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West Bank settlements (2020)
East Jerusalem settlements (2006)
Golan Heights settlements (1992)
Gaza Strip settlements (1993), dismantled since the 2005 disengagement

Israeli settlements, also called Israeli colonies,[1][2][3][4] are the civilian communities built by Israel throughout the Israeli-occupied territories. They are populated by Israeli citizens, almost exclusively of Jewish identity or ethnicity,[5][6][7] and have been constructed on lands that Israel has militarily occupied since the Six-Day War in 1967.[8] The international community considers Israeli settlements to be illegal under international law,[9][10][11][12] but Israel disputes this.[13][14][15][16] In 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found in an advisory opinion that Israel's occupation was illegal and ruled that Israel had "an obligation to cease immediately all new settlement activities and to evacuate all settlers" from the occupied territories.[17] The expansion of settlements often involves the confiscation of Palestinian land and resources, leading to displacement of Palestinian communities and creating a source of tension and conflict. Settlements are often protected by the Israeli military and are frequently flashpoints for violence against Palestinians. Furthermore, the presence of settlements and Jewish-only bypass roads creates a fragmented Palestinian territory, seriously hindering economic development and freedom of movement for Palestinians.[18]

As of April 2025, Israeli settlements exist in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), which is claimed by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sovereign territory of the State of Palestine, and in the Golan Heights, which is internationally recognized as a part of the sovereign territory of Syria.[a] Through the Jerusalem Law and the Golan Heights Law, Israel effectively annexed both territories, though the international community has rejected any change to their status as occupied territory. Although Israel's West Bank settlements have been built on territory administered under military rule rather than civil law, Israeli civil law is "pipelined" into the settlements, such that Israeli citizens living there are treated similarly to those living in Israel. Many consider it to be a major obstacle to the Israeli–Palestinian peace process.[21][22][23][24][25] In Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2004), the ICJ found that Israel's settlements and the then-nascent Israeli West Bank barrier were both in violation of international law; part of the latter has been constructed within the West Bank, as opposed to being entirely on Israel's side of the Green Line.[26][27][28]

As of January 2023,[needs update] there are 144 Israeli settlements in the West Bank, including 12 in East Jerusalem; the Israeli government administers the West Bank as the Judea and Samaria Area, which does not include East Jerusalem.[29] In addition to the settlements, the West Bank is also hosting at least 196 Israeli outposts,[30] which are settlements that have not been authorized by the Israeli government. In total, over 450,000 Israeli settlers reside in the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem, with an additional 220,000 Israeli settlers residing in East Jerusalem.[31][32] Additionally, over 25,000 Israeli settlers live in Syria's Golan Heights.[33] Between 1967 and 1982, there were 18 settlements established in the Israeli-occupied Sinai Peninsula of Egypt, though these were dismantled by Israel after the Egypt–Israel peace treaty of 1979. Additionally, as part of the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005, Israel dismantled all 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip and four settlements in the West Bank.[34]

Per the Fourth Geneva Convention, the transfer by an occupying power of its civilian population into the territory it is occupying constitutes a war crime,[35][36][37] although Israel disputes that this statute applies to the West Bank.[38][39] On 20 December 2019, the International Criminal Court announced the opening of an investigation of war crimes in the Palestinian territories. The presence and ongoing expansion of existing settlements by Israel and the construction of outposts is frequently criticized as an obstacle to peace by the PLO,[40] and by a number of third parties, such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation,[41] the United Nations (UN),[42] Russia,[43][44] the United Kingdom,[45] France,[46] and the European Union.[47] The UN has repeatedly upheld the view that Israel's construction of settlements in the occupied territories constitutes a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention.[48][49][50] For decades, the United States also designated Israeli settlements as illegal,[42] but the first Trump administration reversed this long-standing policy in November 2019,[51] declaring that "the establishment of Israeli civilian settlements in the West Bank is not per se inconsistent with international law";[52] this new policy, in turn, was reversed to the original by the Biden administration in February 2024, once again classifying Israeli settlement expansion as "inconsistent with international law" and matching the official positions of the other three members of the Middle East Quartet.[53][54][needs update?]

Name and characterization

[edit]

Certain observers and Palestinians occasionally use the term "Israeli colonies" as a substitute for the term "settlements".[55][56][57][58] Settlements range in character from farming communities and frontier villages to urban suburbs and neighborhoods. The four largest settlements, Modi'in Illit, Ma'ale Adumim, Beitar Illit and Ariel, have achieved city status. Ariel has 18,000 residents, while the rest have around 37,000 to 55,500 each.

Housing costs and state subventions

[edit]

Settlement has an economic dimension, much of it driven by the significantly lower costs of housing for Israeli citizens living in Israeli settlements compared to the cost of housing and living in Israel proper.[59] Government spending per citizen in the settlements is double that spent per Israeli citizen in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, while government spending for settlers in isolated Israeli settlements is three times the Israeli national average. Most of the spending goes to the security of the Israeli citizens living there.[60]

Number of settlements and inhabitants

[edit]

As of January 2023, there are 144 Israeli settlements in the West Bank, including 12 in East Jerusalem.[29] In addition, there are at least 196 Israeli illegal outposts (not sanctioned by the Israeli government) in the West Bank.[30] In total, over 500,000 Israeli settlers live in the West Bank excluding East Jerusalem,[61][62] with an additional 220,000 Jewish settlers residing in East Jerusalem.[31][32]

Additionally, over 20,000 Israeli citizens live in settlements in the Golan Heights.[63][64]

History

[edit]

Occupied territories

[edit]

Following the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel occupied a number of territories.[65] It took over the remainder of the Palestinian Mandate territories of the West Bank including East Jerusalem, from Jordan which had controlled the territories since the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, which had held Gaza under occupation since 1949. From Egypt, it also captured the Sinai Peninsula and from Syria it captured most of the Golan Heights, which since 1981 has been administered under the Golan Heights Law.

Settlement policy

[edit]

As early as September 1967, Israeli settlement policy was progressively encouraged by the Labor government of Levi Eshkol. The basis for Israeli settlement in the West Bank became the Allon Plan,[66][67] named after its inventor Yigal Allon. It implied Israeli annexation of major parts of the Israeli-occupied territories, especially East Jerusalem, Gush Etzion and the Jordan Valley.[68] The settlement policy of the government of Yitzhak Rabin was also derived from the Allon Plan.[69]

The first settlement was Kfar Etzion, in the southern West Bank,[66][70] although that location was outside the Allon Plan. Many settlements began as Nahal settlements. They were established as military outposts and later expanded and populated with civilian inhabitants. According to a secret document dating to 1970, obtained by Haaretz, the settlement of Kiryat Arba was established by confiscating land by military order and falsely representing the project as being strictly for military use while in reality, Kiryat Arba was planned for settler use. The method of confiscating land by military order for establishing civilian settlements was an open secret in Israel throughout the 1970s, but publication of the information was suppressed by the military censor.[71][72]

In the 1970s, Israel's methods for seizing Palestinian land to establish settlements included requisitioning for ostensibly military purposes and spraying of land with poison.[73]

The Likud government of Menahem Begin, from 1977, was more supportive to settlement in other parts of the West Bank, by organizations like Gush Emunim and the Jewish Agency/World Zionist Organization, and intensified the settlement activities.[69][74][75] In a government statement, Likud declared that the entire historic Land of Israel is the inalienable heritage of the Jewish people and that no part of the West Bank should be handed over to foreign rule.[76] Ariel Sharon declared in the same year (1977) that there was a plan to settle 2 million Jews in the West Bank by 2000.[77] The government abrogated the prohibition from purchasing occupied land by Israelis; the "Drobles Plan", a plan for large-scale settlement in the West Bank meant to prevent a Palestinian state under the pretext of security became the framework for its policy.[78][A] The "Drobles Plan" from the World Zionist Organization, dated October 1978 and named "Master Plan for the Development of Settlements in Judea and Samaria, 1979–1983", was written by the Jewish Agency director and former Knesset member Matityahu Drobles. In January 1981, the government adopted a follow-up plan from Drobles, dated September 1980 and named "The current state of the settlements in Judea and Samaria", with more details about settlement strategy and policy.[79][B]

Israeli soldiers searching a Palestinian in Tel Rumeida, 2012

Since 1967, government-funded settlement projects in the West Bank are implemented by the "Settlement Division" of the World Zionist Organization.[80] Though formally a non-governmental organization, it is funded by the Israeli government and leases lands from the Civil Administration to settle in the West Bank. It is authorized to create settlements in the West Bank on lands licensed to it by the Civil Administration.[66] Traditionally, the Settlement Division has been under the responsibility of the Agriculture Ministry. Since the Oslo Accords, it was always housed within the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). In 2007, it was moved back to the Agriculture Ministry. In 2009, the Netanyahu Government decided to subject all settlement activities to additional approval of the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister. In 2011, Netanyahu sought to move the Settlement Division again under the direct control of (his own) PMO, and to curtail Defense Minister Ehud Barak's authority.[80]

At the presentation of the Oslo II Accord on 5 October 1995 in the Knesset, PM Yitzhak Rabin expounded the Israeli settlement policy in connection with the permanent solution to the conflict. Israel wanted "a Palestinian entity, less than a state, which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank". It wanted to keep settlements beyond the Green Line including Ma'ale Adumim and Givat Ze'ev in East Jerusalem. Blocs of settlements should be established in the West Bank. Rabin promised not to return to the 4 June 1967 lines.[81]

In June 1997, the Likud government of Benjamin Netanyahu presented its "Allon Plus Plan". This plan holds the retention of some 60% of the West Bank, including the "Greater Jerusalem" area with the settlements Gush Etzion and Ma'aleh Adumim, other large concentrations of settlements in the West Bank, the entire Jordan Valley, a "security area", and a network of Israeli-only bypass roads.[82][83]

Israeli settlers in the Ofra settlement, Israeli-occupied West Bank, 2012

In the Road map for peace of 2002, which was never implemented, the establishment of a Palestinian state was acknowledged. Outposts would be dismantled. However, many new outposts appeared instead, few were removed. Israel's settlement policy remained unchanged. Settlements in East Jerusalem and remaining West Bank were expanded.

While according to official Israeli policy no new settlements were built, at least some hundred unauthorized outposts were established since 2002 with state funding in the 60% of the West Bank that was not under Palestinian administrative control and the population growth of settlers did not diminish.

In 2005, all 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip and four in the northern West Bank were forcibly evacuated as part of Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip, known to some in Israel as "the Expulsion".[34] Nevertheless, the total settler population continued to rise.[84]

After the failure of the Roadmap, several new plans emerged to settle in major parts of the West Bank. In 2011, Haaretz revealed the Civil Administration's "Blue Line"-plan, written in January 2011, which aims to increase Israeli "state-ownership" of West Bank land ("state lands") and settlement in strategic areas like the Jordan Valley and the northern Dead Sea area.[85] In March 2012, it was revealed that the Civil Administration over the years covertly allotted 10% of the West Bank for further settlement. Provisional names for future new settlements or settlement expansions were already assigned. The plan includes many Palestinian built-up sites in the Areas A and B.[86]

Settlements in the Gaza Strip

[edit]
Settlement area in the Gaza Strip (March 1999)

Land in the Gaza Strip available to its Palestinian inhabitants has historically been limited as a result of Israeli land confiscation and the establishment of settlements. Settlement growth in the Gaza Strip before 1977 was limited, as the Israeli labor party's policy of containment preferred the establishment of a collection of settlements along the border of the Strip. At this point, 6 settlements in the Strip existed, Kfar Darom, Netzarim, Morag, Eretz, Katif, and Netzer Hazani. With the Likud party's revisionist Zionist policies entering with Begin's government, the scale of settlement expansion increased, although the basic policies relating to the settlements did not change. By 1978, 13 settlements had been built as part of a buffer zone along Gaza's southern border in Rafah.[87]

The discussions at Camp David that year surrounding the idea of potential future Palestinian autonomy would trigger an increase in settlement expansion in the Gaza Strip, following the Israeli policy of establishing "facts on the ground". Political economist Sara Roy described this as a policy intended to make the establishment of an independent Palestinian state more difficult. The locations and size of these new settlements would contribute to geographically isolating Palestinian communities from each other.[87]

In the seven years between 1978 and 1985, 11,500 acres of land were confiscated by the Israeli government for the establishment of settlements. By 1991, the settler population in Gaza would reach 3,500 and 4,000 by 1993, or less than 1% of Gaza's population. The land available for use by the Jewish settler community exceeded 25% of the total land in Gaza. The ratio of dunams to people was 23 for Jewish settlers, and 0.27 for Palestinians. Comparing the available built-up area available to each of the two groups in 1993, the ratio is 115 people per square mile for Jewish settlers and over 9,000 people per square mile for Palestinians. Sara Roy estimates the increase in Palestinian population density in Gaza due to Israeli policies alone to be an increase of almost 2,000 people per square mile in 1993.[87]

All the settlements were surrounded by electric fences or barbed wire.[88]

While the settlements maintained an isolated economic system, they affected the Gazan economy via land confiscation, the disproportionate consumption of local resources such as water, by overwhelmingly denying work opportunities and through the large disparities in funding (both private and governmental) for economic development.[87]

Geography and municipal status

[edit]
Upper left: Modiin bloc Upper middle: Mountain ridge settlements outside barrier Right: Jordan Valley
L above center: Latrun salient Center: Jerusalem envelope, Ma'ale Adumim at right
Lower L of center: Etzion bloc Lower center: Judean Desert Lower right: Dead Sea
Upper L: 3 are outside barrier Top L of center: part of Israel's unilateral disengagement Whole right: Jordan Valley
L: W. Samaria bloc to Kedumim Center: hills around Nablus/Shechem
Lower L: W. Samaria bloc to Ariel Lower middle: E. Trans-Samaria Hwy outside barrier

Some settlements are self-contained cities with a stable population in the tens of thousands, infrastructure, and all other features of permanence. Examples are Beitar Illit (a city of close to 45,000 residents), Ma'ale Adumim, Modi'in Illit, and Ariel (almost 20,000 residents). Some are towns with a local council status with populations of 2,000–20,0000, such as Alfei Menashe, Eli, Elkana, Efrat and Kiryat Arba. There are also clusters of villages governed by a local elected committee and regional councils that are responsible for municipal services. Examples are Kfar Adumim, Neve Daniel, Kfar Tapuach and Ateret. Kibbutzim and moshavim in the territories include Argaman, Gilgal, Na'aran and Yitav. Jewish neighborhoods have been built on the outskirts of Arab neighborhoods, for example in Hebron. In Jerusalem, there are urban neighborhoods where Jews and Arabs live together: the Muslim Quarter, Silwan, Abu Tor, Sheikh Jarrah and Shimon HaTzadik.

Under the Oslo Accords, the West Bank was divided into three separate parts designated as Area A, Area B and Area C. Leaving aside the position of East Jerusalem, all of the settlements are in Area C which comprises about 60% of the West Bank.

Types of settlement

[edit]

Resettlement of former Jewish communities

[edit]

Some settlements were established on sites where Jewish communities had existed during the British Mandate of Palestine or even since the First Aliyah or ancient times.[90]

  • Golan HeightsBnei Yehuda, founded in 1890,[91] abandoned because of Arab attacks in 1920, rebuilt near the original site in 1972.
  • Jerusalem – Jewish presence alongside other peoples since biblical times, various surrounding communities and neighborhoods, including Kfar Shiloah, also known as Silwan—settled by Yemenite Jews in 1884, Jewish residents evacuated in 1938, a few Jewish families move into reclaimed homes in 2004.[92] Other communities: Shimon HaTzadik, Neve Yaakov and Atarot which in post-1967 was rebuilt as an industrial zone.
  • Gush Etzion – four communities, established between 1927 and 1947, destroyed 1948, reestablished beginning 1967.[93]
  • Hebron – Jewish presence since biblical times, forced out in the wake of the 1929 Hebron massacre, some families returned in 1931 but were evacuated by the British, a few buildings resettled since 1967.[94]
  • Dead Sea, northern area – Kalia and Beit HaArava – the former was built in 1934 as a kibbutz for potash mining. The latter was built in 1943 as an agricultural community. Both were abandoned in 1948, and subsequently destroyed by Jordanian forces,[95] and resettled after the Six-Day War.
  • Gaza City had a Jewish community for many centuries that was evacuated following riots in 1929.[96] After the Six-Day War, Jewish communities were not built in Gaza City, but in Gush Katif in the southwestern part of the Gaza Strip, f.e. Kfar Darom – established in 1946, evacuated in 1948 after an Egyptian attack,[97] resettled in 1970, evacuated in 2005 as part of the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.[98]

Demographics

[edit]
Settler population by year in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and Golan Heights 1972–2007[99][100]

At the end of 2010, 534,224 Jewish Israelis lived in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. 314,132 of them lived in the 121 authorised settlements and 102 unauthorised settlement outposts on the West Bank, 198,629 were living in East Jerusalem, and almost 20,000 lived in settlements in the Golan Heights.

By 2011, the number of Jewish settlers in the West Bank excluding East Jerusalem had increased to 328,423 people.[84]

In June 2014, the number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank excluding East Jerusalem had increased to 382,031 people, with over 20,000 Israeli settlers in the Golan Heights.[101][64]

In January 2015, the Israeli Interior Ministry gave figures of 389,250 Israeli citizens living in the West Bank outside East Jerusalem.[102]

By the end of 2016, the West Bank Jewish population had risen to 420,899, excluding East Jerusalem, where there were more than 200,000 Jews.[103]

In 2019, the number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank excluding East Jerusalem had risen to 441,600 individuals,[31] and the number of Israeli settlers in the Golan Heights had risen to 25,261.[33]

In 2020, the number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank excluding East Jerusalem had reportedly risen to 451,700 individuals, with an additional 220,000 Jews living in East Jerusalem.[31]

Based on various sources,[84][104][105][106][107][108][109][110] population dispersal can be estimated as follows:

Settler population 1948 1972 1977 1980 1983 1993 2004 2007 2010 2014 2018 2019 2020 2022
West Bank (excluding Jerusalem) 480 (see Gush Etzion) 1,182 3,200[111]

-4,400[112]

17,400 22,800 111,600 234,500 276,500[113] 314,100[84] 400,000[104] 427,800[114] 441,600[115] 451,700[115] 503,000[116]
Gaza Strip 2 30 (see Kfar Darom) 700 1 900 4,800 7,826 0
East Jerusalem 2,300 (see Jewish Quarter, Atarot, Neve Yaakov) 8,649 76,095 152,800 181,587 189,708 198,629 218,000[114] 220,000[117] 230,000[118][119]
Total 2,810 10,531 99,795 269,200 423,913 467,478 512,769 645,800 671,700 733,000
Golan Heights 0 77 6,800 12,600 17,265 18,692 19,797 21,000[110] 25,261[33]
1 including Sinai
2 Janet Abu-Lughod mentions 500 settlers in Gaza in 1978 (excluding Sinai), and 1,000 in 1980[120]

In addition to internal migration, in large though declining numbers, the settlements absorb annually about 1000 new immigrants from outside Israel. The American Kulanu organization works with such right-wing Israeli settler groups as Amishav and Shavei Israel to settle "lost" Jews of color in such areas where local Palestinians are being displaced.[121] In the 1990s, the annual settler population growth was more than three times the annual population growth in Israel.[122] Population growth has continued in the 2000s.[123] According to the BBC, the settlements in the West Bank have been growing at a rate of 5–6% since 2001.[124] In 2016, there were sixty thousand American Israelis living in settlements in the West Bank.[125]

The establishment of settlements in the Palestinian territories is linked to the displacement of the Palestinian populations as evidenced by a 1979 Security Council Commission which established a link between Israeli settlements and the displacement of the local population. The commission also found that those who remained were under consistent pressure to leave to make room for further settlers who were being encouraged into the area. In conclusion the commission stated that settlement in the Palestinian territories was causing "profound and irreversible changes of a geographic and demographic nature".[126]

Administration and local government

[edit]

West Bank

[edit]
Map of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with Israeli Settlements, 2007
Yamit in the Sinai, between 1975 and 1980, evacuated by Israel in 1982
Neve Dekalim, Gaza Strip, evacuated by Israel in 2005

The Israeli settlements in the West Bank fall under the administrative district of Judea and Samaria Area. Since December 2007, approval by both the Israeli Prime Minister and Israeli Defense Minister of all settlement activities (including planning) in the West Bank is required.[127] Authority for planning and construction is held by the Israel Defense Forces Civil Administration.

The area consists of four cities, thirteen local councils and six regional councils.

The Yesha Council (Hebrew: מועצת יש"ע, Moatzat Yesha, a Hebrew acronym for Judea, Samaria and Gaza) is the umbrella organization of municipal councils in the West Bank.

The actual buildings of the Israeli settlements cover only one percent of the West Bank, but their jurisdiction and their regional councils extend to about 42 percent of the West Bank, according to the Israeli NGO B'Tselem. Yesha Council chairman Dani Dayan disputes the figures and claims that the settlements only control 9.2 percent of the West Bank.[128]

Between 2001 and 2007 more than 10,000 Israeli settlement units were built, while 91 permits were issued for Palestinian construction, and 1,663 Palestinian structures were demolished in Area C.[129]

West Bank Palestinians have their cases tried in Israel's military courts while Jewish Israeli settlers living in the same occupied territory are tried in civil courts.[130] The arrangement has been described as "de facto segregation" by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.[131] A bill to formally extend Israeli law to the Israeli settlements in the West Bank was rejected in 2012.[132] The basic military laws governing the West Bank are influenced by what is called the "pipelining" of Israeli legislation. As a result of "enclave law", large portions of Israeli civil law are applied to Israeli settlements and Israeli residents in the occupied territories.[133]

On 31 August 2014, Israel announced it was appropriating 400 hectares of land in the West Bank to eventually house 1,000 Israel families. The appropriation was described as the largest in more than 30 years.[134] According to reports on Israel Radio, the development is a response to the 2014 kidnapping and murder of Israeli teenagers.[134]

In March 2024 and during the Gaza war, it was announced that Israel was planning on building more than 3,300 new homes in the Kedar and Ma'ale Adumim settlement in the West Bank. The settlement expansion was announced by Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich after three Palestinians opened fire near the Ma'ale Adumim settlement, killing one and wounding five, and drew criticism from the US due to increasing tensions.[135] During the Israel-Hamas war, the lines between settlers and the military were described as having become "indistinguishable".[136]

East Jerusalem

[edit]

East Jerusalem is defined in the Jerusalem Law of 1980 as part of Israel and its capital, Jerusalem. As such it is administered as part of the city and its district, the Jerusalem District. Pre-1967 residents of East Jerusalem and their descendants have residency status in the city but many have refused Israeli citizenship. Thus, the Israeli government maintains an administrative distinction between Israeli citizens and non-citizens in East Jerusalem, but the Jerusalem municipality does not.

Golan Heights

[edit]

The Golan Heights is administered under Israeli civil law as the Golan sub-district, a part of the Northern District. Israel makes no legal or administrative distinction between pre-1967 communities in the Golan Heights (mainly Druze) and the post-1967 settlements.

Sinai Peninsula

[edit]

After the capture of the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt in the 1967 Six-Day War, settlements were established along the Gulf of Aqaba and in northeast Sinai, just below the Gaza Strip. Israel had plans to expand the settlement of Yamit into a city with a population of 200,000,[137] though the actual population of Yamit did not exceed 3,000.[138] The Sinai Peninsula was returned to Egypt in stages beginning in 1979 as part of the Egypt–Israel peace treaty. As required by the treaty, in 1982 Israel evacuated the Israeli civilian population from the 18 Sinai settlements in Sinai. In some instances evacuations were done forcefully, such as the evacuation of Yamit. All the settlements were then dismantled.

Gaza Strip

[edit]

Before Israel's unilateral disengagement plan in which the Israeli settlements were evacuated, there were 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip under the administration of the Hof Aza Regional Council. The land was allocated in such a way that each Israeli settler disposed of 400 times the land available to the Palestinian refugees, and 20 times the volume of water allowed to the peasant farmers of the Strip.[139]

[edit]
Gilo, East Jerusalem
Pisgat Ze'ev, East Jerusalem
Katzrin, Golan Heights

The International Court of Justice delivered a landmark advisory opinion in July 2024 that Israel's occupation of West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip was illegal, that Israel had "an obligation to cease immediately all new settlement activities and to evacuate all settlers" from the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and that Israel should "make reparation for the damage caused to all" the people of such lands.[17][140][141]

The consensus view[142] in the international community is that the existence of Israeli settlements in the West Bank including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights is in violation of international law.[143] The Fourth Geneva Convention includes statements such as "the Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies".[144] On 20 December 2019, International Criminal Court chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda announced an International Criminal Court investigation in Palestine into alleged war crimes committed during the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.[145] At present, the view of the international community, as reflected in numerous UN resolutions, regards the building and existence of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights as a violation of international law.[146][147][148] UN Security Council Resolution 446 refers to the Fourth Geneva Convention as the applicable international legal instrument, and calls upon Israel to desist from transferring its own population into the territories or changing their demographic makeup. The reconvened Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions has declared the settlements illegal[149] as has the primary judicial organ of the UN, the International Court of Justice.[150]

The position of successive Israeli governments is that all authorized settlements are entirely legal and consistent with international law.[151] In practice, Israel does not accept that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies de jure, but has stated that on humanitarian issues it will govern itself de facto by its provisions, without specifying which these are.[152][153] The scholar and jurist Eugene Rostow[154] has disputed the illegality of authorized settlements.

Under Israeli law, West Bank settlements must meet specific criteria to be legal.[155] In 2009, there were approximately 100[124] small communities that did not meet these criteria and are referred to as illegal outposts.[156][157][158]

In 2014 twelve EU countries warned businesses against involving themselves in the settlements. According to the warnings, economic activities relating to the settlements involve legal and economic risks stemming from the fact that the settlements are built on occupied land not recognized as Israel's.[159][160]

Illegality arguments

[edit]

The consensus of the international community – the vast majority of states, the overwhelming majority of legal experts, the International Court of Justice and the UN – is that settlements are in violation of international law.[161][162] After the Six-Day War, in 1967, Theodor Meron, legal counsel to the Israeli Foreign Ministry stated in a legal opinion to the Prime Minister,

"My conclusion is that civilian settlement in the administered territories contravenes the explicit provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention."[163]

This legal opinion was sent to Prime Minister Levi Eshkol. However, it was not made public at the time. The Labor cabinet allowed settlements despite the warning. This paved the way for future settlement growth. In 2007, Meron stated that "I believe that I would have given the same opinion today."[164]

In 1978, the Legal Adviser of the Department of State of the United States reached the same conclusion.[156][165]

The International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion, has since ruled that Israel is in breach of international law by establishing settlements in Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. The Court maintains that Israel cannot rely on its right of self-defense or necessity to impose a regime that violates international law. The Court also ruled that Israel violates basic human rights by impeding liberty of movement and the inhabitants' right to work, health, education and an adequate standard of living.[166]

International intergovernmental organizations such as the Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention,[167] major organs of the United Nations,[168] the European Union, and Canada,[169] also regard the settlements as a violation of international law. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination wrote that "The status of the settlements was clearly inconsistent with Article 3 of the Convention, which, as noted in the Committee's General Recommendation XIX, prohibited all forms of racial segregation in all countries. There is a consensus among publicists that the prohibition of racial discrimination, irrespective of territories, is an imperative norm of international law."[170] Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch have also characterized the settlements as a violation of international law.

In late January 2013 a report drafted by three justices, presided over by Christine Chanet, and issued by the United Nations Human Rights Council declared that Jewish settlements constituted a creeping annexation based on multiple violations of the Geneva Conventions and international law, and stated that if Palestine ratified the Rome Accord, Israel could be tried for "gross violations of human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law." A spokesman for Israel's Foreign Ministry declared the report 'unfortunate' and accused the UN's Human Rights Council of a "systematically one-sided and biased approach towards Israel."[171]

The Supreme Court of Israel, with a variety of different justices sitting, has repeatedly stated that Israel's presence in the West Bank is subject to international law.[172]

Legality arguments

[edit]

Four prominent jurists cited the concept of the "sovereignty vacuum" in the immediate aftermath of the Six-Day War to describe the legal status of the West Bank and Gaza:[173] Yehuda Zvi Blum in 1968,[174] Elihu Lauterpacht in 1968,[175] Julius Stone in 1969[176] and 1981,[177] and Stephen M. Schwebel in 1970.[178] Eugene V. Rostow also argued in 1979 that the occupied territories' legal status was undetermined.[179]

  • Stephen M. Schwebel[180] made three distinctions specific to the Israeli situation to claim that the territories were seized in self-defense and that Israel has more title to them than the previous holders.
  • Julius Stone also wrote that "Israel's presence in all these areas pending negotiation of new borders is entirely lawful, since Israel entered them lawfully in self-defense."[181] He argued that it would be an "irony bordering on the absurd" to read Article 49(6) as meaning that the State of Israel was obliged to ensure (by force if necessary) that areas with a millennial association with Jewish life shall be forever "judenrein".[182]

Professor Ben Saul took exception to this view, arguing that Article 49(6) can be read to include voluntary or assisted transfers, as indeed it was in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice which had expressed this interpretation in the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion (2003).[183]

Israel maintains that a temporary use of land and buildings for various purposes is permissible under a plea of military necessity and that the settlements fulfilled security needs.[13] Israel argues that its settlement policy is consistent with international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention, while recognising that some settlements have been constructed illegally on private land.[14] The Israeli Supreme Court has ruled that the power of the Civil Administration and the Military Commander in the occupied territories is limited by the entrenched customary rules of public international law as codified in the Hague Regulations.[184][185][186] In 1998 the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs produced "The International Criminal Court Background Paper".[187] It concludes

International law has long recognised that there are crimes of such severity they should be considered "international crimes." Such crimes have been established in treaties such as the Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions... The following are Israel's primary issues of concern [i.e. with the rules of the ICC]: The inclusion of settlement activity as a "war crime" is a cynical attempt to abuse the Court for political ends. The implication that the transfer of civilian population to occupied territories can be classified as a crime equal in gravity to attacks on civilian population centres or mass murder is preposterous and has no basis in international law.

A UN conference was held in Rome in 1998, where Israel was one of seven countries to vote against the Rome Statute to establish the International Criminal Court. Israel was opposed to a provision that included as a war crime the transfer of civilian populations into territory the government occupies.[188] Israel has signed the statute, but not ratified the treaty.[189]

Land ownership

[edit]
Elon Moreh, West Bank

A 1996 amendment to an Israeli military order states that land privately owned can not be part of a settlement unless the land in question has been confiscated for military purposes.[155] In 2006 Peace Now acquired a report, which it claims was leaked from the Israeli Government's Civil Administration, indicating that up to 40 percent of the land Israel plans to retain in the West Bank is privately owned by Palestinians.[190] Peace Now called this a violation of Israeli law.[191] Peace Now published a comprehensive report about settlements on private lands.[192][193] In the wake of a legal battle, Peace Now lowered the figure to 32 percent, which the Civil Administration also denied.[194] The Washington Post reported that "The 38-page report offers what appears to be a comprehensive argument against the Israeli government's contention that it avoids building on private land, drawing on the state's own data to make the case."[195]

In February 2008, the Civil Administration stated that the land on which more than a third of West Bank settlements was built had been expropriated by the IDF for "security purposes."[196] The unauthorized seizure of private Palestinian land was defined by the Civil Administration itself as 'theft.'[197] According to B'Tselem, more than 42 percent of the West Bank are under control of the Israeli settlements, 21 percent of which was seized from private Palestinian owners, much of it in violation of the 1979 Israeli Supreme Court decision.[128]

Neve Daniel, West Bank

In 1979, the government decided to extend settlements or build new ones only on "state lands".[85][155]

A secret database, drafted by a retired senior officer, Baruch Spiegel, on orders from former defense minister Shaul Mofaz, found that some settlements deemed legal by Israel were illegal outposts, and that large portions of Ofra, Elon Moreh and Beit El were built on private Palestinian land. The "Spiegel report" was revealed by Haaretz in 2009. Many settlements are largely built on private lands, without approval of the Israeli Government.[198] According to Israel, the bulk of the land was vacant, was leased from the state, or bought fairly from Palestinian landowners.

Invoking the Absentees' Property Laws to transfer, sell or lease property in East Jerusalem owned by Palestinians who live elsewhere without compensation has been criticized both inside and outside of Israel.[199] Opponents of the settlements claim that "vacant" land belonged to Arabs who fled or collectively to an entire village, a practice that developed under Ottoman rule. B'Tselem charged that Israel is using the absence of modern legal documents for the communal land as a legal basis for expropriating it. These "abandoned lands" are sometimes laundered through a series of fraudulent sales.[200]

According to Amira Hass, one of the techniques used by Israel to expropriate Palestinian land is to place desired areas under a "military firing zone" classification, and then issue orders for the evacuation of Palestinians from the villages in that range while allowing contiguous Jewish settlements to remain unaffected.[201]

Effects on Palestinian human rights

[edit]
Parts of the West Bank allocated to the settlements, as of January 2012 (in pink and purple color). Access is prohibited or restricted to Palestinians.

Amnesty International argues that Israel's settlement policy is discriminatory and a violation of Palestinian human rights.[202] B'Tselem claims that Israeli travel restrictions impact on Palestinian freedom of movement[203] and Palestinian human rights have been violated in Hebron due to the presence of the settlers within the city.[204][205][206] According to B'Tselem, over fifty percent of West Bank land expropriated from Palestinians has been used to establish settlements and create reserves of land for their future expansion. The seized lands mainly benefit the settlements and Palestinians cannot use them.[207] The roads built by Israel in the West Bank to serve the settlements are closed to Palestinian vehicles'[208][209] and act as a barrier often between villages and the lands on which they subsist.[210]

Human Rights Watch and other human rights observer volunteer regularly file reports on "settler violence", referring to stoning and shooting incidents involving Israeli settlers.[211] Israel's withdrawal from Gaza and Hebron have led to violent settler protests and disputes over land and resources. Meron Benvenisti described the settlement enterprise as a "commercial real estate project that conscripts Zionist rhetoric for profit."[212]

The construction of the Israeli West Bank barrier has been criticized as an infringement on Palestinian human and land rights. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that 10% of the West Bank would fall on the Israeli side of the barrier.[213][214]

In July 2012, the UN Human Rights Council decided to set up a probe into Jewish settlements. The report of the independent international fact-finding mission which investigated the "implications of the Israeli settlements on the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinian people throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory" was published in February 2013.[215]

In February 2020, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights published a list of 112 companies linked to activities related to Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank.[216][217]

Economy

[edit]
Many residents of Ma'ale Adumim work in Mishor Adumim industrial park

Goods produced in Israeli settlements are able to stay competitive on the global market, in part because of massive state subsidies they receive from the Israeli government. Farmers and producers are given state assistance, while companies that set up in the territories receive tax breaks and direct government subsidies. An Israeli government fund has also been established to help companies pay customs penalties.[218] Palestinian officials estimate that settlers sell goods worth some $500 million to the Palestinian market.[219] Israel has built 16 industrial zones, containing roughly 1000 industrial plants, in the West Bank and East Jerusalem on acreage that consumes large parts of the territory planned for a future Palestinian state. According to Jodi Rudoren these installations both entrench the occupation and provide work for Palestinians, even those opposed to it. The 16 parks are located at Shaked, Beka'ot, Baran, Karnei Shomron, Emmanuel, Barkan, Ariel, Shilo, Halamish, Ma'ale Efraim, Sha'ar Binyamin, Atarot, Mishor Adumim, Gush Etzion, Kiryat Arba and Metarim (2001).[220] In spite of this, the West Bank settlements have failed to develop a self-sustaining local economy. About 60% of the settler workforce commutes to Israel for work. The settlements rely primarily on the labor of their residents in Israel proper rather than local manufacturing, agriculture, or research and development. Of the industrial parks in the settlements, there are only two significant ones, at Ma'ale Adumim and Barkan, with most of the workers there being Palestinian. Only a few hundred settler households cultivate agricultural land, and rely primarily on Palestinian labor in doing so.[221]

Settlement has an economic dimension, much of it driven by the significantly lower costs of housing for Israeli citizens living in Israeli settlements compared to the cost of housing and living in Israel proper.[59] Government spending per citizen in the settlements is double that spent per Israeli citizen in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, while government spending for settlers in isolated Israeli settlements is three times the Israeli national average. Most of the spending goes to the security of the Israeli citizens living there.[60]

Export to EU

[edit]

According to Israeli government estimates, $230 million worth of settler goods including fruit, vegetables, cosmetics, textiles and toys are exported to the EU each year, accounting for approximately 2% of all Israeli exports to Europe.[218] A 2013 report of Profundo revealed that at least 38 Dutch companies imported settlement products.[222]

European Union law requires a distinction to be made between goods originating in Israel and those from the occupied territories. The former benefit from preferential custom treatment according to the EU-Israel Association Agreement (2000); the latter do not, having been explicitly excluded from the agreement.[218][223] In practice, however, settler goods often avoid mandatory customs through being labelled as originating in Israel, while European customs authorities commonly fail to complete obligatory postal code checks of products to ensure they have not originated in the occupied territories.[218][222]

In 2009, the United Kingdom's Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs issued new guidelines concerning labelling of goods imported from the West Bank. The new guidelines require labelling to clarify whether West Bank products originate from settlements or from the Palestinian economy. Israel's foreign ministry said that the UK was "catering to the demands of those whose ultimate goal is the boycott of Israeli products"; but this was denied by the UK government, who said that the aim of the new regulations was to allow consumers to choose for themselves what produce they buy.[223] Denmark has similar legislation requiring food products from settlements in the occupied territories to be accurately labelled.[218] In June 2022, Norway also stated that it would begin complying with EU regulation to label produce originating from Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Golan Heights as such.[224]

On 12 November 2019 the Court of Justice of the European Union in a ruling[225] covering all territory Israel captured in the 1967 war decided that labels on foodstuffs must not imply that goods produced in occupied territory came from Israel itself and must "prevent consumers from being misled as to the fact that the State of Israel is present in the territories concerned as an occupying power and not as a sovereign entity". In its ruling, the court said that failing to inform EU consumers they were potentially buying goods produced in settlements denies them access to "ethical considerations and considerations relating to the observance of international law".[226]

In January 2019 the Dail (Ireland's lower house) voted in favour, by 78 to 45, of the Control of Economic Activity (Occupied Territories) Bill.[227] This piece of legislation prohibits the purchasing of any good and/or service from the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem or West Bank settlements. The Bill made no further progress until 2024 when the then government sought legal advice from the Attorney General in response to the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion on Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories.[228] Following the Attorney General's advice the Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Micheál Martin confirmed on 22 October 2024 that the Bill would be "reviewed and amendments prepared in order to bring in into line with the Constitution and EU Law".[229] On 31 October 2024, it was reported that a technical blockage of the Bill would be removed to allow it to proceed to committee stage, however the Bill was not passed before the Dáil was suspended sine die on the 7 November 2024 marking the end of the 33rd Dáil.

A petition under the European Citizens' Initiative, submitted in September 2021, was accepted on 20 February 2022. The petition seeks the adoption of legislation to ban trade with unlawful settlements. The petition requires a million signatures from across the EU and has received support from civil society groups including Human Rights Watch.[230][231][232][233][234]

Palestinian economy and resources

[edit]

A Palestinian report argued in 2011 that settlements have a detrimental effect on the Palestinian economy, equivalent to about 85% of the nominal gross domestic product of Palestine, and that the "occupation enterprise" allows the state of Israel and commercial firms to profit from Palestinian natural resources and tourist potential.[235] A 2013 report published by the World Bank analysed the impact that the limited access to Area C lands and resources had on the Palestinian economy. While settlements represent a single axis of control, it is the largest with 68% of the Area C lands reserved for the settlements. The report goes on to calculate that access to the lands and resources of Area C, including the territory in and around settlements, would increase the Palestinian GDP by some $3.5 billion (or 35%) per year.[236]

The Israeli Supreme Court has ruled that Israeli companies are entitled to exploit the West Bank's natural resources for economic gain, and that international law must be "adapted" to the "reality on the ground" of long-term occupation.[237]

Palestinian labour

[edit]

Due to the availability of jobs offering twice the prevailing salary of the West Bank (as of August 2013), as well as high unemployment, tens of thousands of Palestinians work in Israeli settlements.[238][239] According to the Manufacturers Association of Israel, some 22,000 Palestinians were employed in construction, agriculture, manufacturing and service industries.[240] An Al-Quds University study in 2011 found that 82% of Palestinian workers said they would prefer to not work in Israeli settlements if they had alternative employment in the West Bank.[238]

Palestinians have been highly involved in the construction of settlements in the West Bank. In 2013, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics released their survey showing that the number of Palestinian workers who are employed by the Jewish settlements increased from 16,000 to 20,000 in the first quarter.[239] The survey also found that Palestinians who work in Israel and the settlements are paid more than twice their salary compared to what they receive from Palestinian employers.[239]

In 2008, Kav LaOved charged that Palestinians who work in Israeli settlements are not granted basic protections of Israeli labor law. Instead, they are employed under Jordanian labor law, which does not require minimum wage, payment for overtime and other social rights. In 2007, the Supreme Court of Israel ruled that Israeli labor law does apply to Palestinians working in West Bank settlements and applying different rules in the same work place constituted discrimination. The ruling allowed Palestinian workers to file lawsuits in Israeli courts. In 2008, the average sum claimed by such lawsuits stood at 100,000 shekels.[241]

According to the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 63% of Palestinians opposed PA plans to prosecute Palestinians who work in the settlements. However, 72% of Palestinians support a boycott of the products they sell.[242] Although the Palestinian Authority has criminalized working in the settlements, the director-general at the Palestinian Ministry of Labor, Samer Salameh, described the situation in February 2014 as being "caught between two fires". He said "We strongly discourage work in the settlements, since the entire enterprise is illegal and illegitimate...but given the high unemployment rate and the lack of alternatives, we do not enforce the law that criminalizes work in the settlements."[238]

Violence

[edit]

Israeli settler violence

[edit]
Graffiti in Hebron, in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, calling for the gassing of Arabs, above a tag for the right-wing group the Jewish Defense League[243][244]
Olive trees in the village of Burin allegedly vandalized by settlers from the settlement Yitzhar in November 2009

Gush Emunim Underground was a militant organization that operated in 1979–1984. The organization planned attacks on Palestinian officials and the Dome of the Rock.[245][246] In 1994, Baruch Goldstein of Hebron, a member of Kach carried out the Cave of the Patriarchs massacre, killing 29 Muslim worshipers and injuring 125. The attack was widely condemned by the Israeli government and Jewish community. The Palestinian leadership has accused Israel of "encouraging and enabling" settler violence in a bid to provoke Palestinian riots and violence in retaliation.[247] Violence perpetrated by Israeli settlers against Palestinians constitutes terrorism according to the U.S. Department of State, and former IDF Head of Central Command Avi Mizrahi stated that such violence constitutes "terror."[248]

In mid-2008, a UN report recorded 222 acts of Israeli settler violence against Palestinians and IDF troops compared with 291 in 2007.[249] This trend reportedly increased in 2009.[250] Maj-Gen Shamni said that the number had risen from a few dozen individuals to hundreds, and called it "a very grave phenomenon."[249] In 2008–2009, the defense establishment adopted a harder line against the extremists.[250] This group responded with a tactic dubbed "price tagging", vandalizing Palestinian property whenever police or soldiers were sent in to dismantle outposts.[251] From January through to September 2013, 276 attacks by settlers against Palestinians were recorded.[252]

Leading religious figures in the West Bank have harshly criticized these tactics. Rabbi Menachem Froman of Tekoa said that "Targeting Palestinians and their property is a shocking thing, ... It's an act of hurting humanity. ... This builds a wall of fire between Jews and Arabs."[253] The Yesha Council and Hanan Porat also condemned such actions.[254] Other rabbis have been accused of inciting violence against non-Jews.[255] In response to settler violence, the Israeli government said that it would increase law enforcement and cut off aid to illegal outposts.[256] Some settlers are thought to lash out at Palestinians because they are "easy victims."[257] The United Nations accused Israel of failing to intervene and arrest settlers suspected of violence.[258] In 2008, Haaretz wrote that "Israeli society has become accustomed to seeing lawbreaking settlers receive special treatment and no other group could similarly attack Israeli law enforcement agencies without being severely punished."[259]

In September 2011, settlers vandalized a mosque and an army base. They slashed tires and cut cables of 12 army vehicles and sprayed graffiti.[260] In November 2011, the United Nations Office for Coordination of Human Affairs (OCHA) in the Palestinian territories published a report on settler violence that showed a significant rise compared to 2009 and 2010. The report covered physical violence and property damage such as uprooted olive trees, damaged tractors and slaughtered sheep. The report states that 90% of complaints filed by Palestinians have been closed without charge.[261]

According to EU reports, Israel has created an "atmosphere of impunity" for Jewish attackers, which is seen as tantamount to tacit approval by the state. In the West Bank, Jews and Palestinians live under two different legal regimes and it is difficult for Palestinians to lodge complaints, which must be filed in Hebrew in Israeli settlements.[262]

The 27 ministers of foreign affairs of the European Union published a report in May 2012 strongly denouncing policies of the State of Israel in the West Bank and denouncing "continuous settler violence and deliberate provocations against Palestinian civilians."[263] The report by all EU ministers called "on the government of Israel to bring the perpetrators to justice and to comply with its obligations under international law."[263]

In July 2014, a day after the burial of three murdered Israeli teens, Khdeir, a 16-year-old Palestinian, was forced into a car by 3 Israeli settlers on an East Jerusalem street. His family immediately reported the fact to Israeli Police who located his charred body a few hours later at Givat Shaul in the Jerusalem Forest. Preliminary results from the autopsy suggested that he was beaten and burnt while still alive.[264][265][266][267] The murder suspects explained the attack as a response to the June abduction and murder of three Israeli teens.[268][269] The murders contributed to a breakout of hostilities in the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict.[270] In July 2015, a similar incident occurred where Israeli settlers made an arson attack on two Palestinian houses, one of which was empty; however, the other was occupied, resulting in the burning to death of a Palestinian infant; the four other members of his family were evacuated to the hospital suffering serious injuries.[271] These two incidents received condemnation from the United States, European Union and the IDF.[272] The European Union criticized Israel for "failing to protect the Palestinian population".[272]

Olive trees

[edit]

While the economy of the Palestinian territories has shown signs of growth, the International Committee of the Red Cross reported that Palestinian olive farming has suffered. According to the ICRC, 10,000 olive trees were cut down or burned by settlers in 2007–2010.[273][274] Foreign ministry spokesman Yigal Palmor said the report ignored official PA data showing that the economic situation of Palestinians had improved substantially, citing Mahmoud Abbas's comment to The Washington Post in May 2009, where he said "in the West Bank, we have a good reality, the people are living a normal life."[273]

Haaretz blamed the violence during the olive harvest on a handful of extremists.[275] In 2010, trees belonging to both Jews and Arabs were cut down, poisoned or torched. In the first two weeks of the harvest, 500 trees owned by Palestinians and 100 trees owned by Jews had been vandalized.[276] In October 2013, 100 trees were cut down.[277]

Violent attacks on olive trees seem to be facilitated by the apparently systematic refusal of the Israeli authorities to allow Palestinians to visit their own groves, sometimes for years, especially in cases where the groves are deemed to be too close to settlements.[278]

Palestinian violence against settlers

[edit]

Israeli civilians[279] living in settlements have been targeted by violence from armed Palestinian groups. These groups, according to Human Rights Watch, assert that settlers are "legitimate targets" that have "forfeited their civilian status by residing in settlements that are illegal under international humanitarian law."[279] Both Human Rights Watch and B'tselem rejected this argument on the basis that the legal status of the settlements has no effect on the civilian status of their residents.[279][280] Human Rights Watch said the "prohibition against intentional attacks against civilians is absolute."[279] B'tselem said "The settlers constitute a distinctly civilian population, which is entitled to all the protections granted civilians by international law. The Israeli security forces' use of land in the settlements or the membership of some settlers in the Israeli security forces does not affect the status of the other residents living among them, and certainly does not make them proper targets of attack."[280]

Fatal attacks on settlers have included firing of rockets and mortars and drive-by shootings, also targeting infants and children. Violent incidents include the murder of Shalhevet Pass, a ten-month-old baby shot by a Palestinian sniper in Hebron,[281] and the murder of two teenagers by unknown perpetrators on 8 May 2001, whose bodies were hidden in a cave near Tekoa, a crime that Israeli authorities suggest may have been committed by Palestinian terrorists.[282] In the Bat Ayin axe attack, children in Bat Ayin were attacked by a Palestinian wielding an axe and a knife. A 13-year-old boy was killed and another was seriously wounded.[283] Rabbi Meir Hai, a father of seven, was killed in a drive-by shooting.[284][285] In August 2011, five members of one family were killed in their beds. The victims were the father Ehud (Udi) Fogel, the mother Ruth Fogel, and three of their six children—Yoav, 11, Elad, 4, and Hadas, the youngest, a three-month-old infant. According to David Ha'ivri,[286] and as reported by multiple sources,[287] the infant was decapitated.[288]

Pro-Palestinian activist violence

[edit]
Itamar, West Bank. Itamar's residents have been the target of deadly attacks by Palestinian militants. Itamar settlers have also committed violent acts against local Palestinians.
Funeral of Fogel family, killed in Itamar attack

Pro-Palestinian activists who hold regular protests near the settlements have been accused of stone-throwing, physical assault and provocation.[289][290][291] In 2008, Avshalom Peled, head of the Israel Police's Hebron district, called "left-wing" activity in the city dangerous and provocative, and accused activists of antagonizing the settlers in the hope of getting a reaction.[292]

Environmental issues

[edit]

Municipal Environmental Associations of Judea and Samaria, an environmental awareness group, was established by the settlers to address sewage treatment problems and cooperate with the Palestinian Authority on environmental issues.[293] According to a 2004 report by Friends of the Earth Middle East, settlers account for 10% of the population in the West Bank but produce 25% of the sewage output.[293] Beit Duqqu and Qalqilyah have accused settlers of polluting their farmland and villagers claim children have become ill after swimming in a local stream. Legal action was taken against 14 settlements by the Israeli Ministry of the Environment. The Palestinian Authority has also been criticized by environmentalists for not doing more to prevent water pollution.[293][294] Settlers and Palestinians share the mountain aquifer as a water source, and both generate sewage and industrial effluents that endanger the aquifer. Friends of the Earth Middle East claimed that sewage treatment was inadequate in both sectors. Sewage from Palestinian sources was estimated at 46 million cubic meters a year, and sources from settler sources at 15 million cubic meters a year. A 2004 study found that sewage was not sufficiently treated in many settlements, while sewage from Palestinian villages and cities flowed into unlined cesspits, streams and the open environment with no treatment at all.[293][295]

In a 2007 study, the Israel Nature and Parks Authority and Israeli Ministry of Environmental Protection, found that Palestinian towns and cities produced 56 million cubic meters of sewage per year, 94 percent discharged without adequate treatment, while Israeli sources produced 17.5 million cubic meters per year, 31.5 percent without adequate treatment.[296]

According to Palestinian environmentalists, the settlers operate industrial and manufacturing plants that can create pollution as many do not conform to Israeli standards.[293][294] In 2005, an old quarry between Kedumim and Nablus was slated for conversion into an industrial waste dump. Pollution experts warned that the dump would threaten Palestinian water sources.[297]

Impact on Palestinian demographics

[edit]
Road to Kiryat Arba, Hebron, 2010

The Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM) has reported in their 2011 migration profile for Palestine that the reasons for individuals to leave the country are similar to those of other countries in the region and they attribute less importance to the specific political situation of the occupied Palestinian territory.[298] Human Rights Watch in 2010 reported that Israeli settlement policies have had the effect of "forcing residents to leave their communities".[299][300]

In 2008, Condoleezza Rice suggested sending Palestinian refugees to South America, which might reduce pressure on Israel to withdraw from the settlements.[301] Sushil P. Seth speculates that Israelis might feel that increasing settlements will force many Palestinians to flee to other countries and that the remainder will be forced to live under Israeli terms.[302] Speaking anonymously with regard to Israeli policies in the South Hebron Hills, a UN expert said that the Israeli crackdown on alternative energy infrastructures like solar panels is part of a deliberate strategy in Area C.

"From December 2010 to April 2011, we saw a systematic targeting of the water infrastructure in Hebron, Bethlehem and the Jordan valley. Now, in the last couple of months, they are targeting electricity. Two villages in the area have had their electrical poles demolished. There is this systematic effort by the civil administration targeting all Palestinian infrastructure in Hebron. They are hoping that by making it miserable enough, they [the Palestinians] will pick up and leave."

Approximately 1,500 people in 16 communities are dependent on energy produced by these installations duct business are threatened with work stoppage orders from the Israeli administration on their installation of alternative power infrastructure, and demolition orders expected to follow will darken the homes of 500 people.[303][304]

Educational institutions

[edit]
Ariel University

Ariel University, formerly the College of Judea and Samaria, is the major Israeli institution of higher education in the West Bank. With close to 13,000 students, it is Israel's largest public college. The college was accredited in 1994 and awards bachelor's degrees in arts, sciences, technology, architecture and physical therapy.[305] On 17 July 2012, the Council for Higher Education in Judea and Samaria voted to grant the institution full university status.[306]

Teacher training colleges include Herzog College in Alon Shvut and Orot Israel College in Elkana. Ohalo College is located in Katzrin, in the Golan Heights.[305] Curricula at these institutions are overseen by the Council for Higher Education in Judea and Samaria (CHE-JS).[307]

In March 2012, The Shomron Regional Council was awarded the Israeli Ministry of Education's first prize National Education Award in recognizing its excellence in investing substantial resources in the educational system.[308] The Shomron Regional Council achieved the highest marks in all parameters (9.28 / 10). Gershon Mesika, the head of the regional council, declared that the award was a certificate of honour of its educators and the settlement youth who proved their quality and excellence.[309]

Strategic significance

[edit]
IDF soldiers and Israeli settlers, 2009

In 1983 an Israeli government plan entitled "Master Plan and Development Plan for Settlement in Samaria and Judea" envisaged placing a "maximally large Jewish population" in priority areas to accomplish incorporation of the West Bank in the Israeli "national system".[310] According to Ariel Sharon, strategic settlement locations would work to preclude the formation of a Palestinian state.[311]

Palestinians argue that the policy of settlements constitutes an effort to preempt or sabotage a peace treaty that includes Palestinian sovereignty, and claim that the presence of settlements harm the ability to have a viable and contiguous state.[312][313] This was also the view of the Israeli Vice Prime Minister Haim Ramon in 2008, saying "the pressure to enlarge Ofra and other settlements does not stem from a housing shortage, but rather is an attempt to undermine any chance of reaching an agreement with the Palestinians ..."[314]

The Israel Foreign Ministry asserts that some settlements are legitimate, as they took shape when there was no operative diplomatic arrangement, and thus they did not violate any agreement.[315][316][317] Based on this, they assert that:

  • Prior to the signing of the Egypt–Israel peace treaty, the eruption of the First Intifada, down to the signing of the Israel–Jordan peace treaty in 1994, Israeli governments on the left and right argued that the settlements were of strategic and tactical importance. The location of the settlements was primarily chosen based on the threat of an attack by the bordering hostile countries of Jordan, Syria, and Egypt and possible routes of advance into Israeli population areas. These settlements were seen as contributing to the security of Israel at a time when peace treaties had not been signed.[318][319][320]

Dismantling of settlements

[edit]
IDF soldiers evacuating Yamit, 1982

An early evacuation took place in 1982 as part of the Egypt–Israel peace treaty, when Israel was required to evacuate its settlers from the 18 Sinai settlements. Arab parties to the conflict had demanded the dismantlement of the settlements as a condition for peace with Israel. The evacuation was carried out with force in some instances, for example in Yamit. The settlements were demolished, as it was feared that settlers might try to return to their homes after the evacuation.

Israel's unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip took place in 2005. It involved the evacuation of settlements in the Gaza Strip and part of the West Bank, including all 21 settlements in Gaza and four in the West Bank, while retaining control over Gaza's borders, coastline, and airspace. Most of these settlements had existed since the early 1980s, some were over 30 years old;[321] the total population involved was more than 8,000.[322] There was significant opposition to the plan among parts of the Israeli public, and especially those living in the territories. George W. Bush said that a permanent peace deal would have to reflect "demographic realities" in the West Bank regarding Israel's settlements.[323]

The Israeli human rights group GISHA maintains that despite the disengagement, Israel continues to occupy Gaza because it maintains its control over the area. For example, Israel maintains control over Gaza's airspace and waters, its borders (specifically, passage of goods and people to and from Gaza), the population registry, its telecommunications networks, and the collection of customs and tax on imports. GISHA also reports that Israel continues to control Gaza's infrastructure through its control over the supply of resources such as electricity. In addition, under the disengagement plan, Israel can prevent the PA from reopening its airport or seaport.[324]

Within the former settlements, almost all buildings were demolished by Israel, with the exception of certain government and religious structures, which were completely emptied. Under an international arrangement, greenhouses were left to assist the Palestinian economy although half had been demolished by the settlers two months prior to the disengagement.[325] The reduction in greenhouse space and increased restrictions on exports reduced the viability of the project.[326] After the redeployment of Israeli troops to the Gaza border, 30% of the greenhouses suffered various degrees of damage due to Palestinian looters stealing, for example, hoses and irrigation equipment.[327] Following the withdrawal, many of the former synagogues were torched and destroyed by Palestinians.[328]

Some believe that settlements need not necessarily be dismantled and evacuated, even if Israel withdraws from the territory where they stand, as they can remain under Palestinian rule. These ideas have been expressed both by left-wing Israelis,[329] and by Palestinians who advocate the two-state solution, and by extreme Israeli right-wingers and settlers[330] who object to any dismantling and claim links to the land that are stronger than the political boundaries of the state of Israel.[clarification needed]

The Israeli government has often threatened to dismantle outposts. Some have actually been dismantled, occasionally with use of force; this led to settler violence.

Palestinian statehood bid of 2011

[edit]

American refusal to declare the settlements illegal was said to be the determining factor in the 2011 attempt to declare Palestinian statehood at the United Nations, the so-called Palestine 194 initiative.[331]

Israel announced additional settlements in response to the Palestinian diplomatic initiative and Germany responded by moving to stop deliveries to Israel of submarines capable of carrying nuclear weapons.[332]

Finally in 2012, several European states switched to either abstain or vote for statehood in response to continued settlement construction.[333] Israel approved further settlements in response to the vote, which brought further worldwide condemnation.[334]

Impact on peace process

[edit]
Ariel, one of the four biggest settlements in the West Bank
Betar Illit, one of the four biggest settlements in the West Bank
Ma'ale Adumim, one of the four biggest settlements in the West Bank, industrial area, 2012
Modi'in Illit, one of the four biggest settlements in the West Bank
Trump's peace plan for the creation of the State of Palestine.

The settlements have been a source of tension between Israel and the U.S. Jimmy Carter regarded the settlements as illegal and tactically unwise. Ronald Reagan stated that they were legal but an obstacle to negotiations.[335] In 1991, the U.S. delayed a subsidized loan to pressure Israel on the subject of settlement-building in the Jerusalem-Bethlehem corridor. In 2005, U.S. declared support for "the retention by Israel of major Israeli population centers as an outcome of negotiations,"[336] reflecting the statement by George W. Bush that a permanent peace treaty would have to reflect "demographic realities" in the West Bank.[337] In June 2009, Barack Obama said that the United States "does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements."[338]

Palestinians claim that Israel has undermined the Oslo accords and peace process by continuing to expand the settlements. Settlements in the Sinai Peninsula were evacuated and razed in the wake of the peace agreement with Egypt. The 27 ministers of foreign affairs of the European Union published a report in May 2012 strongly denouncing policies of the State of Israel in the West Bank and finding that Israeli settlements in the West Bank are illegal and "threaten to make a two-state solution impossible."[263] In the framework of the Oslo I Accord of 1993 between the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a modus vivendi was reached whereby both parties agreed to postpone a final solution on the destination of the settlements to the permanent status negotiations (Article V.3). Israel claims that settlements thereby were not prohibited, since there is no explicit interim provision prohibiting continued settlement construction, the agreement does register an undertaking by both sides, namely that "Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations" (Article XXX1 (7)), which has been interpreted as, not forbidding settlements, but imposing severe restrictions on new settlement building after that date.[339] Melanie Jacques argued in this context that even 'agreements between Israel and the Palestinians which would allow settlements in the OPT, or simply tolerate them pending a settlement of the conflict, violate the Fourth Geneva Convention.'[339]

Final status proposals have called for retaining long-established communities along the Green Line and transferring the same amount of land in Israel to the Palestinian state. The Clinton administration proposed that Israel keep some settlements in the West Bank, especially those in large blocs near the pre-1967 borders of Israel, with the Palestinians receiving concessions of land in other parts of the country.[340] Both Clinton and Tony Blair pointed out the need for territorial and diplomatic compromise based on the validity of some of the claims of both sides.[341][342]

As Minister of Defense, Ehud Barak approved a plan requiring security commitments in exchange for withdrawal from the West Bank.[343] Barak also expressed readiness to cede parts of East Jerusalem and put the holy sites in the city under a "special regime."[344]

On 14 June 2009, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, as an answer to U.S. President Barack Obama's speech in Cairo, delivered a speech setting out his principles for a Palestinian-Israeli peace, among others, he alleged "... we have no intention of building new settlements or of expropriating additional land for existing settlements."[345] In March 2010, the Netanyahu government announced plans for building 1,600 housing units in Ramat Shlomo across the Green Line in East Jerusalem during U.S. Vice President Joe Biden's visit to Israel causing a diplomatic row.[346]

On 6 September 2010, Jordanian King Abdullah II and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad said that Israel would need to withdraw from all of the lands occupied in 1967 in order to achieve peace with the Palestinians.[347]

Bradley Burston has said that a negotiated or unilateral withdraw from most of the settlements in the West Bank is gaining traction in Israel.[348]

In November 2010, the United States offered to "fight against efforts to delegitimize Israel" and provide extra arms to Israel in exchange for a continuation of the settlement freeze and a final peace agreement, but failed to come to an agreement with the Israelis on the exact terms.[349][350]

In December 2010, the United States criticised efforts by the Palestinian Authority to impose borders for the two states through the United Nations rather than through direct negotiations between the two sides.[351] In February 2011, it vetoed a draft resolution to condemn all Jewish settlements established in the occupied Palestinian territory since 1967 as illegal.[352] The resolution, which was supported by all other Security Council members and co-sponsored by nearly 120 nations,[353] would have demanded that "Israel, as the occupying power, immediately and completely ceases all settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem and that it fully respect its legal obligations in this regard."[354] The U.S. representative said that while it agreed that the settlements were illegal, the resolution would harm chances for negotiations.[354] Israel's deputy Foreign Minister, Daniel Ayalon, said that the "UN serves as a rubber stamp for the Arab countries and, as such, the General Assembly has an automatic majority," and that the vote "proved that the United States is the only country capable of advancing the peace process and the only righteous one speaking the truth: that direct talks between Israel and the Palestinians are required."[355] Palestinian negotiators, however, have refused to resume direct talks until Israel ceases all settlement activity.[354]

In November 2009, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu issued a 10-month settlement freeze in the West Bank in an attempt to restart negotiations with the Palestinians. The freeze did not apply to building in Jerusalem in areas across the green line, housing already under construction and existing construction described as "essential for normal life in the settlements" such as synagogues, schools, kindergartens and public buildings. The Palestinians refused to negotiate without a complete halt to construction.[356][357] In the face of pressure from the United States and most world powers supporting the demand by the Palestinian Authority that Israel desist from settlement project in 2010, Israel's ambassador to the UN Meron Reuben said Israel would only stop settlement construction after a peace agreement is concluded, and expressed concern were Arab countries to press for UN recognition of a Palestinian state before such an accord. He cited Israel's dismantlement of settlements in both the Sinai which took place after a peace agreement, and its unilateral dismantlement of settlements in the Gaza Strip. He presumed that settlements would stop being built were Palestinians to establish a state in a given area.[358]

Proposals for land swap

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The Clinton Parameters, a 2000 peace proposal by then U.S. President Bill Clinton, included a plan on which the Palestinian State was to include 94–96% of the West Bank, and around 80% of the settlers were to be under Israeli sovereignty, and in exchange for that, Israel will concede some territory (so called 'Territory Exchange' or 'Land Swap') within the Green Line (1967 borders). The swap would consist of 1–3% of Israeli territory, such that the final borders of the West Bank part of the Palestinian state would include 97% of the land of the original borders.[359]

In 2010, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas said that the Palestinians and Israel have agreed on the principle of a land swap. The issue of the ratio of land Israel would give to the Palestinians in exchange for keeping settlement blocs is an issue of dispute, with the Palestinians demanding that the ratio be 1:1, and Israel insisting that other factors be considered as well.[360]

Under any peace deal with the Palestinians, Israel intends to keep the major settlement blocs close to its borders, which contain over 80% of the settlers. Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin, Ariel Sharon, and Benjamin Netanyahu have all stated Israel's intent to keep such blocs under any peace agreement. U.S. President George W. Bush acknowledged that such areas should be annexed to Israel in a 2004 letter to Prime Minister Sharon.[361][better source needed]

The European Union position is that any annexation of settlements should be done as part of mutually agreed land swaps, which would see the Palestinians controlling territory equivalent to the territory captured in 1967.[362] The EU says that it will not recognise any changes to the 1967 borders without an agreement between the parties.

Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman has proposed a plan which would see settlement blocs annexed to Israel in exchange for heavily Arab areas inside Israel as part of a population exchange.

According to Mitchell G. Bard: "Ultimately, Israel may decide to unilaterally disengage from the West Bank and determine which settlements it will incorporate within the borders it delineates. Israel would prefer, however, to negotiate a peace treaty with the Palestinians that would specify which Jewish communities will remain intact within the mutually agreed border of Israel, and which will need to be evacuated. Israel will undoubtedly insist that some or all of the "consensus" blocs become part of Israel".[361][better source needed]

Proposal of dual citizenship

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A number of proposals for the granting of Palestinian citizenship or residential permits to Jewish settlers in return for the removal of Israeli military installations from the West Bank have been fielded by such individuals[363] as Arafat,[364] Ibrahim Sarsur[365] and Ahmed Qurei.[366] In contrast, Mahmoud Abbas said in July 2013 that "In a final resolution, we would not see the presence of a single Israeli—civilian or soldier—on our lands."[367]

Israeli Minister Moshe Ya'alon said in April 2010 that "just as Arabs live in Israel, so, too, should Jews be able to live in Palestine." ... "If we are talking about coexistence and peace, why the [Palestinian] insistence that the territory they receive be ethnically cleansed of Jews?".[368]

The idea has been expressed by both advocates of the two-state solution[329] and supporters of the settlers and conservative or fundamentalist currents in Israeli Judaism[330] that, while objecting to any withdrawal, claim stronger links to the land than to the State of Israel.

Settlement expansion

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Pre Resolution 2334

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On 19 June 2011, Haaretz reported that the Israeli cabinet voted to revoke Defense Minister Ehud Barak's authority to veto new settlement construction in the West Bank, by transferring this authority from the Agriculture Ministry, headed by Barak ally Orit Noked, to the Prime Minister's office.[369]

In 2009, newly elected Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said: "I have no intention of building new settlements in the West Bank... But like all the governments there have been until now, I will have to meet the needs of natural growth in the population. I will not be able to choke the settlements."[370] On 15 October 2009, he said the settlement row with the United States had been resolved.[371]

In April 2012, four illegal outposts were retroactively legalized by the Israeli government.[372] In June 2012, the Netanyahu government announced a plan to build 851 homes in five settlements: 300 units in Beit El and 551 units in other settlements.[373][374]

Amid peace negotiations that showed little signs of progress, Israel issued on 3 November 2013, tenders for 1,700 new homes for Jewish settlers. The plots were offered in nine settlements in areas Israel says it intends to keep in any peace deal with the Palestinians.[375] On 12 November, Peace Now revealed that the Construction and Housing Ministry had issued tenders for 24,000 more settler homes in the West Bank, including 4,000 in East Jerusalem.[376] 2,500 units were planned in Ma'aleh Adumim, some 9,000 in the Gush Etzion Region, and circa 12,000 in the Binyamin Region, including 1,200 homes in the E1 area in addition to 3,000 homes in previously frozen E1 projects.[377] Circa 15,000 homes of the 24,000 plan would be east of the West Bank Barrier and create the first new settlement blocs for two decades, and the first blocs ever outside the Barrier, far inside the West Bank.[378]

As stated before, the Israeli government (as of 2015) has a program of residential subsidies in which Israeli settlers receive about double that given to Israelis in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. As well, settlers in isolated areas receive three times the Israeli national average. From the beginning of 2009 to the end of 2013, the Israeli settlement population as a whole increased by a rate of over 4% per year. A New York Times article in 2015 stated that said building had been "at the heart of mounting European criticism of Israel."[60]

Resolution 2334 and quarterly reports

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United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334 "Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council every three months on the implementation of the provisions of the present resolution;"[379][380] In the first of these reports, delivered verbally at a security council meeting on 24 March 2017, United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Nickolay Mladenov, noted that Resolution 2334 called on Israel to take steps to cease all settlement activity in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, that "no such steps have been taken during the reporting period" and that instead, there had been a marked increase in statements, announcements and decisions related to construction and expansion.[381][382][383]

Regularization and outpost method

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The 2017 Settlement Regularization in "Judea and Samaria" Law permits backdated legalization of outposts constructed on private Palestinian land. Following a petition challenging its legality, on June 9, 2020, Israel's Supreme Court struck down the law that had retroactively legalized about 4,000 settler homes built on privately owned Palestinian land.[384] The Israeli Attorney General has stated that existing laws already allow legalization of Israeli constructions on private Palestinian land in the West Bank.[385] The Israeli Attorney General, Avichai Mandelblit, has updated the High Court on his official approval of the use of a legal tactic permitting the de facto legalization of roughly 2,000 illegally built Israeli homes throughout the West Bank.[C] The legal mechanism is known as "market regulation" and relies on the notion that wildcat Israeli homes built on private Palestinian land were done so in good faith.[386]

In a report of 22 July 2019, PeaceNow notes that after a gap of 6 years when there were no new outposts, establishment of new outposts recommenced in 2012, with 32 of the current 126 outposts set up to date. 2 outposts were subject to eviction, 15 were legalized and at least 35 are in process of legalization.[387][388][389]

[edit]

The Israeli government announced in 2019 that it has made monetary grants available for the construction of hotels in Area C of the West Bank.[390]

According to Peace Now, approvals for building in Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem expanded by 60% between 2017, when Donald Trump became US president, and 2019.[391]

On 9 July 2021, Michael Lynk, U.N. special rapporteur on human rights in the occupied Palestinian territory, addressing a session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, said "I conclude that the Israeli settlements do amount to a war crime," and "I submit to you that this finding compels the international community...to make it clear to Israel that its illegal occupation, and its defiance of international law and international opinion, can and will no longer be cost-free." Israel, which does not recognize Lynk's mandate, boycotted the session.[392][393][394]

A new Israeli government, formed on 13 June 2021, declared a "status quo" in the settlements policy. According to Peace Now, as of 28 October this has not been the case. On October 24, 2021, tenders were published for 1,355 housing units plus another 83 in Givat HaMatos and on 27 October 2021, approval was given for 3,000 housing units including in settlements deep inside the West Bank.[395] These developments were condemned by the U.S.[396] as well as by the United Kingdom, Russia and 12 European countries.[397][398] while UN experts, Michael Lynk, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian Territory occupied since 1967 and Mr. Balakrishnan Rajagopal (United States of America), UN Special Rapporteur on adequate housing said that settlement expansion should be treated as a "presumptive war crime".[399][400]

In February 2023, the new Israeli government under Benjamin Netanyahu approved the legalization of nine illegal settler outposts in the West Bank.[401] Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich took charge of most of the Civil Administration, obtaining broad authority over civilian issues in the West Bank.[402][403] In March 2023, Netanyahu's government repealed a 2005 law whereby four Israeli settlements, Homesh, Sa-Nur, Ganim and Kadim, were dismantled as part of the Israeli disengagement from Gaza.[404] In June 2023, Israel shortened the procedure of approving settlement construction and gave Finance Minister Smotrich the authority to approve one of the stages, changing the system operating for the last 27 years.[405] In its first six months, construction of 13,000 housing units in settlements, almost triple the amount advanced in the whole of 2022.[406]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Israeli settlements are civilian communities established by Israel primarily in the West Bank (referred to within Israel as Judea and Samaria), East Jerusalem, and the [Golan Heights](/page/Golan Heights) following the capture of these territories from Jordan and Syria during the 1967 Six-Day War.[1] These settlements, numbering over 250 including outposts, house approximately 503,000 Israeli residents in the West Bank excluding East Jerusalem, 234,000 in East Jerusalem, and 31,000 in the [Golan Heights](/page/Golan Heights) as of late 2024, representing a population that has expanded from a few thousand in the immediate post-war period to comprising strategic population centers often integrated with major Israeli infrastructure.[2][3] The initial wave of settlements in 1967-1968 focused on security buffers and ideological reclamation, such as the reestablishment of Kfar Etzion in the West Bank—destroyed in 1948—and early outposts in the Golan Heights to secure strategic heights overlooking Israel; subsequent growth accelerated in the 1970s under the Gush Emunim movement, driven by religious-nationalist visions of resettling biblical heartlands, alongside economic incentives like subsidized housing.[1][4] Israel evacuated all settlements from the Sinai Peninsula in 1982 as part of the Egypt peace treaty and from the Gaza Strip in 2005, but retained and expanded those in the remaining areas, with recent governments approving thousands of new housing units annually amid heightened security concerns.[1] Legally, settlements are deemed by the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, and prevailing international opinion to violate Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits an occupying power from transferring its civilian population into occupied territory, a view reinforced by advisory opinions emphasizing their permanence and role in altering demographic realities.[5][6] Israel counters that the territories are disputed rather than occupied—lacking a prior legitimate sovereign after the 1948 war—and that voluntary civilian migration, rooted in historical Jewish presence and San Remo Conference mandates for Jewish settlement, does not constitute prohibited transfer, a position advanced by legal scholars critiquing the convention's applicability to defensive wars and consensual movements.[7][8] Central controversies encompass their expansion's causal role in complicating territorial contiguity for a Palestinian state, documented land acquisitions via state mechanisms, mutual violence including settler attacks on Palestinian property and lethal assaults on settlements, and their endurance as flashpoints in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict despite Oslo Accords pledges to freeze growth.[6][2]

Definition and Terminology

Characterization and Historical Naming

Israeli settlements are civilian communities comprising Israeli citizens, predominantly Jews, established primarily after Israel's capture of territories in the 1967 Six-Day War, including the West Bank (known in Israel as Judea and Samaria), the Golan Heights, and until the 2005 disengagement, the Gaza Strip.[9] These localities range from small ideological outposts to larger suburban developments, often built on state land, purchased property, or areas declared as security zones, with residents motivated by religious Zionism, national security considerations, or economic incentives such as subsidized housing.[9] The Israeli government has facilitated their establishment through administrative decisions, infrastructure investment, and military protection, viewing them as integral to asserting sovereignty and historical claims in areas with ancient Jewish ties.[9] Terminologically, "settlements" (hitnachaluyot in Hebrew) is the standard international descriptor, evoking colonial connotations in critical discourse, while Israeli official terminology prefers "communities," "localities," or "Jewish towns" to highlight their civilian, urban-like character akin to developments within Israel's pre-1967 borders.[9] The regions themselves are officially named in Israel after biblical divisions: Yehuda (Judea) for southern areas, Shomron (Samaria) for central, and Mateh Binyamin (Tribe of Benjamin) for parts near Jerusalem, rejecting the post-1948 Jordanian appellation "West Bank" as an artificial construct disconnected from historical geography.[9] This naming asserts continuity with Jewish historical presence, as evidenced by archaeological sites and scriptural references predating Arab conquests. On legality, the prevailing view among UN bodies, the International Court of Justice, and human rights organizations holds settlements violative of Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, interpreting it as barring civilian transfer into occupied territory to prevent permanent demographic changes.[5] Israel rejects this application, arguing the territories are disputed—not occupied—lacking a prior legitimate sovereign (Jordan's 1948 annexation unrecognized internationally except by Britain and Pakistan), and that Jewish resettlement aligns with rights under the 1922 League of Nations Mandate for Palestine, preserved by UN Charter Article 80, permitting Jewish settlement in these areas as part of the Jewish national home.[7] Scholars like Eugene Kontorovich further contend the Geneva provision targets forced deportations, not voluntary civilian moves in defensively acquired land, and note historical precedents of settlement in reclaimed territories without legal prohibition.[7] Such perspectives challenge the consensus, often critiqued for overlooking Israel's defensive war context and indigenous Jewish ties, amid noted institutional biases in international forums favoring Palestinian narratives.[7] Historical naming conventions for individual settlements emphasize revival of Hebrew toponyms from Tanakh (Hebrew Bible), Second Temple era, or Zionist history, fostering ideological connection to ancestral lands. Examples include Elon Moreh (Genesis 12:6, Jacob's oak), Ofra (Joshua 18:21, Benjaminite town), and Shiloh (central to ancient Israelite worship), selected to evoke biblical sovereignty and counter narratives of the land as exclusively Arab patrimony.[10] In the Golan Heights, names like Katzrin derive from Talmudic references or modern Hebrew constructs symbolizing renewal, while early post-1967 sites such as Merom Golan (first Golan settlement, July 1967) blend descriptive terms with historical resonance.[11] This systematic Hebraization, rooted in pre-state Zionist practices, serves not mere linguistics but causal assertion of continuous Jewish indigeneity against displacement claims, substantiated by millennia of documented presence predating Islamic eras.[10]

Historical Context

Ancient and Pre-Modern Jewish Presence in the Territories

The regions historically designated as Judea, Samaria, and Gaza—corresponding to much of the modern West Bank and Gaza Strip—served as the core of ancient Jewish civilization. Archaeological findings, including Iron Age settlements, fortifications, and inscriptions from sites like Khirbet Qeiyafa and Tel Dan, attest to the emergence of organized Jewish polities in these areas by the 10th–9th centuries BCE, with the Kingdom of Judah consolidating control over southern highlands including Jerusalem and Hebron by the 8th century BCE.[12][13] The biblical United Monarchy under David and Solomon, centered in Jerusalem, extended influence over Samaria to the north, supported by evidence of administrative structures and cultic sites linked to early Israelite religion. Following the Assyrian conquest of the northern Kingdom of Israel in 722 BCE, Jewish presence persisted in Judea and parts of Samaria under the Kingdom of Judah until the Babylonian destruction of the First Temple in 586 BCE.[14] Post-exilic Jewish resurgence under Persian (Yehud province, circa 539–332 BCE) and Hasmonean rule (167–37 BCE) reestablished control over Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, with the latter incorporated after Maccabean victories around 145–96 BCE, evidenced by Hellenistic-era synagogues and coins bearing Jewish symbols. Roman conquest in 63 BCE integrated these territories into Judea province, where Jewish revolts (66–73 CE and Bar Kokhba, 132–135 CE) centered in Jerusalem, Hebron, and Judean hills, leaving archaeological traces like fortresses at Herodium and Masada. Despite the expulsion of many Jews after 135 CE, remnant communities endured in Galilee (overlapping Samaria's fringes) and isolated Judean enclaves through Byzantine rule (4th–7th centuries CE), as indicated by mosaic-inscribed synagogues and Talmudic references to scholars in these areas.[15][16] In the early Islamic period (7th–11th centuries), Jewish populations in Hebron and Gaza persisted amid dhimmi status, with Hebron recognized as a holy city tied to the patriarchs' tomb, hosting small scholarly communities documented in traveler accounts like those of Benjamin of Tudela (12th century), who noted about 20 Jewish families there. Samaria saw limited continuity, with sporadic presence in Shechem (Nablus) until expulsions, but Gaza retained Jewish traders and rabbis. Under Crusader (1099–1291) and Mamluk (1260–1517) rule, communities fluctuated due to pogroms and migrations, yet Hebron maintained a Jewish quarter near the Cave of Machpelah.[14] The Ottoman era (1517–1917) saw renewed Jewish settlement in these territories, with initial estimates of 1,000 families across sites including Hebron, Nablus, and Gaza, where Jews worked as artisans, shepherds, and merchants. Hebron's community, numbering around 600 by 1874 in a total population of 17,000, focused on glassmaking and weaving while safeguarding religious sites. Gaza emerged as a mystical hub in the 17th century under figures like Nathan of Gaza, precursor to Sabbateanism, with documented synagogues and scholars. Nablus hosted smaller groups tied to Samaritan-Jewish interactions, though numbers remained modest amid Arab Muslim majorities; overall, these pre-modern communities evidenced a thread of Jewish continuity, albeit numerically marginal after ancient peaks, sustained by religious attachment despite periodic violence and economic constraints.[17][18][16]

Modern Developments Prior to 1967

During the late Ottoman period and British Mandate (late 19th to mid-20th century), Zionist settlement initiatives primarily targeted the coastal plains, Jezreel Valley, and other lowland areas suitable for agriculture, establishing over 100 Jewish villages by 1947, but ventures into the hill regions of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza faced greater resistance due to rugged terrain, economic challenges, and Arab opposition. In urban centers within these areas, longstanding Jewish communities persisted, such as in Hebron, where approximately 700-800 Jews lived as part of the Old Yishuv, maintaining synagogues and yeshivas until the 1929 Hebron massacre, in which Arab rioters killed 67 Jews and wounded dozens, prompting mass evacuation and reducing the community to a handful who returned under British protection in the 1930s. Similar violence in 1929 affected Safed and other sites, though Jerusalem's Jewish population, exceeding 100,000 by the 1940s (predominantly in West Jerusalem), represented a significant presence bordering eastern hill areas, with limited rural outposts attempted but largely unsuccessful amid recurring pogroms from 1830 to 1948 aimed at expelling Jewish residents.[9][19][20] The 1947-1948 Arab-Israeli War drastically altered this landscape: Jordanian forces captured the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and Hebron, expelling or evacuating all remaining Jews—numbering fewer than 1,000 across these areas—and subsequently razing the Jewish Quarter in Jerusalem's Old City, destroying 58 synagogues, and desecrating the Mount of Olives cemetery by using it as a quarry and dump site. Gaza fell under Egyptian military administration, where no Jewish civilians resided post-war, reflecting policies barring Jewish settlement in both territories. Between 1948 and 1967, Jordan formally annexed the West Bank in 1950 (recognized only by Britain and Pakistan), enforcing complete Jewish exclusion, while Egypt treated Gaza as occupied without annexation, maintaining Arab refugee camps but no Jewish presence.[21][22] The sole exception was the Mount Scopus enclave in East Jerusalem, established by the July 7, 1948, armistice agreement between Israel, Jordan, and the UN, designating approximately 0.3 square kilometers as a demilitarized zone under UN trusteeship but with Israeli police maintaining order and access rights for institutions like the Hebrew University campus (founded 1925) and Hadassah Hospital grounds. In practice, Jordan restricted convoys—resulting in attacks like the 1948 Hadassah medical convoy ambush killing 78—and barred civilian development, leaving the area with minimal Israeli staff (a few dozen police and caretakers) amid abandoned buildings, no operational university or full hospital, and symbolic burials in the adjacent Jewish cemetery, underscoring Israel's contested foothold until the 1967 Six-Day War reunified access.[23][24][22]

Establishment Following the 1967 Six-Day War

Following Israel's defensive victory in the Six-Day War, concluded on June 10, 1967, the Israel Defense Forces captured the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) from Jordan, the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, and the Golan Heights from Syria, territories previously used as bases for attacks against Israel.[25] These conquests created new strategic frontiers, prompting the Israeli government under Prime Minister Levi Eshkol to authorize initial Jewish settlements primarily for security purposes, such as securing vulnerable borders against infiltration and establishing buffer zones.[4] Early efforts often involved Nahal military outposts—paramilitary agricultural units—that were later converted to civilian communities, reflecting a pragmatic approach blending defense with civilian development.[1] The first post-war settlement was established in the Golan Heights on July 15, 1967, followed shortly by Merom Golan as a civilian kibbutz to consolidate control over the high ground overlooking Israeli communities below.[26] In the West Bank, Kibbutz Kfar Etzion was reestablished on September 25, 1967, in the Etzion Bloc south of Jerusalem, reviving a pre-1948 Jewish community destroyed during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and symbolizing a return to historical sites.[27] [28] This was quickly followed by additional Etzion Bloc settlements and, in 1968, Kiryat Arba adjacent to Hebron, initiated by Rabbi Moshe Levinger and a group of religious Jews who occupied a hotel in Hebron during Passover that year, leading to government approval for a nearby community amid security justifications.[29] In Sinai, the initial Nahal Yam outpost was set up in August 1967 near the Gulf of Aqaba to safeguard the port of Eilat, with early settlements focused on coastal and northeastern areas for defensive depth. Under the Labor-led governments (1967–1977), settlement policy emphasized strategic locations per the Allon Plan of July 1967, which advocated Jewish communities along the Jordan Valley, in the Golan, and near Sharm el-Sheikh, while proposing territorial compromises in densely Arab-populated West Bank areas.[30] Approximately 20–30 settlements were founded by 1977, housing around 11,000 civilians across the territories, with growth driven by security needs post-infiltration incidents and ideological motivations from religious Zionists seeking biblical heartland reclamation.[31] Gaza saw limited early civilian presence, starting with Nahal outposts like Kfar Darom in 1970, converted later amid ongoing military control.[32] These establishments faced internal debate, with figures like Finance Minister Pinchas Sapir opposing expansion on economic grounds, but proceeded under cabinet decisions framing them as temporary defensive measures rather than permanent annexation.[1] The 1973 Yom Kippur War intensified resolve, validating settlements as buffers against surprise attacks and spurring ideological groups like Gush Emunim, founded in 1974, to advocate broader ideological settlement despite government hesitancy.[4]

Gaza Strip Settlements and the 2005 Disengagement

Following Israel's capture of the Gaza Strip from Egypt during the 1967 Six-Day War, the first Israeli settlements were established there in the early 1970s under the Labor-led government.[33] Kfar Darom, originally founded in 1946 and destroyed in 1948, was re-established in 1970 as the initial settlement, with subsequent ones like Netiv Haasara and others following for security buffers and agricultural purposes.[33] By the 1980s and 1990s, settlements expanded, particularly in the Gush Katif bloc along the southern coast, which included communities such as Neve Dekalim and blocked Palestinian access to coastal areas.[33] In total, 21 settlements housed approximately 8,500 Israeli civilians by 2005, representing a small fraction of Gaza's overall population amid ongoing security challenges from Palestinian militant groups.[34] [35] The settlements faced increasing violence during the Second Intifada starting in 2000, with frequent attacks prompting heightened Israeli military presence and contributing to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's policy shift toward unilateral separation.[36] Sharon announced the disengagement plan on February 2, 2004, proposing the evacuation of all 21 Gaza settlements and four small ones in the northern West Bank to reduce friction, consolidate resources, and improve Israel's demographic and security position without negotiating with the Palestinian Authority.[36] The Israeli cabinet approved the plan on June 6, 2004, and the Knesset ratified it on October 26, 2004, despite opposition from settler groups and right-wing parties who argued it rewarded terrorism and undermined territorial claims.[37] [38] Implementation began on August 15, 2005, with a closure period followed by evacuations, where about 90% of the roughly 8,500 Gaza settlers left voluntarily after receiving compensation packages averaging hundreds of thousands of dollars per family.[39] [40] Israeli security forces then forcibly removed remaining holdouts, particularly from Gush Katif and northern settlements like Netzarim, amid protests and some violent resistance that injured over 100 soldiers.[36] All settlements were dismantled, and the Israel Defense Forces completed withdrawal from Gaza on September 12, 2005, ending direct ground presence while retaining control over airspace, territorial waters, and border crossings.[41] [36] In the aftermath, the disengagement did not yield the anticipated reduction in hostilities; instead, rocket attacks from Gaza into Israel escalated dramatically, with thousands fired annually by groups like Hamas, necessitating ongoing border security measures.[40] Hamas won Palestinian legislative elections in January 2006 and seized full control of Gaza in June 2007 after clashes with Fatah, using the vacuum to militarize the territory and build tunnel networks for attacks.[42] Israeli assessments, including from former officials involved, later viewed the withdrawal as a strategic error that empowered jihadist elements without reciprocal concessions, leading to fortified border policies rather than peace.[43] The move's unilateral nature bypassed negotiations, and subsequent Israeli governments maintained external oversight of Gaza due to persistent threats, contradicting claims of full sovereignty transfer.[44]

Sinai Peninsula Settlements and Withdrawal

Following Israel's capture of the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt during the 1967 Six-Day War, the Israeli government initiated settlement activity in the region primarily for strategic depth, agricultural development, and tourism potential. The first settlements were established in the early 1970s, with construction accelerating after the 1973 Yom Kippur War. By 1982, Israel had built 18 settlements housing approximately 7,000 residents, concentrated in northern Sinai near the Gaza Strip and along the Gulf of Aqaba coast.[45][46] Among these, Yamit stood out as the largest and most ambitious project, founded in 1973 as a planned urban center intended to anchor Israeli presence in the northeast. Designed to eventually accommodate up to 200,000 inhabitants with industrial zones and infrastructure, Yamit's actual population peaked at around 3,000 by the late 1970s, focusing on farming, fishing, and light industry. Other notable settlements included Ofira near Sharm el-Sheikh and Netzarim, emphasizing military-adjacent civilian outposts to bolster security claims. These communities were populated mainly by ideological Zionists and economic opportunists drawn by government subsidies, reflecting a mix of security-oriented and expansionist motivations under successive Labor and Likud administrations.[47][48] The settlements' fate shifted with the 1978 Camp David Accords and the subsequent March 26, 1979, Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty, which mandated Israel's complete withdrawal from Sinai in exchange for normalized relations and Egyptian recognition. The process unfolded in three phases: the initial handover of 12,400 square kilometers in November 1979, followed by further territories in 1980 and 1981, culminating in the final evacuation on April 25, 1982. Settlement dismantlement preceded territorial transfers, with most residents relocating voluntarily to Israel proper or other areas, though Yamit's April 23, 1982, evacuation required military enforcement against several hundred holdouts who resisted demolition through protests and barricades.[49][47] Post-evacuation, Israeli forces razed the settlements—including Yamit's structures—to prevent their use by Egyptian forces or militants, a decision influenced by security concerns over potential hostile repurposing. This marked Israel's first large-scale settlement removal, setting a precedent for future disengagements like Gaza in 2005, and demonstrated the feasibility of territorial concession for verifiable peace, as Egypt has since maintained the treaty's demilitarization clauses in Sinai despite occasional tensions. The withdrawal involved significant economic costs, estimated in billions of shekels for compensation and relocation, but achieved enduring bilateral peace without subsequent Israeli reoccupation.[46][48]

Geographical Distribution

West Bank Including East Jerusalem

Israeli settlements in the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem, and those in East Jerusalem differ in administrative status but share origins in the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War, when Israel gained control of the West Bank from Jordan and East Jerusalem from Jordanian occupation. The first post-1967 settlement in the West Bank was established in September 1967 with the re-population of the Kfar Etzion bloc, followed by Kiryat Arba near Hebron in 1968, motivated by historical Jewish ties and security considerations.[4] By 2024, approximately 130 authorized settlements and numerous outposts existed in the West Bank excluding East Jerusalem, housing 503,732 Israeli residents, while East Jerusalem hosted about 14 larger neighborhoods with 233,600 residents, totaling over 737,000 settlers across both areas.[2] [50] In the West Bank proper, settlements are primarily located in Area C under the Oslo Accords, comprising 60% of the territory and under full Israeli administrative control, with many clustered in blocs such as Gush Etzion south of Jerusalem, the Benjamin region north of Jerusalem, and Samaria (Shomron) in the north. Major urban settlements include Ariel (population around 20,000), Ma'ale Adumim (east of Jerusalem), and Modi'in Illit (an ultra-Orthodox city).[51] These areas feature extensive infrastructure, including highways like Route 60, built for security and connectivity to Israel proper. Settlement growth accelerated after October 7, 2023, with approvals for over 10,000 new housing units in 2024 alone, driven by ideological, economic, and security rationales amid heightened conflict.[52] [53] East Jerusalem settlements, such as Pisgat Ze'ev, Neve Ya'akov, and French Hill, were developed starting in the 1970s as municipal neighborhoods following Israel's 1967 unification of the city and formal annexation via the 1980 Jerusalem Law, to which Israeli civil law fully applies.[54] Unlike West Bank settlements under military administration via the IDF Civil Administration, East Jerusalem residents vote in Israeli elections and receive full municipal services, with Israel viewing the area as sovereign territory integral to its capital, rejecting international claims of occupation. The international community, including UN bodies, deems all such settlements illegal under Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, prohibiting population transfer into occupied territory, though Israel contests this applicability, arguing the territories are disputed rather than occupied and that civilian movement is voluntary, not forcible.[55] [5] Administrative governance in the West Bank involves regional councils for clusters of settlements and municipal status for larger ones, coordinated by the Settlement Division of the World Zionist Organization, with land often allocated via military orders on state or surveyed lands.[1] Economic incentives, housing subsidies, and ideological movements like Gush Emunim have sustained growth, with settler populations increasing annually by thousands, outpacing Israel's national rate.[56] Recent developments include advanced plans for the E-1 area between Ma'ale Adumim and Jerusalem, potentially linking major blocs and altering territorial contiguity.[54]

Golan Heights

Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights began shortly after Israel's capture of the territory from Syria during the Six-Day War on June 5-10, 1967, with the first communities established in 1967-1968 to secure strategic vantage points overlooking the Jordan River valley and Sea of Galilee, areas previously used by Syrian forces for artillery attacks on Israeli civilians and farms.[57] By 1982, at least 18 settlements had been founded, primarily kibbutzim and moshavim focused on agriculture, viniculture, and tourism, leveraging the region's fertile volcanic soil and water resources.[58] On December 14, 1981, the Knesset passed the Golan Heights Law, extending Israeli jurisdiction, administration, and civil law to the area, which Israel maintains is necessary for national security given Syria's history of hostility and lack of a peace treaty, effectively integrating the settlements as permanent communities rather than temporary military outposts.[59] This annexation is not recognized by the United Nations or most states, which classify the Golan as occupied Syrian territory under international humanitarian law, viewing the settlements as violations of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibiting an occupying power from transferring its civilian population into occupied land.[6][57] The United States recognized Israeli sovereignty in 2019, citing defensive imperatives.[60] As of 2024, over 30 settlements exist across the Golan plateau, housing between 25,000 and 31,000 Israeli Jewish residents, concentrated in northern and central zones suitable for farming and development, with urban-style towns like Katzrin (population approximately 8,000) serving as administrative and commercial hubs.[3][58][61] These communities coexist with a Druze population of about 23,000, many of whom retained Syrian citizenship and initially resisted settlement expansion, though integration efforts have included infrastructure development and citizenship offers accepted by a minority.[57] In December 2024, following the collapse of the Assad regime, Israel approved plans to significantly increase the settler population to bolster demographic presence amid regional instability.[3] The settlements' growth reflects Israel's strategic prioritization of the Golan's 1,200 square kilometers for defense, with over 60% under civilian control by the 2020s, supported by state subsidies for housing and industry despite international condemnation.[61]

Demographics and Population Dynamics

As of September 2025, approximately 500,000 Israeli settlers reside in the West Bank excluding East Jerusalem, with an additional 220,000 Jewish Israelis living in East Jerusalem neighborhoods considered settlements by international observers, for a combined total exceeding 700,000 in these areas.[53][62] In the Golan Heights, the settler population numbers around 31,000 across dozens of communities.[3] These figures, drawn from Israeli government data and international monitoring, reflect populations in over 300 settlements and outposts, predominantly in the West Bank.[62] The settler population has exhibited robust growth, increasing by nearly 3% in 2023 alone, outpacing Israel's national population growth rate of about 1.6% that year, and accumulating over 15% expansion from 2018 to 2023.[63] This trend correlates with record advancements in housing construction, including 12,349 units in the West Bank and 18,333 in East Jerusalem in 2023, representing a 180% rise over five prior years according to United Nations tracking.[64] Such developments, often approved or facilitated by Israeli authorities, have sustained demographic momentum despite international condemnation, with outposts—unauthorized even under Israeli law—contributing to further expansion.[65] Projections indicate continued increases, driven by ideological, economic, and security-related incentives, though precise 2025 data remains preliminary as of late 2024 reports.[66]

Profiles of Settlers and Motivational Factors

Settlers in the West Bank (referred to by Israelis as Judea and Samaria) and Golan Heights include a mix of religious Zionists, national-religious families, ultra-Orthodox communities, and secular or traditional Jews, with the latter often residing in larger suburban-style developments. Over half of settlements are classified as national-religious or ultra-Orthodox in orientation, housing a disproportionate share of Israel's religious population relative to their national average of about 20-25%.[67] [68] In contrast, approximately a quarter of settlers live in non-orthodox communities, many of which function as commuter suburbs for professionals working in nearby Israeli cities like Jerusalem or Tel Aviv.[67] Demographically, settlers tend to be younger and more likely to be native-born Israelis than the general population, with 63.5% born in Israel compared to a national figure of 57.4%; they also include fewer immigrants from Asia or Africa.[69] Religious and ideological settlers, forming the activist core of the movement, are predominantly motivated by Zionist interpretations of Jewish biblical and historical rights to the land, viewing areas like Hebron, Shiloh, and Beit El as integral to Jewish patrimony and redemption.[70] These individuals, often affiliated with the national-religious sector, prioritize settlement expansion as a fulfillment of divine promise and national security imperative, with groups like Gush Emunim historically leading post-1967 pioneering efforts.[70] In the Golan Heights, ideological motivations blend with strategic concerns over Syrian threats, though communities there include more secular kibbutz-style settlements established for agricultural and defensive purposes since 1967.[71] A substantial portion of settlers, including secular and traditional families, cite pragmatic factors such as enhanced quality of life, including spacious housing and natural surroundings unavailable in Israel's densely populated urban centers.[70] [72] Government incentives, including subsidized mortgages, tax benefits, and infrastructure development, lower the effective cost of living by 20-30% compared to equivalent properties inside the Green Line, drawing middle-class commuters who maintain employment in Israel proper.[70] Economic analyses highlight how these policies enable settlement growth by addressing Israel's housing shortage, with many residents prioritizing affordability over political ideology.[73] Security motivations persist among some, who see dispersed populations as deterring attacks from hostile neighbors, though empirical data on this varies by location and era.[71]

Governance and Administration

Israeli Civil and Military Administration

The Israeli military administration in the West Bank was established on June 7, 1967, following the capture of the territory during the Six-Day War, placing it under the authority of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Central Command.[74] The military government, headed by a governor, derives its powers from the framework of belligerent occupation under international humanitarian law, primarily the Hague Regulations of 1907, and issues military orders to maintain public order, security, and essential services.[75] These orders have regulated aspects such as land requisition for security needs, movement restrictions, and economic activities, with over 1,500 orders promulgated by 1988 alone.[75] The administration's military component, including IDF units, enforces security through checkpoints, patrols, and responses to threats, while coordinating with Palestinian security forces in Areas A and B under the Oslo Accords framework established in 1993 and 1995.[76] In 1981, the Civil Administration was created as a specialized branch of the military government to handle civilian affairs primarily for the Palestinian population in the West Bank, including issuance of permits for construction, water allocation, and health services.[75] Operating under the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), it facilitates humanitarian aid, infrastructure projects, and coordination between Israeli authorities and Palestinian entities, though its decisions on land use in Area C—comprising 60% of the West Bank and encompassing most settlements—remain subject to military oversight.[76] For Israeli settlements, however, the Civil Administration's role is more coordinative, focusing on cross-boundary issues like utilities and roads, rather than direct governance, as settlements operate under de facto Israeli civil law extended via military orders.[77] Israeli citizens in settlements are subject to Israeli domestic civil and criminal law, applied through mechanisms such as Military Order No. 378 (1970), which empowers the military commander to extend Israeli legislation to persons and institutions in the region, and subsequent orders like No. 1651 (2009) enforcing the Israeli Penal Law.[77] This dual system distinguishes between settlers, who access Israeli courts and administrative bodies, and the local Palestinian population under military jurisdiction for offenses involving security. Local settlement governance occurs via regional councils and municipalities recognized by Israel's Ministry of the Interior, handling services like education and waste management, with budgets partly funded through national allocations.[77] In recent developments, the 2023 establishment of a civilian-led Settlements Administration under Minister Bezalel Smotrich has shifted some oversight of settlement planning and land allocation from military to civilian authorities, aiming to streamline development while maintaining the overarching military framework for the territory.[50] This entity, subordinate to the Defense Ministry but with expanded ministerial input, processes settlement expansion applications and infrastructure, processing hundreds of housing units annually amid ongoing security coordination by the IDF.[50] The arrangement reflects efforts to normalize administrative functions for Israeli communities without altering the territory's disputed status.[50]

Local Government Structures

Local government structures in Israeli settlements replicate the tripartite model used across Israel: municipalities for major urban centers, local councils for smaller towns, and regional councils for dispersed rural communities, with authority derived from Israeli statutes like the Local Authorities Law (Ordinances New Version), 5728-1968. These entities manage essential services including education, waste management, zoning, and public welfare, funded partly through Israeli national budgets and local taxes levied on residents.[78][79] Municipalities govern the largest settlements, typically those exceeding 20,000 residents, operating as independent city councils with elected mayors and multi-member bodies responsible for comprehensive urban administration. Examples include Ariel (established 1978, population approximately 20,000 as of 2023), Ma'ale Adumim (1975, ~38,000), Beitar Illit (1980s, ~59,000, primarily ultra-Orthodox), and Modi'in Illit (1990s, largest with over 80,000 ultra-Orthodox residents), where councils handle dense housing development and infrastructure akin to Israeli cities.[80][81] Local councils administer mid-sized settlements, providing municipal services to populations generally between 2,000 and 20,000, with elected heads and smaller councils focused on community-specific needs like road maintenance and schools; Katzrin in the Golan Heights (founded 1977, ~8,000 residents) exemplifies this, functioning semi-independently from broader regional oversight.[82] Regional councils coordinate governance for clusters of smaller settlements, kibbutzim, and outposts across defined territories, pooling resources for shared facilities such as regional high schools, emergency services, and environmental planning while deferring to individual community committees for daily affairs. In the West Bank, key examples are Gush Etzion Regional Council (overseeing ~20 settlements south of Bethlehem), Har Hevron Regional Council (southern Hebron Hills), Mateh Binyamin Regional Council (north of Jerusalem), Megillot Regional Council (Dead Sea area), and Shomron Regional Council (central Samaria); these encompass dozens of communities totaling tens of thousands of residents. In the Golan Heights, the Golan Regional Council supervises 33 settlements with ~25,000 residents as of 2024, managing vast rural expanses including agriculture and tourism infrastructure.[83][84][85] Elections for these bodies occur every five years as part of Israel's unified municipal polls, with settlement residents—Israeli citizens—voting directly for council heads and members under proportional representation, subject to Ministry of Interior approval; the 2024 elections, held February 27 after delays due to the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks, saw strong turnout in settlements and gains by religious and right-wing slates reflecting demographic shifts toward ultra-Orthodox and ideological settlers.[86][87] Local decisions on land use and expansion require coordination with Israel's Civil Administration in the West Bank and Golan, which holds ultimate planning veto power under military orders, though day-to-day operations emphasize self-governance for Jewish communities.[88][79]

Application of Israeli Domestic Law

Israeli domestic law is applied to Jewish settlers in the West Bank (referred to by Israel as Judea and Samaria) through a combination of personal jurisdiction over Israeli nationals, specific Knesset legislation, and military orders issued by the IDF, creating a distinct legal regime from the military law governing Palestinian residents.[78][89] This dual system ensures that Israeli settlers are subject to Israeli criminal, civil, administrative, and economic laws, including the Penal Law (5737-1977), which extends jurisdiction over offenses committed by Israelis in the territories on an extraterritorial basis.[90] Israeli police conduct investigations in settlements, and cases involving settlers are adjudicated in Israeli civilian courts rather than military tribunals.[91] Many Knesset-enacted laws explicitly include application to Israeli residents in the territories via clauses referencing "Judea and Samaria," covering areas such as national insurance, labor rights, consumer protection, and municipal services, thereby integrating settlements into Israel's domestic legal and fiscal framework without formal annexation of the land.[92] The IDF Civil Administration, established in 1981, coordinates civilian governance in Area C (where most settlements are located), implementing Israeli administrative standards for planning, infrastructure, and land allocation to settlers while excluding Palestinians from these benefits.[93] This mechanism has been critiqued for effectively annexing settlements de facto, as settlers enjoy rights equivalent to those in Israel proper, including voting in national elections and access to Israeli social services.[78] In East Jerusalem, annexed by Israel in 1967 via the Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment No. 11), full Israeli domestic law applies uniformly to all residents, including settlements, subjecting the area to Israeli municipal jurisdiction and courts.[94] Similarly, in the Golan Heights, captured in 1967 and annexed in 1981 through the Golan Heights Law, Israeli law is comprehensively extended, granting settlers full citizenship rights and integrating the territory into Israel's legal system.[95] For the West Bank proper, efforts to formalize broader application continue; the 2022 Judea and Samaria Regulations Law allows temporary extension of select Israeli laws to Israeli residents there, addressing gaps in the ad hoc system.[96] As of October 2025, preliminary Knesset bills advancing sovereignty over settlement blocs remain unpassed, maintaining the current patchwork application without altering the non-annexed status of the territory.[97]

Interpretations Supporting Settlement Permissibility Under International Law

Legal scholars and Israeli government positions argue that the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, does not constitute "occupied territory" under the traditional meaning of international humanitarian law, as no legitimate sovereign controlled it prior to Israel's 1967 defensive capture. Jordan's 1950 annexation of the area was recognized only by the United Kingdom and Pakistan, with the Arab League itself rejecting it as illegal, leaving the territory in a status of disputed rather than occupied from a prior sovereign.[98] This view holds that the Fourth Geneva Convention's occupation provisions, including Article 49, apply only to territory taken from a High Contracting Party with recognized sovereignty, which was absent here, as the West Bank's pre-1967 status derived from the defunct British Mandate encouraging Jewish settlement rather than Jordanian title.[7][99] Even assuming arguendo the applicability of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, interpretations supporting settlement permissibility emphasize that the provision prohibits only "forcible transfers and deportations" of civilian populations, not voluntary civilian migration or incentives for settlement in areas under a state's control following a lawful war of self-defense. Eugene Kontorovich, a professor of international law at George Mason University Scalia Law School, contends that Israeli settlers move voluntarily without coercion, distinguishing this from the forced population transfers targeted by the Convention's drafters in response to Nazi practices during World War II.[100] He further notes that global practice permits similar civilian presence in disputed territories by other states, such as Turkish settlements in Northern Cyprus or Moroccan ones in Western Sahara, without consistent international condemnation, undermining claims of a universal prohibition.[101] United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), which Israel accepted as a basis for peace negotiations, endorses withdrawal from "territories occupied" only in exchange for secure and recognized boundaries, without mandating a full retreat to the pre-1967 armistice lines, which were never internationally recognized borders.[102] This resolution, per interpretations by scholars like Kontorovich and historical U.S. policy under administrations including Reagan's, allows Israel to retain control over areas vital for defensible borders until a negotiated peace, consistent with Article 51 of the UN Charter's recognition of self-defense rights.[7] The U.S. State Department under Secretary Mike Pompeo affirmed in November 2019 that Israeli settlements are not inherently illegal under international law, reversing prior positions and aligning with these textual and contextual readings.[99] These interpretations draw on the San Remo Conference (1920) and League of Nations Mandate for Palestine, which explicitly provided for close Jewish settlement on both sides of the Jordan River to reconstitute a Jewish national home, rights preserved under Article 80 of the UN Charter and applicable to the West Bank's legal status post-Mandate.[100] Critics of opposing views highlight selective application of law, noting that advisory opinions like the International Court of Justice's 2004 ruling on the security barrier ignored these historical titles and customary allowances for settlement in non-sovereign lands acquired defensively.[99] Overall, proponents maintain that settlements facilitate negotiation leverage for secure peace rather than foreclosing it, as evidenced by Israel's 1979 full withdrawal from Sinai under similar legal frameworks.[102]

Claims of Illegality Under International Law

Claims that Israeli settlements violate international law primarily center on Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), which prohibits an occupying power from deporting or transferring "parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies."[103] Proponents of this view assert that the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip—territories captured by Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War—constitute occupied Palestinian territory, rendering Israel's establishment and expansion of settlements there a breach of this provision by facilitating the transfer of Israeli civilians.[104] This interpretation holds that even voluntary civilian movement, incentivized by government policies, qualifies as prohibited transfer when enabled by the occupying power's administrative control.[5] The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has reinforced these claims in advisory opinions. In its 2004 opinion on the West Bank separation barrier, the ICJ ruled that Israel's settlement policy contravenes Article 49(6), as it involves the transfer of population into occupied territory, altering demographic composition and hindering Palestinian self-determination.[5] The ICJ's July 19, 2024, advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel's policies in the Occupied Palestinian Territory further declared the settlements illegal under the same article, stating that Israel's presence in territories occupied since 1967, including settlement activities, breaches international humanitarian law and entailing obligations for states to avoid recognition or aid.[5] These rulings emphasize that settlements fragment territory, impede Palestinian rights, and violate the temporary nature of belligerent occupation under customary law derived from the 1907 Hague Regulations, particularly Article 43, which requires an occupier to restore and maintain public order without effecting permanent changes.[105] United Nations bodies have consistently echoed these positions through resolutions. UN Security Council Resolution 2334, adopted December 23, 2016, by a 14-0 vote (with U.S. abstention), reaffirmed that Israeli settlements in Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, "has no legal validity and constitutes a flagrant violation under international law," calling for their immediate cessation.[106] Subsequent UN reports, such as the Secretary-General's updates on Resolution 2334 implementation, document ongoing settlement expansion—citing over 24,000 new housing units advanced in 2023 alone—as perpetuating this illegality and obstructing a two-state solution.[107] Human rights organizations like Amnesty International attribute the settlements' unlawfulness to their role in systematic land expropriation and displacement, arguing they form part of broader annexation efforts incompatible with international humanitarian law.[103] These claims extend to ancillary violations, including breaches of the Palestinian right to self-determination under UN General Assembly resolutions and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as settlements are said to preempt territorial contiguity for a future Palestinian state.[105] Critics, including UN experts, contend that the permanence of settlements—evidenced by infrastructure like 132 settlements and 124 outposts housing approximately 700,000 Israelis in the West Bank and East Jerusalem as of 2024—transforms temporary occupation into de facto annexation, illegal under jus ad bellum principles prohibiting acquisition of territory by force.[108] However, such assertions presuppose the territories' status as inherently Palestinian, a characterization disputed by Israel on grounds that no prior legitimate sovereign existed and that the 1967 war was defensive, rendering Geneva Convention applicability contested from foundational premises.[109] Institutions advancing these claims, such as the UN and ICJ, have faced accusations of systemic bias favoring Palestinian narratives, with resolutions often passing via automatic majorities in the General Assembly and selective enforcement.[100]

Israeli Responses to UN Resolutions and ICJ Opinions

Israel has consistently rejected United Nations resolutions and International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinions that deem its settlements in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Golan Heights illegal, arguing that such determinations misapply international law, ignore historical and security contexts, and reflect institutional bias within the UN system. Israeli officials maintain that the territories are disputed rather than occupied, as no prior legitimate sovereign existed—Jordan's control from 1948 to 1967 being itself unrecognized by most states—and that voluntary civilian settlement does not violate Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits forcible transfers into enemy-occupied territory for colonization.[7] This position holds that settlements serve defensive purposes amid ongoing threats, with empirical evidence from the security barrier—deemed illegal in related ICJ rulings—showing a 90% reduction in terrorist attacks from the West Bank since its construction.[110] In response to the ICJ's 2004 advisory opinion on the separation barrier, which declared settlements a breach of international humanitarian law and called for their evacuation, Israel dismissed the ruling as non-binding, politically motivated, and jurisdictionally flawed, noting the court's failure to fully consider Israel's self-defense imperatives under Article 51 of the UN Charter following the Second Intifada's suicide bombings. The Israeli government did not participate in the proceedings beyond written submissions and continued barrier construction, citing its life-saving efficacy: suicide attacks dropped from over 100 in 2002-2003 to near zero thereafter. Israeli legal experts criticized the opinion for equating defensive measures with aggression and overlooking Palestinian non-compliance with Oslo Accords obligations.[111] The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2334 on December 23, 2016, which reaffirmed settlements' "no legal validity" and demanded their cessation, prompted vehement Israeli condemnation as "shameful" and one-sided, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accusing it of distorting history by omitting Jewish ties to Judea and Samaria while incentivizing Palestinian terrorism through lack of condemnation. In retaliation, Israel approved over 5,000 new settlement housing units, advanced planning for 2,500 more, and downgraded ties with UN member states like New Zealand and Senegal for supporting the resolution, whose U.S. abstention Israel attributed to Obama administration pressure. Netanyahu emphasized that Jews are not "occupiers in their own land," rejecting the resolution's premise amid evidence of UN General Assembly bias, where Israel faces more condemnatory resolutions annually than all other nations combined.[110][112] Following the ICJ's July 19, 2024, advisory opinion declaring Israel's occupation unlawful and settlements illegal, requiring their dismantlement and reparations, Israel rejected the non-binding ruling as a "political assault" divorced from facts, arguing it ignores the absence of a Palestinian state prior to 1967, repeated Arab rejection of partition plans, and security necessities post-October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks. The government highlighted the opinion's reliance on contested interpretations of occupation law without addressing Israel's defensive conquest in a war of survival, and noted the ICJ's selective focus amid global occupations like China's in Tibet or Russia's in Crimea, which receive no equivalent scrutiny. Israel affirmed it would not alter policy based on what it views as judicial overreach, prioritizing empirical security gains—such as settlements buffering population centers—from volatile borders.[55][113]

Economic Dimensions

Government Subsidies and Housing Incentives

The Israeli government designates most settlements in the West Bank as National Priority Area A localities, granting them access to subsidized housing programs, including preferential tenders for low-cost apartments and reduced land acquisition fees through the Israel Land Authority. These designations enable settlers to purchase or lease land at discounts of up to 30-50% compared to central Israel, significantly lowering overall housing costs and facilitating rapid construction. For instance, in 2022, such policies contributed to housing prices in major settlements like Ma'ale Adumim being approximately 20-30% below equivalent urban areas in Israel proper.[114] Local settlement councils receive elevated per capita budgetary grants from the Ministry of Interior, often 50-60% higher than comparable peripheral communities within Israel's pre-1967 borders, funding infrastructure like roads and utilities that indirectly subsidize residential development. A 2014 Adva Center analysis found settlements averaging 2,743 shekels ($743) per capita annually in state funds, versus 1,922 shekels ($522) for periphery towns, with housing-related allocations comprising a substantial portion. These transfers, totaling billions of shekels in recent budgets—such as an additional 1 billion shekels ($274 million) allocated in July 2025 for West Bank projects—support municipal services and development incentives aimed at attracting families.[115][116][117] While direct individual tax credits for settlers, such as income reductions, were largely eliminated after 2003, many settlements qualify for broader periphery tax breaks offering 7-20% reductions on income up to certain thresholds, alongside mortgage subsidies and priority in government-backed home loans. These measures, justified by the government as promoting population distribution to strategic frontier regions, have sustained settlement growth despite international criticism, with over 500,000 residents in the West Bank by 2025 benefiting from the cumulative effect on affordability.[118][119]

Economic Outputs and Trade Including EU Exports

Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Golan Heights generate economic outputs primarily through agriculture and light industry. Agricultural production includes specialized crops such as dates, grapes for wine, citrus fruits, herbs, and vegetables, supported by drip irrigation and greenhouses that enable high yields in arid conditions.[120] Industrial outputs encompass quarrying for stone and minerals, manufacturing of plastics and metals, and waste recycling facilities, with operations like those in the Barkan industrial zone producing goods for domestic and export markets. These sectors employ approximately 22,500 Palestinians in the West Bank as of 2022, contributing to cross-border labor dynamics while bolstering Israel's overall economic activity through supply chains integrated with national infrastructure.[121][122] Exports from settlements focus heavily on agricultural products, which form a key component of Israel's outbound trade. In 2019, fresh fruits like grapes and dates, alongside vegetables, constituted a significant share of settlement goods shipped to international markets, including processing into value-added items such as wines and preserves.[120] The Israeli government estimated the annual value of EU imports from settlements at approximately €230 million as of recent assessments, dwarfing comparable imports from Palestinian areas at €15 million and highlighting the scale of settlement trade relative to local alternatives.[123] These exports benefit from Israel's advanced export logistics but face scrutiny due to origin disputes. EU trade policy toward settlement products mandates explicit labeling of Israeli settlement origin since a December 2015 guideline, denying such goods preferential tariff treatment under the 2000 EU-Israel Association Agreement.[124] This differentiation aims to distinguish settlement produce from Israel proper, with monitoring enforced through customs declarations; non-compliance risks penalties but has not halted flows, as evidenced by ongoing imports of herbs, dates, and manufactured items.[125] Amid broader tensions, including the 2023-2025 Gaza conflict, the European Commission proposed in September 2025 suspending certain trade concessions with Israel, potentially affecting settlement exports indirectly through reimposed tariffs on select goods, though implementation remains pending as of October 2025.[126] Israeli authorities maintain that settlement products comply with domestic standards and contribute legitimately to bilateral trade volumes exceeding €40 billion annually with the EU.[124]

Integration with Palestinian Labor Markets

Palestinian workers from the West Bank have historically provided significant labor to Israeli settlements, primarily in construction, agriculture, and manufacturing, filling shortages in low-skilled sectors where Israeli participation is limited. Prior to October 7, 2023, approximately 133,000 Palestinians were employed across Israel and settlements, constituting about 18.5% of the Palestinian workforce, with a substantial portion engaged in settlement-based industries.[127] In the third quarter of 2023, around 25,000 Palestinians worked in settlements, dropping sharply to 7,000 by the fourth quarter following permit suspensions.[128] By 2024, employment in settlements stabilized at about 15,000, reflecting partial resumption amid security restrictions.[129] These jobs offer wages substantially higher than local Palestinian alternatives, with daily earnings in settlements and Israel averaging 77 NIS (about $21 USD) compared to 68 NIS in the Palestinian private sector as of recent data.[130] Israel's minimum wage of 6,247 NIS monthly applies to permitted workers, exceeding Palestinian Authority rates by a factor of three or more, making remittances from these positions a critical economic inflow exceeding $380 million monthly into Palestinian markets pre-2023.[131][132] Without access to settlement and Israeli employment, West Bank unemployment would have averaged 16 percentage points higher between 1995 and 2019, underscoring the causal role of this labor integration in mitigating local job scarcity.[121] Post-October 7 restrictions suspended permits for over 115,000 West Bank workers, reducing overall cross-boundary employment to under 6% recovery by mid-2024, though some undocumented labor persists in settlements, estimated at 30,000 to 40,000 in construction alone.[133][134] This integration fosters economic interdependence, as settlements rely on Palestinian labor for growth—evident in construction booms—while providing Palestinians with income stability absent in PA-controlled areas hampered by governance and investment constraints. However, permit systems and security barriers limit mobility, with data indicating that settlement jobs, while economically vital, expose workers to risks without full labor protections equivalent to Israelis.[135][136]

Strategic and Security Role

Contributions to National Defense and Border Security

Israeli settlements in the Jordan Valley, established following the 1967 Six-Day War, function as a forward defensive line along Israel's eastern border, leveraging the valley's steep escarpments and rift topography as a natural barrier against armored incursions from Jordan or further east. This positioning allows for effective monitoring of cross-border movements and facilitates rapid IDF deployment, with settlements serving as bases for patrols and intelligence gathering to deter infiltration by hostile forces. [137] [138] In the broader West Bank, settlements occupy elevated terrain that provides oversight of Israel's densely populated coastal plain, which lacks natural defenses and measures only about 15 kilometers in width at its narrowest pre-1967 point. By populating these highlands, settlements deny potential adversaries—such as armies or terrorist groups—uncontested control of positions suitable for artillery spotting or rocket launches, thereby extending Israel's strategic depth and complicating surprise attacks. Israeli security analyses emphasize that this territorial control has prevented the recurrence of threats similar to those posed by Jordanian forces in 1967 or Palestinian militias in subsequent intifadas. [139] [140] Settlements also augment national defense through civilian-militia integration, where residents participate in local security squads coordinated with the IDF, contributing to area surveillance and immediate threat neutralization. For instance, post-October 7, 2023, settlement-based rapid response units in the West Bank assisted in countering Hamas-linked infiltrations, demonstrating their role in layered defense beyond static barriers. This human presence provides an organic early-warning capability, detecting anomalies that remote sensors might miss, and supplements the IDF's operational footprint amid resource constraints. [138] [141] In the Golan Heights, settlements established after the 1967 capture from Syria secure the plateau's commanding heights, which overlook Israel's Galilee region and previously enabled Syrian artillery to shell civilian areas, as occurred in the 1960s and Yom Kippur War of 1973. These communities support military outposts, radar installations, and supply lines, maintaining a populated buffer that discourages Syrian or proxy advances and ensures quick reinforcement during escalations, such as the 2024 post-Assad instability. The approximately 25,000 residents in Golan settlements bolster long-term territorial hold, integrating economic viability with defensive imperatives. [142] [143]

Historical, Religious, and Cultural Claims

Supporters of Israeli settlements in Judea and Samaria assert historical claims based on evidence of ancient Jewish presence dating back over 3,000 years, with the region forming the core of the biblical kingdoms of Israel and Judah from approximately 1200 BCE onward.[144] Archaeological excavations, including those at Samaria—the capital established by King Omri around 880 BCE—have yielded artifacts such as ostraca inscriptions in ancient Hebrew script and intricately carved ivories reflecting Israelite-Phoenician influences, confirming a distinct Israelite material culture in the northern hill country.[145] These findings align with biblical accounts of the United Monarchy under Kings David and Solomon, followed by the divided kingdoms, where Judea and Samaria served as political, economic, and religious centers until the Babylonian conquest in 586 BCE.[146] Jewish communities persisted intermittently through Persian, Hellenistic, Roman, and Byzantine periods, with continuous habitation documented in sites like Hebron, where Jewish settlement traced back to biblical patriarchs and endured under Ottoman rule until the 1929 Arab riots expelled residents.[147] Religious claims draw from Torah covenants, particularly Genesis 15:18–21, where God promises Abraham's descendants territory from the Nile to the Euphrates, explicitly encompassing Canaanite regions corresponding to modern Judea, Samaria, and beyond, as reiterated in Exodus 23:31 and Deuteronomy 1:7–8.[148] These texts describe the land's division among the Twelve Tribes, with Judah's inheritance including Jerusalem and southern hills, and Ephraim and Manasseh holding central Samaria, positioning the area as the spiritual cradle of Judaism, site of the First and Second Temples, and numerous prophetic events.[149] Rabbinic tradition, including Talmudic references, upholds these territories as integral to Eretz Yisrael, with commandments like settling the land (mitzvah of yishuv ha'aretz) applying specifically to biblical heartlands, influencing post-1967 settlement ideology among religious Zionists who view reestablishment as fulfillment of divine redemption.[14] Cultural claims emphasize over 500 Jewish heritage sites in Judea and Samaria, including ancient synagogues, mikvehs, and fortresses, alongside modern continuity through pre-1948 kibbutzim in Gush Etzion—founded in the 1920s–1940s and destroyed during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War—which survivors rebuilt post-1967 to reclaim ancestral farming traditions.[28] These elements underpin arguments for cultural indigeneity, with excavations revealing no equivalent pre-Islamic Arab continuity matching Jewish ties, as evidenced by the scarcity of Palestinian claims to specific ancient sites predating Ottoman-era demographics.[150] Proponents contend that denying Jewish rights ignores this evidentiary record, framing settlements as restorative rather than expansionist.[12]

Conflicts and Violence

Palestinian Violence Targeting Settlers and Settlements

Palestinian violence against Israeli settlers and settlements primarily consists of terrorist attacks including shootings, stabbings, vehicular rammings, improvised explosive devices, and rock-throwing aimed at vehicles and homes in the West Bank. These acts are frequently carried out by members of designated terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, as well as militants linked to Fatah's Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades or independent actors. Israeli security assessments attribute much of this violence to incitement from Palestinian leadership and media, alongside operational support from Iran-backed groups.[151][152] Since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, Palestinian terrorist attacks have resulted in hundreds of Israeli deaths across Israel and the territories, with a significant portion occurring in or en route to settlements due to their location amid hostile populations. From September 2000 onward, at least 1,527 Israelis have been killed in such violence, including civilians targeted in the West Bank; this encompasses attacks on settlement roads like Highway 60, where ambushes and shootings are common. During the Second Intifada (2000-2005), peak years saw 457 fatalities in 2002 alone, many from bombings and shootings affecting settlers commuting or residing in vulnerable outposts.[153][152] Notable incidents include the March 11, 2011, Itamar settlement massacre, where two Palestinian assailants from the nearby village of Awarta infiltrated the community and murdered five residents of the Fogel family—parents Ehud and Ruth, and their three children aged 11 months to 4 years—using knives in a deliberate nighttime raid claimed as retaliation for Israeli operations. Similar attacks, such as the 2015 Dolev shooting that killed a settler couple in their car and the August 2019 shooting of a father and son near Dolev, highlight the persistence of targeted killings despite security barriers. In 2023-2024, Shin Bet reported thwarting over 1,040 major terror plots in the West Bank, underscoring the ongoing threat level.[154] Post-October 7, 2023, violence escalated, with 35 Israelis killed in West Bank attacks by Palestinians through mid-2025, including settlers in ambushes and stabbings amid heightened militant activity in areas like Jenin and Nablus. Rock-throwing, often lethal when directed at moving vehicles, has injured hundreds annually, with data indicating over 1,000 such incidents yearly in peak periods. These attacks contribute to a security environment requiring constant Israeli Defense Forces presence, as settlements remain prime targets for disrupting normalization or pressuring territorial concessions.[155]

Instances of Settler Violence and Responses

Israeli settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank typically involves physical assaults, property destruction such as arson and vandalism of olive groves, livestock theft, and intimidation tactics, often categorized as "price tag" attacks intended as retaliation for Palestinian violence or Israeli government actions perceived as concessions.[156] These acts are frequently carried out by extremist groups like the Hilltop Youth, designated by the U.S. Treasury in October 2024 for engaging in such violence, including arson and assaults to displace Palestinians.[157] According to data from the Israeli NGO Yesh Din, between 2005 and 2024, approximately 94% of police investigations into settler violence complaints ended without indictment, reflecting low accountability.[158] A notable escalation occurred following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks, with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) documenting a surge in incidents; for instance, between October 14 and 20, 2025, 49 settler attacks resulted in Palestinian casualties or property damage.[159] One prominent example is the February 26, 2023, rampage in Huwara, where hundreds of settlers, responding to the killing of two Israeli settlers nearby, torched vehicles and homes, injured over 400 Palestinians, and killed one Palestinian via gunfire, an event described by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as a "pogrom" and "nationalist crime."[160] [161] Israeli authorities arrested several suspects and condemned the violence, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stating it was "not the way of the Jewish people," though subsequent releases of detainees highlighted enforcement challenges.[162] Prosecutions remain rare; a Yesh Din analysis of 1,664 police files from 2005 to 2023 found only about 6% led to charges, attributed by the organization to investigative failures and political pressures, though Israeli officials cite difficulties in evidence collection amid ongoing conflict.[163] In responses to heightened violence, the IDF has occasionally clashed with settlers, as in June 2025 when troops dispersed attackers targeting Palestinian villages, prompting rare condemnations from Israeli leadership.[164] International measures include U.S. sanctions on violent settlers, but domestic enforcement has not significantly curbed the trend, with OCHA reporting continued displacement of over 1,200 Palestinians from 2023 onward due to such attacks.[165]

Role of Israeli Security Forces in Protection

The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), operating under the Central Command, bear primary responsibility for securing Israeli settlements in the West Bank, where approximately 465,000 settlers reside in over 300 communities as of 2024, mostly in Area C under full Israeli military control. This mandate encompasses routine patrols, intelligence gathering, and rapid response to threats such as shootings, stabbings, and rock-throwing attacks originating from Palestinian areas, which have resulted in nearly 45 settler fatalities since 2016 according to conflict data trackers.[166] IDF units, including infantry brigades and specialized counter-terrorism teams like Yamam, coordinate with settlement security squads—often composed of armed civilian volunteers who are former IDF personnel—to monitor perimeters and access roads.[167] Checkpoints and barriers form a core mechanism of protection, with over 500 fixed and temporary structures in the West Bank as of August 2023, many staffed by IDF soldiers or Border Police to screen for weapons and explosives aimed at settlements.[168] These measures, including fenced buffer zones around settlements covering about 3% of West Bank land, have contributed to low settler casualty rates relative to the scale of surrounding hostilities, though critics from Palestinian advocacy groups contend they primarily restrict Palestinian movement rather than enhance security.[169] In practice, an estimated 80% of IDF forces deployed in the region focus on settlement guard duties, underscoring the resource intensity of this role amid ongoing low-level conflict.[170] Following major incidents, such as the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks that heightened regional tensions, IDF responses have included intensified raids and arrests, neutralizing hundreds of potential threats targeting settlements in subsequent years.[171] Local civil administration units under IDF oversight also enforce zoning and entry restrictions to settlements, integrating security with administrative control. As of October 2025, plans to partially transfer routine protection to local forces were under consideration to reallocate IDF assets, reflecting evolving strategic priorities while maintaining overarching military oversight.[172] This framework prioritizes Israeli civilian safety in disputed territories, where settlements serve as forward positions against infiltration, though it draws international scrutiny for entrenching territorial claims.[173]

Environmental Considerations

Water Resources and Land Use Practices

Israeli settlements in the West Bank draw water primarily from Israel's integrated national system, which incorporates desalinated seawater (supplying over 70% of domestic needs nationwide since 2015), the Sea of Galilee, and shared aquifers like the Mountain Aquifer, supplemented by local groundwater. Under the 1995 Oslo II Accord, water rights from these aquifers were allocated based on historical usage, granting Israel control over approximately 80% of the shared resources while assigning the Palestinian Authority (PA) specific quotas from 118 wells (about 118 million cubic meters annually) and requiring Israel to provide an additional 28.6 million cubic meters yearly from its own sources, a commitment Israel has exceeded by supplying around 70-90 million cubic meters to the PA as of 2023-2025 amid population growth. [174] [175] Domestic water consumption in settlements averages 200-300 liters per capita per day, reflecting connection to the reliable Israeli grid and standards comparable to those within Israel's pre-1967 borders, compared to 70-85 liters per capita in PA-controlled areas, where shortages stem partly from infrastructure losses (up to 40% leakage), unmetered agricultural use, and limited new well development despite Oslo provisions for joint projects. [176] [177] Agricultural water use in settlements, which accounts for about 39% of irrigated water in the West Bank despite housing only 10-15% of the combined population, employs drip irrigation systems—developed in Israel in the 1960s—achieving 90-95% efficiency by delivering water directly to roots, minimizing evaporation and enabling cultivation of high-value crops like fruits and vineyards on arid slopes. [178] [179] Land use in settlements prioritizes residential zones on hilltops (often on surveyed state or unclaimed lands), with surrounding areas dedicated to agriculture, industry, and afforestation, totaling around 1-2% of West Bank land as of 2020 but expanding productive output through soil stabilization, terracing, and contour farming that combat erosion in semi-arid terrain. [180] These practices have facilitated land reclamation, converting marginal or overgrazed areas into orchards and fields yielding 5-10 times higher productivity per dunum than traditional Palestinian rain-fed olive groves, supported by Israel's nationwide wastewater recycling (85% reuse rate for agriculture). [181] Environmental impacts include reduced aquifer drawdown in managed areas due to efficient irrigation, which has lowered overall agricultural water demand by 20-30% since the 1970s, but challenges arise from occasional untreated wastewater overflows or pipeline leaks from settlements affecting downstream wadis, contaminating Palestinian groundwater with nitrates and pathogens in isolated cases, despite legal requirements for advanced treatment plants serving most settlements (e.g., 80-90% treatment compliance as per Israeli oversight). [182] [183] PA reports attribute broader pollution to settlement expansion, while Israeli assessments emphasize reciprocal issues like unauthorized PA wells depleting shared resources; overall, settlement practices align with Israel's desertification reversal efforts, increasing vegetative cover by 10-15% in proximate zones through targeted planting. [184] [185]

Implications for Regional Negotiations

Influence on Past Peace Processes

The Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995 established a framework for interim Palestinian self-governance but deferred final-status issues, including settlements, to future negotiations without imposing a construction freeze during the transitional period.[186] This omission permitted continued Israeli settlement expansion in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with the Jewish population there (excluding East Jerusalem) increasing from approximately 110,000 in 1993 to over 200,000 by 2000, as bypass roads and infrastructure facilitated further development.[187] Palestinian negotiators and observers, including B'Tselem, argued that this growth entrenched facts on the ground, complicating territorial contiguity for a future Palestinian state and eroding trust in Israel's commitment to territorial compromise.[188] Israeli governments maintained that settlements served as security buffers and potential bargaining chips, with expansions justified under existing policies rather than as a direct response to the accords.[189] At the 2000 Camp David Summit, settlements emerged as a core sticking point, with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak proposing to annex major settlement blocs such as Ma'ale Adumim and Givat Ze'ev—encompassing about 10% of the West Bank—to Israel in exchange for land swaps totaling up to 94% of the territory for a Palestinian state.[190] Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat rejected the offer, citing insufficient territorial viability due to the blocs' placement, which would fragment the West Bank and isolate East Jerusalem; analysts like those from MERIP noted that the proposal prioritized retaining densely populated settlements near the Green Line while offering non-contiguous desert land in compensation.[191] The summit's failure, followed by the Second Intifada, intensified Palestinian demands for a full settlement freeze as a precondition for talks, while Israeli proponents viewed the offer as evidence that settlements could be integrated into a viable two-state framework via swaps, though subsequent violence halted momentum.[192] Israel's 2005 unilateral disengagement from Gaza, evacuating all 21 settlements and approximately 8,500 residents, represented a significant territorial concession outside bilateral negotiations, aimed at reducing friction and bolstering Israel's negotiating position by demonstrating willingness to withdraw from settlements.[35] However, the move did not yield reciprocal Palestinian moderation; instead, Hamas seized control in 2007, leading to increased rocket attacks, which Israeli leaders cited as validation that unilateral withdrawals without security agreements undermined peace prospects and justified retaining West Bank settlements for defensive depth.[193] Critics, including UN assessments, contended that the disengagement indirectly encouraged West Bank expansion, as settlement populations there grew by over 50,000 between 2000 and 2009, signaling to Palestinians a pattern of selective retrenchment rather than comprehensive resolution.[44] The 2007 Annapolis Conference sought to revive talks under U.S. auspices, with Phase I of the roadmap explicitly calling for a complete settlement freeze, including natural growth, as a confidence-building measure.[194] Yet Israeli construction persisted, with announcements for hundreds of new units in existing settlements post-conference, prompting Palestinian accusations of bad faith and UN Security Council delegates to warn that such activity threatened the process's viability by preempting final-status borders.[195][196] Over 288 negotiation sessions occurred by late 2008, but entrenched settlement growth—reaching about 300,000 settlers in the West Bank by then—fueled Palestinian skepticism, as blocs like Ariel expanded into areas critical for state connectivity, per analyses from the Middle East Forum.[197] In the 2013–2014 talks led by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, settlements again derailed progress; Palestinian negotiators withdrew in November 2013 after Israel announced 24,000 new housing units, violating perceived understandings despite no formal freeze agreement.[198] Chief negotiator Martin Indyk later attributed the collapse partly to settlement escalations, which Palestinians viewed as evidence of Israeli intent to alter demographics irreversibly, though Israeli officials countered that releases of 104 Palestinian prisoners demonstrated flexibility and that natural growth in established communities was non-negotiable.[199] Framework proposals included land swaps to retain major blocs comprising 4–6% of the West Bank, but Palestinian insistence on a full freeze as precondition, coupled with unilateral actions like joining international bodies, mirrored mutual trust deficits exacerbated by settlement visibility.[200] Across these processes, empirical data on settlement growth—doubling in population from 1993 to 2014—objectively heightened Palestinian demands for dismantlement while reinforcing Israeli strategic rationales for retention in any deal, rendering territorial concessions a persistent flashpoint.[201]

Proposals for Territorial Adjustments and Annexation

Various Israeli political figures and parties have proposed annexing portions of the West Bank—referred to by some as Judea and Samaria—to incorporate major settlement blocs into Israel proper, often as part of broader territorial adjustments involving land swaps with a future Palestinian entity. These proposals typically envision retaining control over areas housing over 80% of settlers, such as the Gush Etzion, Ma'ale Adumim, and Ariel blocs, which contain around 500,000 Israeli residents as of 2023, while ceding equivalent uninhabited land elsewhere to Palestine for territorial contiguity.[202][203] Such adjustments aim to resolve the demographic challenges of isolated settlements by prioritizing defensible borders and historical claims, though critics argue they undermine Palestinian state viability without mutual agreement.[50] The 2020 Trump peace plan formalized one such framework, mapping Israeli annexation of the Jordan Valley and all settlement blocs—encompassing about 30% of West Bank land—while offering Palestine 70% of the territory plus additional swaps from Israel proper to achieve near-equivalent size and connectivity via underpasses and bridges. Under this plan, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pledged to begin annexation on July 1, 2020, but suspended it after the UAE conditioned normalization on its halt, preserving Abraham Accords momentum.[204] The plan's map delineated 132 settlements for retention, with evacuation of 15 isolated outposts affecting fewer than 2,000 residents, emphasizing security buffers along the Jordan River.[205] In subsequent years, right-wing coalition partners have intensified calls for unilateral sovereignty. The 2022 Netanyahu-led government's coalition agreement included commitments to extend Israeli law to settlements, building on de facto applications already in place for civil matters.[206] Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, head of the Religious Zionism party, outlined a September 3, 2025, plan to annex 82% of the West Bank, focusing on Area C under Oslo Accords control, where most settlements lie, and transferring populated Arab areas to Jordanian or Egyptian oversight to avoid binational state risks. On July 23, 2025, the Knesset passed a symbolic motion endorsing sovereignty over Judea, Samaria, and the Jordan Valley, reflecting mainstreaming of annexation within Likud and allies.[207] Legislative momentum peaked on October 22, 2025, when the Knesset granted preliminary approval—by 25-24 and similar margins—to two bills: one applying Israeli law across the West Bank and another targeting the Ma'ale Adumim bloc specifically, which houses 40,000 residents and bisects Palestinian areas.[208][202] These advances defied Netanyahu's instructions to halt amid U.S. Vice President JD Vance's visit and President Trump's explicit opposition, stating annexation "won't happen" to safeguard peace prospects.[209][210] Proponents, including settler leaders from the Yesha Council, argue such measures secure strategic depths against threats, citing post-October 7, 2023, security realities, while Netanyahu has conditioned full implementation on U.S. alignment.[203] Despite requiring three more readings, these bills signal escalating pressure from ultranationalist factions holding 14 Knesset seats.[211]

Recent Developments

Policy Shifts Following October 7, 2023 Attacks

In the aftermath of the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attacks that killed approximately 1,200 Israelis and precipitated the ongoing Gaza conflict, the Israeli government under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accelerated settlement expansion in the West Bank, citing security imperatives and the need to strengthen Jewish presence in response to heightened Palestinian violence. This shift involved increased designations of Palestinian-owned land as state land, with over 3,100 acres seized in June 2024—the largest such declaration in more than three decades—primarily in areas like the Jordan Valley and near existing settlements.[212] Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, granted authority over civilian administration in parts of the West Bank, directed efforts to transfer governing powers from military to civilian agencies, enabling faster infrastructure development and outpost regularization.[50] Settlement construction approvals surged, with the government endorsing thousands of new housing units in existing communities and legalizing previously unauthorized outposts. In 2024, the Netanyahu administration allocated 75 million shekels (approximately $20 million) to fund illegal outposts, alongside 39 million shekels for settlement infrastructure, marking a departure from prior restraint amid international scrutiny. By May 2025, the security cabinet approved the establishment or renewal of 22 settlements, including reactivations of previously evacuated sites, while in March 2025, it granted municipal independence to 13 existing ones to enhance self-governance and expansion capabilities. These measures coincided with a reported increase in new outposts, from around 70 pre-October 2023 to over 100 by mid-2025, often tolerated or retroactively approved despite their legal status under Israeli law.[213][214][215] Controversial projects advanced rapidly, including the E1 plan near Ma'ale Adumim, where in August 2025, authorities greenlit 3,401 housing units across 12 square kilometers, a move critics argued would fragment Palestinian territorial contiguity but which the government framed as vital for Jerusalem's security envelope. In September 2025, Netanyahu signed off on further expansions bisecting the West Bank, explicitly stating there would be no Palestinian state, while the Knesset passed a non-binding motion favoring sovereignty application and advanced two annexation bills by October 2025. These policies reflected a broader doctrinal pivot, with pro-settlement coalition partners leveraging wartime focus to embed settlements more firmly, though implementation faced internal Knesset rebellions and U.S. reservations during visits by figures like JD Vance.[54][216][202]

Expansions, Regularizations, and Annexation Initiatives in 2024-2025

In 2024, the Israeli government advanced 28,872 settlement plans and tenders in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, marking continued high levels of activity following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks, though slightly below the 30,682 recorded in 2023.[2] This included expansions in existing settlements and the establishment of at least 61 new outposts, with eight in Area B under partial Palestinian Authority control, facilitated by reduced enforcement against unauthorized structures amid heightened security concerns.[2] By December 2024, the Jewish settler population in the West Bank reached 529,455 across 141 settlements.[217] Regularization efforts intensified, with the government allocating 75 million shekels (approximately $20 million) to fund previously unauthorized outposts, including 39 million shekels disbursed directly.[218] On September 12, 2025, authorities declared state land to advance the legalization of the Havat Gilad outpost, part of broader efforts to retroactively authorize structures built without prior permits.[219] These actions built on a February 2023 cabinet decision to gradually legalize select outposts in Area C, prioritizing those deemed vital for security or ideological reasons.[220] Major expansions were approved in 2025, including on May 29 the authorization of 22 new settlements—the largest single batch in decades—alongside thousands of housing units in existing ones.[214] Final approval for the E1 project near Ma'ale Adumim on August 20 threatened to bisect the West Bank by linking Jerusalem to major settlement blocs.[54] Annexation initiatives gained momentum, driven by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich's transfer of administrative powers from military to civilian bodies, enabling de facto sovereignty over settlement areas without formal declaration.[50] On October 22, 2025, the Knesset passed initial readings of two bills: one for broad West Bank annexation (25-24 vote) and another applying sovereignty to the Ma'ale Adumim settlement, despite Prime Minister Netanyahu's opposition citing political risks.[221][202] These steps reflected coalition pressures for permanent integration of territories, accelerated post-October 2023 amid perceived threats to Israeli security.[208] On December 21, 2025, Israel's security cabinet approved the establishment of 19 additional settlements in the West Bank, building on the May 2025 authorization of 22 new ones.[222]

Accelerated Settlement Expansion and International Condemnations in Early 2026

In early 2026, Israel resumed land registration procedures in the West Bank for the first time since 1967, facilitating declarations of Palestinian land as Israeli 'state land' and accelerating settlement activity. This followed approvals in late 2025 for new settlements and outposts. On February 10, 2026, Japan expressed deep concern over these measures, reiterating that settlement activities violate international law and urging Israel to fully freeze them to preserve the viability of a two-state solution. In March 2026, a UN Human Rights Office (OHCHR) report highlighted accelerated unlawful settlement expansion and annexation, forcibly displacing over 36,000 Palestinians, with transfers potentially constituting war crimes under the Fourth Geneva Convention and contributing to systematic discrimination amounting to apartheid-like conditions. Amnesty International's February 2026 analysis criticized global impunity for enabling Israel's de facto annexation measures in defiance of the 2024 ICJ advisory opinion.

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