and 39%, often viewed as less feasible amid ongoing security concerns. U.S. attitudes, per Gallup data from March 2025, indicate 55% support for establishing a Palestinian state, typically interpreted within a two-state context, with sympathy for Israelis declining but no parallel polling surge for one-state equality. These preferences align with empirical skepticism toward binational models, given historical failures in multi-ethnic states and demographic projections threatening Jewish self-determination. Among Jewish diaspora communities, opposition to a one-state solution predominates due to its perceived incompatibility with Zionism and the preservation of a Jewish-majority state. A 2021 Pew Research Center analysis found U.S. Jews more optimistic about two-state possibilities than the general public, with one-state ideas dismissed as ending Israel's character as a Jewish homeland. Scholars like Guy Ziv have argued that binationalism would transform Israel into a contested entity, eroding the refuge established post-Holocaust, a view echoed in diaspora discourse prioritizing security over ideological equality. Palestinian diaspora perspectives vary but often emphasize right of return and maximal territorial claims, with some advocating one-state as a means to demographic leverage rather than equal governance. Limited polling data suggests alignment with West Bank and Gaza sentiments, where 33% supported one-state in a 2022 survey, though diaspora activism frequently frames it as reversing 1948 displacements without conceding Jewish statehood. This contrasts with institutional Arab League stances, highlighting tensions between grassroots irredentism and pragmatic diplomacy.

Contemporary Debates and Challenges

Post-October 7, 2023 Developments

The Hamas-led attack on southern Israel on October 7, 2023, which killed approximately 1,200 people—mostly civilians—and resulted in the abduction of around 250 hostages, triggered a large-scale Israeli military operation in Gaza aimed at dismantling Hamas's military capabilities and rescuing captives. This escalation, coupled with over 40,000 Palestinian deaths reported in Gaza by mid-2025, deepened mutual distrust and hardened positions, rendering discussions of a binational one-state solution with equal rights even more marginal amid heightened security imperatives. Israeli analysts noted that the attack exemplified the existential risks of demographic integration, as Hamas's charter and actions reject Jewish self-determination, prompting a reevaluation of any framework allowing shared sovereignty. Post-attack polling among Israelis revealed a sharp decline in openness to Palestinian statehood models, including variants implying one-state outcomes like confederation or annexation with limited autonomy. A December 2023 Gallup survey found only 25% of Israelis supported an independent Palestinian state, down from prior levels, reflecting fears that ceding control could enable repeats of October 7-scale violence. By June 2025, Pew Research indicated just 21% believed Israel and a Palestinian state could coexist peacefully, the lowest since 2013, with right-wing annexation advocates—such as ministers in Benjamin Netanyahu's coalition—gaining traction for applying Israeli law to West Bank settlements while denying citizenship to most Arabs to preserve Jewish demographic majorities. Settlement expansion accelerated, with over 12,000 new housing units approved in 2024 alone, solidifying de facto control without formal one-state equality. On the Palestinian side, the war boosted support for maximalist claims, with a mid-November 2023 survey showing 75% in the West Bank and Gaza favoring a single Palestinian state "from the river to the sea," implying the dissolution of Israel as a Jewish state. Joint Israeli-Palestinian polls in September 2024 revealed 33% of Palestinians endorsing a one-state solution without equal rights for Jews, up from pre-war figures, alongside 57% opposition to two states; Israeli Arabs showed 17% support for such a discriminatory model. Hamas's popularity surged in Gaza post-attack, with approval ratings exceeding 40% by early 2024, underscoring rejectionist sentiments incompatible with binational equality. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas's Fatah faction, weakened by corruption allegations and inaction, faced internal challenges, further eroding prospects for negotiated power-sharing. Internationally, while some leftist and academic circles reframed the conflict to revive one-state advocacy—citing South Africa analogies despite differing ethnic conflict dynamics—the dominant response prioritized Hamas's defeat and hostage recovery over structural solutions. U.S. and European leaders, including in a September 2025 UN General Assembly vote, reaffirmed two-state parameters with 142 nations in favor, sidelining one-state proposals amid evidence of Palestinian polling favoring armed struggle (67% in Gaza by May 2025). By late 2025, empirical data from repeated surveys confirmed the October 7 events entrenched zero-sum views, with mutual support for equal-rights one-state below 5% in joint metrics, highlighting governance incompatibilities rooted in irreconcilable national aspirations.

Geopolitical Obstacles and Rejectionism

Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have consistently rejected frameworks that could lead to a single binational state, arguing that it would undermine Israel's identity as a Jewish state and expose it to demographic and security threats from a combined Arab majority. In January 2024, Netanyahu explicitly opposed Palestinian sovereignty over Gaza, framing any territorial concessions as incompatible with Israeli security needs, a stance rooted in historical precedents of violence following withdrawals, such as the 2005 Gaza disengagement. This position aligns with broader Israeli governmental policy, which prioritizes maintaining Jewish demographic control over the territory west of the Jordan River, viewing a one-state arrangement as tantamount to national suicide amid ongoing rejection of Israel's existence by key Palestinian factions. On the Palestinian side, rejectionism manifests through Hamas's ideological commitment to an Islamic state encompassing all of historic Palestine, explicitly rejecting Jewish sovereignty and any compromise that recognizes Israel as a legitimate entity. Hamas's 1988 charter called for the obliteration of Israel, and while its 2017 revision pragmatically accepted a provisional Palestinian state along 1967 borders, it maintained the long-term goal of "liberation" of the entire land, incompatible with a democratic binational state. The Palestinian Authority (PA), led by Mahmoud Abbas, has historically pursued a two-state solution but has rejected multiple statehood offers since 1937, including the 1947 UN Partition Plan and subsequent proposals, often demanding maximalist terms like full right of return that would alter Israel's Jewish character. This pattern of refusal, evident in the collapse of the 2000 Camp David talks and 2008 Olmert offer, underscores a strategic rejectionism that prioritizes irredentist claims over pragmatic coexistence in a single state framework. Geopolitically, Arab states' normalization with Israel via the 2020 Abraham Accords—signed by the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco—has marginalized Palestinian demands, fostering economic and security ties without preconditions for Palestinian statehood, let alone a one-state merger. These accords, expanded post-2020, shifted regional dynamics toward countering Iran rather than enforcing Palestinian-centric solutions, with signatories like the UAE conditioning further progress on Israeli-Palestinian advances but not endorsing binational integration. The United States, under both Biden and subsequent administrations, has reaffirmed opposition to a one-state outcome, advocating instead for a two-state resolution to preserve Israel's Jewish and democratic nature while addressing Palestinian aspirations, as stated in policy documents emphasizing negotiated borders akin to pre-1967 lines. Iran's proxy network, including Hezbollah and Hamas, further entrenches mutual distrust, as persistent rocket attacks and terrorism—exemplified by the October 7, 2023, assault killing over 1,200 Israelis—render power-sharing in a single state untenable amid unresolved cycles of violence. These obstacles are compounded by international consensus against one-state viability, with bodies like the UN and EU endorsing two-state parameters in resolutions such as UNSC 242 (1967), which calls for secure Israeli borders and Palestinian self-determination without merging governance structures. Hardline positions on both sides, fueled by ideological intransigence and external actors like Iran, perpetuate a zero-sum paradigm where neither party concedes legitimacy to the other's national claims, blocking the institutional trust required for unified sovereignty.

Comparative Analysis and Alternatives

Lessons from Multi-Ethnic State Failures

Historical analyses of multi-ethnic states reveal recurrent patterns of instability when constituent groups harbor mutually exclusive national aspirations, leading to governance paralysis, civil strife, and often partition or collapse. In cases like Yugoslavia, Lebanon, and the Soviet Union, attempts at federalism or consociational power-sharing initially suppressed but ultimately failed to resolve deep-seated ethnic animosities, exacerbated by demographic shifts, economic disparities, and external influences. These failures underscore that multi-ethnic arrangements thrive only under authoritarian coercion or voluntary assimilation, but falter when groups prioritize ethnic solidarity over state loyalty, resulting in violence that claims hundreds of thousands of lives. Yugoslavia's disintegration from 1991 to 2001 exemplifies how engineered multi-ethnic unity unravels into ethnic conflict upon the removal of central control. Under Josip Broz Tito's rule until his death in 1980, the Socialist Federal Republic suppressed nationalist sentiments through one-party dominance and balanced federal representation among Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks, Slovenes, and others. However, rising Serbian nationalism under Slobodan Milošević, coupled with economic decline and memories of World War II massacres—such as the Ustaše genocide against Serbs—ignited secessionist movements in Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, escalating to the Bosnian War with over 100,000 deaths, including the Srebrenica massacre of 8,000 Bosniak men in 1995. Scholars attribute the collapse not merely to elite manipulation but to underlying ethnic intolerances that power-sharing mechanisms could not contain, as groups reverted to primordial loyalties amid institutional decay. Lebanon's confessional system, established by the 1943 National Pact allocating offices by sect—such as the Maronite Christian presidency and Sunni Muslim premiership—collapsed into a 15-year civil war from 1975 to 1990, killing approximately 150,000 and displacing one million. Demographic imbalances, with Muslim birth rates outpacing Christians and Palestinian refugee influxes post-1948 altering the 1932 census baseline, eroded the system's legitimacy, fostering militia proliferation and Syrian occupation. Analyses highlight consociationalism's flaws: it rigidified sectarian vetoes, incentivized clientelism over national policy, and failed to build cross-communal trust, allowing grievances like Christian fears of marginalization and Muslim demands for representation to fuel factional violence, including the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacres. The 1989 Taif Accord reformed quotas but perpetuated elite pacts without addressing root incompatibilities, leading to ongoing paralysis evident in the 2019-2020 economic meltdown. The Soviet Union's dissolution in December 1991 similarly illustrates ethnic fractures amplifying systemic weaknesses. Comprising 15 republics with titular ethnic majorities—Russians forming only 50.8% of the population per the 1989 census— the USSR relied on Russification and communist ideology to maintain cohesion. Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost from 1985 unleashed nationalist movements, from Baltic independence drives to ethnic clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh starting in 1988, which killed thousands and accelerated centrifugal forces. While economic stagnation was primary, ethnic pressures acted as precipitants, with non-Russian groups comprising nearly half the populace leveraging weakening central authority for sovereignty declarations; by August 1991, eight republics had exited, culminating in the Belavezha Accords. This trajectory warns that multi-ethnic federations, absent enforced homogeneity, devolve into separatism when ideological glue erodes. Sudan's experience reinforces these patterns through repeated ethnic violence culminating in partition. Two civil wars (1955-1972 and 1983-2005) between the Arab-Muslim north and African-Christian/animist south, driven by resource inequities and Sharia imposition, resulted in over two million deaths before the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and South Sudan's 2011 independence referendum, where 98.83% voted to secede. Yet partition failed to end conflict: Darfur's 2003 genocide by Janjaweed militias against non-Arab Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa—killing 300,000 and displacing 2.7 million—stemmed from similar identity-based marginalization, with Arab supremacist ideologies fueling targeted killings. Post-independence South Sudan descended into civil war in 2013 along Dinka-Nuer lines, underscoring that ethnic partitions merely relocate divisions without resolving them. Collectively, these cases yield empirical lessons for binational or multi-ethnic state viability: power-sharing entrenches zero-sum competitions, breeding and ; unresolved historical grievances incentivize and preemptive ; and without a overriding civic identity or demographic dominance by one assimilative group, states fracture under stress, often requiring external intervention or partition to halt bloodshed. Stable multi-ethnic entities, like or , succeed via small scale, , or strict assimilation policies—conditions absent in deeply polarized contexts.

Contrasts with Two-State or Confederation Models

The one-state solution, envisioning a single binational state encompassing Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza with equal rights for Jews and Arabs, fundamentally differs from the two-state model by forgoing separate national self-determination in favor of integrated governance, which risks subordinating Israel's Jewish-majority identity to a projected Arab demographic majority of approximately 7 million versus 7 million Jews, given higher Palestinian birth rates and potential refugee returns. In contrast, the two-state solution establishes independent sovereign entities—Israel retaining its Jewish democratic character and a Palestinian state achieving Arab self-rule—allowing each population to maintain distinct national institutions without the internal power-sharing dilemmas inherent in a unitary state, where irreconcilable claims to the same territory could exacerbate ethnic conflicts as seen in historical binational experiments. Security dynamics further highlight the divergence: under one-state integration, Israel would relinquish unilateral border control and face internalized threats from a unified polity lacking demilitarization guarantees, potentially enabling armed factions to operate within shared institutions, whereas the two-state framework permits Israel to enforce defensible borders, a demilitarized Palestinian entity, and international security arrangements to mitigate cross-border incursions, as outlined in prior negotiations like the Oslo Accords. Proponents of two states argue this separation aligns with causal realities of mutual distrust, where physical division reduces zero-sum territorial contests, unlike the one-state's reliance on improbable cultural assimilation amid persistent rejectionist ideologies. Confederation models, proposing two sovereign states linked by open borders, shared economic zones, and joint administration of sites like Jerusalem while tying citizenship to origin states, contrast with the one-state by preserving national sovereignty and demographic balances—Palestinians could reside in Israel without automatic enfranchisement there, averting the one-state's projected electoral dominance by Arabs—thus enabling cooperation on trade and security without merging polities into a single vulnerable entity prone to majority-minority disequilibria. This approach, akin to the European Union's supranational structures, addresses one-state critiques of impractical unity by allowing freedom of movement and right-of-return accommodations through residency permits rather than full integration, potentially fostering economic interdependence while insulating each state's core identity and defense autonomy from the governance gridlock of a unitary binational framework. Empirical assessments note confederation's appeal in sidestepping the one-state's existential risks to Israel's Jewish character, as polls indicate minimal Israeli support for full merger amid security concerns, favoring models that maintain separation with coordination.

References

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