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Mobutu Sese Seko
Mobutu Sese Seko
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Mobutu Sese Seko Nkuku Ngbendu wa za Banga[a] (/məˈbt ˈsɛs ˈsɛk/ mə-BOO-too SESS-ay SEK-oh; born Joseph-Désiré Mobutu; 14 October 1930 – 7 September 1997), often shortened to Mobutu Sese Seko or Mobutu and also known by his initials MSS, was a Congolese politician and military officer who was the first and only president of Zaire from 1971 to 1997. Previously, Mobutu served as the second president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, from 1965 to 1971. He also served as the fifth chairperson of the Organisation of African Unity from 1967 to 1968. During the Congo Crisis in 1960, Mobutu, then serving as Chief of Staff of the Congolese Army, deposed the nation's democratically elected government of Patrice Lumumba with the support of the U.S. and Belgium. Mobutu installed a government that arranged for Lumumba's execution in 1961, and continued to lead the country's armed forces until he took power directly in a second coup in 1965.

To consolidate his power, he established the Popular Movement of the Revolution as the sole legal political party in 1967, changed the Congo's name to Zaire in 1971, and his own name to Mobutu Sese Seko in 1972. Mobutu protected his rule through an intensely autocratic regime and came to preside over a period of widespread human rights violations. He attempted to purge the country of all colonial cultural influence through his program of "national authenticity".[1][2] Mobutu was the object of a pervasive cult of personality.[3]

Mobutu claimed that his political ideology was "neither left nor right, nor even centre",[4] but was primarily recognized for his opposition to communism within the Françafrique region and received strong support (military, diplomatic and economic) from the United States, France, and Belgium given the fact. He also built close ties with the governments of apartheid South Africa, Israel, and the Greek junta.[5]

Mobutu was notorious for corruption and nepotism: estimates of his personal wealth range from $50 million to $5 billion,[6][7] amassed through economic exploitation and corruption as president.[8] His rule has been called a kleptocracy[9][10] for allowing this personal fortune even as the economy of Zaire suffered from uncontrolled inflation, a large debt, and massive currency devaluations. Mobutu was further known for extravagances such as shopping trips to Paris via the supersonic Concorde aircraft.[11]

By 1990, economic deterioration and unrest forced Mobutu Sese Seko into a coalition with political opponents and to allow a multiparty system. Although he used his troops to thwart change, his antics did not last long. In May 1997, rebel forces led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila overran the country and forced him into exile. Already suffering from advanced prostate cancer, he died three months later in Morocco.

Biography

[edit]

Early years and education

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Mobutu, a member of the Ngbandi ethnic group,[12] was born in 1930 in Lisala, Belgian Congo.[13] Mobutu's mother, Marie Madeleine Yemo, was a hotel maid who fled to Lisala to escape the harem of a local village chief. There she met and married Albéric Gbemani, a cook for a Belgian judge.[14][15] Shortly afterward she gave birth to Mobutu. The name "Mobutu" was selected by an uncle.

Gbemani died when Mobutu was eight.[16] Thereafter, he was raised by an uncle and a grandfather.

The Belgian judge's wife took a liking to Mobutu and taught him to speak, read, and write fluently in French,[17] the official language of the colony. His widowed mother Yemo relied on the help of relatives to support her four children, and the family moved often. Mobutu's earliest education took place in the capital Léopoldville (now Kinshasa). His mother eventually sent him to an uncle in Coquilhatville (present-day Mbandaka), where he attended the Christian Brothers School, a Catholic-mission boarding school. He excelled in academic subjects and ran the class newspaper. He was also known for his pranks and impish sense of humor.[18]

A classmate recalled that when the Belgian priests, whose first language was Dutch, made an error in French, Mobutu would leap to his feet in class and point out the mistake. In 1949 Mobutu stowed away aboard a boat, traveling downriver to Léopoldville, where he met a girl. The priests found him several weeks later. At the end of the school year, in lieu of being sent to prison, he was ordered to serve seven years in the colonial army, the Force Publique (FP). This was a usual punishment for rebellious students.[19]

Army service

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Mobutu found discipline in army life, as well as a father figure in Sergeant Louis Bobozo. Mobutu kept up his studies by borrowing European newspapers from the Belgian officers and books from wherever he could find them, reading them on sentry duty and whenever he had a spare moment. His favorites were the writings of French president Charles de Gaulle, British prime minister Winston Churchill, and Italian Renaissance philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli. After passing a course in accounting, Mobutu began to dabble professionally in journalism. Still angry after his clashes with the school priests, he did not marry in a church. His contribution to the wedding festivities was a crate of beer, all his army salary could afford.[20]

Early political involvement

[edit]

As a soldier, Mobutu wrote in pseudonym on contemporary politics for Actualités Africaines (African News), a magazine set up by a Belgian colonial. In 1956, he quit the army and became a full-time journalist,[21] writing for the Léopoldville daily L'Avenir.[22]

Two years later, he went to Belgium to cover the 1958 World Exposition and stayed to receive training in journalism. By this time, Mobutu had met many of the young Congolese intellectuals who were challenging colonial rule. He became friendly with Patrice Lumumba and joined Lumumba's Congolese National Movement (MNC). Mobutu eventually became Lumumba's personal aide. Several contemporaries indicate that Belgian intelligence had recruited Mobutu to be an informer to the government.[23]

During the 1960 talks in Brussels on Congolese independence, the US embassy held a reception for the Congolese delegation. Embassy staff were each assigned a list of delegation members to meet, and discussed their impressions afterward. The ambassador noted, "One name kept coming up. But it wasn't on anyone's list because he wasn't an official delegation member, he was Lumumba's secretary. But everyone agreed that this was an extremely intelligent man, very young, perhaps immature, but a man with great potential."[24]

Following the general election, Lumumba was tasked with creating a government. He gave Mobutu the office of Secretary of State to the Presidency. Mobutu held much influence in the final determination of the rest of the government.[25] He lost private access to Lumumba following independence, as the new prime minister grew busy and surrounded by aides and colleagues, leading the two to drift apart.[26]

Congo Crisis

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Colonel Mobutu in 1960
Mobutu in a 1963 visit to Israel, where he participated in a shortened IDF paratrooper course
Mobutu in a 1963 visit to Israel, where he participated in a shortened IDF paratrooper course

On 5 July 1960, soldiers of the Force Publique stationed at Camp Léopold II in Léopoldville, dissatisfied with their all-white leadership and working conditions, mutinied. The revolt spread across the region in the following days. Mobutu assisted other officials in negotiating with the mutineers to secure the release of the officers and their families.[27] On 8 July the full Council of Ministers convened in an extraordinary session under the chairmanship of President Joseph Kasa-Vubu at Camp Léopold II to address the task of Africanising the garrison.[28]

The ministers debated over who would make a suitable army chief of staff. The two main candidates for the post were Minister of Youth and Sports Maurice Mpolo and Mobutu. The former had shown some influence over the mutinying troops, but Kasa-Vubu and the Bakongo ministers feared that he would enact a coup d'état if he were given power. The latter was perceived as calmer and more thoughtful.[29] Lumumba saw Mpolo as courageous, but favored Mobutu's prudence. As the discussions continued, the cabinet began to divide according to who they preferred to serve as chief of staff. Lumumba wanted to keep both men in his government and wished to avoid upsetting one of their camps of supporters.[29] In the end Mobutu was given the role and awarded the rank of colonel.[30] The following day government delegations left the capital to oversee the Africanisation of the army; Mobutu was sent to Équateur.[31] While he was there Mpolo acted as ANC Chief of Staff.[32][33] Mobutu was affronted by this development, and upon his return to the capital he confronted Lumumba in a cabinet meeting, saying, "Either I was unworthy, and you have to dismiss me, or I faithfully accomplished my mission and so I keep my rank and functions."[33]

The British diplomat Brian Urquhart serving with the United Nations wrote: "When I first met Mobutu in July 1960, he was Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba's chief military assistant and had just promoted himself from sergeant to lieutenant-colonel. By comparison with his boss, Mobutu was a pillar of pragmatism and common sense. It was to him that we appealed when our people were arrested by Lumumba's hashish-stimulated guards. It was he who would bring up, in a disarmingly casual way, Lumumba's most outrageous requests – that the UN should, for example, meet the pay roll of the potentially mutinous Congolese army. In those early days, Mobutu seemed a comparatively sensible young man, one who might even, at least now and then, have the best interests of his newly independent country at heart."[34]

Encouraged by a Belgian government intent on maintaining its access to rich Congolese mines, secessionist violence erupted in the south. Concerned that the United Nations force sent to help restore order was not helping to crush the secessionists, Lumumba turned to the Soviet Union for assistance. He received massive military aid and about a thousand Soviet technical advisers within six weeks. As this was during the Cold War, the US government feared that the Soviet activity was a maneuver to spread communist influence in Central Africa. Kasa-Vubu was encouraged by the US and Belgium to dismiss Lumumba, which he did on 5 September. An outraged Lumumba declared Kasa-Vubu deposed. Parliament refused to recognise the dismissals and urged reconciliation, but no agreement was reached.[35][36][37]

Lumumba and Kasa-Vubu each ordered Mobutu to arrest the other. As Army Chief of Staff, Mobutu came under great pressure from multiple sources. The embassies of Western nations, which helped pay the soldiers' salaries, as well as Kasa-Vubu and Mobutu's subordinates, all favored getting rid of the Soviet presence. On 14 September Mobutu launched a bloodless coup, declaring both Kasa-Vubu and Lumumba to be "neutralised" and establishing a new government of university graduates, the College of Commissioners-General. Lumumba rejected this action but was forced to retire to his residence, where UN peacekeepers prevented Mobutu's soldiers from arresting him. Urquhart recalled that on the day of the coup, Mobutu showed up unannounced at the UN headquarters in Léopoldville and refused to leave, until the radio announced the coup, leading Mobutu to say over and over again "C'est moi!" ("This is me!").[34] Recognizing that Mobutu had only gone to the UN headquarters in case the coup should fail, Urquhart ordered him out.[34]

Losing confidence that the international community would support his reinstatement, Lumumba fled in late November to join his supporters in Stanleyville to establish a new government. He was captured by Mobutu's troops in early December, and incarcerated at his headquarters in Thysville. However, Mobutu still considered him a threat, and transferred him to the rebelling State of Katanga on 17 January 1961. Lumumba disappeared from public view. It was later discovered that he was executed the same day by the secessionist forces of Moise Tshombe, after Mobutu's government turned him over.[38]

Colonel Joseph-Desiré Mobutu (left) with President Joseph Kasa-Vubu, 1961

On 23 January 1961, Kasa-Vubu promoted Mobutu to major-general. Historian De Witte argues that this was a political action, "aimed to strengthen the army, the president's sole support, and Mobutu's position within the army".[39]

In 1964, Pierre Mulele led partisans in another rebellion. They quickly occupied two-thirds of the Congo. In response, the Congolese army, led by Mobutu, reconquered the entire territory through 1965.[40]

Second coup and consolidation of power

[edit]

Prime Minister Moise Tshombe's Congolese National Convention had won a large majority in the March 1965 elections, but Kasa-Vubu appointed an anti-Tshombe leader, Évariste Kimba, as prime minister-designate. However, Parliament twice refused to confirm him. With the government in near-paralysis, Mobutu seized power in a bloodless coup on 24 November. He had turned 35 a month earlier.[41]

Under the auspices of a state of exception (regime d'exception), Mobutu assumed sweeping—almost absolute—powers for five years.[42] In his first speech upon taking power, Mobutu told a large crowd at Léopoldville's main stadium that, since politicians had brought the Congo to ruin in five years, it would take him at least that long to set things right again, and therefore there would be no more political party activity for five years.[43] On 30 November 1965 Parliament approved a measure which turned over most legislative powers to Mobutu and his cabinet, though it retained the right to review his decrees. In early March 1966 he opened a new session of Parliament by declaring that he was revoking their right of review, and two weeks later his government permanently suspended the body and assumed all of its remaining functions.[44]

A Congolese cotton shirt embellished with a portrait of Mobutu from the collection of the Tropenmuseum in Amsterdam

Initially, Mobutu's government presented itself as apolitical or even anti-political. The word "politician" carried negative connotations, and became almost synonymous with someone who was wicked or corrupt. In 1966 the Corps of Volunteers of the Republic was established, a vanguard movement designed to mobilize popular support behind Mobutu, who was proclaimed the nation's "Second National Hero" after Lumumba. Despite the role he played in Lumumba's ousting, Mobutu worked to present himself as a successor to Lumumba's legacy. One of his key tenets early in his rule was "authentic Congolese nationalism". In 1966, Mobutu started renaming cities that had European names with more "authentic" African names, and in this way Léopoldville became Kinshasa, Stanleyville became Kisangani and Élisabethville became Lubumbashi.[45]

1967 marked the debut of the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR), which until 1990 was the nation's only legal political party. Among the themes advanced by the MPR in its doctrine, the Manifesto of N'Sele, were nationalism, revolution, and "authenticity". Revolution was described as a "truly national revolution, essentially pragmatic", which called for "the repudiation of both capitalism and communism". One of the MPR's slogans was "Neither left nor right", to which would be added "nor even center" in later years.[46]

That same year, all trade unions were consolidated into a single union, the National Union of Zairian Workers, and brought under government control. Mobutu intended for the union to serve as an instrument of support for government policy, rather than as an independent group. Independent trade unions were illegal until 1991.[47]

Mobutu sworn in as President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo following the 1970 election

Facing many challenges early in his rule, Mobutu converted much opposition into submission through patronage; those he could not co-opt, he dealt with forcefully. In 1966, four cabinet members were arrested on charges of complicity in an attempted coup, tried by a military tribunal, and publicly executed in an open-air spectacle witnessed by over 50,000 people. Uprisings by former Katangan gendarmeries were crushed, as were the Stanleyville mutinies of 1967 led by white mercenaries.[48] By 1970, nearly all potential threats to his authority had been smashed, and for the most part, law and order was brought to nearly all parts of the country. That year marked the pinnacle of Mobutu's legitimacy and power.[47]

In 1970 King Baudouin of Belgium made a highly successful state visit to Kinshasa. That same year presidential and legislative elections were held. Although the constitution allowed for the existence of two parties, the MPR was the only party allowed to nominate candidates. For the presidential election, Mobutu was the only candidate. Voting was not secret; voters chose a green paper if they supported Mobutu's candidacy, and a red paper if they opposed his candidacy. Casting a green ballot was deemed a vote for hope, while a red ballot was deemed a vote for chaos. Under the circumstances, the result was inevitable–according to official figures, Mobutu was confirmed in office with near-unanimous support, garnering 10,131,669 votes to only 157 "no" votes.[49] It later emerged that almost 30,500 more votes were cast than the actual number of registered voters.[50][51] The legislative elections were held in a similar fashion. Voters were presented with a single list from the MPR; according to official figures, an implausible 98.33% of voters voted in favor of the MPR list.[47]

As he consolidated power, Mobutu set up several military forces whose sole purpose was to protect him. These included the Special Presidential Division, Civil Guard and Service for Action, and Military Intelligence (SNIP).[52]

Authenticity campaign

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Flag of Zaire

Embarking on a campaign of pro-Africa cultural awareness, called authenticité, Mobutu began renaming cities that reflected the colonial past, starting on 1 June 1966: Léopoldville became Kinshasa, Elisabethville became Lubumbashi, and Stanleyville became Kisangani. In October 1971, he renamed the country as the Republic of Zaire.[45][53] He ordered the people to change their European names to African ones, and priests were warned that they would face five years' imprisonment if they were caught baptizing a Zairian child with a European name.[45] Western attire and ties were banned, and men were forced to wear a Mao-style tunic known as an abacost (shorthand for à bas le costume, or "down with the suit").[54] Christmas was moved from December to June because it was more of an "authentic" date.[45]

In 1972, in accordance with his own decree of a year earlier, Mobutu renamed himself Mobutu Sese Seko Nkuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga (meaning "The all-powerful warrior who, because of his endurance and inflexible will to win, goes from conquest to conquest, leaving fire in his wake.").[55][56] Around this time, he eschewed his military uniform in favor of what would become his classic image—the tall, imposing man carrying a walking stick while wearing an abacost, thick-framed glasses, and a leopard-skin toque made in Paris.[57][58]

In 1974, a new constitution consolidated Mobutu's grip on the country. It defined the MPR as the "single institution" in the country. It was officially defined as "the nation politically organized"—in essence, the state was a transmission belt for the party. All citizens automatically became members of the MPR from birth. The constitution stated that the MPR was embodied by the party's president, who was elected every seven years at its national convention. At the same time, the party president was automatically nominated as the sole candidate for a seven-year term as president of the republic; he was confirmed in office by a referendum. The document codified the emergency powers Mobutu had exercised since 1965; it vested Mobutu with "plenitude of power exercise", effectively concentrating all governing power in his hands. Mobutu was reelected three times under this system, each time by implausibly high margins of 98 percent or more. A single list of MPR candidates was returned to the legislature every five years with equally implausible margins; official figures gave the MPR list unanimous or near-unanimous support. At one of those elections, in 1975, formal voting was dispensed with altogether. Instead, the election took place by acclaim; candidates were presented at public locations around the country where they would be applauded into parliament.[59]

One-man rule

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Mobutu Sese Seko with the Dutch Prince Bernhard in 1973

Early in his rule, Mobutu consolidated power by publicly executing political rivals, secessionists, coup plotters, and other threats to his rule. To set an example, many were hanged before large audiences. Such victims included former Prime Minister Évariste Kimba, who, with three cabinet members—Jérôme Anany (Defense Minister), Emmanuel Bamba (Finance Minister), and Alexandre Mahamba (Minister of Mines and Energy)—was tried in May 1966, and sent to the gallows on 30 May, before an audience of 50,000 spectators. The men were executed on charges of being in contact with Colonel Alphonse Bangala and Major Pierre Efomi, for the purpose of planning a coup. Mobutu explained the executions as follows: "One had to strike through a spectacular example, and create the conditions of regime discipline. When a chief takes a decision, he decides – period."[60]

In 1968, Pierre Mulele, Lumumba's Minister of Education and a rebel leader during the 1964 Simba rebellion, was lured out of exile in Brazzaville on the belief that he would receive amnesty. Instead, he was tortured and killed by Mobutu's forces. While Mulele was still alive, his eyes were gouged out, his genitals were ripped off, and his limbs were amputated one by one.[61]

Mobutu later switched to a new tactic, buying off political rivals. He used the slogan "Keep your friends close, but your enemies closer still"[62] to describe his tactic of co-opting political opponents through bribery. A favorite Mobutu tactic was to play "musical chairs", rotating members of his government, switching the cabinet roster constantly to ensure that no one would pose a threat to his rule. Between November 1965 and April 1997, Mobutu reshuffled his cabinet 60 times.[63] The frequent cabinet reshuffles as intended encouraged insecurity in his ministers, who knew that the mercurial Mobutu would reshuffle his cabinet with no regard for efficiency and competence on the part of his ministers.[63] The frequency that men entered and left the cabinet also encouraged gross corruption because ministers never knew how long they might be in office, thus encouraging them to steal as much as possible while they were in the cabinet.[63] Another tactic was to arrest and sometimes torture dissident members of the government, only to later pardon them and reward them with high office.[63] The Congolese historian Emizet F. Kisangani wrote: "Most public officials knew that regardless of their inefficiency and degree of corruption, they could reenter the government. To hold a government position required neither a sense of management nor a good conscience. On most occasions, effectiveness and a good conscience were major obstacles to political advancement. Mobutu demanded absolute personal allegiance in return for the opportunity to accumulate wealth".[63] As early as 1970, it was estimated that Mobutu had stolen 60% of the national budget that year, marking him as one of the most corrupt leaders in Africa and the world.[63] Kisangani wrote that Mobutu created a system of institutional corruption that greatly debased public morality by rewarding venality and greed.[64]

In 1972, Mobutu tried unsuccessfully to have himself named president for life.[65] In June 1983, he raised himself to the rank of Marshal;[66] the order was signed by General Likulia Bolongo. Victor Nendaka Bika, in his capacity as Vice-President of the Bureau of the Central Committee, second authority in the land, addressed a speech filled with praise for President Mobutu.

Mobutu Sese Seko in army fatigues, 1978

To gain the revenues of Congolese resources, Mobutu initially nationalized foreign-owned firms and forced European investors out of the country. But in many cases he handed the management of these firms to relatives and close associates, who quickly exercised their own corruption and stole the companies' assets. In 1973–1974, Mobutu launched his "Zairianization" campaign, nationalising foreign owned businesses that were handed over to Zairians.[45] In October 1973, the Arab oil shock ended the "long summer" of prosperity in the West that had begun in 1945, and sent the world economy into its sharpest contraction since the Great Depression. One consequence of the oil shock and the resulting global recession was that the price of copper dropped by 50% over the course of 1974, which proved to be a disaster for Zaire as copper was its most important export.[45] The American historian Thomas Odom wrote because of the collapse in copper prices Zaire went from "prosperity to bankruptcy almost overnight" in 1974.[45] The economic collapse forced Zaire to turn towards the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to help it manage its debts which could no longer be serviced.[45] Seeking an alternative source of support as the auditors for the IMF discovered major corruption within the Zairian finances, Mobutu visited China in 1974 and returned wearing a Mao jacket and the new title of Citoyen Mobutu ("Citizen Mobutu").[67] Influenced by the Cultural Revolution, Mobutu shifted to the left and announced his intention to "radicalize the Zairian revolution".[67] The businesses that Mobutu had just handed over to Zairians were in turn nationalized and placed under state control.[67] At the same time, Mobutu imposed a 50% salary cut to state employees, which led a failed coup attempt against him in June 1975.[67]

President of Uganda Idi Amin visits Zaire and meets Mobutu during the Shaba I conflict in 1977

By 1977, Mobutu's nationalizations had precipitated such an economic slump that Mobutu was forced to try to woo foreign investors back.[68] Katangan rebels based in Angola invaded Zaire that year, in retaliation for Mobutu's support for anti-MPLA rebels. France airlifted 1,500 Moroccan paratroopers into the country and repulsed the rebels, ending Shaba I. The rebels attacked Zaire again, in greater numbers, in the Shaba II invasion of 1978. The governments of Belgium and France deployed troops with logistical support from the United States and defeated the rebels again. The poor performance of the Zairian Army during both Shaba invasions, which humiliated Mobutu by forcing him to ask for foreign troops, did not lead to military reforms.[69] However, Mobutu reduced the size of the Army from 51,000 troops in 1978 down to 23,000 troops in 1980.[69] By 1980, it was estimated that about 90% of the Zairian Army were Ngbandi as Mobutu did not trust the other peoples of Zaire to serve in the Army.[69] The most loyal and best of Mobutu's units were his bodyguards, the Israeli-trained Special Presidential Division (Division Spéciale Présidentielle) that was made up exclusively of Ngbandi and was always commanded by one of Mobutu's relatives.[70]

Mobutu was re-elected in single-candidate elections in 1977 and 1984. He spent most of his time increasing his personal fortune, which in 1988 was estimated to amount to no less than US$50 million.[71] He held most of it out of the country in Swiss banks (however, a comparatively small $3.4 million was declared found in Swiss banks after he was ousted.[72]). This was almost equivalent to the amount of the country's foreign debt at the time. In a speech that he delivered on 20 May 1976 in a football stadium in Kinshasa that was filled with some 70,000 people, Mobutu openly accepted petty corruption, stating: "If you want to steal, steal a little in a nice way, but if you steal too much to become rich overnight, you will be caught".[73] By 1989, the government was forced to default on international loans from Belgium.

Mobutu owned a fleet of Mercedes-Benz vehicles that he used to travel between his numerous palaces, while the nation's roads deteriorated and many of his people starved. The infrastructure virtually collapsed, and many public service workers went months without being paid. Most of the money was siphoned off to Mobutu, his family, and top political and military leaders. Only the Special Presidential Division – on whom his physical safety depended – was paid adequately or regularly. A popular saying that "the civil servants pretended to work while the state pretended to pay them" expressed this grim reality.[74] The Forces Armées Zaïroises (FAZ) suffered from low morale made worse by irregular salaries, dismal living conditions, shortages of supplies and a venal officer corps.[75] The soldiers of the FAZ behaved very much like a brutal occupying force who supported themselves by robbing the civilian population of Zaire.[75] A recurring feature of Mobutu's rule were the seemingly endless number of roadblocks put by the FAZ who extorted money from the drivers of any passing automobile or lorries.[75]

Another feature of Mobutu's economic mismanagement, directly linked to the way he and his friends siphoned off so much of the country's wealth, was rampant inflation. The rapid decline in the real value of salaries strongly encouraged a culture of corruption and dishonesty among public servants of all kinds.[76]

Mobutu was known for his opulent lifestyle. He cruised on the Congo on his yacht Kamanyola. In Gbadolite, he erected a palace, the "Versailles of the jungle".[77] For shopping trips to Paris, he would charter a Concorde from Air France; he had the Gbadolite Airport constructed with a runway long enough to accommodate the Concorde's extended take-off and landing requirements.[78] In 1989, Mobutu chartered Concorde aircraft F-BTSD for a 26 June – 5 July trip to give a speech at the United Nations in New York City, then again on 16 July for French bicentennial celebrations in Paris (where he was a guest of President François Mitterrand), and on 19 September for a flight from Paris to Gbadolite, and another nonstop flight from Gbadolite to Marseille with the youth choir of Zaire.[79] Mobutu owned a villa on the French Riviera, Villa del Mere.[80]

Mobutu's rule earned a reputation as one of the world's foremost examples of kleptocracy and nepotism.[81] Close relatives and fellow members of the Ngbandi tribe were awarded high positions in the military and government, and he groomed his eldest son, Nyiwa, to succeed him as president;[82] however, Nyiwa died from AIDS in 1994.[83]

Mobutu led one of the most enduring autocracies in Africa and amassed a personal fortune estimated to be over US$50 million by selling his nation's rich natural resources while the people lived in poverty.[84][85] While in office, he formed a totalitarian regime responsible for numerous human rights violations, attempted to purge the country of all Belgian cultural influences, and maintained an anti-communist stance to gain positive international support.[43][86]

10 Makuta coin depicting Mobutu Sese Seko

Mobutu was the subject of one of the most pervasive personality cults of the twentieth century. The evening newscast opened with an image of him descending through clouds like a god. His portraits were hung in many public places, and government officials wore lapel pins bearing his portrait. He held such titles as "Father of the Nation", "Messiah", "Guide of the Revolution", "Helmsman", "Founder", "Savior of the People", and "Supreme Combatant". In the 1996 documentary of the 1974 Foreman–Ali fight in Zaire, dancers receiving the fighters can be heard chanting "Sese Seko, Sese Seko". At one point, in early 1975, the media were forbidden to refer to anyone other than Mobutu by name; others were referred to only by the positions they held.[87][88]

Mobutu successfully capitalized on Cold War tensions among European nations and the United States. He gained significant support from the West and its international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund.[89]

Space program

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In the late 1970s, the West Germany company OTRAG was developing a program to send peaceful satellites into space at lower costs, but a 1954 amendment to the Treaty of Brussels prevented them from developing and launching missiles in Germany.[90] As a result, they paid Mobutu $130 million to develop their program in Zaire.[91] In a 1978 agreement with OTRAG, Mobutu gave the company a 25-year rented plot of land in Zaire.[90] The first rocket, OTRAG-1, was launched on 18 May 1977,[90] while Mobutu watched from a distance.[91] The rocket took off successfully, but shortly afterwards fell and crashed back down to the ground.[90][91]

By 6 June 1978, two more rockets had been launched and crashed in Zaire. Nevertheless, Mobutu continued to promote the program, stating that 200 Zairians were employed by the project and the country would receive royalties from future rocket sales.[92] Two years after the launch of the first rocket, the Soviet Union alleged that former Nazi scientists were involved with OTRAG, and became convinced that the company was secretly gathering military intelligence. Mobutu succumbed to Soviet pressure, ended the program, and cut ties with OTRAG.[90]

Foreign policy

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Relations with Belgium

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Relations between Zaire and Belgium wavered between close ties and open hostility during the Mobutu years. More often than not, Belgian decision-makers responded indifferently when Mobutu acted against the interests of Belgium, partly explained by the highly divided Belgian political class.[93] Relations soured early in Mobutu's rule over disputes involving the substantial Belgian commercial and industrial holdings in the country, but they warmed soon afterwards. Mobutu and his family were received as personal guests of the Belgian monarch in 1968, and a convention for scientific and technical cooperation was signed that same year. During King Baudouin's highly successful visit to Kinshasa in 1970, a treaty of friendship and cooperation between the two countries was signed. However, Mobutu tore up the treaty in 1974 in protest at Belgium's refusal to ban an anti-Mobutu book written by left-wing lawyer Jules Chomé.[94] Mobutu's "Zairianisation" policy, which expropriated foreign-held businesses and transferred their ownership to Zairians, added to the strain.[95] Mobutu maintained several personal contacts with prominent Belgians. Edmond Leburton, Belgian prime minister between 1973 and 1974, was someone greatly admired by the President.[96] Alfred Cahen, career diplomat and chef de cabinet of minister Henri Simonet, became a personal friend of Mobutu when he was a student at the Université Libre de Bruxelles.[97] Relations with King Baudouin were mostly cordial, until Mobutu released a bold statement about the Belgian royal family. Prime Minister Wilfried Martens recalled in his memoirs that the palace gates closed completely after Mobutu published a handwritten letter of the King.[98] Because of that, Mobutu was one of only two heads of state who did not receive an invitation to the funeral of Baudouin, the other being Saddam Hussein of Iraq. Next to friendly ties with Belgians residing in Belgium, Mobutu had a number of Belgian advisors at his disposal. Some of them, such as Hugues Leclercq and Colonel Willy Mallants, were interviewed in Thierry Michel's documentary Mobutu, King of Zaire.[citation needed]

Relations with France

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As then the second most populous French-speaking country in the world (it has subsequently come to have a larger population than France) and the most populous one in sub-Saharan Africa,[99] Zaire was of great strategic interest to France.[100] During the First Republic era, France tended to side with the conservative and federalist forces, as opposed to unitarists such as Lumumba.[99] Shortly after the Katangan secession was successfully crushed, Zaire (then called the Republic of the Congo) signed a treaty of technical and cultural cooperation with France. During the presidency of Charles de Gaulle, diplomatic relations between the two countries gradually grew stronger and closer due to their many shared geopolitical interests. In 1971, Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing paid a visit to Zaire; later, after becoming France's president, he would develop a close personal relationship with President Mobutu, and under his leadership, France became one of the Mobutu regime's closest and most important foreign allies.[101] During the Shaba invasions, France sided firmly with Mobutu: during the first Shaba invasion, France airlifted 1,500 Moroccan troops to Zaire, and the rebels were repulsed;[102] a year later, during the second Shaba invasion, France itself (along with Belgium) would send French Foreign Legion paratroopers (2nd Foreign Parachute Regiment) to aid Mobutu.[103][104][105]

Relations with the People's Republic of China

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Initially, Zaire's relationship with the People's Republic of China was no better than its relationship with the Soviet Union. Memories of Chinese aid to Mulele and other Maoist rebels in Kwilu province during the ill-fated Simba Rebellion remained fresh on Mobutu's mind. He also opposed seating the PRC at the United Nations. However, by 1972, he began to see the Chinese in a different light, as a counterbalance to both the Soviet Union as well as his intimate ties with the United States, Israel, and South Africa.[106][107] In November 1972, Mobutu extended diplomatic recognition to the Chinese (as well as East Germany and North Korea). The following year, Mobutu paid a visit to Beijing, where he met with chairman Mao Zedong and received promises of $100 million in technical aid.[108] In 1983, Chinese Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang announced on a trip to Zaire that the money would not have to be repaid.[109]

In 1974, Mobutu made a surprise visit to both China and North Korea, during the time he was originally scheduled to visit the Soviet Union. Upon returning home, both his politics and rhetoric became markedly more radical;[110] it was around this time that Mobutu began criticizing Belgium and the United States (the latter for not doing enough, in Mobutu's opinion, to combat white minority rule in South Africa and Rhodesia), introduced the "obligatory civic work" program called salongo, and initiated "radicalization" (an extension of 1973's "Zairianization" policy). Mobutu even borrowed a title – the Helmsman – from Mao. Incidentally, late 1974 to early 1975 was when his personality cult reached its peak.[111]

China and Zaire shared a common goal in central Africa, namely doing everything in their power to halt Soviet gains in the area. Accordingly, both Zaire and China covertly funneled aid to the National Liberation Front of Angola (and later, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) in order to prevent their former allies, the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola, who were supported and augmented by Cuban forces, from coming to power. The Cubans, who exercised considerable influence in Africa in support of leftist and anti-imperialist forces, were heavily sponsored by the Soviet Union during the period. In addition to inviting Holden Roberto, the leader of the National Liberation Front of Angola, and his guerrillas to Beijing for training, China provided weapons and money to the rebels. Zaire itself launched an ill-fated, pre-emptive invasion of Angola in a bid to install a pro-Kinshasa government, but was repulsed by Cuban troops. The expedition was a fiasco with far-reaching repercussions, most notably the Shaba I and Shaba II invasions, both of which China opposed. China sent military aid to Zaire during both invasions, and accused the Soviet Union and Cuba (who were alleged to have supported the Shaban rebels, although this was and remains speculation) of working to de-stabilize central Africa.[111]

Relations with the Soviet Union

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Mobutu's relationship with the Soviet Union was frosty and tense. A staunch anti-communist, he was not anxious to recognize the Soviets; the USSR had supported—though mostly in words—both Patrice Lumumba, Mobutu's democratically elected predecessor, and the Simba rebellion. However, to project a non-aligned image, he did renew ties in 1967; the first Soviet ambassador arrived and presented his credentials in 1968.[112] Mobutu did, however, join the United States in condemning the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia that year.[113] Mobutu viewed the Soviet presence as advantageous for two reasons: it allowed him to maintain an image of non-alignment, and it provided a convenient scapegoat for problems at home. For example, in 1970, he expelled four Soviet diplomats for carrying out "subversive activities", and in 1971, twenty Soviet officials were declared persona non grata for allegedly instigating student demonstrations at Lovanium University.[114]

Moscow was the only major world capital Mobutu never visited, although he did accept an invitation to do so in 1974. For reasons unknown, he cancelled the visit at the last minute, and toured the People's Republic of China and North Korea instead.[115]

Relations cooled further in 1975, when the two countries found themselves on opposing sides in the Angolan Civil War. This had a dramatic effect on Zairian foreign policy for the next decade; bereft of his claim to African leadership (Mobutu was one of the few leaders who refused to recognize the Marxist government of Angola), Mobutu turned increasingly to the US and its allies, adopting pro-American stances on such issues as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Israel's position in international organizations.[115]

Relations with the United States

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Mobutu Sese Seko and Richard Nixon in Washington, D.C., October 1973
Mobutu Sese Seko and U.S. President George H. W. Bush in Washington, D.C., 1989.

For the most part, Zaire enjoyed warm relations with the United States. The United States was the third largest donor of aid to Zaire (after Belgium and France), and Mobutu befriended several US presidents, including Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and George H. W. Bush. Relations did cool significantly in 1974–1975 over Mobutu's increasingly radical rhetoric (which included his scathing denunciations of American foreign policy),[116] and plummeted to an all-time low in the summer of 1975, when Mobutu accused the Central Intelligence Agency of plotting his overthrow and arrested eleven senior Zairian generals and several civilians, and condemned (in absentia) a former head of the Central Bank (Albert Ndele).[116] However, many people viewed these charges with skepticism; in fact, one of Mobutu's staunchest critics, Nzongola-Ntalaja, speculated that Mobutu invented the plot as an excuse to purge the military of talented officers who might otherwise pose a threat to his rule.[117] In spite of these hindrances, the chilly relationship quickly thawed when both countries found each other supporting the same side during the Angolan Civil War.[118]

Because of Mobutu's poor human rights record, the Carter Administration put some distance between itself and the Kinshasa government;[119] even so, Zaire received nearly half the foreign aid Carter allocated to sub-Saharan Africa.[120] During the first Shaba invasion, the United States played a relatively inconsequential role; its belated intervention consisted of little more than the delivery of non-lethal supplies. But during the second Shaba invasion, the US played a much more active and decisive role by providing transportation and logistical support to the French and Belgian paratroopers that were deployed to aid Mobutu against the rebels. Carter echoed Mobutu's (unsubstantiated) charges of Soviet and Cuban aid to the rebels, until it was apparent that no hard evidence existed to verify his claims.[121] In 1980, the US House of Representatives voted to terminate military aid to Zaire, but the US Senate reinstated the funds, in response to pressure from Carter and American business interests in Zaire.[122]

Mobutu enjoyed a very warm relationship with the Reagan Administration, through financial donations. During Reagan's presidency, Mobutu visited the White House three times, and criticism of Zaire's human rights record by the US was effectively muted. During a state visit by Mobutu in 1983, Reagan praised the Zairian strongman as "a voice of good sense and goodwill".[123]

Mobutu also had a cordial relationship with Reagan's successor, George H. W. Bush; he was the first African head of state to visit Bush at the White House.[124] Even so, Mobutu's relationship with the US radically changed shortly afterward with the end of the Cold War. With the end of the Soviet Union's status as a world superpower, there was no longer any reason to support Mobutu as a bulwark against communism. Accordingly, the US and other Western powers began pressuring Mobutu to democratize the regime. Regarding the change in US attitude to his regime, Mobutu bitterly remarked: "I am the latest victim of the cold war, no longer needed by the US. The lesson is that my support for American policy counts for nothing."[125] In 1993, Mobutu was denied a visa by the US State Department after he sought to visit Washington, D.C.

Mobutu also had friends in America outside Washington. Mobutu was befriended by televangelist Pat Robertson, who promised to try to get the State Department to lift its ban on the African leader.[126]

Coalition government

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Gui Polspoel with Frédéric François and Mobutu in Gbadolite, 1992

In May 1990, due to the ending of the Cold War and a change in the international political climate, as well as economic problems and domestic unrest, Mobutu agreed to give up the MPR's monopoly of power. In early May 1990, students studying at the Lubumbashi campus of the National University of Zaire protested against Mobutu's regime, demanding his resignation.[127] On the night of 11 May 1990, electricity was cut off to the campus while a special military unit called Les Hiboux ("The Owls") were sent in, armed with machetes and bayonets.[127] By the dawn of 12 May 1990, at least 290 students had been killed.[127] The massacre led to the nations of the European Economic Community (now the European Union), the United States, and Canada to end all non-humanitarian aid to Zaire, which marked the beginning of the end of Western support for Mobutu.[127]

Mobutu appointed a transitional government that would lead to promised elections but he retained substantial powers. Following the 1991 riots in Kinshasa by unpaid soldiers, Mobutu brought opposition figures into a coalition government, but still connived to retain control of the security services and important ministries. Factional divisions led to the creation of two governments in 1993, one pro- and one anti-Mobutu. The anti-Mobutu government was headed by Laurent Monsengwo and Étienne Tshisekedi of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS).[128]

The economic situation was still dismal, and in 1994 the two groups merged into the High Council of Republic – Parliament of Transition (HCR-PT). Mobutu appointed Kengo Wa Dondo, an advocate of austerity and free-market reforms, as prime minister. During this period, Mobutu was becoming increasingly physically frail and during one of his trips to Europe for medical treatment, ethnic Tutsis captured much of eastern Zaire.

Overthrow

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The seeds of Mobutu's downfall were sown in the Rwandan genocide, when about 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were massacred by about 200,000 Hutu extremists aided by the Rwandan government in 1994. The genocide ended when the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front seized the whole country, leading hundreds of thousands of Hutus, including many of the génocidaires, to flee into refugee camps in eastern Zaire. Mobutu welcomed the Hutu extremists as personal guests and allowed them to establish military and political bases in the eastern territories, from where they attacked and killed ethnic Tutsis across the border in Rwanda and in Zaire itself, ostensibly to prepare for a renewed offensive back into Rwanda. The new Rwandan government began sending military aid to the Zairian Tutsis in response. The resulting conflict began to destabilize eastern Zaire as a whole.[129]

When Mobutu's government issued an order in November 1996 forcing Tutsis to leave Zaire on penalty of death, the ethnic Tutsis in Zaire,[130] known as Banyamulenge, were the focal point of a rebellion. From eastern Zaire, the rebels, aided by foreign government forces under the leadership of President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Rwandan Minister of Defense Paul Kagame launched an offensive to overthrow Mobutu, joining forces with locals opposed to him under Laurent-Désiré Kabila as they marched west toward Kinshasa. Burundi and Angola also supported the growing rebellion, which mushroomed into the First Congo War.[citation needed]

Ailing with cancer, Mobutu was in Switzerland for treatment,[131] and he was unable to coordinate the resistance which crumbled in front of the march. The rebel forces would have completely overrun the country far sooner than it ultimately did if not for the country's decrepit infrastructure. In most areas, no paved roads existed; the only vehicle paths were irregularly used dirt roads.[132]

By mid-1997, Kabila's forces resumed their advance, and the remains of Mobutu's army offered almost no resistance. On 16 May 1997, failed peace talks were held in Pointe-Noire on board the South African Navy ship SAS Outeniqua with Kabila and President of South Africa Nelson Mandela acting as the chair of the talks. However the talks stalled as Kabila was reluctant to negotiate and deplete the momentum of his forces, potentially seeing it as giving Mobutu the advantage to regroup his forces. Kabila was also anxious about meeting Mobutu face to face on a personal basis, as the United Nations High Special Commission to the Great Lakes Region Spokesperson Timothy Montague Hamilton Douglas later stated: "In all the years I spent in contact with President Mobutu, this was the first time I ever saw him outshone in superstition...Although they sat together in the same room for hours, Kabila refused to look into the president's eyes during the meeting and instead stared at the ceiling; after some conferring with the Zairian and AFDL aides, I was able to discern that the prevailing rationale was that he [Kabila] was afraid that the "Old Leopard" still had enough magical power left to curse him with his stare and prevent him from reaching his prize, which he felt was now so close." Douglas went on to comment on the terse atmosphere at the talks: "It was very strange. It was the only time that the two rivals met; and after fighting him for 32 years and being catapulted to the national stage in only a few months, Kabila had remarkably little to say to his foe. As far as I remember, he said, hand over power, and step down without any conditions, Mobutu, insulted by this treatment as one would imagine, limped off the boat, refusing to strike a deal. I remember President Mandela, 78- years old himself at this time, had to prop him up as he walked to his car...It was really dreadful, on May 15th they were to meet again, Mobutu made the journey-Kabila hadn't bothered to attend."[133][failed verification] Kabila's forces, known as the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), proclaimed victory the next day. On 23 May 1997, Zaire was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo.[134]

Exile and death

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Mobutu went into temporary exile in Togo, until President Gnassingbé Eyadéma insisted that Mobutu leave the country a few days later.[135] From 23 May 1997, he lived mostly in Rabat, Morocco.[136] He died there on 7 September 1997 from prostate cancer at the age of 66.[137] He is interred in an above ground mausoleum at Rabat, in the Christian cemetery known as Cimetière Européen.[138][139]

In December 2007, the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of the Congo recommended returning his remains, and interring them in a mausoleum in the DRC, which has not yet taken place. Mobutu remains interred in Morocco.[140]

Family

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Mobutu was married twice in his lifetime. He married his first wife, Marie-Antoinette Gbiatibwa Gogbe Yetene, in 1955.[141] They had nine children. She died of heart failure on 22 October 1977 in Genolier, Switzerland, at the age of 36. On 1 May 1980, he married his mistress, Bobi Ladawa, on the eve of a visit by Pope John Paul II, thus legitimizing his relationship in the eyes of the Church. Two of his sons from his first marriage died during his lifetime, Nyiwa (d. 16 September 1994) and Konga (d. 1992). Three more died in the years following his death: Kongulu (d. 24 September 1998), Manda (d. 27 November 2004), and Ndokula (d. 4 November 2011).[83] His elder son from his second marriage, Nzanga Mobutu, now the head of the family, finished fourth in the 2006 presidential elections and later served in the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as Minister of State and Deputy Prime Minister of the day government. Another son of his, Giala, has also served in the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo as both a member of the National Assembly and the Senate. A daughter, Yakpwa (nicknamed Yaki), was briefly married to a Belgian, Pierre Janssen, who later wrote a book[142] that described Mobutu's lifestyle in vivid detail.

Altogether, Mobutu had sixteen children.[143]

With Marie-Antoinette (first wife): Nyiwa, Ngombo, Manda, Konga, Ngawali, Yango, Yakpwa, Kongulu, Ndagbia (9)

With Bobi Ladawa (second wife): Nzanga, Giala, Toku, Ndokula (4)

With Kosia Ngama (mistress and twin sister of his second wife): Yalitho, Tende, Ayessa (3)

In art and literature

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Mobutu was the subject of the three-part 1999 Belgian documentary Mobutu, King of Zaire by Thierry Michel. Mobutu was also featured in the 2000 feature film Lumumba, directed by Raoul Peck, which detailed the pre-coup and coup years from the perspective of Lumumba. Mobutu also featured in the 1996 American documentary When We Were Kings, which centred on the famed Rumble in the Jungle boxing bout between George Foreman and Muhammad Ali for the 1974 heavyweight championship of the world which took place in Kinshasa during Mobutu's rule. In the 1978 war adventure film The Wild Geese, the villain, General Ndofa, described in the film as an extremely corrupt leader of a copper-rich nation in central Africa, was a thinly disguised version of Mobutu.[144]

Mobutu also might be considered[original research?] as the inspiration behind some of the characters in the works of the poetry of Wole Soyinka, the novel A Bend in the River by V. S. Naipaul, and Anthills of the Savannah by Chinua Achebe. William Close, father of actress Glenn Close, was once a personal physician to Mobutu and wrote a book focusing on his service in Zaire. Barbara Kingsolver's 1998 historical novel The Poisonwood Bible depicts the events of the Congo Crisis from a fictional standpoint, featuring the role of Mobutu in the crisis. Mobutu was played by the Belgian actor Marc Zinga in the 2011 film Mister Bob. The French critic Isabelle Hanne praised Zinga's performance as Mobutu, writing he "brilliantly embodies this Shakespearian and bloodthirsty figure."[145]

Mobutu was included as an additional promotional card in the card-driven strategy game Twilight Struggle. His card, when played, increases the stability of the country then known as Zaire and increases the influence of the United States over the African nation.[146] The 2015 song "Françafrique" by Swedish hardcore punk band Refused (from the album Freedom) directly references Mobutu in its lyrics — the song contains the lines: "Mobutu, Congo; pimp and whore / As Paris' puppets guard the door".[147][148]

Legacy

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Mobutu's palace in his hometown of Gbadolite, ransacked after he was deposed and exiled. Photographed c. 2010

According to Mobutu's New York Times obituary: "He built his political longevity on three pillars: violence, cunning, and the use of state funds to buy off enemies. His systematic looting of the national treasury and major industries gave birth to the term 'kleptocracy' to describe a rule of official corruption that reputedly made him one of the world's wealthiest heads of state."[149]

In 2011, Time magazine described him as the "archetypal African dictator".[11]

Mobutu was infamous for amassing the equivalent of millions of US dollars from his country. According to the most conservative estimates, he stole US$50–125 million from his country, and some sources put the figure as high as US$150 million.[6] According to Pierre Janssen, the ex-husband of Mobutu's daughter Yaki, Mobutu had no concern for the cost of the expensive gifts he gave away to his cronies. Janssen married Yaki in a lavish ceremony that included three orchestras, a US$65,000 wedding cake, and a giant fireworks display. Yaki wore a US$70,000 wedding gown and US$3 million worth of jewels. Janssen wrote a book describing Mobutu's daily routine, which included several daily bottles of wine, retainers flown in from overseas, and lavish meals.[88]

According to Washington Post, Mobutu amassed between US$50–125 million from his country, ranking him as the third-most corrupt leader since 1984 and the most corrupt African leader during the same period.[6] Philip Gourevitch, in We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families (1998), wrote:

Mobutu had really staged a funeral for a generation of African leadership of which he—the Dinosaur, as he had long been known—was the paragon: the client dictator of Cold War neocolonialism, monomaniacal, perfectly corrupt, and absolutely ruinous to his nation.

Mobutu was instrumental in bringing the Rumble in the Jungle boxing match between Muhammad Ali and George Foreman to Zaire on 30 October 1974. According to the documentary When We Were Kings, promoter Don King promised each fighter five million dollars (U.S.) for the fight. To this end, King offered the bout to any African country that put up the money to host it, in exchange for recognition. Mobutu was willing to fund the ten million dollar purse and host the bout, in order to gain international recognition and legitimacy in the process. Mobutu gained Zaire and its people considerable publicity in the weeks even before the televised bout, as worldwide attention focused on his country. According to a quote in the film, Ali supposedly said: "Some countries go to war to get their names out there, and wars cost a lot more than ten million (dollars)." On 22 September 1974, Mobutu presented the rebuilt 20 May Stadium, a multi-million-dollar sports project constructed to host the Ali-Foreman boxing card, to the Zaire Ministry of Youth and Sport, and to the people of Zaire.[150]

Awards and honors

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National

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Foreign

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Explanatory notes

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See also

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References

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General and cited references

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Mobutu Sese Seko (born Joseph-Désiré Mobutu; 14 October 1930 – 7 September 1997) was a Congolese military officer and statesman who served as the second president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which he renamed Zaire in 1971, from 1965 until his ouster in 1997. As army chief of staff, Mobutu first intervened in national politics by dismissing Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba in 1960 amid post-independence instability, before staging a bloodless coup against President Joseph Kasa-Vubu in November 1965 to assume full control. He consolidated power by establishing the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR) as the sole legal political party in 1967, creating a one-party state that suppressed opposition and enforced loyalty through a cult of personality. Under his doctrine of Authenticity, Mobutu promoted African cultural revival by mandating the abandonment of Christian names, renaming cities and the country itself, and Africanizing the national identity to distance Zaire from its colonial past. While initially stabilizing the country as a Cold War ally against communism and fostering infrastructure projects, his regime devolved into kleptocracy, with Mobutu and his inner circle systematically looting state resources, amassing a personal fortune estimated at $3–5 billion amid widespread poverty and economic collapse. Facing rebellions and international isolation in the 1990s, Mobutu was deposed by Laurent-Désiré Kabila during the First Congo War, fleeing to Morocco where he died of prostate cancer.

Early Life and Rise

Childhood and Education

Joseph-Désiré Mobutu was born on October 14, 1930, in Lisala, Équateur Province, in the , to parents of the Ngbandi ethnic group. His mother, Marie Madeleine Yemo, worked as a hotel maid after fleeing to Lisala to escape the harem of a local village chief, while his father, Albéric Gbemani (also spelled Alberic Bemany), was a cook who either died young or abandoned the family shortly after his birth. Mobutu's early childhood involved some instability, as his mother relocated within the colony for work, placing him under the care of relatives at times. Mobutu received his initial primary education in the capital, Léopoldville (present-day ), through missionary-run schools typical of the limited colonial system available to Congolese children. His mother later sent him to live with an uncle in Coquilhatville (now ), where he attended the Christian Brothers School, a Catholic mission boarding institution for . There, Mobutu excelled in sports, leveraging his tall stature, but clashed with authority, leading to his dismissal for insubordination before completing his studies. This expulsion reflected his early rebellious tendencies, after which he falsified documents to enlist in the Belgian Congolese army, bypassing age restrictions.

Military and Journalistic Career


Mobutu enlisted in the Belgian colonial Force Publique in 1950 after completing secondary education, initially trained as a clerk and later serving as a stenographer in military offices. His seven-year term, which extended through 1956 due to disciplinary conscription following earlier scholastic expulsion, saw him rise to the rank of sergeant while stationed in locations including Luluabourg. During this period, Mobutu received training in journalism within the army and contributed articles to military periodicals, blending administrative duties with early writing on political topics.
Upon discharge in 1956, Mobutu pursued full-time, working as a correspondent for newspapers such as L'Avenir and editing the weekly Actualités Africaines, where he covered emerging Congolese nationalism and interviewed independence figures. His reporting gained prominence, culminating in 1958 when he represented media at the , facilitating contacts with évolués and political elites. These journalistic roles positioned him in Léopoldville's intellectual circles, including associations with Patrice Lumumba's Mouvement National Congolais. Following Congo's independence on June 30, 1960, and the subsequent army mutiny on July 5, President appointed Mobutu as a and of the Armée Nationale Congolaise on July 8, leveraging his military experience and perceived apolitical reliability amid Belgian withdrawals. In this role, Mobutu reorganized mutinous units, integrated former personnel, and suppressed indiscipline, establishing personal loyalty networks within the . His rapid ascent from to command reflected both colonial-era competence and opportunistic alignment during the Congo Crisis's onset.

Role in Independence and Congo Crisis

Following the Democratic Republic of the Congo's independence from on June 30, 1960, Prime Minister appointed Joseph Mobutu as of the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC), promoting him to amid the immediate post-independence army that began on July 5. The , driven by Congolese soldiers' grievances over Belgian officers' continued dominance and unequal treatment, escalated into widespread unrest, prompting Belgian intervention to protect expatriates and leading Lumumba's government to request assistance on July 12. Mobutu's role in stabilizing the ANC during this chaotic period positioned him as a key figure as political fractures deepened, including the of mineral-rich under on July 11. The escalating Congo Crisis intensified in September 1960 when President dismissed Lumumba on September 5, citing his mishandling of the crisis and overtures to Soviet aid; Lumumba countered by dismissing Kasa-Vubu, creating a constitutional deadlock. On September 14, Mobutu orchestrated a bloodless , declaring the "neutralization" of the central government, dissolving parliament, dismissing Lumumba's ministers, and expelling Soviet bloc advisors and diplomats to curb communist influence. He established a College of Commissioners—comprising university students and civil servants—to administer the country, effectively sidelining Lumumba, who was placed under and later transferred to military custody in October; Lumumba's execution by Katangese forces on January 17, 1961, occurred under circumstances involving Mobutu's troops, though direct orders remain disputed. This intervention aligned the ANC with Western interests, securing U.S. financial support—totaling millions for army salaries and operations—to bolster loyalty and counterbalance UN efforts focused on non-military stabilization. Throughout the crisis from 1960 to 1965, Mobutu directed ANC campaigns to suppress rebellions and reintegrate seceded provinces, including joint operations with UN forces that ended Katanga's independence in January 1963 after Tshombe's surrender. His forces played a decisive role in quelling the 1964 , a Lumumbist uprising in the east led by that captured and threatened the capital, with Mobutu coordinating Belgian rescues of hostages in November 1964 alongside U.S. logistical . These efforts, while restoring nominal central authority by late 1965, relied heavily on foreign backing and highlighted Mobutu's strategic pivot toward anti-communist alliances, as evidenced by his May 1963 visit to Washington to meet President Kennedy and secure military agreements. Despite criticisms of authoritarian tactics and abuses in suppressing dissent, Mobutu's military command prevented total fragmentation, though it entrenched his influence leading to full power seizure later that year.

Seizure of Power

By late 1965, the of the Congo's government had descended into paralysis, marked by repeated dismissals of prime ministers by President and persistent threats of civil war amid rebel insurgencies in the east. Following Kasavubu's controversial appointment of as prime minister in October after the ouster of , parliamentary gridlock intensified, with the rejecting Kimba's cabinet and no viable alternative emerging. On November 24, 1965, Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, the 35-year-old of the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC), seized power in a bloodless , leveraging his control over the military without significant resistance or violence. Mobutu announced the takeover via radio broadcast from (then Léopoldville), dismissing both Kasavubu and Kimba from office, suspending the constitution, and dissolving the and provincial assemblies. He declared his intention to rule temporarily for five years to restore order, combat corruption, and neutralize rebel threats, positioning the military as the arbiter of national salvation amid civilian governance failures. Kasavubu was placed under , while Kimba and other officials faced detention, though Mobutu avoided widespread purges initially to maintain stability. On November 30, the remnants of the convened and voted to transfer most legislative powers to Mobutu and his appointed council of commissioners, formalizing his executive authority. This coup, the second led by Mobutu since —the first being a brief 1960 intervention against —marked the onset of his three-decade authoritarian rule, enabled by the ANC's loyalty forged during the .

Domestic Rule and Policies

Consolidation and One-Party State

Following his bloodless coup on , 1965, Mobutu Sese Seko consolidated power by suspending the , dissolving the , and assuming legislative and executive authority, while nationalizing key media to control information flow. He then purged political rivals and eliminated existing parties, creating the (MPR) as the singular vanguard organization to unify the nation under his leadership. The 1967 constitution, promulgated on June 27, provided an initial framework for centralized rule, but it was through successive revisions—particularly in 1970 and culminating in the 1974 constitution—that the was fully institutionalized. These changes designated the MPR as the sole legal party and the foundational institution of the state, with all Zairians automatically enrolled as members by birth and constitutionally obligated to adhere to its principles. The 1974 constitution further entrenched this system by codifying "Mobutism"—Mobutu's ideology of national authenticity and —as the guiding doctrine, effectively merging the party with the state and vesting ultimate authority in the MPR's president, Mobutu himself. Opposition was systematically suppressed via an expanded apparatus, including the creation of the Gendarmerie Nationale in 1972 and other units like the Service National d'Intelligence et de Protection, which conducted arrests, , and intimidation against dissenters. This structure dismantled multiparty competition, fostering a monolithic that prioritized loyalty to Mobutu over political debate, though it achieved a degree of stability amid prior ethnic and regional fractures.

Authenticity Campaign and Zairianization

The Authenticity Campaign, or authenticité, was an ideological movement launched by Mobutu Sese Seko to promote a return to pre-colonial African traditions and reject Western cultural influences, originating with the N’Sele Manifesto in May 1967. This policy emphasized Bantu values, , and state control over society, serving as a tool to consolidate Mobutu's power by fostering a unified under his . Formally adopted as official state in late 1971 and reinforced at the congress in June 1972, it mandated the abandonment of Christian names through a new and the removal of colonial-era statues, such as those of and King Leopold II. A core component involved widespread renaming to erase colonial legacies: the became the Republic of Zaire in 1971, the was redesignated Zaire, and cities like Léopoldville were changed to , with further urban renamings accelerating from June 1966 onward. Mobutu himself adopted the name Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga in , symbolizing "the all-powerful warrior who, because of his endurance and inflexible will to win, goes from conquest to conquest leaving nothing in his wake," while promoting traditional attire like the suit and prohibiting practices such as skin bleaching or Western-style clothing in official settings. These measures aimed to instill cultural pride but were criticized as superficial distractions from mounting economic challenges, with opponents viewing them as reinforcing Mobutu's dictatorial control rather than genuine traditional revival. Zairianization, the economic arm of the Authenticity Campaign, sought to indigenize the by replacing foreign expatriates and nationalizing businesses, announced on November 30, 1973, during a speech to the . This expropriated over 2,000 foreign-owned enterprises, including retail, plantations, and , redistributing them to Zairian nationals—often Mobutu's political allies lacking managerial expertise—under the rationale of economic amid global events like the . Accompanied by a "" phase in 1974–1975 that extended seizures to larger industries like copper mining via the creation of state entities such as Gécamine, it initially boosted nationalist sentiment but rapidly deteriorated productivity due to mismanagement, corruption, and unqualified oversight. The combined policies contributed to Zaire's economic downturn, with nationalized sectors suffering output drops—copper production fell from 430,000 tons in 1970 to under 200,000 by 1975—and hyperinflation, prompting Mobutu to accept an structural adjustment program in 1976 that partially reversed Zairianization by reintroducing foreign management. While intended to empower locals and sever neocolonial ties, Zairianization entrenched kleptocratic networks, as assets were siphoned by regime insiders, exacerbating debt accumulation to nearly $3 billion by 1976 and underscoring the campaign's prioritization of political loyalty over economic viability. By the late , authenticity waned amid these failures, though it persisted symbolically until Mobutu's ouster in 1997.

Economic Policies and Nationalization

Upon seizing power in November 1965, Mobutu implemented economic reforms aimed at stabilizing the post-independence economy, including the of key sectors inherited from Belgian colonial control. In January 1967, the government the mining operations of , the dominant Belgian firm controlling and production in , which accounted for a significant portion of the country's revenue. This move, justified as reclaiming over resources vital to national development, replaced the company with the state-controlled Générale des Carrières et des Mines (), though it triggered disputes with and initial disruptions in production due to the abrupt transfer without sufficient local technical expertise. The 1967 reforms extended beyond mining to address broader imbalances, such as currency overvaluation and import dependency, by devaluing the , liberalizing trade, and promoting import substitution, though these were undermined by ongoing political and inadequate . was framed as essential for economic independence, yet it relied heavily on retained foreign technical assistance, revealing a gap between ideological goals and practical capacity, as Congolese managers often lacked the skills to operate complex extractive industries efficiently. A more radical phase began with the Zairianization of November 30, 1973, which expropriated over 2,000 foreign-owned enterprises—including retail, , and —transferring them to inexperienced Zairian nationals, often political loyalists, without compensation or rigorous selection criteria. This policy, extended by the in to further consolidate state control, aimed to eliminate foreign economic dominance and foster indigenous entrepreneurship but instead caused widespread mismanagement, as new owners frequently liquidated inventories for quick profits rather than sustaining operations, leading to a collapse in agricultural output by up to 60% and industrial production declines of 30-50% within months. The fallout from Zairianization exacerbated , supply shortages, and a economy, prompting partial retrocessions by 1975, where foreign firms were invited back under joint ventures to revive failing sectors, though in —favoring Mobutu's inner circle—entrenched kleptocratic practices that diverted revenues from productive investment. Empirical data from the period show GDP growth stagnating at under 1% annually by the late , with ballooning from $1.5 billion in 1970 to over $5 billion by 1980, attributable in large part to the inefficiencies of rushed without institutional safeguards or merit-based .

Infrastructure and Modernization Efforts

During Mobutu Sese Seko's rule, Zaire's infrastructure initiatives emphasized energy production to support the mining sector, drawing on export revenues amid the commodity boom. The hydroelectric complex on the represented the cornerstone of these efforts, with Inga I becoming operational in 1972 at an installed capacity of 351 megawatts, primarily to power urban centers and industry. II followed in 1982, adding 1,424 megawatts and enabling electricity exports to neighboring countries, though actual output often fell short due to technical and maintenance issues. These dams were financed through international loans and aimed to harness the 's potential for national , but their scale exceeded Zaire's managerial capacity, resulting in underutilization. Complementing the dams, the Inga-Shaba transmission line, stretching over 1,700 kilometers, linked the facilities to copper and cobalt mines in Shaba province (present-day Katanga). Completed in August 1981 after years of delays and costing hundreds of millions in foreign aid, the line was touted as the world's longest and most powerful at the time, boosting and exports critical to Zaire's . Urban modernization in included prestige constructions like the Palais du Peuple, for which occurred in with a $100 million interest-free loan from , intended as a multifunctional congressional and conference center symbolizing Zairian sovereignty. advanced via 13 satellite ground stations installed by a French firm in the 1970s, providing nationwide connectivity for and elite use. Transportation infrastructure received targeted investments, including railway rehabilitations supported by World Bank loans in the to enhance mineral haulage, though broader road networks suffered from chronic underfunding and decay. These projects, while delivering short-term gains in power output and urban symbolism, were undermined by systemic , with funds frequently diverted, leading to incomplete works and a national debt surpassing $5 billion by 1980. Empirical assessments indicate that despite initial GDP growth from mining-linked infrastructure, real stagnated as maintenance lagged, exemplifying overreliance on megaprojects without sustainable fiscal backing.

Foreign Policy and Geopolitics

Anti-Communist Stance and Western Support

Mobutu Sese Seko positioned as a frontline state against Soviet influence in following his 1965 seizure of power, emphasizing opposition to communist ideologies and insurgencies backed by and . His regime's alignment with Western interests during the secured substantial military and economic assistance, as the , , and viewed him as a reliable to leftist movements in the region. The provided direct covert funding through the CIA, estimated at nearly $150 million in bribes and secret payments to Mobutu and his inner circle between 1962 and 1991, alongside over $1 billion in official government aid to bolster his administration against internal and external threats. This support included logistical assistance during the Shaba invasions of 1977 and 1978, where U.S. airlifts facilitated Moroccan troop deployments, while French and Belgian paratroopers intervened to repel Cuban- and Angolan-supported rebels, framing the conflicts as part of broader anti-communist efforts. Belgium and France, as former colonial power and regional influencer respectively, contributed significantly to Zaire's defense and economy, with Belgium providing military training and France leading Operation Bonite in 1978 to secure against invaders. Western tolerance for Mobutu's stemmed from pragmatic geopolitical calculations, prioritizing of over democratic reforms, even as reports of corruption and issues mounted. Mobutu cultivated personal ties with U.S. presidents, including visits to in 1970 and meetings with and , reinforcing Zaire's status as a key ally until the Soviet Union's collapse diminished its strategic value.

Relations with Key Powers

Mobutu Sese Seko cultivated strong relations with the as a key anti-communist ally during the , receiving over $1 billion in economic and from 1965 to 1990 despite criticisms of his authoritarian rule and . U.S. presidents from to engaged directly with Mobutu, prioritizing Zaire's strategic position against Soviet and Cuban influence in over domestic governance issues. This support included CIA backing during Mobutu's 1960 neutralization of Soviet advisors and Lumumba's pro-communist government, as well as logistical aid during the 1977 and 1978 Shaba invasions by Angola-backed rebels. France emerged as another vital supporter, providing military intervention during the Shaba crises of March and May , when French paratroopers and Foreign Legion units, alongside Moroccan troops, repelled invaders linked to Cuban and Soviet proxies. President hosted Mobutu for state visits, including in , fostering economic ties and French investment in Zaire's mining sector, though relations strained in the amid Mobutu's declining power. French covert operations extended into to bolster Mobutu against advancing , reflecting Paris's interest in maintaining influence in Francophone Africa. Belgium, as the former colonial power, maintained pragmatic economic and diplomatic ties with Mobutu's regime, including a 1968 visit to where he secured discussions on international aid packages totaling millions in development assistance. Belgian firms retained significant stakes in Zaire's and industries, and King Baudouin hosted Mobutu in , underscoring mutual interests in stability despite periodic tensions over and corruption. Relations with the remained adversarial, rooted in Mobutu's 1960 expulsion of over 100 military advisors following Lumumba's overtures to , which Mobutu viewed as a direct threat to Zaire's sovereignty. Minimal diplomatic contact persisted only to project non-alignment, but Mobutu consistently condemned -backed insurgencies, such as those in Shaba, without normalizing ties. China's relationship evolved from hostility—due to Beijing's prior support for Congolese —to partnership after diplomatic normalization in November 1972, highlighted by Mobutu's February 1973 to where he met Chairman and secured infrastructure loans and technical aid. This alignment intensified anti-Soviet cooperation, with Chinese delegations visiting in 1978 amid the Shaba conflicts to affirm support for Mobutu against "hegemonist" influences.

Pan-African Role and Regional Interventions

Mobutu Sese Seko positioned as a key player in Pan-African diplomacy, aligning his regime's anti-communist orientation with broader continental efforts to counter Soviet and influence in . He participated in initiatives to unify African liberation movements under OAU auspices, reflecting a view that Zaire's stability contributed to regional solidarity against external threats. This approach, however, often served to bolster his personal rule, as Zairian prioritized alliances with Western powers and select African states opposed to Marxist regimes. In the Angolan Civil War, Mobutu actively intervened to support anti-MPLA factions, viewing the conflict as a frontline against encroaching on Zaire's borders. In 1975, he committed Zairian troops to a brief invasion aimed at bolstering the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), an effort that ultimately failed as Cuban forces reinforced the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola ([MPLA](/page/MPL A)), consolidating its control over . This "Angolan adventure" strained Zaire's military resources and exposed the limits of Mobutu's ambitions, damaging his standing among African peers who backed the [MPLA](/page/MPL A). Subsequently, Mobutu provided logistical and material aid to rebels led by , framing such support as essential to preventing 's Marxist government from destabilizing neighboring states. Mobutu's most direct regional engagements came in response to cross-border threats from Angolan-backed exiles. During in March 1977, approximately 3,000-4,000 Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC) rebels—Katangese exiles based in —invaded Zaire's Shaba Province (formerly Katanga), capturing the mining city of and advancing toward . Mobutu accused Angolan President , , and of orchestrating the assault to overthrow him, prompting urgent appeals for external aid; dispatched 1,500 troops, while provided and logistical support, enabling Zairian forces to repel the invaders by May. The incursion highlighted Zaire's dependence on foreign intervention, as Mobutu's army proved ineffective without it. Shaba II followed in May 1978, with another FLNC thrust of about 4,000 fighters into Shaba, again seizing and prompting massacres of European expatriates. Mobutu renewed calls for assistance, leading to direct French and Belgian paratrooper deployments—Operation Bonite and Zaire—which recaptured the city within days and forced the rebels' retreat. These defenses preserved Mobutu's regime and were portrayed as a collective African stand against proxy aggression, though they underscored ongoing tensions with and reliance on non-African allies. Over 2,000 rebels were reported killed or captured across the two crises, with suffering economic disruption from disrupted copper exports. Mobutu leveraged these events to reinforce his image as a bulwark against radicalism, securing renewed Western military aid while navigating OAU divisions over recognition of the government.

Governance Challenges and Repression

Cult of Personality and Political Control

Mobutu cultivated a pervasive , positioning himself as the messianic and an infallible guide whose leadership was essential for Zaire's unity and progress. In 1972, he adopted the elongated name Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga, translating roughly to "the all-powerful warrior who, through perseverance and will, advances from conquest to conquest, leaving fire behind," which encapsulated his self-image as an indomitable force. This persona was reinforced through symbols like the leopard-skin toque hat, adopted as a of authenticity, and mandatory attire inspired by Maoist uniforms but styled to evoke Zairian pride. State saturated public life with Mobutu's imagery, including mandatory portraits in homes, offices, and schools, alongside statues erected in major cities depicting him in heroic poses. The ideology of Mobutuism, formalized in the , elevated the (MPR)—founded by Mobutu in 1966 and declared the sole legal party in 1967—as the supreme arbiter of national life, fusing party structures with state institutions, the , and even youth organizations by 1970. Under this system, described as "the nation politically organized," Mobutu held titles such as "Supreme Combatant," "Great Helmsman," and "Decisive Choice of the Nation," with MPR membership required for public employment and political participation. Political control was maintained through a combination of institutional monopoly, patronage networks, and divide-and-rule tactics, including frequent government reshuffles—occurring 43 times between 1965 and 1990—to preempt alliances among elites and ensure personal loyalty. The regime's security apparatus, including the National Documentation Center (CENADOC), monitored dissent, while cycles of reward and punishment fostered complicity among officials, who were kept in perpetual uncertainty to prioritize allegiance to Mobutu over institutional stability. This totalitarian framework extended to cultural and media domains, where independent expression was subsumed under Mobutuist orthodoxy, effectively criminalizing opposition as betrayal of the nation's singular will.

Corruption, Kleptocracy, and Economic Mismanagement

Mobutu Sese Seko's regime epitomized , with the president and his entourage systematically diverting state revenues for personal enrichment. He amassed a personal fortune estimated at $4 billion to $15 billion, primarily through of public funds, including revenues and foreign . exacerbated this, as relatives and close associates controlled key parastatals and ministries, enabling widespread siphoning; for instance, a son-in-law embezzled $10 million from loan proceeds allocated for public projects. To sustain loyalty, Mobutu reshuffled cabinets 43 times between 1965 and 1990, fostering instability that masked embezzlements and eroded institutional capacity. Extravagant personal expenditures underscored the scale of plunder. The palace complex, constructed in the as Mobutu's opulent retreat, cost hundreds of millions of dollars to build and $150 million annually to maintain, drawing from national coffers amid widespread poverty. Mobutu owned European chateaus, a fleet of vehicles airlifted for his use, and even a jet for private travel, all financed by diverted state resources. By 1990, from reached $12 billion, much of it linked to elite extraction, leaving scant investment in domestic development. Economic mismanagement intertwined with propelled into crisis. External debt surged from roughly 5% of GDP in 1970 to 150% by 1997, totaling about $14 billion, as loans were misappropriated rather than applied to growth. ensued, with annual rates climbing to around 24,000% in 1993-1994, driven by monetary financing of deficits and loss of fiscal discipline. Currency devaluations rendered the hypervolatile, peaking at monthly exceeding 78% in the mid-1990s, while real GDP plummeted, reflecting and over . This decay contrasted sharply with Mobutu's offshore wealth, perpetuating a cycle where public assets fueled private opulence at the expense of national welfare.

Human Rights Abuses and Opposition Suppression

Mobutu's regime maintained control through a vast security apparatus, including the Division Spéciale Présidentielle (DSP) and other intelligence units, which systematically targeted perceived opponents with arbitrary arrests, torture, and extrajudicial executions. Following his 1965 coup, Mobutu established the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR) as the sole legal party in 1967, effectively banning all opposition and requiring public officials to swear loyalty oaths to him personally, under penalty of imprisonment or death. Political dissidents faced routine torture methods such as beatings, electric shocks, and submersion in water, often in facilities like the DSP's underground cells in Kinshasa, with reports documenting hundreds of such cases annually by the 1990s. Disappearances were commonplace, particularly during crackdowns on student protests and ethnic unrest; Amnesty International recorded thousands of political opponents subjected to enforced disappearances, rape, and summary killings amid the regime's efforts to quash challenges to its authority. In one documented instance, on April 1, 1978, 13 individuals convicted of plotting against Mobutu were publicly executed by firing squad in Kinshasa after a rapid trial, signaling the regime's intolerance for dissent. Opposition suppression intensified during economic crises and democratization pressures in the early 1990s, when security forces detained without trial figures from emerging parties like the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), holding many as prisoners of conscience in overcrowded prisons such as Makala in , where conditions included starvation and disease leading to deaths. The regime's response to the 1991-1993 transitional talks involved inciting ethnic violence and by soldiers to discredit opponents, resulting in extrajudicial killings of civilians and politicians alike, with granted to perpetrators under Mobutu's direct oversight. By 1995, Department assessments confirmed ongoing abuses, including of detainees and arbitrary executions, as core mechanisms for preserving Mobutu's one-man rule.

Decline, Fall, and Aftermath

Mounting Crises and Failed Reforms

By the late , Zaire's economy had deteriorated into a profound , marked by unsustainable exceeding $14 billion accumulated during Mobutu's , which diverted resources from development and fueled estimated at $12 billion by 1990. ravaged the country from 1990 to 1996, driven by fiscal mismanagement, political instability, and the regime's inability to control amid declining export revenues from and . This monetary collapse eroded , with annual rates peaking above 9,000% in 1994, exacerbating food shortages and urban unrest as state employees and soldiers went unpaid for months. Efforts at under (IMF) programs in the mid-1980s collapsed due to Zaire's non-compliance with fiscal austerity and demands; Mobutu's government broke with the IMF in October 1986 after failing to meet repayment obligations and implement cuts. By 1975, the country was already unable to service its debts, initiating a prolonged decline worsened by rebel incursions in 1977–1978 and falling commodity prices, with debt servicing consuming up to 30% of export earnings by 1976. These programs, intended to stabilize finances through and expenditure reductions, faltered as Mobutu prioritized networks over genuine reform, leading to repeated suspensions of aid and further isolation from creditors. In response to mounting domestic pressure and the post-Cold War shift reducing Western tolerance for authoritarian allies, Mobutu announced political reforms on April 24, 1990, pledging a national conference and multiparty democracy to address the crises. However, these initiatives failed as Mobutu maneuvered to undermine opposition through short-lived transitional governments and stalled negotiations, resulting in five years of political stalemate from 1991 onward that deepened economic paralysis. Economic redress attempts in the early , including renewed IMF talks, collapsed amid succession of ineffective cabinets unable to enforce reforms or curb , perpetuating and infrastructure decay. The regime's resistance to devolving power, coupled with elite of donor-driven changes, ensured that efforts served more as tactics for regime survival than pathways to recovery.

Overthrow and Transition

By the mid-1990s, Mobutu's regime had deteriorated amid hyperinflation, widespread corruption, and the disintegration of the Forces Armées Zaïroises (FAZ), which suffered from indiscipline, unpaid salaries, and mutinies. The erupted in October 1996 when the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire (AFDL), led by and backed by Rwandan and Ugandan forces seeking to dismantle militias in eastern , launched an insurgency from the provinces. The rebels advanced rapidly westward, capturing key cities like in late March 1997 after FAZ units collapsed or defected en masse, with minimal resistance due to the army's reliance on rather than organized defense. As AFDL forces approached Kinshasa in early May 1997, Mobutu, weakened by advanced prostate cancer and failed diplomatic efforts—including negotiations in South Africa—abandoned the capital on May 16 aboard a government plane. Kabila's troops entered the city unopposed on May 17, 1997, prompting jubilant crowds to loot Mobutu's properties and symbols of his rule, marking the effective end of his 32-year dictatorship. Kabila declared himself president on May 20, dissolved the Zairian parliament, and renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the Congo on May 29, 1997, initiating a transitional authority that promised multiparty democracy but quickly consolidated power under AFDL control. Mobutu initially sought refuge in Togo before settling in Morocco, where he received medical treatment but died on September 7, 1997, at age 66 from prostate cancer complications at the Mohamed V Military Hospital in Rabat. The transition period saw interim governance by Kabila, who retained foreign backers' influence while facing immediate challenges from ethnic tensions, economic collapse, and the unresolved refugee crisis, setting the stage for renewed conflict in the Second Congo War.

Exile, Death, and Family

Following the capture of by Laurent-Désiré Kabila's (AFDL) on May 17, 1997, Mobutu departed the capital aboard his private jet on May 16, initially heading to before settling in exile in , . His regime's collapse, amid advancing rebel forces backed by and , marked the end of his 32-year rule, with Mobutu having amassed an estimated personal fortune of $5 billion through state resource extraction, much of which remained inaccessible in exile due to frozen assets and legal claims. In , Mobutu resided under the protection of King Hassan II, who provided medical care and lodging, though his health had deteriorated significantly from advanced diagnosed years earlier; he underwent multiple treatments, including , but the disease had metastasized. Mobutu died on September 7, 1997, at the age of 66 in Rabat's Mohamed V Military Hospital after a prolonged battle with . His death, just four months into , precluded any formal or asset recovery efforts by the new Congolese government, though international banks later repatriated portions of his looted funds—estimated at $5-15 billion total—under pressure from transparency campaigns. He was buried in a private Muslim ceremony in Rabat's Christian cemetery on September 12, 1997, attended by a small family contingent and Moroccan officials, reflecting his converted faith and ties to the monarchy; no repatriation of remains to the has occurred. Mobutu had two official wives and fathered at least 17 children across multiple relationships, with reports varying up to 21 due to his polygamous practices common among Ngbandi elites. His first , Marie-Antoinette Mobutu (née Gbagbo), married in 1957, bore nine children before her death on May 22, 1977, from an apparent heart attack amid rumors of , though no conclusive evidence emerged; among their sons was Niwa (Jean-Paul) Mobutu, appointed a who died in a 1994 plane crash widely suspected as . After her death, Mobutu married Bobi Ladawa in dual civil and church ceremonies in 1980; she, mother to several children from prior relations with him, survived into but faced family infighting over inheritance, with limited public details on her fate post-1997. Additional children stemmed from mistresses, including twins Kosia and Bobi Ladawa, yielding like Ya-Litho and ; post-overthrow, many family members scattered, some seeking asylum in or , while others, such as son François Mobutu, died violently in the ensuing instability—François from a heart attack in 1998 amid . The family's dispersal highlighted the causal fallout of Mobutu's kleptocratic rule, as recovered assets were minimal and legal heirs contested Swiss and Belgian holdings into the 2000s.

Legacy and Assessments

Contributions to Stability and Anti-Communism

Mobutu Sese Seko assumed power through a bloodless coup on November 24, 1965, amid ongoing instability following the of the Congo's in 1960, which had seen secessionist movements in Katanga and Kasai, as well as rebellions in the east that culminated in the fall of Stanleyville to rebels on August 4, 1964. His regime centralized authority under the as the sole legal party from 1967, suppressing regional fragmentation and maintaining nominal national unity for over three decades despite periodic uprisings. This consolidation prevented the that had threatened the country during the , providing a degree of political continuity in a region prone to state failure. In the context of Cold War dynamics, Mobutu positioned as a frontline state against Soviet and Cuban influence in , earning substantial Western backing that bolstered his rule. The provided direct support, including approximately $150 million in CIA payments and aid between 1962 and 1991, viewing him as essential to countering communist expansion. President commended Mobutu in 1970 as "a leader of stability and vision," reflecting appreciation for his role in anchoring pro-Western orientations amid leftist insurgencies across the continent. This alignment facilitated 's use as a base for operations against communist-backed forces, including support for Angolan rebels opposing the Soviet- and Cuban-supported during the . Mobutu's military engagements further underscored his anti-communist posture, particularly in repelling invasions into Zaire's Shaba Province by Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC) exiles based in . In (March 1977), Zairian forces, aided by Moroccan troops and Western logistics, halted the advance that reached as far as , averting a potential collapse of the regime. in May 1978 saw French paratroopers and Belgian forces intervene to rescue expatriates and push back invaders, with Mobutu's appeals securing this multinational response against what he framed as a communist proxy threat from . These defenses preserved Zaire's , deterring further encroachments from Angola's government and reinforcing its status as a Western ally. Earlier, in 1975, Mobutu dispatched several battalions to to aid the FNLA and against the , aiming to forestall a Soviet-aligned victory in .

Criticisms of Authoritarianism and Exploitation

Mobutu's authoritarian governance, formalized through the 1970 constitutional amendments that enshrined the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR) as the nation's sole political institution, drew criticism for entrenching a monolithic power structure that precluded genuine multipartism and institutional checks. Under this framework, all citizens were compelled to affiliate with the MPR, and opposition activities were criminalized as threats to national unity, fostering a system where legislative and judicial functions served to rubber-stamp executive decrees rather than represent diverse interests. Detractors, including analysts of African autocracies, have argued that this setup, rationalized via Mobutism—a syncretic ideology blending nationalism with personal veneration—prioritized regime perpetuation over accountable rule, enabling arbitrary purges and elite co-optation while stifling civil society and intellectual dissent. The regime's exploitative dimension manifested in systemic , where Mobutu and his inner circle systematically diverted state revenues from Zaire's mineral wealth—primarily , , and —into private coffers, amassing an estimated personal fortune of $3 billion to $5 billion by the late 1980s through offshore accounts, luxury estates in , and control of parastatals like Gécamines. This plunder occurred against a backdrop of economic contraction, with falling from approximately $390 in 1965 to under $120 by , exceeding 9,000% annually in the early , and national debt surging to over $10 billion by , much of it serviced through resource exports that disproportionately benefited regime loyalists rather than public infrastructure or welfare. Economic historians have attributed this "Zairian malaise" to policies like the 1973 Zairianization, which redistributed foreign assets to unqualified cronies, followed by retrocession that entrenched networks, ultimately hollowing out and perpetuating dependency on raw sales vulnerable to global price fluctuations. Critics from and independent observers have highlighted how such exploitation not only eroded fiscal but also incentivized predatory , where public office became a for private accumulation, leaving Zaire's populace mired in subsistence amid untapped potential estimated at tens of billions in annual value. This pattern, documented in forensic audits post-overthrow, revealed on a scale equivalent to half of Zaire's cumulative GDP during Mobutu's tenure, underscoring a causal link between unchecked authoritarian control and amplification, where elite predation supplanted developmental investment. While some assessments acknowledge contextual factors like aid inflows that sustained the regime, the preponderance of evidence points to deliberate institutional sabotage as the primary driver of socioeconomic decay.

Cultural Depictions and Historiographical Debates

Mobutu Sese Seko has been depicted in documentaries that emphasize his authoritarian rule and personal excesses, such as the 1999 Belgian film Mobutu, King of Zaire directed by Thierry Michel, which draws on 140 hours of archival footage to trace his ascent from military officer to over three decades. The documentary portrays Mobutu as a figure of calculated indulgence, marked by assassinations, economic mismanagement, and alliances with Western powers amid Zaire's internal decay. A more recent 2025 Belgian series, Mobutu's Game, explores his exercise of power, Western geopolitical interests in , and the resulting crises through interviews and historical analysis. In literature, Michela Wrong's 2001 book In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in Mobutu's Congo offers a vivid portrayal of Mobutu's as one of extravagant tyranny, chronicling how the former journalist-turned-leader amassed wealth through corruption while descended into poverty and chaos. Wrong's account, based on eyewitness reporting from Mobutu's final years, depicts him as embodying the archetype of the African strongman who seduced international patrons but ultimately hollowed out state institutions. Such works often frame Mobutu's self-invented image—through state art, propaganda films, and symbols like the suit—as tools of a that suppressed dissent while promoting a fabricated national authenticity. Historiographical assessments of Mobutu remain polarized, with scholars debating whether his 32-year rule preserved national cohesion against ethnic fragmentation and communist threats or entrenched a predatory that devastated Congo's economy and society. Western-oriented analyses, such as those in Reuben Loffman's LSE review, highlight Mobutu's anti-communist stance and initial post-independence stabilization efforts as partial merits, crediting him with averting immediate in a resource-rich but tribal-divided state, though these came at the cost of systemic plunder estimated to have funneled billions into his personal fortune. Critics, including Afrocentric interpretations like Ikambana Peta's 1982 analysis, argue his totalitarian system—renaming the country and enforcing cultural "authenticity"—was a veneer for and foreign dependency, fostering long-term instability rather than genuine . Debates also center on Mobutu's authenticité policy, which mandated rejection of colonial names and European dress to assert African identity; proponents in Congolese view it as a decolonizing impulse that unified cultural narratives, while detractors contend it served authoritarian control by co-opting art and history for , sidelining genuine inquiry. Recent reflections, such as those in 2025 analyses of African governance, portray Mobutu's legacy as a cautionary model of how personalized rule can propagate and ethnic tensions, influencing post-Mobutu leaders, though empirical data on Zaire's GDP contraction from $10 billion in 1970 to under $5 billion by 1990 underscores the causal primacy of his mismanagement over external factors. These interpretations often reflect source biases, with academic works from left-leaning institutions amplifying exploitation narratives while downplaying Mobutu's role in containing Soviet influence during the .

References

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