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Paternalistic conservatism
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Paternalistic conservatism is a strand of conservatism[1][2] which reflects the belief that societies exist, and develop, organically, and that members within them have obligations towards each other.[3] There is particular emphasis on the paternalistic obligation, referencing the feudal concept of noblesse oblige, of those who are privileged and wealthy to the poorer parts of society. Consistent with principles such as duty, hierarchy, and organicism, it can be seen as an outgrowth of traditionalist conservatism. Paternalistic conservatives do not support the individual or the state in principle but are instead prepared to support either or recommend a balance between the two depending on what is most practical.[4]
Paternalistic conservatism emphasizes the duties of the government to entail fairly broad state interventionism to cultivate a good life for all citizens.[5] This leads to a dirigiste path in which the government is envisaged as a benevolent paternal figure setting goals and ensuring fair play and equal opportunity,[5] with a stress on the importance of a social safety net to deal with poverty and support of redistribution of wealth, along with government regulation of markets in the interests of both consumers and producers.[6] Although accepting of state intervention, paternalistic conservatives are not supportive of anything resembling a command economy.[7]
Paternalistic conservatism first arose as a result of the industrial revolution during the 19th century, which had created social unrest, appalling working conditions and inequality. In the United Kingdom, Benjamin Disraeli's one-nation conservatism sought to deal with these effects.[6][8] In the United Kingdom, there has been a continuation of one-nation conservative governments, such as those of Stanley Baldwin, Neville Chamberlain, Winston Churchill, and Harold Macmillan.[9] During the 19th century in Germany, Otto von Bismarck established the first modern welfare state, with the goal of undermining socialism by gaining working-class support.[10] He implemented policies of state-organized compulsory insurance for workers against sickness, accident, incapacity and old age as part of his State Socialism programme.[11] Leo von Caprivi also promoted a policy called the New Course.[12]
Origins
[edit]Paternalistic conservatism has its origins in the Industrial Revolution, which had caused widespread economic inequality, poverty, and social discontent.[13] In the United Kingdom, Tory politicians, such as Richard Oastler, Michael Thomas Sadler and Lord Shaftesbury combined their elitist responsibility and a strong humanitarian element with their involvement on the Factory Acts.[5] Critical of individualism and classical economics,[5] they also disliked the 1834 New Poor Law and believed in the role of the state in guaranteeing decent housing, working conditions, wages and treatment of the poor.[5]

One-nation conservatism
[edit]One-nation conservatism was first conceived in the United Kingdom by Conservative prime minister Benjamin Disraeli,[14] who presented his political philosophy in two novels, Coningsby and Sybil, Or The Two Nations, published in 1844 and 1845, respectively.[13][15] Disraeli proposed a paternalistic society with the social classes intact but the working class receiving support from the well off. He emphasised the importance of social obligation rather than the individualism that pervaded British society.[14] Disraeli warned that the United Kingdom would become divided into two nations (of the rich and poor) as a result of increased industrialisation and inequality.[13] Concerned at that division, he supported measures to improve the lives of the people, to provide social support and to protect the working classes.[14]
Disraeli justified his ideas by his belief in an organic society in which the different classes have natural obligations to one another.[14] He saw society as naturally hierarchical and emphasised the obligations of those at the top to those below. This was a continuation of the feudal concept of noblesse oblige, which asserted that the aristocracy had an obligation to be generous and honourable. To Disraeli, that implied that government should be paternalistic.[13] One-nation conservatism identifies its approach as pragmatic and non-ideological. There is an acceptance of the need for flexible policies, and one-nation conservatives have often sought compromise with their ideological opponents for the sake of social stability.[16] Disraeli justified his views pragmatically, arguing that should the ruling class become indifferent to the suffering of the people, society would become unstable and social revolution would become a possibility.[14]
History
[edit]Germany
[edit]In 1878, the German conservative and Lutheran figure Adolf Stoecker founded the Christian Social Workers' Party with intent to align workers with Protestant Christianity and the German monarchy.[17] Stoecker respected existing social hierarchies but also desired a state that would be active in protecting the poor and vulnerable citizens.[18] On occasion, Stoecker used antisemitic rhetoric to gain support; he urged supporters to practice Christian love even towards Jews.[18]
As Chancellor of Germany, Otto von Bismarck pursued a state-building strategy designed to make ordinary Germans more loyal to the country, implementing the modern welfare state in Germany during the 1880s.[19] Bismarck was fearful of a socialist revolution, and he created the first welfare state in the modern world with the goal of gaining working class support that might otherwise go to his socialist opponents.[10] He adopted policies of state-organized compulsory insurance for workers to guard against sickness, accident, incapacity and old age in what has been named State Socialism.[11] The term State Socialism was coined by Bismarck's German liberal opposition; it was later accepted by Bismarck.[20] Bismarck was a conservative, not a socialist, and he enacted the Anti-Socialist Laws. Bismark's State Socialism was based upon Romanticist political thought in which the state was supreme and carried out Bismarck's agenda of supporting "the protest of collectivism against individualism" and of "nationality against cosmopolitanism" and stated that "the duty of the State is to maintain and promote the interests, the well-being of the nation as such".[21] Rather, his actions were designed to offset the growth of the Social Democratic Party of Germany.[11] In addition, the policy of nationalization of the Prussian state railways was established after the unification of Germany, bringing transportation under the control of the state.[22][23]
Canada
[edit]A red Tory is an adherent of a political philosophy derived from the Tory tradition, predominantly in Canada but also in the United Kingdom. This philosophy tends to favour social policies that are communitarian, while maintaining a degree of fiscal discipline and a respect of the political order.[24] In Canada, red Toryism is found in provincial and federal Conservative political parties. The history of red Toryism marks differences in the development of the political cultures of Canada and the United States. Canadian conservatism and American conservatism have been different from each other in fundamental ways, including their stances on social issues and the role of government in society.[25]
France
[edit]In Europe, Catholic political movements emerged in the 19th century as a response to widespread deterioration of social conditions and rising anti-clerical and democratic tendencies amongst artisans and workers.[26] It mixed social commitment, paternalistic social welfare, and authoritarian patronage from above with deepening popular piety.[27]
Japan
[edit]
During the post-war Japan, policies led by the right-wing conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) became a political model closer to paternalistic democracy than Western-style liberal democracy.[29] In many ways, modern Japan is considered to be a paternalistic state including socially conservative elements, such as Confucian tradition.[30] In the case of the LDP administration under the 1955 System in Japan, their degree of economic control was stronger than that of Western conservative governments; it was also positioned closer to social democracy at that time.[31] Since the 1970s, the oil crisis has slowed economic growth and increased the resistance of urban citizens to policies that favor farmers.[32] To maintain its dominant position, the LDP sought to expand party supporters by incorporating social security policies and pollution measures advocated by opposition parties.[32] It was also historically closely positioned to corporate statism.[33][34]
Founded in 1960, the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) officially supported social democracy. Due to its Japanese nationalist, anti-communist, and socially conservative nature, it was politically different from ordinary social democrats and was more politically close to the right-wing LDP, and was regarded as a conservative political party in Japan at the time.[35]
Argentina
[edit]Peronism is considered a paternalistic ideology.[36] However, traditional Peronism tends to support a command economy, unlike common paternalistic conservatives. Some scholars evaluate Peronism as a mixture of 'militant laborism' and 'traditional conservatism'.[37]
United States
[edit]In the United States, Theodore Roosevelt has been the main figure identified with progressive conservatism as a political tradition. Roosevelt stated that he had "always believed that wise progressivism and wise conservatism go hand in hand".[38] Roosevelt's ideas, such that of New Nationalism, an extension of his earlier philosophy of the Square Deal, have been described as paternalistic and contrasted with the individualistic program, The New Freedom, of Woodrow Wilson from the Democratic Party. Wilson's program in practice has been described as resembling the more paternalistic ideas of Roosevelt, excluding the notion of reining in judges.[39]
The Republican Party administration of William Howard Taft was progressive conservative and he described himself as "a believer in progressive conservatism",[40] Dwight D. Eisenhower also declared himself an advocate of progressive conservatism.[41]
Perspectives
[edit]Unlike many free market conservative ideologies like liberal conservatism and right-libertarianism, paternalistic conservatism supports paternalism and social solidarity as opposed to commercialism, individualism, and laissez-faire economics.[42][43] Because of this, it is sometimes labelled "right-wing socialism" or "conservative socialism" pejoratively by free market economists, including Murray Rothbard and Jesús Huerta de Soto.[44][45] Huerta de Soto also argues that paternalist conservatism supports a state-promoted social hierarchy, maintaining the privileges afforded to certain groups in society.[46]
Although paternalistic conservatives are accepting of state intervention, it is within the context of a market-based social democratic or social market mixed economy. They do not support an economy resembling a command or planned economy,[7] or an economy in which there is public control over the means of production, one of the stated goals of socialism.
Paternalistic conservatives justify their pragmatic approach by asserting that if the ruling classes become indifferent to the hardships and suffering experienced by the common people, it could lead to societal and political instability eventually leading to violent revolution.[14] Subsequently policies must be implemented to address the need to address the needs of all classes within society in order to maintain social harmony. Furthermore, paternalistic conservatives support equality of opportunity and fair play, aiming to ensure that there remains a level playing field for individuals to pursue success based on merit.[5]
See also
[edit]References
[edit]- ^ Heywood 2015, pp. 34–36.
- ^ Gjorshoski 2016.
- ^ Heywood 2013, p. 34.
- ^ Heywood 2012, p. 80.
- ^ a b c d e f Vincent 2009, p. 64.
- ^ a b Dunleavy, Patrick; Kelly, Paul Joseph; Mora, Michael (2000). British Political Science: Fifty Years of Political Studies. Oxford, England; Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 107–108.
- ^ a b Vincent 2009, p. 79.
- ^ Blake, Robert (1967). Disraeli (2nd ed.). London: Eyre & Spottiswoode. p. 524.
- ^ Russel, Trevor (1978). The Tory Party: Its Policies, Divisions and Future. Harmondsworth: Penguinp. p. 167.
- ^ a b Steinberg 2011, pp. 8 & 424–444.
- ^ a b c Taylor, Alan John Percivale (2001) [1988]. The Course of German History: A Survey of the Development of German History. London, England; New York City, New York: Routledge. p. 149.
- ^ Nicholas, John Alden (1958). Germany After Bismarck: The Caprivi Era, 1890–1894, Issue 5. Harvard University Press. p. 260.
- ^ a b c d Heywood 2007, pp. 82–83.
- ^ a b c d e f Dorey 1995, pp. 16–17.
- ^ Arnold 2004, p. 96.
- ^ Bloor 2012, pp. 41–42.
- ^ Dietze, Gottfried (1995). In Defense of Property. Lanham, Maryland; London, England: University Press of America. p. 97.
- ^ a b Lindemann, Albert S. (2000). Esau's Tears: Modern Anti-Semitism and the Rise of the Jews (1st paperback ed.). Cambridge, England; New York City, New York; Melbourne, Australia; Madrid, Spain: Cambridge University Press. p. 145.
- ^ Steinberg 2011, pp. 416–417.
- ^ Feuchtwanger, Edgar (2002). Bismarck. Routeledge. p. 221. ISBN 978-0415216142.
- ^ Harris (1989), p. 442.
- ^ Henderson, William (1975). The Rise of German Industrial Power, 1834–1914. University of California Press. p. 207. ISBN 978-0-5200-3073-2.
- ^ Croly, Herbert (1911). The Promise of American Life. Macmillan. p. 250.
- ^ "Red Tory". Collins English Dictionary. Retrieved 14 January 2020.
[A] Conservative who holds liberal or mildly socialist views on certain fiscal and social issues.
- ^ "Conservatism". The Canadian Encyclopedia.
- ^ Eley (1997), p. 174.
- ^ Eley (1997), pp. 174–175.
- ^ John Creighton Campbell, ed. (2014). How Policies Change: The Japanese Government and the Aging Society. Princeton University Press. p. 363. ISBN 9781400862955.
... Prime Minister Kishi, who leaned toward statecorporatist notions that included paternalistic welfare policy, gave way to Ikeda Hayato, who was more inclined toward free-market liberalism. ...
- ^ Helen Hardacre, ed. (1998). The Postwar Developments of Japanese Studies in the United States. BRILL. p. 10.
- ^ Joseph Burrell, ed. (2008). The Republican Treason: Republican Fascism Exposed. Algora Publishing. p. 187.
... more or less corrupt Liberal Democratic Party politicians, and the representatives of big business, Japan is a paternalistic state that conforms in many respects to the Confucian tradition ...
- ^ Kume, Ikuo [in Japanese]; Kawade, Yoshie [in Japanese]; Kojo, Yoshiko [in Japanese]; Tanaka, Aiji [in Japanese]; Mabuchi, Masaru [in Japanese] (2011). Political Science: Scope and Theory, revised ed. New Liberal Arts Selection (in Japanese). Yuhikaku Publishing. p. 26. ISBN 978-4-641-05377-9.
ただし、日本の55年体制下の自民党政権の場合は欧米の保守政権に比べるとかなり経済的統制の度合いが強く、社会民主主義により近い場所に位置した。
- ^ a b Iio, Jun [in Japanese] (2019). Gendai nihon no seiji. Hōsō daigaku kyōzai (in Japanese). Hōsō daigaku kyōiku shinkōkai. p. 104. ISBN 978-4-595-31946-4.
- ^ McNamara, Dennis (1996). "Corporatism and Cooperation among Japanese Labor". Comparative Politics. 28 (4): 379–397. doi:10.2307/422050. ISSN 0010-4159. JSTOR 422050.
- ^ "The Physical and Institutional Reconstruction of Japan After World War II". Index Page for applet-magic.com. Retrieved 26 October 2021.
- ^ John E. Endicott; William R. Heaton, eds. (1996). The Politics Of East Asia: China, Japan, Korea. Routledge. p. 137. ISBN 9781000304718.
Continuing cooperation between the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the New Liberal Club (NLC), and the conservative Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), will probably assure conservative rule for some time to come.
- ^ James Brennan, ed. (2009). The Labor Wars in Cordoba, 1955-1976: Ideology, Work, and Labor Politics in an Argentine Industrial Society. Harvard University Press. p. 9. ISBN 9780674028753.
- ^ Frederick Turner; Jose Enrique Miguens, eds. (1983). Juan Peron and the Reshaping of Argentina. University of Pittsburgh Pre. p. 173. ISBN 9780822976363.
- ^ Lurie, Jonathan (2011). William Howard Taft: The Travails of a Progressive Conservative. New York City: Cambridge University Press. p. 196. ISBN 9781139502177.
- ^ Kraig, Robert Alexander (2000). "The 1912 Election and the Rhetorical Foundations of the Liberal State". Rhetoric and Public Affairs. 3 (3): 363–395. doi:10.1353/rap.2010.0042. JSTOR 41940243.
- ^ Lurie, Jonathan (2012). William Howard Taft: The Travails of a Progressive Conservative. New York City: Cambridge University Press. p. ix.
- ^ Kutler, Stanley I. "Eisenhower, the Judiciary, and Desegregation". In Ambrose, Stephen E.; Bischof, Günter, eds. (1995). Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment. Louisiana State University Press. p. 98.
- ^ Viereck (2006), p. 74.
- ^ Huerta de Soto 2010, pp. 79–80.
- ^ Rothbard, Murray (2010). Left, Right, and the Prospects for Liberty. Auburn, Alabama: Mises Institute. p. 19.
- ^ Huerta de Soto 2010, p. 80.
- ^ Huerta de Soto 2010, p. 79.
Bibliography
[edit]- Adams, Ian (2001). Political Ideology Today. Manchester University Press. ISBN 978-0-7190-6020-5.
- Arnold, Dana (2004). Cultural Identities and the Aesthetics of Britishness. Manchester University Press. ISBN 978-0719067693.
- Bloor, Kevin (2012). The Definitive Guide to Political Ideologies. ISBN 978-1449067618.
- Dorey, Peter (1995). The Conservative Party and the Trade Unions. Psychology Press. ISBN 0-415-06487-2.
- Gjorshoski, Nikola (2016). "The Ideological Specific of the Variants of Contemporary Conservatism" (PDF). Journal of Liberty and International Affairs. 2(1).
- Heywood, Andrew (2015). "Political Ideas and Ideologies" (PDF). Politics. Red Globe Press – via ESL Writing.
- Heywood, Andrew (2007). Political Ideologies. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0230521803.
- Heywood, Andrew (2012). Political Ideologies: An Introduction. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-230-36994-8.
- Heywood, Andrew (2013). Politics. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-1-137-27244-7.
- Heywood, Andrew (2017). Political Ideologies: An Introduction. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-1-137-60604-4.
- Huerta de Soto, Jesús (2010). Socialism, Economic Calculation and Entrepreneurship Fourth edition. Edward Elgar Publishing. ISBN 978-1-849-80500-1.
- Steinberg, Jonathan (2011). Bismarck: A Life. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-997539-6.
- Vincent, Andrew (2009). Modern Political Ideologies. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 978-1-444-31105-1.
Further reading
[edit]- Eley, Geoff (1997). Society, Culture, and the State in Germany, 1870-1930 (1st paperback ed.). University of Michigan.
- Paxton, Robert O. (1975). Europe in the Twentieth Century. Harcourt Brace College Publishers.
- Paxton, Robert O.; Julie Hessler (2011) [2005]. Europe in the Twentieth Century. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.
- Sternhell, Ze'ev (1986). Neither Right Nor Left: Fascist Ideology in France (2nd ed.). Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Viereck, Peter (2006). Conservative Thinkers: From John Adams to Winston Churchill. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.
- Weitz, Eric D. (2007). Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
External links
[edit]
Quotations related to Paternalistic conservatism at Wikiquote
Paternalistic conservatism
View on GrokipediaIdeological Foundations
Definition and Core Principles
Paternalistic conservatism is a variant of conservative ideology that posits society as an organic entity characterized by natural hierarchies, where authority figures—such as the state, aristocracy, or elites—hold a duty to guide and protect subordinates in a manner akin to parental oversight.[1] This approach rejects laissez-faire individualism, advocating instead for pragmatic state intervention to mitigate social disruptions from industrialization or market excesses, thereby preserving traditional structures and social cohesion.[2] Core to this philosophy is the principle of noblesse oblige, wherein the privileged classes bear moral and practical responsibilities to uplift the less fortunate, preventing class antagonism and potential upheaval.[8] Central tenets include the affirmation of hierarchy as a stabilizing force, with leadership flowing from experienced elites who possess superior judgment to enact reforms in the public's best interest, rather than deferring to mass democracy or radical change.[9] Paternalistic conservatives emphasize organicism—the view that societies evolve gradually through interconnected institutions like family, church, and nation—over atomistic liberalism, supporting policies such as limited welfare provisions or labor protections to foster national unity and avert revolutionary threats.[10] Unlike libertarian conservatism, it endorses benevolent authoritarianism, where the state assumes a nurturing role to cultivate virtue and order, drawing from pragmatic adaptation to maintain established inequalities as functional for societal health.[11] This ideology prioritizes duty and reciprocity within social strata, viewing unchecked capitalism or socialism as corrosive to communal bonds, and thus promotes "one nation" solidarity through top-down benevolence that aligns reform with tradition.[2] Empirical historical applications, such as mid-19th-century British reforms under Disraeli, demonstrate its causal logic: targeted interventions like factory acts reduced exploitation without dismantling hierarchy, stabilizing the social order against Chartist agitations peaking in 1848.[10] Critics from libertarian perspectives argue it risks overreach into dependency, yet proponents substantiate its efficacy through evidence of reduced unrest in paternalistic regimes compared to purely liberal ones.[1]
Philosophical and Ethical Basis
Paternalistic conservatism philosophically conceives society as an organic, hierarchical organism rather than a collection of autonomous individuals, where natural inequalities in wisdom, experience, and capacity necessitate guidance from those in authority to maintain cohesion and promote the welfare of all.[12] This organicist view, inherited from traditional conservative thought, posits that social bonds are rooted in tradition, duty, and interdependence, rejecting atomistic liberalism's emphasis on equal liberty as potentially destabilizing to established orders.[13] Ethically, it invokes noblesse oblige, the moral imperative for elites and the state to exercise stewardship over the less fortunate, justified by the paternalistic rationale that such interventions—though limiting individual autonomy—serve the greater good by preventing exploitation or unrest.[14] In the British tradition, exemplified by Benjamin Disraeli's advocacy for "one nation" unity, this basis underscores an ethical commitment to social responsibility across classes, urging conservatives to pursue reforms not merely for pragmatic stability but to fulfill duties toward the working poor amid industrialization's disruptions.[10] Disraeli's principles framed state action as a conservative antidote to class antagonism, drawing on ethical imperatives of compassion and national solidarity to bridge divides without undermining hierarchy.[4] German variants, as in Otto von Bismarck's state socialism enacted through laws like the 1883 Health Insurance Act and 1884 Accident Insurance Act, grounded paternalism in Romanticist exaltation of the state as a supreme, quasi-familial entity tasked with harmonizing interests between capitalists, workers, and traditional institutions such as the monarchy and church.[15] Here, ethical justification centered on preempting radical socialism by binding the populace to the state through welfare, reflecting a realist assessment of human interdependence under authority rather than egalitarian ideals.[16] Critics from libertarian perspectives argue this paternalism risks eroding personal responsibility, yet proponents maintain its ethical realism aligns with empirical observations of societal fragility absent hierarchical guidance.[7] Overall, the ideology's basis prioritizes causal preservation of order through benevolent authority, substantiated by historical precedents where unchecked individualism exacerbated inequalities, as seen in mid-19th-century England's "two nations" divide Disraeli decried in his 1845 novel Sybil.[17]Relation to Broader Conservatism
Paternalistic conservatism represents a pragmatic strand within traditional conservatism, emphasizing the preservation of social hierarchy and organic societal bonds through benevolent state intervention, rather than laissez-faire individualism. This approach views society as an interconnected whole where elites bear responsibilities toward the less fortunate, akin to a family's paternal authority, to avert unrest and uphold traditions.[1][2] In contrast to libertarian conservatism, which subordinates state action to maximal personal liberty and market freedom, paternalistic variants justify government measures—such as limited welfare reforms—to reinforce stability and moral order, seeing unchecked individualism as a threat to communal duties.[18] Historically, this relation manifests in figures like Benjamin Disraeli, whose "one-nation" conservatism sought to bridge class divides via pragmatic policies, including factory acts and housing reforms in the 1870s, thereby adapting conservative principles to industrial realities without abandoning hierarchical norms.[4] Disraeli's paternalism, rooted in Tory traditions, prioritized national unity over ideological purity, distinguishing it from more rigid authoritarian conservatism while sharing the latter's skepticism of radical egalitarianism. Similarly, Otto von Bismarck's introduction of social insurance laws in 1883–1889 exemplified paternalistic conservatism's integration into state-oriented authoritarianism, using welfare to undermine socialist appeal and consolidate monarchical authority in unified Germany.[5][19] Broader conservatism encompasses diverse emphases— from neoconservative foreign policy activism to fiscal restraint in Thatcherite variants—but paternalistic elements persist as a counterbalance to anti-statist tendencies, advocating intervention only insofar as it sustains the established order against egalitarian disruptions. This tension underscores conservatism's inherent pragmatism, where paternalism serves as a tool for continuity rather than an end in itself, often critiqued by libertarians for eroding self-reliance yet defended as essential for long-term societal resilience.[20][18]Historical Development
Origins in the United Kingdom
Paternalistic conservatism emerged in the United Kingdom during the early 19th century as a response to the social upheavals of the Industrial Revolution, which exacerbated class divisions between the emerging industrial bourgeoisie and the working poor. Traditional Toryism, rooted in the principle of noblesse oblige, advocated for the aristocracy's moral duty to protect and guide the lower classes, contrasting with the rising laissez-faire liberalism of the Whigs and Radicals. This paternalistic ethos emphasized hierarchical social order while permitting limited state intervention to mitigate destitution and maintain stability, as evidenced in early Victorian efforts to reform poor laws and factory conditions without dismantling traditional structures.[21] The Young England movement, formed around 1842 by a group of young Tory MPs including Lord John Manners, George Smythe, and Alexander Baillie Cochrane, crystallized these ideas by romanticizing a return to feudal paternalism adapted to modern industrial society. Benjamin Disraeli, though not of aristocratic birth, became the movement's intellectual leader, using his platform to critique the "Condition of England" question posed by urban poverty and Chartist agitation. In parliamentary debates and writings, Disraeli argued for uniting the "Two Nations" of rich and poor through benevolent leadership, rejecting both revolutionary radicalism and unbridled individualism.[4][22] Disraeli's novels Coningsby (1844) and Sybil (1845) articulated this vision, portraying industrial England's alienation and proposing aristocratic intervention to foster national cohesion. Sybil famously described Britain as divided into "two nations" ignorant of each other, with paternalistic conservatism offering reconciliation via moral and practical reforms like education and housing improvements. These literary works influenced Tory backbenchers, promoting protectionist economic policies and social welfare to bind classes in organic unity, as opposed to class antagonism.[23][24] The movement's ideas gained traction after the 1846 split in the Conservative Party over Corn Law repeal, positioning Disraeli's faction against Robert Peel's free-trade Peelites. By the 1850s, this paternalistic strand evolved into what later became known as "One Nation" conservatism, emphasizing pragmatic governance to integrate the working classes into the polity through expanded suffrage and reforms, as seen in Disraeli's support for the 1867 Reform Act, which doubled the electorate to about 2 million. Despite the movement's short-lived formal existence, it laid the ideological groundwork for subsequent Conservative social policies, prioritizing empirical social stability over ideological purity.[4][25]Development in Germany
Paternalistic conservatism in Germany emerged in the late 19th century under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who implemented state-sponsored social welfare programs to mitigate industrial unrest and counter the rising influence of socialism while preserving monarchical authority and social hierarchy.[26][27] As a conservative Prussian aristocrat, Bismarck viewed these interventions as a paternalistic duty of the state to protect workers from exploitation, drawing on Christian values of concern for the vulnerable.[28] Bismarck's reforms began with the Health Insurance Act of 1883, which provided compulsory sickness insurance funded by employer and employee contributions, covering about 3 million workers initially.[27] This was followed by the Accident Insurance Act of 1884, establishing liability for workplace injuries regardless of fault, and the Old Age and Invalidity Insurance Act of 1889, introducing pensions for those over 70 or disabled, financed through tripartite contributions.[29] These measures formed the foundation of the world's first modern welfare state, explicitly designed to foster loyalty to the empire among the working class and undermine the Social Democratic Party.[29][30] In defending these policies, Bismarck emphasized paternalistic state responsibility, arguing in a 1884 Reichstag speech that such protections made workers "far more easy to handle" by securing their welfare under imperial oversight rather than revolutionary alternatives.[30] German conservatives during this period increasingly embraced statism and paternalism, shifting from economic liberalism to support interventionist policies that maintained traditional authority amid industrialization's challenges.[15] These developments entrenched paternalistic conservatism as a pragmatic response to social pressures, prioritizing stability and hierarchy over laissez-faire ideals.[28]
Implementations in Other Nations
In Japan, elements of paternalistic conservatism appeared in the post-World War II political landscape through the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which dominated governance from 1955 onward. Nobusuke Kishi, a key architect of the LDP's formation in 1955 and prime minister from 1957 to 1960, advanced policies blending economic interventionism with social stability measures to rebuild national cohesion after defeat. His administration prioritized industrial growth via state coordination, including support for export-led development and infrastructure investment, while laying groundwork for expanded welfare provisions that aimed to mitigate class divisions and promote collective prosperity.[31][32] Kishi's conservative consolidation countered leftist influences, such as the Japan Socialist Party, by fostering a paternalistic framework where the state guided private enterprise and social policy to ensure broad-based benefits, evident in early LDP commitments to employment security and housing initiatives amid rapid urbanization. This approach persisted into the 1960s and 1970s, with LDP governments enacting universal health insurance in 1961 and pension expansions, reflecting a duty-bound intervention to cultivate societal harmony without full market laissez-faire.[33] In France, Gaullism under Charles de Gaulle embodied paternalistic conservative traits through dirigiste economic planning and robust state oversight from the Fifth Republic's inception in 1958. De Gaulle's governments nationalized key industries like electricity and banking in 1945-1946, extended into the 1960s with indicative planning via the Commissariat général du Plan established in 1946, directing investments toward modernization while upholding traditional values of national sovereignty and social order. Policies included family allowances and worker protections, positioning the state as a benevolent authority fostering economic independence and welfare without egalitarian redistribution.[34] Gaullist welfare expansions, such as the 1967 social security reforms enhancing coverage, combined with infrastructural projects like the TGV precursors, exemplified intervention for the common good, prioritizing stability over individualism. This paternalism aligned with conservative resistance to both communism and unfettered capitalism, as seen in de Gaulle's 1958-1969 tenure stabilizing the franc and achieving 5-6% annual growth rates through guided capitalism.[35] In Italy, post-war Christian Democracy (Democrazia Cristiana, DC) incorporated paternalistic elements rooted in Catholic social teaching, governing from 1946 to 1994 with centrist coalitions emphasizing familial welfare and moral guidance. Leaders like Alcide De Gasperi implemented land reforms in 1950 redistributing 700,000 hectares to 100,000 families and established the National Health Service framework, intervening to address rural poverty and urban migration while preserving hierarchical social structures. DC policies, including the 1948 Constitution's social provisions, reflected a conservative duty to protect the vulnerable through state-mediated charity over radical change.[36]Key Thinkers and Proponents
British Figures
Benjamin Disraeli (1804–1881), who served as Prime Minister in 1868 and from 1874 to 1880, established the core tenets of paternalistic conservatism in Britain via his "One Nation" vision, which sought to unite social classes under hierarchical guidance informed by noblesse oblige.[4] Through the Young England movement and works like Sybil (1845), he portrayed industrial Britain as divided into "two nations"—the affluent and the laboring poor—urging the elite to intervene paternalistically to avert revolution and foster organic social harmony.[8] His administration enacted reforms such as the Second Reform Act (1867), doubling the electorate to include skilled workers, and sanitary laws like the Public Health Act (1875), reflecting state-directed amelioration of urban squalor while upholding traditional authority.[2] Stanley Baldwin (1867–1947), Prime Minister from 1923–1924, 1924–1929, and 1935–1937, extended Disraelian paternalism by emphasizing employer duty and national cohesion amid interwar tensions.[37] As a paternalistic industrialist himself, Baldwin promoted conciliatory industrial relations, exemplified by his 1925–1926 coal dispute management, where subsidy offers and appeals to mutual obligation delayed conflict, prioritizing stability over laissez-faire confrontation.[38] His rhetoric invoked conservative organicism, viewing society as a family-like entity requiring benevolent leadership to reconcile capital and labor without eroding class roles.[39] Harold Macmillan (1894–1986), Prime Minister from 1957 to 1963, applied One Nation paternalism in the post-war era through his "Middle Way" framework, advocating managed capitalism and welfare expansion to sustain consensus and avert class antagonism.[10] In The Middle Way (1938), he critiqued unbridled markets for exacerbating inequality, proposing state orchestration of investment and housing—evident in his 1950s pledge to build 300,000 homes annually—to integrate the working class into prosperity while preserving institutional continuity.[40] Macmillan's policies, including full employment commitments and opposition to excessive privatization, demonstrated empirical prioritization of social equilibrium over ideological purity.[1]Continental and Global Influencers
Otto von Bismarck, Chancellor of the German Empire from 1871 to 1890, exemplified paternalistic conservatism through his implementation of state-sponsored social insurance programs aimed at fostering loyalty to the monarchy and countering socialist influences. In 1883, he enacted the Health Insurance Act, followed by the Accident Insurance Act in 1884 and the Old Age and Disability Insurance Act in 1889, marking the world's first national social security system designed to provide workers with benefits while reinforcing hierarchical social order under conservative authority.[41] These measures reflected a paternalistic view where the state acted as a guardian, intervening to protect the populace from economic hardships without undermining traditional structures, as evidenced by Bismarck's explicit goal to preempt revolutionary tendencies by binding workers to the state.[42] Bismarck's approach emphasized "state socialism" as a tool for national unity, prioritizing order, patriotism, and duty over laissez-faire individualism, which he saw as destabilizing. His policies, funded through employer and employee contributions, stabilized industrial society by addressing worker grievances pragmatically, though critics noted their authoritarian undertones in suppressing socialist parties via the Anti-Socialist Laws of 1878.[43] This continental model influenced subsequent European welfare developments, underscoring paternalistic conservatism's focus on empirical stability through directed intervention rather than ideological purity. Beyond Europe, Nobusuke Kishi, Prime Minister of Japan from 1957 to 1960, represented paternalistic conservatism in a global context through his leadership in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), where nationalists advocated welfare policies to promote social cohesion and economic growth under conservative governance. Kishi's administration supported state-guided industrialization and social protections, building on post-war LDP strategies that integrated paternalistic elements to maintain traditional values amid rapid modernization, including expansions in public health and employment security prior to the 1980s shift away from such overt interventions. His efforts to unify conservative factions in 1955 facilitated policies that balanced market dynamics with state oversight, aiming to cultivate national resilience against leftist challenges. Kishi's legacy, including his role in revising the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960 despite protests, highlighted a commitment to authoritative leadership for societal welfare, echoing paternalistic ideals of hierarchical guidance for collective benefit.[44]Policy Characteristics and Achievements
Social Reforms and Welfare Measures
Paternalistic conservatism advanced social reforms through targeted state interventions aimed at safeguarding vulnerable populations, particularly industrial workers, from exploitation and hardship while preserving social hierarchy and stability. These measures emphasized benevolent authority guiding societal improvement, often motivated by the need to counter revolutionary threats like socialism by offering incremental welfare benefits.[27] In the United Kingdom, Benjamin Disraeli's Conservative government (1874–1880) enacted the Public Health Act 1875, which consolidated prior sanitary legislation, mandated local authorities to appoint medical officers and inspectors of nuisances, and required adequate water supply and sewage systems to combat urban disease outbreaks.[45] Complementing this, the Artisans' and Labourers' Dwellings Improvement Act 1875 empowered urban authorities to demolish slums and construct affordable housing, addressing overcrowding in working-class districts without resorting to full nationalization.[46] These reforms built on earlier Factory Acts but extended paternalistic oversight to public health and housing, reflecting Disraeli's "One Nation" vision of uniting classes through protective legislation.[45] Germany under Otto von Bismarck pioneered modern welfare measures with the Health Insurance Act of June 1883, mandating compulsory coverage for industrial workers against illness, funded by equal contributions from employees and employers, providing up to 13 weeks of wage replacement initially extendable to 26 weeks.[47] This was followed by the Accident Insurance Act of 1884, establishing employer-funded protection for workplace injuries and diseases, administered through trade guilds.[48] The Old Age and Disability Insurance Act of 1889 introduced the world's first national pension system, requiring contributions from workers, employers, and the state for benefits starting at age 70, though coverage was limited to those with sufficient contribution years.[48] Bismarck framed these as state-orchestrated safeguards to foster worker loyalty and preempt socialist agitation, blending compulsion with mutual aid principles.[27]Economic Interventions
Paternalistic conservatism endorses targeted state interventions in the economy to safeguard social order and mitigate the disruptive effects of industrialization and market volatility, emphasizing compulsory mechanisms that compel contributions from employers and workers while preserving private enterprise. These policies, often framed as "state socialism" by critics, prioritize long-term stability over pure market efficiency, with interventions including social insurance programs funded by payroll levies and protective tariffs to shield domestic industries from foreign competition.[48] Such approaches reflect a causal view that unchecked capitalism risks proletarian radicalization, necessitating paternal guidance to foster loyalty and productivity.[49] Otto von Bismarck's reforms in Germany exemplified these principles during the 1880s. The Health Insurance Law of June 1883 required employers and employees to contribute to funds covering medical treatment and maternity benefits for industrial workers, administered under state oversight with benefits scaled to earnings.[48] This was extended by the Accident Insurance Law of July 1884, providing coverage for workplace injuries without fault assessment, financed primarily by employers, and the Old Age and Disability Insurance Law of 1889, which introduced pensions for those over 70 or disabled, supported by tripartite contributions from workers, employers, and the state.[48] Bismarck's tariff policies from 1879 onward imposed protective duties on imports, averaging 10-15% on manufactured goods and higher on agriculture, reversing prior free-trade leanings to revive heavy industry amid the Long Depression; these measures correlated with industrial output growth from 1.5% annually pre-1879 to over 3% in the following decade.[49] In the United Kingdom, Benjamin Disraeli's influence promoted economic paternalism through pragmatic interventions that tempered laissez-faire excesses, such as the 1875 Public Health Act mandating sanitary improvements in urban areas to curb disease-driven labor disruptions, indirectly bolstering workforce stability.[4] While Disraeli accepted free trade after the 1846 Corn Laws repeal, his government's Artisans' and Labourers' Dwellings Improvement Acts of 1875 and 1879 facilitated state loans for slum clearance and housing, aiming to integrate the working class without redistributive upheaval.[4] These steps, motivated by noblesse oblige, sought to avert class antagonism by linking economic security to traditional hierarchies, though they remained modest compared to Bismarck's compulsions. Postwar implementations, such as in Japan under Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi from 1957 to 1960, integrated paternalistic economics via the Ministry of International Trade and Industry's (MITI) administrative guidance, which directed subsidies, import quotas, and export incentives to key sectors like steel and automobiles, achieving GDP growth rates exceeding 10% annually in the late 1950s while maintaining conservative social structures.[50] Empirical data from these eras indicate that such interventions stabilized employment—Germany's unemployment fell below 5% by 1890—and enhanced industrial competitiveness without derailing private investment, underscoring a realist assessment that moderated markets yield societal resilience over ideological purity.[49]Empirical Outcomes and Stability Gains
Bismarck's social insurance laws, enacted between 1883 and 1889, provided health, accident, and old-age benefits to over 3 million workers by 1890, marking the world's first comprehensive welfare system and tying recipients' security to the monarchical state rather than radical alternatives.[27] These measures correlated with Germany's avoidance of pre-World War I proletarian revolutions seen elsewhere in Europe, such as Russia's 1905 unrest, by channeling worker demands through state-administered programs that reinforced hierarchical loyalty.[51] However, econometric analysis indicates the reforms inadvertently boosted socialist party votes by 2-4 percentage points in affected districts, suggesting limited short-term suppression of leftist mobilization despite long-term institutional embedding of welfare under conservative auspices.[52] In the United Kingdom, Disraeli-era reforms including the Public Health Act 1875 established local sanitary authorities, leading to a 20-30% decline in urban mortality rates from waterborne diseases by the 1890s through mandated sewage and clean water infrastructure.[45] The Education Act 1870 expanded elementary schooling via school boards, increasing enrollment from under 1 million pupils in 1870 to over 4 million by 1880 and contributing to male literacy rising from 69.3% in 1851 to 97.2% by 1900, enhancing workforce skills and reducing illiteracy-linked social friction.[53] [54] [55] These interventions, paired with the Reform Act 1867's enfranchisement of approximately 938,000 working-class voters, shifted electoral allegiance, enabling Conservative victories like the 1874 general election where urban working districts showed increased Tory support, stabilizing the political order by integrating the proletariat into the existing class framework.[46] [56] Cross-nationally, paternalistic conservative policies yielded stability gains through human capital accumulation and grievance mitigation, as evidenced by sustained GDP per capita growth—Germany's averaging 1.5% annually from 1871-1913 and Britain's 1.1%—outpacing revolutionary peers like France during periods of unrest, with welfare reforms credibly linked to lower strike incidence relative to un-reformed industrial economies.[57] Empirical studies affirm that such targeted interventions preserved social hierarchies while averting radical upheavals, though causal attribution remains debated amid confounding industrialization trends.[58]Criticisms and Controversies
Libertarian and Free-Market Critiques
Libertarian critics contend that paternalistic conservatism's emphasis on state-guided social welfare and moral oversight inherently violates individual autonomy by substituting bureaucratic judgment for personal choice. Friedrich Hayek, in The Road to Serfdom (1944), warned that such interventions, even when framed as compassionate protections for the vulnerable, concentrate coercive power in government hands, fostering dependency and eroding the rule of law essential to a free society.[59] This approach, Hayek argued, creates a "household state" where paternalistic authorities allocate resources like a family patriarch, distorting incentives and paving the path to centralized planning incompatible with liberty. Free-market proponents further argue that paternalistic policies, such as Bismarck's 1880s social insurance programs in Germany—which influenced later conservative welfare models—introduce market distortions that stifle entrepreneurship and voluntary cooperation. These measures, by providing state-mandated benefits, generate moral hazard, where individuals and firms reduce risk-taking and productivity in anticipation of government backstops, as evidenced by elevated unemployment persistence in European welfare states post-1970s compared to more liberalized economies like the U.S. during the same period.[60] Austrian economists, including Ludwig von Mises, critiqued such interventionism as disrupting the price mechanism's role in resource allocation, leading to inefficient outcomes that burden taxpayers and undermine the organic social bonds paternalists claim to preserve.[61] Critics like Murray Rothbard extended this to portray paternalistic conservatism as a statist deviation from true liberty, blending traditionalist rhetoric with expansive government that historically enabled imperial overreach and fiscal profligacy, as seen in Britain's post-Disraeli empire-building tied to protective tariffs and colonial paternalism in the late 19th century.[62] Empirical analyses from institutions like the Cato Institute highlight how one-nation style interventions correlate with slower growth; for example, the U.K.'s mid-20th-century paternalistic expansions preceded relative economic decline versus freer U.S. markets until Thatcher-era reforms in 1979 reversed course by slashing subsidies and regulations.[60] Proponents of spontaneous order, echoing Hayek's knowledge problem, assert that no central authority possesses the dispersed information needed for effective paternalistic planning, resulting in unintended consequences like intergenerational welfare traps documented in studies of European systems where benefit recipiency spans multiple generations.[59]Egalitarian and Left-Wing Objections
Egalitarian critics argue that paternalistic conservatism entrenches hierarchical social structures by presupposing innate differences in capacity and authority, thereby undermining the principle of equal moral worth and agency for all individuals.[63] This approach, they contend, treats the lower classes as dependent wards requiring guidance from elites, rather than autonomous agents capable of self-determination, which conflicts with egalitarian commitments to leveling outcomes and opportunities without deference to tradition or status.[13] Left-wing objections, particularly from socialist perspectives, portray paternalistic conservatism as a strategic concession by ruling classes to forestall radical upheaval, offering limited welfare measures that preserve capitalist exploitation and class divisions rather than eradicating them.[64] For instance, Benjamin Disraeli's 1875 reforms, such as the Public Health Act and Artisans' Dwellings Act, expanded working-class enfranchisement and sanitation but stopped short of wealth redistribution or worker ownership, which socialists viewed as insufficient to resolve systemic inequalities rooted in private property.[45] Similarly, Otto von Bismarck's 1880s social insurance programs in Germany were decried by contemporaries like August Bebel of the Social Democratic Party as "state socialism" designed to co-opt labor movements and bolster monarchical authority against Marxist agitation, evidenced by their pairing with anti-socialist laws that suppressed unions and strikes until 1890. These critiques hold that such policies foster dependency on benevolent elites, delaying genuine proletarian empowerment and perpetuating "organized selfishness" under a veneer of noblesse oblige, as philosopher Ted Honderich characterized conservative priorities in prioritizing stability over substantive equality.[13]Responses and Causal Evidence
Proponents of paternalistic conservatism respond to libertarian criticisms by asserting that minimal state intervention risks exacerbating social divisions and economic dislocations, potentially inviting more coercive responses such as revolutionary upheaval. They contend that targeted reforms stabilize society by addressing immediate grievances without undermining market incentives or traditional structures. Historical precedents, such as Otto von Bismarck's introduction of compulsory health insurance in 1883, accident insurance in 1884, and old-age pensions in 1889, were explicitly designed to undercut socialist appeal and foster loyalty to the state among workers, thereby preempting widespread unrest.[27] These measures succeeded in maintaining political and social order in the newly unified German Empire, avoiding the scale of domestic turmoil seen in contemporaneous revolutionary contexts like the Paris Commune of 1871.[65][66] In countering egalitarian objections, paternalistic conservatives maintain that their approach promotes organic social cohesion through hierarchical duties rather than enforced equality, which they argue erodes personal responsibility and cultural norms. Benjamin Disraeli's advocacy for "one nation" principles emphasized the aristocracy's obligation to uplift the working classes via reforms like the 1875 Public Health Act, which improved sanitation and living conditions without dismantling class structures.[45] This framework posits that such interventions sustain long-term prosperity by integrating the populace into the national fabric, contrasting with redistributive models that risk dependency and fiscal strain. Causal evidence supporting these responses includes the observable decline in German emigration rates following Bismarck's social legislation, which provided economic security and reduced the incentive for workers to seek opportunities abroad amid industrialization's disruptions.[67] In Britain, Disraeli's expansion of the electorate through the Second Reform Act of 1867 correlated with broadened Conservative electoral support, facilitating policy continuity that enhanced social stability during rapid urbanization.[68] These outcomes demonstrate that paternalistic measures can mitigate unrest—evidenced by Germany's avoidance of pre-World War I socialist revolutions—while enabling industrial growth, as the empire's GDP per capita rose from approximately 1,200 marks in 1871 to over 2,500 marks by 1913 under this mixed framework.[65]
