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Agesilaus II (/əˌdʒɛsəˈleɪəs/; Ancient Greek: Ἀγησίλαος Agēsílāos; 445/4 – 360/59 BC) was king of Sparta from c. 400 to c. 360 BC. Generally considered the most important king in the history of Sparta, Agesilaus was the main actor during the period of Spartan hegemony that followed the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC). Although brave in combat, Agesilaus lacked the diplomatic skills to preserve Sparta's position, especially against the rising power of Thebes, which reduced Sparta to a secondary power after its victory at Leuctra in 371 BC.

Key Information

Despite the traditional secrecy fostered by the Spartiates, the reign of Agesilaus is particularly well-known thanks to the works of his friend Xenophon, who wrote a large history of Greece (the Hellenica) covering the years 411 to 362 BC, therefore extensively dealing with Agesilaus's rule. Xenophon furthermore composed a panegyric biography of his friend, perhaps to clean his memory from the criticisms voiced against him. Another historical tradition—much more hostile to Agesilaus than Xenophon's writings—has been preserved in the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, and later continued by Diodorus of Sicily. Moreover, Plutarch wrote a biography of Agesilaus in his Parallel Lives, which contains many elements deliberately omitted by Xenophon.

Early life

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Youth

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Agesilaus's father was King Archidamos II (r. 469–427), who belonged to the Eurypontid dynasty, one of the two royal families of Sparta. Archidamos already had a son from a first marriage with Lampito (his own step-aunt) named Agis.[1][2] After the death of Lampito, Archidamos remarried in the early 440s with Eupolia, daughter of Melesippidas, whose name indicates an aristocratic status.[3][4] The dates of Agesilaus's birth, death, and reign are disputed. The only secured information is that he was 84 at his death. The majority opinion is to date his birth to 445/4,[5][6][7][8] but a minority of scholars move it a bit later, c.442.[9][10] Most of the other dates of Agesilaus are similarly disputed, with the minority moving them about two years later than the majority.[i] Agesilaus also had a sister named Kyniska (the first woman in ancient history to achieve an Olympic victory).[11][12] The name Agesilaus was rare and harks back to Agesilaus I, one of the earliest kings of Sparta.[13]

Agesilaus was born lame, a fact that should have cost him his life, since in Sparta deformed babies were thrown into a chasm.[14] As he was not heir-apparent, he might have received some leniency from the tribal elders who examined male infants,[14] or perhaps the first effects of the demographic decline of Sparta were already felt at the time, and only the most severely impaired babies were killed.[15][16]

Starting at the age of 7, Agesilaus had to go through the rigorous education system of Sparta, called the agoge.[17][18] Despite his disability, he brilliantly completed the training,[14] which massively enhanced his prestige, especially after he became king.[19] Indeed, as heirs-apparent were exempted of the agoge, few Spartan kings had gone through the same training as the citizens;[20] another notable exception was Leonidas, the embodiment of the "hero-king".[21] Between 433 and 428, Agesilaus also became the younger lover of Lysander, an aristocrat from the circle of Archidamos, whose family had some influence in Libya.[22][23]

Spartan prince

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Little is known of Agesilaus's adult life before his reign, principally because Xenophon—his friend and main biographer—only wrote about his reign.[24] Due to his special status, Agesilaus likely became a member of the Krypteia, an elite corps of young Spartans going undercover in Spartan territory to kill some helots deemed dangerous.[25] Once he turned 20 and became a full citizen, Agesilaus was elected to a common mess, presumably that of his elder half-brother Agis II, who had become king in 427, of which Lysander was perhaps a member.[26]

Agesilaus probably served during the Peloponnesian War (431–404) against Athens, likely at the Battle of Mantinea in 418.[27] Agesilaus married Kleora at some point between 408 and 400.[28] Despite the influence she apparently had on her husband, she is mostly unknown. Her father was Aristomenidas, an influential noble with connections in Thebes.[29]

Thanks to three treaties signed with Persia in 412–411, Sparta received funding from the Persians, which it used to build a fleet that ultimately defeated Athens.[30] This fleet was essentially led by Lysander, whose success gave him an enormous influence in the Greek cities of Asia as well as in Sparta, where he even schemed to become king.[31][32] In 403 the two kings, Agis and Pausanias, acted together to relieve him from his command.[33]

Reign

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Accession to the throne (400–398 BC)

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Agis II died while returning from Delphi between 400 and 398.[ii] After his funeral, Agesilaus contested the claim of Leotychidas, the son of Agis II, using the widespread belief in Sparta that Leotychidas was an illegitimate son of Alcibiades—a famous Athenian statesman and nephew of Pericles, who had gone into exile in Sparta during the Peloponnesian War, and then seduced the queen. The rumours were strengthened by the fact that even Agis only recognised Leotychidas as his son on his deathbed.[36][37]

Diopeithes, a supporter of Leotychidas, however quoted an old oracle telling that a Spartan king could not be lame, thus refuting Agesilaus's claim, but Lysander cunningly returned the objection by saying that the oracle had to be understood figuratively. The lameness warned against by the oracle would therefore refer to the doubt on Leotychidas's paternity, and this reasoning won the argument.[38][39] The role of Lysander in the accession of Agesilaus has been debated among historians, principally because Plutarch makes him the main instigator of the plot, while Xenophon downplays Lysander's influence.[40][41] Lysander doubtless supported Agesilaus's accession because he hoped that the new king would in return help him to regain the importance that he lost in 403.[42]

Conspiracy of Cinadon (399 BC)

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The Conspiracy of Cinadon took place during the first year of Agesilaus's reign, in the summer of 399.[43] Cinadon was a hypomeion, a Spartan who had lost his citizen status, presumably because he could not afford the price of the collective mess—one of the main reasons for the dwindling number of Spartan citizens in the Classical Era, called oliganthropia.[44][45][46] It is probable that the vast influx of wealth coming to the city after its victory against Athens in 404 triggered inflation in Sparta, which impoverished many citizens with a fixed income, like Cinadon, and caused their downgrade.[47] Therefore, the purpose of the plot was likely to restore the status of these disfranchised citizens.[48] However, the plot was uncovered and Cinadon and its leaders executed—probably with the active participation of Agesilaus,[49] but no further action was taken to solve the social crisis at the origin of the conspiracy. The failure of Agesilaus to acknowledge the critical problem suffered by Sparta at the time has been criticised by modern historians.[50][51]

Invasion of Asia Minor (396–394 BC)

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According to the treaties signed in 412 and 411 between Sparta and the Persian Empire, the latter became the overlord of the Greek city-states of Asia Minor.[52][53] In 401, these cities and Sparta supported the bid of Cyrus the Younger (the Persian Emperor's younger son and a good friend of Lysander) against his elder brother, the new emperor Artaxerxes II, who nevertheless defeated Cyrus at Cunaxa.[54] As a result, Sparta remained at war with Artaxerxes, and supported the Greek cities of Asia, which fought against Tissaphernes, the satrap of Lydia and Caria.[55] In 397 Lysander engineered a large expedition in Asia headed by Agesilaus, likely to recover the influence he had over the Asian cities at the end of the Peloponnesian War.[56][57] In order to win the approval of the Spartan assembly, Lysander built an army with only 30 Spartiates (full Spartan citizens), so the risk would be limited; the bulk of the army consisted of 2,000 neodamodes (freed helots) and 6,000 Greek allies.[58][59] In addition, Agesilaus obtained the support of the oracles of Zeus at Olympia and Apollo at Delphi.[60]

The sacrifice at Aulis (396 BC)

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Lysander and Agesilaus had intended the expedition to be a Panhellenic enterprise,[61] but Athens, Corinth, and especially Thebes, refused to participate.[62][63] In Spring 396, Agesilaus came to Aulis (in Boeotian territory) to sacrifice on the place where Agamemnon had done so just before his departure to Troy at the head of the Greek army in the Iliad, thus giving a grandiose aspect to the expedition. However he did not inform the Boeotians and brought his own seer to perform the sacrifice, instead of the local one. Learning this, the Boeotians prevented him from sacrificing and further humiliated him by casting away the victim; they perhaps intended to provoke a confrontation, as the relations between Sparta and Thebes had become execrable. Agesilaus then left to Asia, but Thebes remained hateful to him for the rest of his life.[64]

Meeting between Spartan king Agesilaus (left) and Pharnabazus II (right) in 395 BC, when Agesilaus agreed to remove himself from Hellespontine Phrygia.

Campaign in Asia (396–394 BC)

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Once Agesilaus landed in Ephesus, the Spartan main base, he concluded a three months' truce with Tissaphernes, likely to settle the affairs among the Greek allies.[65] He integrated some of the Greek mercenaries formerly hired by Cyrus the Younger (the Ten Thousand) in his army. They had returned from Persia under the leadership of Xenophon, who also remained in Agesilaus's staff.[66] In Ephesus, Agesilaus's authority was nevertheless overshadowed by Lysander, who was reacquainted with many of his supporters, men he had placed in control of the Greek cities at the end of the Peloponnesian War. Angered by his local aura, Agesilaus humiliated Lysander several times to force him to leave the army, despite his former relationship and Lysander's role in his accession to the throne.[67][68] Plutarch adds that after Agesilaus's emancipation from him, Lysander returned to his undercover scheme to make the monarchy elective.[69]

After Lysander's departure, Agesilaus raided Phrygia, the satrapy of Pharnabazus, until his advance guard was defeated not far from Daskyleion by the superior Persian cavalry led by Bancaeus and Rathines.[70][71] He then wintered at Ephesus, where he trained a cavalry force, perhaps on the advice of Xenophon, who had commanded the cavalry of the Ten Thousand.[72][73] In 395, the Spartan king managed to trick Tissaphernes into thinking that he would attack Caria, in the south of Asia Minor, forcing the satrap to hold a defence line on the Meander river. Instead, Agesilaus moved north to the important city of Sardis. Tissaphernes hastened to meet the king there, but his cavalry sent in advance was defeated by Agesilaus's army.[74][75] After his victory at the Battle of Sardis, Agesilaus became the first king to be given the command of both land and sea.[76] He delegated the naval command to his brother-in-law Peisander, whom he appointed navarch despite his inexperience; perhaps Agesilaus wanted to avoid the rise of a new Lysander, who owed his prominence to his time as navarch. After his defeat, Tissaphernes was executed and replaced as satrap by Tithraustes, who gave Agesilaus 30 talents to move north to the satrapy of Pharnabazus (Persian satraps were often bitter rivals).[77][78][79] Augesilaus's Phrygian campaign of 394 was fruitless, as he lacked the siege equipment required to take the fortresses of Leonton Kephalai, Gordion, and Miletou Teichos.[80]

Tens of thousands of Darics (popularly called "archers"), the main currency in Persia, were used to bribe the Greek states to start a war against Sparta, so that Agesilaus would have to be recalled from Asia.[81]

Xenophon tells that Agesilaus then wanted to campaign further east in Asia and sow discontent among the subjects of the Achaemenid empire, or even to conquer Asia.[80] Plutarch went further and wrote that Agesilaus had prepared an expedition to the heart of Persia, up to her capital of Susa, thus making him a forerunner of Alexander the Great. It is very unlikely that Agesilaus really had such a grand campaign in mind; regardless, he was soon forced to return to Europe in 394.[82]

Corinthian War (395–387 BC)

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Although Thebes and Corinth had been allies of Sparta throughout the Peloponnesian War, they were dissatisfied by the settlement of the war in 404, with Sparta as leader of the Greek world. Sparta's imperialist expansion in the Aegean greatly upset its former allies, notably by establishing friendly regimes and garrisons in smaller cities.[83][84] Through large gifts, Tithraustes also encouraged Sparta's former allies to start a war in order to force the recall of Agesilaus from Asia—even though the influence of Persian gold has been exaggerated.[76][85] The initiative came from Thebes, which provoked a war between their ally Ozolian Locris and Phocis in order to bring Sparta to the latter's defence.[86] Lysander and the other king Pausanias entered Boeotia, which enabled the Thebans to bring Athens in the war. Lysander then besieged Haliartus without waiting for Pausanias and was killed in a Boeotian counter-attack. In Sparta, Pausanias was condemned to death by Lysander's friends and went into exile.[87][88] After its success at Haliartus, Thebes was able to build a coalition against Sparta, with notably Argos and Corinth, where a war council was established, and securing the defection of most of the cities of northern and central Greece.[89][90] Unable to wage war on two fronts and with the loss of Lysander and Pausanias, Sparta had no choice but to recall Agesilaus from Asia.[91] The Asian Greeks fighting for him said they wanted to continue serving with him, while Agesilaus promised he would return to Asia as soon as he could.[92]

Map of the situation in the Aegean in 394 BC, with the long return of Agesilaus from Asia.

Agesilaus returned to Greece by land, crossing the Hellespont and from there along the coast of the Aegean Sea. In Thessaly he won a cavalry battle near Narthacium against the Pharsalians who had made an alliance with Thebes.[93][94][95] He then entered Boeotia by the Thermopylae, where he received reinforcements from Sparta.[96] Meanwhile, Aristodamos—the regent of the young Agiad king Agesipolis—won a major victory at Nemea near Argos, which was offset by the disaster of the Spartan navy at Cnidus against the Persian fleet led by Conon, an exiled Athenian general. Agesilaus lied to his men about the outcome of the battle of Knidos to avoid demoralising them as they were about to fight a large engagement against the combined armies of Thebes, Athens, Argos and Corinth. The following Battle of Coronea was a classic clash between two lines of hoplites.[97] The anti-Spartan allies were rapidly defeated, but the Thebans managed to retreat in good order, despite Agesilaus's activity on the front line, which caused him several injuries. The next day the Thebans requested a truce to recover their dead, therefore conceding defeat, although they had not been bested on the battlefield.[98] Agesilaus appears to have tried to win an honourable victory, by risking his life and being merciful with some Thebans who had sought shelter in the nearby Temple of Athena Itonia.[99] He then moved to Delphi, where he offered one tenth of the booty he had amassed since his landing at Ephesus, and returned to Sparta.[98]

No pitched battle took place in Greece in 393. Perhaps Agesilaus was still recovering from his wounds, or he was deprived of command because of the opposition of Lysander's and Pausanias's friends, who were disappointed by his lack of decisive victory and his appointment of Peisander as navarch before the disaster of Knidos.[100] The loss of the Spartan fleet besides allowed Konon to capture the island of Kythera, in the south of the Peloponnese, from where he could raid Spartan territory.[101] In 392, Sparta sent Antalcidas to Asia in order to negotiate a general peace with Tiribazus, the satrap of Lydia, while Sparta would recognise Persia's sovereignty over the Asian Greek cities. However, the Greek allies also sent emissaries to Sardis to refuse Antalcidas's plan, and Artaxerxes likewise rejected it. A second peace conference in Sparta failed the following year because of Athens.[102] A personal enemy of Antalcidas, Agesilaus likely disapproved these talks, which show that his influence at home had waned.[103] Plutarch says that he befriended the young Agiad king Agesipolis, possibly to prevent his opponents from coalescing behind him.[104]

By 391 Agesilaus had apparently recovered his influence as he was appointed at the head of the army, while his half-brother Teleutias became navarch.[105] The target was Argos, which had absorbed Corinth into a political union the previous year.[101] In 390 BC he made several successful expeditions into Corinthian territory, capturing Lechaeum and Peiraion. The loss, however, of a battalion (mora), destroyed by Iphicrates, neutralised these successes, and Agesilaus returned to Sparta. In 389 BC he conducted a campaign in Acarnania,[106] but two years later the Peace of Antalcidas, warmly supported by Agesilaus, put an end to the war, maintaining Spartan hegemony over Greece and returning the Greek cities of Asia Minor to the Achaemenid Empire. In this interval, Agesilaus declined command over Sparta's aggression on Mantineia, and justified Phoebidas's seizure of the Theban Cadmea so long as the outcome provided glory to Sparta.[107][87]

Illyrian invasion of Epirus

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In 385 BC, Alcetas of Epirus was a refugee in Syracuse for unknown reasons. The tyrant of Syracuse, Dionysius, wanted a friendly monarch in Epirus, so he sent 2,000 Greek hoplites and 500 suits of Greek armour to help the Illyrians, who at that time were led by king Bardylis, for their battles with the Molossians in Epirus. Attackers killed about 15,000 Molossians.[108] Alcetas was restored to the throne, but the Illyrians didn't stop there. They continued pillaging throughout Epirus and parts of Greece. Dionysius joined them in an attempt to plunder the temple of Delphi. Then, Sparta, supported by Thessaly and Macedonians, intervened under Agesilaus, and expelled the Illyrians and the Syracusan warriors.[109]

Decline

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Agesilaus expels the Illyrians from Epirus in 385 BC

When war broke out afresh with Thebes, Agesilaus twice invaded Boeotia (in 378 and 377 BC), although he spent the next five years largely out of action due to an unspecified but apparently grave illness. In the congress of 371 an altercation is recorded between him and the Theban general Epaminondas, and due to his influence, Thebes was peremptorily excluded from the peace, and orders given for Agesilaus's royal colleague Cleombrotus to march against Thebes in 371. Cleombrotus was defeated and killed at the Battle of Leuctra and the Spartan supremacy overthrown.[110]

In 370 Agesilaus was engaged in an embassy to Mantineia, and reassured the Spartans with an invasion of Arcadia. He preserved an unwalled Sparta against the revolts and conspiracies of helots, perioeci and even other Spartans; and against external enemies, with four different armies led by Epaminondas penetrating Laconia that same year.

Asia Minor expedition (366 BC)

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In 366 BC, Sparta and Athens, dissatisfied with the Persian king's support of Thebes following the embassy of Philiscus of Abydos, decided to provide careful military support to the opponents of the Achaemenid king. Athens and Sparta provided support for the revolting satraps in the Revolt of the Satraps, in particular Ariobarzanes: Sparta sent a force to Ariobarzanes under an aging Agesilaus, while Athens sent a force under Timotheus, which was however diverted when it became obvious that Ariobarzanes had entered frontal conflict with the Achaemenid king.[111][112] An Athenian mercenary force under Chabrias was also sent to the Egyptian Pharaoh Tachos, who was also fighting against the Achaemenid king.[111][113] According to Xenophon,[114] Agesilaus, in order to gain money for prosecuting the war, supported the satrap Ariobarzanes of Phrygia in his revolt against Artaxerxes II in 364 (Revolt of the Satraps).

Again, in 362, Epaminondas almost succeeded in seizing the city of Sparta with a rapid and unexpected march. The Battle of Mantinea, in which Agesilaus took no part, was followed by a general peace: Sparta, however, stood aloof, hoping even yet to recover her supremacy.

Expedition to Egypt

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Agesilaus offers his services to the Egyptian pharaoh Teos, Egypt.

Sometime after the Battle of Mantineia, Agesilaus went to Egypt at the head of a mercenary force to aid the king Nectanebo I and his regent Teos against Persia. In the summer of 358, he transferred his services to Teos's cousin and rival, Nectanebo II, who, in return for his help, gave him a sum of over 200 talents. On his way home Agesilaus died in Cyrenaica, around the age of 84, after a reign of some 41 years.[iii] His body was embalmed in wax, and buried at Sparta.[107]

He was succeeded by his son Archidamus III.

Legacy

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Agesilaus was of small stature and unimpressive appearance, and was lame from birth. These facts were used as an argument against his succession, an oracle having warned Sparta against a "lame reign." Most ancient writers considered him a highly successful leader in guerrilla warfare, alert and quick, yet cautious—a man, moreover, whose personal bravery was rarely questioned in his own time. Of his courage, temperance, and hardiness, many instances are cited, and to these were added the less Spartan qualities of kindliness and tenderness as a father and a friend. As examples, there was the story of his riding a stick-horse with his children and upon being discovered by a friend desiring that the friend not mention what he had seen until he was the father of children; and because of the affection of his son Archidamus for Cleonymus, he saved Sphodrias, Cleonymus's father, from execution for his incursion into Piraeus and dishonourable retreat in 378.[107] Modern writers tend to be slightly more critical of Agesilaus's reputation and achievements, reckoning him an excellent soldier, but one who had a poor understanding of sea power and siege-craft.[118]

As a statesman he won himself both enthusiastic adherents and bitter enemies. Agesilaus was most successful in the opening and closing periods of his reign: commencing but then surrendering a glorious career in Asia; and in extreme age, maintaining his prostrate country. Other writers acknowledge his extremely high popularity at home, but suggest his occasionally rigid and arguably irrational political loyalties and convictions contributed greatly to Spartan decline, notably his unremitting hatred of Thebes, which led to Sparta's humiliation at the Battle of Leuctra and thus the end of Spartan hegemony.[118] Historian J. B. Bury remarks that "there is something melancholy about his career:" born into a Sparta that was the unquestioned continental power of Hellas, the Sparta which mourned him eighty four years later had suffered a series of military defeats which would have been unthinkable to his forebears, had seen its population severely decline, and had run so short of money that its soldiers were increasingly sent on campaigns fought more for money than for defense or glory.[119] Plutarch also describes how often, to remove the threat of instigators of internal dissension, Agesilaus would send his enemies abroad with governorships, where they often were corrupt and procured themselves enemies. Agesilaus would then protect them against these new enemies of theirs, so as to make them his friends. As a result, he no longer had to face internal opposition, as his enemies had henceforth become allies.

As for his personal life, though he had two daughters, Eupolia and Prolyta, and a wife, Cleora, he nonetheless had the habit of forming homosexual "attachments for young men".

Xenophon's Agesilaus.

Other historical accounts paint Agesilaus as a prototype for the ideal leader. His awareness, thoughtfulness, and wisdom were all traits to be emulated diplomatically, while his bravery and shrewdness in battle epitomised the heroic Greek commander. These historians point towards the unstable oligarchies established by Lysander in the former Athenian Empire and the failures of Spartan leaders (such as Pausanias and Kleombrotos) for the eventual suppression of Spartan power. The ancient historian Xenophon was a huge admirer and served under Agesilaus during the campaigns into Asia Minor.[87]

Plutarch includes among Agesilaus's 78 essays and speeches comprising the apophthegmata Agesilaus's letter to the ephors on his recall:

We have reduced most of Asia, driven back the barbarians, made arms abundant in Ionia. But since you bid me, according to the decree, come home, I shall follow my letter, may perhaps be even before it. For my command is not mine, but my country's and her allies'. And a commander then commands truly according to right when he sees his own commander in the laws and ephors, or others holding office in the state.

And when asked whether Agesilaus wanted a memorial erected in his honour:

If I have done any noble action, that is a sufficient memorial; if I have done nothing noble, all the statues in the world will not preserve my memory.[iv]

Agesilaus lived in the most frugal style alike at home and in the field, and though his campaigns were undertaken largely to secure booty, he was content to enrich the state and his friends and to return as poor as he had set forth.[87][120][121][122][123]

Notes

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References

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Sources

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Ancient sources

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Modern sources

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  • Hans Beck & Peter Funke, Federalism in Greek Antiquity, Cambridge University Press, 2015. ISBN 9780521192262
  • Paul Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, A Regional History 1300–362 BC, London, Routledge, 1979 (originally published in 1979). ISBN 0-415-26276-3
  • ——, Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987.
  • George L. Cawkwell, "Agesilaus and Sparta", The Classical Quarterly 26 (1976): 62–84.
  • David, Ephraim. Sparta Between Empire and Revolution (404-243 BC): Internal Problems and Their Impact on Contemporary Greek Consciousness. New York: Arno Press, 1981.
  • Forrest, W.G. A History of Sparta, 950-192 B.C. 2d ed. London: Duckworth, 1980.
  • Dustin A. Gish, "Spartan Justice: The Conspiracy of Kinadon in Xenophon's Hellenika", in Polis, vol. 26, no. 2, 2009, pp. 339–369.
  • Hamilton, Charles D. Agesilaus and the Failure of Spartan Hegemony. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991.
  • Hamilton, Charles D. Sparta's Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979.
  • D. M. Lewis, John Boardman, Simon Hornblower, M. Ostwald (editors), The Cambridge Ancient History, vol. VI, The Fourth Century B.C., Cambridge University Press, 1994.
  • Pascual, José (2013). "La datación de la ascensión al trono de Esparta de Agesilao II y la cronología de la dinastía XXX egipcia". Gerión. Vol. 30. Complutense University of Madrid. pp. 29–49. doi:10.5209/rev_GERI.2012.v30.41802. ISSN 0213-0181.
  • Anton Powell (editor), A Companion to Sparta, Volume I, Hoboken/Chichester, Wiley Blackwell, 2018. ISBN 9781405188692
  • D. R. Shipley, A Commentary on Plutarch's Life of Agesilaos: Response to Sources in the Presentation of Character, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997. ISBN 9780198150732
  • Debby Sneed, "Disability and Infanticide in Ancient Greece", Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, Vol. 90, No. 4, 2021, pp. 747–772.
  • Maria Stamatopoulou, "Thessalians Abroad, the Case of Pharsalos", in Mediterranean Historical Review, vol. 22.2 (2007), pp. 211–236.
  • Graham Wylie, "Agesilaus and the Battle of Sardis", in Klio, n°74 (1992), pp. 118–130.
Regnal titles
Preceded by King of Sparta
400/398–358 BC 		Succeeded by
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Agesilaus II

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Agesilaus II (Ancient Greek: Ἀγησίλαος; c. 444–360 BC) was a king of from the Eurypontid dynasty, reigning from c. 399 BC until his death and commanding Spartan military efforts during the height of its hegemony over . Born as the youngest son of King , he overcame a congenital lameness to complete the rigorous Spartan training and ascend the throne after the death of his half-brother , whose presumed heir Leotychidas was declared illegitimate due to the circumstances of his conception during an . Agesilaus quickly established himself as a formidable general, launching a campaign in 396 BC to Asia Minor aimed at liberating Ionian Greek cities from Persian control, where he achieved initial successes against satrap before a truce and recall to amid the outbreak of the Corinthian War. In the ensuing conflict against a coalition including , Thebes, , and Argos, he secured a at the Battle of Coronea in 394 BC, reinforcing Spartan dominance despite ongoing attrition. His tenure featured persistent interventions to suppress Boeotian ambitions, culminating in the catastrophic Spartan defeat at Leuctra in 371 BC under his co-king , which shattered the Spartan system of equals (homoioi) and ended its unassailable supremacy, though Agesilaus persisted in resistance against Theban incursions. In his later years, facing Sparta's diminished resources, Agesilaus undertook a mercenary expedition to in 362–361 BC to support Tachos against rivals, aiding in victories but ultimately withdrawing amid political shifts; he died en route home at age 84, his body preserved in honey for transport to . Primary accounts of his life, drawn from contemporaries like —who eulogized him as embodying Spartan virtues—and later biographers like , portray a leader of unyielding and tactical ingenuity, yet one whose relentless strained Sparta's rigid and contributed to its long-term decline.

Early Life

Birth and Family Background

Agesilaus II was born around 444 BC as the second son of King (Greek: Ἀρχίδαμος Βʹ), who ruled from approximately 469 to 427 BC. His mother was Eupolia, Archidamus's second wife, making Agesilaus the younger half-brother of the future king [Agis II](/page/Agis II), born to Archidamus's first marriage. This positioned him outside the direct line of succession within the Eurypontid dynasty, one of 's two hereditary royal houses alongside the Agiad line, both claiming descent from to legitimize their dual kingship system. The Eurypontid family traced its origins to the of the around the , establishing 's oligarchic structure where kings held limited executive powers checked by the ephors and . Archidamus II's reign coincided with the early phases of the , during which asserted hegemony over the against , shaping the militaristic environment into which Agesilaus was born. Agesilaus had at least one full sister, , who later gained fame as the first woman to win an Olympic chariot race in 396 BC, highlighting the family's enduring influence in Spartan society. Due to his physical deformity—a congenitally shorter leg causing a limp—Agesilaus was deemed unlikely to inherit the throne, leading him to undergo the full agoge, Sparta's rigorous public education system for male citizens rather than the abbreviated training typical for royals. This background of royal but non-heir status, combined with Sparta's emphasis on merit over birthright in practice, foreshadowed his later ascension amid political maneuvering.

Overcoming Physical Disability

Agesilaus II was born with a congenital lameness that affected one leg, rendering him physically impaired from infancy—a defect that, under traditional Spartan practice, often led to the exposure and death of newborns considered unfit for the rigors of warrior life. Despite this, as the son of King Archidamus II, he was permitted to survive and enter the agoge, Sparta's mandatory educational and military training regimen for boys, where physical endurance was paramount. Plutarch records that Agesilaus's spirited nature enabled him to endure the harsh disciplines of the agoge, including communal living, minimal food rations, and intense physical exercises, without exemption for his condition. In the agoge, Agesilaus demonstrated exceptional resilience, often outpacing peers in competitive activities despite his limp; Plutarch highlights his victory in footraces through unyielding determination, transforming potential weakness into a testament of willpower. Xenophon, while downplaying overt references to physical flaws in keeping with Spartan ideals of stoic virtue, praises Agesilaus's later feats of endurance, such as leading infantry on extended marches and participating in hunts that required sustained physical exertion, indicating he had conditioned his body to perform at elite levels. This training forged him into a formidable commander, as evidenced by his ability to campaign vigorously in Asia Minor and Greece, marching alongside troops without reliance on conveyance, thereby negating any strategic disadvantage from his impairment.

Spartan Education and Early Military Training

Spartan boys of citizen class, including Agesilaus as the younger son of King Archidamus II, entered the —the state's compulsory educational and military training regimen—at age seven, approximately 437 BC in Agesilaus' case, since royal heirs like his elder half-brother Agis were often exempted. The emphasized physical hardening, communal living, and martial discipline over literacy or arts, with trainees grouped by age into ageles under elected boy-leaders and overseers (paidonomoi), enduring sparse rations supplemented by supervised theft to foster cunning, barefoot marches in all seasons to build resilience, ritual floggings at the altar of Artemis Orthia to test pain tolerance, and instruction in wrestling, running, javelin throwing, and shield-bearing formations simulating tactics. Older adolescents participated in the krypteia, a secretive rite involving nocturnal hunts for to instill terror and maintain social control, though direct evidence of Agesilaus' involvement remains anecdotal. Born with a congenital lameness in one leg that impaired mobility, Agesilaus faced potential exclusion from full participation, yet he embraced the agoge's rigors without exemption, demonstrating exceptional spirit and competitiveness that earned repeated election as leader of his agela by peers who valued merit over physique. Plutarch reports that Agesilaus "was not deterred by his lameness from sharing in the activities of the agoge," instead using jest and determination to overcome physical limitations, as when he quipped about his limp during training to deflect pity. This early subjection to obedience and hardship—contrasting with princely privileges elsewhere—cultivated his later command style, marked by empathy for subordinates and aversion to idleness, as he internalized Sparta's ethos of collective endurance over individual comfort. By late adolescence, around age 20 (c. 424 BC), Agesilaus transitioned to the hebontes phase, involving intensified military drills, expeditions in the valley, and oversight of younger trainees, honing skills in light-armed skirmishing and cohesion that foreshadowed his tactical innovations as king. His training culminated without formal graduation until full adulthood at 30, when homoioi status permitted mess membership and potential command, but his proven leadership in youth bands already distinguished him among Spartans, who prized (excellence) proven through adversity. , drawing on Xenophon's accounts, attributes Agesilaus' unyielding discipline to this formative period, where "he had been educated to obey before he came to command," fostering a realism that equated victory with relentless preparation rather than divine favor alone.

Ascension to Power

Succession Dispute After Agis II

Agis II died in 400 BC from illness while returning from , leaving his son Leotychidas as the presumptive heir to the Eurypontid throne. Leotychidas, born circa 420 BC, had been recognized by Agis as his legitimate son during the king's lifetime, but longstanding doubts about his paternity surfaced prominently after Agis's death. These doubts originated from rumors during the , when Agis was absent from for extended campaigns; Timaea, Agis's wife, was alleged to have had an affair with the Athenian exile around 415 BC, with some accounts claiming she openly boasted that Alcibiades had fathered Leotychidas. Agis himself had reportedly hesitated to fully acknowledge Leotychidas as heir earlier, excluding him from royal privileges on at least one occasion due to suspicions of bastardy. Agesilaus, Agis's younger half-brother and also a son of but by Eupolia, advanced his own claim to the , emphasizing his legitimate birth within the royal line. Despite his congenital lameness—a that had marked him as unlikely for kingship—Agesilaus had excelled in the , Sparta's rigorous training system, demonstrating martial prowess and leadership qualities that bolstered his candidacy. The Spartan authorities, including the ephors and , weighed the competing claims amid political maneuvering; , the influential naval commander and recent victor at Aegospotami, actively championed Agesilaus, viewing him as a malleable ally to extend his own influence over Spartan foreign policy. Leotychidas countered by invoking hereditary law, which prioritized the direct male descendant, but the widespread acceptance of the illegitimacy rumor undermined his position. Ultimately, the Lacedaemonian verdict favored Agesilaus, citing his unimpeachable descent from Archidamus and his proven virtue as superior to Leotychidas's contested lineage. Leotychidas was set aside and later exiled, clearing the path for Agesilaus's accession as king circa 400 BC.

Role of the Delphic Oracle

Upon the death of King Agis II in 398 BC, a succession dispute arose in Sparta between Agesilaus, the younger brother of Agis and son of Archidamus II, and Leotychidas, the purported son of Agis, whose legitimacy was questioned due to rumors of his mother's infidelity with Alcibiades during Agis's absence in the Peloponnesian War. Lysander, the influential Spartan general, championed Agesilaus's claim, arguing that Leotychidas's birth was supposititious and thus invalidated his right to the throne. The Delphic Oracle played a decisive role through an ambiguous invoked during the debate: "Bethink thee now, O , though thou art very glorious, lest from thee, sound of foot, there spring a maimed royalty; for long will unexpected toils oppress thee, if thou rear not up the foot that framed." The diviner Diopeithes cited this to oppose Agesilaus, interpreting "maimed royalty" as referring to his physical lameness from birth, which had rendered him unfit for the traditional Spartan in some views but did not bar him from candidacy. Lysander countered by reinterpreting the oracle's "maimed" as denoting illegitimacy rather than physical defect, thereby applying the warning to Leotychidas as the "lame" claimant whose shaky lineage would bring calamity to . This exegesis, combined with an interpreted as divine disapproval of Leotychidas, swayed the ephors and elders to elect Agesilaus as king, securing his ascension despite the oracle's surface-level hindrance. notes that this maneuver highlighted Lysander's rhetorical skill, though it later strained relations between the two men.

Suppression of the Cinadon Conspiracy

In 399 BC, shortly after Agesilaus II's accession to the Spartan throne, the ephors uncovered a conspiracy led by Cinadon, a hypomeiones (a disenfranchised free man of lower status), aimed at overthrowing the homoioi elite by uniting helots, perioikoi, and other inferiors in a massacre of full Spartan citizens during a public gathering. The plot reflected deep-seated resentments among Sparta's underclasses toward the approximately 1,000 homoioi, whom Cinadon reportedly described as enemies hated by the majority of the population. Xenophon, the primary ancient source and a partisan admirer of Agesilaus, attributes the conspiracy's exposure to timely intelligence received by the ephors, noting that it surfaced within five days of Agesilaus' inaugural sacrifices to Zeus Aphyios, during which ominous signs in the victims' entrails had prompted heightened vigilance. To confirm the threat without alerting participants, the ephors dispatched Cinadon—unwittingly or as a test—alongside two Spartan youths to the in Sellasia, instructing him to identify "enemies of the state" by pointing them out with his short sword. Cinadon complied by indicating the handful of present Spartans as foes, while gesturing broadly at the surrounding crowd of traders, , and artisans as those who despised them, thereby revealing the plot's widespread sympathies among non-citizens. Upon his return, he was immediately arrested at the border; under torture, Cinadon named roughly fifty core conspirators, including free non-homoioi, , and armed supporters, totaling over 100 individuals when associates were included. The suppression was swift and ruthless: all implicated parties were rounded up, confined briefly, and executed en masse without formal trial, their bodies reportedly left unburied as a deterrent. Agesilaus, though not directly involved in the operational details—which fell to the ephors—benefited from the event's timing, which solidified his early rule by demonstrating the regime's capacity to neutralize internal subversion amid Sparta's post-Peloponnesian War vulnerabilities. No further details on Cinadon's precise status or motives survive beyond Xenophon's account, which emphasizes the plot's isolation to inferiors and Sparta's effective apparatus, though modern analyses interpret it as symptomatic of demographic decline and eroding the homoioi class.

Campaigns in Asia Minor

Appointment by Lysander and March to Aulis

In 396 BC, following the failure of the Younger's revolt against and subsequent Persian reconquests in Asia Minor, Spartan leaders resolved to dispatch aid to the threatened Greek poleis along the Ionian coast, where and Pharnabazus had imposed harsh tribute and military pressure. , who had previously commanded Spartan forces there during the final stages of the and installed pro-Spartan decarchies in several cities, sought to resume command but encountered resistance from the ephors and assembly wary of his accumulating personal power and deviations from traditional Spartan egalitarianism. To advance his aims indirectly, proposed that King Agesilaus II assume leadership of the expedition, capitalizing on the king's royal prestige and Lysander's prior mentorship of Agesilaus to secure approval. The Spartan assembly, swayed by Lysander's advocacy, granted Agesilaus an army consisting of 30 Spartan lochagoi (captains) to serve as advisors and officers, 2,000 neodamodeis (freed granted partial citizenship for ), and approximately 6,000 allied hoplites drawn primarily from Peloponnesian leagues and central Greek contingents such as the Phocians and Orchomenians. This force, totaling around 8,000 men without significant or light troops initially, emphasized Spartan reliance on disciplined for offensive operations against Persian satrapal armies. Agesilaus, framing the campaign as a panhellenic liberation from barbarian rule akin to the , positioned himself as a successor to in rhetoric to rally support. Agesilaus assembled the troops at Geraestus on the before directing the march northward through friendly territories toward Aulis in Boeotian territory, the mythic site where Agamemnon had sacrificed prior to sailing for . This route, spanning roughly 150-200 kilometers from , allowed coordination with allied levies en route and symbolized the expedition's ideological framing as a renewed Greek crusade against Persia, distinct from Sparta's prior defensive posture. Lysander accompanied Agesilaus as a subordinate advisor, nominally overseeing the Asian command structure but effectively sidelined from direct authority.

Sacrificial Omen and Initial Hesitations

In spring 396 BC, Agesilaus II, appointed to lead a Spartan expedition against Persian satraps in Asia Minor, marched his army to Aulis in to perform a preliminary sacrifice, deliberately emulating Agamemnon's ritual before the Trojan expedition as a symbolic assertion of pan-Hellenic leadership against Persia. The choice of Aulis, a site tied to mythic Greek unity, underscored Agesilaus's intent to frame the campaign as a collective Greek revenge for Persian invasions, though Sparta's hegemonic ambitions underlay the gesture. Upon arrival, Agesilaus attempted the sacrifice using his own Spartan seers and a deer victim, bypassing local Boeotian customs that reserved such rites for their authorities; Boeotian magistrates, viewing the act as an infringement on their amid existing tensions with , dispatched fifty armed men under Theban leadership to halt the proceedings. These interveners seized and cast the victims from the altar, preventing completion of the rite and interpreting the disruption as defiance of Boeotian rights in their territory. The aborted was widely regarded as an ill portending failure for the expedition, evoking divine disfavor akin to the delays in Agamemnon's voyage; Agesilaus, deeply affected, felt discouraged and questioned the undertaking's prospects, his initial hesitation amplified by the sacrilege's implications for Spartan prestige and the campaign's legitimacy. and other advisors urged him to disregard the sign, attributing it to Theban malice rather than celestial will, and his own seers concurred that no further attempt at Aulis was needed, prompting Agesilaus to embark immediately for the Aegean despite lingering unease. This episode sowed early seeds of enmity with Thebes, foreshadowing future conflicts, while Agesilaus pressed on to Asia Minor, where initial successes temporarily overshadowed the portent.

Victories Over Persian Forces (396–395 BC)

Upon arriving at Ephesus in the spring of 396 BC with approximately 8,000 troops, including 2,000 Spartan neodamodes and allied contingents, Agesilaus negotiated a truce with the satrap Tissaphernes, who promised non-interference in exchange for Agesilaus targeting the satrap Pharnabazus in the Hellespontine Phrygia. Agesilaus reinforced his army by enlisting Ionian Greeks and training a cavalry unit from local volunteers and purchased horses, addressing the Spartans' traditional weakness in mounted warfare. Agesilaus marched northward, launching raids into Pharnabazus' domains, where his reformed repeatedly defeated superior Persian horsemen in skirmishes, enabling the plundering of prosperous lands and the capture of supplies. These victories disrupted Persian control and boosted Greek morale, with noting the Spartans' adaptation of light-armed troops to support cavalry charges effectively. Pharnabazus sought aid from , who broke the truce by assembling a large of and . Alerted to the threat, Agesilaus executed a swift march southward to , covering over 300 stadia in three days despite the summer heat. In the battle near in 395 BC, Persian cavalry charges were repulsed by the Greek phalanx and counterattacking horsemen, causing the enemy infantry to rout into the city. With ' lower town undefended by walls, Agesilaus' forces plundered it extensively, seizing treasure and burning suburbs before withdrawing to the coast, marking a significant humiliation for Persian authority in . These successes demonstrated Agesilaus' tactical flexibility but were limited by reliance on Xenophon's pro-Spartan account, which emphasizes Greek prowess over potential logistical strains.

Corinthian War and Panhellenic Conflicts

Recall and Battle of Coronea (394 BC)

In 394 BC, Agesilaus received orders from the Spartan ephors to return from Asia Minor to counter the , where a coalition of Thebes, , , Argos, and others, funded by Persian satraps, threatened in Greece. The recall followed the Spartan naval defeat at Cnidus, prompting Sparta to summon its most experienced commander amid escalating land threats. Agesilaus left a under Euxenus in Asia with 4,000 troops and led his army—comprising approximately 8,000 hoplites, 1,500 peltasts, , and light infantry including neodamodes and Asian veterans—across the Hellespont, retracing Xerxes' invasion route through and Macedonia. En route, he defeated Thessalian forces at Mount Narthacius, erecting a trophy, and avoided major engagements where possible to preserve strength. Upon entering Boeotia, Agesilaus encountered the coalition army positioned to block his path near Coronea, forcing a confrontation on August 14, 394 BC. His forces totaled around 10,000-15,000, including Spartan regulars, Peloponnesian allies, and auxiliaries, arrayed with heavy infantry in the center flanked by cavalry and light troops. The opposing coalition fielded roughly 14,000-20,000, dominated by Boeotian and Theban hoplites on the right, Athenians in the center, and Argives on the left, supported by cavalry. Xenophon, who fought alongside Agesilaus, describes the battle as exceptionally fierce, with Spartans routing the Argives and Athenians on the wings before clashing shield-to-shield with the Theban phalanx in the center. Agesilaus, commanding the right, wheeled to engage the Thebans directly, sustaining a thigh wound but refusing to withdraw, supported by 50 Spartans. The Thebans broke through the Spartan center temporarily but suffered heavy losses in the melee, eventually retreating to after inflicting and taking significant casualties. reports over 600 coalition dead, primarily Boeotians, against 350 Spartan losses, marking a tactical Spartan though strategically inconclusive as Agesilaus could not advance further into central Greece. Xenophon's pro-Spartan account emphasizes the intensity and Spartan resilience, while notes the Thebans' honorable withdrawal undefeated in their sector, highlighting the battle's mutual exhaustion. Agesilaus erected a trophy and proceeded to , offering spoils, before reinforcing Spartan efforts elsewhere.

Victories at Nemea and Alliance Management

The Battle of Nemea, fought in July 394 BC near the River in Corinthian territory, represented a decisive Spartan victory over a coalition comprising forces from Thebes, , , and Argos. Commanded by , acting as for the young Eurypontid king , the Spartan army of approximately 18,000 hoplites exploited traditional tactics, positioning their elite right wing to outmaneuver the enemy left, leading to the routing of Athenian and allied troops while the Theban contingent escaped with heavier but contained losses. Casualty figures, drawn from ancient historians, indicate minimal Spartan dead—only eight full Spartiates according to —contrasted with up to 2,800 coalition fatalities as reported by , highlighting the phalanx's superiority in despite the allies' numerical edge of around 24,000. This outcome stemmed from causal factors including the coalition's internal discord, evidenced by the Theban shift to the left flank disrupting Athenian cohesion, and Spartan in forgoing full pursuit to maintain formation . The triumph at bolstered Spartan land dominance, enabling control over the through fortifications that isolated the rebellious city and curtailed coalition reinforcements from . Agesilaus II, arriving in the shortly after his at Coronea, played a pivotal role in alliance management by leading punitive expeditions into enemy-held areas, such as ravaging Argive fields during a period when locals abstained from defense due to religious observances, thereby pressuring coalition members without risking major engagements. These operations demonstrated Spartan military resolve, deterring potential defections among wavering members like and Mantinea, whose loyalty was secured through shared victories and the tangible benefits of hegemony preservation against northern aggressors. Sparta's approach to alliance cohesion emphasized coercive realism over diplomatic concessions, as Agesilaus prioritized rapid strikes to exploit coalition vulnerabilities, such as the overextension following Nemea, while garrisoning key points like the Corinthian long walls to enforce compliance. This strategy, rooted in the empirical success of hoplite supremacy, temporarily stabilized the league despite underlying tensions from prior Spartan interventions in ally affairs, ensuring no widespread Peloponnesian revolts materialized during the war's early phases. However, the reliance on force underscored causal limits, as persistent alienations from autonomy infringements sowed seeds for future fractures, though immediate post-Nemea management preserved operational unity. Sparta's naval position remained precarious throughout the Corinthian War, hampered by the catastrophic loss at Cnidus in 394 BC, where the fleet under Peisander was annihilated by the Athenian admiral Conon in alliance with the satrap Pharnabazus, preventing effective blockade of enemy ports and reinforcement of land campaigns. This defeat, coupled with ongoing Athenian resurgence funded by Persian subsidies, compelled Sparta to pivot toward diplomacy with Persia to rebuild its fleet and secure subsidies of its own. By 388 BC, Spartan commanders like Teleutias had achieved minor successes, such as raids on Athenian shipping near , but these could not offset the strategic disadvantage at sea. In 387 BC, Antalcidas, serving as Spartan navarch, undertook negotiations with Persian satrap Tiribazus and proceeded to the royal court at , offering Spartan recognition of Persian sovereignty over Ionian Greek cities and in exchange for Persian intervention to end the war on terms favorable to . The resulting King's Peace, dictated by , mandated the autonomy of all Greek poleis, forbade alliances among them, ceded western Asia Minor and nearby islands to Persian control, and dissolved the Boeotian, Argive, and Corinthian confederacies, while requiring oaths from all parties including the . This treaty effectively halted hostilities, as coalition members—lacking unified naval superiority and facing Spartan land dominance—acquiesced under threat of renewed Persian-backed Spartan fleets. Agesilaus II vehemently opposed the peace, as recorded by his contemporary , arguing against concessions that undermined his prior victories over Persian satraps and the Panhellenic crusade he had championed in Asia Minor; he viewed the 's deference to Artaxerxes as dishonorable, prioritizing Spartan independence from barbarian overlordship. Despite his influence, the ephors and other kings ratified it, recognizing the naval impasse rendered prolonged war untenable without Persian gold for triremes and rowers. Agesilaus later pragmatically enforced the autonomy clause against , invading in 386 BC to compel compliance, thereby extending Spartan influence in even as the treaty curtailed his eastern ambitions.

Struggles Against Thebes and Decline of Hegemony

Boeotian Campaigns and Anti-Theban Policy

Following the King's Peace of 386 BC, Sparta pursued a policy of enforcing the of individual Greek poleis, directly challenging Thebes' dominance over the Boeotian Confederation by supporting anti-Theban cities such as , Tanagra, and Orchomenus, which sought independence from . This approach aimed to isolate Thebes politically and militarily, reflecting Agesilaus II's longstanding personal enmity toward the city, rooted in earlier conflicts and a belief that Theban power threatened Spartan interests in central Greece. The policy intensified after the Theban of winter 379/378 BC, when anti-Spartan exiles assassinated the pro-Spartan polemarchs and expelled the garrison from the , prompting to declare war and dispatch Agesilaus to restore order. In spring 378 BC, Agesilaus commanded a Spartan-led of approximately 18,000–20,000 men, including Spartiate hoplites, perioikoi, and Peloponnesian allies, invading through to avoid direct confrontation at . He systematically ravaged the Boeotian countryside, defeating scattered Theban forces in skirmishes and securing the submission of pro-Spartan towns by installing garrisons and oligarchic governments aligned with Sparta's autonomy principle. Thebans, under leaders like Guyllus, adopted a defensive strategy, fortifying positions and constructing stockades to protect their core territories, which frustrated Agesilaus's attempts to draw them into open battle and prevented the capture of Thebes itself. Despite these tactical gains, the campaign ended without a decisive victory, as Theban and scorched-earth tactics limited Spartan foraging and morale. Agesilaus returned to Boeotia in 377 BC with reinforced forces, advancing toward Thebes and engaging a combined Theban-Argive army near Coroneia. In the ensuing clash, Spartan phalanxes routed the Argives while Agesilaus, fighting at the front, sustained a severe from a Theban but was rescued by a volunteer of 50 Spartans, allowing him to rally his lines for a hard-fought victory. The Thebans retreated to in good order, claiming tactical success in repelling the Orchomenians, rendering the battle inconclusive overall. Further advances were stymied by a sudden —likely or —that decimated the army's non-combatants and impaired logistics, forcing Agesilaus to withdraw after minimal additional ravaging. These expeditions exemplified Agesilaus's aggressive anti-Theban stance, prioritizing the humiliation and dismemberment of Thebes over broader alliances, but yielded only temporary control over peripheral Boeotian cities like , which Sparta refounded as a buffer. Strategically, the campaigns inadvertently unified Theban resistance, spurring innovations in tactics and sacred band formations that bolstered their resilience, while exposing Sparta's overreliance on Agesilaus's personal leadership amid declining Spartiates. The failure to achieve in underscored the limits of Sparta's coercive , as enforced autonomies proved unstable without sustained occupation, paving the way for escalated confrontations.

Defeat at Leuctra (371 BC) and Strategic Errors

In 371 BC, during peace negotiations in to renew the King's Peace of 387 BC, Agesilaus refused to permit Theban representatives, led by , to sign the treaty on behalf of all , instead requiring each Boeotian to sign independently. This policy, intended to dismantle Theban dominance over the Boeotian League and install pro-Spartan puppet regimes in smaller cities, backfired by unifying Boeotian opposition and excluding Thebes from the accord. The resulting breakdown prompted to mobilize for war, with —Sparta's co-king and Agiad counterpart to Agesilaus—leading an invasion force of approximately 10,000 Peloponnesian troops, including 700 Spartiates, into to enforce compliance. Agesilaus, adhering to Spartan custom by which one king remained to safeguard the homeland, did not participate directly but bore responsibility for the aggressive anti-Theban posture that precipitated the campaign. The Battle of Leuctra unfolded on July 6, 371 BC, near Thebes, where commanded a Boeotian army of about 6,000 hoplites. Departing from orthodox engagements, deployed an innovative : weakening his left flank to entice the Spartan allies while massing 50 ranks deep on his right with the elite Sacred Band to overwhelm Cleombrotus's vaunted Spartan right wing, traditionally the decisive sector. The maneuver exploited Spartan rigidity, shattering their formation and causing Cleombrotus's death amid chaos; Spartan losses totaled around 1,000, including 400 Spartiates—over half the elite citizen-soldiers present—while Theban casualties numbered fewer than 300. This catastrophic defeat eroded Sparta's military prestige, liberated from helotage in the ensuing invasions, and dismantled the Peloponnesian hegemony Agesilaus had labored to construct. Agesilaus's strategic miscalculations were pivotal. His decade-long fixation on subjugating Thebes—evident in supporting the 382 BC seizure of the Theban by Phoebidas, repeated invasions in 378–377 BC, and rejection of Boeotian unity—alienated potential Greek allies and forged a resilient Theban identity under leaders like , who had reformed the Sacred Band into a professional shock force. attributes this to Agesilaus's personal vengefulness, a trait rooted in earlier Theban slights during his Asian campaigns, which prioritized punitive fragmentation over diplomatic conciliation or recognition of Thebes' evolving capabilities. , a close associate of Agesilaus, downplays systemic faults in his , emphasizing Cleombrotus's hesitation and Theban "treachery" in ephoral delays rather than broader policy flaws, though this account reflects Xenophon's pro-Spartan partiality. Critically, Agesilaus failed to adapt to Sparta's declining Spartiates—thinned by war casualties, the 464 BC earthquake's aftermath, and reliance on less reliable perioikoi and allies—overestimating traditional superiority against tactical innovations. This overconfidence, compounded by diplomatic isolation that invited a pan-Hellenic backlash, marked the unravelling of Spartan primacy, as Agesilaus's rigid pursuit of dominance ignored the causal risks of provoking unified resistance without sufficient coercive reserves.

Battle of Mantinea (362 BC) and Final Greek Engagements

In 362 BC, invaded the for the third time, seeking to dismantle remaining Spartan alliances by besieging Mantinea and threatening itself. Agesilaus, commanding Spartan defenses in Laconia, detected the Theban approach through scouts and dispatched urgent messengers to and other allies, enabling them to muster rapidly at Mantinea and forestall a direct assault on . His timely vigilance preserved the city from capture, as , upon learning of the allied concentration, diverted to confront them rather than risk overextension. The ensuing Battle of Mantinea, fought in midsummer 362 BC, arrayed the Theban coalition—comprising Boeotians, Arcadians, Argives, Messenians, and Thessalians—against the , including Eleans and Achaeans. Agesilaus, constrained by age and the need to secure , did not join the field engagement, where his son Archidamus III led the Spartan phalanx of approximately 2,000 hoplites alongside 6,000 Athenians and others. ' oblique-order tactics initially routed the allied center, killing over 1,000 opponents, but a counterthrust fatally wounded him, prompting Theban withdrawal despite minimal casualties on their side (around 300). Spartan losses totaled nearly , a devastating toll given the citizenry's depletion since Leuctra, underscoring causal demographic strains from prolonged warfare and emancipations. , eyewitness to the clash and sympathetic to Agesilaus, deemed it strategically barren, as neither side achieved hegemony; Thebes' momentum shattered with Epaminondas' death, yet Sparta regained no lost territories like . This campaign closed Agesilaus' era of Greek command, yielding no decisive restoration of Spartan influence amid failed peace talks that ignored Laconian revanchism, prompting his pivot to foreign mercenary service.

Later Foreign Expeditions

Mercenary Service in Egypt (361–360 BC)

In 361 BC, Agesilaus II, aged approximately 82, accepted an invitation from the Egyptian pharaoh Tachos to command Greek mercenaries in a campaign aimed at reclaiming Persian-controlled territories in and the . Sparta's financial straits following defeats at Leuctra and Mantinea necessitated the expedition to secure funds through service. Agesilaus assembled a force of about 1,000 hoplites, 300 , and supporting peltasts, departing from with a modest contingent due to limited resources. Upon arrival in Egypt, Tachos assembled a including native Egyptian troops under his nephew Nectanebo and a fleet commanded by the Athenian Chabrias, with Agesilaus overseeing the . Tachos' arrogance alienated Agesilaus, who endured public humiliations such as being mocked for his age and stature while Tachos paraded in Persian-style luxury. When Nectanebo revolted against Tachos, proclaiming himself and rallying local support, Agesilaus pragmatically transferred allegiance to the usurper, leveraging his mercenaries' discipline to tip the balance. This shift reflected Agesilaus' prioritization of effective command and Spartan interests over personal loyalty, as Tachos fled to the Persian court seeking asylum. With now pharaoh, Agesilaus' forces suppressed remaining opposition, including a rival claimant from , securing Nectanebo's rule without major engagements against Persian armies, as the planned offensive stalled amid internal strife. For his services, Nectanebo compensated Agesilaus with 220 talents of silver, providing crucial relief to Sparta's depleted treasury. The expedition underscored Agesilaus' enduring acumen despite advanced age, though ancient accounts like 's, drawing from pro-Spartan sources, emphasize his resilience while potentially downplaying the opportunistic nature of the alliance switch.

Death and Return of Remains

In 360 BC, Agesilaus II died at the age of 84 during the return voyage from his mercenary service in , succumbing to natural causes amid the rigors of a winter journey along the Libyan coast. recounts that the occurred at the uninhabited Harbour of in , a remote spot where the elderly king, weakened by age and the harsh conditions, could not recover. Spartan custom required preserving royal remains in for transport home, but lacking this, Agesilaus's companions encased his body in melted wax before conveying it to for burial. This adaptation ensured the corpse withstood the sea voyage, reflecting practical improvisation under logistical constraints rather than any deviation from reverence for the king. Upon arrival in Lacedaemon after a of approximately 40 years, he received a , marking the end of his direct influence on Spartan affairs.

Personal Qualities and Leadership

Embodiment of Spartan Virtues: Discipline and Frugality

Agesilaus II exemplified Spartan discipline through his rigorous adherence to the , the state's mandatory public training regimen designed to cultivate obedience, endurance, and from . Despite being the younger son of King and initially deemed unlikely to inherit the throne due to his physical —a lame leg—he fully participated in this austere system, which emphasized communal living, physical hardships, and subordination to authority, forging his resilience and harmony with Spartan societal norms. His personal was evident in his unadorned daily habits, such as sleeping on a simple couch impervious to heat or cold and quartering himself alone in modest, even sacred, precincts during campaigns, rejecting any concessions to comfort that might undermine self-restraint. , who served under him, highlighted Agesilaus's avoidance of excess in food and sleep, noting that he shared his double ration at banquets rather than indulging personally, and derived greater pleasure from laborious toil than from luxury, contrasting sharply with Persian extravagance. This persisted after his Asian campaigns; he retained his Spartan in diet, bathing, and household furnishings, refusing to replace his aged doors despite opportunities for opulence. In foreign expeditions, Agesilaus reinforced these virtues by rejecting lavish gifts that tempted others, such as the satrap Tithraustes's offerings, insisting that a ruler's role was to enrich the army, not himself. During his mercenary service in in 361–360 BC, he spurned luxuries like sweetmeats and perfumes from the native court, accepting only plain provisions, thereby modeling Spartan restraint amid abundance. Even in domestic life, he provided his daughter with a humble basket-carriage rather than ornate vehicles, underscoring his with basic Spartan dwellings and disdain for ostentation. These practices not only embodied Lycurgan ideals of equality and moderation but also served as a moral exemplar for his troops, promoting through personal example.

Tactical Innovations and Personal Bravery

Agesilaus II introduced notable tactical adaptations to Spartan warfare, particularly during his campaigns in Asia Minor from 396 to 394 BC. Recognizing Sparta's traditional weakness in cavalry, he established a dedicated cavalry corps at Ephesus by compelling wealthy citizens to supply horses and riders, transforming a previously negligible force into an effective unit capable of supporting infantry operations. This innovation, detailed in Xenophon's accounts, allowed for combined arms tactics, such as integrating light-armed peltasts with horsemen to execute rapid charges, as demonstrated in the victory near Sardis in 395 BC where Persian forces were routed and their camp captured. He also employed deception, feigning an invasion of Caria to mislead the satrap Tissaphernes before striking Phrygia, ravaging its territory and seizing treasures, which exemplified strategic misdirection over brute force. In Greece, Agesilaus applied similar flexibility during the Corinthian War. At the Battle of Coronea in 394 BC, facing a Boeotian-led coalition, he maneuvered his phalanx to outflank the enemy, securing a tactical victory despite heavy casualties, though it proved pyrrhic in broader strategic terms. Later, in Egypt around 361 BC, commanding a mercenary force for Pharaoh Tachos, he exploited enemy fortifications by charging through a narrow undefended gap in a trench line, defeating a larger opposing army through bold maneuver rather than direct confrontation. These adaptations contrasted with Sparta's rigid hoplite traditions, reflecting Agesilaus' pragmatic response to diverse foes, though critics like Diodorus note they did not fully offset Sparta's institutional limitations in sustaining such forces long-term. Agesilaus exemplified personal bravery throughout his career, often leading from the front despite physical frailty from a congenital limp. In the engagement, he charged ahead of his troops into Persian lines, inspiring his men amid the melee. At Coronea, wounded by a Boeotian spear during close-quarters combat, he continued fighting until surrounded and rescued by fifty elite volunteers who formed a protective cordon, underscoring his willingness to for victory. Even in old age, during the Theban invasion of Laconia in 370 BC, the 73-year-old king personally directed counterattacks, repelling assaults on Spartan positions with displays of vigor that rallied defenders. , a contemporary admirer and participant in his campaigns, portrays this as emblematic of Spartan , though modern assessments, drawing on 's synthesis of sources, affirm its authenticity while noting potential hagiographic exaggeration in pro-Spartan accounts. His bravery extended to his final Egyptian expedition in 360 BC, where, aged over 80, he commanded mercenaries in grueling marches until felled by illness, never shirking frontline duties.

Criticisms of Vengefulness and Political Rigidity

Agesilaus II's longstanding animosity toward Thebes manifested in policies that prioritized retribution over reconciliation, notably his endorsement of the 382 BC seizure of the Cadmean acropolis by Phoebidas, which installed a pro-Spartan tyranny and provoked widespread resentment among Greek states. This act, defended by Agesilaus despite initial Spartan condemnation, reflected a pattern of vengeful escalation rooted in earlier Theban resistance to , such as their defection during the Corinthian War (395–387 BC). Historians have characterized this fixation as a "fanatical hatred" that impaired judicious decision-making, contributing to the alienation of potential allies. The culmination of this vengefulness occurred at the peace conference of 371 BC, where Agesilaus, presiding over the renewal of the , refused to permit Theban representatives to swear oaths on behalf of all , thereby denying Thebes recognition as its hegemon and isolating it diplomatically. This rigid stance, driven by a desire to dismantle Theban influence permanently, prompted Thebes to forge an alliance with and reject the , directly precipitating the Spartan defeat at Leuctra later that year. Critics argue that Agesilaus's unwillingness to compromise, even when Spartan forces were overstretched, exemplified a punitive approach that disregarded broader strategic imperatives for hegemony preservation. In domestic politics, Agesilaus demonstrated comparable rigidity by cultivating factional loyalties among kin and supporters, sidelining rivals like Antalcidas and resisting adaptations to Sparta's evolving socio-economic pressures, such as land concentration and helot unrest. His policies reinforced traditional oligarchic structures without accommodating calls for reform, fostering internal divisions that weakened Sparta's cohesion amid external threats. This inflexibility, compounded by personal grudges—such as his demotion of after the latter's Asiatic campaigns—prioritized short-term vendettas over institutional stability, as evidenced by opposition to diplomatic initiatives favoring conciliation with former enemies. Modern assessments attribute Sparta's hegemonic decline partly to these unyielding traits, contrasting with Xenophon's encomiastic portrayal that downplays such flaws.

Legacy and Historical Assessment

Ancient Sources: Xenophon and Plutarch's Portrayals

Xenophon, a contemporary Athenian exile who served under Agesilaus during his Asian campaigns and the Corinthian War, produced the earliest detailed accounts of the king's life in his Hellenica (Books 3–7, covering 411–362 BC) and the dedicated encomium Agesilaus. In the Agesilaus, Xenophon extols him as the paragon of royal virtue, emphasizing his piety toward the gods, strict justice in dealings with allies and enemies, temperance in personal habits—such as sleeping on hard pallets and marching on foot with his troops—and unparalleled courage in battle, where he personally led charges despite physical frailty from a limp caused by childhood injury. Xenophon attributes Agesilaus's successes, like the rapid conquests in Asia Minor (396–394 BC), to divine favor earned through moral excellence, while framing setbacks like the recall from Asia as tests of character that he overcame with resilience. This portrayal reflects Xenophon's personal admiration and pro-Spartan bias, as he resided in Scillus near Olympia on land granted by Agesilaus, yet it subordinates historical analysis to panegyric, omitting or minimizing strategic errors such as the failure to exploit Persian vulnerabilities fully. In the Hellenica, Xenophon's narrative remains sympathetic but integrates Agesilaus into broader Greek politics, depicting him as a shrewd tactician who revitalized post-Peloponnesian War through disciplined and alliances, such as with Pharnabazus's defectors. He highlights Agesilaus's frugality—refusing lavish Persian gifts—and motivational speeches that inspired loyalty, while portraying defeats like Leuctra (371 BC) as stemming from subordinates' disobedience rather than the king's rigidity. Xenophon's selective focus elevates Agesilaus as a exemplar amid Sparta's decline, aligning with his philosophical interests in seen in works like , though critics note his omission of internal Spartan dissent and overemphasis on personal agency ignores systemic factors like the helot revolts and demographic decline. Plutarch, writing in the late 1st–early AD, drew extensively from for his Life of Agesilaus in the Parallel Lives (paired with ), but supplemented with sources like , Ephorus, and to offer a more balanced assessment, incorporating anecdotes that reveal character flaws alongside virtues. Plutarch affirms 's praise of Agesilaus's discipline—his simple diet, endurance of hardships, and rejection of luxury—but critiques his vengefulness, such as the harsh treatment of Mantineia (captured and disbanded in 385 BC) and obsessive anti-Theban policy, which Plutarch links causally to Sparta's downfall at Leuctra by alienating potential allies. He portrays Agesilaus as politically shortsighted, manipulated early by and later rigid in refusing compromises, contrasting his military prowess (e.g., 394 BC victories) with diplomatic failures that eroded Sparta's empire. Plutarch's moralistic lens judges Agesilaus's temperance as genuine yet marred by "small-minded" grudges, using omitted Xenophontic details—like his daughter's name, Eupolia—to signal broader research, while emphasizing how personal traits amplified Sparta's institutional weaknesses. The divergence stems from their contexts: Xenophon's proximity fosters idealization, presenting Agesilaus as a timeless to defend Spartan values against Athenian critics, whereas Plutarch's distance allows critical synthesis, viewing him through Roman imperial hindsight as a cautionary figure whose virtues could not compensate for and inflexibility in interstate relations. Both affirm his bravery—Plutarch recounts identical battlefield exploits—but Plutarch qualifies Xenophon's by attributing Sparta's post-362 BC eclipse not to fate but to Agesilaus's unyielding pursuit of , drawing on anti-Spartan historians to highlight how his campaigns overstretched resources without securing lasting .

Role in Spartan Supremacy and Decline

Agesilaus II became king of Sparta's Eurypontid line circa 401 BC after Agis II's death, emerging as the primary architect of in the decades following the Peloponnesian War's conclusion in 404 BC. His appointment as harmost in Asia Minor initiated campaigns from 396 to 394 BC, where Spartan forces under his command defeated Persian satrap ' army, sacked in 395 BC—killing around 6,000 enemies—and liberated Ionian Greek cities, temporarily enhancing Sparta's prestige as a defender of Hellenic interests against Persia. These victories aligned with an ambitious panhellenic vision but were cut short by the 's onset in 395 BC, sparked by a Theban-led coalition fearing Spartan overreach. During the Corinthian War (395–386 BC), Agesilaus reinforced Spartan supremacy upon his return in 394 BC, leading to triumphs at the Battle of Nemea—where a Spartan alliance of 23,000 inflicted 1,100 coalition casualties—and Coronea, a costly draw against Theban forces that claimed 350 Spartan lives including 17 Spartiates but prevented enemy advances. These engagements, alongside naval setbacks like Cnidus and ground losses such as 250 Spartiates at Lechaeum in 390 BC, strained resources yet culminated in the King's Peace of 386 BC, negotiated with Persian backing to guarantee Greek city autonomy while enabling Sparta to dismantle opposing leagues like the Boeotian. Agesilaus' tactical restraint, such as avoiding pursuit at Coronea due to traditions, preserved forces but highlighted rigidities that limited decisive exploitation of victories. In enforcing the King's Peace, Agesilaus adopted an imperialist stance that prioritized oligarchic installations and s over genuine autonomy, subduing Mantinea in 385 BC by razing its walls and imposing a narrow , actions that eroded allied goodwill and contradicted peace terms. His endorsement of Phoebidas' seizure of Thebes' in 382 BC—placing a pro-Spartan despite violating sworn oaths—stemmed from personal enmity rooted in events like the Aulis dispute, further alienating central Greek states and provoking Theban liberation in 379 BC. Parallel expeditions, such as against (382–379 BC) deploying 10,000 troops, exemplified overextension, diverting manpower from core threats while Teleutias' 381 BC defeat incurred 1,200 casualties without strategic gain. Agesilaus' unyielding anti-Theban fixation, ignoring Sparta's oliganthropia—evident in numbers falling from 2,777 in 394 BC amid irreplaceable losses—fostered coalitions that undid . Boeotian campaigns from 378 BC, including ravaging Theban territory with 18,000 allies, failed to suppress resistance, as Sphodrias' acquitted raid on in 378 BC reignited Athenian involvement via the Second Naval League. This culminated in Leuctra (371 BC), where Spartan-led forces of 10,000 suffered 400 deaths—halving the citizen class—against ' 7,000 Thebans employing oblique tactics, collapsing the and enabling Messenian revolt in 369 BC. Scholars like Hamilton attribute the hegemony's failure largely to Agesilaus' inflexible ambition, vendetta-driven decisions, and neglect of demographic crises, which transformed military prowess into systemic isolation rather than sustainable dominance.

Modern Debates: Military Genius Versus Statesmanship Failures

Historians continue to assess Agesilaus II's tenure as a pivotal factor in Sparta's post-Peloponnesian War hegemony, weighing his undoubted military acumen against perceived deficiencies in broader statesmanship. While his campaigns demonstrated tactical proficiency and personal valor—such as the 396 BC victories over Persian satrap near , where Spartan forces routed larger enemy contingents through mobility and discipline—critics argue these exploits masked a failure to translate battlefield gains into sustainable political structures. Charles D. Hamilton contends that Agesilaus' vengeful disposition and obsession with subjugating Thebes alienated potential allies, culminating in the isolation that preceded the catastrophic defeat at Leuctra in 371 BC, where Spartan losses exceeded 1,000 hoplites including King . This event, Hamilton posits, stemmed not merely from tactical errors but from Agesilaus' diplomatic intransigence, including the imposition of unpopular garrisons and the rejection of conciliatory alliances post-King's Peace of 386 BC. In contrast, Paul Cartledge emphasizes systemic constraints over individual culpability, portraying Agesilaus as a capable whose aggressive exacerbated but did not originate Sparta's demographic and institutional decay. By the 370s BC, the Spartiates numbered fewer than 1,000 eligible citizens, a decline from approximately 8,000 in 480 BC, driven by inheritance laws favoring and an unyielding commitment to land-based that Agesilaus upheld rather than reformed. Cartledge notes Agesilaus' later resilience, such as repelling Theban incursions in 369 BC with limited forces, as evidence of enduring military genius, yet faults his rigidity in ignoring naval innovations and helot potentials that might have bolstered Sparta's manpower. This view aligns with analyses attributing hegemony's collapse to pre-existing oligarchic , where Agesilaus' Theban fixation—rooted in events like the 382 BC seizure of Thebes' —served as a symptom rather than the core pathology. The debate underscores a causal tension: Agesilaus' personal bravery and adaptability in combat, evidenced by his mercenary command in (361–360 BC) yielding 220 talents in pay, contrasted with statesmanship lapses that forfeited goodwill accrued from victories like those in the Corinthian War (394–387 BC). Hamilton attributes Sparta's post-Leuctra vulnerability—marked by invasions and loss of Messenian territories—to Agesilaus' prioritization of punitive expeditions over coalition-building, estimating his policies contributed decisively to the erosion of Spartan influence by 360 BC. Proponents of a more exculpatory stance, however, highlight that demographic implosion and failure to integrate perioikoi or foreigners into the citizenry predated his reign, rendering any single leader's agency limited amid Sparta's aversion to constitutional change. Ultimately, while prowess prolonged Spartan resistance, the consensus leans toward Agesilaus' statesmanship as a critical accelerator of decline, though not its sole architect, reflecting broader historiographic shifts from Xenophon's to structural realism.

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