Hubbry Logo
ExtractivismExtractivismMain
Open search
Extractivism
Community hub
Extractivism
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Contribute something
Extractivism
Extractivism
Extractivism
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia
Example of extractivism: open-pit mining in Russia
Example of European extractivism: a quarry in the Apuan Alps, Italy. No Cav is an anti-extractivism movement fighting against this activity.

Extractivism is the removal of natural resources particularly for export with minimal processing.[1][2][3] This economic model is common throughout the Global South and the Arctic region, but also happens in some sacrifice zones in the Global North in European extractivism.[3][4][5] The concept was coined in Portuguese as "extractivismo" in 1996 to describe the for-profit exploitation of forest resources in Brazil.[6][A]

Many actors are involved in the process of extractivism. These mainly include transnational corporations (TNCs) as the main players,[8] but are not limited to them, because they also include the government and some (chiefly economic) community members. Trends have demonstrated that countries do not often extract their own resources;[need quotation to verify] extraction is often led from abroad.[9] Extractivism is controversial because it exists at the intersection where economic growth and environmental protection meet. This intersection is known as the green economy. Extractivism has evolved in the wake of neo-liberal economic transitions to become a potential avenue for development to occur.[10] This development occurs through stabilizing growth rates and increasing direct foreign investment.[11]

However, while these short-term economic benefits can be substantial, extractivism as a development model is often critiqued for failing to deliver the improved living conditions it promises and failing to work collaboratively with already existing programs, therefore inflicting environmental, social and political consequences.[12][B]

Environmental concerns of extractivism include; climate change, soil depletion, deforestation, loss of food sovereignty, declining biodiversity and contamination of freshwater.[14] Social and political implications include violation of human rights, unsafe labour conditions, unequal wealth distribution and conflict.[15] As a result of this, extractivism remains a prominent debate in policy related discourse because while it sometimes delivers high economic gains in the short term, it also poses social and environmental dangers. Case studies in Latin America demonstrate these policy gaps.

Background

[edit]

Definition

[edit]

Extractivism is the removal of large quantities of raw or natural materials, particularly for export with minimal processing.[3] The concept emerged in the 1990s (as extractivismo) to describe resource appropriation for export in Latin America.[16] Scholarly work on extractivism has since applied the concept to other geographical areas and also to more abstract forms of extraction such as the digital and intellectual realms or to finance.[16] Regardless of its range of application, the concept of extractivism may be essentially conceived as "a particular way of thinking and the properties and practices organized towards the goal of maximizing benefit through extraction, which brings in its wake violence and destruction".[17] Guido Pascual Galafassi and Lorena Natalia Riffo see the concept as a continuation of Galeano's Open Veins of Latin America (1971).[18]

Neo-extractivism

[edit]

Extractivism has been promoted as a potential development path in which raw materials are exported and revenues are used to improve people's living conditions. This approach is called "neo-extractivism".[10] This transition to neo-liberal economies is rooted in a nation's subordination to an emphasis on free trade.[19] In contrast to older forms of extractivism, neo-extractivism regulates the allotment of resources and their revenue, pushes state-ownership of companies and raw materials, revises contracts, and raises export duties and taxes.[20] The success of neo-extractivism is debatable as the communities at the sites of extraction rarely experience improved living conditions. More commonly, the people at these sites experience worsened living conditions, such as in the cases of extraction from Indigenous communities in Canada's boreal forest.[21] Neo-extractivism has similarities to older forms of extractivism and exists in the realm of neo-colonialism.[3]

Criticism

[edit]

The term and its negative connotations have drawn comments from some economists and high-ranking officials in South America. Álvaro García Linera, Vice President of Bolivia from 2005 to 2019 wrote:[22]

All societies and modes of production have these different levels of processing of "raw materials" in their own way. If we conceptualize "extractivism" as the activity that only extracts raw materials (renewable or non-renewable), without introducing further transformation in labor activity, then all societies in the world, capitalist and non-capitalist, are also extractivist to a greater or lesser extent. The agrarian non-capitalist societies that processed iron, copper, gold or bronze on a greater or lesser scale, had some type of specialized extractive activity, complemented in some cases with the simple or complex processing of that raw material. Even the societies that lived or live from the extraction of wood and chestnut along with hunting and fishing, maintain a type of extractive activity of renewable natural resources.

The concept of extractivism has been criticized by Nicolás Eyzaguirre, Chilean Minister of Finance between 2000 and 2006, who cites the mining sector of Australia as a successful example of a "deep and sophisticated value chain", with high human capital, self-produced machinery and associated top-tier scientific research.[23] For the case of Chile Eyzaguirre argue that rentierism and not extractivism should be the concept of concern.[23]

History

[edit]
Slaves clearing the Atlantic Forest in Brazil, c. 1820–1825, by Moritz Rugendas

Extractivism has been occurring for over 500 years.[3] During colonization, large quantities of natural resources were exported from colonies in Africa, Asia and the Americas to meet the demands of metropolitan centres.[3][16]

According to Rafael Domínguez the Chilean government coalition Concertación, which rule Chile from 1990 to 2010, pioneered "neo-extrativism".[7]

Philosophy

[edit]

Extractivism is a result of colonial thought which places humans above other life forms. It is rooted in the belief that taking from the earth will create abundance. Many Indigenous scholars argue that extractivism opposes their philosophy of living in balance with the earth and other life forms in order to create abundance. Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, a Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg scholar and writer, compares these ideas of destruction versus regeneration in her book A Short History of the Blockade. She references the Trent–Severn Waterway, a dam in Canada that caused major loss of fish, a major source of food for her people. She quotes Freda Huson in saying, "Our people's belief is that we are part of the land. The land is not separate from us. The land sustains us. And if we don't take care of her, she won't be able to sustain us, and we as a generation of people will die." She also defines extractivism in another work, stating it is "stealing. It's taking something, whether it's a process, an object, a gift, or a person, out of the relationships that give it meaning, and placing it in a nonrelational context for the purposes of accumulation." The colonial action of theft goes beyond only extracting from the earth. This philosophy of entitlement is the cause behind colonization itself, and we are watching the continuation of theft in real-time through practices such as extractivism.[24] Naomi Klein also touches on this in her book This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate. She writes, "Extractivism ran rampant under colonialism because relating to the world as a frontier of conquest- rather than a home- fosters this particular brand of irresponsibility. The colonial mind nurtures the belief that there is always somewhere else to go to and exploit once the current site of extraction has been exhausted."[25]

Actors

[edit]

Transnational corporations (TNCs) are a primary actor in neo-extractivism. Originally, as TNCs began to explore raw material extraction in developing countries they were applauded for taking a risk to extract high-demand resources.[26] TNCs were able to navigate their way into a position where they maintained large amounts of control over various extraction-based industries. This success is credited to the oftentimes weak governance structure of the resource dependent economies where extraction is taking place.[27] Through complex arrangements and agreements, resources have slowly become denationalized.[28] As a result of this, the government has taken a "hands-off" approach, awarding most of the control over resource enclaves and the social responsibility that accompanies them to TNCs.[28] However, the government still plays an important role in leading development by determining which TNCs they allow to extract their resources and how thorough they are when it comes to enforcing certain standards of social responsibility.

Example of mass extraction of trees for lumber, resulting in deforestation

Resources and techniques

[edit]

Some resources that are obtained through extraction include but are not limited to gold, diamonds, oil, lumber, water and food.[29] This occurs through techniques such as mining, drilling and deforestation. Resources are typically extracted from developing countries as a raw material.[29] This means that it has not been processed or has been processed only slightly. These materials then travel elsewhere to be turned into goods that are for sale on the world market. An example of this would be gold that is mined as a raw mineral and later in the supply chain manufactured into jewellery.

Impacts of extractivism

[edit]

Economic benefits

[edit]

Neo-extractivism is seen as an opportunity for successful development in many areas of the developing world. Demand for extracted resources on the global market has allowed this industry to expand.[10] Since the year 2000, there has been a substantial rise in global demand and value for raw materials – this has contributed to steadily high prices.[20] Neo-extractivism has therefore been seen as a tool for economically advancing developing countries that are rich in natural resources by participating in this market.

It is argued that the emergence of this industry in the neo-liberal context has allowed extractivism to contribute to stabilizing growth rates, increasing direct foreign investment, diversifying local economies, expanding the middle class and reducing poverty.[11] This is done by using surplus revenue to invest in development projects such as expanding social programs and infrastructure.[14] Overall, extraction based economies are seen as long-term development projects that guarantee a robust economic foundation.[20] It has created a new hegemonic order that closely intertwines with the dominant capitalist system of the world.[30] The green economy has emerged as an economic model in response to the arising tensions between the economy and the environment. Extractivism is one of the many issues that exist at this intersection between the economy and the environment.[20]

Increasingly, policy tools such as corporate social responsibility mechanisms and increased government involvement are being used to mitigate the negative implications of neo-extractivism and make it a more effective development model.[31]

Environmental consequences

[edit]

One of the main consequences of extractivism is the toll that it takes on the natural environment. Due to the scale extraction takes place on; several renewable resources are becoming non-renewable.[3] This means that the environment is incapable of renewing its resources as quickly as the rate they are extracted at.[3] It is often falsely assumed that technological advancements will enable resources to renew more effectively and as a result make raw material extraction more sustainable.[32] The environment often must compensate for overproduction driven by high demand.[32] Global climate change, soil depletion, loss of biodiversity and contamination of fresh water are some of the environmental issues that extractivism contributes to.[14] As well, extraction produces large amounts of waste such as toxic chemicals and heavy metals that are difficult to dispose of properly.[33] To what degree humans have a right to take from the environment for developmental purposes is a topic that continues to be debated.[34]

Social impacts

[edit]

In addition to the environmental consequences of extractivism, social impacts arise as well. Local communities are often opposed to extractivism occurring. This is because it often uproots the communities or cause environmental impacts that will affect their quality of life.[14] Indigenous communities tend to be particularly susceptible to the social impacts of extractivism. Indigenous peoples rely on their environment to sustain their lifestyles as well as connect with the land in spiritual ways.[35] Extractivist policies and practices heavily destroy the land as explained above. This changes game populations, migration patterns for animals, pollutes rivers and much more. Doing so, does not allow Indigenous populations to practice their culture and ways of life because the environment they depend on to hunt, fish etc. is drastically changed.[35] In addition, this destruction hinders the practice of Indigenous culture and creation of knowledge making it more difficult for Indigenous individuals to pass down their traditions to future generations.[35]

While employment opportunities are brought to local communities as a pillar of neo-extractivism projects, the conditions are often unsafe for workers.[36] TNCs can take advantage of more lenient health and safety conditions in developing countries and pay inadequate wages in order to maximize their profits.[36] As well, foreigners usually fill the highest paying managerial positions, leaving local community members to do the most labour intensive jobs.[37] Frequently, the enclaves where extractivism occurs are distanced from government involvement, therefore allowing them to avoid being subjected to the enforcement of national laws to protect citizens.[28] This can result in widespread human rights violations.[38] It is argued that prolonged social transformation cannot thrive on export dependent extractivism alone therefore making neo-extractivism a potentially flawed development method on its own.[39]

Political implications

[edit]
The Idle No More campaign began in Canada to build indigenous sovereignty and nationhood and to protect water, air, land and all creation for future generations.[40]

Due to the fact that the state is a prominent actor in the extractivism process it has several political implications. It pushes the state into a position where they are one of the central actors involved in development when recent decades have seen a shift to civil society organizations.[20] As well, the relationship between the State providing the natural resources and the TNCs extracting them can be politically complex sometimes leading to corruption.[9] Likewise, as a result of government involvement, this process as a development project becomes politicized.[41] The increasing demand for raw materials also increases the likelihood of conflict breaking out over natural resources.[20]

Extractivism near or on Indigenous land without the permission of Indigenous peoples begins to threaten the land based self-determination of Indigenous groups.[42] Conflicts between Indigenous peoples, corporations and governments are occurring around the world. Because many of the extractivist practices take place where Indigenous communities are located, the conflicts are making these landscapes politicized and contested. The conflicts are driven because Indigenous lives are put in jeopardy when they are dispossessed, when they lose their livelihoods, when their water and land is polluted and the environment is commodified.[43]

Anti-extractivist activism

[edit]
See also: Blockadia and No Cav

Because extractivism so often has negative implications for the Indigenous communities it affects, there is much resistance and activism on their end. For example, from the 1980s and through today we can see examples of "extrACTIVISM", a term coined by author Anna J. Willow. In protest of the logging project on their land, the Penan of Borean Malaysia claimed it was a case of civil disobedience as a means to end it and succeeded. In '89, Kayapó peoples stood up against the building of dams on their land in Pará, Brazil, causing their funding to be stopped and successfully ending the project. The U'wa people of Colombia ended oil extraction on their land through blockade activism from the 90s through 2000. Just this year,[when?] the Keystone Pipeline that runs through Canada and the U.S. was put to a halt due to Indigenous activism. Its construction officially ended in June 2021. Despite the difficulties they face in protesting these projects, their resilience continues to flourish and oftentimes they succeed in ending extractivism on their land.[21] Another example of this activism is the Ponca tribe planting corn in the path of the Keystone Pipeline as an act of resistance.[44] Aside from active protesting, Tribal sovereignty is essential in their goal of protecting their own land.[45]

Case studies

[edit]
Yanacocha Mine in Cajamarca, Peru

Yanacocha gold mine

[edit]

The Yanacocha gold mine in Cajamarca, Peru, is an extractivist project. In 1993, a joint venture between Newmont Corp and Compañia de Minas Buenaventura began the project.[46] The government favoured this project and saw it as an opportunity for development therefore giving large amounts of control to the mining companies.[46] Local communities expressed concerns about water contamination.[46] The corporations promised the creation of 7,000 jobs and development projects that would be beneficial for the community.[46] The TNC said they would abandon the project if they could not do so on socially and economically responsible terms.[46] However, this guarantee failed to be actualized and violent conflict broke out as a result of chemical spills and environmental degradation.[46] Regional and national governments had opposing opinions on the project and protests broke out injuring more than 20 people and killing five.[46] The regional government sided with the community protestors, rejecting the Cajamarca mining project, but in the end, the national government overrode the concerns of the community and pushed the mine forward, leaving the task of social responsibility to the corporations.[47]

Ecuador: oil exploitation in Yasuni National Park

[edit]
Map of Yasuni National Park in Ecuador (green area)

Many Amazonian communities in Ecuador are opposed to the national government's endorsement of oil extraction in Yasuni National Park.[48] The Spanish corporation Repsol S.A. and American corporation Chevron-Texaco have both attempted to extract oil from the reserves in Yasuni.[48] Various civil society organizations fought against the implementation of this project because of the park's valuable biodiversity.[48] In 2007 under President Correa, Ecuador launched the Yasuní-ITT Initiative, which proposed that the international community would compensate Ecuador $3.5 billion for the lost income that an oil reserve would have generated in exchange for protecting the forest.[48] The initiative only raised $13 million dollars, and was cancelled in 2013. Drilling began in 2016, and in 2023 several oil platforms had been developed with over 100 oil wells in production.[49]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]

Bibliography

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Extractivism

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Extractivism is an centered on the large-scale extraction and of unprocessed or minimally processed natural resources, such as minerals, hydrocarbons, and timber, which dominates the productive structures of many peripheral economies in , , and beyond. This approach prioritizes over value-added industrialization, often resulting in heavy reliance on foreign capital and markets, with revenues funding state operations but exposing nations to global price volatility. Historically rooted in colonial practices of resource plunder, extractivism persisted through post-independence dependencies and neoliberal reforms, evolving into "neo-extractivism" under progressive governments that expanded state control while maintaining export-oriented extraction to finance social programs. In regions like the , it has driven booms in and oil, contributing to GDP growth but also exacerbating the "," where resource wealth correlates with slower overall economic diversification and institutional weaknesses in countries lacking strong . Key impacts include from and , as seen in large-scale operations that release toxins into waterways and accelerate . Socially, it has sparked conflicts over land rights, particularly with indigenous communities displaced or affected by operations, leading to protests and concerns. Economically, while providing fiscal revenues—such as Bolivia's gas exports funding —extractivism often perpetuates inequality and hinders technological advancement due to effects, where resource sectors crowd out manufacturing. Controversies intensify with the green energy transition, as demand for and fuels "green extractivism," mirroring historical patterns of ecological sacrifice in the Global South for Northern consumption, though empirical studies highlight that effective , as in Norway's oil fund, can mitigate curses through prudent institutions rather than inherent flaws in extraction itself.

Definition and Conceptual Framework

Core Definition and Scope

Extractivism refers to the large-scale appropriation, , and exportation of raw natural resources, serving as a dominant development model that structures economies, particularly in the Global South. This process involves the extraction of materials such as minerals, hydrocarbons, timber, and agricultural commodities from the earth, often from territories previously unexploited for commercial purposes, with primary orientation toward foreign markets rather than local value addition or processing. The scope of extractivism encompasses a broad array of activities beyond non-renewable resources, including the intensive exploitation of renewables like forests and soils at scales that render them effectively non-renewable due to rates exceeding natural regeneration. It integrates geopolitical, economic, and social dimensions, characterized by enclosures of through property rights assertions, labor under unequal conditions, and integration into global value chains that prioritize revenues over domestic industrialization. While providing essential inputs for global industries—such as metals for and transitions—extractivism frequently correlates with , resource dependency, and limited technological spillovers to host communities. Originating in Latin American critical scholarship during the early , the concept has evolved to analyze resource extraction globally, highlighting patterns of ecologically where peripheral economies bear disproportionate environmental costs to supply core industrialized nations. Empirical analyses link extractivism to boom-bust cycles driven by price volatility, as observed in policy shifts toward in the late that intensified export-oriented extraction. Despite critiques from academic sources, often aligned with , the model's persistence underscores its role in generating fiscal revenues critical for state functions in resource-dependent countries.

Distinction from Sustainable Resource Use

Extractivism is characterized by the intensive exploitation of non-renewable or slowly regenerating resources, often at rates that surpass ecological replacement capacities, leading to long-term depletion and . In contrast, sustainable resource use employs methods that maintain services, such as harvesting timber through selective logging that preserves canopy cover and , or fisheries managed under quotas aligned with population replenishment rates, ensuring . This distinction arises from differing temporal horizons: extractivism optimizes for immediate economic output, frequently disregarding externalities like , whereas incorporates regenerative cycles, as evidenced by certified standards that limit annual cuts to growth increments. Environmentally, extractivism generates disproportionate impacts, including accelerated and , as seen in large-scale operations that remove without restoration, contaminating watersheds with and altering hydrological cycles. Sustainable practices mitigate such outcomes through techniques like in agriculture or in , which preserve topsoil and potential; for instance, community-managed fisheries in indigenous territories have demonstrated stock recovery by adhering to seasonal bans and , avoiding the typical of industrial trawling. Empirical data from global assessments indicate that extractive regimes contribute to 20-30% higher rates in affected regions compared to sustainably managed forests, underscoring the causal link between unchecked extraction volumes and irreversible shifts. Economically and socially, extractivism fosters dependency on volatile commodity booms, yielding resource curses like —where currency appreciation from exports undermines diversification—as observed in oil-dependent economies with per capita GDP volatility exceeding 10% annually, without commensurate reinvestment in . Sustainable resource use, by prioritizing value-added processing and local retention, supports stable livelihoods; examples include systems in that integrate crop cultivation with timber harvesting, generating 15-25% higher long-term yields per hectare than monoculture clear-cutting while reducing through diversified income streams. This divergence reflects extractivism's enclosure-driven model, which concentrates benefits among elites and multinationals, versus sustainability's emphasis on inclusive that internalizes costs and distributes rents.

Neo-Extractivism and Ideological Variants

Neo-extractivism describes a extraction model adopted by several left-leaning governments in during the boom, characterized by increased state control over primary exports to generate revenues for social spending and , while maintaining high-volume, low-processing export patterns. Unlike prior neoliberal approaches, neo-extractivism emphasizes or renegotiation of contracts with multinational firms to capture greater rents, often framed within ideologies of and redistribution. This model emerged prominently in the "" of progressive administrations, where extractive sectors funded programs, yet perpetuated dependence on volatile global markets. In under President from 2006, the 2006 of hydrocarbons boosted state revenues from , with production peaking at approximately 59 million cubic meters per day in , enabling expansions in social welfare that reduced from 38% in 2006 to 15% by 2017. Ecuador's administration (2007–2017) similarly expanded oil extraction, granting new concessions and increasing state ownership in , despite constitutional commitments to (buen vivir) emphasizing harmony with nature. , under (1999–2013) and , intensified oil reliance through , though production declined from over 3 million barrels per day in the early to under 1 million by the 2020s due to underinvestment and mismanagement, exacerbating economic collapse after the oil price drop. These cases illustrate neo-extractivism's reliance on state-led intensification of extraction to sustain redistributive policies. Ideologically, neo-extractivism variants align with 21st-century and , as in Venezuela's Bolivarian or Bolivia's plurinational state model, which integrate rhetoric with extractive expansion, often justifying it as compensatory for historical exploitation. In , it manifested as "citizens' ," blending anti-neoliberal with pragmatic , including the short-lived Yasuní-ITT Initiative (2007–2013), which sought international compensation to leave 846 million barrels of oil untapped in the Amazon but failed due to insufficient pledges totaling only $13 million against a $3.6 billion target, leading to resumed drilling. Variants differ in emphasis—more radical in Venezuela with expropriations, versus Bolivia's contractual renegotiations—but share a core tension between anti-extractivist constitutions and practice, critiqued as neo-developmentalism sustaining commodity dependence rather than transitioning to diversified economies. Critics, including post-development scholars, argue neo-extractivism's unsustainability, as intensified extraction—evident in Ecuador's oil frontier expansion into biodiverse areas—generates environmental liabilities like and water contamination, while economic benefits prove ephemeral amid price cycles, as seen in Venezuela's and shortages post-2014. Empirical data from these regimes show persistent raw export dominance (e.g., oil over 90% of Venezuela's exports), reinforcing causal patterns of , including and , despite redistributive intents. While proponents attribute failures to external factors like insufficient global solidarity for initiatives like Yasuní, verifiable production trends and conflict data indicate internal policy choices prioritizing short-term gains over long-term ecological or economic resilience.

Historical Evolution

Colonial and Imperial Foundations

The practice of extractivism emerged prominently during the age of European colonialism, as imperial powers established systems for the large-scale removal of raw materials from subjugated territories to sustain metropolitan wealth and military endeavors. In the , Spain's conquest of the initiated this pattern, with conquistadors targeting precious metals that accounted for a substantial portion of the empire's ; between 1500 and 1800, American silver and inflows represented up to 20% of Spain's total fiscal intake in peak decades. This extraction relied on coerced indigenous labor, disrupting local economies and demographics through , overwork, and relocation. A pivotal instance was the 1545 discovery of vast silver deposits at in , present-day , which became the world's most productive mine for over two centuries. Under the system—a form of rotational forced labor imposed on Andean communities—the mine yielded an estimated 45,000 tons of silver by the early 19th century, comprising roughly 40% of global output during the late 16th and 17th centuries and funding Spain's wars, trade deficits, and Habsburg patronage. Production involved mercury amalgamation for refining, which poisoned workers and environments, while smuggling and royal fifth taxes (quinto real) captured only fractions of the output for the crown. Similar dynamics unfolded in Mexico's and silver districts, discovered in the 1540s, where output peaked at 7 million pesos annually by the 1570s, reinforcing extractive institutions that prioritized over local development. Other empires mirrored this model with commodity-specific exploitation. Britain's , from the late , expanded opium cultivation in —compelling farmers via revenue advances—to supply , generating £5 million annually by the 1830s and constituting the colony's second-largest export revenue source by 1843. Cotton extraction intensified during the , with forced shifts from food crops exacerbating famines, as imperial demand for textiles drove land enclosures and . In , King Leopold II's (1885–1908) enforced rubber and ivory quotas through private concession companies like Abir Congo, employing mutilation and hostage-taking; exports surged from negligible levels to over 4,000 tons of rubber yearly by 1900, amid demographic collapses estimated at 1–5 million excess deaths from violence, starvation, and disease. These operations, often granted monopolistic charters, embedded extractivism in imperial governance, prioritizing short-term yields over sustainability and bequeathing institutional legacies of resource dependency.

20th-Century Industrial Expansion

The witnessed accelerated industrial extractivism as global demand for fossil fuels and minerals surged to power mechanized warfare, automotive , and electrical in rapidly urbanizing economies. Technological breakthroughs, including rotary rigs introduced around and large-scale mechanized excavators, enabled deeper and more voluminous extraction from remote deposits, shifting operations from artisanal to capital-intensive scales. This expansion was causally linked to transitions favoring over , with worldwide crude output climbing from 20 million metric tons in to approximately 3.3 billion metric tons by 1979, underpinning industrial growth in and . Major oil booms defined early-century dynamics, exemplified by the 1901 Spindletop discovery in Texas, which produced over 17 million barrels in its first year and catalyzed the U.S. petroleum industry's shift to dominance, supplying 63% of global output by 1925. In Latin America, Venezuela's 1914 Mene Grande field initiated large-scale exports, with production reaching 200 million barrels annually by the 1940s, drawn by foreign firms like Standard Oil amid rising automotive demand post-Ford Model T rollout in 1908. Middle Eastern fields, such as Saudi Arabia's 1938 Dammam No. 7 well, further globalized supply, with output escalating to support Allied efforts in World War II, where oil consumption tripled from pre-war levels due to mechanized armies and aviation. These wartime imperatives not only boosted extraction rates but also spurred innovations like offshore drilling platforms prototyped in the 1940s Gulf of Mexico. Metallic mineral extraction paralleled this trajectory, with copper output in expanding from 23,000 metric tons in 1900 to 594,000 metric tons by 1970, driven by electrification and wiring needs in the U.S. and Europe; companies like dominated, exporting raw ore with minimal local processing. In , Belgian Congo's under yielded 70% of global by 1940 for demands, alongside production hitting 300,000 tons annually post-1920s rail infrastructure. Soviet industrialization featured mega-projects like the Mirny diamond mine, operational from 1955 with open-pit depths exceeding 500 meters by century's end, extracting over 2 million carats yearly to fund . Such operations often prioritized volume over , leading to localized ecological degradation, including in Chilean cordilleras and forest clearance for Congolese rail lines, though comprehensive global emerged only later. Post-World War II reconstruction and competition sustained this momentum, with bauxite extraction for aluminum surging 20-fold globally from 1945 to 1970 to meet aviation and consumer goods demands, concentrated in and under multinational concessions. in newly independent states, such as Mexico's 1938 oil expropriation, temporarily disrupted flows but ultimately integrated into export-oriented models, as evidenced by Iran's production rebound to 5 million barrels daily by 1973 before . By mid-century, extractivism's industrial scale had entrenched dependency in producer nations, where raw exports comprised over 50% of GDP in cases like Zambia's copper reliance, underscoring causal links between peripheral resource peripheries and core manufacturing hubs absent diversified processing.

Post-2000 Globalization and Neo-Extractivism

The intensification of and flows after , particularly China's rapid industrialization and , triggered a supercycle that elevated prices for oil, metals, and other raw materials from roughly to 2014. China's annual GDP growth averaged around 10% during this period, accounting for a substantial share of global demand increases in commodities like and , which spurred (FDI) in extractive sectors across resource-rich regions. This dynamic reinforced extractivism by linking peripheral economies more tightly to global markets, where raw exports funded imports of manufactured goods, perpetuating terms-of-trade imbalances despite temporary revenue windfalls. In , the commodity boom coincided with the rise of left-leaning governments—often termed the ""—which pursued neo-extractivism, a model emphasizing state control over resource rents to finance social welfare while maintaining export-oriented extraction. Unlike prior neoliberal variants reliant on private concessions, neo-extractivism involved nationalizations and higher royalties; for instance, under expropriated assets starting in 2007, channeling revenues into social "missions" that reduced from 23% in 1998 to 8% by 2012. 's nationalized hydrocarbons in 2006, boosting state hydrocarbon revenues from $173 million in 2005 to over $2 billion by 2008, enabling from 60% to 36% between 2006 and 2019. under expanded and outputs, with production rising from 340,000 to 550,000 barrels per day between 2007 and 2015, funding infrastructure despite initial pledges for alternatives. Neo-extractivism's core features included progressive rent distribution for domestic consumption but retained extractivism's enclave nature, with limited local processing and vulnerability to price volatility, as revenues remained subordinate to transnational demand. In Ecuador, the 2007 Yasuní-ITT initiative proposed forgoing oil extraction in —estimated at 846 million barrels—in exchange for $3.6 billion in global compensation, but it collapsed in 2013 after securing only about $13 million in pledges, leading to drilling approvals and heightened indigenous conflicts. Critics, including empirical analyses of territorial fragmentation, argue this model amplified and social displacement without fostering industrial diversification, as seen in Bolivia's lithium expansion plans post-2019, which faced opposition from indigenous groups over use in the salt flats. Globally, post-2000 globalization extended extractive FDI beyond , with China's overseas investments surging in and to secure supplies amid its commodity hunger. In , Chinese FDI reached $33 billion by 2023, concentrated in copper (, DRC) and , growing from $75 million in 2003 to $5 billion annually by 2021, often tied to loans that deepened resource dependency. Similar patterns emerged in , such as Indonesia's boom, where FDI inflows quadrupled post-2010 to feed battery supply chains, though with uneven local benefits and ecological costs like . Empirical outcomes of this era reveal short-term GDP boosts—Latin America's regional growth averaged 4.5% annually from 2003-2008—but exposed structural frailties, including effects that crowded out manufacturing and post-2014 busts triggering crises, as in where GDP contracted over 75% from 2013 to 2021 amid oil price collapse and mismanagement. Neo-extractivism's reliance on volatile rents, without substantive shifts toward value-added processing, underscored causal limits: high enabled redistribution but entrenched path dependency on finite resources, often at the expense of long-term ecological and fiscal resilience.

Key Actors and Institutional Dynamics

State Governments and Resource Nationalism

State governments in extractive economies frequently adopt to assert over natural resources, prioritizing national control and revenue maximization over foreign investor interests. This approach includes of assets, contract renegotiations, elevated royalties and taxes, export restrictions, and mandates for local beneficiation. Triggered often by rising prices, such policies reflect ideological commitments to economic but are modulated by institutional quality; weaker amplifies risks of inefficiency and conflict. In Latin America's "," Bolivia exemplifies aggressive state-led extractivism, with the government under nationalizing hydrocarbons in May 2006 to redirect rents toward social programs, boosting fiscal revenues from 5% of GDP in 2005 to over 20% by 2014. However, lithium efforts via state entity Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos have yielded minimal output—less than 600 tons annually as of 2023—due to technical hurdles and insistence on full , contrasting Chile's hybrid model through state-owned , which produced 44,000 tons in 2022 while allowing private partnerships under revised 2023 royalty structures up to 70% on operating margins. , meanwhile, enacted a 2019 investment law offering tax stability but imposed progressive royalties reaching 8% in 2024, aiming to balance inflows with amid fiscal pressures. In , Tanzania's 2017 mining reforms under President revoked licenses, demanded 16% free state equity in projects, and banned unprocessed mineral exports, prompting $100 billion in threatened investments and legal battles, including a $190 million settlement with Barrick Gold in 2020 after output fell 20% in gold production. Empirical analyses indicate often erodes long-term growth by deterring —reducing inflows by up to 30% in affected sectors—and exacerbating the , where rents fuel and volatility rather than diversification, as evidenced in Venezuela's post-2007 oil , which saw production plummet from 3.1 million barrels per day in 2008 to 0.7 million by 2021 amid expropriations and mismanagement. Exceptions like Botswana's diamond partnerships highlight that robust institutions enable revenue recycling into , but such outcomes are atypical in low-governance contexts.

Multinational Corporations and Private Investment

![Yanacocha gold mine in Peru, operated by Newmont Mining Corporation][float-right] Multinational corporations (MNCs) play a central role in extractivism by mobilizing large-scale capital, advanced technologies, and global supply chains for resource extraction, particularly in resource-rich developing regions where domestic capabilities are limited. These firms, such as , Chevron, and Shell, undertake high-risk exploration and production in oil, gas, and sectors, often through (FDI) that accounts for significant portions of host country inflows. For instance, since 2022, nearly half of greenfield FDI in oil and gas extraction (excluding LNG projects) has targeted , driven by multinational projects in countries like and . Private investment by MNCs contributes to economic expansion via procurement of local goods and services, job creation, and fiscal revenues, with extractive firms generating revenues equivalent to substantial shares of host GDPs in nations like and . In , companies like Anglo American extract , diamonds, and across , , and , supporting industrial applications while facing scrutiny over revenue distribution. Similarly, in , Newmont's operations at the Yanacocha mine in exemplify MNC-led extraction, producing millions of ounces of since 1993 through open-pit methods that require substantial private capital outlays. Despite criticisms of enclave operations with limited local spillovers, empirical analyses indicate that MNCs facilitate and development, potentially mitigating resource dependency when paired with transparent . Global FDI in extractives remained resilient amid a broader 11% decline to $1.5 trillion in , with mining sectors attracting over $1.6 billion in FDI in select regions between and 2023. Private investment mechanisms, including alongside greenfield initiatives, enable MNCs to navigate regulatory environments and , as seen in rising state interventions in African oil and South American projects. These dynamics underscore MNCs' capacity to drive efficiency in extraction while host governments seek to maximize benefits through fiscal reforms.

International Organizations and Financial Markets

International organizations such as the and the (IMF) have played significant roles in facilitating extractivism in developing countries by providing financial support, policy advice, and technical assistance aimed at leveraging wealth for . The World Bank's Extractive Industries program assists resource-rich nations in managing revenues through fiscal frameworks, transparency initiatives, and sustainable practices to avoid volatility and promote long-term growth. For instance, since 2019, the World Bank and its private-sector arm, the (IFC), have advanced the Climate-Smart Mining Initiative, which addresses rising global demand for minerals essential to low-carbon technologies by funding projects that emphasize environmental safeguards and in low- and middle-income countries. Similarly, the IMF collaborates with the World Bank on economic assessments that inform lending conditions, often encouraging export-oriented resource extraction to stabilize and reduce debt burdens in commodity-dependent economies. The Extractives Global Programmatic Support (EGPS) initiative, managed by the World Bank, exemplifies targeted multilateral funding by offering grants and expertise to enhance , with over 20 partner countries benefiting from improved transparency and since its inception. These efforts have financed and exploration in sectors like oil, gas, and minerals, contributing to GDP expansion; for example, World Bank-backed projects in have supported mineral output growth averaging 5-7% annually in participating nations from 2015 to 2023. However, while official mandates prioritize , critics from organizations argue that such interventions have historically reinforced dependency on raw exports without sufficient local value addition, though empirical data from IMF-World Bank evaluations show correlated reductions in funded extractive hubs like Zambia's copper belt. Financial markets provide the bulk of capital for extractive operations through equity listings, bonds, and direct foreign investment (FDI), with global FDI in and hydrocarbons exceeding $200 billion annually as of 2022, driven by commodity price cycles and demand for critical minerals. Stock exchanges in , , and New York host major firms like and , enabling billions in that fund large-scale projects; for instance, 's facilitated over CAD 10 billion in junior mining financings in 2023 alone. Institutional investors increasingly apply environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria, with sustainable bonds for extractives rising to $15 billion issued in 2024, though exclusionary strategies persist among some funds wary of volatility. Emerging trends include alternative financing mechanisms reshaping capital flows, such as and government-backed funds targeting critical minerals; in October 2025, the U.S. and committed $1.8 billion via the Orion Resource Partners fund for global and refining ventures to secure supply chains for electric vehicles and renewables. These markets also influence extractivism via price signals, where futures trading on exchanges like the determines investment viability, with oil and metal benchmarks correlating to 70-80% of project economics in producer nations. Multilateral coordination, as urged in a 2025 UN Environment Programme report, seeks to align private with responsible practices, including fiscal incentives for circular resource use in .

Resources, Techniques, and Technological Progress

Primary Resources Extracted

Extractivism centers on the large-scale removal of non-renewable natural resources, primarily and minerals, for export with limited local processing. , including crude and , dominate in many extractive economies, often comprising the majority of resource wealth despite efforts at diversification. For example, in , hydrocarbons account for the bulk of extractive output, overshadowing minerals such as ferronickel and . Globally, and gas extraction supports needs but ties economies to volatile prices, with production concentrated in regions like the , , and . Metallic minerals form another core category, encompassing base metals like , , , and , as well as precious metals such as and silver. Copper production, vital for electrical infrastructure, is led by , which supplies a significant portion of global output, while dominates lithium mining essential for batteries. Critical minerals including , rare earth elements, and are increasingly extracted to meet demands for clean energy technologies, with holding dominant positions in graphite and rare earths processing. These resources are often mined in countries facing challenges, where two-thirds of global extraction of minerals like tin, lead, , iron, and phosphates occurs amid low press freedom. Non-metallic minerals and industrial materials, such as phosphates and aggregates, also feature prominently, though less emphasized in export-oriented extractivism compared to hydrocarbons and metals. remains a key in some contexts, particularly in and , fueling industrial expansion but contributing to environmental strain. Extraction of these primary resources drives economic activity in resource-rich developing nations, where they underpin exports and foreign , yet frequently exacerbates dependencies on raw sales.
Resource CategoryKey ExamplesMajor Producers (as of recent data)
Fossil FuelsCrude oil, , (oil), (gas), (coal)
Base Metals, , , (copper), (iron ore, bauxite), (nickel)
Precious/Critical Metals, , , rare earths (gold), (lithium), Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt), (rare earths)

Modern Extraction Methods

Open-pit mining remains a dominant surface extraction technique for commodities like , , and , involving systematic removal of using large-scale excavators and haul trucks that can transport over 300 tons per load, enabling operations at depths exceeding 1 kilometer in sites such as Chile's mine. Underground mining methods, including sublevel stoping and , utilize continuous mining machines, hydraulic roof supports, and automated drilling rigs to access deeper deposits while managing rock stability through ventilation systems handling up to 1 million cubic meters of air per minute. In-situ leaching, applied to and , dissolves minerals underground via injected chemicals, reducing surface disruption compared to traditional milling, with recovery rates reaching 70-90% in amenable deposits. In the hydrocarbons sector, high-volume hydraulic fracturing paired with horizontal —perfected since the mid-2000s—targets formations by injecting , , and chemicals at pressures up to 15,000 psi to create fractures extending laterally over 2 kilometers, unlocking reserves like those in the U.S. Permian Basin where production surged from 1 million to over 5 million barrels per day between 2010 and 2020. Offshore deepwater extraction employs rigs and subsea completions to drill in depths beyond 2,000 meters, as in Brazil's pre-salt fields, using managed pressure to maintain under high-temperature, high-pressure conditions. Industrial forestry extraction relies on mechanized full-tree harvesting systems, where feller-bunchers fell and bunch trees, followed by skidders or forwarders for , achieving productivity rates of 20-30 cubic meters per machine-hour in even-aged plantations, often integrated with GPS-guided cable yarding on slopes exceeding 30 degrees to minimize disturbance. Emerging deep-sea techniques for polymetallic nodules involve seafloor collector vehicles deploying hydraulic suction or mechanical rakes at depths of 4-6 kilometers, as tested by companies like in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone, with pilot systems processing up to 1,000 tons per hour while separating nodules from sediment. These methods prioritize scale and yield, leveraging diesel-electric and real-time monitoring to sustain global commodity flows.

Innovations in Efficiency and Safety

Autonomous haulage systems (AHS) in open-pit mining operations have increased productivity by enabling 24/7 operation without human fatigue, with reported efficiency gains of 15-25% in material movement and fuel savings of up to 10% due to optimized routing algorithms. These systems, deployed since the early 2010s by companies like Rio Tinto and , integrate GPS, , and AI for real-time navigation, reducing collision risks and eliminating operator exposure to hazardous environments, which has lowered incident rates by over 80% in implemented fleets. AI-driven predictive maintenance and geological modeling have further boosted efficiency by forecasting equipment failures and optimizing ore extraction paths, cutting unplanned by 20-50% and reducing costs by up to 60% through improved discovery success rates—sometimes quadrupling hit rates in exploration. In oil and gas, automated rigs equipped with algorithms adjust parameters in real time to minimize non-productive time, achieving rate-of-penetration increases of 20-30% while enhancing safety via remote operation that avoids human presence in high-pressure zones. Wearable sensors and IoT-enabled monitoring systems track and environmental hazards, such as toxic gases or structural instabilities, alerting workers preemptively and reducing injury rates by integrating with AI for —evidenced by a 40% drop in reportable incidents in adopting mines. Drones and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) facilitate aerial inspections of remote or unstable sites, improving by replacing manual surveys and enhancing efficiency through high-resolution 3D mapping that shortens planning cycles by weeks. In-situ leaching and biomining techniques represent low-impact efficiency innovations, using microbial processes or chemical solutions to extract metals like and with 30-50% less than traditional methods, while minimizing surface disturbance and worker exposure to dust and blasts. Advanced seismic , including 4D monitoring, has improved reservoir management in hydrocarbons, enabling precise infill that boosts recovery rates by 10-15% and detects micro-seismic events for proactive measures against blowouts. These technologies collectively address causal factors in accidents—human error accounts for 70-80% of mining incidents—by shifting operations toward data-centric, remote control paradigms.

Economic Contributions and Management Strategies

Drivers of GDP Growth and Poverty Reduction

Extractive industries contribute to GDP growth primarily through high-value exports, attraction of foreign direct investment, and technological spillovers that enhance in related sectors. In resource-rich developing economies, revenues from , gas, minerals, and metals often constitute a substantial share of earnings, enabling and development that support broader . For instance, empirical analysis of discoveries indicates significant increases in GDP, with positive spillovers to non- sectors such as and services due to increased domestic demand and . These dynamics are evident in countries where extractive output scales with global commodity demand, as seen in the positive correlation between resource wealth and in case studies from . In , copper mining exemplifies extractivism's role in GDP expansion, accounting for 13.6% of national GDP in 2022 and driving 58% of total exports through large-scale operations in the . The sector's integration with global supply chains has sustained average annual GDP growth rates above 4% from 2000 to 2019, fueled by foreign investment exceeding $50 billion in projects during that period. Similarly, Botswana's extraction has underpinned one of Africa's highest sustained growth trajectories, contributing approximately 25% to GDP and one-third of fiscal revenues by 2023, transforming the nation from among the world's poorest at independence in 1966 to upper-middle-income status with per capita GDP surpassing $7,000. These contributions stem from efficient scaling of production, where output rose from negligible levels to over 20 million carats annually by the 2010s, generating revenues that funded diversification into and . Poverty reduction follows from extractive-driven fiscal revenues that finance social expenditures, alongside direct and indirect employment effects. In Chile, the 2003–2009 commodity price boom, which doubled mineral values, lowered poverty rates by 2.4 percentage points in mining-dependent municipalities, as royalties and taxes supported expanded and programs reaching over 1 million households. Botswana's prudent management of proceeds has halved from 59% in 1985 to under 17% by 2015, with revenues allocating 40% to that improved access to clean for 95% of the population and rates to 88%. Cross-country evidence confirms that such growth, when channeled through public investments, elevates household incomes and reduces inequality, with elasticities showing a 1% GDP increase correlating to 0.6–1% decline in resource economies. While direct jobs in extraction remain limited to 1–2% of due to , multiplier effects via supplier industries and local procurement amplify labor absorption, as observed in Chilean clusters employing over 300,000 workers by 2020.

Fiscal Mechanisms: Taxes, Royalties, and Funds

Fiscal regimes in extractive industries encompass a suite of instruments designed to allocate resource rents between governments and investors, primarily through royalties, taxes, and stabilization mechanisms such as sovereign wealth funds. These tools enable states to capture value from non-renewable resources like minerals, oil, and gas, often constituting a substantial portion of public in resource-dependent economies; for instance, accounts for over 80% of in several Middle Eastern countries and . Royalties and taxes are typically structured to balance immediate fiscal inflows with incentives for exploration and production, though regimes vary widely by commodity and jurisdiction to reflect geological risks and market volatility. Royalties represent an upfront payment to governments for extraction , levied as a of gross production value (ad valorem) or per unit output (specific), independent of profitability to ensure early streams. In oil sectors, rates commonly range from 5% to 20%; Algeria applies 5.5% to 20% based on gross income and location, while imposes a flat 12% on wellhead value, and levies 5% to 10% on oil production. royalties similarly differ: charges 2% to 10% on sales volume for minerals, whereas forgoes traditional royalties in favor of a special production of 0.5% to 4.5% on sales, escalating with operating margins. Such structures prioritize government take during high-price periods but can introduce instability if rates adjust retroactively, potentially signaling sovereign risk to investors. Beyond royalties, extractive firms face corporate income taxes (CIT), often at elevated rates, alongside profit-based levies to target economic rents after cost recovery. Over 95% of surveyed countries impose CIT on at nominal averages around 34%, frequently combined with royalties; additional resource rent taxes apply in places like and the , where petroleum revenue taxes reach 50% on super-profits post-allowances. Production-sharing agreements in further blend these, with governments receiving shares of output after contractors recoup costs. Empirical analyses indicate these regimes can yield high effective government takes—up to 70-80% in mature fields—but require careful design to avoid discouraging marginal projects with high upfront capital needs. Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) channel extractive revenues into long-term investments, mitigating volatility and preserving intergenerational wealth. At least 34 countries base SWFs explicitly on income, holding approximately $3.7 trillion globally in oil, gas, and minerals as of 2016. Norway's Government Pension Fund Global, funded primarily by royalties and taxes, exceeds $1.7 trillion and invests abroad to avoid domestic overheating. Similar funds in resource-rich states like (from diamonds) and ( stabilization) demonstrate fiscal discipline, with returns augmenting budgets via investment taxes, though success hinges on transparent governance to counter risks.
CommodityCountryRoyalty/Tax RateBasisSource
5.5%-20%Gross income, location-based
5%-10%Production
2%-10%Annual sales volume
0.5%-4.5% (special tax)Sales, margins

Empirical Evidence Against the Resource Curse Thesis

Empirical analyses have challenged the universality of the hypothesis, which posits that abundance systematically impedes and fosters poor . In a cross-country study of over 50 nations from 1970 to 2000, Alexeev and Conrad found no statistically significant negative relationship between abundance—measured as per —and either long-term rates or institutional quality indicators such as and control; instead, resource abundance showed a positive association with GDP per levels after controlling for endogeneity and reverse causality. Their instrumental variable approach, using geological data on endowments, addressed common econometric biases in prior studies that often conflated resource dependence with abundance or failed to account for institutional priors. High-income resource-rich economies provide counterexamples where extractive sectors have supported sustained prosperity without the predicted pathologies. , discovering significant in the late , achieved average annual GDP growth of 2.5% from 1970 to 2020, outpacing many non-resource peers, through prudent fiscal rules and the Government Pension Fund Global, which by 2023 held assets exceeding $1.5 trillion (over 300% of GDP) to mitigate volatility and fund diversification. Similarly, , with resource exports comprising 60-70% of goods trade since the , maintained real GDP growth averaging 2.2% annually from 1990 to 2020, leveraging strong property rights and countercyclical policies to avoid effects on . Botswana's sector, accounting for 80-90% of exports since the , propelled the nation from one of the world's poorest in 1966 (GDP ~$70) to upper-middle status by 2020 (over $7,000), with sustained 5-7% annual growth attributed to transparent and low via elite bargains prioritizing long-term stability. Further econometric evidence underscores that the curse's apparent effects often vanish when isolating institutional quality as the causal driver rather than resources per se. Frankel's survey of mechanisms—such as volatility, crowding out, and conflict—concludes that while resource rents can exacerbate weaknesses in weak institutions, robust frameworks enable positive outcomes, as evidenced by positive growth correlations in resource exporters versus non-exporters over 1970-2005. A of 100+ countries from 1990 to 2015 similarly found no aggregate resource curse when adjusting for levels and openness, with resource booms boosting in in institutionally strong settings. These findings imply that policy choices, not resource endowments, determine trajectories, countering deterministic interpretations of the .

Environmental and Social Consequences

Quantifiable Environmental Effects and Technological Mitigations

Extractive industries, encompassing , , and gas operations, generate measurable (GHG) emissions through energy-intensive processes like machinery operation, flaring, and venting. In , these sectors accounted for 15% of global anthropogenic GHG emissions, with oil and gas operations directly responsible for nearly 15% of energy-related GHGs. Mining emissions alone impose annual environmental damages estimated at up to $3 trillion globally, primarily from CO2 and releases. Deforestation linked to extractivism arises from direct site clearing and indirect infrastructure like roads and tailings ponds. Industrial mining directly eliminated 3,264 km² of tropical forest from 2001 to 2018, concentrated in Indonesia, Brazil, Ghana, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, representing about 1% of total tropical deforestation but with outsized carbon release in biodiverse hotspots. Globally, mining activities caused 6,785 km² of forest loss between 2000 and 2019, exacerbating habitat fragmentation. In the Brazilian Amazon, mining leases experienced deforestation rates up to 4.4% in buffer zones from 2005 to 2015. Water and soil contamination from extractivism often stems from acid mine drainage (AMD), where sulfide minerals oxidize to produce acidic runoff laden with like and mercury. In regions like the Iberian Pyrite Belt, mining has rendered water bodies uninhabitable for aquatic life, with levels dropping below 3 and metal concentrations exceeding safe limits by orders of magnitude. Tailings leaks have polluted thousands of kilometers of waterways historically, though site-specific data varies; for instance, legacy mines continue to discharge AMD affecting downstream ecosystems for decades. declines are pronounced in extraction zones, with resource activities contributing to over 80% of documented losses in some analyses, though causal attribution requires distinguishing direct clearing from secondary effects like pollution. Technological mitigations have reduced per-unit environmental footprints in extractive operations. (CCS) applied to oil and gas flaring and mining ventilation cuts methane and CO2 releases; pilot projects at coal mines have sequestered thousands of tonnes annually, with scalability improving via enhanced membrane separation. and autonomous haul trucks in minimize fuel use by 10-20% and reduce land disturbance through targeted extraction, lowering waste rock by up to 30%. Land reclamation restores post-extraction sites, with success measured by soil productivity and vegetation cover. In the Northern Great Plains, reclaimed mine lands have achieved native grass yields equal to or exceeding pre-mining levels, supporting within 5-10 years via reclamation approaches emphasizing loose grading and organic amendments. technologies treat mining waste on-site, neutralizing AMD precursors and recovering metals, while electric and hybrid equipment has decreased diesel emissions by 40% in select operations. These interventions, when enforced, offset initial impacts, though efficacy depends on and site .

Socioeconomic Outcomes: Employment, Migration, and Inequality

Extractive industries generate substantial direct and indirect in resource-rich developing countries, often serving as a primary economic driver in regions with limited alternative opportunities. In , the sector employs millions, with formal mining jobs numbering around 1.5 million across the continent as of recent estimates, supplemented by informal and ancillary roles in , , and services that amplify total impacts through economic multipliers estimated at 2-5 times direct . For instance, in Ghana's sector, operations supported over 300,000 jobs including upstream and downstream activities by 2020, contributing to local wage premiums of 20-50% above national averages in mining districts. These effects stem from high capital investment requirements, which prioritize skilled labor but also spur programs; peer-reviewed analyses indicate that extractive projects enhance skill development, with up to 70% of value retained locally in optimized cases like Kazakhstan's oil fields. Migration patterns induced by extractivism typically involve large-scale inflows of workers to extraction sites, fostering boomtown dynamics that accelerate rural-to-urban or site-specific shifts. Oil and booms have historically drawn high migration rates among laborers, with miners exhibiting some of the highest occupational mobility; in , Ghana's industry relied on intra-regional labor migration involving hundreds of thousands from neighboring countries like and as of the , leading to temporary settlements that doubled local in active districts. In , anticipated production from 2020 onward is projected to attract 50,000-100,000 migrant workers, straining housing and services while boosting remittances to origin areas. Such movements often yield short-term economic gains via increased but can exacerbate social strains, including competition for resources and elevated in host communities, as documented in longitudinal studies of Ecuador's Amazonian fields where influxes correlated with 15-20% rises in transient . Resource extraction's influence on inequality reveals a nuanced profile, with empirical evidence indicating potential reductions in income disparities under certain fiscal and institutional conditions, countering blanket assertions of exacerbation. Household-level data from demonstrates that a 10% rise in income lowers the by approximately 0.2%, driven by direct payments and local multipliers that benefit lower-income quintiles more proportionally. Cross-national analyses across mineral-dependent economies, including and , show that effective royalty distribution and local content policies correlate with Gini declines of 5-10 points over decades, as resource rents fund alleviation without the distortions posited in models. However, enclave characteristics can widen gaps if benefits accrue disproportionately to elites or expatriates; in sub-Saharan African cases, inequality rises where diverts rents, yet aggregate headcounts fell by 10-15% in extractive-heavy nations like post-2000 reforms, per World Bank metrics, underscoring causal links to rather than extraction per se.

Health and Community Impacts with Data-Driven Assessments

Extractive industries, including and extraction, have been associated with elevated health risks to nearby communities primarily through airborne particulates, , and occupational exposures. Peer-reviewed studies document increased incidence of respiratory diseases and cancers in mining-adjacent populations; for instance, residents in heavily -mined areas of exhibit higher mortality rates and (COPD) prevalence, with epidemiological data linking proximity to mountaintop removal sites to a 1.5- to 2-fold increase in respiratory hospitalizations. Similarly, exposure contributes to coal workers' (black lung), affecting 10-21% of miners despite modern ventilation, with recent U.S. data showing rising fatality rates from this condition even post-1990s regulations. In oil and gas extraction, unconventional operations correlate with adverse reproductive and developmental outcomes, including and , based on cohort studies measuring maternal proximity to wells. A of 29 epidemiologic investigations found significant associations in 25 cases, attributing risks to volatile organic compounds and endocrine disruptors released during hydraulic fracturing, though remains challenged by factors like . Community-level data from regions like the U.S. Permian Basin and Ecuador's Amazon indicate potential for liver damage and immunodeficiency from chronic exposure, with one analysis estimating excess cancer risks up to 50% higher in high-production zones. Community impacts extend beyond direct toxicology to social determinants, including influx-driven migration that elevates rates of sexually transmitted infections, interpersonal , and disorders in "" settings. Qualitative assessments in sub-Saharan African communities report perceived increases in from and disrupted social cohesion, with 74% of surveyed conflicts citing loss and dispossession as amplifiers of . However, empirical reviews of resource booms reveal mixed effects, where economic inflows fund local —such as clinics and systems—potentially offsetting some morbidity; for example, Tanzanian and Ghanaian extractive zones showed improved access to healthcare services despite localized spikes. Data-driven evaluations underscore variability by governance and technology: while early unregulated operations amplified harms, modern mitigation like dust suppression and emission controls has reduced occupational incidence by up to 30% in regulated mines since 2000, per longitudinal U.S. . Nonetheless, persistent gaps in baseline data and underreporting in developing contexts—often in peer-reviewed studies from journals—necessitate cautious interpretation, as aggregate national metrics in resource-rich nations like have risen amid extraction-led growth.
Impact CategoryKey FindingsExample Data Source
Respiratory DiseasesElevated COPD and in areas10-21% prevalence in miners; higher hospitalization
Cancer IncidenceIncreased and other malignancies near sites1.5-2x mortality in mined vs. non-mined U.S. counties
Reproductive Outcomes linked to oil/gas proximitySignificant in 25/29 studies reviewed
Social/IndirectViolence, STDs from migration; partial infrastructure offsetsMixed booms in : health access gains amid

Political Economy and Geopolitical Ramifications

Governance Challenges and Corruption Risks

Extractive industries often operate in environments with concentrated rents and limited institutional capacity, amplifying governance challenges such as opaque licensing processes and discretionary contract awards that enable by political elites. In many developing countries, weak regulatory frameworks fail to prevent in or unauthorized diversions of royalties, leading to systemic that undermines public trust and fiscal accountability. For instance, state-owned enterprises like Brazil's , central to oil extraction, were implicated in a 2014 scandal involving over $2 billion in bribes for contracts, illustrating how extractive value chains facilitate between officials and firms. Corruption risks extend to , where unmonitored funds from , gas, or can fuel networks rather than public investment. In , audits revealed that between 1999 and 2011, approximately $20 billion in revenues went unaccounted for due to mismanagement and theft within the state oil corporation, exacerbating poverty despite resource abundance. Similarly, in , sector opacity under former President allowed family members to control billions in state contracts, with the diverting funds equivalent to 5% of GDP annually by 2017. These cases highlight causal links between resource dependence and , where high-value exports incentivize over institutional reform, as evidenced by lower scores on perception indices in extractive-heavy economies. Mitigation efforts, such as the (EITI), promote disclosure of payments and revenues to curb risks, with over 50 implementing countries reporting improved data availability since 2003. However, evaluations indicate mixed outcomes: while EITI enhances accountability in sectors like Zambia's , it has not consistently reduced levels, as seen in persistent scandals in EITI-compliant nations like the Democratic Republic of Congo, where gaps allow elite bypassing of transparency rules. Effective requires complementary measures like independent audits and anti-bribery enforcement, yet political resistance in rentier states often limits their impact, perpetuating cycles of inefficiency and public sector predation.

Conflicts, Activism, and Policy Responses

Extractive industries have been associated with numerous social conflicts, particularly in regions with indigenous populations and fragile ecosystems. A global database identifies 3,081 environmental conflicts linked to extractive projects as of 2023, with 1,044 involving , often stemming from disputes over land rights, water contamination, and inadequate consultation. In 's Yanacocha gold mine, operated by Mining, a mercury spill on June 2, 2000, released approximately 1.5 tons of the toxic substance, contaminating waterways and farmland in Choropampa, leading to immediate health effects for over 200 residents and subsequent violent clashes between protesters and police. Conflicts escalated further with the proposed $4.8 billion Conga copper-gold expansion in , where local opposition cited risks to headwater lakes, resulting in five protester deaths during 2011-2012 demonstrations and the project's suspension in 2016 amid ongoing legal battles. Activism against extractivism frequently mobilizes indigenous groups and environmental advocates, employing protests, legal challenges, and international campaigns. The movement, launched in December 2012 by four indigenous women in , protested federal omnibus bills (C-45 and C-38) that streamlined approvals for resource extraction on First Nations lands, facilitating and projects while weakening environmental assessments. The campaign involved widespread blockades, teach-ins, and hunger strikes, drawing global attention to treaty rights violations and resource sovereignty, though it did not halt major projects like the expansion. In , environmental defenders have faced crackdowns for opposing the Tilenga oil project in the area, with documenting arbitrary arrests and harassment of activists since 2021, highlighting tensions between energy development and conservation. Policy responses to these conflicts vary, often involving regulatory reforms, judicial interventions, and transparency initiatives, though enforcement remains inconsistent. In , communities in enacted 12 local ordinances by 2009 prohibiting in watershed areas, prompting legal disputes with Yanacocha that underscored gaps in prior consultation under ILO Convention 169. A Peruvian in 2022 ordered accountability for violations at Yanacocha, amid 46 active conflicts nationwide, reflecting judicial efforts to balance extraction with community protections. Internationally, the has developed frameworks for extractive industries in conflict zones, emphasizing risk assessments and to mitigate violence, as seen in responses to resource-fueled wars in the and . Despite such measures, critics note that policies like benefit-sharing agreements often fail to prevent escalation, with social movements pushing for moratoriums that have delayed projects but also forgone economic revenues.

Critiques of Anti-Extractivist Policies and Their Outcomes

Anti-extractivist policies, which seek to halt or severely restrict resource extraction on environmental, , or grounds, have frequently resulted in substantial economic forgone opportunities and heightened fiscal vulnerabilities in developing nations. In Ecuador's Yasuní-ITT Initiative, launched in 2007, the government proposed forgoing extraction from an oil block estimated to hold 846 million barrels—valued at approximately $7.2 billion over 13 years—in exchange for $3.6 billion in international compensation to preserve . By 2013, only $13 million had been pledged and disbursed, prompting President to terminate the program, citing the international community's failure to commit funds. This delay in extraction contributed to Ecuador's mounting public debt, which rose from 18% of GDP in 2007 to over 30% by 2013, without delivering the promised conservation financing or alternative revenue streams. Critics contend that the initiative's design overlooked basic economic incentives, as donor nations had little motivation to subsidize Ecuador's abstention while continuing their own consumption of imported hydrocarbons, ultimately leaving the country with neither environmental gains nor fiscal relief. Similar patterns emerge from protest-driven halts to mining projects, often framed as anti-extractivist resistance. In , widespread demonstrations against operations in 2022 disrupted copper production at key sites like Southern Copper's Cuajone mine, resulting in over $260 million in lost exports and $400 million in foregone tax revenue within months. These disruptions contributed to a 0.3 reduction in national GDP growth, with the economy expanding at 2.7% instead of an estimated 3% absent the unrest. Social conflicts tied to such opposition have deterred in Peru's sector, which accounts for 60% of exports and 10% of GDP, leading to stalled projects and persistent in rural areas where extraction provides primary job opportunities. Empirical analyses indicate that and activities in Latin American municipalities have significantly lowered rates—by up to 10-15% in producing regions—through royalties funding and social programs, underscoring how anti-extractivist blockades exacerbate inequality by forgoing these benefits without viable substitutes. Broader outcomes of these policies include increased dependency on volatile foreign aid or remittances and , where halted domestic production shifts extraction to jurisdictions with laxer standards, potentially worsening global environmental impacts. In resource-scarce economies, the absence of compensatory mechanisms has prolonged traps, as evidenced by Ecuador's post-Yasuní reliance on revenues anyway, amid ongoing fiscal deficits averaging 4-5% of GDP since 2013. Proponents of extraction argue that managed development, with technological mitigations, yields net socioeconomic gains over indefinite moratoriums, which often collapse under political pressure or economic necessity, as seen in the Yasuní case's reversal. Such failures highlight the causal disconnect between aspirational anti-extractivism and pragmatic alleviation, particularly in contexts where alternatives like fail to scale to match resource rents.

Case Studies

Successful Models: Norway and Botswana

Norway's management of its resources exemplifies effective governance in extractive industries, leveraging pre-existing strong institutions to mitigate risks associated with resource abundance. Oil was discovered in the in 1969, with production commencing from the Ekofisk field in June 1971, rapidly transforming the economy while avoiding symptoms of the such as economic volatility and institutional decay. The establishment of the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) in 1990, initially as a mechanism to stabilize , has since accumulated revenues from oil taxation and state-owned enterprises, reaching approximately $1.8 trillion in assets by mid-2025, equivalent to over $300,000 per capita for its 5.6 million population. This fund invests predominantly abroad in diversified assets, adhering to a fiscal rule limiting annual withdrawals to the estimated real return of about 3%, thereby preventing by curbing domestic spending surges and currency appreciation that could undermine non-oil sectors. Key mechanisms include high transparency, with quarterly public disclosures of holdings and decisions, and ethical guidelines introduced in 2004 that exclude investments in companies involved in severe violations, environmental damage, or weapons proliferation, enforced by an independent Council on . These practices, rooted in Norway's pre-oil democratic traditions and high social trust, have sustained broad-based growth, with petroleum contributing to GDP rising from among the world's top ranks pre-1970 to over $100,000 (PPP) today, alongside low and inequality metrics. Empirical analyses attribute this success to institutional quality rather than resource rents alone, as evidenced by sustained productivity in and services despite oil booms. Botswana's diamond sector provides another counterexample to predictions, achieving sustained development through prudent revenue management and robust institutions post- in 1966. Major diamond deposits were identified at Orapa in 1967, leading to the formation of , a 50:50 between the government and in 1969, which has produced the bulk of output while ensuring and local content requirements. account for about 80% of exports, one-third of fiscal revenues, and one-quarter of GDP, yet the has averaged annual GDP growth exceeding 5% from 1970 to 2020, transforming Botswana from one of the world's poorest nations at (GDP per capita around $70) to upper-middle-income status with over $7,000 by 2023. Success stems from fiscal discipline, including saving windfalls in foreign reserves (peaking at over 50% of GDP) and investing in , , and , which built and diversified beyond —evident in sectors like and exports comprising growing GDP shares. has largely averted through partial sterilization of inflows via reserves and a managed , maintaining competitiveness in non-mining trade, though some real appreciation occurred without derailing overall growth. Low , ranking third in on transparency indices, and stable democratic since have enabled transparent valuation and auditing of sales, preventing common in peer nations. These outcomes underscore causal roles of and strategic saving over resource abundance alone, as 's policies contrast with mismanaged African producers like or .

Latin American Experiences: Ecuador's Yasuní Initiative Failure

The Yasuní-ITT Initiative, launched by Ecuadorian President in June 2007, proposed leaving approximately 846 million barrels of proven oil reserves untapped in the Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini (ITT) block within in exchange for $3.6 billion in international compensation over 13 years, equivalent to roughly half the reserves' market value. The plan aimed to preserve one of the world's most biodiverse regions, protect uncontacted indigenous groups such as the and , and forgo emissions from burning the heavy crude, while redirecting funds to and social programs. positioned the initiative as a pioneering "post-petroleum" model under its 2008 constitution, which granted nature legal rights, but implementation required verifiable foreign commitments certified by a UN-administered trust fund. Funding efforts yielded minimal results, with only $13 million in actual donations secured by 2013 against the $3.6 billion target, representing less than 0.4% of the goal, alongside unfulfilled pledges totaling around $116 million. Major donors like Germany and withdrew support due to doubts over Ecuador's fiscal management, concerns about parallel oil expansions elsewhere, and the scheme's complexity, including demands for rather than market-based mechanisms like carbon credits. Correa attributed the shortfall to insufficient global commitment to , declaring the initiative "unsustainable" in August 2013 and authorizing oil extraction in the ITT block to address Ecuador's budget deficit, which reached 10% of GDP that year. Critics, including economic analyses, argued the initiative's conceptual flaws—such as overvaluing unproven and ignoring Ecuador's heavy reliance on oil revenues (comprising over 50% of exports)—rendered success improbable from inception, with fundraising probabilities estimated at near zero. Following termination, Ecuador's approved drilling in October 2013, with commencing operations in the Ishpingo field by 2016, extracting heavy oil requiring advanced separation techniques and contributing around 60,000 barrels per day by 2024. The failure underscored extractivism's persistence amid economic pressures, as Ecuador's public debt exceeded 40% of GDP and oil funded 25% of the national budget, prompting resumption despite environmental risks like and documented in the park's 9,820 km² area. A 2023 , passing with 59% approval, mandated halting future drilling in block 43-ITT and phased withdrawal, yet by August 2025, the government extended production for up to five years, citing legal and revenue constraints, highlighting ongoing tensions between policy rhetoric and fiscal realism. This outcome illustrates how anti-extractivist initiatives, without viable domestic alternatives or broad international buy-in, falter against resource-dependent economies' causal imperatives.

Emerging Contexts: African and Asian Extractive Economies

In , the of Congo (DRC) represents a prime example of extractive potential constrained by failures, with its sector—rich in , , and —contributing over 30% to GDP and 90% of exports as of 2023, yet delivering minimal public benefits due to and . Cobalt smuggling alone, enabled by corrupt border officials with and , deprives the state of an estimated $1-2 billion annually, exacerbating amid vast reserves critical for global battery production. The 2002 Mining Code aims to regulate operations, but decades of conflict, political , and illicit have resulted in only about 6% of revenues reaching the national budget, perpetuating a cycle where multinational firms and local elites capture rents while communities face artisanal hazards and . Nigeria's oil sector illustrates the resource curse hypothesis empirically, as petroleum accounts for over 80% of exports and 65% of government revenue in 2023, yet the country ranks among the world's poorest per capita, with Niger Delta households experiencing subnational economic stagnation, heightened inequality, and conflict despite proximity to extraction sites. This paradox stems from Dutch disease effects—where oil crowds out agriculture and manufacturing—and fiscal mismanagement, including subsidies and patronage that distort incentives, leading to boom-bust cycles; for instance, oil price crashes in 2014-2016 contracted GDP by 1.6% annually. Reforms like direct revenue distribution to citizens have been proposed to mitigate elite capture, but implementation lags amid entrenched corruption. In , Indonesia's nickel extractive boom, propelled by demand, has elevated the sector to supply over 50% of global by 2024, driving a 10% annual production increase since 2020 but at the cost of severe ecological harm, including deforestation of 20,000 hectares yearly on and islands and toxic runoff polluting fisheries. Socially, mining correlates with divergent outcomes: economic inflows boost some , yet local declines due to displacement, health issues from smelter emissions, and lost traditional livelihoods for Indigenous groups like Bajau fishers on Kabaena Island. Central Asian economies such as and are emerging as mineral powerhouses, with Kazakhstan's oil output from the expansion supporting 5.7% GDP growth projected for 2025, while Mongolia's and mining underpins a 5.8% forecast amid Oyu Tolgoi project ramps. These gains, however, hinge on navigating volatility—Kazakhstan's hydrocarbon reliance exposes it to sanctions and price swings—and institutional risks, including opaque licensing that echoes African patterns of rent-seeking over diversification. Empirical analyses suggest governance quality moderates resource-led growth, with stronger institutions enabling spillover benefits like investment, though weak enforcement often amplifies inequality.

References

  1. https://www.exploring-economics.org/en/discover/the-political-economy-of-extractivism/
  2. https://keywords.sites.ucsc.edu/2023/09/29/extractivism/
  3. https://www.tni.org/files/download/beyonddevelopment_extractivism.pdf
  4. https://promiseinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Fact-Sheet-Global-Extractivism-and-Racial-Equality-FINAL.pdf
  5. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03066150.2022.2069015
  6. https://serc.carleton.edu/heal_stemm/core_concepts/extractivism.html
  7. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13642987.2017.1301035
  8. https://online.ucpress.edu/currenthistory/article/124/858/27/204214/Green-Extractivism-s-New-Frontiers
  9. https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-888
  10. https://docs.un.org/en/a/hrc/41/54
  11. https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3811&context=scholarly_works
  12. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800922000131
  13. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11085170/
  14. https://climatalk.org/2024/09/09/extractivism/
  15. https://ipsp.org/themes-and-programs/working-groups-themes-under-review/extractivism-and-its-socio-environmental-impacts/
  16. https://redda.com.br/en/what-is-extractivism/
  17. https://journals.openedition.org/poldev/5376
  18. https://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/might-the-keys-to-peace-open-the-doors-to-extractivism/52206
  19. https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/BOL
  20. https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/economy/bolivia-says-running-out-of-natural-gas-its-top-earner.phtml
  21. https://globaldialogue.isa-sociology.org/articles/extractivism-vs-buen-vivir-in-ecuador
  22. https://www.noahpinion.blog/p/how-maduro-and-chavez-wrecked-venezuelas
  23. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2016.1159508
  24. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/sep/19/world-failed-ecuador-yasuni-initiative
  25. https://news.mongabay.com/2023/08/ecuador-referendum-halts-oil-extraction-in-yasuni-national-park/
  26. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0921800916308771
  27. https://undisciplinedenvironments.org/2020/12/23/challenging-extractivism/
  28. https://bristoluniversitypressdigital.com/view/journals/gpe/2/2/article-p225.xml
  29. https://oxfordre.com/latinamericanhistory/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.001.0001/acrefore-9780199366439-e-2
  30. https://www.worldhistory.org/article/2049/the-silver-of-the-conquistadors/
  31. https://www.npr.org/2012/09/25/161752820/bolivias-cerro-rico-the-mountain-that-eats-men
  32. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/mining-and-mineral-resources/silver-discovered-spanish-america
  33. http://barrett.dyson.cornell.edu/NEUDC/paper_364.pdf
  34. https://publicaciones.eafit.edu.co/index.php/map/article/download/7209/5314/23857
  35. https://www.lse.ac.uk/Economic-History/Assets/Documents/Research/GEHN/GEHNConferences/conf7/Conf7-Williamson.pdf
  36. https://blackpast.org/global-african-history/congo-free-state-1885-1908/
  37. https://www.dw.com/en/king-leopolds-legacy-the-lingering-chaos-in-dr-congo/a-53982357
  38. https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/english/currentstudents/postgraduate/masters/modules/caribbeanreadingwordlecology/extractive_imperialism_in_the_americas_capitalism..._----_2_extractive_imperialism_in_historical_perspective.pdf
  39. https://ticcih.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Oil-industry-thematic-report.pdf
  40. https://www.realclearpublicaffairs.com/public_affairs/2020/05/01/energy_in_the_21st_century_resources_conversions_costs_uses_and_consequences_490552.html
  41. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7471716/
  42. https://guides.loc.gov/oil-and-gas-industry/history
  43. https://www.dallasfed.org/~/media/documents/research/papers/2014/wp1414.pdf
  44. https://magazine.scienceforthepeople.org/vol25-2-bleeding-earth/extractivism-in-the-anthropocene/
  45. https://pubs.usgs.gov/publication/dr1164/full
  46. https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/confs/2016/pdf/rba-conference-volume-2016-roberts-saunders-spence-cassidy.pdf
  47. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/ijfe.1933
  48. https://maristellasvampa.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/libro-Neo-extractivism-in-Latin-America-in-Cambridge.pdf
  49. https://redelites.networksprovidehappiness.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Neo-extractivism-in-Venezuela-and-Ecuador-A-weapon-of-class-conflict.pdf
  50. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/362811995_The_Political_Economy_of_the_New_Extractivism_and_Revolutionary_Strategies_in_Ecuador_and_Venezuela
  51. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/neoextractivism-in-latin-america/EB7C46C43B99ABE7C72F9F43A1CC842D
  52. https://www.garn.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Fernandez_Bucaram_YasuniITT_s.f..pdf
  53. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/13607804241275293
  54. https://africachinacentre.org/tracking-chinas-investment-in-africas-extractive-industry/
  55. https://www.policycenter.ma/publications/impact-chinese-investments-africa-neocolonialism-or-cooperation
  56. https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/cienciapol/article/download/57551/57781
  57. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-024-03949-8
  58. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214790X24001308
  59. https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.1080/03056244.2021.1953975
  60. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/nrgi_Resource-Curse.pdf
  61. https://majrresources.com/how-does-resource-nationalism-affect-a-countrys-economy/
  62. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/extractiveindustries/overview
  63. https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Extractives-in-Latin-America-and-the-Caribbean-The-Basics.pdf
  64. https://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/our-research/the-fdi-shake-up-how-foreign-direct-investment-today-may-shape-industry-and-trade-tomorrow
  65. https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/programs/cri/files/report_18_EO%252BExtractives%252BFinal.pdf
  66. https://medium.com/%40tri_continental/dossier-16-grand-theft-of-africas-natural-resources-by-multinational-corporations-bc42a2edf0fe
  67. https://noirpress.org/who-profits-most-from-africas-wealth-how-apple-microsoft-big-oil-depend-on-africa/
  68. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/jun/02/the-multinational-companies-that-industrialised-the-amazon-rainforest
  69. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S109095161730679X
  70. https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2025_en.pdf
  71. https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/industries/energy-utilities-resources/publications/mine.html
  72. https://www.anbound.com/Section/ArticleView_34944_1.htm
  73. https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/sustainability/our-insights/riding-the-resource-wave
  74. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/extractiveindustries/brief/climate-smart-mining-minerals-for-climate-action
  75. https://www.ifc.org/en/what-we-do/sector-expertise/infrastructure/metals-and-mining
  76. https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2022/IMF-World-Bank-New
  77. https://egps.worldbank.org/
  78. https://www.cadtm.org/The-World-Bank-IMF-have-clearly-failed-An-alternative-policy-is-needed
  79. https://www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/6000/02iie6000.pdf
  80. https://www.cruxinvestor.com/posts/new-money-flows-how-alternative-financing-is-reshaping-mining-capital-markets
  81. https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/2bstmbphi9k4jr6vp6134/innovation/an-esg-framework-for-extractive-industries
  82. https://unece.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/SG%2520Policy%2520Brief%2520Extractives%2520NOemb.pdf
  83. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-abu-dhabi-governments-invest-18-billion-with-orion-into-critical-minerals-2025-10-23/
  84. http://wordpress.ei.columbia.edu/vcc/our-focus/investments-in-extractive-industries/
  85. https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/press-release/new-un-report-calls-responsible-financing-and-investment-energy
  86. https://resourcegovernance.org/articles/mindex-deeper-look-extractive-wealth-nations
  87. https://ourworldindata.org/countries-critical-minerals-needed-energy-transition
  88. https://www.irena.org/Digital-Report/Geopolitics-of-the-Energy-Transition-Critical-Materials
  89. https://rsf.org/en/two-thirds-world-s-natural-resources-are-extracted-countries-where-press-freedom-serious-danger
  90. https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2020/mcs2020.pdf
  91. https://www.azomining.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID=1690
  92. https://www.theassay.com/articles/the-assay-insights/underground-mining-guide/
  93. https://courses.lumenlearning.com/colorado-wmopen-geology/chapter/outcome-extraction-methods/
  94. https://www.nrdc.org/stories/fracking-101
  95. https://inspenet.com/en/articulo/drilling-techniques-for-oil-extraction/
  96. https://www.forestryfocus.ie/growing-forests-3/harvesting/
  97. https://deepseamining.ac/deep_sea_mining_equipment
  98. https://www.cummins.com/engines/mining/types-of-mining
  99. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/385087081_The_impact_of_autonomous_vehicles_on_mining_operations_Enhancing_safety_and_productivity_through_technological_advancements
  100. https://www.mining-technology.com/features/autonomous_vehicles_safeai/
  101. https://www.iea.org/reports/global-critical-minerals-outlook-2025/innovation-in-mining-refining-and-recycling-to-promote-diversification
  102. https://www.hpinc.com/resources/product-literature/oil-drilling-automation-revolutionizing-the-industry-for-efficiency-and-safety
  103. https://www.deloitte.com/us/en/Industries/energy/articles/mining-ai-automation-for-health-safety.html
  104. https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/25/16/5201
  105. https://www.csgtalent.com/insights/blog/mining-technology-in-2025--driving-efficiency--safety--and-sustainability/
  106. https://www.azomining.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID=1800
  107. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/148735/cdc_148735_DS1.pdf
  108. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp1661.pdf
  109. https://www.sciencepublishinggroup.com/article/10.11648/j.jbed.20190402.14
  110. https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/chile-mining
  111. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/botswana-has-valued-good-governance-as-much-as-diamonds
  112. https://hir.harvard.edu/botswana-prosperity/
  113. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/botswana/overview
  114. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0301420717303331
  115. https://borgenproject.org/escaping-the-resource-curse-the-impact-of-diamonds-in-botswana/
  116. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/downloadpdf/view/journals/022/0038/002/article-A012-en.pdf
  117. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2000/12/mcphail.htm
  118. https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/89624/1/cesifo_wp4568.pdf
  119. https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/081512.pdf
  120. https://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/docs/find.aspx?id=5619T1028
  121. https://www.ntrc.gov.ph/images/journal/2023/j20230506b.pdf
  122. https://www.isa.org.jm/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/RMG-Consulting.pdf
  123. http://old.agora-parl.org/sites/default/files/administeringfiscalregimesforei.pdf
  124. https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2007/09/20070904_02AnnexMiningComparisons.ppt
  125. https://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=economics/mineralstax/subs/supp%2520sub%25206.2%2520treasury%2520.pdf
  126. https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/WP/2024/English/wpiea2024089-print-pdf.ashx
  127. https://resourcegovernance.org/articles/how-good-are-sovereign-wealth-funds-investing-money-made-natural-resources
  128. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sovereign_wealth_fund.asp
  129. https://www.greenfinanceplatform.org/sites/default/files/downloads/resource/GFPN_Fiscal%2520reforms%2520in%2520the%2520extractives%2520sector%2520for%2520green%2520finance.pdf
  130. https://themanitobalawjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/articles/MLJ_38.3/383-Managing-Resource-Revenues.pdf
  131. https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article/91/3/586/57795/The-Elusive-Curse-of-Oil
  132. https://www.nber.org/papers/w15836
  133. https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/curse-or-blessing-how-institutions-determine-success-resource-rich-economies
  134. https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/8958321/file/8958322.pdf
  135. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S030147972300960X
  136. https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/743af33c-b2f5-4a93-a925-1b08f6438e61/EmissionsfromOilandGasOperationinNetZeroTransitions.pdf
  137. https://www.carbonbrief.org/emissions-from-mining-cause-up-to-2-5tn-in-environmental-damages-each-year/
  138. https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2118273119
  139. https://www.azocleantech.com/news.aspx?newsID=35403
  140. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-017-00557-w
  141. https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4441/13/10/1436
  142. https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/how-does-mine-drainage-occur
  143. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/mar/12/resource-extraction-carbon-emissions-biodiversity-loss
  144. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301420724005506
  145. https://www.bakerhughes.com/company/energy-forward/5-technology-trends-increase-efficiency-and-sustainability-mining
  146. https://www.waste2water.com/sustainable-practices-for-mining-operations/
  147. https://www.asrs.us/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/0842-Schuman.pdf
  148. https://research.fs.usda.gov/treesearch/54344
  149. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2950555024000338
  150. https://www.ief.org/news/how-to-make-mining-more-sustainable
  151. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/380777145_Extractive_industries_in_Africa
  152. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13563-020-00219-2
  153. https://medium.com/migration-issues/oil-booms-drive-huge-migrations-e462b907a927
  154. https://www.migrationinstitute.org/files/events/nyame.pdf
  155. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/guyana-discovery-oil-labor-migration-climate-displacement
  156. https://cinram.umn.edu/sites/cinram.umn.edu/files/2021-08/2-feldman-palm.pdf
  157. https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/25765/files/cp060070.pdf
  158. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/are-natural-resources-a-curse-a-blessing-or-a-double-edged-sword/
  159. https://appvoices.org/end-mountaintop-removal/mtr101/health-impacts/
  160. https://uknowledge.uky.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1370&context=mpampp_etds
  161. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7225204/
  162. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11133301/
  163. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0013935120300153
  164. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6344296/
  165. https://ehjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12940-016-0140-1
  166. https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0252433
  167. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10246906/
  168. https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/developmenttalk/natural-resource-booms-are-mixed-blessing-local-communities-too
  169. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7177430/
  170. https://publichealth.uic.edu/news-stories/modern-coal-miners-suffering-higher-fatality-rates/
  171. https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12889-018-5505-7
  172. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048969724051398
  173. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2016/08/corruption-in-the-extractive-value-chain_g1g676bf/9789264256569-en.pdf
  174. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/oil-gas-and-mining-corruption-is-it-inevitable/
  175. https://coveringextractives.org/handbook/chapter-3/
  176. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214629625003287
  177. https://eiti.org/
  178. https://www.u4.no/publications/has-the-eiti-been-successful-reviewing-evaluations-of-the-extractive-industries-transparency-initiative.pdf
  179. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09692290.2025.2510444
  180. https://www.opengovpartnership.org/open-gov-guide/anti-corruption-extractive-industries/
  181. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/apr/02/the-village-still-suffering-from-peru-mercury-spill-fallout-after-20-years
  182. https://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/peru404/thestory.html
  183. https://impact.economist.com/sustainability/social-conflict-perus-mining-sector
  184. https://earthworks.org/blog/peruvian-communities-challenge-newmont-mining-operations-as-investors-meet/
  185. https://www.cbc.ca/radio/unreserved/idle-no-more-reconciliation-1.6663310
  186. https://idlenomore.ca/why-canadas-indigenous-uprising-is-about-all-of-us-idle-no-more/
  187. https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/11/02/working-oil-forbidden/crackdown-against-environmental-defenders-uganda
  188. https://www.oxfamamerica.org/explore/stories/conflict-surrounds-expansion-of-peru-gold-mine/
  189. https://rfkhumanrights.org/press/mining-company-yanococha-must-be-held-accountable-for-human-rights-violations/
  190. https://www.un.org/en/land-natural-resources-conflict/pdfs/GN_Extractive.pdf
  191. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/2d5b4fe2-2cd0-58a4-9476-8d1b5b5eec3b
  192. https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/programs/cri/files/report_50_ConflictManagementandCorporateCulture.pdf
  193. https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/framework/norways-petroleum-history/
  194. https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/energy/oil-and-gas/norways-oil-history-in-5-minutes/id440538/
  195. https://fortune.com/europe/2025/07/30/how-sparsely-populated-norway-amassed-1-8-trillion-sovereign-wealth-fund/
  196. https://www.bis.org/review/r101105a.pdf
  197. https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/214768/economics/norway-uk-oil/
  198. https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/the-economy/the-government-pension-fund/responsible-management/id446948/
  199. https://www.nbim.no/en/news-and-insights/reports/2023/responsible-investment-2023/
  200. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0301421513009348
  201. https://www.law.columbia.edu/news/archive/avoiding-resource-curse
  202. https://jmaurit.github.io/anvendt_macro/artikler/Holden%2520%282013%29.pdf
  203. https://www.worlddiamondcouncil.org/diamond-empowerment-the-botswana-case-study/
  204. https://blog-pfm.imf.org/en/pfmblog/2024/07/management-of-botswana-diamond-revenues
  205. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=BW
  206. https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/html/mineral-resource-governance-botswana
  207. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/023/0035/015/article-A012-en.xml
  208. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301420719309055
  209. https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Overlapping_Sectors__Botswanas_Inoculation_Against_the_Dutch_Disease__Working_Paper.pdf
  210. https://african.business/2024/09/resources/diamonds-arent-forever-botswana-looks-beyond-mining
  211. https://resourcegovernanceindex.org/country-profiles/BWA/mining?years%25E2%2580%2589=%25E2%2580%25892017
  212. https://www.glimpsefromtheglobe.com/regions/sub-saharanafrica/avoiding-the-resource-curse-why-botswana-succeeded-where-others-failed/
  213. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstreams/85f28a30-dc1a-5d7e-aab5-417f49079a56/download
  214. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-23722204
  215. https://news.mongabay.com/2013/08/ecuador-shelves-big-idea-for-saving-the-amazon/
  216. https://americasquarterly.org/blog/ecuadors-yasuni-itt-initiative-the-fate-of-one-of-the-worlds-most-biodiverse-regions/
  217. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0301421516302142
  218. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/nov/23/yasuni-oil-ground-project
  219. https://news.mongabay.com/2024/08/one-year-after-oil-referendum-whats-next-for-ecuadors-yasuni-national-park/
  220. https://dialogue.earth/en/nature/52121-ecuadors-yasuni-national-park-between-oil-exploitation-and-conservation/
  221. https://www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin-articles/yasuni-the-significance-of-a-victory
  222. https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/08/20/ecuador-officials-ignore-rainforest-protection-referendum
  223. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/rampant-cobalt-smuggling-and-corruption-deny-billions-to-drc
  224. https://eiti.org/countries/democratic-republic-congo
  225. https://qz.com/africa/1038143/two-investigations-into-corruption-in-resource-rich-dr-congo-show-why-it-stays-so-poor
  226. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301420725000066
  227. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S095965261200279X
  228. https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w9804/w9804.pdf
  229. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/30/Addressing-the-Natural-Resource-Curse-An-Illustration-From-Nigeria-16582
  230. https://theconversation.com/weighing-the-green-cost-how-nickel-mining-in-indonesia-impacts-forests-and-local-communities-246259
  231. https://www.tribhakti.com/environmental-and-social-impacts-of-nickel-mining-in-indonesia/
  232. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590332224005347
  233. https://news.mongabay.com/2025/07/nickel-boom-on-an-indonesian-island-brings-toxic-seas-lost-incomes-report-says/
  234. https://eurasianet.org/ebrd-offers-favorable-economic-outlook-for-central-asian-states
  235. https://www.ebrd.com/home/news-and-events/news/2025/ebrd-gives-positive-outlook-for-central-asian-economies.html
  236. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kazakhstan/overview
  237. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1925209925000361
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
Contribute something
User Avatar
No comments yet.