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The BM-21 "Grad" (Russian: БМ-21 "Град", lit. 'hailstorm') is a self-propelled 122 mm multiple rocket launcher designed in the Soviet Union.[12] The system and the M-21OF rocket[13] were first developed in the early 1960s, and saw their first combat use in March 1969 during the Sino-Soviet border conflict.[14] BM stands for boyevaya mashina (Russian: боевая машина – combat vehicle), and the nickname grad means "hail". The complete system with the BM-21 launch vehicle and the M-21OF rocket is designated as the M-21 field-rocket system and is more commonly known as a Grad multiple rocket launcher system.

Key Information

In NATO countries the system, either the complete system or the launch vehicle only, was initially known as the M1964. Several other countries have copied the Grad or developed similar systems. In Russian service its intended replacement is the 9A52-4 Tornado. Many similar 122 mm MLRS systems are made by different countries based on the BM-21 Grad.

Description

[edit]
A BM-21-1 launch vehicle during a military parade in Yekaterinburg, May 2009.

The M-21 field rocket system with a BM-21 launch vehicle (122 mm multiple rocket launcher (MRL) system) entered service with the Soviet Army in 1963 to replace the aging 140 mm BM-14 system. The launch vehicle consists of a Ural-375D 6x6 truck chassis fitted with a bank of 40 launch tubes arranged in a rectangular shape that can be turned away from the unprotected cab.

The vehicle is powered by a water-cooled V8 180 hp gasoline engine, has a maximum road speed of 75 km/h (47 mph), a road range of up to 750 kilometers (470 mi), and can cross fords up to 1.5 m (4 ft 11 in) deep. The original vehicle together with supporting equipment (including the resupply truck 9T254 with 60 rockets) is referred to by the GRAU index "9K51". The launcher itself has the industrial index of "2B5". In 1976, the BM-21 was mounted on the newer Ural-4320 6x6 army truck.[citation needed]

The three-member crew can emplace the system and have it ready to fire in three minutes. The crew can fire the rockets from the cab or from a trigger at the end of a 64-meter (210 ft) cable. All 40 rockets can be away in as little as 20 seconds, and can be fired individually or in small groups in several-second intervals. A PG-1M panoramic telescope with a K-1 collimator can be used for sighting.[citation needed]

Each 2.87-meter (9 ft 5 in) rocket is slowly spun by rifling in its tube as it exits, which along with its primary fin stabilization keeps it on course. Rockets armed with high explosive-fragmentation, incendiary, or chemical warheads can be fired 20 kilometers (12 mi). Newer high explosive and cargo rockets (used to deliver anti-personnel or antitank mines) have a range of 30 kilometers (19 mi) and more. Warheads weigh around 20 kilograms (44 lb), depending on the type.[citation needed]

The number of rockets that each vehicle is able to quickly bring to bear on an enemy target makes it effective, especially at shorter ranges. One battalion of eighteen launchers is able to deliver 720 rockets in a single volley. The system has lower precision than gun artillery and cannot be used in situations that call for pinpoint accuracy. It relies on a large number of shells impacting over an area for a certain hit rate on specific targets. Because of the short warning time for the impact of the whole volley, the BM-21 is still considered an effective weapon.[citation needed]

Operational history

[edit]

The Grad saw its first combat use in March 1969 during the Sino-Soviet border conflict.

Their use, in conjunction with the M-46, during Operation Savannah halted the advance of South African troops in 1975. The Valkiri was brought into service in 1977 to counter the Grad.

Variants

[edit]
A BM-21 launch vehicle.
The 9P138 launch vehicle of the Grad-1 multiple rocket launcher system.
A BM-21V VDV variant.

Soviet Union/Russia

[edit]

  • BM-21: Original version known as the BM-21 launch vehicle. The launcher unit was mounted on a modified Ural-375D truck chassis.
    • BM-21-1: Launch vehicles are mounted on a family of Ural-4320 truck chassis.
    • 2B17 or also BM-21-1: This upgrade was presented for the first time in 2003 and was developed by Motovilikha Plants from Perm. The system is fitted with a satellite navigation system NAP SNS, automated fire control system ASUNO, APP laying system and can fire a new generation of rockets with a range of 40 km (25 mi). The truck is the Ural-43201.

  • 9P138 "Grad-1": lighter 36-round version, mounted on a 6x6 ZIL-131 chassis. The vehicle with supporting equipment (rockets, transporter 9T450 and resupply truck 9F380) is referred to as complex 9K55. The 9P138 can only use "short-range" rockets with a range of 15 km (9.3 mi). It used to be known in the West as BM-21b or M1976.

  • BM-21V "Grad-V" (Vozdushnodesantniy – 'airborne') (NATO designation M1975): Developed for Soviet Airborne Forces in 1969. A GAZ-66B 4x4 truck chassis is fitted with a 12-round 122 mm rocket launcher. The vehicle is sturdy enough to be airdropped. Parts of the vehicle such as the canvas cab roof can be taken off or folded down to reduce its size during transit. Like the BM-21, the BM-21V has stabilizing jacks on the rear of the vehicle for support when firing. The launch vehicle has the industrial index of 9P125.

  • 9А51 "Prima": 50-round launcher on a Ural-4320 5t chassis. The vehicle together with fire control equipment, the ammunition transporter TZM 9T232M and the new rocket 9M53F is referred to as complex 9K59. Apparently only a small number was produced.
A Grad-P single tube launcher system

  • "Grad-P Light portable rocket system": The complete system comprises a 9P132 [vi] single-round man-portable launcher (it can be reloaded and used again), a 9M22M 122 mm high-explosive fragmentation rocket and a fire control panel. The system was developed in the middle of the 1960s for Soviet special units and was used by Vietnamese forces at war with the US, under the designation DKZ-B.[15] It was not accepted for regular service with the Russian Army, but it was and is still popular with paramilitary and guerrilla forces. This version was occasionally employed by both sides in the Donbas War (2014–2022).[16][17]

  • BM-21PD "Damba" (Protivodiversionnyi): 40-round launcher mounted on Ural-375D or 43201 truck chassis. Developed for protection of naval bases against underwater infiltrations, uses special ammunition PRS-60 (Protivodiversionnyi Reaktivnyi Snaryad). The vehicle together with ammunition transporter is referred to as complex DP-62 "Damba".

  • A-215 "Grad-M": 20-round naval version, entered service in 1978.

  • 9K51M "Tornado-G": an advanced version of the original BM-21 vehicle with sophisticated fire control system, satellite navigation, and automatic target aiming.[18]

Adaptations of the launcher were/are produced by several countries including China, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Iran, North Korea, Poland and Romania.

Belarus

[edit]
A Belarusian BM-21A "BelGrad"
  • BM-21A "BelGrad": This is a modernized version, based on a MAZ-631705 6×6 truck with 425 hp diesel engine TMZ-8424. Between the cab and the launcher there is another pack of 40 rockets. The system was evaluated from 1997 and entered service in 2001.

China

[edit]
  • Type 81 SPRL: The People's Republic of China produces the Type 81, its 122 mm rocket and launch tube was likely copied from Russian Grad-P projectiles and launchers that were captured in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. It entered service with the PLA in 1982 where its upgraded version nowadays known as PHZ81. Due to the fact that it is a direct copy, the Type 81 is extremely similar to its Russian predecessor. Its 40 tubes are mounted on a Shaanxi Automobile Works Yan'an SX2150 6x6 truck, which unlike the original Russian version, has a cab protected by blast shields.
  • Type 83 SPRL: This is a 24-round version, based on a Dong Feng truck. The launch tubes are arranged in three rows of 8. The launch vehicle has a total combat weight of 8,700 kilograms (19,200 lb) and can also be used as part of the mine-laying rocket system Type 84. Currently new rockets with ranges between 30 and 40 km (19 and 25 mi) are being developed.[citation needed]
  • Type 89 TSPRL: This is basically the 40-round launcher of the BM-21 or Type 81 mounted on a tracked chassis with 520 hp diesel engine. The same chassis is also used for the Type 83 152 mm self-propelled howitzer (PLZ83), the Type 89 120 mm tank destroyer (PTZ89) and several other specialised vehicles. The vehicle has a combat weight of 29.9 short tons (27.1 metric tons) and carries 40 spare rockets. Its current PLA designator is PHZ89.
  • Type 90 SPRL: The NORINCO (China North Industries Corporation) Type 90 40-round multiple rocket system is an indigenously designed and built system equipped with an automatic operating and laying system, an electric firing system and an automatically reloadable pack of 40 rockets. It is very similar to the M-77 Oganj but of 122 mm calibre. The chassis used is the Tiema SC2030 6×6 truck. A Type 90 MRL battalion consists of three batteries, each with 6 self-propelled rocket launchers, 6 ammunition resupply trucks Tiema XC2200 with 80 rockets and a battery command post on a DongFeng EQ-245 6×6 truck.
  • Type 90A: Modernised version, based on a Tiema XC2200 6×6 truck chassis and fitted with a modern fire control system with GPS. The command post vehicle can lay and control a number of Type 90A systems by remote control for maximum firepower.
  • Type 90B: Latest, digitalised version. The rocket launch vehicle is based on a Beifang Benchi 2629 series 6×6 truck (Mercedes-Benz copy) and has a longer cabin. Each set now also has three forward observer vehicles, based on the armoured WZ551.
  • PR50 SPMRL: Development of Type 90B SPMRL with firepower increased by 25% (50 rounds compared to the original 40 rounds). Incorporate features of Weishi series self-propelled multiple rocket launchers (WS SPMRL) series so that the operating cost and overall life cycle cost for both when most components of PR50 is interchangeable with that of WS series. Also incorporated is a feature originated in Type 90B, which is the adoption of rockets of different ranges, so PR50 has a wide range of 20 km to 40 km.
  • WS-6 SPMRL: A lightweight and more compact derivative of unguided 122 mm PR50 SPMRL for rapid deployment, with number of tubes reduced by 60% to 40 * from the original 100 of PR50 MLS.
A WS-22 SPMRL of the Bangladesh Army.
  • WS-22 SPMRL: A guided version of 122 mm PR50 MLS with primitive cascade inertial terminal guidance, with standard range of 20 to 30 km
  • CTL-181A MRL: A Dongfeng Mengshi variants fitted with 122 mm multiple rocket launcher and modular ammunition storage unit.[19]

Croatia

[edit]
  • LRSV-122 M-96 "Tajfun" (samovozni višecijevni lanser raketa): Modified version of M-77 Oganj with 128 mm barrels replaced with 122 mm barrels due to lack of missiles in 128 mm caliber, in 4 rows of 8 launch tubes for use with Grad calibre rockets placed on unarmoured Tatra T813 truck instead of FAP trucks that were damaged beyond repair. About 4 of such conversions were done on Tatra chassis. Like the M-77 Oganj, the launcher and reloading pack are covered by a collapsible awning for protection and camouflage when travelling. Combat weight: 23.5 t. Only a very small number was built.
A LRSV-122 M-96 "Tajfun
  • LRSV-122 M-92 "Vulkan" (samovozni višecijevni lanser raketa): Modified version of M-77 Oganj with 128 mm barrels replaced with 122 mm barrels due to lack of missiles in 128 mm caliber, in 4 rows of 8 launch tubes for use with Grad caliber.[20]

Czechoslovakia

[edit]
A RM-70 launch vehicle, a Czechoslovak variant with the BM-21 launch vehicle launcher unit.
  • RM-70 (122 mm RAKETOMET vz. 70): In 1972 the Czechoslovak Army introduced its own version of the BM-21 launch vehicle, designated the RM-70. The launcher unit comprises a bank of 40 launch tubes arranged in 4 rows of 10 and it is mounted on an 8x8 10-ton modified Tatra 813 truck. Unlike the BM-21, the RM-70 has an armoured cab and enough room behind it to allow for the storage of further 40 rockets. Those rockets can be automatically reloaded into launcher at the same time.
    • RM-70/85: Modification of RM-70 launch vehicle on unarmored Tatra 815 truck.

Czech Republic

[edit]
  • RM 70 Vampire: RM 70 modern version on Tatra 817 8x8 chassis with digital fire control system, introduced in 2015.
  • BM-21 MT STRIGA: BM-21 launch vehicle on Tatra 817 4x4 chassis with digital fire control system, without spare rack for immediate reload, introduced in 2022.

Egypt

[edit]

The Egyptians domestically manufacture the rockets Sakr-18 and Sakr-36, with a respective range of 18 km (11 mi) and 36 km (22 mi), and the latest Sakr-45 with a superior range of 45 km (28 mi). Rather than a standard HE-Frag round, the Egyptian military prefers a 23-kilogram (51 lb) cluster munition, which can be extremely effective against lightly armored equipment and troop concentrations. Both rockets, as well as the original Soviet models of course, are fired by locally manufactured rocket launchers like the RL-21 (copy of BM-11) and RC-21 (copy of BM-21, similar to the Hadid HM20). The Helwan Machine Tools Company also produces portable systems with one, three, four and eight launch tubes. Also the RAAD 200 which is a BM-21 on a new tracked vehicle.

Ethiopia

[edit]

The Homicho Ammunition Engineering Complex produces the rockets while the Bishoftu Motorization Engineering Complex produces the launching tubes and has converted existing trucks to diesel engine. Bishoftu Motorization has also produced a six tube launcher to be mounted on light trucks.

Gaza Strip

[edit]

Since 2006 Hamas has fired 122 mm Grad rockets, copies made in Iran, and Eastern-bloc versions modified to expand their range, into Israel.[21] The rockets were believed to be brought into the Gaza Strip via tunnels from Egypt.[21] Some of the rockets were of a Chinese Grad variant.[22] Hamas sources said they were pleased by the performance of the Chinese variants of the BM-21 Grad rocket, which demonstrated a far greater range and blast impact than Palestinian-made rockets, as well as Russian-origin Grads or Katyushas.[22][23]

Hamas have used small man-portable single-tube launchers for rockets in attacks against Israel, designated 122 mm 9P132/BM-21-P.[24] The 122 mm Grad rockets used in Gaza have a range of about 40 km (25 mi), and can reach the Israeli towns of Ashdod, Beer-Sheva, Ofakim, Gedera, Kiryat Gat, Ashqelon, Sderot, Rehovot, Kiryat Malachi and Gan Yavne. They also published a clip claiming device mounted used as a multi-barrel rocket launcher on vehicle used for first time in Gaza.[25] On 7 April 2011, the Iron Dome system successfully intercepted a Grad rocket launched from Gaza for the first time. The rockets were launched without their dedicated platforms and by untrained operators which causes very low accuracy. Over 50% of the rockets miss entire cities and over 10% end up hitting the sea.[26]

Georgia

[edit]
A Georgian RS-122, a heavily upgraded and automated version of the Soviet BM-21 based on the Ukrainian KrAZ-63221 chassis
  • RS-122 Magaria: In March 2012, the Republic of Georgia unveiled its own heavily modified self-propelled version of the BM-21 Grad. There are innovative improvements similar to that of its Polish counterpart. The crew cabin is armoured and well-protected in accordance with STANAG level 2 or higher. The 40-tube launcher is fitted with a pinpoint targeting system and has a maximum firing distance of 45 km depending on ammunition, guaranteeing much more precision at greater distances. There is enough room for an additional 40-tube pack. The launcher can be deployed and activated directly from inside the crew cab, greatly decreasing time between salvos. However, the traditional external setup is also available. An entire barrage can be fired in less than 20 seconds. The general purpose platform can also be used for more sophisticated rocket systems.[27][28]

Iran

[edit]

D.I.O. from Iran produces copies of the BM-11 and BM-21 systems that can fire the original Soviet rockets as well as the locally developed "Arash" with a range of 20.5 km (12.7 mi). There is also a rocket with a range of 75 km (47 mi).[citation needed]

  • Heidar-44: A 40-tube version of the BM-21 based on KrAZ truck chassies.
  • HM20: This is the Iranian version of the BM-21, mounted on a Mercedes-Benz 2624 6×6 truck. The launch pack however consists of 2 packs of 20 tubes. Reportedly[by whom?] there is also a version with an automatic reload-system, latest version is mounted on 6×6 MAN trucks.[citation needed]
  • HM23: Lighter 16-round version with two packs of 8 launch tubes.
  • HM27: An 8-round version based on the Toyota Land Cruiser truck.
  • Raad: Iranian version of the 24-round BM-11, based on a Mercedes-Benz LA 911B 4x4 truck. Some vehicles are equipped with a light hydraulic crane. Not to be confused with an ATGM or a self-propelled howitzer of the same name.

Iraq

[edit]

Various 122 mm-type rockets were deployed by Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, modified to deliver nerve agents to targets. This included the 40-inch long, domestically produced Grad MLRS-compatible "Borak" warhead designed to disperse sarin gas.[29]

Italy

[edit]

Produced a limited number of FIROS 25 and 30 rocket launchers. They had the same configuration, exactly 40 rockets 122 mm caliber, compatible also with BM-21 launcher. Range about 25–32 km, sold to Libya, United Arab Emirates and probably other customers. About 150 produced in '80s-'90s.

North Korea

[edit]
  • BM-11: North Korean 30-tube version. The tubes are arranged in 2 banks of 15; all rockets can be fired in as little as 15 seconds. The basis for the BM-11 system is an unlicensed copy of the Japanese-manufactured Isuzu HTS12G 2.5 ton truck chassis.
  • MRL 122 mm M1977: U.S. DIA code for a system that appears to be a direct copy of the BM-21 "Grad".
  • MRL 122 mm M1985: This is a more modern version, based on an Isuzu 6×6 truck and probably with a 40-round reload pack mounted between the cab and the launcher.

Pakistan

[edit]

Pakistan first obtained these MRLS from China in few numbers (52+ Chinese Type-83) and then reverse engineered to develop these multiple rockets indigenously by KRL (Khan Research Laboratories). The new missile system were developed with 16 modernization by Pakistani Engineers. A vertical stabilizer was added to the launcher that improved its accuracy. The new indigenously reverse engineered system were named KRL Ghadab. The range of the indigenously developed rockets were increased to 45 km with <1% CEP.

  • KRL 122: Kahuta Research Laboratories from Pakistan have developed a rocket launcher based on the BM-21 Grad.[30][31] The KRL 122 was originally based on an Isuzu truck but later models use the Reo M35 truck. Some sources mention the designator Gadab. In addition to the original Soviet rockets, the system can launch the Yarmuk Rockets developed by Pakistan Ordnance Factories. The KRL 122 has achieved a maximum range of over 40 km due to the use of upgraded 122 mm rockets.[32][33][citation needed]

Poland

[edit]
A WR-40 Langusta, a deeply modernized and automated version, of the Soviet BM-21 based on the Jelcz P662D.35 6x6 truck, displayed at the MSPO 2007.
  • WR-40 "Langusta" (eng. spiny lobster) (wyrzutnia rakietowa means rocket launcher): This is a modern Polish version with a new fire control system (with ballistic computer BFC201 and navigation system Sigma 30) and a modified launcher based on the Jelcz P662D.35G-27 6×6 truck, produced by Jelcz Komponenty.[34] The first vehicle entered service on 20 March 2007. Probably about half of all 227 Polish BM-21 launchers will be converted into WR-40 launchers. New, modern types of munition were also developed for the launcher: the range is approximately 42 km (26 mi) for fragmentation-HE rockets "Feniks-Z [d]" and 32 km (20 mi) for cargo rockets. The Jelcz P662.D.35 truck with lightly armoured cab is also believed to be the base of a Polish multiple rocket launcher complex, which will possibly be developed in the future.

Romania

[edit]
  • APR-21 (aruncător de proiectile reactive – rocket launcher): Romanian 21-round launcher (3 rows of 7) mounted on a Bucegi SR-114 4x4 chassis. No longer used by the Romanian Army but some vehicles have been exported to Nigeria and Croatia. Morocco has the launch pack mounted on a Kaiser M35 truck.
  • APR-40: Initially this designator was used for the original BM-21 "Grad" in Romanian service, but Aerostar SA has developed an improved model, based on a DAC-665T 6x6 truck. A slightly improved model, called APRA-40 or 40 APRA 122 FMC is based on the DAC 15.215 DFAEG truck. Each launcher is normally accompanied by a resupply truck MITC with a 6t crane and a trailer RM13. The system is also used by Botswana, Bosnia, Cameroon, Croatia, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Nigeria and Ukraine.[35]
    • LAROM or LAROM 160: This is an upgraded version that was developed in cooperation with Israel. The launch vehicle is based on the truck chassis DAC 25.360 DFAEG, fitted with two launch packs with each 20 122 mm tubes or 13 160 mm tubes.[36] The LAROM 160 can fire rockets like the LAR Mk.IV with a range of 45 km (28 mi). The system entered service with the Romanian Land Forces in 2002.[37]

Serbia

[edit]
A Serbian LRSVM Morava
  • LRSVM Morava: Universal modular MLRS with possibilities to use all models of Grad 122 mm rockets, both with M-77 Oganj and M-63 Plamen 128 mm rockets too.
  • G-2000: Produced by EdePro, G-2000 122 mm missile is with range above 40 km.[38]

South Africa

[edit]
A Ukrainian BM-21 Bastion-1 based on a KrAZ-260 chassis
  • Valkiri: This is a South African design based on Grad 21a Unimog truck chassis by Denel using 127 mm rockets.
  • Bateleur: A newer, more accurate version of the Valkiri. Based on the Withings (White Stallion) military recovery truck chassis. Also produced by Denel.

Thailand

[edit]
  • DTI-2: The 122 mm multiple rocket launcher by Defense Technology Institute.[citation needed]

Ukraine

[edit]
A Ukrainian Bastion-02
  • BM-21K: A modernization based on a modified double-cab KrAZ-260 chassis with an improved fire control system.
  • Bastion-1: A modernization based on the KrAZ-260 chassis.
  • Bastion-2: A modernization based on the KrAZ-260 chassis with additional storage space for 40 missiles.
  • BM-21 UM Berest
  • Verba: A modernization based on a modified double-cab KrAZ-6322 chassis with a digital fire control system.
  • Mini-Grad: an improvised launcher constructed from BM-21 Grad launch tubes mounted on a pickup truck, enhanced with additional features to improve survivability and short-range accuracy.[39]

Projectiles

[edit]

The original "Grad" rocket has a range of about 20 kilometers (12 mi). The first modification called "G-M" increased the range to about 27.5 kilometers (17.1 mi), while the second modification "G-2000" further increased the range to about 40 kilometers (25 mi).[40] The latest technology development has allowed new Grad rockets to have 52 kilometers (32 mi) range.[41] The range may also vary due to the type of warhead.

The 9M22S munition (see below) was developed by NPO Splav during the Soviet era.[42][43] Instead of a high-explosive fragmentation warhead, the 9M22S rocket carries a warhead containing 180 separate 9N510 incendiary elements.[44] Designed to ignite vegetation, storage facilities, or fuel, these incendiary elements consist of hexagonal prisms made from a magnesium alloy known to the Russian GOST as ML-5,[45][46] filled with a thermite mixture.[47] Each element has a nominal length of 40 mm and a width of 25 mm and a burning time of at least 2 minutes. The effect of these incendiary, as well as conventional lighting munitions (especially at night), outwardly resembles the use of phosphorus munitions.[42]

Origin Ammunition type Minimum range Maximum range Length Weight Warhead
weight
metres miles metres miles metres ft in kg lb kg lb
9M22U (M-21OF) USSR/Russia Fragmentation-HE 5,000 3.1 20,380 12.66 2.87 9 ft 5 in 66.6 147 18.4 41
9M18 USSR/Russia POM-2 submunitions
9M28F USSR/Russia Fragmentation-HE 1,500 0.93 15,000 9.3 2.27 7 ft 5 in 56.5 125 21.0 46.3
9M28K USSR/Russia Anti-tank mines 13,400 8.3 3.04 10 ft 0 in 57.7 127 22.8 50
9M43 USSR/Russia Smoke 20,000 12 2.95 9 ft 8 in 66 146 20.2 45
9M217 USSR/Russia Anti-tank submunitions 30,000 19 3.04 10 ft 0 in 70 150 25 55
9M218 USSR/Russia HEAT submunitions 30,000 19 3.04 10 ft 0 in 70 150 25 55
9M519 USSR/Russia RF jammer 18,500 11.5 3.04 10 ft 0 in 66 146 18.4 41
9M521 USSR/Russia Fragmentation-HE 40,000 25 2.87 9 ft 5 in 66 146 21 46
9M522 USSR/Russia Fragmentation-HE 37,500 23.3 3.04 10 ft 0 in 70 150 25 55
PRC-60 USSR/Russia Underwater charge (for BM-21PD) 300 0.19 5,000 3.1 2.75 9 ft 0 in 75.3 166 20 44
Type 90A China Fragmentation-HE 12,700 7.9 32,700 20.3 2.75 9 ft 0 in 18.3 40
M21-OF-FP Romania Fragmentation-HE 5,000–6,000 3.1–3.7 20,400 12.7 2.87 9 ft 5 in 65.4 144 6.35 14.0
M21-OF-S Romania Fragmentation-HE 1,000 0.62 12,700 7.9 1.927 6 ft 3.9 in 46.6 103 6.35 14.0
Edepro G2000/52 Serbia Fragmentation-HE 40,200 25.0 2.862 9 ft 4.7 in 64.4 142 19.0 41.9
Sakr-45A Egypt AT / AP submunitions 42,000 26 3.31 10 ft 10 in 67.5 149 24.5 54
Sakr-45B Egypt Fragmentation-HE 45,000 28 2.9 9 ft 6 in 63.5 140 20.5 45
9M22S USSR/Russia Incendiary 1,500 0.93 19,890 12.36 2.97 9 ft 9 in 66 146 17.8 39
9M28S USSR/Russia Incendiary 1,650 1.03 15,070 9.36 2.318 7 ft 7.3 in 53 117 17.8 39

Also Incendiary, Chemical, Illumination, Antipersonnel mines.

Operators

[edit]
Operators
  Current
  Former
A fired 122 mm projectile of a RM-70 multiple rocket launcher stuck in muddy land in Vakarai, Batticaloa during the Sri Lankan Civil War (2007).
A Djiboutian Army Rocket Launcher
A BM-21 on display near the Karen Demirchyan Complex, Yerevan, Armenia

Current operators

[edit]

Former operators

[edit]

Evaluation only

[edit]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Bibliography

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

BM-21 Grad

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The is a truck-mounted 122 mm system developed by the in the early 1960s. It features a 40-tube launcher capable of firing unguided M-21OF high-explosive rockets with a maximum range of up to 20 kilometers. The system entered service with the in 1963 as a replacement for the older launcher, mounted initially on the Ural-375D 6x6 truck chassis for enhanced mobility. Designed for rapid saturation bombardment, the BM-21 Grad can unleash a full salvo of 40 rockets in under 20 seconds, providing area against troop concentrations, equipment, and fortifications. Its simplicity, low cost, and ease of maintenance have contributed to its status as one of the most prolifically produced and exported systems of the era. The launcher has been upgraded over time, including adoption of the chassis in the 1970s, and licensed variants have been manufactured in countries such as , , and . Remaining in active service with dozens of nations more than six decades after its introduction, the BM-21 Grad exemplifies enduring Soviet principles emphasizing massed and logistical robustness. It has been employed in numerous conflicts worldwide, demonstrating effectiveness in both conventional and despite limitations in precision compared to modern guided systems.

Development and Introduction

Design Origins and Early Prototyping

The development of the BM-21 Grad originated in the late 1950s as part of Soviet efforts to modernize beyond the improvised II-era Katyusha systems, such as the BM-13, which had demonstrated the effectiveness of massed unguided rocket salvos for area suppression but suffered from inconsistent mounting, limited mobility, and logistical challenges. In , the State Committee for Defense Technology tasked the Scientific Research Institute No. 147 (NII-147) in Tula, under chief designer Alexander N. Ganichev, with creating a standardized 122 mm multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) mounted on a production truck chassis to enable rapid saturation fire against troop concentrations and fortifications, prioritizing volume over precision in line with Soviet artillery doctrine. The project drew tactical lessons from Katyusha's WWII employment, where salvoes provided psychological and suppressive impact despite inaccuracy, but aimed to address Katyusha's vulnerabilities like rail-mounted immobility and exposure during reloading. Early prototyping began around 1960 at SKB-203 (later JSC NPP Start), focusing on integrating a fixed 40-tube launcher pod capable of firing up to 40 rockets in approximately 20 seconds with the Ural-375D 6x6 truck chassis for enhanced cross-country mobility and quick repositioning to avoid counter-battery fire. Factory tests of initial prototypes occurred in late 1961, followed by field trials in 1961–1962 at sites like the Sofrino artillery range and Rzhevka, where engineers refined stabilization, rocket stabilization, and pod reloading mechanisms based on performance data from prototype batches, including two combat vehicles and associated munitions. These efforts incorporated warhead development input from the State Research and Production Enterprise Splav (NPO Splav), emphasizing reliable fragmentation and incendiary effects for the M-21OF rockets. The prototypes successfully validated the system's core concept of high-volume, short-duration barrages, leading to its formal adoption by the Soviet Army on March 28, 1963, via USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No. 372-130ss, marking a shift to purpose-built, wheeled MLRS platforms in Soviet inventory.

Production and Initial Deployment

Serial production of the BM-21 Grad commenced in 1963 at the Motovilikha Plants in Perm, Soviet Union, transitioning from earlier prototypes mounted on ZIL-157 trucks to the standardized Ural-375D 6x6 chassis for enhanced mobility and logistics compatibility. This shift emphasized cost-effective manufacturing by leveraging existing automotive production lines, enabling rapid scalability without requiring bespoke vehicle development. The system entered service with artillery units in 1964, replacing older rocket launchers and integrating into divisional structures. Initial deployment focused on equipping motorized rifle and tank divisions, with batteries organized into regiments capable of delivering high-volume . The first documented combat use occurred in March 1969 during the at Damansky Island, where Soviet forces employed the BM-21 to counter Chinese infantry assaults, marking its operational debut. By the 1970s, production had scaled to thousands of units, supporting widespread adoption across forces through exports to allies such as Poland, , and , which licensed local assembly to bolster collective defense capabilities. Doctrinally, the BM-21 formed a core element of Soviet "firepower strikes," designed to saturate enemy fortifications and troop concentrations over areas up to 40 hectares per salvo, facilitating breakthroughs by formations while supported by counter-battery radars like the AN/MPQ-37 for targeting. This integration prioritized massed, short-duration barrages to disrupt defenses prior to maneuver elements advancing.

System Design and Specifications

Launcher Vehicle and Chassis

The BM-21 Grad utilizes the Ural-375D 6x6 truck chassis as its primary mounting platform in the standard configuration, providing a robust, all-wheel-drive base engineered for cross-country mobility in diverse terrains. This chassis features an unarmored forward cab for the driver and crew, with the rear area dedicated to the launcher assembly, prioritizing simplicity and rapid deployment over protected operations. The vehicle's overall dimensions are 7.35 meters in length, 2.40 meters in width, and 3.09 meters in height, contributing to a combat weight of 13.7 metric tons when fully loaded with rockets. Propulsion is provided by a ZIL-375 V-8 gasoline engine delivering 180 horsepower, enabling a maximum road speed of 75-80 km/h and an operational range of 750-800 km on prepared surfaces. The 6x6 configuration, supplemented by features like optional central tire inflation systems, enhances reliability in rugged conditions, allowing fording depths up to 1.5 meters. The launcher consists of a reusable pod with 40 launch tubes arranged in a rectangular , which is hydraulically elevated from 0 to 55 degrees for firing and rotated forward over the cab for transit to minimize silhouette and facilitate transport. For stability during launch, particularly off-road, two hydraulic jacks at the rear are extended to brace the vehicle against recoil forces. Reloading the pod is performed manually or with auxiliary equipment from a separate ammunition carrier truck, typically requiring 5-10 minutes for a trained to achieve combat readiness. This design emphasizes quick setup and teardown, integral to the system's role in massed, high-volume .

Rocket Pods and Firing System

The rocket pods of the BM-21 Grad consist of a single launcher unit with 40 launch tubes arranged in four rows of ten, each tube accommodating one 122 mm unguided rocket. The tubes feature internal grooves to impart stabilizing spin to the rockets during launch, enabling a maximum range of 20 km with standard ammunition. Reloading is performed manually by the crew, who insert individual rockets into the tubes, a process requiring approximately 10 minutes for a full pod. The firing system employs electrical ignition powered by an onboard generator, allowing for single-round or full-salvo discharge. A complete salvo of 40 rockets can be launched in about 20 seconds, saturating a target area with high volume of fire. At maximum range, this salvo produces a lethal covering roughly 600 m × 600 m, optimized for suppression of exposed or area denial rather than precision strikes. Aiming relies on the PG-1M panoramic telescope for manual alignment in and , with no integrated ballistic computer in the original design; operators use precomputed firing tables adjusted for meteorological conditions and surveyed positions. The system supports firing directly from the cab for crew protection or remotely via cable up to 60 meters, minimizing exposure during engagement. Launch tubes are elevated hydraulically to the firing angle, with the pod's open-bottom design directing exhaust gases downward to mitigate backblast hazards to the vehicle.

Mobility, Crew Requirements, and Logistics

The BM-21 Grad utilizes the Ural-375D 6×6 truck chassis, which features all-wheel drive and high ground clearance suited for rough roads and off-road conditions, though specific clearance figures are approximately 400 mm based on the base truck's design. This configuration allows traversal of secondary roads and unprepared terrain but limits maximum speeds to 75 km/h on highways due to the 180 hp V8 and 5×2 gearbox. The vehicle's operational range extends to around 750 km, yet its truck-like profile and moderate acceleration increase exposure to and precision strikes during transit or repositioning after firing. Crew requirements consist of three personnel for emplacement and firing—typically a , commander, and gunner—with additional loaders bringing the total to four or five for efficient reloading. The system's manual controls and cab-fired operation enable quick setup in under three minutes, accommodating operators with basic training rather than extensive expertise. Logistics involve manual rocket reloading by crew, achievable in about eight minutes with five personnel, or faster pod swaps on supported variants. rockets are transported in wooden crates on supply trucks, with a standard battery organization providing 2–3 reloads per launcher to support initial salvos before resupply, making prolonged field use sensitive to disruptions in convoys.

Ammunition and Warheads

Standard 122 mm Rockets

The primary munition for the BM-21 Grad is the unguided M-21OF 122 mm , a solid-fuel designed for high-explosive fragmentation effects against area targets. Total rocket weight measures 66 kg, incorporating an 18.4 kg charged with TNT-based such as TGAF-5. Launched from the system's pods, it attains a of 690 m/s, enabling a maximum range of 20,127 to 20,380 meters. The M-21OF warhead features internal scoring to generate approximately 3,950 fragments weighing 0.5 grams or more upon detonation, dispersing over a lethal radius of roughly 28 to 40 meters. This configuration prioritizes saturation fire for area denial, particularly effective against exposed infantry concentrations and light vehicles lacking armor protection. Development of the M-21OF coincided with the BM-21's introduction in , with production scaling up in the through state enterprises like Splav for widespread distribution to Warsaw Pact forces and allies. These rockets load directly into the launcher's 40-tube pods without requiring alterations, facilitating rapid replenishment in field conditions. Subsequent manufacturing by licensed producers in , Asia, and the has sustained stockpiles globally.

Specialized Payloads and Extensions

Specialized warheads for the BM-21 Grad include incendiary types such as the 9M22S rocket, which carries 180 ML-5 elements filled with thermite-based incendiary mixture, each burning for at least two minutes to create sustained fire foci over an area of up to 1,000 square meters. munitions enable mine dispersal, with variants like the 9M22K deploying three PTM-3 anti-tank mines and the 9M18 releasing five anti-personnel mines, while scatterable POM-2 fragmentation mines can be delivered via compatible dispensers for remote emplacement and self-destruct after 10–96 hours. Cluster payloads, such as those in 9M218 rockets, disperse submunitions including bomblets for anti-personnel or anti-armor effects, enhancing area saturation beyond standard fragmentation. Range extensions incorporate upgraded solid-fuel rockets like the 9M522, achieving maximum distances of up to 40–42 km for modern extended-range variants compared to 20 km for the standard 9M22 rocket, through improved propellant efficiency while maintaining compatibility with BM-21 launchers. Limited post-2000 modifications add guidance kits, such as inertial navigation with GPS for precision strikes, though these are not standard and deployment remains restricted primarily to upgraded systems. Theoretically, Grad rockets accommodate chemical warheads from historical Soviet stockpiles, allowing dispersal of agents over 20 km, but no verified combat applications exist; Ukrainian authorities reported alleged Russian use of irritant-loaded 122 mm rounds in BM-21 systems as of January 2025, prompting OPCW notifications, though independent confirmation is lacking amid conflicting claims.

Performance Characteristics

The standard M-21OF rocket for the BM-21 Grad achieves a maximum range of 20,380 meters and a minimum range of 5,000 meters. These unguided, spin-stabilized projectiles follow a ballistic trajectory influenced by factors such as wind and launch angle, resulting in substantial dispersion that increases with distance. At maximum range, the probable error in deflection is approximately 160 meters, contributing to an overall circular error probable (CEP) of around 200 meters. The launcher's firing mechanism enables a full salvo of 40 rockets in 20 seconds, with individual rockets intervaled at 0.5 seconds. This capability supports area saturation, where the combined impact footprint of a single vehicle's salvo spans roughly 0.36 km² (600 m × 600 m) when accounting for dispersion and effects. In massed battery fire involving 10 or more launchers, the overlapping patterns can empirically cover 1–2 km², enhancing probability of effect against dispersed area targets despite inherent inaccuracies. Terminal effects derive primarily from the high-explosive fragmentation (HE-FRAG) , which weighs 18.4 kg and contains about 4 kg of filler. Upon , it generates a and disperses approximately 3,950 pre-formed fragments greater than 0.5 g, producing lethal effects against exposed personnel within a radius of 25–30 meters per . The 's design emphasizes blast and fragmentation over penetration, yielding a high of in open terrain but reduced efficacy against hardened structures or armored vehicles.

Variants and Modernizations

Soviet and Russian Upgrades

The BM-21PD "Damba" variant, developed in the Soviet era during the as part of the DP-62 anti-sabotage system, features a 40-tube launcher mounted on a Ural-375D or for defending naval bases against combat divers and underwater threats. It incorporates electrically ignited rockets with a reduced range of approximately 1-2 km optimized for close-in coastal engagements, along with a power allowing operation from shipboard electricity for enhanced deployability in maritime environments. Post-Soviet Russian modernization efforts centered on the 9K51M Tornado-G system, introduced in the as a direct upgrade to the BM-21 Grad, featuring an automated with satellite navigation for precise targeting and reduced dispersion that reportedly increases strike effectiveness by 2.5 times compared to legacy systems. The Tornado-G employs a KamAZ-63501 6x6 for improved cross-country mobility and reliability over the original Ural-375D, with a 40-tube pod capable of ripple-firing in 20 seconds and reloading in about 8 minutes. Tornado-G ammunition includes extended-range 122 mm rockets such as the 9M521 (up to 40 km) and 9M522 variants, extending operational reach beyond the standard BM-21's 20-30 km while maintaining compatibility with existing Grad munitions for logistical flexibility. Russian forces continue production of Tornado-G units as a lower-cost complement to heavier systems like the , emphasizing massed with precision enhancements for divisional-level operations.

Eastern European Copies

The RM-70, developed by in the late 1960s and entering service in 1972, adapted the BM-21 Grad's 40-tube 122 mm launcher to a 8x8 wheeled chassis, incorporating an armored crew cab for improved protection against small arms and shell fragments. This design retained full compatibility with standard Grad rockets for interoperability while adding two auxiliary reload pods, each holding 40 rockets, to reduce replenishment time from 10-15 minutes to under 5 minutes under optimal conditions. Production emphasized rugged mobility over the original Ural-375D truck, with over 100 units built primarily for export to allied forces. Romania's APR-40, manufactured by Aerostar starting in the 1970s and formally adopted in 1978, replicated the BM-21's firing module on a lighter domestic , such as the DAC-443, to enhance logistical compatibility within Romanian forces. The system maintained the 40-round pod configuration and 122 mm caliber, enabling seamless use of Soviet or locally produced with ranges up to 20 km for unguided rockets, though it featured minor refinements to the elevation mechanism for slightly improved accuracy in static positions. Approximately 100 units were produced, reflecting fidelity to the original design amid resource constraints in non-Soviet Pact production. Poland's , introduced in the as a modernization of imported BM-21s, substituted the launcher onto a P662D 6x6 with updated fire control , yet preserved the core 122 mm compatibility to leverage existing stockpiles. This variant supported both original Grad munitions and Polish-developed guided rockets for ranges extending to 35 km, with about 70 systems delivered by 2012, underscoring limited deviations focused on chassis durability rather than radical redesign. Belarusian efforts produced the BM-21A BelGrad around 2001, mounting the Grad launcher on an with enhanced digital fire control for automated aiming and reduced crew exposure. Retaining the 40-tube array and 122 mm standard, it improved off-road performance and integrated GPS for positioning, with upgrades addressing wear from Soviet-era units while avoiding changes to ensure ammunition interchangeability across . Serbian BM-21 copies involved primarily chassis adaptations, such as integrating Grad pods onto local FAMOS or Tatra-derived trucks, maintaining the original launcher's simplicity and 122 mm for cost-effective sustainment. These modifications, seen in systems like the hybrid Oganj configurations capable of firing up to 50 Grad-compatible rockets, prioritized modular pod swaps over comprehensive overhauls. Across these copies, the 122 mm was universally retained for logistical alignment with Soviet doctrine, enabling shared supply chains in former armies. However, post-1991 NATO accessions in countries like and constrained further indigenous upgrades, shifting focus to Western integrations and donations rather than deepening fidelity to the Grad lineage.

Asian and Middle Eastern Adaptations

China produced the Type 81 self-propelled multiple rocket launcher in the early 1980s as a licensed derivative of the BM-21, featuring 40 launch tubes for 122 mm rockets mounted on a modified Dongfeng EQ140 6x6 truck chassis with a standard range of approximately 20 km. This system marked China's initial effort to localize production of Soviet-era rocket artillery for the People's Liberation Army, incorporating domestic rocket variants compatible with BM-21 munitions. Subsequent developments included the Type 90, an upgraded 40-tube 122 mm launcher on an improved XC2030 6x6 chassis developed by Norinco, emphasizing enhanced mobility and fire control over the original design. Export variants of these systems, such as the WS-22, have been supplied to regional allies including Bangladesh, where they retain the core 122 mm pod configuration but integrate Chinese guidance upgrades for limited precision in some configurations. North Korea developed the M-1985 and M-1991 multiple rocket launchers in the 1980s, direct copies of the BM-21 and its towed Type 63 counterpart, with approximately 200 units estimated in service for saturation fire roles. These adaptations prioritize mass production using local chassis, though without verified solid-fuel rocket enhancements beyond standard liquid propellants. In , the produced Fajr-series launchers derived from North Korean M-1985 designs, which trace lineage to the BM-21; the Fajr-3 employs 12 tubes for 240 mm rockets achieving 43 km range, doubling the original Grad's effective reach through extended warheads and propellants. incorporated similar Fajr-derived systems during the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, adapting captured and imported BM-21 chassis with Iranian rockets for extended-range barrages exceeding 40 km. fields BM-21 systems augmented by indigenous Yarmuk high-explosive fragmentation rockets, produced by since the 2000s, which extend operational range to over 40 km while maintaining compatibility with standard 40-tube pods. Middle Eastern non-state actors like have localized BM-21 adaptations by mounting standard 40-tube pods on 6x6 trucks such as the HM-20 variant, facilitating rapid deployment in while preserving the system's area-denial capabilities. These truck-based modifications emphasize concealment and mobility over chassis redesign, drawing from Iranian technical assistance.

Improvised and Recent Field Modifications

In the , Ukrainian forces have fielded improvised "mini-Grad" multiple rocket launchers by adapting shortened launch tubes from BM-21 systems onto civilian pickup trucks, enabling lighter, more agile platforms for saturation fire since at least August 2023. These modifications prioritize tactics amid drone and counter-battery risks, with tubes firing standard 122 mm rockets in salvos of 10-20 for area suppression. To compensate for ammunition shortages and extend engagement ranges, Ukrainian BM-21 operators have incorporated Serbian-manufactured 122 mm rockets, which reportedly achieve up to 50 km compared to the baseline Soviet M-21OF's 20-40 km, with integrations noted by February 2024. Such ad-hoc swaps leverage third-party imports for compatibility with existing pods, though precision remains unguided and reliant on volume fire. Following the in , insurgents mounted BM-21-derived 122 mm rocket tubes on captured U.S.-origin Navistar trucks, repurposing abandoned logistics vehicles for mobile launchers to support territorial advances. These field assemblies, observed in operations through 2025, substitute for unavailable Soviet , emphasizing rapid assembly from stockpiles over standardized engineering. In , amid 2024 modernization efforts tied to anti-narcotics operations, the army transferred BM-21 launchers (designated 2B5) to KamAZ-43118 6x6 chassis, replacing obsolescent Ural-375D trucks to boost off-road mobility and payload capacity in rugged terrain. This retrofit, leveraging commercially available Russian heavy trucks, enhances deployment speed without full-system overhauls. Across these conflicts, operators have jury-rigged basic GPS units and mesh screens onto BM-21 variants for improved execution against FPV drones, with Ukrainian and Russian attempts documented in 2025 strikes where unmodified systems were neutralized post-firing within 30 minutes. Such low-tech additions aim to shorten exposure times but face limitations from the platform's inherent reload delays and acoustic signatures.

Operational History

Early Combat Deployments (1960s–1980s)

The BM-21 Grad received its baptism of fire in March 1969 during the , specifically in clashes over Damansky Island () along the River, where Soviet border guards and motorized rifle units deployed the system to repel Chinese incursions involving infantry and light armor. Following approval amid escalating tensions, the launchers provided suppressive rocket barrages that marked the system's debut in operational combat, demonstrating its capacity for rapid area denial against massed assaults in a defensive border scenario. In the , Arab states equipped with Soviet-supplied BM-21 Grads employed the launcher extensively during the 1973 , with Egyptian and Syrian forces firing salvos to saturate Israeli armored columns advancing across the Sinai and . These deployments highlighted the system's role in high-intensity conventional warfare, where batteries delivered high-volume unguided rocket fire over ranges of up to 20 kilometers to disrupt mechanized breakthroughs, though exact casualty figures from Grad strikes remain undocumented in declassified accounts. Syrian units continued using the BM-21 in subsequent engagements, including defensive operations during Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, where it supported Syrian and Palestinian positions against advancing IDF formations in the Bekaa Valley and . The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 introduced the BM-21 to prolonged operations, with motorized rifle divisions and regiments deploying the launchers from bases in the northern provinces to target strongholds in rugged terrain. Over the decade-long conflict, Grads were fired in salvos to blanket fortified caves and mountain redoubts, such as those near , expending thousands of 122 mm rockets annually to support ground advances by the 40th Army. These missions, often conducted from mobile Ural-375D trucks traversing limited road networks, underscored logistical demands in austere environments, including ammunition resupply over extended supply lines vulnerable to ambush.

Post-Cold War Conflicts

In the of the 1990s, BM-21 Grad systems saw employment by Croatian forces during on August 4–7, 1995, when multiple rocket barrages targeted the Serb-held town of , facilitating the rapid advance and capture of the region with minimal Croatian casualties but contributing to civilian displacement and infrastructure damage. Bosnian government army units also integrated captured or supplied BM-21 launchers into their artillery for and urban defense, though limited quantities restricted widespread use compared to heavier field guns. These applications highlighted the system's role in area suppression during sieges and breakthroughs, where its 40-rocket salvoes covered up to 600 meters in width but offered little precision against mobile or entrenched opponents. Russian forces extensively deployed BM-21 Grad launchers during the (1994–1996), particularly in the Battle of Grozny from December 1994 to March 1995, unleashing saturation fire to dismantle Chechen strongpoints amid dense urban terrain. The unguided rockets, fired in volleys from truck-mounted platforms, demolished buildings and suppressed guerrilla positions but proved ineffective for pinpoint targeting, allowing Chechen fighters to exploit the system's 20–30 km range limitations and inaccuracy in close-quarters combat. Chechen rebels captured several launchers and over 1,000 rockets, repurposing them for ambushes on federal convoys, which underscored vulnerabilities in unsecured supply lines and the weapon's ease of operation by minimally trained personnel. In the 1991 , Iraqi army and divisions fielded approximately 200–300 BM-21 Grad systems as part of their doctrine, launching rockets against coalition troop concentrations and forward operating bases during the ground campaign from February 24–28, 1991, to disrupt advances in and southern . While capable of delivering high-volume fire—up to 40 rockets per launcher in 20 seconds—the platforms' static reloading process and lack of camouflage exposed them to devastating counterstrikes from U.S.-led air assets, resulting in near-total attrition rates exceeding 80% of deployed units. Residual Grads remained in Iraqi service through the 2003 invasion, where they were sporadically fired at invading coalition columns near and but similarly succumbed to rapid neutralization by helicopters and raids, affirming their doctrinal emphasis on massed firepower over survivability against technologically superior foes.

Syrian Civil War and Middle East Uses

The Syrian Arab Army deployed BM-21 Grad systems in massed barrages against rebel-held districts during the civil war from 2011 onward, targeting urban centers like Homs to dislodge opposition fighters entrenched in densely populated areas. In mid-December 2012, government forces fired 122 mm Grad rockets carrying cluster munitions from BM-21 launchers at locations near Homs, contributing to siege tactics that combined rocket saturation with ground assaults. Similar volleys supported offensives in Aleppo by 2016, where the system's rapid-fire capability—up to 40 rockets in 20 seconds—enabled suppression of rebel positions amid prolonged urban combat. Hezbollah, supporting Assad's regime, facilitated smuggling of Grad rockets through Syrian territory for its arsenal, with consignments seized by Syrian as recently as September 2025 in Al-Qusayr, intended for cross-border operations against Israeli positions. The group employed 122 mm Grad-type Katyushas in skirmishes along the Syria-Lebanon-Israel , leveraging the system's mobility for hit-and-run launches amid Hezbollah's interventions in Syrian battles like Qusayr in 2013. The seized BM-21 launchers from captured Syrian and Iraqi military depots, reversing them for offensive use including a July 2018 barrage of Grad rockets fired from toward the in . These captures enabled to conduct syndicated strikes in eastern and northern , though operational constraints limited sustained employment compared to state forces. Iranian-aligned proxies integrated Grad systems into ; in , Houthi fighters inherited BM-21 launchers from pre-war Yemeni army stocks, deploying them in attacks on coalition advances toward in 2021, often alongside improvised adaptations for drone-integrated targeting. In Iraq, militias launched Grad rocket salvos at U.S.-hosted bases, such as the March 2021 attack on airbase using multiple BM-21 systems from nearby positions. Across these theaters, Grad rockets exerted high psychological pressure through sheer volume and noise of incoming salvos, demoralizing insurgents in urban fights, but empirical assessments noted diminished precision and reliability from aged stockpiles, with unguided trajectories favoring area suppression over pinpoint strikes.

(2014–Present)

In the initial phase of the conflict in 2014, Russian-backed separatists in employed BM-21 Grad systems, with early instances reported as early as May 9, 2014, when insurgents allegedly seized Ukrainian units and used them for salvos against government positions. Ukrainian forces responded with BM-21 , integrating the systems into operations near the Russian border to target separatist and positions. Both sides relied on the Grad for area suppression in the theater, contributing to intensified exchanges around key sites like Airport. Following the full-scale Russian invasion on February 24, 2022, BM-21 Grads saw sustained bilateral deployment, with Russian forces using them for preparatory barrages and Ukrainian units, such as the , firing 122 mm salvos against advancing positions in areas like as late as July 2024. modernized portions of its Grad inventory, including mini-Grad variants like the Verba MLRS on chassis, while receiving transfers of Romanian APR-40 systems—a Grad derivative—in early 2025 to bolster stocks. deployed upgraded Tornado-G variants, entering combat in by November 2022, featuring improved guidance for ranges up to 40 km via integrated UAV support. From 2023 to 2025, Grad systems faced heightened vulnerabilities to Ukrainian FPV and bomber drones, which destroyed numerous BM-21 launchers mid-movement or in firing positions, with at least 265 confirmed losses by OSINT tracking through early 2025. Usage persisted due to scaled production: increased 122 mm output from approximately 33,000 rounds in 2023 to over 500,000 in 2024, sustaining frontline salvos amid broader demands. Ukrainian forces reported destroying at least one BM-21 in June 2025 allegedly loaded with chemical munitions in , based on intercepted communications urging use post-strike, though independent verification of the payload remains pending.

Tactical Employment and Effectiveness

Doctrinal Role in Soviet and Successor Forces

In Soviet military doctrine, the BM-21 Grad served as a divisional-level multiple rocket launcher system designed primarily for artillery preparation within the framework of deep battle operations, entering service around 1963. Organized into battalions typically comprising 18 launchers mounted on Ural-375D trucks, these units executed concentrated, high-volume fire raids to suppress enemy defenses, disrupt command and control, and soften targets immediately preceding infantry and armored assaults. A single battalion volley—delivering up to 720 122 mm rockets—equated to the explosive effect of approximately 18 howitzer batteries, emphasizing saturation over precision to achieve temporary dominance in the close operational depth. Doctrinal employment stressed massed fires from multiple battalions, often exceeding 100 launchers in breakthrough scenarios, to overwhelm fortified positions and enable successive echelons of maneuver forces to exploit gaps in enemy lines. This aligned with the Soviet emphasis on operational art, where complemented tube systems in phased fire preparations, transitioning from destructive barrages to accompanying fires during advances. Post-firing, units prioritized rapid displacement—achievable within 2 minutes—to mitigate counter-battery risks, embodying the "fire and maneuver" principle central to Soviet tactical flexibility. Post-Soviet successor forces, notably in the , retained the BM-21's core role in general-purpose while adapting it to contemporary doctrines favoring reconnaissance-fire complexes against hybrid threats. Integration with longer-range assets like the system enables layered engagements, where Grad batteries provide area suppression to fix dispersed or mobile adversaries, facilitating precision strikes on high-value targets. This evolution reflects a doctrinal shift toward fires in non-linear warfare, preserving the system's utility for massed, responsive barrages despite the proliferation of guided munitions.

Strengths in Saturation Fire and Suppression

The BM-21 Grad's primary strength lies in its capacity for high-volume saturation fire, enabling rapid delivery of 122mm rockets over large areas to overwhelm enemy defenses and positions. A single launcher can discharge its full load of 40 rockets in as little as 20 seconds, achieving an effective firing rate of approximately 120 rockets per minute per vehicle. In standard battery configurations, often involving multiple coordinated launchers, this scales to deliver hundreds or thousands of projectiles in coordinated salvos, saturating target zones up to 20 km away and covering areas exceeding 400 meters in diameter per launcher salvo. This volume-based approach prioritizes quantity over precision, proving effective against dispersed , unarmored vehicles, and soft targets in open terrain. The system's saturation barrages induce significant psychological disruption and area denial, compelling enemy forces to seek cover and halting maneuvers for extended periods. The incoming rockets produce a characteristic screeching that heightens and disorientation, amplifying non-lethal effects on troop morale and cohesion. Combined with the wide dispersal of high-explosive fragmentation warheads, a typical salvo can suppress enemy or batteries for 10 to 20 minutes by denying safe movement and forcing dispersal, as evidenced in doctrinal employment for during advances or retreats. In the from 2022 onward, Grad systems have demonstrated sustained utility in these roles despite the rise of drones and counter-battery radars, forming the backbone of for due to their to provide immediate, high-density in attritional frontline conditions. Cost-effectiveness further enhances the Grad's viability for prolonged operations, with individual 122mm rockets estimated at $1,000 to $2,000 per unit—orders of magnitude cheaper than comparable precision-guided munitions, which often exceed $100,000 each. This affordability, coupled with simple production and , allows batteries to sustain repetitive salvos in high-consumption environments without straining resources, achieving equivalent area coverage against non-point targets at roughly one-tenth the expense of guided alternatives like GMLRS rockets. Such economics have underpinned its persistence in modern conflicts, including through 2025, where massed unguided fire remains a practical counter to resource constraints.

Limitations, Vulnerabilities, and Countermeasures

The BM-21 Grad's 122 mm rockets demonstrate limited accuracy, with a typical (CEP) ranging from 200 to 500 meters at maximum ranges of 20-40 km, depending on rocket and environmental factors; this dispersion arises from ballistic inconsistencies and wind effects, confining effective employment to area suppression of troop concentrations or unarmored assets rather than precision engagements. A full 40-rocket salvo at 20 km can blanket a roughly 600 by 600 meter zone, but individual rockets often deviate significantly, reducing hit probability on smaller targets below 10% without advanced guidance retrofits unavailable in standard configurations. Mechanically, the system's truck-mounted design lacks armor plating, rendering the launcher and crew vulnerable to small-arms fire, shrapnel, drones, and loitering munitions; in the since 2022, numerous BM-21 units have been destroyed by Ukrainian FPV drones and Western-supplied systems exploiting this exposure during reloading or repositioning. Age-related breakdowns are common, with Soviet-era prone to transmission failures and hydraulic issues under sustained operations, earning derisive nicknames like "grandma" among Ukrainian forces due to frequent demands and limited off-road reliability in contested environments. Reloading the pod requires 5-10 minutes manually, exposing crews to detection and attack in forward areas without dedicated armored resupply vehicles. The prominent launch signature—characterized by dense smoke trails and audible barrages—combined with short rocket flight times of 20-40 seconds to targets facilitates rapid counter-battery response; opposing forces can triangulate origins via radar or acoustic sensors within 1-2 minutes, as evidenced by High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) strikes neutralizing Russian BM-21 batteries in shortly after salvos. The doctrinal "" tactic, involving displacement within 2 minutes post-firing, partially mitigates this by leveraging the chassis's mobility, though logistical dependence on vulnerable ammunition convoys and limited onboard spares hampers sustained evasion against persistent surveillance. Successor upgrades like the Russian Tornado-G incorporate automated aiming and improved to shorten setup times and enhance scoot speed, partially addressing dispersion via better stabilization but retaining core unguided vulnerabilities without full precision munitions.

Controversies and Criticisms

Allegations of Indiscriminate Attacks

The unguided 122 mm rockets fired by the BM-21 Grad system exhibit significant dispersion, with individual rockets having a (CEP) of approximately 200-400 meters at maximum range of 20 km, and a full 40-rocket salvo effectively saturating an area of roughly 400 m × 400 m with high-explosive fragmentation effects. This inherent inaccuracy renders the system prone to when employed against targets in or near populated areas, as fragments and blast radii extend beyond precise objectives, a characteristic shared with other unguided multiple launch rocket systems but amplified in urban environments. In the starting in 2011, Syrian government forces deployed BM-21 Grad launchers during offensives in rebel-held urban zones like , where barrages of unguided rockets struck residential districts, contributing to documented civilian casualties amid broader patterns of reported by international observers. and inquiries have cited such rocket attacks as part of systematic strikes causing high numbers of deaths, though precise attribution to Grad systems versus other varies across incidents. During the from 2014 onward, both belligerents faced allegations of Grad misuse in , including and regions. Pro-Russian forces fired at least 88 volleys of BM-21 Grad rockets at a Ukrainian civilian checkpoint near on January 18, 2015, resulting in 31 deaths, as detailed in proceedings. documented indiscriminate shelling by both Ukrainian and separatist forces in 2014-2015, with unguided rocket attacks from populated areas or into them causing civilian bloodshed on either side of the frontline. Non-state actors have similarly employed Grad-type rockets in cross-border strikes, exacerbating civilian risks due to the weapons' poor guidance. , utilizing BM-21 systems and compatible 122 mm Katyusha/Grad rockets, launched barrages into northern Israeli communities during escalations, including a July 2024 attack killing 12 civilians at a soccer field in . In Gaza, and allied groups fired thousands of imported or locally produced Grad-equivalent rockets toward Israeli population centers since 2001, with verifying instances where inaccurate trajectories led to deaths among Israeli civilians and misfires harming Gazans. These launches, often from improvised platforms, underscore the system's challenges in distinguishing targets amid dense settlement patterns. The employment of the BM-21 Grad, which launches unguided 122 mm rockets with inherent dispersion patterns, is governed by core principles of (IHL) enshrined in the of 1949 and Additional Protocol I of 1977, particularly Articles 48 (basic rule of distinction), 51(4) (prohibition of indiscriminate attacks), and 51(5)(b) (proportionality rule). These require attacks to distinguish between military objectives and civilians, while ensuring anticipated civilian harm does not exceed the concrete military advantage. Unguided rockets are not classified as inherently indiscriminate weapons under customary IHL, as they may be lawfully directed at verifiable military targets in open terrain, but their wide-area effects—typically covering 40,000 square meters per salvo—frequently precipitate proportionality violations when fired into populated areas, where risks escalate due to inaccuracy and blast radii. No explicitly prohibits multiple launch rocket systems like the BM-21, distinguishing them from cluster munitions restricted under the 2008 or blinding lasers under Protocol IV to the 1980 (CCW). Efforts within the CCW framework to address explosive weapons with wide-area effects, including discussions on their use in populated areas since 2016, have not yielded binding restrictions on unguided MLRS, stalling amid disagreements over scope and feasibility. The 2022 Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas, endorsed by over 70 states, urges restraint in such environments but remains politically non-binding and omits outright bans on systems like the Grad. In ongoing conflicts, BM-21 use has fueled IHL compliance scrutiny, as seen in the International Criminal Court's (ICC) investigation into the Ukraine situation since November 21, 2013, encompassing alleged war crimes from indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks on civilians, potentially including Grad barrages documented in urban strikes. Similar patterns emerged in Syria's , where UN commissions of inquiry highlighted Grad rockets' role in attacks causing excessive civilian casualties, prompting referrals to the UN Security Council though not advancing to ICC jurisdiction absent state party status. Left-leaning NGOs, such as and the International Network on Explosive Weapons, contend that the system's inaccuracy renders urban employment presumptively unlawful, prioritizing civilian risk mitigation. Military legal analysts, however, equate Grad rockets to unguided barrel —widely used without —arguing legality hinges on contextual targeting rather than weapon type, provided precautions mitigate foreseeable harm.

Defenses Based on Military Utility and Context

The BM-21 Grad has demonstrated empirical military utility in countering massed and exposed troop concentrations, as evidenced by its captured use during the 1973 , where Israeli forces reported it among the most effective systems for disrupting Arab advances across open terrain through rapid, high-volume barrages. This effectiveness stems from the launcher's capacity to deliver 40 unguided 122 mm s in under 20 seconds, saturating an area of approximately 600 by 400 meters and suppressing maneuvers where precision targeting is secondary to denying space to large formations. Such applications align with causal demands of warfare against numerically superior or advancing forces, where alternatives like guided munitions remain cost-prohibitive for many state militaries, with each Grad costing under $1,000 compared to tens of thousands for precision equivalents. In defensive contexts, such as Ukraine's repulsion of Russian incursions since 2014, the Grad provides essential fire support to halt armored and pushes, with massed salvos from multiple launchers mitigating inherent inaccuracies through sheer volume, akin to historical massed tactics that prioritize coverage over individual precision. Ukrainian modernizations, including digital fire control and extended-range rockets introduced by May 2025, further enhance targeting efficiency while preserving the system's rapid reload and mobility for counter-battery roles against advancing threats. These upgrades, such as the series with automated aiming, reduce dispersion errors to under 100 meters at maximum range, allowing defensive employment without undue collateral risks in fluid battlespaces. Claims of inherent indiscriminacy overlook comparable area-effect capabilities in Western systems like the M270 MLRS, which can fire unguided M26 rockets dispersing submunitions over large zones for suppression, producing effects analogous to Grad volleys despite optional guided munitions. In peer conflicts, where enemies employ dispersion and mobility to evade single strikes, the Grad's utility lies in enabling defenders—often outmatched in precision assets—to impose attrition through affordable saturation, a necessity unaddressed by selective prohibitions that prioritize technical sophistication over operational realism. Russian Tornado-G variants, modernizing the Grad platform since 2010, exemplify how incremental guidance improvements sustain this role without negating the value of volume fire against massed assaults.

Current Status and Proliferation

Ongoing Production and Upgrades

Russia continues serial production of the Tornado-G multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), a modernized successor to the BM-21 Grad featuring automated fire control, integration, and compatibility with precision-guided 122 mm rockets that extend range beyond 30 km and improve strike accuracy by up to 2.5 times compared to legacy unguided munitions. Deliveries to n forces included over 30 units in 2020, with additional contracts for rockets and systems fulfilled in 2022 and 2023, alongside development of extended-range variants exceeding 90 km. New 122 mm rocket projectiles with enhanced guidance were certified for Tornado-G in 2023, emphasizing hybrid unguided/guided options to balance cost and precision in sustained operations. Ukraine has ramped up domestic production of 122 mm Grad-compatible rockets, enabling self-sufficiency amid high consumption rates in frontline use as of March 2025. Modernization efforts include upgrading over 100 systems with electric vertical/horizontal aiming drives, , and automated targeting to reduce reaction times and enhance precision, with deliveries to the reported in May 2025. Innovations encompass portable "mini-Grad" launchers improvised from BM-21 tubes mounted on light vehicles for rapid, decentralized , alongside the Bastion-01 variant integrating satellite communications and automatic fire control for improved responsiveness. Export adaptations persist, such as Ecuador's integration of BM-21 Grad launchers onto modernized 6x6 KamAZ-43118 chassis in 2024, replacing outdated Soviet-era trucks to boost mobility and reliability in counter-narcotics operations. Proliferation through licensed copies continues, notably Iran's Heidar-44, an upgraded BM-21 variant with drone-assisted fire control and rockets compatible with original Grad tubes, sustaining local production for regional allies. Recent upgrades prioritize hybrid guidance—combining low-cost unguided salvos with selective GPS/INS-equipped rockets—to maintain affordability while addressing drone threats through accelerated reload cycles and automated sequencing, as seen in Tornado-G's reduced firing time to under 30 seconds. These adaptations enable saturation fire to overwhelm electronic warfare and loitering munitions, preserving the system's doctrinal emphasis on area suppression despite precision proliferation.

Active Operators and Exports

The BM-21 Grad remains in active service across more than 50 countries, with proliferation sustained by its low cost, ease of maintenance, and availability of munitions, despite the adoption of precision-guided alternatives by advanced militaries. No verified large-scale phase-outs have occurred, as the system continues to meet doctrinal needs for area suppression in resource-constrained forces. In the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, both Russian and Ukrainian armed forces have employed the BM-21 extensively from 2022 to 2025, comprising the majority of their capabilities due to high-volume fire requirements in attritional combat. has augmented its stocks through allied transfers, including Romanian APR-40 launchers—a local BM-21 variant—delivered in early 2025, and has pursued domestic upgrades such as remounting systems on modern MAN 6x6 chassis for improved mobility. Middle Eastern operators, including Syrian government forces and Iranian-backed proxies, sustain BM-21 operations via routes that bypass sanctions, enabling continued use in asymmetric conflicts. In , and maintain modernized Grad-derived stockpiles for territorial defense and export, while recent border tensions saw deploy BM-21 systems against in July 2025. African nations such as retain significant inventories, with over 70 BM-21 and RM-70 variants reported active, alongside usage by non-state actors like affiliates in regional insurgencies. Exports persist into 2025, exemplified by Ecuador's integration of BM-21 launchers onto upgraded 6x6 vehicles to modernize formations. In , operates the system alongside indigenous developments, and the in evaluates captured units for potential adaptation in roles.

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