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Classified information
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Classified information is confidential material that a government, corporation, or non-governmental organisation deems to be sensitive information, which must be protected from unauthorized disclosure and that requires special handling and dissemination controls. Access is restricted by law, regulation, or corporate policies to particular groups of individuals with both the necessary security clearance and a need to know.
Classified information within an organisation is typically arranged into several hierarchical levels of sensitivity—e.g. Confidential (C), Secret (S), and Top Secret (TS). The choice of which level to assign a file is based on threat modelling, with different organisations have varying classification systems, asset management rules, and assessment frameworks. Classified information generally becomes less sensitive with the passage of time, and may eventually be reclassified or declassified and made public.
Governments often require a formal security clearance and corresponding background check to view or handle classified material. Mishandling or unlawful disclosure of confidential material can incur criminal penalties, depending on the nature of the information and the laws of a jurisdiction. Since the late twentieth century, there has been freedom of information legislation in some countries, where the public is deemed to have the right to all information that is not considered to be damaging if released. Sometimes documents are released with information still considered confidential redacted. Classified information is sometimes also intentionally leaked to the media to influence public opinion.[2][3]
Governmental classification levels
[edit]Top Secret (TS)
[edit]
In many jurisdictions, for example, the United States and United Kingdom, Top Secret (TS) is the highest level of classified information.[4] Prior to 1942, the United Kingdom and other members of the British Empire used Most Secret, but this was later changed to match the United States' category name of Top Secret in order to simplify Allied interoperability. The unauthorized disclosure of Top Secret information is expected to cause harm and be of grave threat to national security.[5][6]
Secret
[edit]It is desired that no document be released which refers to experiments with humans and might have adverse effect on public opinion or result in legal suits. Documents covering such work field should be classified "secret".
Secret material is often regarded as causative of "serious damage" to national security if it were publicly available,[9] although not as serious harm as in the case of Top Secret classification.
Confidential
[edit]Confidential material is material that would cause "damage" or be prejudicial to national security if publicly available. It is used in the US since as early as 1936.[10] A relatively recent revision of its definition is in Executive Order 13526.
Restricted
[edit]Restricted material would cause "undesirable effects" if publicly available. Some countries do not have such a classification in public sectors, such as commercial industries. Such a level is also known as "Private Information". Such a level existed within the US Government during World War II but is no longer used.
The Official-Sensitive classification replaced the Restricted' classification in April 2014 in the UK. Unlike information only marked Official, information that belong to this class is of some interest to threat actors. Compromise is likely to cause moderate damage to the work or reputation of the organisation and/or the government.[11]
Controlled
[edit]This class of information forms the generality of government business, public service delivery and commercial activity. Compared to the higher levels, the consequence of compromise is lower but not nonexistent.
- In U.S. DOD classification, this class is called Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI). It is divided into five levels specifying different scopes of dissemination. It is the result of an effort to consolidate agency-specific markings such as Sensitive But Unclassified.
- In U.K. classification, this class is called Official. It replaced the previously used Unclassified marking in 2014. Protection is required but is not as strict as the higher levels.[11]
Unclassified
[edit]Unclassified information is low-impact, and therefore does not require any special protection.
Corporate classification
[edit]Private corporations often require written confidentiality agreements and conduct background checks on candidates for sensitive positions.[12]
Policies dictating methods for marking and safeguarding company-sensitive information are common in companies, especially as regards information that is protected under trade secret laws. New product development teams are often sequestered and forbidden to share information about their efforts with un-cleared employees. Other activities, such as mergers and financial report preparation generally involve similar restrictions. However, corporate security generally lacks the standardised hierarchical clearance and sensitivity structures and the criminal sanctions of government classification systems.
In the U.S., the Employee Polygraph Protection Act prohibits private employers from requiring lie detector tests, but there are a few exceptions.
Trade secrets
[edit]Personally identifiable information (PII)
[edit]Protected health information (PHI)
[edit]Nonpublic personal information
[edit]Material Nonpublic Information
[edit]International classification systems
[edit]When a government agency or group shares information between an agency or group of other country's government they will generally employ a special classification scheme that both parties have previously agreed to honour.
For example, the marking Atomal, is applied to U.S. Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data and United Kingdom Atomic information that has been released to NATO. Atomal information is marked COSMIC Top Secret Atomal (CTSA), NATO Secret Atomal (NSAT), or NATO Confidential Atomal (NCA). BALK and BOHEMIA are also used.
NATO classifications
[edit]For example, sensitive information shared amongst NATO allies has four levels of security classification; from most to least classified:[13][14]
- COSMIC Top Secret (CTS)
- NATO Secret (NS)
- NATO Confidential (NC)
- NATO Restricted (NR)
- ATOMAL: This designation is added to the NATO security classification when applicable. For example, COSMIC TOP SECRET ATOMAL (CTS-A). ATOMAL information applies to U.S. RESTRICTED DATA or FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA or United Kingdom Atomic Information released to NATO.[15]
A special case exists with regard to NATO Unclassified (NU) information. Documents with this marking are NATO property (copyright) and must not be made public without NATO permission.
COSMIC is an acronym for "Control of Secret Material in an International Command".[16]
International organizations
[edit]- The European Union has four levels: EU Top Secret, EU Secret, EU Confidential, EU Restricted.[17] (Note that usually the French terms are used.[18])
- Très Secret UE/EU Top Secret: information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which could cause exceptionally grave prejudice to the essential interests of the European Union or of one or more of the Member States;
- Secret UE/EU Secret: information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which could seriously harm the essential interests of the European Union or of one or more of the Member States;
- Confidentiel UE/EU Confidential: information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which could harm the essential interests of the European Union or of one or more of the Member States;
- Restreint UE/EU Restricted: information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which could be disadvantageous to the interests of the European Union or of one or more of the Member States.
- Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation, a European defence organisation, has three levels of classification: OCCAR Secret, OCCAR Confidential, and OCCAR Restricted.[19]
- The United Nations has two classification levels: Confidential and Strictly Confidential.[20]
Traffic Light Protocol
[edit]The Traffic Light Protocol[21][22] was developed by the Group of Eight countries to enable the sharing of sensitive information between government agencies and corporations. This protocol has now been accepted as a model for trusted information exchange by over 30 other countries. The protocol provides for four "information sharing levels" for the handling of sensitive information.
By country
[edit]
Most countries employ some sort of classification system for certain government information. For example, in Canada, information that the U.S. would classify SBU (Sensitive but Unclassified) is called "protected" and further subcategorised into levels A, B, and C.
Australia
[edit]On 19 July 2011, the National Security (NS) classification marking scheme and the Non-National Security (NNS) classification marking scheme in Australia was unified into one structure.
As of 2018, the policy detailing how Australian government entities handle classified information is defined in the Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF). The PSPF is published by the Attorney-General's Department and covers security governance, information security, personal security, and physical security. A security classification can be applied to the information itself or an asset that holds information e.g., a USB or laptop.[23]
The Australian Government uses four security classifications: OFFICIAL: Sensitive, PROTECTED, SECRET and TOP SECRET. The relevant security classification is based on the likely damage resulting from compromise of the information's confidentiality.
All other information from business operations and services requires a routine level of protection and is treated as OFFICIAL. Information that does not form part of official duty is treated as UNOFFICIAL.
OFFICIAL and UNOFFICIAL are not security classifications and are not mandatory markings.
Caveats are a warning that the information has special protections in addition to those indicated by the security classification of PROTECTED or higher (or in the case of the NATIONAL CABINET caveat, OFFICIAL: Sensitive or higher). Australia has four caveats:
- Codewords (sensitive compartmented information)
- Foreign government markings
- Special handling instructions
- Releasability caveats
Codewords are primarily used within the national security community. Each codeword identifies a special need-to-know compartment.
Foreign government markings are applied to information created by Australian agencies from foreign source information. Foreign government marking caveats require protection at least equivalent to that required by the foreign government providing the source information.
Special handling instructions are used to indicate particular precautions for information handling. They include:
- EXCLUSIVE FOR (named person)
- CABINET
- NATIONAL CABINET
A releasability caveat restricts information based on citizenship. The three in use are:
- Australian Eyes Only (AUSTEO)
- Australian Government Access Only (AGAO)
- Releasable To (REL).[23]
Additionally, the PSPF outlines Information Management Markers (IMM) as a way for entities to identify information that is subject to non-security related restrictions on access and use. These are:
- Legal privilege
- Legislative secret
- Personal privacy[23]
Brazil
[edit]There are three levels of document classification under Brazilian Law No. 12.527, the Access to Information Act:[24] ultrassecreto (top secret), secreto (secret) and reservado (restricted).
A top secret (ultrassecreto) government-issued document may be classified for a period of 25 years, which may be extended up to another 25 years.[25] Thus, no document remains classified for more than 50 years. This is mandated by the 2011 Information Access Law (Lei de Acesso à Informação), a change from the previous rule, under which documents could have their classification time length renewed indefinitely, effectively shuttering state secrets from the public. The 2011 law applies retroactively to existing documents.
Canada
[edit]Background and hierarchy
[edit]The government of Canada employs two main types of sensitive information designation: Classified and Protected. The access and protection of both types of information is governed by the Security of Information Act, effective 24 December 2001, replacing the Official Secrets Act 1981.[26] To access the information, a person must have the appropriate security clearance and the need to know.
In addition, the caveat "Canadian Eyes Only" is used to restrict access to Classified or Protected information only to Canadian citizens with the appropriate security clearance and need to know.[27]
Special operational information
[edit]SOI is not a classification of data per se. It is defined under the Security of Information Act, and unauthorised release of such information constitutes a higher breach of trust, with a penalty of up to life imprisonment if the information is shared with a foreign entity or terrorist group.
SOIs include:
- military operations in respect of a potential, imminent or present armed conflict
- the identity of confidential source of information, intelligence or assistance to the Government of Canada
- tools used for information gathering or intelligence
- the object of a covert investigation, or a covert collection of information or intelligence
- the identity of any person who is under covert surveillance
- encryption and cryptographic systems
- information or intelligence to, or received from, a foreign entity or terrorist group
In February 2025, the Department of National Defence announced a new category of Persons Permanently Bound to Security (PPBS). The protection would apply to some units, sections or elements, and select positions (both current and former), with access to sensitive Special Operational Information (SOI) for national defense and intelligence work. If a unit or organization routinely handles SOI, all members of that unit will be automatically bound to secrecy. If an individual has direct access to SOI, deemed to be integral to national security, that person may be recommended for PPBS designation. The designation is for life, punishable by imprisonment.[28]
Classified information
[edit]Classified information can be designated Top Secret, Secret or Confidential. These classifications are only used on matters of national interest.
- Top Secret: applies when compromise might reasonably cause exceptionally grave injury to the national interest. The possible impact must be great, immediate and irreparable.
- Secret: applies when compromise might reasonably cause serious injury to the national interest.
- Confidential: disclosure might reasonably cause injury to the national interest.
Protected information
[edit]Protected information is not classified. It pertains to any sensitive information that does not relate to national security and cannot be disclosed under the access and privacy legislation because of the potential injury to particular public or private interests.[29][30]
- Protected C (Extremely Sensitive protected information): designates extremely sensitive information, which if compromised, could reasonably be expected to cause extremely grave injury outside the national interest. Examples include bankruptcy, identities of informants in criminal investigations, etc.
- Protected B (Particularly Sensitive protected information): designates information that could cause severe injury or damage to the people or group involved if it was released. Examples include medical records, annual personnel performance reviews, income tax returns, etc.
- Protected A (Low-Sensitive protected information): designates low sensitivity information that should not be disclosed to the public without authorization and could reasonably be expected to cause injury or embarrassment outside the national interest. Example of Protected A information include employee identification number, pay deposit banking information, etc.
Federal Cabinet (King's Privy Council for Canada) papers are either protected (e.g., overhead slides prepared to make presentations to Cabinet) or classified (e.g., draft legislation, certain memos).[31]
People's Republic of China
[edit]
The Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (which is not operative in the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau) makes it a crime to release a state secret. Regulation and enforcement is carried out by the National Administration for the Protection of State Secrets.
Under the 2024 revision of the "Law on Guarding State Secrets",[32] state secrets are defined as those that concern:
- Major policy decisions on state affairs
- The building of national defence and in the activities of the armed forces
- Diplomatic activities and in activities related to foreign countries and those to be maintained as commitments to foreign countries
- National economic and social development
- Science and technology
- Activities for preserving state security and the investigation of criminal offences
- Any other matters classified as "state secrets" by the national State Secrets Bureau[33]
Secrets can be classified into three categories:
- Top Secret (Chinese: 绝密; pinyin: Juémì), defined as "vital state secrets whose disclosure would cause extremely serious harm to state security and national interests"
- Highly Secret (Chinese: 机密; pinyin: Jīmì), defined as "important state secrets whose disclosure would cause serious harm to state security and national interests"
- Secret (Chinese: 秘密; pinyin: Mìmì), defined as "ordinary state secrets whose disclosure would cause harm to state security and national interests"[33]
France
[edit]In France, classified information is defined by article 413-9 of the Penal Code.[34] The three levels of military classification are
- Très Secret Défense (Very Secret Defence): Information deemed extremely harmful to national defence,[citation needed] and relative to governmental priorities in national defence. No service or organisation can elaborate, process, stock, transfer, display or destroy information or protected supports classified at this level without authorization from the Prime Minister or the national secretary for National Defence. Partial or exhaustive reproduction is strictly forbidden.
- Secret Défense (Secret Defence): Information deemed very harmful to national defence. Such information cannot be reproduced without authorisation from the emitting authority, except in exceptional emergencies.
- Confidentiel Défense (Confidential Defence) - in effect until 2021:[35] Information deemed potentially harmful to national defence, or that could lead to uncovering some information classified at a higher level of security.
Less sensitive information is "protected". The levels are
- Confidentiel personnels Officiers ("Confidential officers")
- Confidentiel personnels Sous-Officiers ("Confidential non-commissioned officers")
- Diffusion restreinte ("restricted information")
- Diffusion restreinte administrateur ("administrative restricted information")
- Non Protégé (unprotected)
A further caveat, spécial France (reserved France) restricts the document to French citizens (in its entirety or by extracts). This is not a classification level.
Declassification of documents can be done by the Commission consultative du secret de la défense nationale (CCSDN), an independent authority. Transfer of classified information is done with double envelopes, the outer layer being plastified and numbered, and the inner in strong paper. Reception of the document involves examination of the physical integrity of the container and registration of the document. In foreign countries, the document must be transferred through specialised military mail or diplomatic bag. Transport is done by an authorised conveyor or habilitated person for mail under 20 kg. The letter must bear a seal mentioning "Par Valise Accompagnee-Sacoche". Once a year, ministers have an inventory of classified information and supports by competent authorities.
Once their usage period is expired, documents are transferred to archives, where they are either destroyed (by incineration, crushing, or overvoltage), or stored.
In case of unauthorized release of classified information, competent authorities are the Ministry of Interior, the 'Haut fonctionnaire de défense et de sécurité ("high civil servant for defence and security") of the relevant ministry, and the General secretary for National Defence. Violation of such secrets is an offence punishable with seven years of imprisonment and a 100,000-euro fine; if the offence is committed by imprudence or negligence, the penalties are three years of imprisonment and a 45,000-euro fine.
Hong Kong
[edit]The Security Bureau is responsible for developing policies in regards to the protection and handling of confidential government information. In general, the system used in Hong Kong is very similar to the UK system, developed from the colonial era of Hong Kong.
Four classifications exists in Hong Kong, from highest to lowest in sensitivity:[36]
- Top Secret (絕對機密)
- Secret (高度機密)
- Confidential (機密)
- Temporary Confidential (臨時保密)
- Restricted (限閱文件/內部文件)
- Restricted (staff) (限閱文件(人事))
- Restricted (tender) (限閱文件 (投標))
- Restricted (administration) (限閱文件 (行政))
Restricted documents are not classified per se, but only those who have a need to know will have access to such information, in accordance with the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance.[37]
New Zealand
[edit]New Zealand uses the Restricted classification, which is lower than Confidential. People may be given access to Restricted information on the strength of an authorisation by their Head of department, without being subjected to the background vetting associated with Confidential, Secret and Top Secret clearances. New Zealand's security classifications and the national-harm requirements associated with their use are roughly similar to those of the United States.
In addition to national security classifications there are two additional security classifications, In Confidence and Sensitive, which are used to protect information of a policy and privacy nature. There are also a number of information markings used within ministries and departments of the government, to indicate, for example, that information should not be released outside the originating ministry.
Because of strict privacy requirements around personal information, personnel files are controlled in all parts of the public and private sectors. Information relating to the security vetting of an individual is usually classified at the In Confidence level.
Romania
[edit]In Romania, classified information is referred to as "state secrets" (secrete de stat) and is defined by the Penal Code as "documents and data that manifestly appear to have this status or have been declared or qualified as such by decision of Government".[38] There are three levels of classification: "Secret" (Secret/S), "Top Secret" (Strict Secret/SS), and "Top Secret of Particular Importance" (Strict secret de interes deosebit/SSID).[39] The levels are set by the Romanian Intelligence Service and must be aligned with NATO regulations—in case of conflicting regulations, the latter are applied with priority. Dissemination of classified information to foreign agents or powers is punishable by up to life imprisonment, if such dissemination threatens Romania's national security.[40]

Russia
[edit]In the Russian Federation, a state secret (Государственная тайна) is information protected by the state on its military, foreign policy, economic, intelligence, counterintelligence, operational and investigative and other activities, dissemination of which could harm state security.
Sweden
[edit]
The Swedish classification has been updated due to increased NATO/PfP cooperation. All classified defence documents will now have both a Swedish classification (Kvalificerat hemlig, Hemlig, Konfidentiell or Begränsat Hemlig), and an English classification (Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, or Restricted).[citation needed] The term skyddad identitet, "protected identity", is used in the case of protection of a threatened person, basically implying "secret identity", accessible only to certain members of the police force and explicitly authorised officials.
Switzerland
[edit]At the federal level, classified information in Switzerland is assigned one of three levels, which are from lowest to highest: Internal, Confidential, Secret.[41] Respectively, these are, in German, Intern, Vertraulich, Geheim; in French, Interne, Confidentiel, Secret; in Italian, Ad Uso Interno, Confidenziale, Segreto. As in other countries, the choice of classification depends on the potential impact that the unauthorised release of the classified document would have on Switzerland, the federal authorities or the authorities of a foreign government.
According to the Ordinance on the Protection of Federal Information, information is classified as Internal if its "disclosure to unauthorised persons may be disadvantageous to national interests."[41] Information classified as Confidential could, if disclosed, compromise "the free formation of opinions and decision-making of the Federal Assembly or the Federal Council," jeopardise national monetary/economic policy, put the population at risk or adversely affect the operations of the Swiss Armed Forces. Finally, the unauthorised release of Secret information could seriously compromise the ability of either the Federal Assembly or the Federal Council to function or impede the ability of the Federal Government or the Armed Forces to act.
Turkey
[edit]According to the related regulations in Turkey, there are four levels of document classification:[42] çok gizli (top secret), gizli (secret), özel (confidential) and hizmete özel (restricted). The fifth is tasnif dışı, which means unclassified.
United Kingdom
[edit]
Until 2013, the United Kingdom used five levels of classification—from lowest to highest, they were: Protect, Restricted, Confidential, Secret and Top Secret (formerly Most Secret). The Cabinet Office provides guidance on how to protect information, including the security clearances required for personnel. Staff may be required to sign to confirm their understanding and acceptance of the Official Secrets Acts 1911 to 1989, although the Act applies regardless of signature. Protect is not in itself a security protective marking level (such as Restricted or greater), but is used to indicate information which should not be disclosed because, for instance, the document contains tax, national insurance, or other personal information.
Government documents without a classification may be marked as Unclassified or Not Protectively Marked.[43]
This system was replaced by the Government Security Classifications Policy, which has a simpler model: Top Secret, Secret, and Official from April 2014.[11] Official Sensitive is a security marking which may be followed by one of three authorised descriptors: Commercial, LocSen (location sensitive) or Personal. Secret and Top Secret may include a caveat such as UK Eyes Only.
Also useful is that scientific discoveries may be classified via the D-Notice system if they are deemed to have applications relevant to national security. These may later emerge when technology improves so for example the specialised processors and routing engines used in graphics cards are loosely based on top secret military chips designed for code breaking and image processing. They may or may not have safeguards built in to generate errors when specific tasks are attempted and this is invariably independent of the card's operating system.[citation needed]
United States
[edit]The U.S. classification system is currently established under Executive Order 13526 and has three levels of classification—Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret. The U.S. had a Restricted level during World War II but no longer does. U.S. regulations state that information received from other countries at the Restricted level should be handled as Confidential. A variety of markings are used for material that is not classified, but whose distribution is limited administratively or by other laws, e.g., For Official Use Only (FOUO), or sensitive but unclassified (SBU). The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 provides for the protection of information related to the design of nuclear weapons. The term "Restricted Data" is used to denote certain nuclear technology. Information about the storage, use or handling of nuclear material or weapons is marked "Formerly Restricted Data". These designations are used in addition to level markings (Confidential, Secret and Top Secret). Information protected by the Atomic Energy Act is protected by law and information classified under the Executive Order is protected by Executive privilege.
The U.S. government insists it is "not appropriate" for a court to question whether any document is legally classified.[44] In the 1973 trial of Daniel Ellsberg for releasing the Pentagon Papers, the judge did not allow any testimony from Ellsberg, claiming it was "irrelevant", because the assigned classification could not be challenged. The charges against Ellsberg were ultimately dismissed after it was revealed that the government had broken the law in secretly breaking into the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist and in tapping his telephone without a warrant. Ellsberg insists that the legal situation in the U.S. in 2014 is worse than it was in 1973, and Edward Snowden could not get a fair trial.[45] The State Secrets Protection Act of 2008 might have given judges the authority to review such questions in camera, but the bill was not passed.[44]
When a government agency acquires classified information through covert means, or designates a program as classified, the agency asserts "ownership" of that information and considers any public availability of it to be a violation of their ownership—even if the same information was acquired independently through "parallel reporting" by the press or others. For example, although the CIA drone program has been widely discussed in public since the early 2000s, and reporters personally observed and reported on drone missile strikes, the CIA still considers the very existence of the program to be classified in its entirety, and any public discussion of it technically constitutes exposure of classified information. "Parallel reporting" was an issue in determining what constitutes "classified" information during the Hillary Clinton email controversy when Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Julia Frifield noted, "When policy officials obtain information from open sources, 'think tanks,' experts, foreign government officials, or others, the fact that some of the information may also have been available through intelligence channels does not mean that the information is necessarily classified."[46][47][48]
Former government intelligence officials are usually able to retain their security clearance, but it is a privilege not a right, with the President being the grantor.[49] The Washington Post reported in an investigation entitled "Top Secret America" that, as of 2010, "An estimated 854,000 people ... hold top-secret security clearances" in the United States.[50]
Clearance
[edit]Clearance is a general classification, that comprises a variety of rules controlling the level of permission required to view some classified information, and how it must be stored, transmitted, and destroyed. Additionally, access is restricted on a "need to know" basis. Simply possessing a clearance does not automatically authorize the individual to view all material classified at that level or below that level. The individual must present a legitimate "need to know" in addition to the proper level of clearance.
NOFORN (NF)
[edit]The classification markings NOFORN (NF) is information may not be disseminated to any foreign government, foreign national, foreigners, international organizations or any individuals that are not citizens of the United States of America.
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES ONLY (FED ONLY)
[edit]The document designation classification Federal Employees Only (FED ONLY) is a limited dissemination control established by the Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) executive. FED ONLY dissemination controls are authorized only to U.S. Government official employees, executive branch agencies, or United States armed forces of the U.S. Active Guard Reserve.
Federal Employees and Contractors Only (FEDCON)
[edit]Federal Employees and Contractors Only (FEDCON) is a limited dissemination control for authorized individuals or employees who enter a contract with the United States to perform a specific job.
Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU)
[edit]The document designation marking indicator for Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) is information that requires special handling and limited dissemination controls that falls under category of the CUI Policy.
Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)
[edit]Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) is information that falls within a law, regulation, and government-wide policy that require safeguarding to be protected from unauthorized disclosure. No individual may have access to CUI information unless he or she has been granted an authorization.
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
[edit]In addition to the general risk-based classification levels, additional compartmented constraints on access exist, such as (in the U.S.) Special Intelligence (SI), which protects intelligence sources and methods, No Foreign dissemination (NoForn), which restricts dissemination to U.S. nationals, and Originator Controlled dissemination (OrCon), which ensures that the originator can track possessors of the information. Information in these compartments is usually marked with specific keywords in addition to the classification level.
Government information about nuclear weapons often has an additional marking to show it contains such information (CNWDI).
Declassification
[edit]For originally classified documents, the date of the original classification is scheduled for an automatic declassification of 10 years or 25 years, from the date of original classification. "50X1-HUM" is information that reveals the identity of a confidential human source or a human intelligence source which is exempt from scheduled automatic declassification.[51] "50X2-WMD" is classified information exempt from automatic declassification at 10 years and 25 years that reveal information that reveals key elements and design of weapons of mass destruction assembly, production and deployment.
Table of equivalent classification markings in various countries
[edit]| (State) | Top Secret | Secret | Confidential | Restricted |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Albania | Teper Sekret | Sekret | Konfidencial | I Kufizuar |
| Argentina | Estrictamente Secreto y Confidencial
Strictly Secret and Confidential |
Secreto
Secret |
Confidencial
Confidential |
Reservado
Reserved |
| Armenia | Հատուկ կարևորության Of Special Importance |
Հույժ գաղտնի Top Secret |
Գաղտնի Secret[52] |
Ծառայողական օգտագործման համար For Service Use |
| Australia | Top Secret | Secret[23] | Retired 2018. No equivalent level for historical classification
US, French, EU, Japan "Confidential" marking to be handled as SECRET.[53] |
Protected |
| Austria | Streng Geheim | Geheim | Vertraulich | Eingeschränkt |
| Belgium | Zeer Geheim / Très Secret | Geheim / Secret | Vertrouwelijk / Confidentiel | Beperkte Verspreiding / Diffusion restreinte |
| Bolivia | Supersecreto or Muy Secreto |
Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | Vrlo tajno | Tajno | Povjerljivo | Interno |
| Brazil | Ultrassecreto | Secreto | no equivalent (formerly Confidencial) | Reservado |
| Bulgaria | Strògo sèkretno Строго секретно |
Sèkretno Секретно |
Poveritèlno Поверително |
Za služebno polzvàne За служебно ползване |
| Cambodia | Sam Ngat Bamphot | Sam Ngat Roeung | Art Kambang | Ham Kom Psay |
| Canada | Top Secret/Très secret | Secret/Secret | Confidential/Confidentiel | Protected A, B or C/Protégé A, B ou C |
| Chile | Secreto | Secreto | Reservado | Reservado |
| China | Juémì (绝密)
Top Secret |
Jīmì (机密)
Highly Secret |
Mìmì (秘密)
Secret |
Nèibù (内部)
Internal |
| Colombia | Ultrasecreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reserva del sumario |
| Costa Rica | Alto Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | |
| Croatia | Vrlo tajno | Tajno | Povjerljivo | Ograničeno |
| Czech Republic | Přísně tajné | Tajné | Důvěrné | Vyhrazené |
| Denmark | Yderst Hemmeligt (YHM) | Hemmeligt (HEM) | Fortroligt (FTR) | Til Tjenestebrug (TTJ) Foreign Service: Fortroligt |
| Ecuador | Secretisimo | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado |
| Egypt | Sirriy lil-Ġāyah سري للغاية |
Sirriy Ǧiddan سري جداً |
Khāṣ خاص |
Maḥzūr محظور |
| El Salvador | Ultra Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado |
| Estonia | Täiesti salajane | Salajane | Konfidentsiaalne | Piiratud |
| Ethiopia | ብርቱ ምስጢር | ምስጢር | ጥብቅ | ክልክል |
| European Union (EU) | Tres Secret UE / EU Top Secret | Secret UE / EU Secret | Confidentiel UE / EU Confidential | Restreint UE / EU Restricted |
| European Union (Western) (WEU) | Focal top secret | WEU Secret | WEU Confidential | WEU Restricted |
| Euratom | EURA Top Secret | EURA Secret | EURA Confidential | EURA Restricted |
| Finland[a] | Erittäin salainen (TL I) | Salainen (TL II) | Luottamuksellinen (TL III) | Käyttö rajoitettu (TL IV) |
| France | Très secret | Secret | Secret | Diffusion restreinte |
| Germany | Streng Geheim
Top Secret |
Geheim
Secret |
VS-Vertraulich
Confidential |
VS-Nur Für Den Dienstgebrauch
For Official Use Only |
| Greece | Άκρως Απόρρητον
Top Secret |
Απόρρητον
Secret |
Εμπιστευτικόν
Confidential |
Περιορισμένης Χρήσης Limited Use |
| Guatemala | Alto Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado |
| Haiti | Top Secret | Secret | Confidential | Reserve |
| Honduras | Super Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado |
| Hong Kong | Top Secret, 高度機密 | Secret, 機密 | Confidential, 保密 | Restricted, 內部文件/限閱文件 |
| Hungary | Szigorúan Titkos
Top Secret |
Titkos
Secret |
Bizalmas
Confidential |
Korlátozott Terjesztésű
Restricted Distribution |
| India (Hindi) | परम गुप्त (Param Gupt) | गुप्त (Gupt) | गोपनीय (Gopniya) | प्रतिबंधित/सीमित (Pratibandhit/seemit) |
| India (English) | Top Secret | Secret | Confidential | Restricted |
| Indonesia | Sangat Rahasia | Rahasia | Rahasia Dinas | Terbatas |
| Iran | Bekoli-Serri بکلی سری | Serri سری | Kheili-Mahramaneh خیلی محرمانه | Mahramaneh محرمانه |
| Iraq | Sirriy lil-Ġāyah سري للغاية |
Sirriy سري |
Khāṣ خاص |
Maḥdūd محدود |
| Iceland | Algert Leyndarmál
Absolute Secret |
Leyndarmál
Secret |
Trúnaðarmál
Confidential |
Þjónustuskjal
Service Document |
| Ireland (Irish language) | An-sicréideach | Sicréideach | Rúnda | Srianta |
| Israel | Sodi Beyoter סודי ביותר |
Sodi סודי |
Shamur שמור |
Mugbal מוגבל |
| Italy | Segretissimo | Segreto | Riservatissimo | Riservato |
| Japan | Kimitsu (機密) | Gokuhi (極秘) | Hi (秘) | Toriatsukaichuui (取り扱い注意) |
| Jordan | Maktūm Ǧiddan مكتوم جداً |
Maktūm مكتوم |
Sirriy سري |
Maḥdūd محدود |
| South Korea | 1(Il)-geup Bimil, 1급 비밀, 一級秘密
Class 1 Secret |
2(I)-geup Bimil, 2급 비밀, 二級秘密
Class 2 Secret |
3(Sam)-geup Bimil, 3급 비밀, 三級秘密
Class 3 Secret |
Daeoebi, 대외비, 對外秘
Confidential |
| Laos | Lup Sood Gnod | Kuam Lup | Kuam Lap | Chum Kut Kon Arn |
| Latvia | Sevišķi slepeni | Slepeni | Konfidenciāli | Dienesta vajadzībām |
| Lebanon | Tres Secret | Secret | Confidentiel | |
| Lithuania | Visiškai Slaptai | Slaptai | Konfidencialiai | Riboto Naudojimo |
| Malaysia | Rahsia Besar | Rahsia | Sulit | Terhad |
| Mexico | Ultra Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Restringido |
| Montenegro | Strogo Tajno | Tajno | Povjerljivo | Interno |
| Netherlands[54] | STG. Zeer Geheim | STG. Geheim | STG. Confidentieel | Departementaal Vertrouwelijk |
| New Zealand | Top Secret | Secret | Confidential | Restricted |
| Nicaragua | Alto Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado |
| Norway | STRENGT HEMMELIG | HEMMELIG | KONFIDENSIELT | BEGRENSET |
| Pakistan (Urdu) | Intahai Khufia انتہائی خفیہ |
Khufia خفیہ |
Sigh-e-Raz صیخہ راز |
Barai Mahdud Taqsim محدود تقسیم |
| Pakistan (English) | Top Secret | Secret | Confidential | Restricted |
| Paraguay | Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado |
| Peru | Estrictamente Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado |
| Philippines (English) | Top Secret
Matinding Lihim |
Secret
Mahigpit na Lihim |
Confidential
Lihim |
Restricted
Ipinagbabawal |
| Poland | Ściśle tajne | Tajne | Poufne | Zastrzeżone |
| Portugal | Muito Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado |
| Romania | Strict Secret de Importanță Deosebită
Strict Secret of Special Importance |
Strict Secret | Secret | Secret de serviciu
Secret for Service Use |
| Russia | Особой важности (вариант: Совершенно Секретно (Sovershenno Sekretno)) Of Special Importance (variant: Completely Secret) |
Совершенно секретно (вариант: Секретно (Sekretno)) Completely Secret (variant: Secret) |
Секретно (вариант: Не подлежит оглашению (Конфиденциально) (Ne podlezhit oglasheniyu (Konfidentsial'no)) Secret (variant: Not To Be Disclosed (Confidential)) |
Для Служебного Пользования (ДСП) (Dlya Sluzhebnogo Pol'zovaniya) For Official Use |
| Saudi Arabia | Saudi Top Secret | Saudi Very Secret | Saudi Secret | Saudi Restricted |
| Serbia | Cyrillic: Државна тајна Latin: Državna tajna State Secret |
Cyrillic: Строго поверљиво Latin: Strogo poverljivo Strictly Confidential |
Cyrillic: Поверљиво Latin: Poverljivo Confidential |
Cyrillic: Интерно Latin: Interno Internal |
| Singapore | Top Secret | Secret | Confidential | Restricted |
| Somalia | Sir Muhiim ah | Sir Gooniya | Xog Qarsoon | Qarsoon |
| Slovak Republic | Prísne tajné | Tajné | Dôverné | Vyhradené |
| Slovenia | Strogo tajno | Tajno | Zaupno | Interno |
| Spain | Secreto | Reservado | Confidencial | Difusión Limitada |
| Sri Lanka | අති රහස්ය | රහස්ය | රහසිගත | සීමාන්විත |
| Sweden | Kvalificerat hemlig (KH); Hemlig/Top Secret (H/TS) | Hemlig (H); Hemlig/Secret (H/S) | Konfidentiell; Hemlig/Confidential (H/C) | Begränsat hemlig; Hemlig/Restricted (H/R) |
| Switzerland | Geheim / Secret | Vertraulich / Confidentiel | Intern / Interne | |
| Taiwan (Republic of China)[55] | Top Secret (絕對機密) | Secret (極機密) | Confidential (機密) | no direct equivalent |
| Tanzania (Swahili) | Siri Kuu | Siri | Stiri | Imezuiliwa |
| Thailand | Lap thi sut (ลับที่สุด)
Most Secret |
Lap mak (ลับมาก)
Very Secret |
Lap (ลับ)
Secret |
Pok pit (ปกปิด)
Restricted |
| Turkey | Çok Gizli
Top Secret |
Gizli
Secret |
Özel
Confidential |
Hizmete Özel
Restricted |
| South Africa (English) | Top Secret | Secret | Confidential | Restricted |
| South Africa (Afrikaans) | Uiters Geheim | Geheim | Vertroulik | Beperk |
| Ukraine | Особливої важливості | Цілком таємно | Таємно | Для службового користування |
| United Kingdom | Top Secret (until 1942: Most Secret) | Secret | (formerly Confidential) abolished in 2014[56] | Official-Sensitive (formerly Restricted) |
| United States | Top Secret | Secret | Confidential | no direct equivalent |
| Uruguay | Ultra Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado |
| Vietnam | Tuyệt mật | Tối mật | Tài liệu mật | Hạn chế phổ biến |
Table notes:
Table source: US Department of Defense (January 1995). "National Industrial Security Program - Operating Manual (DoD 5220.22-M)" (PDF). pp. B1 - B3 (PDF pages:121–123 ). Archived (PDF) from the original on 27 July 2019. Retrieved 27 July 2019. | ||||
See also
[edit]- Cloak and dagger
- Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (U.S.)
- Espionage
- Espionage Act of 1917 (U.S.)
- Eyes only
- Five Eyes
- Golden Shield Project
- Government Security Classifications Policy (UK)
- Illegal number
- Information security
- Official Secrets Act (UK, India, Ireland, Malaysia, New Zealand)
- Security of Information Act (Canada)
- State Secrets Privilege (US)
- Wassenaar Arrangement
- WikiLeaks
- UKUSA Agreement
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- ^ Spracher, William C. “The Use and Abuse of Intelligence as a Political Weapon: Can the U.S. Avoid the Latin American Model?” American Intelligence Journal, vol. 37, no. 2, 2020, pp. 143–54. JSTOR website Archived 10 June 2023 at the Wayback Machine Retrieved 13 Feb. 2025.
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- ^ "Open Government | Declassification Frequently Asked Questions". www.justice.gov. 9 September 2014. Archived from the original on 25 May 2025. Retrieved 25 May 2025.
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External links
[edit]- Defence Vetting Agency Archived 29 November 2006 at the Wayback Machine. Carries out national security checks in the UK.
- Peter Galison, Removing Knowledge Archived 19 July 2014 at the Wayback Machine in Critical Inquiry n°31 (Autumn 2004).
- Goldman, Jan, & Susan Maret. Intelligence and information policy for national security: Key terms and concepts. Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.
- Lerner, Brenda Wilmoth, & K. Lee Lerner, eds. Terrorism: Essential primary sources. Thomson Gale, 2006.
- Los Alamos table of equivalent US and UK classifications
- Maret, Susan. On their own terms: A lexicon with an emphasis on information-related terms produced by the U.S. federal government. [1] Archived 26 February 2020 at the Wayback Machine, FAS, 6th ed., 2016.
- Marking Classified National Security Information Archived 31 August 2016 at the Wayback Machine ISOO booklet.
- The National Security Archive Archived 19 March 2015 at the Wayback Machine – a collection of declassified documents acquired through the FOIA.
- Parliament of Montenegro Archived 5 October 2011 at the Wayback Machine, Law on confidentiality of data. (in Serbian).
- Parliament of Serbia Archived 11 January 2012 at the Wayback Machine, Law on confidentiality of data. (in Serbian).
- U.S. Department of Defense National Industrial Security Program - Operating Manual (DoD 5220.22-M), explaining rules and policies for handling classified information.
Classified information
View on GrokipediaDefinition and Purpose
Definition of Classified Information
Classified information constitutes any knowledge that has been determined by an authorized official to require protection against unauthorized disclosure, as its release could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security of the issuing government.[3] This designation applies to information owned by, produced for, or under the control of a government agency, encompassing data in any form—such as documents, oral communications, or digital records—that pertains to military capabilities, intelligence sources, foreign relations, or other sensitive matters.[2] The core criterion is the potential for harm: unauthorized disclosure must pose identifiable risks, ranging from damage at lower levels to exceptionally grave damage at the highest, as established in frameworks like the U.S. Executive Order 13526, which mandates classification only when there is demonstrable need based on specific standards rather than blanket secrecy.[1] Governments implement classification to restrict access to a "need-to-know" basis, ensuring that only individuals with appropriate clearances and roles can view the material, thereby mitigating espionage, sabotage, or inadvertent leaks that could compromise operations or alliances.[9] While primarily associated with national defense and foreign policy, the term extends to analogous systems in other nations, such as the UK's Official-Secret levels or historical Soviet markings, where the emphasis remains on safeguarding information whose exposure could undermine state interests or public safety.[10] Classification does not imply perpetual secrecy; it includes provisions for periodic review and declassification when the information no longer meets harm thresholds, promoting accountability amid risks of overuse that can obscure legitimate public oversight.[3]Rationale for Classification
The rationale for classifying information centers on safeguarding national security by limiting access to material whose unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable damage to the national interests of the classifying government. In the United States, Executive Order 13526 specifies that classification applies only to information pertaining to specific categories, such as military plans, weapons systems, or operations; foreign government information; intelligence activities (including sources and methods); foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States; scientific, technological, or economic vulnerabilities of the United States; scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to non-proliferation, arms control, or disarmament; United States Government programs (including classified research) for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to national security; or the development, production, or use of weapons of mass destruction.[3][11] Classification decisions must demonstrate anticipated damage from disclosure—ranging from damage at the Confidential level, serious damage at Secret, to exceptionally grave damage at Top Secret—while prohibiting classification to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; prevent embarrassment; restrain competition; or for other improper purposes. This framework ensures protection against adversaries exploiting sensitive data to undermine defense capabilities, compromise intelligence operations, or disrupt foreign policy objectives, thereby preserving strategic advantages and operational effectiveness.[3][12] In intelligence and defense contexts, the imperative to classify extends to shielding human sources, technical collection methods, and analytical assessments, as exposure could terminate vital information flows, endanger personnel, or enable countermeasures that erode collection efficacy. Similarly, for defense applications, classification guards technological edges, such as advanced weaponry designs or cyber defense architectures, preventing proliferation to hostile actors and maintaining deterrence postures. Empirical instances, including historical leaks like the disclosure of atomic bomb development details during World War II, underscore how premature revelation can accelerate enemy adaptations and prolong conflicts.[13][4]Fundamental Principles
Classified information systems operate on the principle that access to sensitive data must be restricted to prevent damage to national security, with classification applied only when disclosure could reasonably cause identifiable harm.[3] This requires information to pertain to specific categories, such as military plans, foreign government information, intelligence sources and methods, or vulnerabilities that, if unauthorizedly disclosed, would damage national security interests.[14] Classification is prohibited for concealing violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error, ensuring it serves protection rather than evasion of accountability.[3] A core tenet is the "need-to-know" requirement, mandating that even cleared individuals receive access only if it is essential for their duties, minimizing unnecessary exposure.[14] Original classification authority is delegated sparingly to senior officials, with derivative classification following established sources to maintain consistency.[3] Levels of classification—Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret—correspond to escalating degrees of potential damage from unauthorized disclosure: damage, serious damage, and exceptionally grave damage, respectively.[4] Declassification embodies the principle of temporality, with information presumed declassifiable after 25 years unless an exemption applies, promoting eventual transparency while allowing extensions for ongoing risks.[14] Mandatory declassification reviews and systematic processes ensure ongoing evaluation, countering indefinite secrecy.[3] Safeguarding measures, including marking, storage, and transmission protocols, enforce these principles operationally.[15] Oversight by agencies like the Information Security Oversight Office verifies compliance, with penalties for mishandling underscoring accountability.[16]Historical Development
Early Origins
The practice of protecting sensitive governmental and military information dates back to ancient civilizations, where leaders employed secrecy to maintain strategic advantages and internal control. In ancient China, during the Warring States period around the 5th century BC, military strategist Sun Tzu outlined principles of information control in The Art of War, emphasizing that "the formation and procedure of government should not be divulged" to prevent adversaries from exploiting knowledge, and that withholding what one knows avoids trouble.[6] This approach extended to espionage, with Sun Tzu advocating the use of secret agents whose operations required compartmentalized knowledge inaccessible to most. Similarly, during the Trojan War, circa 1200 BC, the Greeks demonstrated early classification by concealing soldiers within the Trojan Horse, a tactic that succeeded due to the secrecy of the ploy's true purpose, illustrating military deception as a form of protected information.[6] In ancient Greece, Sparta institutionalized secrecy as a core element of state security. The krypteia, a secretive rite involving elite youth who conducted covert surveillance and assassinations of helots (subjugated populations) to deter rebellion, operated under strict nondisclosure, functioning as an early secret service to enforce social order without public scrutiny.[17] Sparta's governance further embodied opacity; its foundational constitution, the Great Rhetra attributed to the semi-mythical lawgiver Lycurgus around the 8th century BC, was treated as a state secret, inscribed and guarded by the Oracle of Delphi to prevent dissemination and preserve the oligarchic system's mystique.[18] This culture of reticence extended to foreign policy, where ephors (overseers) withheld deliberations from outsiders, as noted by Thucydides, reflecting a deliberate policy to shield internal mechanisms from emulation or subversion.[19] Ancient Rome developed the concept of arcana imperii, or "secrets of empire," denoting esoteric knowledge of statecraft reserved for emperors, senators, and priests to sustain power. Tacitus, in his Histories (circa 100 AD), referenced these as hidden doctrines guiding rule, including ritual secrets like the names of Rome's guardian gods, disclosed only to select augurs under penalty of sacrilege.[20][21] Such practices protected imperial strategies from rivals, with breaches punished severely, foreshadowing later legal frameworks. By the early modern period, European monarchs continued these traditions; in 16th-century England, Queen Elizabeth I decreed all written accounts of Francis Drake's circumnavigation (1577–1580) as state secrets to safeguard naval tactics from foreign powers. These precedents laid the groundwork for formalized systems, though pre-19th-century secrecy relied more on oaths, customs, and ad hoc prohibitions than standardized marking or hierarchies.Establishment of Modern Systems
The establishment of modern classification systems in the United States gained momentum during World War II, when ad hoc measures were adopted to protect defense-related information amid escalating global conflicts. President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8381 on June 10, 1940, empowering military and civilian officials to classify documents deemed vital to national defense, with initial categories including "Secret," "Confidential," and "Restricted" primarily for military use. These wartime directives, however, lacked a unified government-wide structure, relying instead on departmental discretion and temporary regulations that varied in application and enforcement.[6] Postwar institutionalization marked the true foundation of enduring modern frameworks, driven by the need for standardized protections in the face of Soviet espionage and nuclear proliferation risks. President Harry S. Truman's Executive Order 10290, promulgated on September 24, 1951, created the first comprehensive executive branch program for classifying, safeguarding, and handling sensitive information across all departments and agencies.[22] This order formalized three core sensitivity levels—Confidential (potential damage to national security), Secret (serious damage), and Top Secret (exceptionally grave damage)—alongside the ancillary "Restricted" category, which was discontinued in subsequent revisions.[6][23] Authority for original classification was delegated to specified high-level officials, with mandates for marking documents, secure storage, and limited access based on "need to know," reflecting first-principles assessments of disclosure risks rather than blanket secrecy.[24] These U.S. innovations influenced allied systems through wartime intelligence sharing, such as the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff arrangements, which harmonized terminology like "Most Secret" (precursor to Top Secret) in joint operations.[6] By embedding empirical criteria tied to verifiable harm—rather than subjective political concerns—the 1951 framework prioritized causal linkages between information release and tangible threats, setting precedents for declassification reviews every 10 years unless extended with justification. Subsequent executive orders, such as Eisenhower's 10501 in 1953, refined but did not fundamentally alter this baseline structure.Evolution in the Post-Cold War and Digital Age
The end of the Cold War in 1991 shifted national security priorities away from superpower rivalry toward asymmetric threats like terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and regional conflicts, prompting initial declassification efforts to reduce Cold War-era secrecy. President Bill Clinton's Executive Order 12958, issued on April 17, 1995, established a presumption of declassification for information older than 25 years unless an exemption applied, aiming to limit overclassification and facilitate public access to historical records while maintaining protections for ongoing risks.[25] This reform responded to post-Cold War assessments that much archived material no longer warranted secrecy, though implementation faced resistance from agencies citing persistent intelligence sources and methods vulnerabilities.[26] The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks reversed some declassification momentum, driving a sharp increase in classified outputs as governments expanded counterterrorism intelligence sharing under frameworks like the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, which authorized broader surveillance and data retention. Annual original classification decisions in the U.S. surged from approximately 5.6 million in fiscal year 2001 to over 14 million by fiscal year 2008, reflecting heightened sensitivity around operational details and foreign liaison relationships.[27] Critics, including government reports, argued this expansion fostered inefficiency and diluted focus on truly critical secrets, yet causal analysis links it to the imperative of fusing disparate intelligence streams to prevent future attacks. The digital age amplified vulnerabilities inherent in electronic storage and transmission, enabling rapid bulk exfiltration of classified data via removable media or networks, as demonstrated by WikiLeaks' 2010 publication of over 250,000 U.S. diplomatic cables and Chelsea Manning's preceding leak of military logs. Edward Snowden's 2013 disclosure of NSA bulk metadata collection programs further highlighted systemic risks, prompting federal agencies to overhaul insider threat programs with mandatory user activity monitoring and behavioral analytics by 2014.[28] [29] These incidents, involving terabytes of data copied in hours—impossible in paper-based eras—underscored how digitization inverted classification's risk calculus, prioritizing prevention of unauthorized access over mere physical safeguards.[30] In response, President Barack Obama's Executive Order 13526, effective June 2010, curtailed original classification authorities to top-level officials, mandated annual audits of classification guides, and reinforced declassification triggers to combat proliferation, reducing derivative markings by emphasizing need-to-know principles.[3] Cyber threats from state actors, including alleged intrusions into U.S. defense networks documented in reports from 2007 onward, drove adoption of air-gapped systems, multi-factor authentication, and encrypted classified email protocols.[31] Persistent challenges include balancing interoperability for allied intelligence fusion—via systems like Five Eyes—against digital espionage, with ongoing reforms leveraging machine learning for automated redaction to manage the estimated 50 million pages of potentially declassifiable material annually.[32]Classification Processes and Criteria
Standards for Determining Classification
In the United States, the standards for determining whether information warrants classification as national security information are codified in Executive Order 13526, signed by President Barack Obama on December 29, 2009, and remain in effect as of 2025.[3][33] This executive order establishes that information may be classified only if unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to result in damage to the national security, with the degree of anticipated damage determining the classification level: "exceptionally grave damage" for Top Secret, "serious damage" for Secret, and "damage" for Confidential.[33] Classifiers must specifically identify or describe the anticipated damage in writing for original classifications at Secret or Confidential levels, ensuring decisions are not arbitrary but grounded in assessable risks to interests such as military operations, intelligence sources, or foreign relations.[33][14] The order limits classification to eight discrete categories of information, requiring that material fall within at least one to be eligible: (a) military plans, weapons systems, or operations; (b) foreign government information; (c) intelligence activities (including special activities), sources, or methods; (d) the foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources; (e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security; (f) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; (g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to national security; or (h) the development, testing, or use of any material, equipment, or weapon.[33] This categorical approach prevents overclassification by tying decisions to verifiable national security concerns rather than vague or subjective judgments, with original classification authority granted only to a limited number of senior officials explicitly designated by the President or agency heads.[33][34] Prohibitions further constrain classification to uphold truth-seeking and accountability: information cannot be classified, reclassified after declassification, or upgraded to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; to prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; to restrain competition; or to shield internal deliberations from legitimate public scrutiny.[33] These standards emphasize first-principles evaluation of disclosure risks, mandating that classification be applied only when necessary and for no longer than required, with automatic declassification after 25 years unless an exemption is justified by ongoing harm.[33] In practice, implementation across agencies like the Department of Defense follows these criteria through manuals such as DoD Manual 5200.01, which requires classifiers to articulate precise rationales tied to empirical assessments of potential harm.[35] Internationally, analogous standards exist but vary by jurisdiction; for instance, the United Kingdom's Government Security Classifications Policy, updated in April 2014, uses three tiers (OFFICIAL, SECRET, TOP SECRET) based on potential impact to national security, economy, or international relations from disclosure, with criteria emphasizing quantifiable consequences like loss of life or severe economic damage.[36] Similar harm-based thresholds appear in NATO's shared systems under the Atlantic Alliance's security protocols, harmonizing with U.S. levels for interoperability while adapting to member-specific threats. These frameworks collectively prioritize causal linkages between disclosure and concrete harms, avoiding classification for non-security motives, though enforcement rigor differs due to institutional variances in oversight and declassification processes.[36]Hierarchical Levels of Sensitivity
Classified information systems employ hierarchical levels of sensitivity to calibrate protection requirements according to the anticipated severity of harm from unauthorized disclosure. These levels, typically ranging from two to four tiers, determine handling procedures, storage safeguards, and personnel clearance standards, ensuring resources align with risk. In practice, higher levels impose stricter controls, such as limited distribution and enhanced physical security, reflecting first-principles prioritization of mitigating greater threats.[13] The United States federal system, governed by Executive Order 13526 issued on December 29, 2009, establishes three baseline levels for national security information: Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret.[3] This framework mandates classification based on verifiable potential damage, prohibiting speculative or indefinite designations beyond 25 years absent exceptional circumstances.[34]| Level | Description of Potential Damage from Unauthorized Disclosure |
|---|---|
| Confidential | Reasonably expected to cause damage to national security, encompassing harm to defense plans, foreign relations, or intelligence sources.[13] |
| Secret | Reasonably expected to cause serious damage to national security, such as compromising military operations or diplomatic initiatives.[13] |
| Top Secret | Reasonably expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to national security, potentially endangering vital national interests or alliances.[13] |
Original versus Derivative Classification
Original classification refers to the initial determination by a designated authority that specific information requires protection against unauthorized disclosure in the interests of national security. This process involves an affirmative decision to classify information based on its potential to cause identifiable damage if disclosed, as outlined in standards such as those requiring demonstration of damage to national security at specified levels (e.g., serious damage for Confidential, grave damage for Secret, or exceptionally grave damage for Top Secret).[39] Only Original Classification Authorities (OCAs), explicitly designated by the President or by officials with delegated authority under Executive Order 13526, may perform original classification; these include heads of agencies and their designees who undergo mandatory training and certification before exercising this power.[39] OCAs must justify classifications in writing for records over 10 years and ensure decisions align with predefined criteria, prohibiting over-classification or classification to conceal violations of law or inefficiency.[39] In contrast, derivative classification applies to the incorporation, paraphrasing, restating, or generation in new form of information that has already been classified, with the new material marked consistent with the source's markings and guidance.[40] Unlike original classification, derivative classification does not require possessing OCA authority; trained personnel across agencies can apply it by referencing classification guides, source documents, or secure rooms, but they must respect original decisions, verify the ongoing validity of source classifications, and avoid extracting or combining information in ways that escalate levels without justification.[41] Agencies with original classification authority are required to issue classification guides—detailed documents specifying what elements are classified, at what level, and why—to standardize and facilitate uniform derivative applications, thereby minimizing errors and ensuring consistency.[39] The fundamental distinction lies in the locus of decision-making and risk assessment: original classification demands proactive evaluation by limited, accountable authorities to establish protection needs, whereas derivative classification is reactive, inheriting protections to propagate security without redundant original analyses, though it carries responsibilities like identifying derivative classifiers by name or position on documents.[42] Derivative processes also exclude mere duplication of classified information from constituting derivative classification, emphasizing transformative use instead.[40] Both mechanisms operate under the same executive framework, such as Executive Order 13526 issued on December 29, 2009, which limits original classifications to essential needs and mandates annual audits to prevent unnecessary secrecy.[39]Sectoral Applications
Governmental Systems
Governmental systems for classifying information establish standardized protocols to identify, mark, and protect data whose unauthorized disclosure could damage national security, foreign relations, or public safety. These systems typically feature hierarchical sensitivity levels, original classification by authorized personnel, and criteria centered on anticipated harm, such as damage to military capabilities or intelligence sources. Oversight bodies ensure compliance, with processes integrating physical, procedural, and personnel controls.[3][43] In the United States, Executive Order 13526, signed December 29, 2009, prescribes a uniform system for classifying national security information across executive branch agencies.[3] Classification occurs only when information pertains to specified categories like military plans or foreign government information and requires demonstration of potential damage: Confidential for any damage, Secret for serious damage, and Top Secret for exceptionally grave damage to national security.[3] Original classifiers, limited to designated senior officials, must include a date or event for declassification, defaulting to 25 years absent exemptions.[3] The Information Security Oversight Office within the National Archives coordinates implementation, training, and annual reporting on classification activities.[43] Derivative classification applies markings from source documents without re-evaluating content, streamlining handling in agencies like the Department of Defense.[44] Safeguards scale with level, including secure storage, need-to-know access, and security clearances vetted through background investigations.[3] Violations, such as unauthorized disclosure, carry penalties under laws like 18 U.S.C. § 798, reflecting the system's emphasis on deterrence.[7] The United Kingdom's Government Security Classifications Policy, effective since April 2, 2014, and revised as of June 30, 2023, adopts a risk-managed approach for HM Government information assets.[45] It defines three levels: OFFICIAL for routine business where mishandling causes limited or no harm; SECRET for disclosures threatening national interests or operations; and TOP SECRET for those gravely damaging prosperity, defense, or security.[45] Cabinet Office guidance mandates protective security measures proportional to risk, including additional markings for handling caveats like "UK Eyes Only."[45] Unlike prior systems, it de-emphasizes routine over-classification by prioritizing impact assessment over rigid tiers for lower sensitivities.[36] Many allied governments align classifications for interoperability, such as NATO's use of COSMIC TOP SECRET equivalent to national Top Secret levels, facilitating shared intelligence. Variations persist; for example, France maintains "Défense Secret de France Nationale" and elevated tiers under its defense code, while systems in non-democratic states like China and Russia apply broader secrecy laws with levels including "Top Secret" and "State Secret," often extending to economic or political data with limited public transparency on criteria.[42] These frameworks evolve with threats, incorporating digital marking and automated controls to address cyber risks.[43]Private Sector Equivalents
In the private sector, information classification systems serve as equivalents to governmental classified information frameworks, primarily to safeguard trade secrets, proprietary data, and other competitively sensitive materials that could cause economic harm if disclosed. These systems categorize data based on potential impact to the organization, such as financial loss or loss of market advantage, rather than national security risks. Common levels include public (freely releasable, like marketing materials), internal or private (accessible to employees but not external parties, such as operational memos), confidential (limited to authorized personnel, encompassing business strategies or employee records), and restricted (highest protection for trade secrets like formulas or algorithms, with strict access controls).[46][47][48] Protection mechanisms mirror governmental practices in principle but emphasize contractual and technological enforcement over statutory mandates. Companies implement labeling policies (e.g., watermarks or metadata tags denoting "Proprietary" or "Confidential"), non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) binding employees and partners, role-based access controls, encryption, and audit trails to demonstrate "reasonable efforts" under trade secret laws. For instance, under the U.S. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, firms must proactively classify and secure information to qualify for legal remedies against misappropriation, including injunctions and damages. Failure to classify and protect can invalidate claims, as courts require evidence of secrecy measures like secure storage and limited dissemination.[49][50][51] Legal frameworks underpin these equivalents, with most U.S. states adopting the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (since 1985), defining trade secrets as information deriving economic value from secrecy and subject to efforts excluding it from general knowledge. Internationally, protections align with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS, 1994), requiring members to criminalize trade secret theft. In practice, sectors like technology and pharmaceuticals classify source code or drug formulations as restricted, enforcing need-to-know principles via background checks for key roles and exit interviews to prevent exfiltration. Examples include software firms protecting algorithms through internal "confidential" tiers, where breach could lead to multimillion-dollar losses, as seen in cases like Waymo v. Uber (2017), where stolen self-driving car technology highlighted classification lapses.[52][53][54] Unlike governmental systems, private equivalents are voluntary and profit-driven, lacking coercive state power but leveraging civil litigation for enforcement; however, they face challenges from insider threats and cyber vulnerabilities, prompting adoption of standards like ISO 27001 for risk-based classification. Empirical data from breaches, such as the 2014 Sony Pictures hack exposing proprietary scripts labeled confidential, underscore the causal link between inadequate classification and tangible damages exceeding $100 million in recovery costs and lost value.[55][56]Hybrid and Emerging Contexts
In hybrid contexts, classified information is frequently shared between government agencies and private sector entities, particularly in defense and national security collaborations. Under the U.S. National Industrial Security Program (NISP), contractors awarded classified contracts must obtain a Facility Security Clearance (FCL) to access and safeguard such information, ensuring compliance with federal standards equivalent to those in government facilities.[57] This framework, administered by the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), mandates physical, procedural, and personnel security measures to prevent unauthorized disclosure, with over 12,000 cleared facilities participating as of 2023. Violations can result in contract termination or debarment, as seen in cases where lapses led to compromises of Secret-level data.[58] Emerging hybrid applications arise in dual-use technologies, where civilian innovations hold military potential, necessitating adaptive classification to protect national security without stifling private sector development. For instance, artificial intelligence and quantum computing systems developed by commercial firms may require classification when integrated into defense systems, blurring traditional boundaries and prompting export controls under regimes like the U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has identified emerging technologies such as advanced semiconductors and biotechnology for review, with rules finalized in 2024 to restrict transfers to adversaries, citing risks of reverse-engineering military applications from commercial data. In Europe, the 2025 dual-use export control list updates expanded controls on quantum and additive manufacturing tech, reflecting concerns over proliferation in hybrid public-private R&D ecosystems.[59] These contexts introduce challenges in classification authority, as private entities often generate derivative information that inherits original classifications, requiring original classification authorities (OCAs) to provide guidance.[12] Causal risks include inadvertent leaks via supply chains, as evidenced by 2023 incidents where contractor subcontractors mishandled controlled unclassified information (CUI) precursors to classified data, underscoring the need for tiered protections in interconnected environments.[60] Harmonizing standards across sectors remains incomplete, with proposals for reformed two-tiered systems to reduce over-classification in dual-use areas while prioritizing empirical threat assessments over bureaucratic inertia.[27]International and Comparative Frameworks
Allied and Multilateral Systems
In multilateral organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), classified information is protected under a standardized four-level system: COSMIC TOP SECRET (CTS), NATO SECRET (NS), NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NC), and NATO RESTRICTED.[61][62] These levels apply to information originated by NATO or shared among its 32 member states, with CTS representing the highest sensitivity, equivalent in protection requirements to national top secret designations in many member countries.[63] Access to NATO-classified material requires personnel to hold equivalent national clearances, a demonstrated need-to-know, and adherence to NATO security protocols, including physical safeguards and disclosure restrictions.[64] NATO RESTRICTED, the lowest classified level, does not align directly with any U.S. national security classification but is treated as foreign government information requiring safeguards against unauthorized disclosure equivalent to U.S. Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) in practice.[65] Member nations implement these protections through national laws and agreements, such as NATO's Security Within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization document (C-M(2002)49), which mandates uniform handling, storage, and transmission standards across allies.[66] Declassification follows NATO procedures, often triggered by reviews after 10 years for RESTRICTED and up to 50 years for CTS, unless exemptions apply for ongoing sensitivities.[67] Among close allies, the Five Eyes intelligence alliance—comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States—facilitates extensive sharing of signals intelligence (SIGINT) under the UKUSA Agreement, originally signed in 1946 and expanded post-World War II.[68][69] This framework emphasizes mutual recognition of classification levels, with national systems (e.g., U.S. TOP SECRET, UK TOP SECRET) treated as interoperable for shared material, supplemented by special access programs and caveats like "NOFORN" to restrict further dissemination.[70] The agreement specifies handling procedures for communications intelligence (COMINT), including encryption for transmission and compartmented storage to prevent leaks, enabling real-time collaboration on threats without routine reclassification.[69] Five Eyes partners conduct joint oversight through bodies like the Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC), which ensures compliance with classification standards during sharing, addressing risks from divergent national policies.[71] Bilateral extensions of UKUSA, such as U.S.-UK General Security Agreements, further harmonize protections for exchanged classified data, requiring equivalent vetting and auditing.[70] These systems prioritize causal linkages in threat assessment, such as SIGINT-derived insights into adversary capabilities, over fragmented national silos, though challenges persist in aligning declassification timelines across members.[72]Variations Across Major Nations
The United States employs a three-tiered classification system for national security information under Executive Order 13526, consisting of Confidential (unauthorized disclosure could cause damage to national security), Secret (serious damage), and Top Secret (exceptionally grave damage).[39] This framework emphasizes potential harm to national security as the core criterion, with classification authority delegated to Original Classification Authorities (OCAs) within executive agencies, and requires periodic reviews for declassification after 10, 25, or 50 years depending on sensitivity.[73] In the United Kingdom, the Government Security Classifications Policy (GSCP), implemented in 2014 and updated through 2023, uses three main tiers: OFFICIAL (for routine business with potential impact on individuals or organizations but not national security), SECRET (serious damage to national security or public safety), and TOP SECRET (catastrophic damage).[36] Unlike the U.S. system, OFFICIAL encompasses most government information previously under the deprecated "OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE" label, reflecting a shift toward risk-based protective markings rather than strict classification for lower sensitivities, with additional caveats like "UK EYES ONLY" for handling restrictions.[74] France maintains a defense-oriented system with levels including Diffusion Restreinte (restricted diffusion for sensitive unclassified information), Confidentiel Défense (damage to defense interests), Secret Défense (serious damage), and Très Secret Défense (exceptionally grave damage), governed by interministerial instructions such as No. 1300/SGDSN/PSE/PS.[75] This structure, reformed in 2021 to align partially with NATO standards, integrates "Défense" markings to denote military and national defense scope, differing from broader national security emphases in Anglo-American systems by prioritizing operational secrecy in joint European defense contexts.[76] Russia's state secrets regime, established under Federal Law No. 5485-1 of 1993 and amended through 2023, classifies information into three degrees: "of special importance" (highest, for intelligence causing grave damage if disclosed), "top secret," and "secret," covering military, foreign policy, economic, intelligence, and counterintelligence domains per Presidential Edict No. 1203.[77] The system allows broader designation of state secrets by executive lists, enabling classification of economic data impacting defense capabilities, which contrasts with Western focus on disclosure harm by incorporating proactive lists of protectable subjects, potentially expanding scope amid centralized control.[78] China's Law on Guarding State Secrets, revised in 2024, divides secrets into Top Secret (absolutely vital matters), Secret (important matters), and Confidential (general state secrets), with classification based on disclosure's potential to harm state power, sovereignty, or security interests across 27 enumerated categories like science, technology, and national economy.[79] This framework, enforced by the National Administration for the Protection of State Secrets, emphasizes expansive coverage including commercial and technological data intertwined with state interests, differing from democratic systems by lacking fixed declassification timelines and integrating with national security laws that penalize vague "endangering" disclosures, as evidenced by overbroad applications in cases involving economic intelligence.[80][81]| Country | Classification Levels (Highest to Lowest) | Key Distinctions |
|---|---|---|
| United States | Top Secret, Secret, Confidential | Harm-based; mandatory declassification reviews after set periods. |
| United Kingdom | TOP SECRET, SECRET, OFFICIAL | Risk-managed; OFFICIAL for most non-sensitive data, with protective markings. |
| France | Très Secret Défense, Secret Défense, Confidentiel Défense | Defense-specific; aligns with EU/NATO but includes unclassified "Restreinte." |
| Russia | Of Special Importance, Top Secret, Secret | List-driven subjects; broad economic/military scope under executive edicts. |
| China | Top Secret, Secret, Confidential | Category-based (27 areas); no automatic declassification, tied to state power. |
