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Dunkirk evacuation
Dunkirk evacuation
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Operation Dynamo
Part of Battle of Dunkirk during the Battle of France in the Second World War
Allied evacuation of Dunkirk
British troops lined up on the beach awaiting evacuation
Date26 May – 4 June 1940
Location
France, Dunkirk, and the English Channel
51°3′27″N 2°21′27″E / 51.05750°N 2.35750°E / 51.05750; 2.35750 (East mole)
Result
  • Successful retreat
  • Evacuation of 338,226 soldiers
Belligerents

United Kingdom United Kingdom

Belgium Belgium[2]
Canada Canada[3]
French Third Republic France

Netherlands Netherlands[5]
Polish government-in-exile Poland[2]
Nazi Germany Germany
Commanders and leaders
Map

The Dunkirk evacuation, codenamed Operation Dynamo and also known as the Miracle of Dunkirk, or just Dunkirk, was the evacuation of more than 338,000 Allied soldiers during the Second World War from the beaches and harbour of Dunkirk, in the north of France, between 26 May and 4 June 1940. The operation began after large numbers of Belgian, British, and French troops were cut off and surrounded by German troops during the six-week Battle of France.

After Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, France and the British Empire declared war on Germany and imposed an economic blockade. The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was sent to help defend France. After the Phoney War of October 1939 to April 1940, Germany invaded Belgium, the Netherlands, and France on 10 May 1940. Three panzer corps attacked through the Ardennes and drove northwest to the English Channel. By 21 May, German forces had trapped the BEF, the remains of the Belgian forces, and three French field armies along the northern coast of France. BEF commander General Viscount Gort immediately saw evacuation across the Channel as the best course of action, and began planning a withdrawal to Dunkirk, the closest good port.

Late on 23 May, the halt order was issued by Generaloberst Gerd von Rundstedt, commander of Army Group A. Adolf Hitler approved this order the next day, and had the German High Command send confirmation to the front. Attacking the trapped BEF, French, and Belgian armies was left to the Luftwaffe until the order was rescinded on 26 May. This gave Allied forces time to construct defensive works and pull back large numbers of troops to fight the Battle of Dunkirk. From 28 to 31 May, in the siege of Lille, the remaining 40,000 men of the French First Army fought a delaying action against seven German divisions, including three armoured divisions.

On the first day, only 7,669 Allied soldiers were evacuated, but by the end of the eighth day, 338,226 had been rescued by a hastily assembled fleet of over 800 vessels. Many troops were able to embark from the harbour's protective mole onto 39 British Royal Navy destroyers, four Royal Canadian Navy destroyers,[3] at least three French Navy destroyers, and a variety of civilian merchant ships. Others had to wade out from the beaches, waiting for hours in shoulder-deep water. Some were ferried to the larger ships by what became known as the Little Ships of Dunkirk, a flotilla of hundreds of merchant marine boats, fishing boats, pleasure craft, yachts, and lifeboats called into service from Britain.

The BEF lost 68,000 soldiers during the French campaign and had to abandon nearly all of its tanks, vehicles, and equipment. In his "We shall fight on the beaches" speech on 4 June to the House of Commons, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill called the event "a colossal military disaster", saying "the whole root and core and brain of the British Army" had been stranded at Dunkirk and seemed about to perish or be captured.[7] He hailed their rescue as a "miracle of deliverance".[8] Churchill also reminded the country that "we must be very careful not to assign to this deliverance the attributes of a victory. Wars are not won by evacuations."[9]

Background

[edit]

In September 1939, after Germany invaded Poland, the United Kingdom sent the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to aid in the defence of France, landing at Cherbourg, Nantes, and Saint-Nazaire. By May 1940 the force consisted of ten divisions in three corps under the command of General John Vereker, 6th Viscount Gort.[10][11] Working with the BEF were the Belgian Army and the French First, Seventh, and Ninth Armies.[12]

Situation on 21 May 1940; German forces occupy the area shaded in pink

During the 1930s, the French had constructed the Maginot Line, a series of fortifications along their border with Germany. This line had been designed to deter a German invasion across the Franco-German border and funnel an attack into Belgium, which could then be met by the best divisions of the French Army. Thus, any future war would take place outside of French territory, avoiding a repeat of the First World War.[13][14] The area immediately to the north of the Maginot Line was covered by the heavily wooded Ardennes region,[15] which French General Philippe Pétain declared to be "impenetrable" as long as "special provisions" were taken. He believed that any enemy force emerging from the forest would be vulnerable to a pincer attack and destroyed. The French commander-in-chief, Maurice Gamelin, also believed the area to be of a limited threat, noting that it "never favoured large operations".[16] With this in mind, the area was left lightly defended.[13]

The initial plan for the German invasion of France called for an encirclement attack through the Netherlands and Belgium, avoiding the Maginot Line.[17] Erich von Manstein, then Chief of Staff of the German Army Group A, prepared the outline of a different plan and submitted it to the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH; German High Command) via his superior, Generaloberst Gerd von Rundstedt.[18][19] Manstein's plan suggested that panzer divisions should attack through the Ardennes, then establish bridgeheads on the Meuse River and rapidly drive to the English Channel. The Germans would thus cut off the Allied armies in Belgium. This part of the plan later became known as the Sichelschnitt ("sickle cut").[19][20] Adolf Hitler approved a modified version of Manstein's ideas, today known as the Manstein Plan, after meeting with him on 17 February.[21]

On 10 May, Germany invaded Belgium and the Netherlands.[22] Army Group B, under Generaloberst Fedor von Bock, attacked into Belgium, while the three panzer corps of Army Group A under Rundstedt swung around to the south and drove for the Channel.[23] The BEF advanced from the Belgian border to positions along the River Dyle within Belgium, where they fought elements of Army Group B starting on 10 May.[24][25] They were ordered to begin a fighting withdrawal to the Scheldt River on 14 May when the Belgian and French positions on their flanks failed to hold.[26] During a visit to Paris on 17 May, Winston Churchill was astonished to learn from Gamelin that the French had committed all their troops to the ongoing engagements and had no strategic reserves.[27] On 19 May, Gort met with French General Gaston Billotte, commander of the French First Army and overall coordinator of the Allied forces. Billotte revealed that the French had no troops between the Germans and the sea. Gort immediately saw that evacuation across the Channel was the best course of action, and began planning a withdrawal to Dunkirk, the closest location with good port facilities.[28] Surrounded by marshes, Dunkirk boasted old fortifications and the longest sand beach in Europe, where large groups could assemble.[29] On 20 May, on Churchill's suggestion, the Admiralty began arranging for all available small vessels to be made ready to proceed to France.[30] After continued engagements and a failed Allied attempt on 21 May at Arras to cut through the German spearhead,[31] the BEF was trapped, along with the remains of the Belgian forces and the three French armies, in an area along the coast of northern France and Belgium.[32][33]

Prelude

[edit]
Lord Gort (gesturing, at centre) was commander of the British Expeditionary Force.

Without informing the French, the British began planning on 20 May for Operation Dynamo, the evacuation of the BEF.[29][30] This planning was headed by Vice Admiral Bertram Ramsay at the naval headquarters below Dover Castle, from which he briefed Churchill as it was under way.[34] Ships began gathering at Dover for the evacuation.[35] On 20 May, the BEF sent Brigadier Gerald Whitfield to Dunkirk to start evacuating unnecessary personnel. Overwhelmed by what he later described as "a somewhat alarming movement towards Dunkirk by both officers and men", due to a shortage of food and water, he had to send many along without thoroughly checking their credentials. Even officers ordered to stay behind to aid the evacuation disappeared onto the boats.[36]

On 22 May, Churchill ordered the BEF to attack southward in coordination with the French First Army under General Georges Blanchard to reconnect with the remainder of the French forces.[37] This proposed action was dubbed the Weygand Plan after General Maxime Weygand, appointed Supreme Commander after Gamelin's dismissal on 18 May.[38] On 25 May, Gort had to abandon any hope of achieving this objective and withdrew on his own initiative, along with Blanchard's forces, behind the Lys Canal, part of a canal system that reached the sea at Gravelines.[39] Sluice gates had already been opened all along the canal to flood the system and create a barrier (the Canal Line) against the German advance.[40]

Battle of Dunkirk

[edit]
Soldiers were strafed and bombed by German aircraft while awaiting transport.[41]

By 24 May, the Germans had captured the port of Boulogne and surrounded Calais.[32] The engineers of the 2nd Panzer Division under Generalmajor Rudolf Veiel built five bridges over the Canal Line and only one British battalion barred the way to Dunkirk.[42] On 23 May, at the suggestion of Fourth Army commander Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge, Rundstedt had ordered the panzer units to halt, concerned about the vulnerability of his flanks and the question of supply to his forward troops.[43][44][45][46] He was also concerned that the marshy ground around Dunkirk would prove unsuitable for tanks and he wished to conserve them for later operations (in some units, tank losses were 30–50 per cent).[47][48] Hitler was also apprehensive, and on a visit to Army Group A headquarters on 24 May, he endorsed the order.[47][46]

Air Marshal Hermann Göring urged Hitler to let the Luftwaffe (aided by Army Group B[49]) finish off the British. However, General Franz Halder noted in his diary that the Luftwaffe was dependent upon the weather and aircrews were worn out after two weeks of battle.[50] Rundstedt issued another order, which was sent uncoded. It was picked up by the Royal Air Force (RAF) Y service intelligence network at 12:42: "By order of the Fuhrer ... attack north-west of Arras is to be limited to the general line Lens–Bethune–Aire–St Omer–Gravelines. The Canal will not be crossed."[51][52] Later that day, Hitler issued Directive 13, which called for the Luftwaffe to defeat the trapped Allied forces and stop their escape.[53] At 15:30 on 26 May, Hitler ordered the panzer groups to continue their advance, but most units took another 16 hours to attack.[54] Some accounts quote Hitler as saying he deliberately allowed the British to escape.[55] The delay gave the Allies time to prepare defences vital for the evacuation and prevented the Germans from stopping the Allied retreat from Lille.[56]

The halt order has been the subject of much discussion by historians.[57][58] Guderian considered the failure to order a timely assault on Dunkirk to be one of the major German mistakes on the Western Front.[59] Rundstedt called it "one of the great turning points of the war",[60] and Manstein described it as "one of Hitler's most critical mistakes".[61] B. H. Liddell Hart interviewed many of the generals after the war and put together a picture of Hitler's strategic thinking on the matter. He concluded that Hitler believed that once Britain's troops left continental Europe, they would never return.[62][page needed]

Evacuation

[edit]

26–27 May

[edit]
British troops during the evacuation from France
Troops evacuated from Dunkirk arrive at Dover, 31 May 1940

The retreat was undertaken amid chaotic conditions, with abandoned vehicles blocking the roads and a flood of refugees heading in the opposite direction.[63][64] Due to wartime censorship and the desire to keep up British morale, the full extent of the unfolding disaster at Dunkirk was not initially publicised. A special service attended by King George VI was held in Westminster Abbey on 26 May, which was declared a national day of prayer.[65][66] The Archbishop of Canterbury led prayers "for our soldiers in dire peril in France". Similar prayers were offered in synagogues and churches throughout the UK that day, confirming to the public their suspicion of the desperate plight of the troops.[67] Just before 19:00 on 26 May, Churchill ordered Dynamo to begin, by which time 28,000 men had already departed.[29] Initial plans called for the recovery of 45,000 men from the BEF within two days, at which time German troops were expected to block further evacuation. Only 25,000 men escaped during this period, including 7,669 on the first day.[68][69]

On 27 May, the first full day of the evacuation, one cruiser, eight destroyers, and 26 other craft were active.[70] Admiralty officers combed nearby boatyards for small craft that could ferry personnel from the beaches out to larger craft in the harbour, as well as larger vessels that could load from the docks. An emergency call was put out for additional help, and by 31 May nearly four hundred small craft were voluntarily and enthusiastically taking part in the effort.[71]

The same day, the Luftwaffe heavily bombed Dunkirk, both the town and the dock installations. As the water supply was knocked out, the resulting fires could not be extinguished.[72] An estimated one thousand civilians were killed, one-third of the remaining population of the town.[73] RAF squadrons were ordered to provide air supremacy for the Royal Navy during evacuation. Their efforts shifted to covering Dunkirk and the English Channel, protecting the evacuation fleet.[74] The Luftwaffe was met by 16 squadrons of the RAF, who claimed 38 kills on 27 May while losing 14 aircraft.[72][75] Many more RAF fighters sustained damage and were subsequently written off. On the German side, Kampfgeschwader 2 (KG 2) and KG 3 suffered the heaviest casualties. German losses amounted to 23 Dornier Do 17s. KG 1 and KG 4 bombed the beach and harbour and KG 54 sank the 8,000-ton steamer Aden. Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive bombers sank the troopship Cote d' Azur. The Luftwaffe engaged with 300 bombers which were protected by 550 fighter sorties and attacked Dunkirk in twelve raids. They dropped 15,000 high explosive and 30,000 incendiary bombs, destroying the oil tanks and wrecking the harbour.[76] No. 11 Group RAF flew 22 patrols with 287 aircraft this day, in formations of up to 20 aircraft.[77]

Altogether, over 3,500 sorties were flown in support of Operation Dynamo.[75] The RAF continued to inflict a heavy toll on the German bombers throughout the week. Soldiers being bombed and strafed while awaiting transport were for the most part unaware of the efforts of the RAF to protect them, as most of the dogfights took place far from the beaches. As a result, many British soldiers bitterly accused the airmen of doing nothing to help, reportedly leading to some army troops accosting and insulting RAF personnel once they returned to England.[41]

On 25 and 26 May, the Luftwaffe focused their attention on Allied pockets holding out at Calais, Lille, and Amiens, and did not attack Dunkirk.[73] Calais, held by the BEF, surrendered on 26 May.[78] Remnants of the French First Army, surrounded at Lille, fought off seven German divisions, several of them armoured, until 31 May, when the remaining 35,000 soldiers were forced to surrender after running out of food and ammunition.[79][80] The Germans accorded the honours of war to the defenders of Lille in recognition of their bravery.[81]

28 May – 4 June

[edit]
Situation on 4 June 1940; the remaining French rearguard held a sliver of land around Dunkirk
East mole (2009)

The Belgian Army surrendered on 28 May,[82] leaving a large gap to the east of Dunkirk. Several British divisions were rushed in to cover that side.[83] The Luftwaffe flew fewer sorties over Dunkirk on 28 May, switching their attention to the Belgian ports of Ostend and Nieuwpoort. The weather over Dunkirk was not conducive to dive or low-level bombing. The RAF flew 11 patrols and 321 sorties, claiming 23 destroyed for the loss of 13 aircraft.[77] On 28 May, 17,804 soldiers arrived at British ports.[69]

On 29 May, 47,310 British troops were rescued[69] as the Luftwaffe's Ju 87s exacted a heavy toll on shipping. The British destroyer HMS Grenade was sunk and the French destroyer Mistral was crippled, while her sister ships, each laden with 500 men, were damaged by near misses. British destroyers Jaguar and Verity were badly damaged but escaped the harbour. Two trawlers disintegrated in the attack. Later, the passenger steamer SS Fenella sank with 600 men aboard at the pier but the men were able to get off. The paddle steamer HMS Crested Eagle suffered a direct hit, caught fire, and sank with severe casualties. The raiders also destroyed the two rail-owned ships, the SS Lorina and the SS Normannia.[84] Of the five major German attacks, just two were contested by RAF fighters; the British lost 16 fighters in nine patrols. German losses amounted to 11 Ju 87s destroyed or damaged.[85]

On 30 May, Churchill received word that all British divisions were now behind the defensive lines, along with more than half of the French First Army.[79] By this time, the perimeter ran along a series of canals about 7 miles (11 km) from the coast, in marshy country not suitable for tanks.[86] With the docks in the harbour rendered unusable by German air attacks, senior naval officer Captain (later Admiral) William Tennant initially ordered men to be evacuated from the beaches. When this proved too slow, he re-routed the evacuees to two long stone and concrete breakwaters, called the east and west moles, as well as the beaches. The moles were not designed to dock ships, but despite this, the majority of troops rescued from Dunkirk were taken off this way.[87] Almost 200,000 troops embarked on ships from the east mole (which stretched nearly a mile out to sea) over the next week.[88][89] James Campbell Clouston, pier master on the east mole, organised and regulated the flow of men along the mole into the waiting ships.[90] Once more, low clouds kept Luftwaffe activity to a minimum. Nine RAF patrols were mounted, with no German formation encountered.[91] The following day, the Luftwaffe sank one transport and damaged 12 others for 17 losses; the British claimed 38 kills, which is disputed. The RAF and Fleet Air Arm lost 28 aircraft.[91]

British troops evacuated from Dunkirk on 31 May 1940

The next day, an additional 53,823 men were embarked,[9] including the first French soldiers.[92] Lord Gort and 68,014 men were evacuated on 31 May,[93] leaving Major-General Harold Alexander in command of the rearguard.[94] A further 64,429 Allied soldiers departed on 1 June,[69] before the increasing air attacks prevented further daylight evacuation.[95] The British rearguard of 4,000 men left on the night of 2–3 June.[96] An additional 75,000 French troops were retrieved over the nights of 2–4 June,[69][97] before the operation finally ended. The remainder of the rearguard, 40,000 French troops, surrendered on 4 June.[96]

Of the total 338,226 soldiers, several hundred were unarmed Indian mule handlers on detachment from the Royal Indian Army Service Corps, forming four of the six units of Force K-6 transport. Cypriot muleteers were also present. Three units were successfully evacuated and one captured.[98][99][100] Also present at Dunkirk were a small number of French Senegalese soldiers and Moroccans.[4][101]

[edit]

Evacuation routes

[edit]
Map of the three evacuation routes
Evacuated troops enjoying tea and other refreshments before boarding a train at Dover Station, 26–29 May 1940

Three routes were allocated to the evacuating vessels. The shortest was Route Z, a distance of 39 nautical miles (72 km), but it entailed hugging the French coast and thus ships using it were subject to bombardment from on-shore batteries, particularly in daylight hours.[102][103] Route X, although the safest from shore batteries, travelled through a particularly heavily mined portion of the Channel. Ships on this route travelled 55 nautical miles (102 km) north out of Dunkirk, proceeded through the Ruytingen Pass,[104] and headed towards the North Goodwin Lightship before heading south around the Goodwin Sands to Dover.[102][103] The route was safest from surface attacks, but the nearby minefields and sandbanks meant it could not be used at night.[105] The longest of the three was Route Y, a distance of 87 nautical miles (161 km); using this route increased the sailing time to four hours, double the time required for Route Z. This route followed the French coast as far as Bray-Dunes, then turned north-east until reaching the Kwinte Buoy.[106] Here, after making an approximately 135-degree turn, the ships sailed west to the North Goodwin Lightship and headed south around the Goodwin Sands to Dover.[102][103] Ships on Route Y were the most likely to be attacked by German surface vessels, submarines, and the Luftwaffe.[107]

You knew this was the chance to get home and you kept praying, please God, let us go, get us out, get us out of this mess back to England. To see that ship that came in to pick me and my brother up, it was a most fantastic sight. We saw dog fights up in the air, hoping nothing would happen to us and we saw one or two terrible sights. Then somebody said, there's Dover, that was when we saw the White Cliffs, the atmosphere was terrific. From hell to heaven was how the feeling was, you felt like a miracle had happened.

— Harry Garrett, British Army, speaking to Kent Online[108]

Ships

[edit]
Troops evacuated from Dunkirk on a destroyer about to berth at Dover, 31 May 1940

The Royal Navy provided the anti-aircraft cruiser HMS Calcutta, 39 destroyers, and many other craft. The Merchant Navy supplied passenger ferries, hospital ships, and other vessels. Britain's Belgian, Dutch, Canadian,[3] Polish,[109] and French allies provided vessels as well. Admiral Ramsay arranged for around a thousand copies to be made of the required charts, had buoys laid around the Goodwin Sands and down to Dunkirk, and organised the flow of shipping.[105] Larger ships such as destroyers were able to carry about 900 men per trip. The soldiers mostly travelled on the upper decks for fear of being trapped below if the ship sank.[110] After the loss on 29 May of 19 British and French navy ships plus three of the larger requisitioned vessels, the Admiralty withdrew their eight best destroyers for the future defence of the country.[111]

British ships[112]
Type of vessel Total engaged Sunk Damaged
Cruisers 1 0 1
Destroyers 39 6 19
Sloops, corvettes and gunboats 9 1 1
Minesweepers 36 5 7
Trawlers and drifters 113 17 2
Special service vessels 3 1 0
Ocean boarding vessels 3 1 1
Torpedo boats and anti-submarine boats 13 0 0
Former Dutch schuyts with naval crews 40 4 Unknown
Yachts with naval crews 26 3 Unknown
Personnel ships 45 8 8
Hospital carriers 8 1 5
Naval motor boats 12 6 Unknown
Tugboats 34 3 Unknown
Other small craft[note 1] 311 170 Unknown
Total British ships 693 226
  1. ^ Does not include ships' lifeboats and some unrecorded small privately owned craft.[112]
Allied ships[112]
Type of vessel Total engaged Sunk Damaged
Warships (all types) 49 8 Unknown
Other vessels 119 9 Unknown
Total Allied ships 168 17 Unknown
Grand total 861 243 Unknown

Little ships

[edit]

A wide variety of small vessels from all over the south of England were pressed into service to aid in the Dunkirk evacuation. They included speedboats, Thames vessels, car ferries, pleasure craft, and many other types of small craft.[113] The most useful proved to be the motor lifeboats, which had a reasonably good capacity and speed.[113] Some boats were requisitioned without the owner's knowledge or consent. Agents of the Ministry of Shipping, accompanied by a naval officer, scoured the Thames for likely vessels, had them checked for seaworthiness, and took them downriver to Sheerness, where naval crews were to be placed aboard. Due to shortages of personnel, many small craft crossed the Channel with civilian crews.[114]

The first of the "little ships" arrived at Dunkirk on 28 May.[110] The wide sand beaches meant that large vessels could not get anywhere near the shore, and even small craft had to stop about 100 yards (91 m) from the waterline and wait for the soldiers to wade out.[115] In many cases, personnel would abandon their boat upon reaching a larger ship, and subsequent evacuees had to wait for boats to drift ashore with the tide before they could make use of them.[116] In most areas on the beaches, soldiers queued up with their units and patiently awaited their turn to leave. But at times, panicky soldiers had to be warned off at gunpoint when they attempted to rush to the boats out of turn.[117] In addition to ferrying out on boats, soldiers at De Panne and Bray-Dunes constructed improvised jetties by driving rows of abandoned vehicles onto the beach at low tide, anchoring them with sandbags, and connecting them with wooden walkways.[118]

Aftermath

[edit]

Analysis

[edit]
Troops landed from Dunkirk
27 May – 4 June 1940[69]
Date Beaches Harbour Total
27 May 7,669 7,669
28 May 5,930 11,874 17,804
29 May 13,752 33,558 47,310
30 May 29,512 24,311 53,823
31 May 22,942 45,072 68,014
1 June 17,348 47,081 64,429
2 June 6,695 19,561 26,256
3 June 1,870 24,876 26,746
4 June 622 25,553 26,175
Totals 98,671 239,555 338,226

Before the operation was completed, the prognosis had been gloomy, with Churchill warning the House of Commons on 28 May to expect "hard and heavy tidings".[119] Subsequently, Churchill referred to the outcome as a miracle, and the British press presented the evacuation as a "disaster turned to triumph" so successfully that Churchill had to remind the country in a speech to the House of Commons on 4 June that "we must be very careful not to assign to this deliverance the attributes of a victory. Wars are not won by evacuations."[9] Andrew Roberts comments that the confusion over the Dunkirk evacuation is illustrated by two of the best books on it being called Strange Defeat and Strange Victory.[120]

The 51st (Highland) Infantry Division was cut off south of the Somme, by the German "race to the sea", in addition to the 1st Armoured Division and a host of logistical and labour troops. Some of the latter had been formed into the improvised Beauman Division. At the end of May, further elements of two divisions began deploying to France with the hope of establishing a Second BEF. The majority of the 51st (Highland) Infantry Division was forced to surrender on 12 June. However, almost 192,000 Allied personnel, including 144,000 British, were evacuated through various French ports from 15 to 25 June under the codename Operation Aerial.[121] Remaining British forces under the French Tenth Army as Norman Force retreated towards Cherbourg.[122] The Germans marched into Paris on 14 June and France surrendered eight days later.[123]

The more than 100,000 French troops evacuated from Dunkirk were quickly and efficiently shuttled to camps in various parts of south-western England, where they were temporarily lodged before being repatriated.[124] British ships ferried French troops to Brest, Cherbourg, and other ports in Normandy and Brittany, although only about half of the repatriated troops were redeployed against the Germans before the surrender of France. For many French soldiers, the Dunkirk evacuation represented only a few weeks' delay before being killed or captured by the German army after their return to France.[125] Of the French soldiers evacuated from France in June 1940, about 3,000 joined Charles de Gaulle's Free French army in Britain.[126]

Troops evacuated from Dunkirk in London, 31 May 1940

In France, the unilateral British decision to evacuate through Dunkirk rather than counter-attack to the south, and the perceived preference of the Royal Navy for evacuating British forces at the expense of the French, led to some bitter resentment. According to Churchill, French Admiral François Darlan originally ordered that the British forces should receive preference, but on 31 May, he intervened at a meeting in Paris to order that the evacuation should proceed on equal terms and that the British would form the rearguard.[127] In fact, the 35,000 men who finally surrendered after covering the final evacuations were mostly French soldiers of the 2nd Light Mechanized and the 68th Infantry Divisions.[128][129] Their resistance allowed the evacuation effort to be extended to 4 June, on which date another 26,175 Frenchmen were transported to England.[69]

The evacuation was presented to the German public as an overwhelming and decisive German victory. On 5 June 1940, Hitler stated, "Dunkirk has fallen! 40,000 French and English troops are all that remains of the formerly great armies. Immeasurable quantities of materiel have been captured. The greatest battle in the history of the world has come to an end."[a][130] Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (the German armed forces high command) announced the event as "the greatest annihilation battle of all time".[131]

Within Britain, there was a sharp ideological division about the portrayal of the Dunkirk evacuation. Left-wing and liberal accounts at the time such as by the writer J. B. Priestley and the journalist Hilda Marchant tended to focus exclusively upon Dunkirk, which was portrayed as the beginning of the "people's war", where ordinary people rallied to save the BEF.[132] By contrast, Conservative accounts at the time portrayed Dunkirk as merely one part of a wider "battle of the ports" which also included the battle of Boulogne and the siege of Calais.[133] Conservative accounts of the "battle of the ports" tended to focus on the professionalism and the bravery of the British military, especially the British Army, in desperate conditions, which were portrayed as symbols of British martial prowess.[133] Conservative newspapers and journals in early 1940 tended to give more coverage to the battle of Calais, where Brigadier Claude Nicholson chose to fight on despite being informed that escape was impossible from Calais, rather than the Durkirk evacuation.[134] The triumph of the "people's war" interpretation, which completely obliviated the rival "battle of the ports" interpretation in the popular memory of 1940, was largely due to cinema, as filmmakers chose to focus on the evacuation at Dunkirk and ignored the other battles along the French coast.[133]

Casualties

[edit]
Bourrasque slowly sinking
Isle of Man Steam Packet Company vessel Mona's Queen shortly after striking a mine on the approach to Dunkirk, 29 May 1940

During the entire campaign, from 10 May until the armistice with France on 22 June, the BEF suffered 68,000 casualties.[135] This included 3,500 killed and 13,053 wounded.[136][137] Most heavy equipment had to be abandoned during the various evacuations, resulting in the loss of 2,472 pieces of artillery, 20,000 motorcycles, nearly 65,000 other vehicles, 416,000 long tons (423,000 t) of stores, more than 75,000 long tons (76,000 t) of ammunition, and 162,000 long tons (165,000 t) of fuel.[138] Almost all of the 445 British tanks despatched to France were abandoned.[139]

Six British and three French destroyers were sunk, along with nine other major vessels. In addition, 19 destroyers were damaged.[140] Over 200 British and Allied sea craft were sunk, with a similar number damaged.[141] The Royal Navy's most significant losses in the operation were six destroyers:

The French Navy lost three destroyers:

The RAF lost 145 aircraft, of which at least 42 were Spitfires, while the Luftwaffe lost 156 aircraft in operations during the nine days of Operation Dynamo,[146] including 35 destroyed by Royal Navy ships (plus 21 damaged) during the six days from 27 May to 1 June.[147]

For every seven soldiers who escaped through Dunkirk, one man became a prisoner of war. The majority of these prisoners were sent on forced marches into Germany. Prisoners reported brutal treatment by their guards, including beatings, starvation, and murder. Another complaint was that German guards kicked over buckets of water that had been left at the roadside by French civilians, for the marching prisoners to drink.[148]

Many of the prisoners were marched to the city of Trier, with the march taking as long as 20 days. Others were marched to the river Scheldt and were sent by barge to the Ruhr. The prisoners were then sent by rail to prisoner of war camps in Germany.[149] The majority (those below the rank of corporal) then worked in German industry and agriculture for the remainder of the war.[150]

Those of the BEF who died in the fighting of 1940, or as a prisoner of war following capture during this campaign, and have no known grave are commemorated on the Dunkirk Memorial.[151]

Dunkirk Jack

[edit]

Dunkirk Jack

The St George's Cross defaced with the arms of Dunkirk is the warranted house flag of the Association of Dunkirk Little Ships. It is known as the Dunkirk Jack. The flag may be flown from the jack staff only by civilian vessels that took part in the Dunkirk rescue operation.[152]

Portrayals

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Films

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Television

[edit]

Books

[edit]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]

Bibliography

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
[edit]
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The Dunkirk evacuation, codenamed Operation Dynamo, was the emergency withdrawal of encircled Allied forces from the port and beaches of Dunkirk in northern France between 26 May and 4 June 1940, amid the German offensive during the in . Primarily involving the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) alongside French, Belgian, and other Allied troops, the operation rescued approximately 338,000 personnel using a flotilla of over 800 naval and civilian vessels, including small private boats known as the "little ships," despite intense bombing and ground threats. Ordered by and directed by Vice-Admiral from , it succeeded beyond initial expectations of evacuating only 45,000 men, preserving the core of Britain's professional army for future defense against invasion. While hailed as a "miracle" in British propaganda—exemplified by Churchill's 4 June 1940 speech framing it as a "deliverance"—the evacuation represented a stark military defeat, with the Allies abandoning vast quantities of equipment, including nearly 64,000 vehicles, 20,000 motorcycles, and 2,500 artillery pieces, severely hampering Britain's rearmament and leaving France to collapse shortly thereafter. German forces, having shattered Allied lines through the Ardennes, encircled the BEF and allies after rapid advances, but a critical halt order issued on 24 May by Army Group A commander Gerd von Rundstedt—endorsed by Adolf Hitler—paused panzer assaults for logistical recovery and due to marshy terrain unsuitable for tanks, allowing the perimeter to consolidate under RAF air cover and enabling the sea lift. This decision, rooted in overextended supply lines, exhaustion after weeks of combat, and misplaced Luftwaffe confidence rather than any strategic mercy, averted total annihilation but stemmed from operational miscalculations rather than Allied heroism alone. The operation's success in manpower preservation underpinned Britain's resolve to continue the independently, buying time for industrial mobilization, but its mythic portrayal has obscured the causal of a near-catastrophic , with over 68,000 British and 30,000 French troops captured or killed, underscoring the Wehrmacht's tactical superiority in .

Historical Context

German Offensive in

The German offensive in , designated Fall Gelb (Case Yellow), launched on 10 with invasions of the , , , and , involving three army groups comprising 27 and 112 divisions. Central to the operation was the Sichelschnitt (sickle cut) strategy, which employed 's northern assault to draw Allied forces into while , under , delivered the main armored thrust through the forest—a region Allied intelligence considered unsuitable for large-scale mechanized operations due to its dense woods and poor roads. included 45 divisions, spearheaded by seven panzer divisions and three motorized infantry divisions grouped under Panzergruppe Kleist. From 10 to 12 May, German armored columns, including Erwin Rommel's 7th Panzer Division and Heinz Guderian's XIX Panzer Corps, traversed narrow routes despite severe traffic congestion, positioning for crossings of the Meuse River. On 13 May, following massive strikes that disrupted French command and artillery, German engineers and infantry established bridgeheads at Sedan, , and Monthermé, with the Sedan sector—defended by three French divisions—yielding after two days of combat marked by initial German infantry losses from counter-battery fire. The rapid consolidation of these crossings enabled panzer forces to bypass the and penetrate into open French territory. Exploiting the breach, Guderian's and Hoth's corps advanced westward at speeds exceeding 30 miles per day, outpacing their supply lines and infantry support. Rommel's division captured key bridges and towns in the northern advance, earning it the moniker "Ghost Division" for its elusive speed. By 20 May, spearheads of the 2nd Panzer Division reached on the Channel coast, severing Allied communications and encircling the British Expeditionary Force along with Belgian, Dutch, and French units in northern France and the —totaling over 1 million men, though effective combat strength was lower due to prior engagements. This maneuver isolated the northern Allied armies, compelling a defensive perimeter around as the path to opened for subsequent operations.

Allied Strategies and Initial Engagements

The Allied strategy to counter a anticipated German invasion through and the relied on the Dyle Plan, devised by French commander in November 1939, which called for the rapid forward deployment of the French First Army Group—comprising 36 divisions including the British Expeditionary Force (BEF)—to defensive positions along the Dyle River from through Louvain, , and . This positioning aimed to integrate with Belgian forces holding the Albert Canal and extend linkages to Dutch defenses via the Breda Variant, deploying the French Seventh Army approximately 48 kilometers eastward to and ; the plan assumed a German offensive mirroring patterns, emphasizing linear defense against a broad frontal assault rather than rapid armored maneuver. The BEF, expanded to ten divisions (five regular and five Territorial, totaling over 390,000 men) and positioned along the Belgian frontier, was tasked with supporting French flanks on the Dyle line while the French Second Army anchored the southern pivot near Sedan with reserve divisions. On 10 May 1940, as German Army Groups A and B initiated Fall Gelb with invasions of , , and , Allied forces executed the Dyle Plan, advancing motorized units into on 11–12 May to engage what was perceived as the main German effort in central . The BEF crossed from into to occupy assigned sectors, linking with French and Belgian troops amid strikes that destroyed 50% of Dutch and 25% of Belgian aircraft on airfields. Initial engagements pitted Allied northern forces against German Army Group B's 29 divisions, intended as a deception to fix Allied attention northward while maneuvered through the . The , from 12 to 14 May, marked the campaign's first major armored clash, with French light divisions (including the 2nd and 3rd Light Mechanized Divisions) confronting elements of German XVI near the Belgian town of Hannut; French forces inflicted significant losses on German panzers through superior anti-tank tactics but withdrew to maintain the Dyle line as German infantry pressure mounted. Further fighting erupted in the Gembloux Gap, where French infantry divisions held against German advances probing the Dyle defenses through 15 May, achieving local tactical successes but unable to counter the undetected German River crossings at Sedan on 13–14 May by XIX (900 armored vehicles supported by 1,500 aircraft and 284 artillery pieces), which shattered French Second Army cohesion and initiated the encirclement threat. In response to early reports of southern vulnerabilities, Gamelin ordered redeployments of 20 divisions southward using 500 trains and 30,000 vehicles from 12–17 May, but these movements proved too slow to seal the breach, leaving northern Allied forces—including the BEF—exposed to outflanking as German Panzer Group Kleist raced toward the Channel. The BEF's subsequent improvised at on 21 May, involving British 1st Tank Brigade and French 3rd Mechanized Division elements against the German 7th Panzer Division, briefly halted the enemy advance and inflicted 400 casualties, but lacked sufficient reserves to exploit gains amid broader strategic collapse.

Encirclement and Perimeter Defense

Breakthrough and Maneuvers Leading to the Pocket

The German offensive, codenamed Fall Gelb, commenced on May 10, 1940, with , comprising 45 divisions including seven panzer divisions, advancing through the region, which Allied commanders deemed impassable for large armored forces. This maneuver, part of Erich von Manstein's revised plan known as the sickle cut, aimed to bypass the and the main Allied concentrations in by thrusting toward Sedan and then the to sever northern Allied armies from reinforcements. German forces under General crossed the River at Sedan between May 12 and 14, overcoming French defenses through concentrated air support and rapid infantry assaults, establishing bridgeheads despite initial fierce resistance from the French Ninth Army. By May 15, German panzer corps under XIX Panzer Corps commander Guderian had broken out from the bridgeheads, exploiting weak French reserves and communication breakdowns to advance unchecked toward the west. Over the next days, these armored units covered approximately 150 miles in five days, reaching by May 19 and on the Channel coast on May 20, where Guderian's tanks linked up with forces from , effectively cutting off the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), Belgian Army, and northern French units—totaling around 400,000 to 500,000 troops—from the main French forces to the south. This breakthrough isolated the Allied armies in a pocket extending from the Channel to roughly the line of the River and Somme, as German Army Group A wheeled northward to compress the salient while pressed from the northeast. The rapidity of the panzer advance stemmed from superior German tactical doctrine emphasizing , speed, and initiative, contrasting with Allied adherence to static defenses and slower mobilization, which failed to mount effective counterattacks despite attempts like the French counteroffensive toward Sedan that faltered due to command hesitancy. By May 21, German forces had secured the Channel ports of Boulogne and , further tightening the encirclement and forcing the Allies into a defensive perimeter around , with the pocket's formation complete as interdiction hampered Allied redeployments.

Battles Around Dunkirk

The defensive battles around Dunkirk from 26 May to 4 June 1940 involved Allied forces holding a shrinking perimeter against German Army Group B to enable Operation Dynamo. The roughly 48-kilometer perimeter encompassed the port and beaches, defended by about 40,000 British, 40,000 French, and remaining Belgian troops facing superior German numbers, including the 6th and 18th Armies. Marshy terrain, canals, and the hindered German armor, while Allied artillery, machine guns, and infantry conducted rearguard actions amid constant bombing and artillery barrages. In the eastern sector, British III Corps, including the 48th (South Midland) Division's 145th Brigade, anchored defenses at key positions like Cassel. From 25 to 29 May, British forces at Cassel repelled repeated assaults by German and tanks, including elements of the 256th and 290th Divisions supported by Stuka dive-bombers. The , comprising units such as the 5th and 2nd Gloster Regiment, held the hilltop town for four days despite being outgunned, destroying over 20 German tanks and delaying advances toward the perimeter's flank; most defenders were eventually captured after ammunition exhaustion. This action secured observation posts vital for directing artillery fire onto approaching German columns. The northern sector saw Belgian forces along the Yser Canal collapse after King Leopold III's capitulation on 28 May, exposing French and British lines at and Furnes to German 4th Army attacks. French troops, including the 12th Motorised Division, reinforced these positions, countering infantry probes but suffering heavy losses from air and ground assaults. In the south, French First Army remnants executed critical delaying actions; during of Lille from 28 to 31 May, approximately 40,000 French soldiers from two corps tied down seven to ten German divisions, including elite units, preventing their redeployment to Dunkirk. The French defenders inflicted significant casualties before surrendering on 31 May, buying essential time for evacuation shipping. German assaults peaked between 27 and 30 May, with infantry divisions like the 1st and 22nd supported by panzers attempting breakthroughs at , Spycker, and Bulscamp, but Allied resistance, combined with RAF fighter cover and smokescreens, blunted penetrations. By 1 June, the perimeter contracted under pressure, but sufficient forces had embarked, totaling 338,000 rescued troops. Allied ground exceeded 68,000 for the BEF alone, with most abandoned, though the defenses ensured the operation's partial success despite strategic .

Operation Dynamo

Planning and Launch (26 May 1940)

As the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) faced encirclement by German forces advancing through and northern , British military leaders recognized the impossibility of continued offensive operations and shifted focus to withdrawal toward the Channel ports, with emerging as the primary viable evacuation point. John Gort, commander of the BEF, received authorization from the British War Cabinet on 25 May to retreat specifically to while maintaining defensive positions to cover the move. Vice Admiral , serving as Dover and recently recalled from retirement, was appointed to oversee the naval aspects of the evacuation, codenamed Operation Dynamo, from a fortified carved into the cliffs beneath . Ramsay's team, operating with limited resources and under intense time pressure, developed plans emphasizing the use of the harbor's East Mole for efficient loading alongside beach evacuations, anticipating initial lifts of around 45,000 troops over 48 hours amid heavy threats. On 26 May 1940, Prime Minister Winston Churchill formally approved the operation's launch shortly before 7:00 p.m., prioritizing the BEF's preservation without initially coordinating details with French allies, who continued defensive preparations around Dunkirk. The first vessels, including destroyers and smaller craft, departed Dover that evening, with embarkations commencing under cover of dusk to minimize exposure to German air attacks, though only a few hundred troops were rescued on the initial night due to organizational challenges and adverse conditions. This marked the practical onset of Dynamo, transforming a desperate rearguard into a large-scale maritime rescue amid ongoing ground fighting.

Evacuation Phases: 26-27 May and 28 May-4 June

Operation Dynamo commenced on the evening of 26 May 1940, with initial evacuation efforts yielding limited results. Over the nights of 26-27 May, a total of 7,699 Allied troops were rescued exclusively from harbor, as personnel ships navigated the damaged port facilities. The East Mole, a breakwater in the harbor, was utilized for the first time on 27 May, facilitating boarding despite ongoing German artillery and air threats. These early lifts fell short of expectations due to the late start at 6:57 PM on 26 May, incomplete reconnaissance of beach conditions, and intense bombing that disrupted operations and caused initial disarray among waiting troops. From 28 May to 4 June, evacuation rates accelerated significantly, with nightly totals rising to peaks exceeding 60,000 troops. On 28 May, 17,804 men were embarked, including the first substantial beach lifts of 5,930 via smaller vessels. Subsequent days saw intensified activity: 47,310 on 29 May amid heavy ship losses like HMS Wakeful; 53,823 on 30 May under protective low cloud cover; and a record 68,014 on 31 May, primarily from the harbor. The introduction of over 300 civilian "little ships" from 28 May enabled efficient beach evacuations, complementing destroyer operations at the East Mole, from which approximately 200,000 troops were ultimately extracted. Persistent challenges included Luftwaffe attacks sinking multiple destroyers—four on 1 June alone—and German ground advances pressuring the perimeter, exacerbated by the Belgian surrender on 28 May exposing the northern flank. However, defensive inundations, French rearguard actions around and the Aa Canal, and RAF sorties totaling 4,822 provided critical breathing room, preventing total . By 2 June, British forces had largely withdrawn, leaving French troops to cover the final phases, with 26,746 rescued on 3 June and 26,175 on 4 June before operations ceased at 2:23 PM. Weather variations, such as wind dispersing smokescreens on 31 May, intermittently increased vulnerability to shelling, yet overall progress exceeded initial projections of 45,000 rescues.

Sea Routes, Harbors, and Beach Operations

The evacuation during Operation Dynamo relied on two primary embarkation points at : the damaged harbor facilities, particularly the East Mole, and the adjacent open beaches stretching approximately 10 miles eastward toward the Belgian border. The East Mole, a wooden breakwater extending nearly a mile into deeper water, allowed larger vessels such as destroyers and personnel ships to berth directly and load troops efficiently, accounting for the majority of evacuees with 239,465 men rescued via this route between 26 May and 4 June 1940. In contrast, the main harbor docks had been heavily bombed and rendered unusable early in the operation. Beach operations were necessitated by the gentle shelving of the sandy shoreline, which prevented deep-draft warships from approaching close to shore, requiring troops to wade into shallow waters or board smaller craft for transfer to offshore vessels. Troops were organized into defensive perimeters and queued in sectors along the beaches, including areas near Bray-Dunes and La Panne, where and naval personnel coordinated loading onto lighters, skoot barges, and "little ships" to ferry them out. Ultimately, 98,761 soldiers were directly evacuated from the beaches, a process hampered by , attacks, and the physical exhaustion of wading through chest-deep water while under fire. Sea routes across the from to English ports, primarily Dover, were designated as Routes X, Y, and to navigate minefields, U-boat threats, and German E-boats, with Route being the shortest at about 39 miles along a southern path skirting the . These routes evolved during the operation; initially, longer detours were used to avoid concentrations of enemy forces, but as the situation stabilized, shorter direct passages predominated, enabling over 800 vessels to complete multiple crossings despite losses from air and submarine attacks. Coordination from ensured a steady flow, with ships returning to ports like and for dispersal of troops.

Royal Navy and Merchant Ships Involved

The provided the core of the evacuation effort during Operation Dynamo, deploying warships primarily to the Eastern Mole at harbor for rapid embarkation of troops, where two-thirds of the 338,000 rescued Allied personnel were loaded directly onto larger vessels. Destroyers formed the backbone of this force, making repeated crossings despite exposure to dive-bombing, E-boat torpedoes, mines, and shore artillery; these fast warships could berth alongside the mole to expedite loading, often evacuating thousands per trip before withdrawing under fire. Minesweepers and trawlers cleared channels and supported anti-submarine patrols, while sloops, gunboats, and armed boarding vessels provided escort and additional transport capacity. Merchant ships, requisitioned by the Admiralty and frequently crewed by personnel, augmented the naval fleet by ferrying troops from the mole or beaches to deeper waters for transfer to destroyers or direct return to Britain. These included cross-Channel passenger steamers, ferries, and cargo vessels suited for high troop volumes, such as the , which was bombed and sunk off Bray Dunes on 29 May 1940 with heavy loss of life. Other examples encompassed requisitioned Dutch and French dredgers repurposed for evacuation, though their shallower drafts limited them to near-shore operations vulnerable to air attack. Losses among warships were severe, with six destroyers sunk—including HMS Grafton, , Wakeful, and Keith—primarily to aerial bombing and torpedoes, alongside damage to many others that reduced their operational tempo after 29 May. Merchant vessels suffered similarly, contributing to the overall toll of over 200 British and Allied craft sunk out of approximately 933 deployed, as the congested approach routes and lack of adequate air cover exposed them to sustained German assaults. Despite these sacrifices, the combined naval and merchant effort enabled the extraction of the bulk of the trapped forces before the perimeter collapsed on 4 June 1940.
Vessel TypeApproximate Number InvolvedKey ExamplesFate/Notes
Destroyers ()~25-30HMS Grenade, Grafton, Wakeful6 sunk; primary mole evacuators
Minesweepers/TrawlersDozensVarious armed trawlersChannel clearance; some sunk by air attack
Merchant Ferries/TransportsMultiple requisitioned (paddle steamer)Sunk 29 May; high-capacity troop carriers

Role and Limitations of Little Ships

The Little Ships, comprising approximately 850 privately owned civilian vessels such as fishing boats, yachts, and motor launches, were mobilized from ports like to supplement the Royal Navy's evacuation efforts during Operation Dynamo from 26 May to 4 June 1940. These craft, often crewed by their owners or naval personnel, primarily served as shuttles to ferry Allied troops from the shallow beaches east of to larger warships anchored offshore, where water depths prevented bigger vessels from approaching directly. This role was essential for accessing soldiers dispersed along the open sands when the harbor's eastern mole—handling the bulk of embarkations—became congested or damaged by attacks. While enabling continuous beach operations around the clock, the Little Ships' contributions were supplementary rather than primary, with historical analyses indicating they rescued fewer than 100,000 troops compared to the over 239,000 evacuated directly via the mole by naval and requisitioned merchant vessels. Their involvement peaked after 28 May, once initial naval losses necessitated broader recruitment of civilian craft, but many completed only single round trips due to operational constraints. Specific examples include (RNLI) motor lifeboats, which on 30 May rescued hundreds from the beaches despite heavy fire, though three such wherries were ultimately lost. Limitations of the Little Ships stemmed from their small size, lack of armor, and amateur crewing, rendering them highly vulnerable to German air attacks, , and Channel conditions; over 200 vessels were lost overall at , with more than 100 of the recorded 700 Little Ships sunk or damaged beyond return. Civilian crews faced acute risks, with 125 merchant seamen and private operators killed and 81 wounded, exacerbating the strain on an fleet unaccustomed to combat zones. Naval historians have critiqued popular narratives overstating their impact, noting that professional destroyers and ferries conducted the majority of lifts, while the Little Ships' ferrying role, though valuable for marginal gains, could not compensate for the absence of heavier naval assets in contested waters. favored calm seas during the operation, mitigating some hydrodynamic issues, but shortages, navigation hazards from wrecks, and enemy curtailed their sustained effectiveness.

Air and Ground Operations

RAF Air Cover Versus Luftwaffe Bombing

The Royal Air Force (RAF) provided critical air cover during Operation Dynamo from 26 May to 4 June 1940, engaging forces primarily inland to intercept bombers and fighters before they reached the Dunkirk beaches, thereby minimizing visibility over the evacuation zone to avoid drawing German attention to troop concentrations. This strategy, directed by Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, prioritized preserving fighter strength for the anticipated , resulting in fewer patrols directly over the perimeter compared to inland engagements. Over the operation, the RAF flew 2,739 fighter sorties, 651 bombing raids, and 171 reconnaissance flights, with daily fighter sorties not exceeding 300 despite intense pressure. The Luftwaffe, under Fliegerkorps VIII and other units, conducted aggressive bombing campaigns targeting ships, harbors, and beaches, sinking or damaging numerous vessels, including destroyers on 29 May and 1 June when daylight evacuations were particularly vulnerable due to gaps in RAF defensive patrols. German attacks focused on high-explosive and incendiary bombs, with Stuka dive-bombers proving effective against clustered targets, though coordination between fighters and bombers was hampered by training limitations and overstretched supply lines. Luftwaffe losses during the nine days totaled 240 aircraft, significantly outnumbering RAF fighter losses of approximately 100-149, reflecting the toll of engagements where British Hurricanes and Spitfires exploited superior maneuverability. Despite perceptions among ground troops—who often reported minimal overhead protection—the RAF's inland interceptions disrupted Luftwaffe formations, preventing unchallenged dominance over the evacuation and enabling the rescue of over 338,000 personnel amid adverse weather that further curtailed German bombing in the final days (2-4 June). Total RAF air effort exceeded 4,000 sorties, inflicting disproportionate attrition on the Luftwaffe relative to resources committed, though ship losses from air attack—around 240 vessels damaged or sunk—highlighted the incomplete nature of the cover.
AspectRAFLuftwaffe
Fighter Sorties~2,739Not specified; higher volume but less efficient
Total Aircraft Losses100-149 fighters240
Key EngagementsInland intercepts; Hurricanes/Spitfires vs. Bf 109sBeach/ship bombings; Stukas vs. exposed targets
This disparity in losses underscores the RAF's tactical effectiveness in a defensive role, despite numerical inferiority, as German pilots faced higher operational demands and radar-directed British responses.

Allied Ground Forces: British, French, and Belgian Contributions

The British Expeditionary Force (BEF), under General Lord Gort, organized the initial defensive perimeter around , a semi-circular line roughly 30 miles in extent from in the east to in the west, established by 26 to shield the beaches and port during Operation . The BEF's 2nd Division and ad hoc units, including the 1st , 2nd Dorsets, 2nd Glosters, and 4th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, manned key strongpoints such as La Bassée, Festubert, and Cassel from 27-29 May, repelling German infantry assaults and delaying advances until ammunition shortages forced withdrawals. These actions, combined with rearguard stands at Boulogne and involving BEF elements, bought critical time for embarkation, enabling over 200,000 British troops to escape before the perimeter contracted on 1-2 June. French ground forces, remnants of the 1st Army, took primary responsibility for the rearguard after British withdrawals accelerated, holding the eastern and western sectors including Mardyck, Spycker, and against intensified German attacks from 28 May onward. Units such as the 8th Zouaves, 137th and 150th Infantry Regiments, and 92nd GRDI (Groupe de Reconnaissance de Division d'Infanterie) defended inner lines along the Canal des Moeres and Canal des Chats from 1-2 , absorbing heavy casualties to prevent while the final evacuations proceeded. Earlier diversions, like the 1st Army's stand at which pinned multiple German divisions, further extended the perimeter's viability, though only around 50,000 French troops were embarked in the operation's closing phase, with the majority captured after 4 . Belgian Army units provided limited direct support to the Dunkirk perimeter, having already engaged German forces extensively during the Battle of Belgium from 10 May, which initially slowed the Wehrmacht's northern push. The Belgian surrender on 28 May under King Leopold III exposed the Allied left flank near the Aa Canal, hastening German closure on the pocket and complicating defenses, though some Belgian elements integrated into the sector briefly before capitulation. Approximately 2,000 to 4,000 Belgian troops were evacuated amid the 139,997 non-British Allied personnel rescued, reflecting their marginal role in the final ground holding actions compared to British and French contributions.

Outcomes and Immediate Effects

Personnel Rescued and National Breakdowns

Operation Dynamo successfully evacuated 338,226 Allied military personnel from the Dunkirk perimeter between 26 May and 4 June 1940. This figure, derived from and Admiralty records, represents the vast majority of trapped British Expeditionary Force (BEF) troops and supporting Allied units encircled by German forces during the . The national composition was dominated by British and French personnel, reflecting the primary Allied forces in the sector. Approximately 198,229 were British troops, comprising the core of the BEF sent to France in 1939–1940. The remainder, totaling 139,997, included French soldiers as the largest contingent, supplemented by smaller groups from , , and the ; these non-British evacuees were often prioritized in later phases as British rearguard actions secured the perimeter.
NationalityApproximate Number Rescued
British198,229
French and others (Belgian, Polish, Dutch)139,997
These figures exclude civilian evacuees and subsequent operations like or Ariel, which rescued additional Allied personnel from other French ports after Dunkirk. Variations in exact counts arise from incomplete records amid chaos, with some French troops repatriated via British ships only to rejoin units in western France before broader capitulation. The evacuation preserved critical manpower for Britain's defense, though it left significant French forces behind to cover the withdrawal.

Equipment Losses and Casualty Figures

The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) incurred approximately 68,000 casualties during the 1940 campaign in , encompassing killed, wounded, and captured personnel up to and including the Dunkirk evacuation period from 26 May to 4 June. Specific losses during Operation Dynamo itself were lower, with estimates of around 1,000 British soldiers killed amid bombing, artillery fire, and ground fighting on the perimeter. Approximately 40,000 British troops were ultimately captured after failing to reach evacuation points, contributing to the overall toll. French rearguard forces, holding the defensive lines to enable the , suffered heavier attrition, with around 16,000 fatalities reported during the operation's final phases, alongside tens of thousands captured as German forces overran positions post-evacuation. Equipment losses were catastrophic, as priority was given to personnel evacuation, leaving behind nearly all heavy to avoid use by advancing German forces where possible, though much was abandoned intact or destroyed hastily. The BEF relinquished 63,879 motor vehicles (including trucks and staff cars), 20,548 motorcycles, and 2,472 pieces, field guns, anti-aircraft guns, and anti-tank guns. Tank abandonments totaled several hundred, comprising 184 cruiser tanks, 23 Matilda IIs, 77 Matilda Is, and 331 Mark VI light tanks, representing roughly half the BEF's armored strength in . Additional losses included 704 25-pounder guns, 216 18-pounders, 96 4.5-inch howitzers, 221 6-inch howitzers, and 51 4.5-inch and 60-pounder guns, alongside 509 2-pounder anti-tank guns—about 60% of Britain's total pre-war anti-tank capability. Over 90,000 tons of and small arms were also left, much of which German forces captured and repurposed. French equipment losses, while less quantified in British records, included similar volumes of vehicles and guns from their northern armies, exacerbating Allied materiel shortages.
Equipment CategoryQuantity Abandoned or Destroyed
Motor Vehicles63,879
Motorcycles20,548
Guns (all types)2,472
Tanks (total)~615 (various types)
Anti-Tank Guns509 (2-pounder)

Strategic Analysis

Achievements in Preserving Manpower

The Dunkirk evacuation, conducted from 26 May to 4 as Operation Dynamo, rescued 338,226 Allied personnel, including approximately 198,000 British troops from the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). This figure substantially exceeded pre-operation estimates, which anticipated saving only 45,000 men amid encirclement by German forces. The BEF, comprising around 250,000 personnel deployed to France and by early 1940, saw the majority of its surviving combat-effective units preserved, with roughly 68,000 British troops either captured or unaccounted for during the broader campaign. Preservation of this manpower cadre proved decisive for Britain's capacity to sustain resistance after the fall of France on 22 June 1940. The evacuated soldiers, many experienced regulars and territorials, formed the nucleus for reorganizing defenses against potential German invasion during the Battle of Britain (July–October 1940) and subsequent operations. Without this retention of trained personnel—estimated at over 80 percent of the BEF's fighting strength reaching the perimeter—Britain's home forces would have relied predominantly on undertrained conscripts and volunteers, severely compromising coastal fortifications and rapid mobilization. Casualties during the evacuation itself remained limited relative to the scale, with British losses totaling around 30,000 killed, wounded, or missing across the retreat and perimeter defense, enabling the repatriated troops to re-equip and redeploy within months. Strategically, the manpower salvage underpinned Britain's transition to offensive warfare, contributing to campaigns in from 1940 onward and the buildup for D-Day in 1944. Evacuated units, such as elements of the 1st and 2nd Divisions, provided and expertise for over 2 million additional soldiers by mid-1941, averting a scenario where total BEF annihilation might have forced negotiated peace or capitulation. This outcome stemmed from coordinated rear-guard actions by British, French, and Belgian forces, which delayed German panzer advances long enough for sea lifts to extract the bulk of encircled troops, prioritizing human resources over irreplaceable .

Failures in Materiel and Tactical Retreat

The retreat to compelled the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to abandon nearly all heavy , as troops prioritized personal evacuation over transporting equipment via beach lighters ill-suited for bulk loads. Specific losses included approximately 64,000 vehicles, 20,000 motorcycles, and 2,500 guns, rendering the BEF effectively unarmed upon return to Britain. Among armored units, 184 cruiser tanks, 23 infantry tanks, 77 Matilda I tanks, and 331 Mark VI light tanks were left behind, many captured intact by German forces for reuse. Artillery abandonment was equally catastrophic, encompassing 704 18/25-pounder field guns, 216 18-pounder guns, 96 4.5-inch howitzers, and 221 6-inch howitzers, alongside thousands of anti-tank guns and small arms. These failures stemmed from the BEF's expeditionary nature, deploying with limited reserves and relying on French industrial support that collapsed amid the broader defeat. Tactically, the withdrawal to the perimeter, ordered by General Lord Gort on 26 after encirclement by German Panzer divisions, represented a desperate rather than a planned fallback. Earlier doctrinal adherence to linear defense along the Dyle River, per the Allied Dyle Plan, exposed flanks to the German sickle-cut through the , bypassing extensions and achieving surprise operational depth by 13 May. BEF armored communications proved unreliable in fluid combat, with radio failures and incompatible signaling hindering coordinated counterattacks, such as the failed offensive on 21 May that briefly stalled but could not reverse Panzers. Inter-Allied frictions exacerbated the retreat: Belgian forces ceased resistance on 28 May, fracturing the line, while French commands diverted BEF elements southward, diluting perimeter defenses until Gort's unilateral pivot to the coast. The tactical retreat's execution prioritized manpower preservation over materiel salvage, with orders to spike guns and disable vehicles where possible, yet time constraints and Luftwaffe interdiction left much usable kit for German exploitation. This calculus reflected causal realities of encirclement—fighting to hold equipment would have invited annihilation without sea lift capacity for bulk items—but underscored pre-war underinvestment in mobile reserves and signals intelligence, leaving the BEF tactically rigid against Blitzkrieg maneuver. Post-evacuation, Britain faced acute shortages, requisitioning civilian vehicles and accelerating production, yet the losses delayed offensive readiness until 1941.

Controversies and Debates

Myths of the 'Miracle' and German Halt Order

The portrayal of the Dunkirk evacuation as a "miracle" stems from contemporary British narratives emphasizing providential deliverance, including claims of divine intervention, calm weather favoring small vessels, and the spontaneous mobilization of the British "little ships." However, empirical analysis reveals these elements were secondary to deliberate military preparations, such as Operation Dynamo's planning from May 21, 1940, which prioritized naval assets and established defensive perimeters, alongside French forces' actions that delayed German advances eastward of Dunkirk. The of boats, while symbolically potent, transported fewer than 5,000 troops directly from beaches, with the Royal Navy's destroyers and larger vessels evacuating over 90% of the 338,000 personnel between May 26 and June 4, 1940; weather conditions, including fog on key days, impeded operations more than they aided evacuation, but RAF fighter cover—flying sorties from bases in —neutralized much of the aerial threat despite public underappreciation at the time. The German "Halt Order" of May 24, 1940, directing under General to pause panzer advances short of Dunkirk, has fueled myths of deliberate leniency by , such as sparing the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) for peace negotiations or racial affinity—claims unsupported by primary records, including Hitler's own directives emphasizing annihilation of encircled forces. Issued after panzer units had already decelerated due to mechanical attrition (e.g., only 40% operational by May 25), fuel shortages, and overextended supply lines following 10 days of continuous combat, the order reflected tactical prudence: the terrain, crisscrossed by canals and prone to flooding, posed risks to armored formations, while Göring's was tasked with bombardment, allowing infantry to consolidate gains. Historians debate the order's decisiveness, but causal evidence indicates it neither gifted the evacuation nor stemmed from strategic benevolence; resumed advances from May 27 onward were stalled by French First Army resistance at and the Ypres-Comines canal, buying critical time for perimeter defenses, while bombing proved insufficient against massed shipping due to coordination failures and RAF interdiction—destroying only about 6 warships and 235 other vessels amid 1,000+ sorties. Absent the halt, German panzers might have pressured the pocket further, yet fortified positions around (including 16 British and 13 French battalions by ) and the port's mole-enabled rapid loading likely would have inflicted heavy without fully preventing escape, as Allied firepower and naval superiority mitigated . The myth persists in popular accounts but overlooks German operational limits and Allied agency, framing a —costing 68,000 British and 30,000 French , plus nearly all heavy equipment—as unearned fortune rather than contested survival.

Leadership Blunders and Inter-Allied Blame

Lord Gort, commander of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), defied directives from Prime Minister on 25 May 1940 to launch a southward toward the Somme to link with French forces, instead prioritizing a northward withdrawal to the perimeter, which facilitated the eventual evacuation but exacerbated inter-allied tensions by appearing to abandon coordinated efforts. This decision stemmed from Gort's assessment of the BEF's dire position amid collapsing flanks, yet it drew criticism for undermining French General Maxime Weygand's planned pincer counteroffensive, which required British participation and ultimately failed due to partial execution. French high command under Maurice Gamelin committed a foundational error by maintaining no strategic reserves during the German Ardennes breakthrough, as revealed to Churchill on 16 May 1940, leaving Allied forces without reinforcements to counter the blitzkrieg's momentum. Gamelin's order on 19 May for simultaneous Allied attacks northward and southward proved logistically unfeasible, with French units failing to materialize in support of British efforts, such as the limited Arras counterattack on 21 May that briefly halted German armor but lacked follow-through. Belgian forces, under King Leopold III, surrendered unconditionally on 28 May 1940 after 18 days of fighting, exposing a critical 20-mile gap in the Allied line east of Dunkirk and forcing British divisions to redeploy hastily, which accelerated the pocket's contraction. Inter-allied recriminations intensified post-evacuation, with French military and political figures accusing the British of prioritizing the BEF's rescue—evacuating 198,000 British troops before 139,000 French between 26 May and 4 June 1940—constituting a that left French rearguards to bear disproportionate losses while holding the perimeter. British leaders, including Churchill, countered by highlighting French command's poor communication and failure to execute joint plans, as well as Belgium's premature capitulation, which Churchill later described as a shock that doomed broader Allied cohesion. These disputes persisted into France's , amplifying perceptions of Anglo-Saxon abandonment, though empirical analysis shows French units enabled the BEF's escape by delaying German advances, with over 40,000 French casualties in the defense compared to British figures of around 68,000 total losses including prisoners. Coordination breakdowns, exacerbated by linguistic barriers and divergent national priorities—Britain's focus on preserving its sole versus France's territorial defense—underscored systemic Allied command flaws rather than isolated malice.

French Sacrifices and Perceptions of Betrayal

The French First Army, numbering approximately 40,000 men, conducted a critical delaying action in the siege of from May 28 to 31, 1940, engaging seven German divisions despite being outnumbered and lacking armored support, which enabled the bulk of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and elements of two French divisions to withdraw toward . French forces also manned key sectors of the perimeter defense, particularly the eastern and southern flanks, absorbing intense German assaults to shield the evacuation beaches and moles. This effort resulted in heavy casualties, with the majority of the First Army's personnel ultimately captured after their was expended, as they prioritized Allied withdrawal over their own. Of the total 338,000 troops evacuated during Operation Dynamo from May 26 to June 4, 1940, roughly 140,000 were French, though many more French soldiers remained in the field to cover , facing encirclement and surrender following the BEF's priority . British naval and command decisions emphasized repatriating forces first, with French troops loaded later in the operation, exacerbating losses among units like those at , where mixed Anglo-French defenders were deliberately expended to buy additional time for the main evacuation. These sacrifices fostered perceptions in of British betrayal, as the narrative emphasized a "" for Britain while downplaying French contributions, leading to accusations that Prime Minister prioritized imperial troops over shared Allied defense. French military leaders and later regime propaganda amplified this view, portraying the evacuation as abandonment that hastened 's capitulation on June 22, 1940, and strained Anglo-French relations amid mutual recriminations over strategic divergences. General , in exile, echoed sentiments of perfidy, though empirical analysis reveals the sacrifices bought time for French forces elsewhere to reorganize, even as Allied command disarray and German superiority rendered full salvage improbable.

Long-Term Consequences

Military Reconstitution and Morale Impacts

The evacuation of approximately 338,000 Allied troops, including around 198,000 British personnel, from Dunkirk between May 26 and June 4, 1940, preserved a vital cadre of trained soldiers that formed the nucleus for reconstituting the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). These evacuated units, though stripped of most —with losses including over 2,400 guns, 65,000 vehicles, and nearly all tanks—underwent rest, refitting, and integration with new draftees and volunteers in Britain. By late 1940, this manpower enabled the expansion of home defense forces against invasion threats and laid the groundwork for later campaigns, as divisions reformed through domestic production and eventual supplies from the starting in March 1941. Without this preservation of experienced leadership and infantry, the British Army's recovery would have been severely hampered, potentially delaying or preventing effective contributions to by 1941 and the in 1944. Despite the material devastation, the operation's success in salvaging personnel bolstered British reconstitution by maintaining institutional knowledge and , allowing for accelerated programs that integrated raw recruits with battle-tested veterans. Rearmament efforts prioritized equipping these forces, with industrial output ramping up to replace lost and vehicles, though shortages persisted into 1941. This reconstitution proved causally essential, as the reformed BEF provided the manpower backbone for subsequent Allied offensives, underscoring that outweighed in enabling Britain's continued resistance. On morale, the Dunkirk withdrawal was framed domestically as a "" to counter initial perceptions of defeat, significantly uplifting public and military spirits amid the fall of . Winston Churchill's June 4, 1940, speech to emphasized the evacuation's role in preserving fighting strength for future battles, transforming a tactical retreat into a symbol of resilience that galvanized national determination during the . While frontline troops experienced short-term demoralization from equipment losses and the rapidity of German advances, the overall narrative of deliverance fostered unity and resolve, contributing to sustained recruitment and civilian support for the . This psychological boost, though partly propagandistic, had tangible effects in preventing widespread and enabling the societal necessary for long-term victory.

Political Repercussions for Britain and France

The Dunkirk evacuation, concluding on June 4, 1940, strengthened Prime Minister Winston Churchill's domestic authority by preserving the core of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), approximately 198,000 British troops among the 338,000 total evacuated, which averted a total military collapse that could have empowered factions within the cabinet. Churchill's address to the that day emphasized the operation's partial success in salvaging manpower despite "a colossal military disaster," countering premature optimism while underscoring Britain's intent to fight on, thereby consolidating parliamentary and public support against Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax's advocacy for exploratory peace talks via Mussolini's . This rhetorical pivot marginalized defeatist elements, as the evacuation's outcome provided Churchill with tangible evidence of resilience to justify rejecting negotiations, ensuring Britain's isolationist yet defiant stance absent immediate continental allies. In France, the prioritization of British withdrawals amid the BEF's retreat fueled accusations of perfidy, as French Ninth Army units were left exposed to contain German Panzer spearheads, contributing to the rapid disintegration of organized resistance south of Dunkirk. Prime Minister Paul Reynaud's coalition fractured under these pressures; on June 16, 1940, Reynaud resigned after failing to secure unified cabinet backing for continued resistance or a proposed Anglo-French union, allowing 84-year-old Marshal Philippe Pétain—previously a symbol of WWI steadfastness—to form a new that immediately pursued terms with on June 17. Pétain's administration formalized the on June 22, partitioning and establishing the collaborationist regime, a direct political consequence of the perceived abandonment that eroded Reynaud's war-continuation efforts and entrenched among French elites. The episode engendered lasting bilateral acrimony, with French military and political circles viewing the evacuation as a self-interested British maneuver that hastened France's capitulation, while British leaders cited strategic necessity to rebuild forces for home defense; this divergence persisted into postwar recriminations, evident in French historiography emphasizing disproportionate sacrifices—over 120,000 French troops captured post-evacuation—to enable Allied shipping's escape. Such tensions underscored causal disparities in Allied commitment, where Britain's insular geography permitted reconstitution, whereas France's continental exposure amplified the political costs of tactical withdrawal into governmental overthrow.

Enduring Legacy in WWII and Historical Memory

The preservation of approximately 338,000 Allied troops, including over 198,000 British personnel, during Operation Dynamo from 26 May to 4 June 1940 allowed Britain to reconstitute its expeditionary force and avert a potential military collapse that could have forced negotiated peace with . This manpower retention proved pivotal in sustaining home defenses against , the planned invasion of Britain in summer 1940, and in deploying trained units to by early 1941, where they contributed to halting Axis advances at . Strategically, the evacuation bought critical time for industrial rearmament; Britain produced over 12,000 in alone, offsetting the abandonment of 2,472 guns and nearly 77,000 at , which had left the army bereft of heavy equipment. By enabling continued resistance, indirectly facilitated the accumulation of U.S. aid starting March 1941 and the buildup for in November 1942, preserving Allied initiative in the European theater. In British historical memory, the event crystallized as a symbol of national defiance and improvisation, with the mobilization of over 800 civilian vessels—the "Little Ships"—embodying collective resolve amid adversity. Winston Churchill's 4 June 1940 address to reframed the retreat as a "miracle of deliverance," embedding it in wartime to sustain public morale despite the stark reality of tactical defeat and material devastation. , this narrative evolved into the "Dunkirk spirit," invoked during the 1970s economic crises and 2016 debates as a motif of resilience, though veterans' accounts often highlight the ordeal's trauma, including over 16,000 French and 1,000 British fatalities during the operation. The legacy also underscores naval and air power's decisiveness; fighter cover, which downed 100 aircraft while losing 106, constrained German interdiction, affirming sea control's role in denying total victory to tactics. Culturally, depictions in literature and film, such as J.B. Priestley's 1940 broadcast praising the "little holiday steamers," have perpetuated an optimistic lens, yet scholarly assessments emphasize its contingency on Göring's overcommitment and adverse weather, rather than divine intervention. This duality—triumph amid humiliation—positions as a foundational episode in Allied perseverance, influencing military doctrines on expeditionary withdrawals and rapid force regeneration.

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