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Thabo Mbeki
Thabo Mbeki
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Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki (Xhosa: [tʰaɓɔ ʼmbɛːki]; born 18 June 1942) is a South African politician and economist who served as the president of South Africa from 14 June 1999 to 24 September 2008, when he resigned at the request of his party, the African National Congress (ANC).[1] Before that, he was deputy president under Nelson Mandela from 1994 to 1999.[2]

Key Information

The son of Govan Mbeki, an ANC intellectual, Mbeki has been involved in ANC politics since 1956, when he joined the ANC Youth League, and has been a member of the party's National Executive Committee since 1975. Born in the Transkei, he left South Africa aged twenty to attend university in England, and spent almost three decades in exile abroad, until the ANC was unbanned in 1990. He rose through the organisation in its information and publicity section and as Oliver Tambo's protégé, but he was also an experienced diplomat, serving as the ANC's official representative in several of its African outposts. He was an early advocate for and leader of the diplomatic engagements which led to the negotiations to end apartheid. After South Africa's first democratic elections in 1994, he was appointed national deputy president. In subsequent years, it became apparent that he was Mandela's chosen successor, and he was elected unopposed as ANC president in 1997, enabling his rise to the presidency as the ANC's candidate in the 1999 elections.

While deputy president, Mbeki had been regarded as a steward of the government's Growth, Employment and Redistribution policy, introduced in 1996, and as president he continued to subscribe to relatively conservative, market-friendly macroeconomic policies. During his presidency, South Africa experienced falling public debt, a narrowing budget deficit, and consistent, moderate economic growth. However, despite his retention of various social democratic programmes, and notable expansions to the black economic empowerment programme, critics often regarded Mbeki's economic policies as neoliberal, with insufficient consideration for developmental and redistributive objectives. On these grounds, Mbeki grew increasingly alienated from the left wing of the ANC, and from the leaders of the ANC's Tripartite Alliance partners, the Congress of South African Trade Unions and South African Communist Party. It was these leftist elements which supported Jacob Zuma over Mbeki in the political rivalry that erupted after Mbeki removed the latter from his post as deputy president in 2005.

As president, Mbeki had an apparent predilection for foreign policy and particularly for multilateralism. His pan-Africanism and vision for an "African renaissance" are central parts of his political persona, and commentators suggest that he secured for South Africa a role in African and global politics that was disproportionate to the country's size and historical influence.[3][4] He was the central architect of the New Partnership for Africa's Development and, as the inaugural chairperson of the African Union, spearheaded the introduction of the African Peer Review Mechanism. After the IBSA Dialogue Forum was launched in 2003, his government collaborated with India and Brazil to lobby for reforms at the United Nations, advocating for a stronger role for developing countries. Among South Africa's various peacekeeping commitments during his presidency, Mbeki was the primary mediator in the conflict between ZANU-PF and the Zimbabwean opposition in the 2000s. However, he was frequently criticised for his policy of "quiet diplomacy" in Zimbabwe, under which he refused to condemn Robert Mugabe's regime or institute sanctions against it.

Also highly controversial worldwide was Mbeki's HIV/AIDS policy. His government did not introduce a national mother-to-child transmission prevention programme until 2002, when it was mandated by the Constitutional Court, nor did it make antiretroviral therapy available in the public healthcare system until late 2003. Subsequent studies have estimated that these delays caused hundreds of thousands of preventable deaths.[5][6][7] Mbeki himself, like his Health Minister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, has been described as an AIDS denialist, "dissident", or sceptic. Although he did not explicitly deny the causal link between HIV and AIDS, he often posited a need to investigate alternate causes of and alternative treatments for AIDS, frequently suggesting that immunodeficiency was the indirect result of poverty.

His political descent began at the ANC's Polokwane conference in December 2007, when he was replaced as ANC president by Zuma. Although his term as national president was not due to expire until June 2009, he announced on 20 September 2008 that he would resign at the request of the ANC National Executive Committee. The ANC's decision to "recall" Mbeki was understood to be linked to a High Court judgement, handed down earlier that month, in which judge Chris Nicholson had alleged improper political interference in the National Prosecuting Authority and specifically in the corruption charges against Zuma. Nicholson's judgement was overturned by the Supreme Court of Appeal in January 2009, by which time Mbeki had been replaced as president by Kgalema Motlanthe.

Early life and education

[edit]

1942–60: Eastern Cape

[edit]

Mbeki was born on 18 June 1942 in Mbewuleni, a small village in the former homeland of Transkei, now part of the Eastern Cape. The second of four siblings, he had one sister, Linda (born 1941, died 2003), and two brothers, Moeletsi (born 1945) and Jama (born 1948, died 1982).[8]: 54 [9][10] His parents were Epainette (died 2014), a trained teacher, and Govan (died 2001), a shopkeeper, teacher, journalist, and senior activist in the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). Both Epainette and Govan came from educated, Christian, land-owning families, and Govan's father was Sikelewu Mbeki, a colonially appointed headman.[8]: 4  The couple had met in Durban, where Epainette had become the second black woman to join the SACP (then still called the Communist Party of South Africa); however, while Mbeki was a child, his family was separated when Govan moved alone to Ladismith for a teaching job.[9] Mbeki has said that he was "born into the struggle", and recalls that his childhood home was decorated with portraits of Karl Marx and Mahatma Gandhi.[11][12] Govan named him after senior South African communist Thabo Mofutsanyana.[13]

Lovedale, where Mbeki attended high school, in the 1900s.

Mbeki began attending school in 1948, the same year that the National Party was elected with a mandate to legislate apartheid.[8]: 58–59  The Bantu Education Act was implemented towards the end of his school career, and in 1955 he arrived at the Lovedale Institute, an eminent mission school outside Alice, as part of the last class which would be permitted to follow the same curriculum as white students. At Lovedale, he was a year behind Chris Hani, his future colleague and rival in the ANC.[8]: 95  Mbeki joined the ANC Youth League at age fourteen[12] and in 1958 became the secretary of its Lovedale branch. Shortly afterwards, at the start of his final year of high school, he was identified as one of the leaders of a March 1959 boycott of classes, and was summarily expelled from Lovedale.[8]: 101–2  He nonetheless sat for matric examinations and obtained a second-class pass.[8]: 113 

1960–62: Johannesburg

[edit]

In June 1960, Mbeki moved to Johannesburg, where he lived in the home of ANC secretary general Duma Nokwe and where he intended to sit for A-level examinations. The ANC had recently been banned in the aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre, but Mbeki remained highly politically active, becoming national secretary of the African Students' Association, a new (and short-lived) youth movement envisaged as replacing the now illegal ANC Youth League. It was also during this period that Nokwe recruited Mbeki into the SACP.[8]: 129–48 

Thus the ANC instructed him to join the growing cohort of cadres who were leaving South Africa to evade police attention, receive training, and establish the overt ANC structures that were now illegal inside the country. Mbeki was detained twice by the police while attempting to leave the country, first in Rustenberg, when the group he was travelling with failed to pass themselves off as a touring football team, and then in Rhodesia.[8]: 169–70  He arrived at the ANC's new headquarters in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in November 1962, and left shortly afterwards for England.[8]: 174–75 

Exile and early career

[edit]
Govan Mbeki during the raid on Liliesleaf Farm, July 1963.

1962–69: England

[edit]

While at Sussex, Mbeki was involved in ANC work and in broader organising for the English Anti-Apartheid Movement. Months after his arrival, his father was arrested during a Security Branch raid at Liliesleaf Farm in July 1963. During the ensuing Rivonia Trial, Mbeki appeared before the United Nations (UN) Special Committee on Apartheid and later led a student march from Brighton to London, a distance of fifty miles.[8]: 202–12  At the conclusion of the trial, Govan and seven other ANC leaders, among them Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, were sentenced to life imprisonment.

Mbeki completed his bachelor's degree in economics in May 1965 but, at the exhortation of O. R. Tambo, enrolled for a Master's in economics and development instead of returning to Africa to join Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the ANC's armed wing. His Master's dissertation was in economic geography.[8]: 198, 223  In addition to this and his political organising, he developed a deep fondness for Yeats, Brecht, Shakespeare, and blues music.[8]: 195 After completing his Master's, in October 1966 he moved to London to work full-time for the propaganda section of the ANC's English headquarters.[8]: 251 He remained active in the SACP, which was very closely allied to the ANC, and in 1967 he was appointed to the editorial board of its official magazine, the African Communist.[8]: 221 

Throughout his time in England, Mbeki was the ward of O. R. Tambo and his wife Adelaide Tambo – in the absence of his parents, it was Adelaide and senior communist Michael Harmel who attended Mbeki's graduation ceremony in 1965.[8]: 218  O. R. Tambo later became the ANC's longest-serving president, and he acted as Mbeki's "political mentor and patron" until his death in 1993. Other friends Mbeki made in England, including Ronnie Kasrils and brothers Essop Pahad and Aziz Pahad, were also among his key political allies in his later career.[8]: 166, 181, 221–22 

1969–71: Soviet Union

[edit]

In February 1969, Mbeki was sent to Moscow in the Soviet Union to receive Marxist–Leninist political and ideological training – a fairly common practice, and even a rite of passage, among young people identified as belonging to the future generation of ANC and SACP political leaders. He was educated at the Lenin Institute, where, because of the secrecy required, he went by the alias "Jack Fortune".[8]: 266–71  He excelled at the institute and in June 1970 was appointed to the Central Committee of the SACP, alongside Chris Hani.[8]: 277  The last part of his training entailed military training, also a rite of passage, including in intelligence, guerrilla tactics, and weaponry. However, his biographer Mark Gevisser adduces that he was "not the ideal candidate for military life", and Max Sisulu, who trained alongside him, says that he always regarded Mbeki as better suited to political leadership than military leadership.[8]: 278–80 

1971–75: Lusaka

[edit]

In April 1971, having been pulled out from military training, Mbeki was sent to Lusaka, Zambia, where the ANC-in-exile had set up its new headquarters under acting president Tambo. He was to fill the post of administrative secretary to the ANC Revolutionary Council, a body newly established to coordinate the political and military efforts of the ANC and SACP.[8]: 289  He was later moved to the propaganda section, but continued to attend the council's meetings, and in 1975 he (again alongside Hani) was elected onto the ANC's top decision-making organ, the National Executive Committee.[8]: 296, 317  It was during this period that he began to ghostwrite some of Tambo's speeches and reports, and he accompanied Tambo on important occasions, such as to the infamous December 1972 meeting with Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the head of Inkatha, in London.[8]: 327, 415  In 1973, he helped to establish the ANC's office in Botswana, considered a "frontline" country because of its shared border with South Africa, where the ANC was attempting to re-establish its underground.[8]: 317  However, although he travelled frequently in subsequent years, the ANC's Lusaka headquarters remained his central base.

Mbeki's brother Moeletsi in Amsterdam in 1978, accepting an award on behalf of their father. The banner calls for Govan's release.

1975–76: Swaziland

[edit]

Between 1975 and 1976, Mbeki was instrumental in establishing the ANC's frontline base in Swaziland. He was first sent there to assess the political landscape in January 1975, under the cover of attending a UN conference. As part of this reconnaissance trip, he and his colleague Max Sisulu spent time with S'bu Ndebele, Max's sister Lindiwe Sisulu, and their associates in the Black Consciousness movement, which at the time was ascendent in neighbouring South Africa.[8]: 314–15  Mbeki made a positive report to the ANC executive, and he was sent back to Swaziland to begin establishing the base. In Swaziland, he lived at Stanley Mabizela's family home in Manzini. Working with Albert Dhlomo, Mbeki was responsible for helping to re-establish underground ANC networks in the South African provinces of Natal and Transvaal, which shared a border with Swaziland. His counterpart inside South Africa was MK operative Jacob Zuma, who ran the Natal underground. According to Gevisser, the pair developed "an unlikely rapport".[8]: 343–345  Mbeki was also responsible for recruiting new MK operatives, for liaising with South African student and labour activists, and for liaising with Inkatha, which was becoming dominant in Natal.[8]: 316–17, 343–45 

However, still another part of his duties was to act as the ANC's official representative in the country, and to maintain good diplomatic relations with the Swazi government. In March 1976, the government discovered that Mbeki was involved in military activity inside Swaziland, and he and Dhlomo – as well as Zuma, who was in the country illegally – were detained and then deported, though they managed to negotiate their deportation to the neutral territory of Mozambique rather than to South Africa.[8]: 341–43  Mbeki's management of the Swaziland base later became a point of contention between him and Mac Maharaj, with whom his relationship has remained acrimonious decades later. In 1978, Maharaj and Mbeki argued at a top-level strategic meeting in Luanda, Angola, when Maharaj, who had been tasked with running the political underground, claimed that Mbeki's records from the Swaziland office were in fact "just an empty folder".[8]: 348–49 

1976–78: Nigeria

[edit]

After being deported, Mbeki returned to Lusaka, where he was made Duma Nokwe's deputy in the ANC's Department of Information and Propaganda (DIP). In January 1977, he was posted to Lagos, Nigeria, where he was to be – as in Swaziland – the ANC's first representative to the country. Although there was some debate about whether the appointment was a signal that he had been sidelined, Gevisser says that Mbeki performed well in Lagos, establishing good relations with Olusegun Obasanjo's regime and establishing an ANC presence to eclipse that of its rival Pan Africanist Congress (PAC).[8]: 370–71, 384–85 

1978–80: Political secretary

[edit]

When he returned to Lusaka from Lagos in 1978, he was promoted again: he replaced Nokwe as head of DIP, and simultaneously was appointed Tambo's political secretary, an extremely influential position in which he became one of Tambo's closest advisors and confidantes. He also continued to ghostwrite for Tambo, now in a formal capacity.[8]: 385, 415  At DIP, his approach was encapsulated by the change he made to the department's name, replacing "propaganda" with "publicity". He eschewed the secrecy of earlier years and openly gave interviews and access to American journalists, to the disapproval of some hardline communists. According to various sources, he was responsible for reforming the public image of the ANC from that of a terrorist organisation to that of a "government-in-waiting".[8]: 394 [14]

When I look at Thabo, I look at my husband's son. Physically, they bear a striking resemblance... They are both perfectionists, but without the intolerance that comes from many who share that quality. They are loyal and true. They are their own harshest critics. They both have the gift to draw people to them... They were soul mates, different generations fusing at that particular time.

Adelaide Tambo reflects on Mbeki's relationship with O. R. Tambo, June 2002[8]: 222 

He established some of his own high-level intelligence networks, with key underground operatives reporting directly to him, and Gevisser claims that these led to the initiation of relationships with many of the domestic activists who later became his political allies. Moreover, he was responsible for innovating some of the vocabulary which became emblematic of the 1980s anti-apartheid struggle, which burgeoned in the aftermath of the 1976 Soweto uprising. Such phrases as "mass democratic movement", "people's power", and the exhortation to "make the country ungovernable" are attributed to Mbeki, and gained widespread popularity inside South Africa through Radio Freedom broadcasts written by DIP or by Mbeki personally.[8]: 414, 420  Zuma has said that it was Mbeki's "drafting skills" which enabled his ascendancy in the ANC and ultimately to the presidency.[8]: 415 

In 1980, Mbeki led the ANC's delegation to Zimbabwe, where the party hoped to establish relations with Robert Mugabe's newly elected government. This was a sensitive mission, because the ANC had historically been strongly allied to the Zimbabwe African People's Union, the arch rival of Mugabe's ZANU-PF. Working primarily through Mugabe's righthand man, future Zimbabwean president Emmerson Mnangagwa, Mbeki negotiated an extraordinarily congenial agreement between ZANU-PF and the ANC. The agreement allowed the ANC to open an office in Zimbabwe and to move MK weapons and cadres over Zimbabwean borders; moreover, it committed the Zimbabwean military to assisting the ANC, and the government to providing MK cadres with Zimbabwean identity documents.[8]: 434–36  However, Mbeki handed the running of the Salisbury office over to another ANC official, and the deal later collapsed.

1980s: Negotiations

[edit]

In 1985, PW Botha declared a State of Emergency and gave the army and police special powers. In 1986, the South African Army sent a captain in the South African Defence Force (SADF) to kill Mbeki. The plan was to put a bomb in his house in Lusaka, but the assassin was arrested by the Zambian police before he could go through with the plan.[15] Also in 1985, Mbeki became the ANC's director of the Department of Information and Publicity and coordinated diplomatic campaigns to involve more white South Africans in anti-apartheid activities. In 1989, he rose in the ranks to head the ANC's Department of International Affairs and was involved in the ANC's negotiations with the South African government. Mbeki played a major role in turning the international media against apartheid. Raising the diplomatic profile of the ANC, Mbeki acted as a point of contact for foreign governments and international organisations and he was extremely successful in this position. Mbeki also played the role of ambassador to the steady flow of delegates from the elite sectors of white South Africa. These included academics, clerics, business people and representatives of liberal white groups who travelled to Lusaka to assess the ANC's views on a democratic, free South Africa.

Mbeki was seen as pragmatic, eloquent, rational, and urbane. He was known for his diplomatic style and sophistication. In the early 1980s, Mbeki, Jacob Zuma and Aziz Pahad were appointed by Tambo to conduct private talks with representatives of the National Party government. Twelve meetings between the parties took place between November 1987 and May 1990, most of them held at Mells Park House, a country house near Bath in Somerset, England. By September 1989, the team secretly met with Maritz Spaarwater and Mike Louw in a hotel in Switzerland. Known as "Operation Flair", PW Botha was kept informed of all the meetings. At the same time, Mandela and Kobie Coetzee, the Minister of Justice, were also holding secret talks. When Mbeki finally was able to return home to South Africa and was reunited with his own father, the elder Mbeki told a reporter, "You must remember that Thabo Mbeki is no longer my son. He is my comrade!" A news article pointed out that this was an expression of pride, explaining, "For Govan Mbeki, a son was a mere biological appendage; to be called a comrade, on the other hand, was the highest honour."[16]

In the late 1970s, Mbeki made a number of trips to the United States in search of support among US corporations. Literate and funny, he made a wide circle of friends in New York City. Mbeki was appointed head of the ANC's information department in 1984 and then became head of the international department in 1989, reporting directly to Oliver Tambo, then President of the ANC. Tambo was Mbeki's long-time mentor. In 1985, Mbeki was a member of a delegation that began meeting secretly with representatives of the South African business community, and in 1989, he led the ANC delegation that conducted secret talks with the South African government. These talks led to the unbanning of the ANC and the release of political prisoners. He also participated in many of the other important negotiations between the ANC and the government that eventually led to the democratisation of South Africa.[17] As a sign of goodwill, de Klerk set free a few of the ANC's top leadership at the end of 1989, among them Govan Mbeki.

Rise to the presidency

[edit]

On 2 February 1990, Botha's successor as state president, F. W. de Klerk, announced that the ANC and other political organisations would be unbanned, and ANC exiles began to return to South Africa. At the same time that it was to negotiate the end of apartheid, the ANC had to implement a significant internal reorganisation, absorbing into its official exile bodies the domestic ANC underground, released political prisoners, and other activists from the trade unions and the United Democratic Front. It also had an ageing leadership, meaning that a new generation of leaders had to be prepared for succession.[18]

1993: ANC chairperson

[edit]

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Mbeki's key role in the early negotiations made him a likely contender for top leadership positions in the party, and he was even considered to be in line for the ANC presidency.[18] However, at the ANC's 48th National Conference in July 1991, its first national elective conference since 1960, Mbeki was not elected to any of the "Top Six" leadership positions. Sisulu was elected ANC deputy president, almost certainly as a compromise candidate, and trade unionist Cyril Ramaphosa was elected secretary general.[19] According to historian Tom Lodge, Ramaphosa's election was a putsch carried out by the party's "internal wing", in defiance of the former exiles and political prisoners who had hitherto dominated the ANC's leadership.[18] Over the next three years, Ramaphosa also came to eclipse Mbeki as the party's central negotiator when he, not Mbeki, was appointed to lead the ANC's delegation to the CODESA talks. Once SACP leader Chris Hani was assassinated in April 1993, Ramaphosa became Mbeki's primary competition in the ANC succession battle.[18] When Tambo died later the same month, Mbeki succeeded him as ANC national chairperson.[19]

1994: Deputy president

[edit]

Well, I don't imagine that there's any such requirement. I mean, he's got very big feet. The shoes will be too big. What does that mean? Does it mean we start off by going to jail for 27 years and then sort of graduate from there, grow taller, wear strange shirts? It's not a rational expectation.

— Mbeki in 1997, on filling Mandela's shoes[20]

Following the 1994 elections, South Africa's first under universal suffrage, Mbeki became one of the two national deputy presidents in the ANC-led Government of National Unity, in which Mandela was president. At the ANC's next national conference, held in December that year, Mbeki was elected unopposed to the ANC deputy presidency, also under Mandela.[21] In June 1996, the National Party withdrew from the Government of National Unity and, with the second deputy, de Klerk, having thereby resigned, Mbeki became the sole deputy president.[22]

The same year, as deputy president, Mbeki acted as a peace broker in what was then known as Zaire, following the First Congo War and the deposition of Zairean president Mobutu Sese Seko.[23] Mbeki also took on increasing domestic responsibilities, including executive powers delegated to him by Mandela, to such an extent that Mandela called him "a de facto president".[24][25] Mandela had made it clear publicly since early 1995 or earlier that he intended to retire after one term in office, and by then Mbeki was already seen as his most likely successor.[26]

1997: ANC president

[edit]

In December 1997, the ANC's 50th National Conference elected Mbeki unopposed to succeed Mandela as ANC president. On some accounts, the election was not contested because the top leadership had prepared assiduously for the conference, lobbying and negotiating on Mbeki's behalf in the interest of unity and continuity.[27][28][20][29] Pursuant to the 1999 national elections, which the ANC won by a significant majority, Mbeki was elected president of South Africa. He was re-elected for a second term in 2002.

Presidency of South Africa

[edit]

Ours is a capitalist society. It is therefore inevitable that, in part – and I repeat, in part – we must address this goal of deracialisation within the context of the property relations characteristic [of] a capitalist economy.

— Mbeki in 1999[30]

Economic policy

[edit]

Mbeki had been highly involved in economic policy as deputy president, especially in spearheading the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme, which was introduced in 1996 and remained a cornerstone of Mbeki's administration after 1999.[31][32][33] In comparison to the Reconstruction and Development Programme policy which had been the basis of the ANC's platform in 1994, GEAR placed less emphasis on developmental and redistributive imperatives, and subscribed to elements of the liberalisation, deregulation, and privatisation at the centre of Washington Consensus-style reforms.[33] It was therefore viewed by some as a "policy reversal" and embrace of neoliberalism, and thus as an abandonment of the ANC's socialist principles.[31][32][33] Mbeki also emphasised communication between government, business, and labour, establishing four working groups – for big business, black business, trade unions, and commercial agriculture – under which ministers, senior officials, and Mbeki himself met regularly with business and union leaders to build trust and explore solutions to structural economic problems.[34]

Mbeki speaks to District Six land claimants in Cape Town, 2001.

Conservative groups such as the Cato Institute commended Mbeki's macroeconomic policies, which reduced the budget deficit and public debt and which according to them likely played a role in increasing economic growth.[35][36][30] According to the Free Market Foundation, during the Mbeki presidency, average annualised quarter-on-quarter GDP growth was 4.2%, and average annual inflation was 5.7%.[36] On the other hand, the shift alienated leftists, including inside in the ANC and its Tripartite Alliance.[33] Zwelinzima Vavi of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) was an outspoken critic of Mbeki's "market-friendly" economic policies, claiming that Mbeki's "flirtation" with neoliberalism had been "absolutely disastrous" for development, and especially for the labour-intensive development required to address South Africa's high unemployment rate.[37] The discord between Mbeki and the left was on public display by December 2002, when Mbeki attacked what he called divisive "ultra-leftists" in a speech to the ANC's 51st National Conference.[38][39]

However, Mbeki clearly never subscribed to undiluted neoliberalism. He retained various social democratic programmes and principles, and generally endorsed a mixed economy in South Africa.[32] One of the ANC's slogans in the campaign for his 2004 re-election was, "A people's contract for growth and development."[34] He popularised the concept of a dual or two-track economy in South Africa, with severe underdevelopment in one segment of the population, and, for example in a 2003 newsletter, argued that high growth alone would only benefit the developed segment, without significant trickle-down benefits for the rest of the population.[34][40] Yet, somewhat paradoxically, he explicitly advocated state support for the creation of a black capitalist class in South Africa.[30] The government's black economic empowerment policy, which was expanded and consolidated under his administration, was criticised precisely for benefitting only a small black elite and thereby failing to address inequality.[33]

Foreign policy

[edit]
Mbeki with American President George W. Bush at the White House, June 2001.
Mbeki with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in June 2003.

According to academic and diplomat Gerrit Olivier, during his presidency Mbeki "succeeded in placing Africa high on the global agenda."[4] He was known for his pan-Africanism, having emphasised related themes both in his famous "I am an African" speech in 1996 and in his first speech to Parliament as president in June 1999, when he foregrounded his trademark ideal of an "African renaissance".[41][42] He advocated for greater solidarity among African countries and, in place of reliance on Western intervention and aid, for greater self-sufficiency for the African continent. Simultaneously, however, he argued for increased developmental aid to Africa.[4] He called for Western leaders to address global apartheid and unequal development, most memorably in a speech to the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in August 2002.[43][44]

Africa

[edit]

Although Mbeki also forged strategic individual relationships with key African leaders, especially the heads of state of Nigeria, Algeria, Mozambique, and Tanzania,[3] perhaps his central foreign policy instrument was multilateral cooperation. Mbeki's government, and Mbeki personally, are frequently cited as the single most significant driving force behind the creation in 2001 of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which aims to develop a framework for accelerating economic development and cooperation in Africa.[33][4][3][45] Olivier calls Mbeki the "seminal thinker" behind NEPAD and its "principal author and articulator".[4] According to academic Chris Landsberg, NEPAD's central principle – "African leaders holding one another accountable in exchange for the recommitment of the industrialised world to Africa's development" – epitomised Mbeki's strategy in Africa.[3] Mbeki was also involved in the dissolution of the Organisation of African Unity and its replacement by the African Union (AU), of which he became the inaugural chairperson in 2002,[46] and his government spearheaded the introduction of the AU's African Peer Review Mechanism in 2003.[4][3][47] He was twice chairperson of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), first from 1999 to 2000 and second, briefly, in 2008.[48] Through these multilateral organisations and by contributing forces to various United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions, Mbeki and his government were involved in peacekeeping initiatives in African countries including Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Burundi.[23]

Global South

[edit]

Outside Africa, Mbeki was the chairperson of the Non-Aligned Movement between 1999 and 2003 and the chairperson of the Group of 77 + China in 2006.[4][49] He also pursued South-South solidarity in a coalition with India and Brazil under the IBSA Dialogue Forum, which was launched in June 2003 and held its first summit in September 2006.[50] The IBSA countries together pressed for changes in the agricultural subsidy regimes of developed countries at the 2003 World Trade Organisation conference, and also pressed for reforms at the UN which would allow developing countries a stronger role.[50][51] Indeed, Mbeki had called for reform at the UN as early as 1999 and 2000.[52][53]

Mbeki with Brazilian President Lula da Silva and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the second IBSA summit in Pretoria, October 2007.

In 2007, following a prolonged diplomatic campaign,[45] South Africa secured a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council for a two-year term.[54] Controversially, in February 2007, South Africa followed Russia and China in voting against a draft resolution calling for an end to political detentions and military attacks against ethnic minorities in Myanmar.[54][55] Mbeki later told the media that the resolution exceeded the Security Council's mandate, and that its tabling had been illegal in terms of international law.[56]

Quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe

[edit]

Mbeki's presidency coincided with an escalating political and economic crisis in South Africa's neighbour, Zimbabwe, under president Mugabe of ZANU-PF. Problems included land invasions under the "fast-track" land reform programme, political violence and state-sponsored human rights violations, and hyperinflation.[57] With SADC's endorsement, Mbeki frequently acted as a mediator between ZANU-PF and the Zimbabwean opposition. However, controversially, his policy towards the Mugabe regime was one of non-confrontational "quiet diplomacy" and "constructive engagement": he refused to condemn Mugabe and instead attempted to persuade him to accept gradual political reforms.[58][57] He was firmly opposed to forcible or manufactured regime change in Zimbabwe, and also opposed the use of sanctions.[59][60][61] The Economist posited an "Mbeki doctrine" holding that South Africa "cannot impose its will on others, but it can help to deal with instability in African countries by offering its resources and its leadership to bring rival groups together, and to keep things calm until an election is safely held."[62] Mbeki said in 2004:

...the critical role we should play is to assist the Zimbabweans to find each other, really to agree among themselves about the political, economic, social, other solutions that their country needs. We could have stepped aside from that task and then shouted, and that would be the end of our contribution... They would shout back at us and that would be the end of the story. I'm actually the only head of government that I know anywhere in the world who has actually gone to Zimbabwe and spoken publicly very critically of the things that they are doing.[63]

The motives behind Mbeki's Zimbabwe policy have been interpreted in various ways: for example, some suggest that he was attempting to maintain economic stability in Zimbabwe and therefore to protect South African economic interests, while others cite his attachment to ideals of African solidarity and opposition to what he perceived as quasi-imperial Western interference in Africa.[57][58][64][65][66] In any case, Mbeki's policy on Zimbabwe attracted widespread criticism both domestically and internationally.[67][68][69][70] Some also questioned Mbeki's neutrality in his role as mediator.[71] After a South African observer mission endorsed the result of the Zimbabwean presidential election of 2002, in which Mugabe was re-elected,[72][73] Zimbabwean opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai accused Mbeki of being a "dishonest broker" and his government of becoming "part of the Zimbabwe problem because its actions are worsening the crisis."[58] Commentators later said that Mbeki's soft stance on Mugabe during this period permanently damaged relations between South Africa and the Zimbabwean opposition.[64][74] A South African government observer mission also endorsed the result of the Zimbabwean parliamentary elections of 2005, apparently leading Tsvangirai's party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), to effectively sever relations with Mbeki's administration.[75]

Mbeki with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Cape Town, September 2006.

Power-sharing negotiations

[edit]

Following another contested election in Zimbabwe – after which Mbeki controversially denied that there was a "crisis" in Zimbabwe[76] – the MDC and ZANU-PF entered into negotiations towards the formation of a power-sharing government, with talks beginning in July 2008.[77] Mbeki mediated the negotiations and brokered the resulting power-sharing agreement, signed on 15 September 2008, which retained Mugabe as president but diluted his executive power across posts to be held by opposition leaders.[78]

HIV/AIDS

[edit]

Policy and treatment

[edit]

According to political scientist Jeffrey Herbst, Mbeki's HIV/AIDS policies were "bizarre at best, severely negligent at worst."[30] In 2000, amid a burgeoning HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa, Mbeki's government launched the HIV/AIDS/STD Strategic Plan for South Africa, 2000–2005, a "multi-sectoral" plan which was criticised by HIV/AIDS activists for lacking concrete timeframes and failing to commit to antiretroviral treatment programmes.[79] Indeed, according to economist Nicoli Nattrass, resistance to the roll-out of antiretroviral drugs for prevention and treatment became central to the HIV/AIDS policy of Mbeki's government in subsequent years.[6] A national mother-to-child transmission prevention programme was not introduced until 2002, when it was mandated by the Constitutional Court in response to a successful legal challenge by the Treatment Action Campaign.[80] Similarly, chronic highly active antiretroviral therapy for AIDS-sick people was not introduced in the public healthcare system until late 2003, reportedly at the insistence of some members of Mbeki's cabinet.[6] According to Nattrass, better access to antiretroviral drugs in South Africa could have prevented about 171,000 HIV infections and 343,000 deaths between 1999 and 2007.[6] In November 2008, a Harvard University study estimated that more than 330,000 people died between 2000 and 2005 due to insufficient antiretroviral programmes under Mbeki's government.[7]

Even after these programmes were introduced, Mbeki's appointee as Minister of Health, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, continued to advocate publicly for unproven alternative treatments in place of antiretrovirals, leading to continual calls by civil society for her dismissal.[6] In late 2006, the cabinet transferred responsibility for AIDS policy from Tshabalala-Msimang to Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, who subsequently spearheaded a new draft National Strategic Plan on HIV/AIDS.[6][81]

Association with denialism

[edit]
Protest poster at the XIII International AIDS Conference in Durban, July 2000.

While president, Mbeki was also criticised for his public messaging on HIV/AIDS. He was viewed as sympathetic to or influenced by the views of a small minority of scientists who challenged the scientific consensus that HIV caused AIDS and that antiretroviral drugs were the most effective means of treatment.[82][83] In an April 2000 letter to UN secretary-general Kofi Annan and the heads of state of the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and France, Mbeki pointed to differences in how the AIDS epidemic had manifested in Africa and in the West, and committed to "the search for specific and targeted responses to the specifically African incidence of HIV-AIDS."[84] He also defended scientists who had challenged the scientific consensus on AIDS:

Not long ago, in our own country, people were killed, tortured, imprisoned and prohibited from being quoted in private and in public because the established authority believed that their views were dangerous and discredited. We are now being asked to do precisely the same thing that the racist apartheid tyranny we opposed did, because, it is said, there exists a scientific view that is supported by the majority, against which dissent is prohibited... People who otherwise would fight very hard to defend the critically important rights of freedom of thought and speech occupy, with regard to the HIV-AIDS issue, the frontline in the campaign of intellectual intimidation and terrorism...[84]

The letter was leaked to The Washington Post and caused controversy.[85] During the same period, Mbeki convened a panel to investigate the cause of AIDS, staffed by researchers who believed that AIDS was caused by malnutrition and parasites as well as by orthodox researchers.[86] In July 2000, opening the 13th International AIDS Conference in Durban, he proposed that the "disturbing phenomenon of the collapse of immune systems among millions of our people" was the result of various factors, especially poverty, and that "we could not blame everything on a single virus."[87] It was characteristic of Mbeki's stance on HIV/AIDS to draw attention to socioeconomic differences between the West and Africa, emphasising the importance of poverty in poor health outcomes in Africa, and to insist that African countries should not be asked blindly to accept Western scientific theories and policy models. Commentators speculate that his stance was motivated by suspicion of the West and was a response to what he perceived as racist stereotypes of the continent and its people.[88][89][90] For example, in October 2001, in a speech at the University of Fort Hare, he said of the West: "Convinced that we are but natural-born, promiscuous carriers of germs, unique in the world, they proclaim that our continent is doomed to an inevitable mortal end because of our unconquerable devotion to the sin of lust."[91]

Mbeki announced in October 2000 that he would withdraw from the public debate on HIV/AIDS science,[79][89] and in 2002 his cabinet staunchly affirmed that HIV causes AIDS.[92] However, critics claimed that he continued to influence – and impede – HIV/AIDS policy, a charge which Mbeki denied.[93] AIDS activist Zackie Achmat said in 2002 that "Mbeki epitomizes leadership in denial and his stand has fuelled government inaction."[89] Gevisser writes that in 2007 Mbeki continued to defend his position on HIV/AIDS, and directed Gevisser to a controversial and anonymous ANC discussion document titled Castro Hlongwane, Caravans, Cats, Geese, Foot & Mouth and Statistics: HIV/Aids and the Struggle for the Humanisation of the African.[94][95] The Gevisser biography also says that, while Mbeki never explicitly denied the link between HIV and AIDS, he is a "profound sceptic"[94] – as Mbeki himself wrote in 2016, in a newsletter cautioning "great care and caution" in the use of antiretrovirals, he had not denied that HIV caused AIDS but that "a virus [could] cause a syndrome."[96] He is generally referred to as an HIV/AIDS "dissident" rather than an outright denialist, although Nattrass questions the value of that distinction.[97]

FIFA World Cup bid

[edit]

As president, Mbeki spearheaded South Africa's successful bid to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Commentators, and Mbeki himself, frequently linked the bid to his vision for an African renaissance.[98][99][100] In 2015, amid an American investigation into corruption at FIFA, soccer administrator Chuck Blazer testified that, between 2004 and 2011, he and other FIFA executives had received bribes in connection with South Africa's bid.[101] Mbeki denied any knowledge of the bribes.[102][103]

Mbeki with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev at the 34th G8 summit, July 2008.

Electricity crisis

[edit]

In late 2007, Mbeki's government announced that the public power utility, Eskom, would introduce electricity rationing or rolling blackouts, commonly known in South Africa as loadshedding.[104] In subsequent months, Mbeki publicly apologised, acknowledging that the government had failed to heed Eskom's warnings, offered regularly for several consecutive years, that infrastructure investments were required to avoid energy shortages – in his words, "Eskom was right and government was wrong."[105] However, some analysts suggested that insufficient investment was not the hindrance to electricity supply, and that other policy decisions by government and at Eskom, including the implementation of black economic empowerment criteria in coal procurement contracts, had contributed to the crisis.[106] In his last State of the Nation address in February 2008, Mbeki repeated the apology and devoted nearly three pages of his speech to government's plans for addressing the energy crisis.[107]

2008 xenophobic attacks

[edit]

In May 2008, a series of riots took place in a number of South African townships, mainly in Gauteng province, when South African residents violently attacked migrants from other African countries. At least 62 people were killed, several hundred injured, and many thousand displaced.[108] To contain the violence, Mbeki deployed the army to affected areas – the first such deployment to a civilian area since the end of apartheid.[109] In a televised address towards the end of the saga, Mbeki called the attacks "an absolute disgrace", saying, "Never since the birth of our democracy have we witnessed such callousness."[110]

Some commentators argued that Mbeki's government had failed to acknowledge or sufficiently to address growing xenophobia in South Africa in the years preceding the attacks. Indeed, the AU's African Peer Review Mechanism had reported in 2006 that xenophobia was an urgent concern in South Africa.[111][112] These criticisms were often linked to criticisms of Mbeki's policy in Zimbabwe, because a large proportion of South Africa's growing foreign-born population were Zimbabwean refugees.[113] Moreover, when Mbeki argued that the attacks had other motives, both economic and "criminal", some critics accused him of "xenophobia denialism" and of refusing to acknowledge the genuine xenophobic sentiment in parts of the population.[111][112]

Succession

[edit]
Zuma supporters outside the Johannesburg High Court during Zuma's rape trial, May 2006.

Polokwane conference

[edit]

In June 2005, Mbeki removed Zuma from his post as national deputy president, after Zuma's associate Schabir Shaik was convicted of making corrupt payments to Zuma in relation to the 1999 Arms Deal.[114][115] The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) charged Zuma with corruption later that year. However, Zuma remained deputy president of the ANC, and in subsequent years, the rivalry between Zuma and Mbeki and their allies intensified, with Zuma supporters frequently alleging that the charges against Zuma were politically motivated.[116][117][118]

By 2007, Zuma had emerged as an apparent contender in the ANC's next presidential elections, to be held at the party's 52nd National Conference in Polokwane, Limpopo. By April of that year, it was also clear that Mbeki intended to stand for a third term as ANC president.[118][119] Mbeki's term as national president would expire in 2009, and he had said in 2006 that he had no intention of having the Constitution changed to permit him a third term in office, saying, "By the end of 2009, I will have been in a senior position in government for 15 years. I think that's too long."[120] However, the ANC lacked internal term limits, and some suspected that he intended to continue to exert substantial influence over the government through the ANC presidency.[118][121]

Zuma drew substantial support from the left wing of the party, especially through the ANC Youth League and the ANC's partners in the Tripartite Alliance, the South African Communist Party and COSATU, with whom Mbeki's relationship was extremely poor.[118] At the elective conference, on 18 December, Mbeki lost the presidential election to Zuma, gaining less than 40% of the vote.[122] According to ANC tradition, as ANC president Zuma would become the party's presidential candidate in the 2009 general election, and therefore, given the ANC's substantial electoral majority, was overwhelmingly likely to succeed Mbeki as national president in 2009.

High court finding and appeal

[edit]

On 12 September 2008, Pietermaritzburg High Court judge Chris Nicholson set aside the corruption charges against Zuma. He found that the charges were unlawful on the procedural grounds that the NPA had not given Zuma adequate opportunity to make representations.[123][124][125] Nicholson also lent his support to allegations that Zuma's charges had been politically motivated, saying that he was "not convinced that [Zuma] was incorrect when he averred political meddling in his prosecution" and that the case seemed to be part of "some great political contest or game."[123][125] Mbeki later applied to the Constitutional Court to appeal the judgement, calling Nicholson's findings about political interference "vexatious, scandalous and prejudicial."[126] The NPA also appealed, and in January 2009 the Supreme Court of Appeal found in its favour and overturned Nicholson's ruling. Partially redeeming Mbeki, the appellate court said that Nicholson's allegations of political interference had been irrelevant to Nicholson's decision and had apparently derived from Nicholson's "own conspiracy theory."[127][128]

Resignation

[edit]

However, shortly after Nicholson delivered his judgement and months before the appeal was heard, the Zuma-aligned ANC National Executive Committee, as elected at the Polokwane conference, "recalled" Mbeki, asking him to resign as national president.[129] The National Executive Committee is a party political body and therefore lacked the constitutional authority to remove Mbeki directly, but the ANC-controlled Parliament could have effected his removal had he not acquiesced voluntarily. On 20 September 2008, a spokesman announced that Mbeki would resign.[130][131] In court papers filed later that week, Mbeki said that it was Nicholson's findings which had "led to my being recalled by my political party, the ANC – a request I have acceded to as a committed and loyal member of the ANC for the past 52 years."[126]

In the aftermath of his announcement, at least 11 cabinet ministers and three deputy ministers – including Deputy President Mlambo-Ngcuka and Minister of Finance Trevor Manuel – announced that they would also resign.[132] Mbeki's resignation took effect on 25 September, and he was replaced as national president by Kgalema Motlanthe, who had been elected ANC deputy president at the Polokwane conference.[133]

Post-presidency

[edit]
Mbeki with American Vice President Joe Biden in the West Wing, April 2011.
Mbeki at a United Nations meeting on Sudan, July 2019.

Party politics

[edit]

After his resignation from the presidency, Mbeki retained his ANC membership but retreated from party politics. In the meantime, the Congress of the People (Cope) was founded as a breakaway party, composed largely of former ANC members known to be Mbeki loyalists. There were rumours that Mbeki was involved in Cope and would perhaps defect to it,[134][135] especially after his mother Epainette, widow of ANC stalwart Govan, began attending Cope election rallies in the family's native Eastern Cape.[136][137] According to political analyst Susan Booysen, although Mbeki "would never emerge from the silent, invisible wings onto centre stage... the whole Cope plot carried the 'Mbeki' stamp."[138]

Mbeki began again to appear at ANC events and to comment on ANC politics from around 2011.[139] Although he has since said that he continued to vote for the ANC in the interim, he did not campaign on its behalf at any time during the Zuma presidency, which lasted between 2009 and 2018.[140] In more recent years, he has been fairly vocal in reflecting publicly about perceived problems in the ANC and its leadership[141][142] and about the country's economic problems and policies.[143][144]

International mediation

[edit]

Motlanthe asked Mbeki to remain in his role as mediator in Zimbabwe after his resignation in 2008,[145] and he later returned to Zimbabwe, in 2020, to mediate a further political dispute.[146] He also continued to chair the long-serving AU High-level Implementation Panel for Sudan and South Sudan, which in 2016 brokered an agreement between warring Sudanese parties to begin peace negotiations.[147][148] Although he remained critical of the UN's interventions in Africa,[149] he also chaired the UN Economic Commission for Africa High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, which was established in collaboration with the AU in 2011.[150][151]

Philanthropy

[edit]

The Thabo Mbeki Foundation was launched on 10 October 2010, ahead of a three-day conference. Its mission centres around Mbeki's trademark "African renaissance", and the objective of promoting Africa's political, social, economic, and cultural development.[152][153] It was launched in tandem with the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute, which aims to train leaders capable of contributing to the foundation's objectives.[152]

Personality and public image

[edit]
Mbeki at the World Economic Forum in New York, February 2002.

Mbeki has sometimes been characterised as remote and academic, although in his second campaign for the Presidency in 2004, many observers described him as finally relaxing into more traditional ways of campaigning, sometimes dancing at events and even kissing babies.[154][155] Mbeki used his weekly column in the ANC newsletter ANC Today,[156] to produce discussions on a variety of topics. He sometimes used his column to deliver pointed invective against political opponents, and at other times used it as a kind of professor of political theory, educating ANC cadres on the intellectual justifications for African National Congress policy. Although these columns were remarkable for their dense prose, they often were used to influence news. Although Mbeki did not generally make a point of befriending or courting reporters, his columns and news events often yielded good results for his administration by ensuring that his message is a primary driving force of news coverage.[157] Indeed, in initiating his columns, Mbeki stated his view that the bulk of South African media sources did not speak for or to the South African majority, and stated his intent to use ANC Today to speak directly to his constituents rather than through the media.[158]

Mbeki appears to have been at ease with the Internet and willing to quote from it. For instance, in a column discussing Hurricane Katrina,[159] he cited Wikipedia, quoted at length a discussion of Katrina's lessons on American inequality from the Native American publication Indian Country Today,[160] and then included excerpts from a David Brooks column in The New York Times in a discussion of why the events of Katrina illustrated the necessity for global development and redistribution of wealth.

His penchant for quoting diverse and sometimes obscure sources, both from the Internet and from a wide variety of books, made his column an interesting parallel to political blogs although the ANC does not describe it in these terms. His views on AIDS were supported by Internet searching which led him to so-called "AIDS denialist" websites; in this case, Mbeki's use of the Internet was roundly criticised and even ridiculed by opponents.[161]

Controversies

[edit]

1999 Arms Deal

[edit]

There have been rumours and allegations, never proven or prosecuted and denied by Mbeki, that Mbeki was involved in or aware of corruption in the 1999 Arms Deal, a major defence procurement package negotiated while he was deputy president.[162][163][164][165][166]

Crime

[edit]

In 2004 President Thabo Mbeki made an attack on commentators who argued that violent crime was out of control in South Africa, calling them white racists who want the country to fail. He alleged that crime was falling and some journalists were distorting reality by depicting black people as "barbaric savages" who liked to rape and kill.[167] Annual statistics published in September 2004 showed that most categories of crime were down, but some had challenged the figures' credibility and said that South Africa remained extremely dangerous, especially for women. In a column for the African National Congress website, the president rebuked the doubters.[168] Mr Mbeki did not name journalist Charlene Smith who had championed victims of sexual violence since writing about her own rape, but quoted a recent article in which she said South Africa had the highest rate of rape and referred (apparently sarcastically) to her as an "internationally recognised expert on sexual violence".[167] He said: "She was saying our cultures, traditions and religions as Africans inherently make every African man a potential rapist ... [a] view which defines the African people as barbaric savages."[168] Mr Mbeki also described the newspaper The Citizen, and other commentators who challenged the apparent fall in crime, as pessimists who did not trust black rule.[167]

In January 2007, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) draft report on South Africa was released. This noted that South Africa had the world's second-highest murder rate, with about 50 people a day being killed, and that although serious crime was reported as falling, security analysts said that the use of violence in robberies, and rape, were more common. Mbeki in response said in an interview that fears of crime were exaggerated.[169][170]

In December 2007 the final African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) report on South Africa, again suggested that there was an unacceptably high level of violent crime in the country.[171] President Mbeki said the suggestion of unacceptably high violent crime appeared to be an acceptance by the panel of what he called "a populist view".[172] He challenged some of the statistics on crime, which he noted may have resulted from a weak information base, leading to wrong conclusions. Although rape statistics had been obtained from the South African Police Service, "this only denotes the incidents of rape that were reported, some of which could have resulted in acquittals" Mbeki indicated.[172]

Debate with Archbishop Tutu

[edit]

In 2004 the Archbishop Emeritus of Cape Town, Desmond Tutu, criticised President Mbeki for surrounding himself with "yes-men", not doing enough to improve the position of the poor and for promoting economic policies that only benefited a small black elite. He also accused Mbeki and the ANC of suppressing public debate. Mbeki responded that Tutu had never been an ANC member and defended the debates that took place within ANC branches and other public forums. He also asserted his belief in the value of democratic discussion by quoting the Chinese slogan "let a hundred flowers bloom", referring to the brief Hundred Flowers Campaign within the Chinese Communist Party in 1956–57.

The ANC Today newsletter featured several analyses of the debate, written by Mbeki and the ANC.[173][174] The latter suggested that Tutu was an "icon" of "white elites", thereby suggesting that his political importance was overblown by the media; and while the article took pains to say that Tutu had not sought this status, it was described in the press as a particularly pointed and personal critique of Tutu. Tutu responded that he would pray for Mbeki as he had prayed for the officials of the apartheid government.[175]

Political commentary post-presidency

[edit]

On 10 October 2024, Mbeki wrote a letter to Mr Matome Chiloane, Member of the Executive for the Gauteng Education Department (GED), criticizing the GED's handling of an incident of alleged racism at Pretoria High School for Girls. The letter was copied to the Gauteng Premier, Mr Phanyaza Lesufi.[176][177][178] The GED had been criticized in the South African media for claiming that there was racism at Pretoria High School for Girls without proof of such.[179][180]

Personal life and family

[edit]
Mbeki in 2003

In October 1959, Mbeki had a son, Monwabisi Kwanda, with Olive Mpahlwa, a childhood friend which whom he had struck up a romance while at Lovedale. Kwanda was raised by his mother and later by Mbeki's mother, Epainette.[8]: 110–116  He was last seen by his family in 1981 and is presumed to have died in exile, but the circumstances of his death remain unknown. Olive testified about his disappearance at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1996, making an impassioned plea for those with information to step forward.[8]: 108 

Mbeki's youngest brother, Jama, also disappeared in exile. He had spent his adolescence in Lesotho and was an activist in the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) and its Lesotho Liberation Army. BCP was much closer to the PAC than to the ANC, and later became an avowed enemy of the latter. Jama disappeared in March 1982, after he skipped bail.[8]: 448–451  According to an investigation commissioned by his family in the early 1990s, he was informed upon by a comrade, entrapped by security police, and killed on the side of a highway later in 1982.[8]: 454  Mbeki's only living sibling, Moeletsi, was also educated abroad and is now a prominent economist. He often publicly criticised the policies of his brother's government.[181]

Mbeki married Zanele Dlamini Mbeki in 1974, a social worker from Alexandra whom he met in London before his departure for Moscow. The wedding ceremony was held on 23 November at Farnham Castle in Surrey, England. Adelaide Tambo and Mendi Msimang stood in loco parentis for Mbeki, and Essop Pahad was his best man.[8]: 300–310 [182] They have no children together.

Recognition

[edit]

Honorary degrees

[edit]

Mbeki has received many honorary degrees from South African and foreign universities. Mbeki received an honorary doctorate in business administration from the Arthur D Little Institute, Boston, in 1994.[183] In 1995, he received honorary doctorate from the University of South Africa and an honorary doctorate of laws from Sussex University.[183] Mbeki was awarded an honorary doctorate from Rand Afrikaans University in 1999.[184] In 2000 he was awarded an honorary doctorate of laws from Glasgow Caledonian University.[185] In 2004, he was awarded an honorary doctorate in commercial sciences by the University of Stellenbosch.[186]

Orders and decorations

[edit]

During Mbeki's official visit to Britain in 2001, he was made an honorary Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath (GCB).[187] The Mayor of Athens, Dora Bakoyannis, awarded Mbeki with the City of Athens Medal of Honour in 2005.[188] During Mbeki's official visit to Sudan in 2005, he was awarded Sudan's Insignia of Honour in recognition of his role in resolving conflicts and working for development in the Continent.[189] In 2007, Mbeki was made a Knight of the Most Venerable Order of the Hospital of Saint John of Jerusalem at St George's Cathedral in Cape Town by the current grand prior, Prince Richard, Duke of Gloucester.[190]

Awards

[edit]

Mbeki was awarded the Good Governance Award in 1997 by the US-based Corporate Council on Africa.[191] He received the Newsmaker of the year award from Pretoria News Press Association in 2000[184] and repeated the honour in 2008, this time under the auspices of media research company Monitoring South Africa.[192] In honour of his commitment to democracy in the new South Africa, Mbeki was awarded the Oliver Tambo/Johnny Makatini Freedom Award in 2000.[184] Mbeki was awarded the Peace and Reconciliation Award at the Gandhi Awards for Reconciliation in Durban in 2003.[193] In 2004, Mbeki was awarded the Good Brother Award by Washington, D.C.'s National Congress of Black Women for his commitment to gender equality and the emancipation of women in South Africa.[194] In 2005, he was also awarded the Champion of the Earth Award by the United Nations.[195] During the European-wide Action Week Against Racism in 2005, Mbeki was awarded the Rotterdamse Jongeren Raad (RJR) Antidiscrimination Award by the Netherlands.[196] In 2006, he was awarded the Presidential Award for his outstanding service to economic growth and investor confidence in South Africa and Africa and for his role in the international arena by the South African Chambers of Commerce and Industry.[197] In 2007 Mbeki was awarded the Confederation of African Football's Order of Merit for his contribution to football on the continent.[198]

Patronages

[edit]
  • Thabo Mbeki Foundation
  • Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute, an institute of the University of South Africa in partnership with the Thabo Mbeki Foundation
  • Thabo Mbeki Presidential Library
  • Thabo Mbeki School for Public and International Affairs based in UNISA.

Foreign honours

[edit]

Cuba:

Italy:

Jamaica:

Zambia:

United Kingdom:

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki (born 18 June 1942) is a South African politician who served as the second democratically elected president of the Republic of from 14 June 1999 until his resignation on 24 September 2008. Born in Idutywa, , to parents who were teachers, intellectuals, and political activists, Mbeki joined the (ANC) as a youth and became involved in anti-apartheid activities, leading to his exile where he represented the organization internationally. As deputy president from 1994 to 1999 under and then as president, Mbeki focused on through policies like the Growth, Employment and Redistribution program, achieving average annual GDP growth of around 4 percent, alongside initiatives to promote continental integration such as chairing the from 2002 to 2003. His administration emphasized African solutions to African problems, including efforts in conflicts like those in and the , though his support for Zimbabwe's drew criticism for enabling authoritarianism. Mbeki's also strengthened South Africa's role in global forums, fostering partnerships with emerging economies. Mbeki's legacy is significantly tarnished by his administration's handling of the crisis, where he publicly questioned the established that HIV causes AIDS and resisted widespread provision of antiretroviral drugs, favoring alternative explanations and nutritional interventions instead. This stance obstructed access to life-saving treatments, resulting in an estimated 330,000 excess deaths from AIDS between 2000 and 2005, according to a Harvard study analyzing government policy impacts. His presidency ended prematurely when the ANC's national executive recalled him amid factional battles with , whom Mbeki had opposed in corruption proceedings, prioritizing party directives over completing his term.

Early Life and Education

Family Background and Eastern Cape Upbringing (1942–1960)

Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki was born on 18 June 1942 in Mbewuleni, a rural village near Idutywa in the Transkei region, which later became part of South Africa's Eastern Cape province. He was the second child of Govan Archibald Mvuyelwa Mbeki and Epainette Nomaka Mbeki, both of whom were educators from Xhosa-speaking families that prioritized intellectual development and political engagement. Govan Mbeki, a university-educated teacher and journalist, was a key figure in the African National Congress (ANC) in the Eastern Cape, focusing on rural mobilization amid grievances over land and governance in the Transkei. Epainette Mbeki, who held a senior certificate and taught locally, managed the family home and a general store while supporting her husband's activism; she raised their four children—daughter Linda and sons Thabo, Moeletsi, and Jama—often in Govan's prolonged absence due to organizational duties. Mbeki's early years unfolded in a politically charged rural setting, where the Mbeki household served as a hub for discussions on anti-colonial resistance and , influenced by Govan's involvement in events like the precursor to the 1960 Pondo Revolt. The family's commitment to education mirrored broader Xhosa traditions of fostering izifundisawa (educated elites), with Govan instilling in his children an appreciation for reading and debate despite resource constraints in the segregated system. Epainette's practical resilience shaped daily life, as she navigated subsistence farming, teaching, and community support amid the economic hardships of Transkei peasant households under indirect colonial rule. Mbeki began formal schooling around 1948, attending primary institutions in Idutywa and Butterworth before progressing to . He enrolled at the prestigious Lovedale High School in Alice (now Dikeni), a missionary-founded institution known for producing African leaders, where he demonstrated academic aptitude in subjects like history and languages. By his late teens, around 1959–1960, Mbeki completed his matriculation amid the intensifying apartheid restrictions, reflecting the family's emphasis on self-reliance and intellectual preparation for broader struggles, though Govan's growing ANC commitments limited direct paternal guidance. This period instilled in Mbeki a foundational rooted in rational inquiry and resistance to systemic dispossession, setting the stage for his subsequent political involvement.

Initial ANC Activism and Johannesburg Period (1960–1962)

Following the (ANC)'s prohibition on 8 April 1960 in the aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre, Mbeki initiated underground operations in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) region, centered around , to sustain the organization's clandestine presence amid intensified state repression. He resided with the family of ANC Secretary-General Duma Nokwe in , where he coordinated with veteran leaders including and to reorganize local networks and propagate anti-apartheid messaging. These efforts focused on recruiting youth and students, leveraging Mbeki's prior experience in the ANC Youth League to counteract the effects of the ban on open political activity. In 1961, after his expulsion from Lovedale College in the for orchestrating a class , Mbeki relocated permanently to , enrolling as an external student in economics at the while deepening his activist commitments. He was elected secretary of the African Students' Association (ASA) at Britzius College, a Johannesburg-based institution, though the group soon dissolved following arrests of its members by authorities. During this period, Mbeki mobilized students and young workers for the ANC's nationwide stay-at-home campaign on 31 May 1961, protesting the National Party government's declaration of as a and its entrenchment of white minority rule. This action, which saw partial participation despite government intimidation, underscored Mbeki's emerging role in sustaining structures. By early 1962, escalating surveillance and arrests prompted the ANC leadership to evacuate key young operatives; Mbeki departed under instructions, disguised as a member of a football team, traveling via and before joining in to continue studies and organizational work in . This transition marked the end of his domestic activism phase, during which he had helped preserve ANC viability in the industrial heartland amid the shift toward armed struggle via Umkhonto we Sizwe, though his contributions remained non-violent and focused on ideological mobilization.

Exile and ANC Organizational Role

Studies and Training in England and Soviet Union (1962–1971)

In 1962, following the African National Congress (ANC) directive after its banning in South Africa, Thabo Mbeki departed the country with a group of students via Southern Rhodesia (now ) and , eventually arriving in to pursue further education and ANC-related activities in . He initially undertook first-year studies as an external with the between 1961 and 1962, transitioning to full enrollment at the in for a Master of degree, which he completed in 1966. During his time at Sussex, Mbeki remained actively engaged in anti-apartheid advocacy, serving as a key figure in politics; on 13 June 1964, he led a group of Sussex students on an 80-kilometer protest march from to London in solidarity with the defendants, including his father and . This period solidified his intellectual grounding in while fostering networks within the exile community and international leftist circles supportive of the ANC's struggle. Post-graduation in 1966, Mbeki contributed to the ANC's London office from 1967 to 1970, collaborating with leaders such as and on organizational and propaganda efforts amid the challenges of exile, including fundraising and ideological alignment with global anti-colonial movements. His role emphasized administrative and diplomatic tasks rather than frontline militancy, reflecting the ANC's strategy of building intellectual and political cadres abroad. In this capacity, Mbeki honed skills in and economic analysis, which later informed his views on development and sanctions against apartheid . In 1970, the ANC dispatched Mbeki to the for military training, a component of broader efforts to prepare cadres for armed struggle following the establishment of Umkhonto we Sizwe. This short-term program, likely conducted under Soviet auspices in , focused on basic guerrilla tactics, political indoctrination, and strategic warfare, aligning with the USSR's support for liberation movements as part of proxy engagements. Upon completion later that year, Mbeki proceeded to , , integrating into the ANC's central apparatus by early 1971, marking the transition from academic and preparatory phases to operational leadership in exile. The training underscored the ANC's reliance on Soviet material and ideological backing, though Mbeki's primary orientation remained toward diplomatic and economic strategies over direct combat roles.

Diplomatic and Administrative Posts in Lusaka, Swaziland, and Nigeria (1971–1978)

In April 1971, Thabo Mbeki arrived in , —the site of the (ANC) headquarters in exile—and was appointed to the ANC's Revolutionary Council. In this administrative role, he bridged communications between the exiled leadership and internal anti-apartheid resistance inside , attended Revolutionary Council meetings, and later worked in the ANC's propaganda section after his appointment as deputy to Duma Nokwe in the Department of Information and Propaganda. Mbeki's tenure in Lusaka also involved outreach efforts, such as delivering a speech at the Youth Secretariat summer school in 1971 and meeting in December 1972 to discuss strategies for resistance against apartheid. During this period, he resided in a secret location in , southwest of , to evade South African intelligence threats. In 1975, Mbeki was acting ANC representative in Swaziland (now ), where he assessed the territory's viability as a frontline base for operations, recruited potential soldiers for Umkhonto we Sizwe, and built underground networks while liaising with the and elements. His activities there focused on internal mobilization to support infiltration routes into , though they were disrupted in March 1976 when he was arrested alongside and Albert Dhlomo; the trio escaped to shortly thereafter. From 1976 to early 1978, Mbeki served as the ANC's diplomatic representative in , where he established formal relations with the regime of , assisted South African exile students in relocating and integrating, and strengthened ANC influence over rival Pan-Africanist Congress networks through sustained engagement. He returned to in February 1978 and was appointed Political Secretary in the office of ANC President , marking a shift toward higher-level strategic coordination.

Negotiations and Strategic Leadership in the 1980s

During the early 1980s, following his return to as political secretary to ANC president , Thabo Mbeki contributed to the organization's strategic coordination from its headquarters, emphasizing both internal consolidation and external pressure on the apartheid regime. By 1985, Mbeki had ascended to direct the ANC's Department of Information and Publicity, where he orchestrated campaigns to amplify global awareness of apartheid's injustices and mobilize international support for sanctions against . Under his leadership, the department produced materials for Radio Freedom broadcasts and publications that highlighted ANC military actions by Umkhonto we Sizwe, aiming to undermine the regime's legitimacy and foster ungovernability within . Mbeki's strategic focus extended to diplomatic outreach, positioning the ANC as a credible interlocutor with foreign governments and media. He served as a primary contact for and journalists, leveraging personal networks to advocate for economic isolation of the apartheid state, including U.S. Congressional sanctions in 1986 via the . This approach complemented the ANC's armed struggle by eroding the regime's economic viability, with Mbeki coordinating efforts to involve white South African dissidents and business leaders in anti-apartheid advocacy, thereby broadening domestic opposition. His emphasis on was pragmatic, recognizing that sustained international pressure could compel negotiations without solely relying on military escalation, which faced logistical constraints in exile. As the decade progressed, Mbeki initiated discreet channels for dialogue with apartheid representatives, laying groundwork for formal talks. In the mid-1980s, he engaged in confidential meetings, such as a 1980s discussion in New York with Pieter de Lange, chairman of the Afrikaner Broederbond, addressing potential minority rights assurances to ease transition fears. By 1989, elevated to head the Department of International Affairs, Mbeki led ANC delegations in secret preliminary negotiations with the de Klerk administration, focusing on ceasefires and unbanning the organization, which culminated in the Groote Schuur Minute of May 1990. These efforts reflected Mbeki's strategic realism: prioritizing phased de-escalation to avoid civil war while maintaining revolutionary objectives, informed by assessments that the regime's military dominance necessitated parallel diplomatic leverage.

Ascension to ANC and National Leadership

Return from Exile and Deputy Presidency (1990–1994)

Following the unbanning of the (ANC) on February 2, 1990, and the release of on February 11, 1990, Thabo Mbeki returned from exile on April 28, 1990, arriving at International Airport in aboard a Zambian Airways flight alongside senior ANC figures including , Alfred Nzo, Ruth Mompati, and . The homecoming marked an emotional reunion with his father, , who had been imprisoned for 23 years under apartheid and released in 1987; Mbeki visibly wept during the embrace, symbolizing the end of decades of separation for many ANC exiles. This return positioned Mbeki, already a seasoned ANC strategist from his exile roles, as a central figure in the transitional process toward democratic rule. Upon repatriation, Mbeki contributed to preliminary bilateral talks between the ANC and the de Klerk government, including a September 12, 1990, meeting in between ANC leaders like Mbeki and and 's National Intelligence Service, which laid groundwork for formal negotiations amid ongoing violence. He played a key role in the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), launched in December 1991, advocating ANC positions on interim arrangements and constitutional principles while navigating deadlocks, such as those in CODESA II in mid-1992 over issues like constitutional assembly powers and violence cessation. Mbeki's diplomatic experience from exile helped shift international perceptions of the ANC from a terrorist organization to a legitimate negotiating partner, facilitating sanctions relief and foreign investment inflows critical to the transition. By 1993, as multi-party talks resumed under the Multi-Party Negotiation Process, Mbeki supported the ANC's strategic concessions, including sunset clauses for civil servants, to secure agreement on an interim ratified in November 1993. In the April 26–29, 1994, general elections—the first vote in South African history—the ANC secured 62.65% of the vote, forming the Government of National Unity. Mandela, elected president by the on May 9, 1994, appointed Mbeki as executive deputy president on May 10, 1994, alongside in a power-sharing arrangement per the interim constitution, reflecting Mbeki's grooming as Mandela's successor and his oversight of administrative continuity. This role positioned Mbeki to handle day-to-day governance, including formulation, while Mandela focused on and symbolism.

ANC Presidency and Preparation for National Leadership (1994–1999)

Following South Africa's first multiracial democratic elections on April 27, 1994, which the (ANC) won with 62.65% of the vote, Thabo Mbeki was appointed Deputy President by President in the Government of National Unity. In this capacity, Mbeki assumed substantial responsibility for the administration's operational aspects, functioning in effect as a while Mandela focused on symbolic and reconciliatory duties. He oversaw the shift from the initial (RDP), emphasizing social spending, toward a more market-oriented approach, including the 1996 adoption of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy to stabilize finances, attract , and target 2.2% annual GDP growth alongside deficit reduction to 3% of GDP. The RDP ministry was abolished that year, with its functions transferred to Mbeki's office to integrate economic planning more tightly with fiscal discipline. Mbeki also directed much of South Africa's foreign policy reorientation, prioritizing continental engagement and non-alignment. In a 1995 address to South African ambassadors, he outlined a framework promoting , , and in while advancing global South interests. This included forging ties with former adversaries, such as reestablishing diplomatic relations with in May 1994 and pursuing trade diversification beyond traditional Western partners. His diplomatic efforts helped secure South Africa's reintegration into international bodies, including rejoining the in 1994 and obtaining an IMF standby arrangement in 1996 to bolster reserves amid currency pressures. At the ANC's 50th National Conference in , held December 16–20, 1997, Mbeki was elected unopposed as ANC President, succeeding Mandela, who had announced his intent to retire from party leadership; was similarly elected unopposed as deputy. This uncontested transition underscored Mbeki's grooming as Mandela's successor, with the conference affirming policy continuity on economic stabilization and party renewal amid internal debates over GEAR's austerity measures. As ANC President from late through 1999, while retaining his deputy national role until June 14, 1999, Mbeki steered organizational preparations for the June 2, 1999, general elections, emphasizing cadre deployment for governance efficiency and ideological discipline to counter emerging factionalism. These efforts culminated in the ANC securing 266 of 400 seats in 1999, enabling Mbeki's elevation to President without a popular vote contest, as the automatically assumed the office.

Presidential Term (1999–2008)

Macroeconomic Policies and GEAR Implementation

The Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, adopted by the South African government in June 1996, served as the cornerstone of macroeconomic policy during Thabo Mbeki's vice presidency and continued as the framework into his presidential tenure from 1999 onward. GEAR emphasized fiscal discipline, including deficit reduction from projected levels above 5% of GDP to near balance, below 10%, trade liberalization, and export promotion to foster private investment and achieve average annual GDP growth of 4.2% over 1996–2000, alongside non-agricultural employment expansion of 2.9%. Mbeki, as deputy president, played a pivotal role in its formulation and defense, arguing that it complemented rather than supplanted the (RDP) by enabling sustainable implementation through macroeconomic stability to avoid a debt trap inherited from apartheid-era fiscal imbalances. Under Mbeki's presidency, GEAR's principles underpinned consistent policy execution, yielding a narrowing deficit to 1.1% of GDP by and public debt reduction to approximately 27% of GDP by , alongside containment averaging 5–6% annually. Real GDP growth averaged 4.1% per year from 1999 to , surpassing the post-apartheid average prior to his term and reflecting gains from privatized efficiencies, such as in , and improved confidence amid global booms. However, employment growth lagged, with formal sector job creation totaling about 1.9 million over the period but official remaining structurally high at around 23–25%, critiqued by labor unions as "jobless growth" due to capital-intensive sectors dominating expansion. To address these constraints, Mbeki launched the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for (ASGISA) in 2006, targeting GDP growth acceleration to 6% by 2010 through exceeding R370 billion in the medium term, skills development for 50,000 additional workers annually, and bottleneck removal in , , and regulatory hurdles. ASGISA built on GEAR's stability by prioritizing public-private partnerships and sector-specific interventions, such as expanding broadband access and youth brigades, though its full effects were curtailed by Mbeki's 2008 resignation amid internal ANC strife. Empirical assessments indicate GEAR and its extensions stabilized finances and boosted per capita income, yet persistent inequality— hovering near 0.63—and uneven redistribution highlighted limits in translating macro gains to broad-based alleviation without deeper microeconomic reforms.

Domestic Challenges: Crime, Corruption, and Social Issues

During Thabo Mbeki's presidency from 1999 to 2008, experienced persistently high levels of , with the intentional rate averaging approximately 50 per 100,000 people annually, peaking at around 67 per 100,000 in 1995-2000 before a gradual decline to about 40 per 100,000 by 2008. Official (SAPS) data reported over 20,000 murders per year throughout the period, with contact crimes like and comprising a significant portion of the roughly 2 million serious reported incidents annually by the late 2000s. Mbeki's administration responded with initiatives such as forums and the 2007 National Crime Prevention Strategy, emphasizing prevention over reactive measures, though critics argued these efforts yielded limited results amid under-resourced police forces and socioeconomic drivers like . Corruption scandals eroded public trust and strained governance, most notably the 1999 Strategic Defence Package, a R30 billion arms procurement deal for military equipment that faced allegations of bribery, kickbacks, and political favoritism involving senior ANC figures, including Mbeki's deputy Jacob Zuma. Investigations revealed offsets and tenders marred by irregularities, with estimates of corrupt payments exceeding R1 billion, though Mbeki maintained the process was transparent and necessary for national defense, denying personal involvement or systemic graft. South Africa's Corruption Perceptions Index score, as assessed by Transparency International, deteriorated from 5.6 out of 10 in 1998 to 4.7 in 2007, reflecting perceptions of entrenched public-sector corruption linked to patronage networks within the ruling party. The government's establishment of the Special Investigating Unit and anti-corruption task teams aimed to address these issues, but prosecutions were slow, exacerbating perceptions of elite impunity. Social challenges, including entrenched inequality and rising , persisted despite macroeconomic growth under the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) framework, with the remaining among the world's highest at approximately 0.63, indicating stark wealth disparities disproportionately affecting black South Africans. Official rates climbed from about 23% in 1999 to over 30% by , fueling levels that affected nearly 50% of the by mid-decade, as measured by UNDP thresholds. Service delivery protests surged, with over 10,000 actions recorded between 2004 and protesting inadequate , , and access, often met with police responses that highlighted tensions between and public expectations. Mbeki's policies expanded social grants to reach millions, mitigating absolute for some, yet critics contended that programs primarily enriched a connected political elite rather than broadly alleviating structural inequities rooted in apartheid legacies and policy implementation gaps.

Foreign Policy: African Renaissance and Continental Engagement

Mbeki's foreign policy emphasized the , a vision he articulated in speeches and policy documents starting in the late , aiming to foster continental , , and political renewal through endogenous development rather than dependency on external . In a address to the corporate sector, Mbeki outlined actions such as promoting intra-n trade, strengthening governance institutions, and leveraging South Africa's post-apartheid stability to lead regional initiatives, positioning the Renaissance as a counter to narratives of African failure. This framework guided South Africa's engagement, prioritizing over unilateral interventions and seeking to reposition in global affairs via partnerships that demanded accountability from African states themselves. Central to this was the establishment of the in 2001, which Mbeki co-initiated with leaders like Nigeria's and Algeria's , merging earlier plans such as Senegal's Omega Plan into a comprehensive framework for , , and reforms. NEPAD's adoption by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in on July 11, 2001, and formal launch at the inaugural (AU) summit in on July 9, 2002, reflected Mbeki's push for peer accountability, including the voluntary African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) adopted in 2003 to assess participating states' adherence to standards in , economic management, and . By 2003, 23 countries had acceded to the APRM, with undergoing its review in 2006, though implementation faced delays due to resource constraints and varying national commitments. South Africa's continental engagement under Mbeki involved hosting the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa's transition and committing over R1 billion (approximately $150 million at the time) to NEPAD projects by 2005, focusing on sectors like interconnectivity and to reduce affecting 300 million Africans. Mbeki advocated for increased intra-African , which stood at under 10% of total continental commerce in 2000, through initiatives like the African Continental Free Trade Area's precursors, while critiquing donor-driven models for perpetuating neocolonial dynamics. This approach elevated South Africa's diplomatic influence, with Mbeki chairing the NEPAD Heads of State Implementation Committee from 2001 to 2003, though critics from institutions like the World Bank noted uneven progress in attracting $64 billion in promised investments by 2010 due to governance gaps in member states.

Zimbabwe Intervention via Quiet Diplomacy

During Thabo Mbeki's presidency, South Africa's approach to the crisis, which intensified after the fast-track program began in 2000, emphasized over public condemnation or sanctions. This policy involved private engagements with President and his ZANU-PF party, alongside coordination through the (SADC), to encourage electoral reforms and economic stabilization without external interference. Mbeki argued that confrontational measures, such as those advocated by Western governments, would exacerbate instability and flows into , potentially destabilizing the . The rationale rooted in Mbeki's commitment to "African solutions to African problems," viewing Zimbabwe's issues—stemming from contested land redistribution, peaking at 231 million percent in 2008, and —as internal matters best addressed through dialogue among liberation-era allies. Quiet diplomacy included repeated bilateral talks, SADC troika interventions, and withholding recognition of Mugabe's 2002 presidential victory amid allegations of rigging, though South Africa abstained from UN sanctions and blocked harsher measures. Critics, including South African opposition parties and groups, contended this leniency enabled Mugabe's regime to suppress opposition, with over 200 documented killings and thousands displaced during farm invasions and post-2000 elections. The policy's most prominent application occurred following the March 29, 2008, harmonized elections, where the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) secured a parliamentary majority and led the presidential first round with 47.9% against Mugabe's 43.2%, triggering a violent run-off marred by state-orchestrated assaults killing at least 86 and forcing Tsvangirai's withdrawal. Appointed SADC mediator on March 12, 2007, Mbeki conducted from July 25, 2008, in , culminating in the Global Political Agreement (GPA) signed on September 15, 2008, by Mugabe, , and . The GPA established a unity government with Mugabe as president, Tsvangirai as prime minister, and power-sharing in key ministries, alongside commitments to constitutional reform and security sector stabilization. Implementation yielded short-term gains, including the February 11, , inauguration of the inclusive government, which facilitated dollarization of the economy, curbing and restoring basic services amid a GDP contraction of over 50% from 2000 to 2008. However, core provisions faltered: land audits were incomplete, media laws remained repressive, and Mugabe retained control over security forces, leading to stalled reforms and the GPA's effective collapse by elections, which international observers deemed flawed. Mbeki defended the outcome as averting or foreign invasion, asserting in 2016 that it aligned with Zimbabwean popular will expressed through participation, though empirical data showed persistent and economic of 3-4 million Zimbabweans by 2008. Assessments of effectiveness remain divided, with proponents crediting quiet diplomacy for regional containment but detractors, including Institute for Security Studies analyses, arguing it prolonged Mugabe's rule by signaling , as evidenced by ZANU-PF's retention of power until Mugabe's 2017 ouster via internal coup. South African parliamentary debates and reports highlighted domestic costs, such as strained bilateral ties and unaddressed abuses, underscoring quiet diplomacy's limits in enforcing accountability without leverage beyond persuasion.

HIV/AIDS Strategy and Public Health Response

Thabo Mbeki's administration adopted a heterodox approach to the epidemic, characterized by skepticism toward the established that is the causative agent of AIDS. Mbeki publicly questioned this linkage, emphasizing multifactorial causes including poverty, malnutrition, and lack of sanitation, and engaged with denialists such as . In early 2000, he circulated a letter to expressing doubts about HIV's exclusive role in AIDS and advocating for broader into alternative etiologies. This stance influenced national policy, delaying the widespread provision of antiretroviral (ARV) drugs, which were deemed too toxic by Mbeki despite of their efficacy in suppressing and restoring immune function. The government prioritized nutritional interventions and promoted African traditional medicines over ARVs, while obstructing programs for preventing mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT). At the 13th International AIDS Conference in in July 2000, Mbeki highlighted poverty as the primary driver of the crisis but avoided endorsing ARV treatments in his opening address. In response, over 5,000 scientists issued the Durban Declaration affirming HIV's causation of AIDS based on virological, epidemiological, and clinical , including fulfillment of and dramatic ARV success rates; Mbeki dismissed it as stifling inquiry. Mbeki appointed a presidential advisory panel in 2001 that included both mainstream experts and denialists, producing divided recommendations that further entrenched policy ambiguity. Legal challenges from groups like the Treatment Action Campaign compelled the government to initiate limited PMTCT in 2001, but comprehensive ARV rollout remained stalled until 2003–2004 amid mounting domestic and international pressure. A 2008 Harvard study estimated that these policies resulted in approximately 330,000 preventable adult deaths and 35,000–50,000 infant infections between 2000 and 2005, attributing the toll to restricted ARV access. Critics, including epidemiologists, argued that Mbeki's deviation from evidence-based consensus—supported by longitudinal cohort studies showing HIV's direct immunodepletion and ARV's reversal of progression—exacerbated South Africa's , which peaked at over 5 million infections by 2000. Mbeki maintained that his approach sought to address root socio-economic causes without uncritically accepting pharmaceutical narratives, though post-resignation analyses, including from the Treatment Action Campaign, underscored the causal primacy of delayed in . By 2008, under successor , the policy shifted toward full ARV integration, marking a departure from Mbeki's framework.

Infrastructure and Events: World Cup Bid, Energy Crisis, and Xenophobia

During Mbeki's presidency, South Africa successfully bid for and hosted the 2010 FIFA World Cup, a milestone announced on May 15, 2004, following Mbeki's personal presentation to the FIFA Executive Committee on May 14, 2004. The bid emphasized the event's role in advancing Mbeki's African Renaissance vision, positioning it as a continental achievement to counter Afro-pessimism and foster sports diplomacy. Preparations involved substantial infrastructure investments, including new stadiums like Soccer City in Johannesburg and upgrades to transport networks, airports, and hospitality facilities, with the government projecting 77,400 permanent jobs from the event amid 24% unemployment. Mbeki hailed the hosting as proof of Africa's capability, stating post-event that it had silenced skeptics. Parallel to these developments, South Africa faced an emerging energy crisis due to insufficient investment in electricity generation capacity. Load shedding—scheduled power outages—began in late 2007 during peak summer demand, escalating into a national emergency declared on January 24, 2008, by Eskom, the state utility. The shortages stemmed from Eskom's failure to heed internal forecasts from as early as 1998 predicting a supply-demand shortfall by 2007, compounded by delayed maintenance and underinvestment in new plants during the 1990s and early 2000s. Mbeki later attributed the initial blackouts to Eskom managers ignoring warnings, while apologizing publicly in 2007 for the government's oversight in not prioritizing capacity expansion sooner. This crisis strained World Cup preparations, prompting emergency measures like diesel generators for stadiums and highlighting broader infrastructure vulnerabilities despite macroeconomic growth under Mbeki's GEAR policies. In May 2008, amid these strains, experienced widespread xenophobic attacks targeting African immigrants, erupting in Johannesburg's and spreading to seven of nine provinces, resulting in 62 deaths, over 1,000 injuries, and displacement of approximately 100,000 people. The violence, fueled by economic grievances including competition for low-wage jobs, housing shortages, and perceptions of immigrants capturing social grants and informal trade opportunities, built on prior sporadic incidents dating back to 1994 but intensified by post-apartheid inequalities and unaddressed service delivery failures. Mbeki condemned the attacks as a "disgrace" and "shameful," urging national unity and deploying police and military to quell unrest, though critics noted a delayed government acknowledgment of xenophobic motives, framing them initially as criminal acts rather than ethnically driven. The events exposed fault lines in Mbeki's domestic policies, including persistent affecting 40% of the , and prompted international scrutiny of 's social cohesion.

Political Downfall and Resignation

Internal ANC Conflicts and Polokwane Conference (2007)

Tensions within the (ANC) escalated in 2007 as a succession battle unfolded between President Thabo Mbeki, seeking a third term as ANC president, and his predecessor as deputy president, , who mounted a direct challenge. These divisions arose from policy disputes, including dissatisfaction among trade unions and communists with Mbeki's market-oriented Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, perceived as prioritizing fiscal discipline over worker interests, as well as grievances over Mbeki's centralized leadership style and handling of policies. Zuma garnered support from the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the (SACP), and the ANC Youth League, who framed the contest as a struggle against Mbeki's alleged and intellectual . Central to the rift were corruption charges against Zuma stemming from the 1999 arms deal, involving payments from his financial advisor , convicted in 2005 for fraud and corruption linked to Zuma. Zuma's allies accused Mbeki of orchestrating the National Prosecuting Authority's pursuit as a political vendetta to eliminate a rival, while Mbeki maintained commitment to legal accountability; a September 2007 court ruling in dismissed Zuma's bid to block the charges but highlighted prosecutorial flaws, fueling perceptions of state weaponization. Zuma's 2006 acquittal in a separate further galvanized his base, portraying him as a victim of elite , though critics noted the charges reflected genuine evidence of influence-peddling rather than mere factional intrigue. The 52nd ANC National Conference, convened at the in from December 16 to 20, 2007, became the arena for this contest—the first open in the party since 1952—with approximately 4,000 voting delegates participating. Mbeki's keynote address emphasized combating as a systemic threat, but it failed to sway delegates amid chants and disruptions favoring Zuma. On December 18, Zuma secured victory with 2,329 votes to Mbeki's 1,505, a margin reflecting broad provincial branch support and alliance mobilization. Zuma's win extended to his slate, with allies like elevated to deputy president and control gained over the National Executive Committee, signaling the left wing's dominance and deepening factional rifts that presaged ANC splits. The outcome rendered Mbeki a lame-duck state president until 2008, as ANC control of ensured Zuma's eventual ascension, though it amplified internal volatility by prioritizing loyalty over institutional integrity. On September 20, 2008, the (ANC) National Executive Committee (NEC) voted to recall Thabo Mbeki from the presidency, citing the need to heal internal party divisions stemming from the 2007 conference and subsequent tensions over Jacob Zuma's corruption trial. The decision followed a September 12 ruling by Judge Chris Nicholson, who dropped graft charges against Zuma on grounds of prosecutorial abuse, including alleged political meddling by Mbeki's administration, though Mbeki denied any interference. ANC Secretary-General described the recall as a political step to unify the party, not tied to criminality, amid criticisms from Mbeki allies that it represented factional triumph by Zuma supporters. Mbeki accepted the recall without public resistance, tendering his resignation to Speaker on September 21, 2008, effective immediately. In a national broadcast, he affirmed his 52-year loyalty to the ANC, expressed gratitude for his service, and urged continuity in governance, avoiding direct confrontation with the party's directive despite its unprecedented nature for a sitting president. The move triggered resignations from several cabinet members in solidarity, including Foreign Minister and Intelligence Minister , though most withdrew after appeals for stability; was elected interim president by on September 25, 2008, to serve until the 2009 elections. Legally, Mbeki refrained from challenging the recall's , prioritizing ANC over litigation, a choice later critiqued for subordinating executive to . Supporters, including some civil groups, questioned its legitimacy, arguing it blurred by allowing fiat to override parliamentary mandate, but no successful was obtained. Post-resignation, Mbeki pursued an appeal against Nicholson's broader implications for the National Prosecuting Authority's , but the of Appeal overturned the judge's findings on political interference in January 2009, validating aspects of the prior prosecution process without reinstating charges or altering Mbeki's ouster. The episode highlighted ANC internal dynamics' dominance over formal state processes, with no criminal repercussions for Mbeki himself.

Post-Presidency Engagements

Commentary on South African Politics and ANC Decline

Following his resignation, Mbeki initially refrained from direct involvement in day-to-day South African politics but increasingly offered commentary on the (ANC)'s trajectory, emphasizing a post-2007 erosion in governance effectiveness and party integrity. In a speech marking the 30th anniversary of South Africa's democracy on April 30, 2024, he contrasted robust economic performance during his presidency—GDP growth averaging 3.6% from 1994 to 2007, with employment rising from 8 million to 14 million jobs—with subsequent stagnation, including GDP growth slowing to 1.2% and reaching 32.9% by 2024. He attributed this shift to the 2007 conference leadership change, which he linked to internal factionalism enabling "" sabotage of key institutions like the (SARS) and , exemplified by load-shedding crises starting in 2014 and cost overruns from R79 billion to R234 billion. Mbeki has repeatedly highlighted a deterioration in ANC membership quality, warning that opportunistic individuals have infiltrated the party primarily for access to government positions rather than alignment with its principles. Speaking at an ANC event on May 27, 2024, he referenced Nelson Mandela's 1997 Mahikeng conference caution against such trends, stating, "Over the years you’ve had a deterioration in the quality of the membership of the ANC; not everybody, but some of these people," and urged intervention to avert contradictions between member actions and party values. He extended this critique in September 2024, decrying "deep-rooted criminality" where "every single ANC branch is led by a criminal" in certain regions, citing the party's avoidance of campaigning in , during the 2021 local elections to prevent installing corrupt councillors. The ANC's 2024 national election performance, securing 40.18% of the vote—a 17-percentage-point drop from 57.5% in —prompted Mbeki to label the result a profound demanding unflinching acknowledgment of and indiscipline. In a September 2024 address at a ANC workshop, he rejected superficial renewal slogans, questioning the party's ability to deliver services amid entrenched self-enrichment and incompetence. He advocated prioritizing substantive renewal over elective conferences, proposing a national dialogue to confront ideological voids—such as the post-Cold War decline of communist guidance that once structured ANC policy—and rebuild through . Mbeki's analysis frames the ANC's decline as a confluence of internal decay and external pressures, including the loss of disciplined ideological frameworks that sustained earlier gains under (RDP) and Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategies. While supporting Ramaphosa-era pledges in the 2024 manifesto, he expressed skepticism about implementation, stressing that recovery hinges on excising criminal elements and restoring competence to avert irreversible voter alienation.

International Mediation and African Conflict Resolution

Following his resignation as South African president on September 21, 2008, Thabo Mbeki was appointed by the (AU) to lead high-level panels addressing protracted conflicts on the continent. In July 2009, Mbeki chaired the AU High-Level Panel on (AUPD), tasked with assessing the situation in Sudan's region and proposing pathways for peace, justice, and reconciliation. The panel's comprehensive report, released on October 29, 2009, analyzed root causes including historical marginalization, resource competition, and governance failures, while recommending comprehensive political dialogue, power-sharing arrangements, and compensation mechanisms for victims. It emphasized African-led solutions, urging the Sudanese government to engage rebels and integrate 's administration into national structures, though implementation faced resistance from , with limited progress noted by observers a year later. Building on this, Mbeki assumed leadership of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan and (AUHIP) in 2010, alongside former presidents of and of . The panel's mandate focused on facilitating implementation of the 2005 (CPA), resolving post-independence disputes such as the border demarcation, oil revenue sharing, and citizenship issues following 's secession in July 2011. Mbeki mediated negotiations in , securing agreements like the 2011 protocol for a and temporary administration, though enforcement challenges persisted amid clashes. The AU renewed the AUHIP mandate multiple times, including in February 2018 for another year, commending Mbeki's facilitation of dialogue between and on security and economic cooperation. Mbeki's mediation extended to other African hotspots, including advisory roles in Burundi's political crisis. In 2020, as AUHIP chair, he briefed the AU Peace and Security Council on Abyei tensions and urged intervention in Burundi's post-2015 instability, advocating for constitutional reforms to avert authoritarian backsliding. His approach consistently prioritized quiet diplomacy, sovereignty-respecting negotiations, and African institutional frameworks over external impositions, yielding partial stabilizations—such as temporary ceasefires in Sudan-South Sudan flashpoints—but confronting persistent hurdles from non-state actors and regime intransigence. By 2021, Mbeki continued engaging UN bodies, briefing the Security Council on AUHIP progress amid Sudan's transitional challenges.

Thabo Mbeki Foundation Initiatives and Philanthropy (2009–2025)

The Thabo Mbeki Foundation was established in 2010 to advance Mbeki's vision of an by mobilizing progressive forces across the continent and fostering dialogue on key challenges. Its core mission focuses on promoting African-led solutions in areas such as peace and security, , and economic renewal, including , through four flagship programs that support policy reflection and implementation. The foundation has organized annual Thabo Mbeki Lectures since 2010, providing platforms for discourse on post-colonial issues like the and continental integration, with the 2025 edition marking 15 years of such engagements. In education, the foundation partnered with the to launch the Thabo Mbeki African School of Public and International Affairs (TM-School), a graduate institution aimed at building capacity in leadership and international affairs, emphasizing and global competitiveness. On peace and security, it has facilitated dialogues, including engagements in with leaders from and to address conflicts, and contributed to broader African security frameworks by promoting pan-Africanist approaches over external narratives. Strategic collaborations, such as with the Human Sciences Research Council on initiatives and Anglo American's R35 million commitment in 2022 toward infrastructure like the Thabo Mbeki Presidential Centre, have underpinned these efforts. Philanthropic activities center on rather than direct personal donations from Mbeki, with the foundation soliciting contributions from individuals, governments, and corporations to fund programs and events, including a 2025 charity golf day to engage partners. By October 2025, it hosted a groundbreaking for the Presidential Centre, signaling expanded institutional capacity for ongoing work in promotion and continental upliftment, while withdrawing from certain national dialogues to maintain focus on African priorities. These initiatives reflect a sustained commitment to self-reliant development, evidenced by 15 years of platform-building without reliance on Western-dominated funding models.

Personal Life and Character

Family Dynamics and Private Relationships

Thabo Mbeki was born on June 18, 1942, in Idutywa, (now ), to , a prominent ANC intellectual and activist imprisoned on [Robben Island](/page/Robben Island) from 1964 to 1987, and , a teacher and community organizer. Both parents prioritized political engagement over daily child-rearing, leading to Mbeki and his siblings—older sister Linda (died 2003), younger brother Moeletsi, and another brother Jama—being raised partly by extended family and friends amid the risks of apartheid persecution. This environment instilled early exposure to political and , with Govan's library shaping Mbeki's intellectual development, though the father's frequent absences fostered a distant paternal bond described as guidance-oriented rather than affectionate. Mbeki's relationship with Govan exemplified ideological mentorship over emotional intimacy; Govan, a key ANC strategist and author of The Peasants' Revolt, influenced his son's commitment to armed struggle and , yet their interactions remained formal, with Thabo viewing his father as a political exemplar rather than a personal confidant during . , an economist and vocal critic of post-apartheid economic policies like , has maintained an independent public profile, occasionally diverging from Thabo's views on governance and cronyism, though no overt familial rift is documented beyond policy disagreements. On November 23, 1974, Mbeki married Zanele Dlamini in a civil ceremony at , , after meeting her in during exile studies; Zanele, who pursued and later led initiatives, supported his ANC work but the couple often lived apart due to diplomatic postings, with no children born from the union. Prior to the marriage, Mbeki fathered with Olive Mpahlwa in the late 1970s; the son vanished in 1981 while attempting to join ANC exiles, presumed murdered by apartheid agents, prompting Mbeki to pursue inquiries even after official acceptance of his death in 1996. Mbeki's private life has been notably reclusive, with limited public disclosures on personal relationships beyond his and the unresolved loss of his son, reflecting a deliberate separation of familial matters from political scrutiny amid and demands. Zanele emerged as a discreet influencer in , founding groups like the Zanele Mbeki Development Trust, but the couple's childless and physical separations fueled occasional speculation, unsubstantiated by evidence, about relational strains.

Intellectual Habits, Health, and Public Persona


Mbeki demonstrated intellectual habits rooted in from youth, drawing from his father's collection that included historical texts on and broader literature, fostering a foundation in self-. He sustained voracious reading practices, which informed pragmatic decision-making beyond strict ideological confines, as evidenced by his engagement with diverse political and philosophical works. Mbeki personally drafted many of his speeches and pursued analytical debates, marked by persistent questioning of established views and a commitment to first-principles scrutiny of complex issues like and African development. This approach aligned with his advocacy for building Africa's intellectual capacity through and knowledge-driven transformation.
Public records indicate no chronic health conditions for Mbeki, though he faced acute episodes during his . In January 2004, he was hospitalized for breathing difficulties at the African National Congress's national conference opening in , recovering without reported long-term effects. Two years later, in September 2006, flu-like symptoms prompted an angiogram after he missed a parliamentary session; official statements affirmed his overall good health post-examination. As of 2024, at age 82, Mbeki remained active in public life, with his foundation debunking unfounded death rumors. Mbeki cultivated a public as a cerebral , often seen as remote and prioritizing depth over mass appeal. Described by associates as one of the sharpest policy analysts encountered, he embodied an "ideas man" focused on behind-the-scenes and long-range planning rather than charismatic oratory. His formal, pedantic style in communications reinforced perceptions of aloofness, yet underscored a principled, anti-populist ethic committed to ethical and rigor. This image extended to his post-presidency role as a thoughtful commentator, challenging dominant narratives with evidence-based dissent.

Core Ideological Positions

Advocacy for African Self-Reliance and Renaissance

Thabo Mbeki articulated the as a vision for continental revival centered on endogenous solutions to Africa's challenges, rejecting perpetual dependency on external aid and emphasizing collective , cultural affirmation, and economic integration among African states. In a 1998 speech titled "The African Renaissance, and the World," Mbeki outlined its core elements, including the eradication of through internal resource mobilization, the promotion of democratic , and the establishment of as an active participant in global affairs rather than a passive recipient of charity. This ideology drew from pan-Africanist traditions but prioritized pragmatic self-reliance, arguing that historical legacies of colonialism and apartheid necessitated Africans taking primary responsibility for their development trajectories. A practical embodiment of this advocacy was Mbeki's co-authorship of the (NEPAD) in 2001, alongside leaders from , , , and , which aimed to foster sustainable growth via regional infrastructure projects, agricultural enhancement, and private sector investment while incorporating the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to enforce commitments to political stability and standards. NEPAD's framework explicitly positioned self-help as its essence, seeking to leverage Africa's own efforts and resources—such as intra-continental trade and development—over unconditional foreign assistance, with Mbeki rebuking critics who dismissed it as overly reliant on Western partnerships by stressing African ownership and accountability. By 2003, Mbeki reiterated in public addresses that Africa must "rely on ourselves, our own resources and our efforts," particularly amid global uncertainties like the , to build resilience against external shocks. Mbeki's post-presidency efforts through the Thabo Mbeki Foundation, established around 2010, continued this advocacy by mobilizing intellectual and policy platforms for training African cadres in leadership and development, aiming to accelerate the via dialogue on unity, identity, and economic rebuilding. He has critiqued donor-driven models for perpetuating , insisting in 2023 statements that Africa's redefinition requires shedding victim narratives and harnessing internal capacities for and reform. This stance aligned with causal analyses of Africa's stagnation, attributing persistent issues to governance deficits and resource mismanagement rather than solely external factors, thereby urging empirical focus on domestic reforms for genuine self-reliance.

Skepticism Toward Western Dominance and Global Narratives

Thabo Mbeki articulated a profound toward Western dominance through his advocacy for an , which sought to dismantle narratives portraying as inherently inferior or perpetually dependent on external salvation. In a 1998 address, he argued that colonizers had aimed "to perpetuate their imperial domination over the peoples of " by enslaving the African mind and destroying the African soul, framing the Renaissance as a "call to " against such subservience, backwardness, and imposed notions of incapacity. This perspective emphasized , urging African intellectuals to lead efforts against , , and without uncritical adoption of Western paradigms, while reclaiming 's historical achievements like the pyramids and to counter dehumanizing stereotypes. Mbeki extended this critique to global financial institutions, viewing the IMF and World Bank as instruments of Western hegemony that prioritized the interests of a few advanced economies over equitable representation. Addressing finance ministers in 2007, he called for substantial reforms to the , which he described as a structure dominated "of the many by the few," lacking legitimacy due to imbalances in voting shares and leadership selection that marginalized developing nations. Through initiatives like the (NEPAD), Mbeki positioned Africa to negotiate globalization on its own terms, challenging what he termed "global apartheid" and promoting South-South cooperation via forums such as IBSA to foster multipolarity and reduce reliance on Western aid or conditionalities. His stance manifested in opposition to Western interventions in African affairs, particularly evident in his handling of , where he resisted pressures for and defended against sanctions he believed exacerbated instability. In 2013, Mbeki revealed that former UK Prime Minister had urged South African military cooperation to oust , a request he rejected in favor of African Union-mediated dialogue. Similarly, he warned in 2008 that intensified Western sanctions could precipitate civil war in , prioritizing regional solidarity over external dictates. Mbeki later expressed alarm at "" exemplified by NATO's 2011 Libya intervention, criticizing the UN Security Council's selective enforcement and Western overreach that undermined African . These positions underscored his commitment to rooted in , often clashing with Western narratives framing African governance failures as justifying interventionist policies.

Major Controversies

Arms Procurement Deal and Corruption Claims

The South African government's Strategic Defence Procurement Package, commonly known as the arms deal, involved contracts signed in December 1999 for the acquisition of military equipment valued at approximately R30 billion (equivalent to about $4.8 billion at the time). The package included 26 Gripen fighter aircraft and 24 Hawk trainer aircraft from and Saab, four corvettes and three submarines from a German consortium led by , and additional helicopters and patrol vessels, aimed at modernizing the post-apartheid. The procurement process began in 1997 under President , with Thabo Mbeki serving as deputy president, but was finalized and approved by the cabinet under Mbeki's presidency after he assumed office in June 1999. Corruption allegations centered on claims of , kickbacks, and in the tender evaluation and award processes, with accusations that foreign contractors paid commissions to South African officials and politicians to secure contracts. Notable cases included convictions related to payments funneled through businessman to then-deputy president , totaling around R1.4 million between 1999 and 2002, which Shaik was found guilty of fraudulently facilitating in 2005. Further claims involved non-delivery or exaggeration of promised industrial offsets, such as job creation and , which were supposed to offset 80-100% of costs but largely failed to materialize, leading to net financial losses estimated in billions of rand. Investigations uncovered evidence of irregularities, including conflicts of interest among evaluation committee members and inflated pricing, though systemic political interference in decision-making remained contested. A 2001 Joint Investigation Report by the Auditor-General, National Treasury, and intelligence agencies identified procedural flaws and potential offsets but concluded there was no conclusive evidence of in the core offsets adjudication, recommending targeted probes into specific contracts. Mbeki's administration accepted the report's findings on no widespread graft but pursued limited follow-ups, with critics alleging reluctance to implicate senior ANC figures. The Seriti Commission of , established in 2011 under President Zuma and costing R140 million, examined the deal from 2013 to 2016 and ruled in 2016 that no or irregularities tainted the process, dismissing most allegations for lack of evidence and recommending no further prosecutions. However, in 2019, the North High Court set aside the commission's findings, citing procedural irrationality, failure to consider material evidence, and witness intimidation concerns, effectively invalidating its conclusions. Mbeki testified before the Seriti Commission in July 2014, asserting that the deal underwent rigorous cabinet scrutiny with no of among those processing acquisitions, and that media-driven allegations lacked substantiation. He emphasized the process's transparency via parliamentary oversight and denied personal complicity, noting that cabinet ministers like and corroborated the absence of graft at executive levels. Despite these defenses, groups such as Watch argued that the commission ignored documented of tender manipulation and offsets failures, perpetuating . No charges have been brought against Mbeki personally, but the scandal contributed to perceptions of in post-apartheid governance, with ongoing private prosecutions and audits revealing persistent discrepancies in contract values exceeding R2 billion.

HIV/AIDS Causation Debate and Policy Impacts

Thabo Mbeki, upon assuming the presidency in 1999, expressed skepticism regarding the established scientific consensus that HIV is the primary causative agent of AIDS. He argued that factors such as poverty, malnutrition, and lack of sanitation were significant contributors to immune deficiency syndromes observed in Africa, rather than HIV alone. Mbeki convened a panel of experts in 2000, including HIV/AIDS denialists like Peter Duesberg, to review the evidence, which led to a divided report that did not uniformly affirm HIV's role. This stance contrasted with global virological evidence, including HIV isolation, fulfillment of Koch's postulates, and the efficacy of antiretrovirals (ARVs) in suppressing viral load and preventing progression to AIDS. At the 13th International AIDS Conference in in July 2000, Mbeki's opening address emphasized poverty as the "real killer" in and avoided directly endorsing HIV causation, prompting scientists to issue the Durban Declaration affirming HIV's role based on empirical data from , , and clinical trials. Mbeki dismissed the declaration, maintaining that dissenting views from a minority of scientists warranted further debate, despite their lack of support in peer-reviewed literature. His correspondence with denialists and rejection of ARVs as toxic stemmed from concerns over pharmaceutical profiteering and historical medical abuses against black South Africans, though these did not negate the causal evidence. South African government policy under Mbeki prioritized nutritional interventions, such as supplements and traditional medicines, over widespread ARV distribution, delaying a national rollout until late despite rulings and international offers of free drugs from manufacturers like GlaxoSmithKline starting in 2001. The Treatment Action Campaign's 2002 Constitutional victory mandated for mother-to-child transmission prevention, but implementation lagged, with only limited pilots until 2004. By 2005, ARV coverage remained below 5% of those needing it, compared to scalable models in and . A 2008 peer-reviewed study by Harvard researchers estimated that Mbeki-era policies resulted in over 330,000 preventable deaths and 35,000 unnecessary mother-to-child transmissions between 2000 and 2005, based on comparisons with ARV uptake in other high-prevalence countries and excess mortality data. These figures derived from modeling antiretroviral benefits using UNAIDS prevalence data and outcomes showing ARVs reduce mortality by 80-90%. Independent analyses corroborated the scale, attributing delays to presidential obstruction rather than solely logistical barriers, as provinces like independently provided ARVs earlier. Post-2008 policy shifts under subsequent leadership expanded treatment, averting further losses and reducing new infections. Mbeki has expressed no remorse for these outcomes, defending his approach in as fostering on African-specific factors, though empirical evidence post-policy reversal validated ARV-centric strategies in reducing South Africa's adult mortality from 2006 peaks. The episode highlighted tensions between executive skepticism and scientific governance, with lasting impacts on public trust in .

Economic Empowerment Programs: BEE Critiques and Cronyism

Under Mbeki's administration, (BEE) policies, formalized through the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2003, sought to redress apartheid-era economic disparities by mandating increased black ownership, management control, and skills transfer in businesses, with targets such as 25-30% black equity in key sectors like and . These measures built on earlier initiatives but expanded under Mbeki's emphasis on , aiming to cultivate a black capitalist class to drive . Proponents viewed BEE as essential for deracializing the , yet implementation revealed structural flaws that prioritized political patronage over merit-based redistribution. Critiques of during the Mbeki era centered on its failure to achieve broad , instead enabling where benefits accrued to a narrow cadre of ANC-connected individuals rather than the wider population. , the former president's brother and a political analyst, described as "legalised ," arguing it incentivized by rewarding loyalty to the through preferential deals and tenders, stifling and genuine . Empirical assessments corroborate this, showing that while a small emerged—exemplified by figures like gaining mining stakes—the policy had negligible effects on overall inequality, with household income disparities widening as resources funneled to politically favored fronts rather than . Studies highlight how compliance often involved "fronting," where nominal partners served as proxies for white-owned entities, perpetuating control imbalances while extracting fees. Cronyism manifested in opaque deal-making, such as state-linked financing from institutions like the (PIC), which directed billions into transactions benefiting ANC elites amid allegations of and graft. For instance, tenders for and procurement were reportedly rigged to favor associates, contributing to an estimated annual loss of $3 billion to by the mid-2000s, undermining fiscal discipline and . This patronage system, critics contend, entrenched a symbiotic relationship between the state and select tycoons, where policy enforcement hinged on political alignment rather than economic viability, deterring through regulatory uncertainty and elevated compliance costs. Mbeki defended as transformative, but retrospective analyses, including from in 2005, questioned its efficacy when empowerment appeared confined to a "tiny elite," exacerbating social tensions without addressing mass poverty.

Succession Struggles and Zuma Rift

The rift between Thabo Mbeki and , his long-time deputy in the (ANC), intensified in the mid-2000s amid internal party power dynamics and Zuma's legal troubles. Zuma, appointed in 1999 under Mbeki, was dismissed from that role on June 14, 2005, following the conviction of his financial advisor on and charges, which implicated Zuma in receiving improper payments. Mbeki's administration cited the need to uphold integrity in government, but Zuma's supporters viewed the dismissal as politically motivated to sideline a rival ahead of ANC leadership succession. Tensions escalated toward the ANC's 52nd National Conference in from December 16 to 20, 2007, marking the party's first contested since 1952. Mbeki sought a third term as ANC president to consolidate influence, while Zuma, backed by the of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the (SACP), and provincial branches resentful of Mbeki's perceived top-down style and economic policies favoring business elites, mounted a challenge. On December 18, 2007, Zuma defeated Mbeki, securing approximately 62.9% of the vote from roughly 4,000 delegates, a sweeping victory that humiliated Mbeki and positioned Zuma to potentially assume the national presidency after the 2009 elections. The outcome reflected broader ANC divisions, with Zuma's camp portraying the win as a rebuke to Mbeki's "" and neglect of the poor, though critics argued it empowered populist forces over technocratic governance. Mbeki retained the state presidency until September 2008, creating a dual-power structure that fueled ongoing strife, as he continued state duties while Zuma commanded party machinery. A pivotal trigger came on September 12, 2008, when Chris Nicholson ruled that charges against Zuma were politically driven, citing evidence of interference by Mbeki's administration in the National Prosecuting Authority's (NPA) decisions, effectively invalidating the prosecution. In response, the ANC (), now dominated by Zuma allies, voted on September 20, 2008, to "recall" Mbeki from the presidency, a move unprecedented in post-apartheid that prioritized party loyalty over constitutional stability. Mbeki resigned the following day, September 21, 2008, stating he accepted the decision to avoid further division, though he later expressed reservations about the 's authority to override an elected term. served as interim president until Zuma's inauguration in May 2009, formalizing the shift. The succession battle exposed deep ANC fault lines, including accusations of Mbeki's judicial manipulation to block Zuma and Zuma's reliance on alliances that sidelined merit for networks, contributing to perceptions of institutional erosion where party edicts superseded democratic norms. Zuma's victory, while democratic within ANC structures, amplified risks of factionalism, as evidenced by subsequent party splits and governance challenges under his leadership.

Legacy Assessment

Economic and Diplomatic Achievements

During Thabo Mbeki's presidency from 1999 to 2008, 's economy achieved sustained macroeconomic stability, with average annual GDP growth of approximately 4%. This period saw consistent budget surpluses, controlled inflation, and a reduction in public debt to around 27% of GDP by the mid-2000s. Mbeki's administration continued the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, emphasizing fiscal discipline, trade liberalization, and limited privatization to foster investor confidence and economic expansion. In 2006, he launched the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for (AsgiSA), targeting infrastructure bottlenecks, skills shortages, and investment in sectors like and to elevate growth toward 6%. On the diplomatic front, Mbeki prioritized African self-reliance and continental integration, co-founding the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in 2001 as a framework for sustainable growth, good governance, and infrastructure through peer review and partnerships with the Global North. As African Union Chairperson from 2002 to 2003, he advanced the transition from the Organization of African Unity to the AU, strengthening mechanisms for conflict resolution and economic cooperation. Mbeki's quiet diplomacy yielded successes in mediating African conflicts, including facilitating peace accords in Burundi via sustained engagement that complemented Nelson Mandela's efforts, contributing to the 2005 elections; brokering a 2005 truce and disarmament steps in Ivory Coast; and enabling the 2008 power-sharing agreement in Zimbabwe between Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai. He also co-initiated the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum in 2003, promoting South-South cooperation on trade, technology, and development among emerging economies.

Governance Failures and Societal Costs

Under Mbeki's presidency from 1999 to 2008, South Africa's policies delayed the rollout of antiretroviral treatments, contributing to an estimated 330,000 preventable deaths and 35,000 unnecessary mother-to-child transmissions between 2000 and 2005, according to a analysis based on data compared to projected treatment scenarios. This stemmed from Mbeki's public skepticism of the HIV-AIDS causal link and preference for nutritional interventions over pharmaceuticals, which postponed national ARV programs until 2004 despite international evidence of efficacy. The societal toll included strained healthcare systems, orphaned children numbering in the millions, and economic losses from lost productivity, exacerbating cycles in affected communities. The arms procurement deal, signed in 1999 for R30 billion (approximately $5 billion at the time), became emblematic of lapses, with investigations revealing allegations involving senior officials and diverting public funds from social needs like and . Audits and probes implicated politically connected figures in kickbacks totaling hundreds of millions, fostering a culture of that undermined investor confidence and in state institutions. Societal costs manifested in opportunity losses—funds could have addressed deficits—and entrenched , where procurement benefits accrued to a narrow cadre rather than broad development. Persistent high rates compounded these issues, with annual averaging over 18,000 during Mbeki's term in a of about 45-48 million, yielding a rate of roughly 40 per 100,000—among the world's highest despite a slight decline from early post-apartheid peaks. Police inefficiencies and hindered effective policing, leading to societal costs including , business emigration, and daily insecurity that deterred and perpetuated inequality. Underinvestment in Eskom's capacity, ignoring warnings of supply shortages, triggered the nation's first load-shedding blackouts in late , disrupting industry and households; Mbeki later attributed this to managerial failures but acknowledged governmental oversight lapses in his state of the nation address. This initiated chronic energy instability, costing the economy billions annually in lost output and foreshadowing deeper infrastructural decay. Mbeki's "quiet diplomacy" toward allowed Robert Mugabe's regime to evade pressure on and economic mismanagement post-2002, resulting in over 3 million refugees straining South African borders and services by 2008. The policy's failure prolonged Zimbabwe's and farm seizures, indirectly inflating South Africa's import costs and regional instability without yielding democratic reforms. Domestically, redistributed only about 4% of farmland by 2008 against a 30% target, with many projects collapsing due to inadequate post-transfer support, perpetuating and racial disparities in ownership. averaged 4.5% yearly, yet the hovered at 0.63-0.67, reflecting policies like that enriched connected elites while broad inequality endured, limiting to marginal gains. These failures collectively eroded social cohesion, with unmet expectations fueling unrest and long-term developmental setbacks.

Evolving Public and Historical Evaluations

During his from 1999 to , Thabo Mbeki received acclaim for stabilizing South Africa's economy through prudent fiscal policies, including reducing the budget deficit from 4.8% of GDP in to near balance by and lowering public debt from 27% to under 25% of GDP, which supported average annual GDP growth of 4.2%. A 2004 Kaiser Family Foundation survey indicated that 72% of held a favorable view of Mbeki, reflecting approval for early post-apartheid consolidation and his role in elevating South Africa's global standing via initiatives like the (NEPAD). These assessments emphasized his intellectual approach to governance and , positioning him as a architect of African self-reliance amid Western skepticism. Evaluations shifted negatively amid escalating controversies, particularly Mbeki's questioning of as the sole cause of AIDS, which delayed antiretroviral rollout and contributed to an estimated 330,000 preventable deaths between 2000 and according to a Harvard study commissioned by the . in the under Mbeki declined, with Afrobarometer surveys from showing approval ratings dropping below 50% in some metrics due to perceived aloofness, scandals like the arms deal, and internal ANC factionalism culminating in his recall. Contemporary analyses, such as those from the Foundation, critiqued his administration for high unemployment (reaching 23% by ) and policy rigidities that favored elite empowerment over broad-based growth, framing his tenure as marked by centralization and unfulfilled promises. Post-presidency assessments initially reinforced these criticisms, with outlets like Al Jazeera highlighting Mbeki's ousting as emblematic of eroded democratic credentials through state institution misuse against rivals like . However, by the and into the , a reappraisal emerged amid comparisons to successors' lapses, including Zuma-era and Ramaphosa's slower reforms. A 2023 Ipsos survey for the South African Institute of Race Relations found Mbeki rated as the most favorably viewed political figure, with 58% approval among ANC supporters—surpassing Cyril Ramaphosa's 44%—attributed to nostalgia for his era's relative stability and lower levels. Scholars have increasingly credited his pan-African vision, including mediation in conflicts like and Côte d'Ivoire, as enduring contributions, though domestic critiques persist on personality-driven isolation and uneven inequality reduction. Historical scholarship, such as reflections in "Mbeki and After" (2009), underscores this evolution from vilification to partial rehabilitation, noting Mbeki's efforts to counter neocolonial narratives while acknowledging causal links between his stances and delays. On the continent, admiration endures for his intellectual defense of African agency, contrasting with African domestic ambivalence where polls show persistent divides: urban elites value his , while rural and working-class respondents cite unmet service delivery. This bifurcation reflects broader debates on measuring legacy against empirical outcomes like sustained growth versus societal costs from hesitancy, with recent works urging balanced over partisan recall.

Honors and Distinctions

Academic and Professional Recognitions

Mbeki completed British examinations in 1960 and 1961 before undertaking the first year of an degree as an external student with the from 1961 to 1962. He subsequently registered for and completed a Master of degree at the in 1966. In recognition of his intellectual and leadership contributions, Mbeki has received multiple honorary doctorates from academic institutions. Confirmed awards include the Diploma of Honorary Doctorate from RUDN University in 1998; an on 17 September 1999; an on 19 May 2000; an in 2016; and an . Mbeki holds the position of Chancellor at the (Unisa), a role that underscores his ongoing engagement with higher education in and . Professionally, he received the Chancellor's Award for Leadership in Africa from the in 2004, honoring his anti-apartheid efforts and post-presidency initiatives. These recognitions reflect institutions' acknowledgment of his economic scholarship and advocacy for African development, though they have occasionally been critiqued in contexts tied to debates during his .

International Awards and Patron Roles

Mbeki was conferred the , Cuba's highest state honor, by President on March 28, 2001, in recognition of his contributions to anti-apartheid solidarity and bilateral relations. In 2002, he received the Knight Grand Cross with Collar of the of the Italian Republic, Italy's premier civil honor, acknowledging his role in fostering international and post-apartheid . Jamaica awarded him membership in the Order of Excellence in 2003, the island nation's top distinction for foreign heads of state or government, as the inaugural recipient for advancing global cooperation. The presented Mbeki with the Champions of the Earth award in 2005, honoring South Africa's initiatives in cultural and biological diversity preservation under his leadership. Following his presidency, Mbeki assumed the role of patron for the Thabo Mbeki Foundation, established to advance the through policy dialogues, leadership training via the Thabo Mbeki African School of Public and International Affairs, and support for continental institutions like the . The foundation facilitates high-level engagements on , , and , positioning Mbeki as an influential figure in pan-African intellectual and diplomatic networks.

References

  1. http://news.[bbc](/page/BBC).co.uk/2/hi/africa/249680.stm
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