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United Nations Mission in South Sudan
United Nations Mission in South Sudan
United Nations Mission in South Sudan
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The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is a United Nations peacekeeping mission for South Sudan, which became independent on 9 July 2011. UNMISS[1] was established on 8 July 2011 by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1996 (2011).

Key Information

Since December 2016, UNMISS has been led by the Secretary-General's Special Representative, South African lawyer and diplomat Nicholas Haysom. Haysom succeeded David Shearer in January 2021.[2]

As of March 2021, it is composed of 14,222 military personnel, 1,446 police, and 2,228 civilian workers, as well as small contingents of experts, staff officers, and volunteers.[3] The military deployment is commanded by the Indian Lieutenant General Mohan Subramanian.[4] It is headquartered in the South Sudanese capital of Juba.[5]

Mandate

[edit]
Politics of South Sudan
Constitution
Executive
Legislature
Judiciary
Administrative divisions
Elections
Foreign relations
Related topics

The stated UNMISS Mandate[6] includes:

  • Support for peace consolidation and thereby fostering longer-term statebuilding and economic development
  • Support the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution and protect civilians
  • Support the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in developing its capacity to provide security, to establish rule of law, and to strengthen the security and justice sectors.

The mission was established by Security Council Resolution 1996[7] and extended to 15 July 2013 by Resolution 2057.[8]

As per Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the peacekeeping mission is concerned with the protection of civilians, and thus is not mandated to engage in protection of South Sudan's territory or the sovereignty of that territory[8] (cf. the 2012 South Sudan–Sudan border war).

Leadership

[edit]

Force Commanders

No. Name Nationality From To Previous Deployment
1 Maj. Gen. Moses Bisong Obi[12] Nigeria 9 July 2011 18 November 2012 Force Commander of the UNMIS[13]
2 Maj. Gen. Delali Johnson Sakyi[12] Ghana 11 December 2012 9 June 2014 Assistant Commandant of the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College, Junior Division.
3 Lt. Gen. Yohannes Gebremeskel Tesfamariam[14] Ethiopia 17 June 2014 17 June 2016 Head of Mission and Force Commander of the UNISFA
4 Lt. Gen. Johnson Mogoa Kimani Ondieki[15] Kenya 18 June 2016 1 November 2016 Deputy Army Chief of Staff-Command and Control of Kenya Army Forces (Dismissed from the post )[16]
5 Maj. Gen. Chaoying Yang China 3 November 2016 6 April 2017 Deputy Force Commander of UNMISS.[17]
6 Lt. Gen. Frank Mushyo Kamanzi[18] Rwanda 6 April 2017 26 May 2019 Force Commander of UNAMID and Army Chieff of Staff of Rwanda Defence Forces
7. Lt. Gen. Shailesh Tinaikar India 27 May 2019[19] 5 July 2022 Commandant of the Infantry School
8. Lt Gen. Mohan Subramanian[4] India 6 July 2022 Incumbent Commandant of the Defence Services Staff College

Composition

[edit]

UN Security Council resolution 2132 (24 December 2013) authorised a military component of up to 12,500 troops, and a police component of up to 1,323.[20]

India has supplied 2,237 troops; the Deputy Force Commander is India's Brigadier Asit Mistry,[21] while the force commander is Ghana's Major General Delali Johnson Sakyi.[22] Other contributors of troops are Australia,[23] Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Togo, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.[24]

Police have been contributed by Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, China, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, India, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United States, Zambia and Zimbabwe.[24]

History

[edit]

2012

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Main article: United Nations Flight 544 shootdown

In a July 2012 speech, a day after the extension of the mission, Hilde F. Johnson spoke in Juba about the progress of UNMISS.[8] Johnson discussed the mission's protection of civilians and the documenting and verification of incidents. Johnson discussed the January 2012 Lou Nuer attacks in Jonglei State whereby the actions of UNMISS in deploying peacekeepers and alerting the South Sudanese government resulted in "thousands of civilian lives [being] saved", as well as progress in areas such as policing, justice and democracy.[8]

On 21 December 2012, a civilian UNMISS helicopter was shot down over Jonglei State. All four Russian crew-members on board the aircraft were killed.[25]

2013

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On 9 April, five Indian UNMISS troops and seven civilian UN employees (two UN staff and five contractors) were killed in a rebel ambush[26] in Jonglei while escorting a UN convoy between Pibor and Bor.[27] Nine further UN employees, both military and civilian, were wounded and some remain missing.[28] Four of the civilians killed were Kenyan contractors working to drill water boreholes.[29] One of the dead soldiers was a lieutenant-colonel and one of the wounded was a captain.[30] According to South Sudan's military spokesman, the convoy was attacked by David Yau Yau's rebel forces that they believe are supported by the Sudanese government.[28] UNMISS said that 200 armed men were involved in the attack and that their convoy was escorted by 32 Indian UN peacekeepers.[28] The attackers were equipped with rocket propelled grenades.[29]

A UN spokesman said that the fierce resistance put up by Indian peacekeepers forced the rebels to withdraw and saved the lives of many of the civilians.[28] UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called the killings a war crime, and called for the perpetrators to be brought to justice.[31] United Nations Assistant Secretary-General Anthony Banbury praised the bravery of the Indian soldiers.[32] India's Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, paid his tribute to the "brave soldiers".[33] About 2,200 Indian Army personnel are deployed in South Sudan as a part of the UNMISS mission.[34]

Coup d'état attempt

[edit]

Fighting that spread as a result of the 2013 South Sudanese coup d'état attempt led to the deaths of two Indian peacekeepers, while another soldier was wounded in Akobo, Jonglei, on 19 December.[35] On 24 December, the UNSC voted to nearly double the existing 7,600 troops in the mission, with another approximately 6,000 troops to be added.[36]

The UN Secretary General expressed deep concern as UN staff received threats from the body guards of Senior government Information Minister that demanded armed access to UN Mission Camps where civilians are sheltering.[37] Following this incident President Salva Kiir accused the UN of sheltering armed opposition forces in their UN Mission, which the UN denied. Salva Kiir also accused the UN of an attempted take over of his leadership.[38][39]

2014

[edit]

On Thursday 17 April 2014, 58 people were killed and at least 100 people wounded when an armed mob stormed the UN base in Bor.[40][41][42] A crowd of people who pretended they were visiting the base to present a peaceful petition opened fire on some of the 5,000 civilians who had taken shelter in the UN base.[43] Of those killed, 48 were civilians, while 10 were among the attackers. The violence reflected tension between the ethnic Dinka and Nuer peoples;[42] before the attack, a crowd of local Dinkas had demanded the thousands of Nuer sheltering in the camp be relocated elsewhere.[42]

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon emphasised that any attack on UN peacekeepers constituted "a war crime".[40] The UN Security Council expressed "outrage" at the attack, saying:[44][45]

The members of the Security Council expressed their outrage at the recent attacks by armed groups in South Sudan that have purposefully targeted civilians as well as UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) sites and personnel, in particular 17 April attack against the UNMISS compound in Bor that resulted in scores of dead and injured, including those seeking the shelter and protection of the United Nations, and 14 April attacks in Bentiu and Unity State.

The members of the Security Council condemned in the strongest terms these acts and underscored that attacks on civilians and UN peacekeepers may constitute a war crime.

In June 2014, Vietnam participated in UNMISS as their first official peacekeeping mission by sending officers from the Vietnam People's Army.[46]

2015

[edit]

As part of its mandate to conduct human rights reporting, UNMISS released a report in mid-2015 on an alleged campaign of violence by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and associated armed groups in Unity State. The report cited witness accounts of abductions, rapes, and people being killed and burned alive in dwellings.[47]

UNMISS continued to struggle to cope with the large populations of internally displaced people living within the 'Protection of Civilians' (PoC) sites in 2015. The mission was accused in May 2015 of failing to secure the perimeter of the Bentiu PoC site during an expansion of the site led by the International Organisation for Migration.[48]

2016

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Ban Ki-moon requested an independent investigation of the deployment be made following reports that on 11 July South Sudanese troops rampaged through the capital, killing and raping civilians and foreign aid workers. The event had occurred following three days of fighting between troops loyal to President Salva Kiir and soldiers aligned with former Vice President Riek Machar that resulted in the deaths of 300 civilians and two UN peacekeepers. Led by Patrick Cammaert, the investigation found that the force suffered from disorganization and a lack of leadership. Ban Ki-moon requested on 1 November that Lieutenant General Johnson Mogoa Kimani Ondieki, the Kenyan force commander, be replaced as soon as possible.[49] The next day the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the United Nations of using Ondieki as a scapegoat and announced that it would be withdrawing all of its forces from South Sudan.[50]

Head of UNMISS, Ellen Margrethe Løj, completed her assignment in November 2016 and was replaced by David Shearer.[51]

In 2016, the United Kingdom began Operation Trenton, a deployment of over 300 personnel to support UNMISS. It concluded in 2020.[52]

2017

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Japanese peacekeepers left South Sudan, ending five years of their mandate under UNMISS.[53] The withdrawals were done in April 2017, followed by two withdrawals in May with Chief Cabinet Suga denying that it was made due to security matters.[54]

Their deployment was a part of the Abe government's efforts to promote new laws for Japanese peacekeepers to easily intervene, such as assisting fellow peacekeepers and civilians working under UNMISS mandate.[55][56]

The Japanese MOD is accusing of covering up the security situation in Juba.[57]

In December 2017, the mission closed down the first Protection of Civilian site (PoC) in Melut town after IDPs voluntarily requested to return home.[58]

2021

[edit]

On 15 January 2021, the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres announced Haysom's appointment as his Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).[59]

2025

[edit]

On 4 April 2025, the Netherlands decided to withdraw their contribution to UNMISS, effective 31 July 2025. On 4 May 2025, the United Nations Security Council extended UNMISS with one year. Initial talks broke down on 1 May after the United States disagreed on the terms and conditions of the extension. On 4 May a second meeting was held, in which the US approved extending the mission to 1 May 2026.

Contributing countries

[edit]

As of 31 August 2025, the total number of personnel in the mission is 15,465:[60]

Country Police Experts Troops and staff officers Total
 Albania 0 1 2 3
 Angola 2 0 0 2
 Argentina 4 0 0 4
 Australia 0 1 15 16
 Azerbaijan 0 2 0 2
 Bangladesh 28 11 1617 1656
 Benin 0 4 5 9
 Bhutan 0 2 2 4
 Bolivia 0 3 1 4
 Bosnia and Herzegovina 18 0 0 18
 Brazil 0 5 6 11
 Burkina Faso 14 0 0 14
 Cambodia 0 4 78 82
Cameroon 1 0 0 1
 Canada 0 0 9 9
 Chad 0 2 1 3
 China 18 3 1050 1071
 Ecuador 0 1 2 3
 Egypt 33 4 3 40
El Salvador 0 0 1 1
 Ethiopia 25 10 1508 1543
 Fiji 24 1 1 26
 Finland 9 0 0 9
 Gambia 17 1 4 22
 Germany 7 11 3 21
 Ghana 291 14 719 1024
 Guatemala 0 4 2 6
 Guinea 0 1 2 3
 India 12 21 2381 2414
 Indonesia 18 3 1 22
 Japan 0 0 4 4
 Jordan 15 0 5 20
 Kenya 29 5 13 47
Kyrgyzstan 9 2 0 11
Liberia 16 2 1 19
Malawi 14 3 4 21
Malaysia 13 0 0 13
 Moldova 0 4 1 5
 Mongolia 0 8 865 873
 Morocco 0 3 1 4
 Namibia 0 4 1 5
 Nepal 203 12 1745 1960
 New Zealand 0 0 3 3
 Nigeria 19 8 5 32
 Norway 8 0 14 22
 Pakistan 15 6 286 307
 Paraguay 0 2 0 2
 Peru 5 3 2 10
 Philippines 20 1 0 21
 Portugal 4 0 0 4
 Romania 15 4 1 20
 Russia 16 2 1 19
 Rwanda 425 20 2614 3059
 Sierra Leone 11 1 0 12
 South Africa 1 0 0 1
 South Korea 0 3 264 267
 Sri Lanka 21 1 64 86
 Sweden 16 0 0 16
 Switzerland 2 0 1 3
 Tanzania 21 5 4 30
 Thailand 21 3 280 302
Timor 0 2 0 2
 Togo 0 1 1 2
 Tunisia 6 1 2 9
 Turkey 20 0 0 20
 Uganda 26 0 2 28
 United Kingdom 0 0 4 4
 United States 0 0 7 7
 Vietnam 6 4 64 74
 Zambia 20 2 5 27
 Zimbabwe 7 7 3 17
Total 1545 228 13681 15454

Criticism and Alternative International Interventions

[edit]

As stated, the UNMISS has been present in the country since its independence in 2011. However, as demonstrated throughout the mission's history, there were numerous incidents that point towards an inability of the peacekeeping forces to protect civilians. In general, scholars such as Weinstein question the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions,[61] and it is not difficult to find a peacekeeping "fiasco"[62] among the numerous peacekeeping missions undertaken within the history of the United Nations. While it is only possible to speculate on counterfactuals for the assessment and evaluation of peacekeeping missions and their effectiveness[63] – i.e. we do not know what the situation in South Sudan would look like if the UN had not deployed peacekeeping forces – an article published in the New York Times has called for an alternative international intervention for South Sudan.[64] Thereby, the alternatives for international interventions are numerous. The article mentions trusteeship as a potential solution to the violent chaos in South Sudan.[64] This form of international intervention was prominently discussed by Fearon and Laitin.[65]

The authors thereby suggest a system of neo-trusteeship, in which peacekeeping efforts should be oriented towards state building under the coordination of a leading (outside) state.[65] This state building should encompass the establishment of institutions that are necessary for increasing South Sudan's capability for collecting taxes, which could increase the governance capacity of the country.[65] To prevent a new civil war in South Sudan, according to Fearon and Laitin's neo-trusteeship approach, a continuous international monitoring and support system might be required.[65] The New York Times article states that some South Sudanese would not tolerate such an international trusteeship and might see it as colonialism.[64]

Furthermore, as pointed out by Weinstein, neo-trusteeship is a post-conflict international intervention.[61] As South Sudan was still in the midst of a bloody conflict as of 2005, Weinstein suggested refraining from any kind of international intervention and leaving the South Sudanese to solve their conflict autonomously ("autonomous recovery"[61]), usually through the victory of one of the conflict parties over the other.[61]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

United Nations Mission in South Sudan

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Mission in (UNMISS) is a operation deployed by the on 9 July 2011, immediately following 's independence from , to consolidate peace and security, protect civilians under imminent threat, support the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and foster conditions for development in the world's newest nation. Established under Resolution 1996 (2011) for an initial one-year term, renewable as necessary, UNMISS's mandate has since evolved through multiple renewals, including a reprioritization in via Resolution 2155 to emphasize civilian protection amid escalating . The mission maintains a troop ceiling of 17,000 and 2,101 police, drawn from over 50 contributing countries, with total uniformed and civilian staff exceeding 17,000 as of recent figures. UNMISS's core pillars encompass protecting civilians through robust patrols and protection-of-civilians sites that have sheltered hundreds of thousands during outbreaks of ethnic violence, facilitating safe humanitarian access in high-risk areas, monitoring and reporting violations including sexual and gender-based violence, and providing technical support for implementing the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in to advance inclusive and elections. Under the latest mandate extension via Resolution 2779 (2025) until 30 April 2026, the mission pursues a multiyear strategic vision to avert a return to full-scale civil war, emphasizing self-reliance through strengthened state institutions rather than perpetual dependency. Notable achievements include enabling the transition of protection sites into conventional camps post-2018 peace deal, which reduced immediate violence levels, and contributions like road construction to enhance mobility and aid delivery in remote regions. Despite these efforts, UNMISS has encountered significant controversies, particularly regarding its effectiveness in beyond fortified bases, where risk-averse operational doctrines and leadership shortcomings allowed atrocities like the 2013 Juba clashes and subsequent attacks on sites to claim thousands of lives despite the mission's presence. In 2025, tensions escalated with the South Sudanese government demanding the vacating of key UN bases and the withdrawing military support amid disputes over deportees and perceived overreach, highlighting the mission's precarious position between host state sovereignty and international mandates. These challenges underscore broader critiques of UN in fragile states, where empirical outcomes often fall short of ambitious goals due to limited enforcement powers and host government obstructions.

Mandate and Objectives

Initial Establishment and Core Goals

The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1996, adopted unanimously on July 8, 2011, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The resolution authorized the deployment for an initial period of one year, commencing on July 9, 2011, coinciding with South Sudan's formal independence from Sudan. This timing reflected the Council's intent to address the fragile post-independence security environment, including risks of inter-communal violence, militia activities, and potential border tensions with Sudan, by providing a transitional stabilization force. UNMISS succeeded elements of the earlier United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), with personnel and assets transferred to support continuity in the region. The core mandate of UNMISS, as outlined in Resolution 1996, centered on consolidating peace and security while fostering conditions for development in the nascent state. Primary objectives included protecting civilians under imminent threat of violence, without prejudice to the government's primary responsibility for security; supporting the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and subsequent agreements; and assisting the Government of South Sudan in building state institutions such as security forces, rule of law, and governance structures. Additional goals encompassed facilitating humanitarian assistance delivery, monitoring and reporting on human rights violations, and promoting disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants. These tasks emphasized capacity-building over direct intervention, with an initial authorized strength of up to 7,000 military personnel, 900 police, and civilian components to enable operations across South Sudan's ten states. Unlike subsequent mandate renewals that shifted toward crisis response amid , the initial framework prioritized preventive stabilization and institution-building to avert state failure in a resource-scarce, ethnically diverse lacking robust apparatus. The mission's design assumed cooperation with South Sudan's government and regional actors, though empirical outcomes later highlighted challenges in mandate execution due to limited enforcement powers and host-state consent requirements.

Mandate Renewals and Adaptations

The United Nations Security Council established the initial mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) through Resolution 1996 on 8 July 2011, authorizing operations for one year from 9 July 2011 with a focus on consolidating peace and security, supporting state-building, and creating conditions for development in the newly independent state. This mandate emphasized support for rule of law, security sector reform, and protection of civilians as a core responsibility, alongside facilitating humanitarian assistance and monitoring human rights. Following the outbreak of on 15 December 2013, which displaced over 900,000 people by February 2014 and led 85,000 to seek refuge in UNMISS compounds, the Security Council adapted the mandate via Resolution 2155 on 27 May 2014 to reprioritize protection of civilians as the primary task, shifting from broader efforts amid escalating ethnic violence and instability. Resolution 2132 of 24 December 2013 had already expanded authorized troop strength to approximately 13,700 and police to address the crisis, reflecting an immediate operational scaling to prioritize civilian safety over institutional development. Subsequent renewals, such as Resolution 2206 on 3 March 2015, integrated support for the August 2015 peace agreement, authorizing UNMISS to monitor ceasefires, disarmament processes, and transitional security arrangements while maintaining POC sites. Mandate renewals continued annually, with adaptations tied to evolving conflict dynamics and peace efforts. Resolution 2406 of 15 March 2018 aligned operations with the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) signed in September 2018, emphasizing support for its implementation, including constitutional processes and security unification, alongside sustained POC and humanitarian enablement. By Resolution 2567 on 12 March 2021, the Council streamlined tasks, redesignating four of five POC sites as integrated IDP camps to transition responsibility toward South Sudanese authorities and prepare for potential elections, while retaining core protection duties amid ongoing subnational violence. Renewals in 2022 (Resolution 2625, 15 March 2022) and 2023 further prioritized reporting on human rights violations and election readiness under the R-ARCSS, with force ceilings held at 17,000 troops and 2,101 police personnel. The most recent renewal under Resolution 2779 on 8 May 2025 extended the mandate until 30 April 2026, advancing a multiyear strategic vision to avert relapse through four pillars: civilian protection (including preventing and supporting returns), humanitarian access facilitation, R-ARCSS implementation (with focus on inclusive and elections), and monitoring. This iteration requests the Secretary-General to assess mandate implementation and obstacles, such as government restrictions on UNMISS mobility, while authorizing adjustments to force configuration based on security assessments. These adaptations underscore a persistent tension between aspirational and reactive crisis response, as empirical data on recurrent intercommunal clashes and delayed R-ARCSS benchmarks—such as unification of forces—have necessitated repeated emphasis on immediate civilian safeguards over long-term capacity-building.

Leadership and Command

Key Special Representatives and Force Commanders

The (SRSG) for has served as for UNMISS since its establishment, responsible for directing the mission's integrated political, civilian, and military efforts to support , security, and humanitarian access. Hilde F. Johnson of was the inaugural SRSG, appointed on 8 July 2011 and serving until 7 July 2014, during which she oversaw the mission's initial deployment amid post-independence instability and early capacity-building initiatives. She was succeeded by Ellen Margrethe Løj of , appointed on 24 July 2014 and departing on 14 December 2016, who navigated the mission through the escalation of violence starting in 2013, emphasizing protection of civilians and mediation support. David Shearer of then led as SRSG from February 2017 until January 2021, focusing on implementation of the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in amid ongoing factional fighting and delayed transitional processes. Nicholas Haysom of assumed the role on 15 January 2021, prioritizing electoral preparations, security sector reform, and humanitarian coordination until his departure in August 2025, after which the mission operated under interim leadership amid transitional extensions. Force Commanders have directed UNMISS's military operations, including troop deployments exceeding 12,000 personnel at peak and mandates in conflict zones. Shailesh S. Tinaikar of commanded from 2019 to 5 July 2022, managing responses to intercommunal violence and support for the Joint Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism under the peace agreement. He was succeeded by Mohan Subramanian of on 5 July 2022, who has overseen sustained operations amid recurrent clashes and logistical challenges in remote areas like Jonglei and . Earlier commanders included Johnson P. Okok Ojuri of as the initial appointee in , reflecting the mission's emphasis on national ownership alongside international expertise.
RoleName (Nationality)Tenure
SRSG/Head of MissionHilde F. Johnson ()July 2011 – July 2014
SRSG/Head of MissionEllen Margrethe Løj ()July 2014 – December 2016
SRSG/Head of MissionDavid Shearer ()February 2017 – January 2021
SRSG/Head of MissionNicholas Haysom ()January 2021 – August 2025
Force CommanderLt. Gen. Johnson P. Okok Ojuri ()July 2011 – 2012
Force CommanderLt. Gen. Shailesh S. Tinaikar ()2019 – July 2022
Force CommanderLt. Gen. Mohan Subramanian ()July 2022 – present

Decision-Making Structure

The decision-making authority in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is vested in the (SRSG), who serves as and exercises overall direction of the operation's political, civilian, military, and police components. Appointed by the UN Secretary-General, the SRSG reports directly to UN Headquarters in New York and ensures mission activities align with the Security Council mandate, as established under resolution 1996 (2011) and subsequent renewals. This centralized structure facilitates strategic coherence, with the SRSG responsible for high-level approvals on operations, resource allocation, and engagement with South Sudanese authorities and international partners. Beneath the SRSG, a hierarchical chain of command integrates deputy representatives and component leaders to support operational decisions. The Deputy Special Representative for Political Affairs functions as Deputy , managing political analysis, dialogue facilitation, and coordination with national stakeholders, while feeding inputs into SRSG-level deliberations. A second Deputy SRSG, concurrently serving as Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, oversees integration of development and humanitarian efforts, ensuring decisions address immediate needs alongside long-term stability goals. The Force Commander directs the contingent—comprising over 10,000 troops as of recent deployments—handling tactical operations such as patrols and of civilians, but under the SRSG's strategic oversight to prevent beyond mandate parameters. UNMISS employs an integrated mission model, where decision-making processes emphasize cross-pillar consultation via senior leadership mechanisms, such as joint task forces and coordination cells at national and field levels, to address complex threats like and political instability. While tactical authority is decentralized to sector commanders and formed police units for rapid response—per UN on authority, command, and control—strategic choices, including mandate interpretation and reporting on violations, require SRSG validation to maintain and alignment with UN principles. This framework, refined through annual mandate reviews (e.g., resolution 2729 in April 2024), balances responsiveness with oversight, though challenges persist in reconciling military imperatives with civilian protection mandates amid South Sudan's fragmented security environment.

Composition and Resources

Troop and Police Contributing Countries

provides the largest troop contingent to UNMISS, deploying 2,321 as of 31 January 2025, primarily for and support in protection of civilians operations. follows with 1,699 troops, including specialized units for and roles, while contributes 1,491 troops focused on regional security dynamics given its proximity. deploys 1,581 troops, and 1,031, with the latter emphasizing and capabilities to enhance mission mobility. Other significant troop contributors include (850 troops), (700), and Côte d'Ivoire (198), reflecting a mix of Asian, African, and developing nation participation that aligns with UN 's reliance on cost-effective, voluntary deployments from Global South countries. Smaller contingents from countries like (70 troops) provide niche expertise, such as riverine operations suited to South Sudan's terrain. Overall, these contributions total approximately 13,000 troops across more than 20 nations, enabling UNMISS to maintain its authorized strength amid fluctuating security demands. Police contributions, totaling around 1,500 personnel, come from over 40 countries and include formed police units (FPUs) for and individual officers for mentoring South Sudanese forces. leads with 290 police (including 270 in FPUs), followed by (211, with 180 in FPUs) and (55 individual officers), supporting corrections and amid high crime rates in mission areas. Additional providers like Côte d'Ivoire (49), (29), and (31) bolster capacity-building efforts, though challenges such as language barriers and equipment compatibility persist due to diverse national standards.
Top Troop Contributors (as of January 2025)Number of Troops
2,321
1,699
1,491
1,581
1,031
850
700
Top Police Contributors (Total Police Personnel, as of 2025)Number
290
211
55
Côte d'Ivoire49
29
Contributions are voluntary and subject to national priorities, with rotations occurring periodically; for instance, the announced withdrawal of its small contingent effective July 2025, citing domestic resource constraints. African nations like and provide troops attuned to local ethnic and conflict dynamics, potentially enhancing operational effectiveness over distant contributors, though all operate under unified UN command to avoid national biases influencing mandate execution. Data reflects UN-verified deployments, prioritizing empirical counts over self-reported figures from contributing states.

Personnel Deployment and Capabilities

UNMISS operates under an authorized ceiling of 17,000 military troops and 2,101 police personnel, as extended by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2729 on May 8, 2025. Deployed uniformed strength typically falls below this cap; as of March 2025, the mission included over 13,000 troops and approximately 1,500 police, drawn from more than 60 contributing countries. Civilian personnel numbered 2,657, including international and national staff focused on political, humanitarian, and administrative functions, while additional experts on mission, staff officers, and UN Volunteers bring the total to nearly 18,000 personnel. Deployment emphasizes protection of civilians and humanitarian access, with troops and police stationed across 10 sectors covering South Sudan's 10 states, plus . Key concentrations occur at protection of civilians (PoC) sites in high-risk areas like , , Bor, and Wau, where forces maintain static defenses and conduct patrols to deter attacks. Mobile operating bases enable quick reaction forces for threat response, coordinated via joint operations centers with national authorities. Police components include formed units for and individual officers embedded in initiatives. The mission's capabilities center on defensive under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, prioritizing civilian protection without offensive combat authority. Military assets comprise 10-12 battalions for ground security and deterrence, supported by units providing utility helicopters for troop transport, reconnaissance, and —typically 10-15 rotary-wing aircraft from contributors like and . Engineering contingents handle infrastructure repair and base fortification using bulldozers and bridging equipment, while sustainment relies on contingent-owned trucks and fuel depots for extended operations in remote terrain. Medical capabilities include Level II field hospitals for trauma care and Level III facilities in for advanced surgery. Limitations persist due to reliance on troop-contributing countries for specialized equipment, such as armored vehicles (e.g., MRAPs), which number in the hundreds but face maintenance challenges in South Sudan's environment.

Historical Context and Establishment

South Sudan Independence and Pre-Mission Dynamics

The Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005) pitted the /Army (SPLM/A), representing largely southern ethnic groups, against the Khartoum-based , resulting in an estimated 2 million deaths from combat, famine, and disease, alongside the displacement of about 4 million people. The conflict stemmed from longstanding grievances over resource allocation, cultural marginalization, and central government policies favoring Arab-Muslim northern elites, exacerbating ethnic and regional divides in a resource-poor south heavily impacted by oil discoveries in the late 1970s. The (CPA), signed on January 9, 2005, in , , between the and the SPLM/A, ended the war by establishing a six-year interim period of north-south power-sharing, revenue division (with southern oil fields receiving 50% of net proceeds), security arrangements including demilitarization zones, and a commitment to a for Southern . The (UNMIS), authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1590 on March 24, 2005, monitored ceasefire implementation, supported elections in 2010, and facilitated the process amid ongoing low-level violence and disputes over the border region. However, the CPA's unity incentives proved insufficient, as southern aspirations for separation intensified due to persistent northern interference and internal southern factionalism. Southern Sudan's January 9–15, 2011, referendum saw 3.95 million voters participate, with 98.83% favoring independence, turnout exceeding 97%, and minimal reported irregularities despite logistical challenges in remote areas. Independence was declared on July 9, 2011, creating the Republic of South Sudan as the world's newest sovereign state, inheriting 75% of Sudan's oil reserves but facing acute vulnerabilities: underdeveloped institutions, ethnic militias, inter-communal cattle raids killing thousands annually, and unresolved border demarcations leading to clashes like the April 2012 Heglig crisis. These dynamics—rooted in war legacies, weak governance under the SPLM-dominated Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), and economic dependence on oil pipelines through Sudan—highlighted the risk of state fragility and internal conflict, prompting anticipatory international intervention to avert collapse.

Formation of UNMISS in 2011

The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1996 on 8 July 2011, establishing the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) effective 9 July 2011, coinciding with South Sudan's declaration of independence from Sudan. This resolution succeeded the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), which had supported implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) across both Sudan and the soon-to-be-independent South Sudan, by reorienting peacekeeping efforts exclusively to the new republic amid risks of instability following the January 2011 referendum where 98.83% voted for secession. UNMISS was authorized for an initial one-year period, with provisions for review and renewal. The mission's initial authorized strength included up to 7,000 , up to 900 formed police units and individual police officers, and an appropriate civilian component with expertise in monitoring. The Security Council intended to assess the force requirements after three and six months, potentially reducing to 6,000 if conditions allowed, reflecting a focus on rapid deployment to address immediate post-independence vulnerabilities such as weak state institutions and potential inter-communal violence. UNMISS's core mandate emphasized consolidating peace and security while helping establish conditions for development, with priority tasks including the protection of civilians under imminent threat of violence, support for governance and state-building initiatives, and assistance in developing the security, rule of law, and justice sectors. Additional elements involved promoting human rights through monitoring and reporting, facilitating humanitarian assistance, and aiding conflict prevention mechanisms, all tailored to the nascent state's challenges of building effective institutions without assuming direct responsibility for internal security. This framework aimed to enable the Government of South Sudan to assume primary responsibility for stability, underscoring the mission's supportive rather than substitutive role.

Operational History

Early Years and Initial Challenges (2011-2012)

The United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) through Resolution 1996 on 8 July 2011, with operations commencing on 9 July 2011 to align with South Sudan's declaration of independence. The mandate, enforced under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, directed UNMISS to consolidate peace and security, support the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) in building state capacity, protect civilians under imminent threat, monitor human rights, and facilitate humanitarian access and early recovery efforts. Authorized for an initial one-year period, the mission inherited personnel and assets from the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), with an approved ceiling of 7,000 military troops and 900 police officers to cover a territory spanning over 619,000 square kilometers marked by minimal infrastructure. Initial deployment prioritized securing and establishing forward operating bases in volatile regions like Jonglei, Unity, and Upper states, involving joint patrols with GRSS forces and capacity-building for nascent institutions such as the South Sudan National Police Service. However, logistical constraints— including inadequate roads, unreliable communications, and dependence on air assets—hindered rapid force generation, leaving UNMISS understrength in remote areas during the first months. These operational gaps were exacerbated by the GRSS's limited administrative reach, where weak governance and undisciplined security forces struggled to curb activities and resource disputes. A primary early challenge was inter-communal violence, exemplified by the escalation in starting in December 2011, when Lou Nuer militias launched coordinated attacks on Murle settlements in Pibor County, resulting in widespread killings, abductions, and displacement affecting over 120,000 people by January 2012. UNMISS responded with condemnation of the atrocities, , integrated patrols alongside GRSS troops, and facilitation of humanitarian convoys, but its constrained troop levels—initially below authorized strength—prevented comprehensive deterrence or extraction of civilians from remote sites. An ensuing UNMISS investigation documented systematic violations, including targeted civilian attacks and , attributing much of the failure to prevent escalation to inadequate early warning integration and GRSS delays in deploying effective forces. Compounding these security pressures was a massive influx of over 340,000 returnees and refugees from between October 2011 and early 2012, overwhelming GRSS services and straining UNMISS's humanitarian coordination role amid food shortages and disease outbreaks in camps. Border frictions with , including artillery exchanges near the contested region in early 2012, diverted GRSS attention and resources, indirectly fueling internal instability through arms proliferation and ethnic animosities. Despite these hurdles, UNMISS advanced rule-of-law initiatives, such as training police and monitoring ceasefires, revealing the tension between its ambitious mandate and the realities of a post-independence state lacking unified command structures or popular consent for external intervention.

Civil War Onset and Immediate Response (2013-2014)

The South Sudanese civil war commenced on December 15, 2013, when clashes erupted in Juba between factions of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) loyal to President Salva Kiir and those aligned with former Vice President Riek Machar, following Machar's dismissal and escalating political disputes within the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). The violence rapidly assumed ethnic dimensions, with government-aligned forces, predominantly Dinka, targeting Nuer civilians perceived as supportive of Machar, resulting in mass killings, including an estimated 300 Nuer men executed in Gudele neighborhood on December 18. Fighting spread swiftly to Jonglei State (Bor captured by opposition on December 18), Unity State (Bentiu), and Upper Nile State (Malakal), with state capitals changing hands multiple times amid widespread looting, sexual violence, and attacks on hospitals and churches. By late December, casualties numbered in the thousands, and nearly 500,000 people were internally displaced within the first month alone. In immediate response, UNMISS opened its compounds to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, establishing Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites in , Bor, , , and other locations; by December 21, 2013, over 35,000 individuals had sought refuge, primarily Nuer fearing targeted attacks. This action saved lives amid the chaos, though UNMISS's pre-crisis troop strength of approximately 7,000 military personnel limited proactive patrols and external interventions, confining protection efforts largely to base perimeters. The mission also began monitoring violations and facilitating humanitarian access where possible, documenting extrajudicial executions, , and displacement but facing restricted movement due to ongoing hostilities. The UN Security Council, through Resolution 2132 adopted on December 24, 2013, endorsed Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's recommendation to temporarily surge UNMISS forces to bolster civilian protection, increasing authorized toward 12,500 and police to 1,323 while reorienting the mandate from state-building to prioritize protection of civilians, reporting, and support for a political process. By April 2014, PoC sites sheltered over 78,000 internally displaced persons, with hosting around 32,000. Resolution 2155 of May 27, 2014, further streamlined operations, authorizing "all necessary means" for civilian protection irrespective of threat source and suspending non-essential tasks amid the escalating crisis. Despite these adjustments, challenges persisted, including attacks on UN bases—such as the assault on Bor PoC site killing two peacekeepers and 47 civilians—and crossfire incidents that wounded dozens, underscoring the mission's vulnerabilities with under-resourced troops often outnumbered by hostile forces.

Escalation and Stalemate (2015-2017)

In late 2015, despite the signing of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of (ARCSS) on , mediated by the (IGAD) with UN support, ceasefire violations escalated the . The ARCSS aimed to form a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) and address power-sharing between President Salva Kiir's government forces (Sudan People's Liberation Army, SPLA) and Riek Machar's opposition (SPLA-IO), but sporadic clashes persisted in Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei states, displacing over 1.6 million people internally by year's end. UNMISS, under Security Council Resolution 2304 (2016) renewed in June, maintained its mandate for civilian protection, monitoring, and humanitarian facilitation, sheltering around 180,000 in protection of civilians (POC) sites amid rising ethnic-targeted violence. The conflict intensified dramatically in from July 8-11, 2016, when fighting erupted between SPLA and SPLA-IO forces following disputes over Machar's return under ARCSS terms, resulting in over 300 civilian deaths, widespread , and . UNMISS bases were struck by more than 200 rounds of fire, and on July 11, government soldiers attacked the compound—a UN-adjacent housing aid workers—killing at least 12, including four UN contractors, in one of the worst incidents against humanitarians. The mission evacuated over 1,000 civilians to its compounds but faced for delayed response due to restricted movement, command hesitancy, and obstructions by both parties, though it prevented broader massacres in POC sites. Machar fled to the , prompting Kiir to dissolve the TGNU and launch offensives, capturing key opposition areas and forcing SPLA-IO fragmentation. By 2017, the war devolved into a stalemate of fragmented fronts, with government advances in Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal offset by insurgency tactics, exacerbating a humanitarian crisis where famine was declared in Unity State on February 20, affecting 100,000 people amid hyperinflation and aid blockages. UNMISS documented systematic abuses, including indiscriminate shelling and targeted killings around Yei, with over 1,000 civilian deaths reported in the first half of the year. The mission's 20,000-strong force focused on POC site security for 210,000 displaced and facilitating aid convoys, but its non-enforcement mandate limited offensive actions, while peacekeepers faced ambushes killing nine by mid-year. Security Council Resolution 2363 (2017) in July urged ARCSS revitalization, yet obstructions by government forces hindered UN mobility, underscoring the mission's constrained role in a conflict driven by elite power struggles and ethnic militias rather than decisive military gains.

Peace Process Engagement (2018-2020)

In September 2018, the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) was signed in Khartoum, Sudan, by President Salva Kiir, opposition leader Riek Machar, and other parties, aiming to revive and implement key provisions of the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS). The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) played a supportive role in the lead-up to the signing by maintaining protection of civilians sites and facilitating local-level dialogues to build confidence among communities, though primary mediation efforts were coordinated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) with Sudanese facilitation. UN Security Council Resolution 2412 (2018), which renewed UNMISS's mandate on March 15, 2018, prior to the signing, emphasized the mission's responsibility to create conditions conducive to political dialogue by prioritizing civilian protection and monitoring ceasefire compliance. Following the R-ARCSS signing, UNMISS shifted focus toward supporting implementation benchmarks, including security sector reform, , and power-sharing arrangements, amid ongoing delays attributed to disputes over force unification and resource allocation. The mission provided technical assistance and good offices to IGAD and the parties, including verification of cantonment sites and advisory support for joint integrated security forces, while its mandate renewal in March 2019 explicitly tasked it with aiding the agreement's rollout to reduce intercommunal violence that persisted despite the national-level truce. By mid-2019, UNMISS reported facilitating over 200 local peace dialogues involving more than 10,000 community members to align with national processes, though critics noted the mission's limited leverage in enforcing elite-level compliance due to reliance on host government consent. Implementation stalled through 2019, with key deadlines for forming the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGNU) postponed multiple times due to disagreements on security protocols and Machar's return to ; UNMISS intervened by mediating bilaterally with parties and coordinating with regional actors to avert escalations. On February 22, 2020, the RTGNU was established, with Kiir as president and Machar as first , marking a in power-sharing under Chapter I of the R-ARCSS. UNMISS contributed by securing key locations in and supporting the safe deployment of opposition forces, which helped sustain a relative reduction in —fatalities from organized conflict dropped by approximately 80% from 2017 peaks—though subnational clashes continued, underscoring the agreement's elite-centric limitations. The mission's Security Council-mandated role in 2020 emphasized monitoring Chapter II security provisions, including the strategic defense and security review, but faced constraints from inadequate funding and host resistance to full integration.

Ongoing Instability and Recent Developments (2021-2025)

The implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of (R-ARCSS), signed in 2018, continued to falter from 2021, marked by delays in security sector reforms, unification of forces, and transitional benchmarks, exacerbating political deadlock and subnational tensions. Intercommunal violence, often driven by resource competition and , persisted as a primary driver of instability, particularly in regions like Greater Bahr el and Jonglei, resulting in hundreds of civilian casualties annually despite UNMISS efforts to mediate local ceasefires. Civilian protection challenges intensified, with UNMISS reporting a surge in violence against non-combatants; between January and March 2025 alone, 739 civilians were killed, 679 injured, 149 abducted, and 40 subjected to conflict-related amid clashes involving armed groups and security forces. The mission's mandate, renewed annually by the Security Council—via Resolution 2653 (2022) until March 2023, Resolution 2727 (2023) until March 2024, Resolution 2726 (2024) until April 2025, and Resolution 2779 (2025) until April 2026—emphasized civilian protection sites, humanitarian access facilitation, and support for inclusive political dialogue, though operational constraints, including restricted access by host authorities, limited effectiveness. In April 2025, the withdrew key military personnel from UNMISS in response to South Sudan's handling of U.S. deportees, temporarily straining logistics and signaling donor frustrations with governance failures. Elections, originally slated for February 2023 under the R-ARCSS timeline, faced repeated postponements due to unmet preconditions like constitution-making and security arrangements; deadlines shifted to December 2024, then to December 2026 following a September 2024 government decision extending the transition, drawing UN criticism for undermining public trust and risking renewed elite-level conflict. By August 2025, the Security Council described at a "turning point" amid escalating , , and humanitarian needs affecting 9 million people, with UNMISS facilitating state-level discussions on response but unable to halt broader for atrocities. In October 2025, a UN Commission of highlighted complicity in fueling and obstructing accountability, urging AU and Security Council intervention to avert atrocity risks.

Core Activities and Operations

Civilian Protection Initiatives

UNMISS's civilian protection mandate, authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter through Security Council resolutions such as Resolution 1996 (2011) and reaffirmed in Resolution 2779 (2025) adopted on 8 May 2025, empowers the mission to use all necessary means to protect civilians under threat of physical violence. This includes proactive measures to deter attacks, rapid response to imminent dangers, and prevention of violence particularly against women, children, and in displacement settings. The mission prioritizes protection in areas of high conflict risk, integrating military, police, and civilian components to maintain security within and around designated sites. A cornerstone initiative is the establishment of Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites adjacent to UNMISS bases, initiated in December 2013 amid the outbreak of violence on 15 December 2013, when approximately 85,000 civilians sought refuge in eight mission compounds across locations including , Bor, and . These sites peaked at over 200,000 residents in 2015 and 214,000 as of March 2017, providing immediate physical security, basic services, and humanitarian access coordination for hundreds of thousands cumulatively during the conflict. By early 2021, populations had declined to about 125,000, with five of six sites transitioned to government control following the 2018 Revitalized Agreement, aiming to build national capacity for sustained protection. Beyond sites, UNMISS conducts proactive and reactive patrols by its 17,000 troops and 2,101 police personnel to monitor threats and intervene in high-risk areas, supplemented by early warning mechanisms and community alert networks to facilitate timely evacuations or . The Protection, Transition and Reintegration (PTR) section engages local authorities and communities to strengthen these networks, administers sites like in partnership with humanitarian actors, and addresses specific vulnerabilities such as sexual and gender-based violence through dialogue and rapid response protocols. Capacity-building efforts include training programs for forces and UN personnel on civilian principles, such as a May 2025 session in Duk County, , targeting local authorities amid rising insecurity. UNMISS also supports gender-responsive community violence reduction initiatives and technical assistance for rule-of-law reforms to enable safer returns and reintegration of displaced persons, aligning with the National Framework for returnees and IDPs. These activities emphasize coordination with the UN Country Team and government to transition from mission-led to state-owned solutions.

Political and Security Sector Support

UNMISS's mandate includes supporting the Government of South Sudan in advancing political processes under the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), such as facilitating dialogue among political actors and providing technical assistance for electoral preparations. This involves urging leaders to meet benchmarks for democratic elections, including unification of security forces and constitution-making, as emphasized in mission statements following Security Council Resolution 2779 (2025). A 2024 perception survey indicated 79% of South Sudanese viewed UNMISS's performance in political support positively, with strong public backing for elections. In security sector reform (SSR), UNMISS conducts technical workshops and training to extend SSR and community violence reduction, including sessions from February to May 2024 that engaged national stakeholders. Efforts include dialogues between and security personnel to build trust, such as a November 2024 forum establishing ongoing communication platforms, and partnerships with state officials in in June 2025 to enhance civilian protection collaborations. Training programs target ethical reporting integration into SSR, with an August 2025 initiative for journalists to promote accountability in security operations. Funding from the Elsie Initiative in October 2025 bolstered SSR by supporting troop- and police-contributing countries. Rule of law support focuses on sector reforms, including deployment of mobile courts to remote areas for case resolution and prolonged reduction. UNMISS facilitated the first mobile court in Town from January 30 to February 22, 2025, and initiated operations in Maban on October 26, 2025, to deliver and strengthen . In Gogrial East, a June 2025 UNMISS-supported addressed long-delayed cases, fostering accountability. The mission handed over a renovated prison service training academy in November 2024 to build capacity in the system. These initiatives aim to restore civilian trust, though evaluations note challenges in nationwide implementation amid ongoing .

Humanitarian and State-Building Efforts

UNMISS's humanitarian efforts center on facilitating safe access for delivery amid ongoing insecurity, with its mandate explicitly including the creation of conditions conducive to humanitarian assistance. Peacekeepers secure convoys and patrol areas to enable the provision of essentials like , , and healthcare to millions of vulnerable South Sudanese. The mission's Mine Action Service has cleared 1,918,524 square meters of explosive-contaminated land as of August 2025 to mitigate threats and support operations. UNMISS also administers protection of civilians sites, such as in , coordinating with humanitarian partners for joint planning and facilitating safe returns; for example, it assisted 128 displaced households in 2025 by removing , constructing shelters, and distributing . In parallel, the mission bolsters through technical assistance and capacity enhancement for ese institutions, aligned with its foundational mandate to help establish development conditions and strengthen government capabilities. This includes support for implementing the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in , encompassing reforms, election preparations, and inclusive governance involving women, youth, and marginalized groups. UNMISS provides training to security forces, such as a July 2024 program for around 600 personnel aimed at improving inter-agency coordination and reducing operational gaps. Grassroots initiatives form a key component of state-building activities, with UNMISS launching projects like one in Warrap State in July 2025 to equip local communities with conflict resolution skills and self-protection tools. The mission has constructed infrastructure such as peace hubs; in October 2025, it handed over a facility to the Azande kingdom for hosting traditional dialogues, youth and women's empowerment sessions, cultural events, and training. Following the 2013 civil war, UNMISS reprioritized from broader state-building toward immediate protection and transitional support, including climate security expertise deployment in 2024 to integrate environmental risks into institutional planning. These activities seek to foster institutional resilience and prevent conflict relapse, though implementation faces challenges from host government obstructions and resource constraints as noted in Security Council reports.

Achievements and Positive Outcomes

Quantifiable Impacts on Stability and Aid Delivery

UNMISS established Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites on its bases in response to the 2013 civil war outbreak, providing and security to displaced populations vulnerable to targeted attacks. At their peak in 2015, these sites collectively protected over 200,000 civilians across , preventing exposure to widespread violence and enabling localized stability within protected perimeters. By April 2020, the six primary PoC sites housed 190,376 individuals, while figures remained at 188,649 as of early May 2020, demonstrating sustained capacity to safeguard significant numbers amid ongoing conflict. These sites facilitated the delivery of critical humanitarian aid directly to sheltered populations, including food rations, clean water, medical services, and sanitation infrastructure, with UNMISS personnel coordinating logistics to mitigate risks from surrounding hostilities. The presence of UNMISS forces in PoC vicinities contributed to reduced incident rates in immediate areas through patrols and deterrence, supporting community-level that averted escalation in select hotspots; for instance, mission-supported local dialogues helped de-escalate tensions in regions like Unity and Jonglei states during 2018-2020 peace implementation phases. Overall, PoC operations shielded hundreds of thousands cumulatively from 2013 to 2021, when populations declined to around 125,000 following partial site transitions to control, thereby bolstering aid efficacy by concentrating resources in secure zones amid national humanitarian needs affecting up to 76% of the population in 2023.

Role in Facilitating Peace Agreements

The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has provided good offices and technical support to the implementation of the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in (ARCSS), signed on 17 August 2015 under the mediation of the (IGAD), by monitoring ceasefire observance and facilitating security arrangements between the /Army in Government (SPLM/A-IG) and opposition forces. Following the ARCSS signing, the UN Security Council extended UNMISS's mandate on 15 December 2015 until 31 July 2016 and authorized an increase in authorized troop strength to 13,000 military personnel and over 1,300 formed police, enabling enhanced verification of , , and reintegration processes outlined in the agreement. UNMISS officers engaged local communities to promote adherence to the accord's provisions on transitional governance and power-sharing, though implementation faltered amid renewed fighting in July 2016. In response to the ARCSS's partial collapse, UNMISS contributed to the revitalization process leading to the Revitalized ARCSS (R-ARCSS), signed on 12 2018, by coordinating with IGAD to support and the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity on 22 February 2020. UNMISS's mandate, renewed periodically by the Security Council, includes specific tasks to aid R-ARCSS execution, such as advising on unified forces integration—targeting 83,000 troops by the agreement's benchmarks—and providing logistical assistance for joint security mechanisms. The mission has facilitated subnational dialogues to align local truces with national commitments, including efforts in border areas to mitigate intercommunal violence that undermined the accord. UNMISS has sustained its facilitation role through joint initiatives with IGAD and the Mission in South Sudan (AUMISS), issuing communiqués urging adherence to R-ARCSS timelines, such as the 2019 extension of the transitional period and preparations for December 2026 elections. In 2024, UNMISS supported the Tumaini Initiative peace talks in , engaging hold-out groups like the National Salvation Front to broaden the agreement's inclusivity beyond the original parties. The mission's 2025 mandate renewal under Security Council Resolution 2779 emphasizes technical aid for electoral processes and security sector reform, with UNMISS deploying advisors to monitor progress on outstanding benchmarks like constitutional drafting. Despite these efforts, delays in R-ARCSS implementation—necessitating a second transitional extension in September 2024—highlight constraints on UNMISS's influence, as primary leverage remains with IGAD-led mediation.

Criticisms, Failures, and Controversies

Failures in Civilian Protection and Conflict Prevention

Despite its core mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, the Mission in (UNMISS) has repeatedly failed to prevent attacks even in areas under its direct operational purview, contributing to thousands of civilian deaths and displacements since 2011. High-profile incidents, such as the July 2016 fighting in between Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) factions, exposed systemic lapses: an independent UN panel found that chaotic command structures, risk-averse troop policies, and delayed responses allowed government soldiers to kill and hundreds of civilians in hotels and on streets adjacent to UN bases, with peacekeepers often remaining passive or retreating. Similarly, the February 2016 assault on the Protection of Civilians (POC) site—where over 30 civilians died amid looting and arson—highlighted UNMISS's inadequate perimeter security and failure to mobilize reinforcements promptly, despite housing thousands in the camp. These protection shortfalls extend to intercommunal violence, which UNMISS has proven unable to deter despite patrols and forward deployments; a Stockholm International Peace Research Institute assessment noted non-interventions in multiple Jonglei State clashes between 2013 and 2016, where one-third of troops operated under national caveats restricting engagement beyond self-defense, allowing revenge killings and cattle raids to claim hundreds of lives annually. Outside POC sites, which peaked at sheltering 220,000 people but transitioned to community-based models by 2020, vulnerabilities persist: a 2021 U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants report documented UNMISS's inaction on reported sexual assaults in Unity State, where victims faced retaliation without mission-led investigations or deterrence. In terms of conflict prevention, UNMISS's political facilitation and early warning mechanisms have not curbed recurring subnational escalations, with intercommunal fighting driving most civilian harm post-2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan. An Office of Internal Oversight Services evaluation in 2025 criticized delays in responding to warnings in Tambura and Adidiang counties, where ethnic clashes displaced thousands despite mission mediation attempts, attributing failures to operational bottlenecks and dependence on South Sudanese security forces for access. By early 2025, such violence in Warrap State's Tonj East killed over 200 civilians in March alone, part of 1,607 verified victims nationwide from January to March—including 739 deaths and 149 abductions—illustrating UNMISS's limited capacity to break cycles fueled by arms proliferation and weak state authority. Broader critiques identify causal factors like troop-contributing countries' restrictions, host-government of UN personnel, and the mission's "caveat-laden" posture, which prioritizes force preservation over robust intervention, as per analyses from the Center for Civilians in Conflict. These have perpetuated a protection paradox: while POC sites averted mass atrocities in and , the mission's inability to project force beyond static sites has enabled attackers to operate with , undermining deterrence and fostering dependency on UN enclaves rather than sustainable . A 2025 UN report underscored this as central to South Sudan's crisis, with non-state armed groups exploiting gaps to commit atrocities unchecked.

Specific Incidents and Operational Shortcomings

In February 2016, an attack on the UNMISS Protection of Civilians (PoC) site in resulted in the deaths of at least 30 civilians and injuries to over 100 others when government-aligned forces infiltrated the site and engaged in heavy fighting. UNMISS troops, despite being present, failed to mount an effective defensive response or evacuate vulnerable individuals, citing in command structures and inadequate preparation for intra-site violence. A subsequent UN investigation acknowledged delays in and poor coordination among contingents, which allowed assailants to burn one-third of the camp and perpetrate widespread looting. During the July 2016 clashes in , government soldiers stormed the Terrain Hotel, killing approximately 10 civilians and two foreigners in a that lasted hours, yet nearby UNMISS peacekeepers stationed less than a kilometer away did not intervene due to restrictive and a prevailing risk-averse operational culture. An independent board of inquiry concluded that chaotic leadership and failure to anticipate escalation contributed to the inaction, despite UNMISS's mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat. The same fighting saw extensive against women and girls, with UNMISS unable to curb attacks even after issuing public condemnations, exacerbating vulnerabilities in urban areas outside PoC sites. In October 2014, opposition forces overran , committing targeted massacres against Dinka civilians that killed hundreds, while UNMISS forces at the local PoC site provided only limited perimeter security and could not prevent infiltrations or retaliatory ethnic killings in adjacent areas. Reports documented over 200 civilian deaths in the town, with UNMISS criticized for insufficient patrols and intelligence sharing that might have mitigated the offensive's scale. Similar lapses occurred in Bor in April 2014, where attacks on a PoC site killed more than 50 refugees, underscoring recurring issues with rapid reaction capabilities amid host government restrictions on troop movements. Operational shortcomings have also included persistent sexual exploitation and abuse by UNMISS personnel, with at least 38 allegations reported across UN operations in the second quarter of 2019 alone, several involving troops. In 2018, eight Ghanaian members were repatriated after substantiated claims of with local women, highlighting enforcement gaps in zero-tolerance policies and inadequate vetting of contingents. Independent assessments have faulted UNMISS for slow investigations and failure to support victims, particularly in PoC sites where aid workers' abuses went unchecked for years despite early reports dating to 2015. These incidents reflect broader deficiencies in mechanisms, including disjointed oversight between troop-contributing countries and UN headquarters.

Internal Mission Issues and Accountability Gaps

The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has faced persistent internal challenges related to misconduct among its personnel, including sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), corruption in procurement and operations, and mismanagement in facilities and discipline processes. A 2021 audit by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) assessed UNMISS's conduct and discipline measures as partially effective but identified gaps in timely reporting, investigation tracking, and risk mitigation for serious misconduct, such as SEA, which is classified as a Category I violation under UN standards. Specific incidents include allegations in February 2018 against members of a formed police unit (FPU) engaging in transactional sex, prompting immediate repatriation but highlighting enforcement reliance on troop-contributing countries (TCCs). In Yambio, local women reported ongoing SEA burdens in 2019, with calls for justice amid UN campaigns like the 2017 "No Second Chance" initiative emphasizing zero tolerance yet revealing recurrent patterns. UNMISS also recorded high rates of intra-mission sexual abuse against female peacekeepers, underscoring vulnerabilities within the force. Corruption risks have compounded these issues, with reports of fraudulent practices such as unsubstantiated medical claims by and a questionable $10 million payment in 2019 for "sport facilities" lacking proper procedures, diverting resources from core mandates. OIOS audits have repeatedly flagged and facilities mismanagement; a 2013 review deemed UNMISS's in facilities unsatisfactory, while 2024 audits noted deficiencies in , arrival inspections, and handling in accommodations, leading to inefficient resource use and potential exposure. These findings align with broader assessments of risks, including in contracts and fuel diversion, though UNMISS-specific prosecutions remain rare due to jurisdictional limits. Accountability gaps stem primarily from the UN's dependence on TCCs for prosecuting uniformed personnel, resulting in low conviction rates—often below 10% for allegations across missions—and repatriation without follow-through. OIOS and Conduct and Discipline Teams (CDTs) handle investigations, mandating 24-hour reporting for serious , but audits reveal delays in case resolution and inadequate oversight, as seen in the conduct audit's recommendations for better tracking systems. Systemic issues include failures and cultural , exacerbated by the mission's scale—over 19,000 personnel as of recent mandates—without robust internal criminal , leading critics to argue that self-reported reforms, like enhanced , fail to address causal roots in weak enforcement and misaligned incentives among TCCs. Despite UN Security Council resolutions pushing for stricter responses, such as name-and-shame lists for non-compliant TCCs, implementation lags, perpetuating a cycle of allegations without proportional deterrence.

Broader Critiques of Effectiveness and Resource Use

Critics have highlighted the disproportionate resource allocation to UNMISS relative to its tangible impacts on South Sudan's stability, with the mission's annual budgets consistently exceeding $1 billion—reaching a proposed $1.3 billion for the /25 period—amid persistent conflict and governance failures. Since its establishment in 2011, cumulative expenditures have approached $13 billion, yet these funds have not prevented the eruption of in 2013 or subsequent cycles of ethnic violence that have displaced over 4 million people internally. Analyses from independent evaluators point to structural inefficiencies, including mandate ambiguities that hinder proactive intervention and foster dependency on UN presence without building local capacities, as seen in UNMISS's inability to curb or compel political elites to honor ceasefires. assessments of UN peacekeeping underscore broader flaws such as mismanagement and operational abuses, arguing that missions like UNMISS often exacerbate local distortions—through inflated economies around bases—without addressing root causes like elite and resource competition. Further critiques emphasize resource misallocation, with reports documenting waste and abuse in operations, including in , where logistical dependencies and troop-contributing countries' incentives prioritize reimbursement over outcomes, leading to outgunned forces unable to influence armed actors effectively. Despite claims of cost-effectiveness compared to unilateral interventions, empirical reviews indicate that UNMISS's protection efforts, while implementing mandated tasks, have failed to translate into sustainable peace, perpetuating a cycle of high expenditure for reactive rather than .

International Involvement and Alternatives

Complementary Roles of Regional and Bilateral Actors

Regional organizations, particularly the (IGAD), have played a pivotal role in mediating political dialogues and guaranteeing implementation of the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in (R-ARCSS), complementing UNMISS's focus on civilian protection and humanitarian access by providing regional leverage over 's leadership. IGAD, comprising , , , , , , , and , facilitated the initial 2015 peace talks and subsequent 2018 revitalization, acting as the principal guarantor amid delays in elections and power-sharing. In coordination with UNMISS and the , IGAD issued joint statements in December 2024 urging tangible progress in 2025, including security arrangements and constitutional reforms, while emphasizing its stewardship of the process through high-level summits, such as the 43rd Extraordinary Summit in March 2025. This regional mediation fills gaps in UNMISS's mandate by exerting peer pressure on holdout parties, as evidenced by IGAD's facilitation of dialogue extensions following the transitional period's September 2024 prolongation. Neighboring states within IGAD, including , , and , have contributed militarily and diplomatically to stabilization efforts, enabling UNMISS to prioritize non-combat tasks like aid delivery amid cross-border dynamics. Ethiopia hosted key IGAD-mediated talks leading to the R-ARCSS and has influenced border security, while Uganda provided direct military support to South Sudan's government forces during early conflict phases, deterring escalation that could strain UNMISS resources. Kenya has mediated subnational conflicts and hosted opposition figures, fostering incremental ceasefires that align with UNMISS's protection sites. These bilateral engagements by neighbors, critical in the 2020 negotiations per UN reporting, address localized power vacuums and flows—over 2.2 million South Sudanese refugees hosted regionally as of 2023—where UNMISS's troop constraints limit proactive intervention. However, competing national interests among these actors have occasionally fragmented efforts, underscoring the need for UNMISS-UN coordination to mitigate proxy influences. The (AU), through mechanisms like the AU High-Level Committee (C5) and the Panel of the Wise, supports and conflict mitigation in tandem with UNMISS, emphasizing African-led solutions to root causes such as pacts. AU efforts, including joint monitoring with IGAD and UNMISS, have pushed for reconstitution of security institutions delayed beyond 2023 deadlines, as noted in November 2023 communiques. This complements UNMISS by integrating continental norms into local governance, though implementation lags due to South Sudan's assertions. Bilateral actors, notably the Troika (United States, United Kingdom, Norway), have provided financial incentives and diplomatic sanctions to enforce R-ARCSS benchmarks, augmenting UNMISS's operational funding shortfalls—UNMISS's 2024-2025 budget exceeded $1.2 billion, with Troika pledges covering aid gaps. The Troika conditioned $1.5 billion in assistance on progress toward 2026 elections, pressuring reforms UNMISS monitors but cannot mandate. , holder of South Sudan's oil export routes via , deployed a 700-strong to UNMISS in 2015—the first troops abroad—and mediated discreetly between factions, leveraging economic ties to promote stability protecting its $8 billion investments. These bilateral inputs address UNMISS limitations in , though China's non-interference stance has drawn critique for prioritizing commerce over enforcement.

Debates on UN Model Limitations and Potential Reforms

Critics argue that the UN model, as applied in UNMISS, is inherently limited by its foundational principles of host state consent, , and minimal , which constrain effective action in environments where conflict parties lack commitment to . In , this has manifested in UNMISS's inability to prevent widespread violence despite a robust mandate for civilian protection, as the mission's operations remain dependent on cooperation from a actively involved in the conflict. Empirical assessments indicate that UN peacekeepers, including in UNMISS, failed to respond to approximately 80% of reported incidents of violence against civilians across multiple missions, underscoring a capabilities-expectations gap exacerbated by inadequate equipment, training, and rapid deployment mechanisms. Operational shortcomings in UNMISS highlight broader model flaws, such as prioritizing static protection-of-civilians sites—where over 200,000 lives were sheltered during spikes in and —over proactive patrols, leaving vast territories vulnerable and limiting evidence of preventive impact due to poor . Geopolitical divisions within the UN Security Council further hamper decisive mandates, as veto powers and competing interests prevent adaptations to asymmetric threats like those posed by South Sudanese militias. Additionally, reliance on troop-contributing countries from developing nations has led to persistent issues of , including underreported sexual exploitation cases in UNMISS as early as , eroding mission credibility without robust accountability from contributing states. Debates on reforms center on shifting from a one-size-fits-all approach to modular, context-specific models that integrate advanced capabilities like unmanned aerial systems for and rapid deployment forces to address high-risk scenarios in places like . Proponents advocate for enhanced partnerships with regional bodies such as IGAD or the , allowing hybrid operations that leverage local knowledge while reducing UN overstretch, as pure UN missions struggle with financial arrears exceeding $1.3 billion annually. Others call for stricter conditionality, including repatriation of abusive units and tying funding to verifiable progress, to counter the model's tendency toward indefinite quagmires, as seen in UNMISS's prolongation since 2011 amid stalled political processes. Evidence-based reforms, such as systematic data-gathering on patrol efficacy, could refine mandates but require overcoming institutional inertia and host government tensions that currently undermine state-building efforts.

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