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Left Socialist-Revolutionaries
Left Socialist-Revolutionaries
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The Party of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries-Internationalists (Russian: Партия левых социалистов-революционеров-интернационалистов, romanizedPartiya levykh sotsialistov-revolyutsionerov-internatsionalistov) was a revolutionary socialist political party formed during the Russian Revolution.

Key Information

In 1917, the Socialist Revolutionary Party split between those who supported the Russian Provisional Government, established after the February Revolution and those who supported the Bolsheviks, who favoured the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the placing of political power in the hands of the Congress of Soviets. Those that continued to support the Provisional Government became known as the Right SRs while those who aligned with the Bolsheviks became known as the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries or Left SRs (Russian: левые эсеры, romanizedleviye esery).[3] After the October Revolution, the Left SRs formed a coalition government with the Bolsheviks from November 1917 to March 1918, but resigned its position in government after the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The Central Committee of the Left SRs ultimately ordered the assassination of Wilhelm von Mirbach in an attempt to cause Russia to re-enter World War I and launched an ill-fated uprising against the Bolsheviks shortly after. Most members of the Left SRs were promptly arrested, though the majority that opposed the uprising were steadily released and allowed to retain their positions in the Soviets and bureaucracy. However, they were unable to reorganize the party, which gradually splintered into multiple pro-Bolshevik parties – all of which would merge with the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) by 1921.

The Left SRs were significantly underrepresented in the Russian Constituent Assembly due to outdated voter rolls which did not acknowledge the split between the Right and Left SRs.[4]

History

[edit]

Background

[edit]

The left-wing faction of the Socialist Revolutionary Party began to form after the February Revolution, grouping the most radical elements of the party. The internal faction was highlighted in the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in mid-May 1917 for its position close to that of the Bolsheviks, while the bulk of the party aligned with the Mensheviks.[5] The left-wing socialist revolutionaries were especially strong in the Petrograd Soviet, where they opposed the continuation of the First World War – which had been defended by the centrist fraction of the party since mid-April. They were also strong in the Northern Region, Kazan, Kronstadt, Helsinki and Kharkiv.[6]

Later they became the main current in important rural provinces of the Russian interior, places where the socialist revolutionaries enjoyed the favor of the population. At the third party congress in May, they were a large and important fraction, although it was not until the crisis of autumn and the October Revolution when its support extended to the entire country.[5] During the summer of 1917, it was gaining strength among soldier committees, both inside the country and in the front.[6]

Except for Mark Natanson,[7] at the head of the faction was a series of young leaders, from exile (Boris Kamkov), from Siberia (Maria Spiridonova[8]) or agitation activities among the population (Prosh Proshian).[9] The SR leadership, on the contrary, had veteran and conservative representatives, who led the party into an alliance with the liberals.[10] This led the party to share government power but, at the same time, jeopardized its support among the population.[10] As the year progressed, the leadership of the SRs moved further and further away from the feelings of its followers and its base, which favoured the leftist current.[11] The number of socialist-revolutionary organizations and committees that followed the leftist faction grew, a trend that was accentuated in the early autumn.[11] In general, workers and soldiers agreed with the positions of the left-wing, the intelligentsia continued to support the SR party line, and the peasants and local branches were divided among them.[12][13] The executive committee of the largest railway union, the Vikzhel, elected on 23 August, had a majority of Left SRs.[12] During the congresses of the regional, national and provincial soviets held between August and November, it was the effective division of the Right SRs and the strength of those on the left that often allowed the approval of leftist motions.[12]

The leftists declared themselves the only representatives of the party program,[12] and proclaimed the socialist character of the revolution, demanded the end of collaboration with the bourgeoisie[14][15] and the immediate socialization of land,[16][17] first with their surrender to the land committees and then to the peasants themselves.[18] They were also opposed to the continuation of the war,[16][17] even if it involved signing a separate peace with the Central Powers.[18] In industrial policy, they advocated the granting of various rights (union organizing, living wages, eight-hour days) and workers' control of factories and played a prevalent role in the factory committees.[18] Internationalists in the party wanted the extension of the revolution to other countries.[18] They also advocated the transfer of government power to the Soviets, convinced that the provisional government did not apply the reforms they deemed necessary.[18]

After the failed Kornilov coup, the leftist current took control of the socialist-revolutionary organization in the capital, traditionally more radical than that of other localities.[19] Their growth within the SRs led them to hope that it would come under their control, delaying a split.[17]

In October 1917, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries joined the new Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee,[20] formed with the aim of accelerating the revolution and at the same time moderating actions of the Bolsheviks; One of its members, Pavel Lazimir, who had played a leading role in the measures against Kornilov and presided over the military section of the Petrograd Soviet, presided over it officially.[21][22] Numerous left-wing social revolutionaries, in addition to Bolsheviks and other activists without clear affiliation, participated in the committee's activities, from which the former withdrew on several occasions in protest of the actions of the Bolsheviks.[22] Despite opposition from its main leaders,[20] many Left SRs eventually participated in actions against the discredited Provisional Government before the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, in which they called for the transfer of government power to the Soviets.[22] The moderate Bolshevik current, headed by Lev Kamenev and Grigory Zinoviev, counted on the collaboration of the Left SRs to form a majority in the constituent assembly.[23]

Split with the Socialist Revolutionary Party

[edit]
Maria Spiridonova, revolutionary icon and symbol of the new Left SR party.

The final Left SR split was due to the party's attitude towards the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.[24][25] At the beginning, the SRs opposed the convocation of the new congress, fearing that it would be dominated by the extremists.[24] After seeing that it had the support of much of the populace, the party changed its stance to support the congress, but only stood for delegate elections where it believed it had a chance of being elected, having lost much of the old support in big cities and the front line.[24] In these councils, the majority of the elected delegates were Bolsheviks or Left SRs.[24] At least half of the Socialist Revolutionary delegates elected to Congress belonged to the leftist current of the party.[26] Together, the SR delegations held a slight majority in the congress.[26]

The representatives of the Left SRs hoped that the Petrograd Soviet would not take power by itself, but that the Congress of the Soviets would form a new socialist government that included multiple parties and separated Alexander Kerenski from power without causing a civil war.[27] Despite its presence in the Military Revolutionary Committee, the Left SRs opposed an armed insurrection.[20][17]

During the Congress, in the midst of October Revolution, the Central Committee of the Socialist Revolutionary Party ordered its members to leave the Military Revolutionary Committee, the center of the "Bolshevik adventure", having previously ordered the withdrawal of delegates from Congress.[20][28] Part of the party's left wing remained [29][30][20][31] in Congress and refused to leave the Military Committee. They were expelled [17][32] by the SR Central Committee the next day, along with all those considered complicit in the Bolshevik uprising.[33] The remaining delegates voted in favor of the decrees on peace and land – the latter very similar to the SR program -,[34][35] but they refused to accept an exclusively Bolshevik government and demanded the formation of a coalition [30][17] including both socialists in favor of the October Revolution and those who rejected it.[29] They refused to join the Sovnarkom, although they did accept twenty-nine seats (compared to the sixty-seven of the Bolsheviks and twenty of other minor groups) in the new All-Russian Central Executive Committee that emerged from the congress.[34] Remaining outside the new government they were convinced that they could favor the creation of a coalition between socialists.[36]

During the rebellion, the Left SRs had maintained a similar position to that of the Bolsheviks, participating in agitation in favor of the dissolution of the Russian Provisional Government, the transfer of power to the soviets and chairing the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee.[37] Opposed to the Bolshevik seizure of power up until the last moment,[38] they reluctantly supported it,[17] worried about the possibility of the Provisional Government's return or the unleashing of a counterrevolution.[37] Their votes, together with those of the Bolsheviks, had been crucial in approving the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the seizure of power in Congress [39] The Left Socialist Revolutionaries entered the Council of People's Commissars, leading the people's commissariats of agriculture (Kolegaev), property (Karelin), justice (Steinberg), post offices and telegraphs (Proshian), local government (Trutovsky), and Algasov received the post of People's Commissar without a briefcase.[citation needed] The left SRs also collaborated with the Bolsheviks during Kerensky's attempts to regain control of the capital,[37] in which they played a leading role in the street-fighting.[40] Many representatives of the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party participated in the creation of the Red Army, in the work of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission.[citation needed]

Subsequently, the SR Central Committee began to dissolve local groups that they considered to be rebels,[32] beginning with the largest in the country, that of the capital, with around forty-five thousand members.[33] Although the true extent of the split unleashed by the PSR Central Committee is unknown,[41] it is considered to have been remarkable and deprived the Socialist Revolutionaries of most of its radical elements and most of its support among the soldiers, while the intelligentsia remained mainly in the old party and the peasantry was divided between the two formations.[42] In geographical terms, the new party formed by those expelled from the Socialist Revolutionary Party gained control of nearly half a dozen provinces, mainly in Ukraine and the Urals, parts of the capital and other isolated rural areas in the country.[42] Their first conference as a separate group, held in November 1917, brought together representatives of ninety-nine groups.[20]

Demands

[edit]

The Left SRs made the following demands:

  • Condemnation of the war as an imperialist venture and immediately exit from the same war.
  • Cessation of cooperation with the provisional government of the Socialist Revolutionary Party.
  • Immediate resolution of the land issue in accordance with the program of the party and giving of the land to the peasantry.

Organization and first months

[edit]
Russian peasants. The Left SRs presented itself as their main representative and sole defender of the populist program against the passivity of the moderate Socialist Revolutionary Party. The reforms they led during the first months of 1918 gave the government significant support in the countryside.

The new party held its first congress in early December and elected a central committee of fifteen members and five deputies.[43][44][45][46] The conference was attended by one hundred and sixteen delegates from ninety-nine local organizations that had abandoned Socialist Revolutionary Party.[47] The leadership was dominated by the more moderate current of the party.[48]

At first the Left SRs defended the creation of a new exclusively socialist government that included all currents and parties, including the Right SRs.[49][50][51][52] However, the refusal of the Right SRs to participate and the pressure of its most extreme supporters made the party abandon this cause[52] and agree to negotiate with the Bolsheviks its entry into the revolutionary government, even if the rest of the socialist formations did not enter it.[53][51] For the Bolsheviks, the coalition with the left social revolutionaries represented a way of obtaining some peasant support.[43]

Approach to the Bolsheviks

[edit]

While the Socialist Revolutionary Party expelled the leftists, its various currents had participated in the failed negotiations to form a socialist coalition government, imposed by the executive committee of the main railway union (the Vikzhel).[54] The idea of a broad socialist coalition government had received widespread support, including among the Bolsheviks, during the Soviet Congress, in which a motion to this effect by Julius Martov had initially been unanimously approved.[55] The Bolshevik radicals – led by Lenin and Trotsky – and the conservative faction of the Socialist Revolutionaries had been opposed to an agreement between the new government and the socialist opposition.[54][17][56] The Left Socialist Revolutionaries, together with the moderate Bolsheviks and the Menshevik left, had played a crucial role in the negotiations thanks to their prominent presence in the Vikzhel that had imposed them.[57][55] Their initial refusal to join the Government with the Bolsheviks was due to their desire to assume the role of mediator between the Bolsheviks and the socialists opposed to the October Revolution.[56] After the failure of the coalition negotiations and the approval of the censorship of press in the CEC, the socialist revolutionaries resigned from the CMR, although they remained there.[58][59]

Spiridonova, surrounded by delegates of the Second Congress of Peasant Soviets, at the end of 1917.

For its part, continuing the talks to join the new government, the Left SRs demanded the union of the executive committee of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers with that of the Soviets of Peasants, of which it hoped to gain control in the imminent second congress, in addition to limit the Sovnarkom to executive functions and leave the legislative to a new unified Executive Committee.[53][51] Lenin, in need of the support of the peasantry, agreed to these conditions.[51][53][60] The result, however, was not as satisfactory as the Left SRs announced, since the government was controlled by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.[60] However, the alliance of Bolsheviks and left-wing socialist revolutionaries gave them control of the splintered Second Congress of Peasant Soviets.[43] This had been called by mutual agreement between the Bolsheviks and left-wing socialist revolutionaries, to eliminate the Right SR leadership that still dominated the executive committee of the peasant soviets and that rejected the October Revolution.[32]

During their conversations with the Bolsheviks that ended their entry into the Government, they demanded control of the Ministry of Justice because of their opposition to terror,[61] with the intention of stopping it, and they obtained this portfolio for Isaac Steinberg.[62] The objective of the Left SRs in partnering with the Bolsheviks was to moderate their actions,[61] as well as participate in the revolutionary process that was coming.[60]

The Left SRs formed a coalition with the Bolsheviks in the Council of People's Commissars in late 1917 when, after Lenin's ultimatum to moderate Bolshevik leaders to abandon their attempts to achieve a coalition government with the rest of the more moderate socialist parties, those left the Government (among them, Lev Kamenev, Grigory Zinoviev, Aleksei Rykov and Viktor Nogin).[63][64]

Government coalition

[edit]

Formation of the coalition

[edit]

Eight members of the Left SRs eventually entered the Sovnarkom.[43] Others also joined the Cheka —after the forced dissolution of the constituent assembly—, whose actions managed to moderate in some cases.[61][65] The government agreement was reached on 28, the day on which the executive councils of the two council organizations were unified.[53][66] Three days later, the Agriculture Ministry [51] passed into the hands of the left-wing socialist revolutionary Andrei Kolegayev and Left SR deputy commissioners were appointed in other government posts.[53] Finally and after new and hard negotiations, the Left SRs obtained the Justice Ministry for Isaac Steinberg (25).[67] For his part, Karelin obtained the Deputy Commissariat of State Property, Prosh Proshian that of Post and Telegraph, Trutovski that of Local Government and Aleksandra Izmailovich that of Housing.[67][68][69] The Bolsheviks, however, maintained the most powerful ministries, those that controlled the armed forces, finances, and politics [67][70] Despite having seven commissioners and vice-commissioners compared to the eleven Bolsheviks, the distribution of power in the government was very unfavorable to the Left SRs.[67]

According to Leonard Shapiro, the alliance between Bolsheviks and left socialist revolutionaries "was to prove a shortlived and uneasy coalition, but it pacified Vikzhel, gave the Bolsheviks the appearance of peasant support, and no doubt also served to allay dormant apprehensions among the recent dissidents within the bolshevik party".[71] The alliance lasted until mid-March 1918, when the left socialist revolutionaries withdrew from the government in protest at the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.[63]

Attitude towards the Constituent Assembly and the Third Congress of Soviets

[edit]

Despite initially defending the convocation of the Russian Constituent Assembly,[72] the number of its delegates to it was low.[73][74][75]

Partly their low presence on the Socialist Revolutionary lists was due to the youth and lack of experience of many of its future members, which made them seem unsuitable candidates to represent the party.[76] The Left SRs wanted to approve extensive political and social changes in the assembly, but had no intention of submitting to parliamentary procedures to achieve its revolutionary objectives, as was the case with the Bolsheviks.[73] Even the most moderate of the Left SR leaders were only willing to tolerate the existence of the Assembly as long as they did not oppose the new system of government that emerged from the October Revolution.[77][72][78][79][80] From the party's point of view, the Assembly should limit itself to little more than endorsing the workers and peasants government created in the revolution[81] and in no case would it be allowed to oppose the government of the Soviets, being threatened with dissolution if this happened.[77][80]

Their candidate to preside over the Assembly, Maria Spiridonova, also supported by the Bolsheviks, was defeated by the SR leader, Victor Chernov by 244 votes to 153.[82] Following the Assembly's rejection of the government motion (the "Declaration of the Rights of Working and Exploited Peoples"), that included the legislation approved until then by the Sovnarkom and limited its activity to establishing the bases for a socialist transformation, the Bolshevik and Left SR deputies left the session.[83][84] Despite the last-minute doubts of the Left SR commissioners, the Assembly was dissolved the next day (19).[85] Both the party's bases and its delegates to the Third Congress of Soviets, generally approved the action.[61][85] For the Left SRs, the Assembly had lost its original function because the measures expected of it had already been enacted by the Sovnarkom.[81][86]

In this Third Congress of Soviets, which brought together soldiers and workers with peasants for the first time, the Left SRs supported the Bolshevik position against that of the Right SRs and managed to defeat the rightist's motions to debate land management. But the leftists became increasingly dependent on Lenin's party and lost their political power base by approving the union of the soviets, as the peasant section was now subordinated to that of the workers and soldiers, controlled by the Bolsheviks.[77] In exchange for accepting the union of the congresses, the left socialist revolutionaries had achieved the Bolshevik acceptance of the socialization of land (instead of the expropriation that the Bolsheviks proposed and would later carry out), which the new Unified Congress approved by 376 votes out of 533.[87]

Agrarian policy and the strengthening of the Soviet regime

[edit]

In the field, the Left SRs played a crucial role in extending the authority of the new Soviet Government through the "volost" soviets that the Bolsheviks, weak in the countryside, could not play. [88] Also, the party supervised the agrarian reform approved by the Government at the end of 1917 and maintained control of both the Commissary of Agriculture and the peasant section of the VTsIK – chaired by Spiridonova -, also in charge of agrarian issues.[89] The legal reforms that supported the changes in the countryside increased support for the Soviet regime in Russian agriculture and during their months in government the Left SRs managed to unite their populist program with the peasant desires for land.[89] These measures concentrated the efforts of the party once disputes by the Constituent Assembly, dissolved by the Government, had ended.[90] The populists also supported the resurgence of communes, despite the Bolshevik opposition.[91] The new "Fundamental Law of Land Socialization" [92] —which abolished private land ownership, handed it over to those who worked it and favored cooperatives—, enacted on 9,[93] it was also populist-inspired (see Decree on Land). Lenin accepted it as inevitable. Between the approval in the Congress of Soviets and the ratification by the VTsIK, which emerged from the Congress, the Bolsheviks managed to include important clauses such as the priority of collective farms or the state concession of property that upset the Left SRs.[93][91] The law produced a gigantic change in land ownership in the spring of 1918, generally carried out in a peaceful and orderly manner.[94] Although the result did not dramatically increase the amount of land per farmer,[94] it fulfilled the old peasant desire to drive out landowners and redistribute their land.[95] In early 1918, The main strength of the Bolshevik-controlled regime was due to the peasant support achieved by its socialist-revolutionary allies, while in the cities the opposition of the middle classes continued and workers' disillusionment arose due to the food crisis.[95]

Split with the Bolsheviks

[edit]

Terror

[edit]

Along with differences over land ownership, the main dissent between the two allied parties was due to the use of terror as a political instrument.[96] Steinberg, as People's Commissar of Justice, was in favor of applying harsh measures against the opposition, but always legally; Lenin, on the contrary, was willing to use state terror to consolidate the revolution.[96] Contrary to the activity of the Cheka, founded five days before the entry of Steinberg into the government, the Left SRs eventually decided to participate in the body – to try to control it.[96] Steinberg tried to subordinate it to the revolutionary court, which dealt with the cases related to counterrevolutionary activity.[96] But efforts to control Cheka's activity failed, as Lenin gave the organization the power to inform the Commissioners of its actions once already carried out, without the need for prior permission.[96] In practice, the Cheka was subordinate only to the Sovnarkom, where the Bolshevik majority could approve its actions without the Left SRs being able to impede it.[96]

After the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, the Bolshevik Party finally agreed to admit the left socialist revolutionaries into the Cheka.[96] Four of them joined the body's advisory board, a number that grew over time to almost equal that of the Bolsheviks.[96]

The socialist revolutionary Peter Aleksandrovich, lieutenant of Felix Dzerzhinski, obtained great power in the Cheka, imposing unanimous votes in the troikas' that judged the most serious cases of counterrevolutionary activity, which in practice gave the veto over the death sentences.[96] Until the loss of control of the body during the July revolt, the Left SRs avoided the execution of political prisoners.[96] Even after his brethren joined the organization, Steinberg continued to try to subordinate the CheKa to his Commissariat, and reported their abuses.[96]

Peace with the Central Powers

[edit]
Negotiations with Central Empires in Brest-Litovsk. The Left SRs opposed the conditions imposed by the imperialist powers, rejecting the peace treaty and withdrawing from the coalition government with the Bolsheviks.

The main disagreement with the Bolsheviks arose during the peace negotiations with the Central Powers that ended in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.[3][97] At a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on February 23, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries criticized the Bolsheviks for their repressions on trade union freedoms and voted against the signing of the treaty.[98] None of the ninety-three party representatives in the VTsIK voted in favor of the treaty, albeit in some cases, such as that of Spiridonova, only for party discipline.[99] This disagreement led to the resignation of the Socialist Revolutionary Commissioners on March 19, 1918,[100][97] during the Fourth Congress of Soviets.[3] The Socialist Revolutionaries rejected the treaty,[100][61] but their departure from the government did not mean a complete break with the Bolsheviks as both parties continued to collaborate in other councils and in the Commissariats.[3][101] The socialist revolutionary leadership was actually very divided: almost half of the central committee was inclined to sign the peace treaty.[102] The Left SR's opposition to the conditions imposed by the empires made them support Trotsky's proposal to abandon the war without signing the peace.[103] Determined internationalists, during the talks they had been convinced that the revolution would spread throughout Europe and that workers' representatives of the Empires would take the reins of the peace negotiations.[100] They argued that the signing of the peace was both a betrayal of the international revolution and a surrender to the bourgeoisie, both national and foreign.[61]

During the Fourth Congress of Soviets, the representatives of the Left SRs opposed, in vain, the ratification of the peace treaty. It was defended by the Bolshevik majority but rejected by a minority, who received the name Left Communists.[104][97][105] After the ratification of the treaty,[106] the representatives of the left-communists – who had abstained in the final vote – [97][107] and the Socialist Revolutionaries – who had voted against ratification – [107] resigned from the government, withdrew from the Council of People's Commissars and announced the termination of their agreement with the Bolsheviks.[108][61][109][101] The governing coalition had lasted just over two months.[101]

Peak

[edit]

In the spring the Left SR's influence grew,[110][111] as support for the Bolsheviks fell.[3] Between April and June, the party grew from some sixty thousand members to one hundred thousand.[3] The socialist revolutionaries rejected the dictatorship of the proletariat and advocated a government controlled by both the working classes and the intellectuals.[3] Their law of socialization of the land had won them a great amount of support with the peasantry and they also had support among the workers of the cities.[3] After their withdrawal from the Government, guerrilla actions in the Baltic and Ukraine against the occupying troops of the Central Empires intensified, while devising terrorist attacks against senior German officials.[101] The party helped to organize a popular, mainly peasant, uprising against the invading empires.[97]

At the Second Party Congress, held from April 17 to 25 in Moscow, Proshian described the rapprochement between the party and the Bolsheviks in some respects until the departure for peace with the Central Powers.[108] Their withdrawal from the Sovnarkom did not, however, entail a total break with the Bolsheviks.[108] The Left SRs continued to participate in numerous government agencies, including the Cheka.[105] Other participants, like former Justice Commissioner Steinberg, were much more critical of the Bolsheviks, especially their repressive and illegal measures.[100] Still, prominent leaders defended staying in the government.[61][112] Those who considered that the withdrawal of the Government had been a mistake and advocated resuming government work, a majority in the central committee, failed to convince the congress delegates, who ratified the actions taken after the approval of the peace treaty.[113]

In May the relationship between Bolsheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries was markedly worsened by the actions of the Bolsheviks in domestic politics,[114] which joined the disagreements on foreign policy.[3] The signing of the peace treaty, rejected by the Left SRs, the campaign to divide the peasantry and loot [115] from the countryside to supply the cities,[110][note 1] the final takeover of the soviets by the Bolsheviks with the expulsion of Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks (14 June[116][113]),[110] economic and political centralization,[61] the creation of a professional Army with tsarist officers,[117][118] the restoration of the death penalty (May 21)[110] and the sharpening of terror made the Left SRs an implacable enemy of the Bolsheviks. The substitution of the elected soviets led in their opinion to bureaucratization and a new tyranny.[119] They also condemned the end of workers' control of the factories and the reappearance of the bourgeois managers, who they considered endangered the socialist transformation.[119][note 2] For the Left SRs, food requisitions in the countryside did not solve the supply problems of the cities, but instead endangered the Soviet system of government.[121] They weakened the Bolsheviks in the countryside while strengthening rural support for the Left Social Revolutionaries.[121] Where the party concentrated on opposing requisitions and "Committees of Poor Peasants",[note 3] generally maintained peasant support,[111] even after the July crisis, where they concentrated on opposing the Brest-Litovsk peace.[123]

The Fifth Congress of the Soviets and the uprising

[edit]
Mark Natanson, a respected old revolutionary leader, one of the founders of the Circle of Tchaikovsky, Land and Liberty and the Socialist Revolutionary Party. In 1917 he became the noble inspirer of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, but in 1918 he joined the new Party of Revolutionary Communism

Although some sectors of the party reacted to the repression in the countryside by demanding the separation of the Soviets of the peasant deputies from those of the soldiers and workers, the central committee preferred to press the Bolsheviks demanding the convocation of a new congress of the unified soviets, hoping to subject the government's policy to harsh criticism therein.[124] The leaders of the Left SRs also hoped to gain the support of the left-communists, at odds with Lenin for his capitulation to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.[124] The schism in the Bolshevik leadership, however, had settled by the end of the month and the Left SRs could not count on the support of the former dissidents in their confrontation with the government in Congress.[124]

Seeking to secure a majority in the congress, on June 14 Lenin ordered the expulsion of the Mensheviks and the Right SRs from the VTsIK to undermine their chances of getting delegates.[124] Despite pre-congress estimates that the left socialist revolutionaries would eventually have nearly as many delegates as the Bolsheviks,[125] the Bolsheviks sent enough delegates with suspicious credentials to secure a large majority in congress,[126][124] wiping out the hopes of modifying government policy in congress.[127][128]

In this environment, the Third Party Congress took place, between June 28 and July 1,[111] a congress that showed greater unity in the party and a certain euphoria for its growth – the number of affiliates had tripled in just three months -[129] and in which greater hostility to the Central Powers and to maintaining peace with them was revealed.[130] Spiridonova raised the provocation of the imperialist invasion to cause uprisings like those taking place in Ukraine, a position that was rejected by other delegates, who were not convinced of the disposition of the population to rise up against the occupiers.[130][131] Opposition to maintaining the treaty, however, was in a majority among the delegates and the central committee weighed in on carrying out terrorist actions against the German representatives.[132][133][134]

In this tense atmosphere began the Fifth Congress of Soviets on July 4.[133] The Left SRs, being in the minority (about 353 (30%) deputies, to the Bolsheviks' 773 (66%) deputies[135]), still openly opposed their former Bolshevik allies, for which they were expelled from the congress.[136]

On July 6, the German Ambassador Wilhelm von Mirbach was assassinated by Yakov Blumkin and Nikolai Andreev,[132] on the orders of the Left SR Central Committee.[137][138] Initially the Bolsheviks reacted in disbelief, doubting the authorship of the crime.[139] Dzerzhinski himself, sent to the Moscow headquarters of the Cheka in search of the assassins, was arrested by the Left SR central committee, gathered there, when he believed that the socialist revolutionaries were not involved.[140][139] The intention of the party was not, however, to seize power and overthrow the Bolsheviks, but to force a confrontation with Germany, destroying the results of Brest-Litovsk.[139][110] Fearful of the German imperialist reaction, Lenin declared, on the contrary, that the murder was part of an attempt by the Left SRs to destroy the government of the soviets and ordered the crushing of the revolt.[141] According to a letter from Spiridonova, the murder of Mirbach was a personal initiative of several leaders of the Socialist Revolutionaries, and there was no rebellion, and all further actions of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries were "self-defense". However, it was beneficial for the Bolsheviks to use the assassination of the ambassador as a pretext for defeating the last opposition party.[142]

Immediately, military measures began to destroy the centers held by the Socialist Revolutionaries, whose delegates to the Fifth Congress were arrested at the Bolshoi Theater that same afternoon.[141][140] The central committee had not communicated to the hundreds of delegates its intention to assassinate the German representative and they were arrested unaware of what had happened.[141] The party was immediately denounced as counter-revolutionary and determined to lead the country to war with Germany, and the population was called to arms against him.[141] Attempts to take the centers into the hands of the Left SRs in Moscow, however, could not begin firmly on that night due to a lack of troops, and finally began at noon the following day, with the use of artillery against the Cheka headquarters.[143] The bombardment caused the Socialist Revolutionary troops and the Central Committee to leave the building, where Dzerzhinski was abandoned.[143] The main nucleus of the pro-Bolshevik troops were the Latvian units stationed in the capital.[128]

Repression and decline

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The murder triggered the immediate and harsh repression of the political formation; several hundred of its members were arrested and some executed, although many of its leaders managed to escape.[143] Spiridonova, detained when she went to the Bolshoi to explain the actions decided by the central committee to her delegates, remained locked up in the Kremlin until the end of November.[143][144] The two party newspapers, Znamia trudá [132][145] (Banner of Work) and Golos trudovogo krestianstva (The Voice of the Working Peasantry) were shut down the day after Mirbach's death.[146] On July 9, the Fifth Congress of Soviets resumed its sessions, without the Social Revolutionary delegates;[144] condemned the Left SR actions as an attempt to seize power, supported the repressive actions of the government and ordered the expulsion of Left SRs from the soviets.[146] The central committee, which had not adequately informed its groups of the change of strategy and the possible consequences of the use of terrorism, left them ill-prepared to face its consequences.[147] Lenin took the opportunity to get rid of the Left SRs as a political rival.[147] In Petrograd, after short but hard fighting,[128] the local headquarters of the Socialist Revolutionaries were seized; Those arrested were gradually released, after no connection to the events in Moscow was found, despite the initial fear of the Bolsheviks.[148] At the nearby Kronstadt naval base, where the influence of the Left SRs was great, the Bolsheviks took political control by force, creating a "revolutionary committee" that separated the Soviet and in practice excluded the Socialist Revolutionaries from the next elections.[149]

The expulsion[128] of the Left SRs from the Central Executive Committee meant that the few sessions of the body that followed the Fifth Congress had a ceremonial character, all opposition to the Bolsheviks having been excluded from them.[146] During the month of July, the Bolsheviks forcibly dissolved the soviets in which the Left SRs had a majority, while expelling the Socialist Revolutionaries where they were a minority and did not agree to reject the actions of their central committee.[144][128][126] The party joined the other socialist collectives persecuted by the government; for many historians, it is July 1918 that is considered the milestone of the final formation of a one-party Bolshevik dictatorship in the country, since after July 1918 the representation of other parties in the soviets became insignificant.[150][151][152][153][154] The attempts of the weakened party in maintaining their opposition to the government was futile and many of its members ended up joining Lenin's party.[126] Already in August, splits in the formation began to emerge; one of them, that of the Party of Narodnik Communists, ended up joining the Bolsheviks in November.[128] The Party of Revolutionary Communism (including Mark Natanson and Andrei Kolegayev), continued to support the Lenin government and joined his party in 1920.[128]

At the Fourth and Final Party Congress, held between October 2 and 7, 1918,[138] the Left SRs claimed that the murder of the German ambassador had been a measure favorable to the world revolution, despite the fact that it ended their alliance with the Bolsheviks and led to the repression of the party.[155] The party's determination to focus on opposing the peace treaty, a matter of secondary interest to the majority of the population at a time of great urban and rural discontent with the Bolshevik government, deprived the Left SRs of the great support with which it had counted in the spring and early summer.[138] The government persecution of the Left SRs disrupted the organization within only a few months.[156] The general meaning of the interventions in the last congress was dejected, unlike those of the previous one.[156] The party was in crisis, both due to the government persecution and internal divisions.[156] Originally opposed to the poor peasant committees created by decree on June 11 to help with the requisitioning of food and to fuel the class struggle in the countryside, the Left SRs in its last congress was more ambiguous due to the new decree from Lenin of August 18 in which it was declared that the committees should only confront the more than well-to-do peasants and not the average peasants.[157] Although the practical consequences of this decree were very few, the tolerance of the committees by the Left SR congress, generally rejected in the countryside, ended up ruining the strength of the party in rural Russia.[157] Many of its members gave up for joining the Bolshevik party.[158]

Some members of the central committee were tried and sentenced to imprisonment on November 27; some of them, like Spiridonova, received a pardon a few days later.[159] The most radical current of the party, around Kamkov and Irina Kakhovskaya, formed a clandestine terrorist group that carried out the murder of the German Commander in Ukraine, Hermann von Eichhorn and other minor actions, disrupted by the authorities.[159][128] The current favorable to Spiridonova advocated a peasant uprising against the Bolsheviks, the abolition of the Sovnarkom and the transfer of government power to a democratically elected VTsIK, the end of the Cheka, the poor peasant committees and requisitions in the countryside.[160] In early 1919, some of the leaders were arrested again; in 1920 part of the party was able to re-establish itself until May 1921.[161] Periods of relative tolerance alternated with more habitual periods of persecution by the Cheka and clandestine activity.[160] Their relative influence among the workers and peasants in Ukraine in 1919 did not endanger the government, so they were allowed to continue their activity.[160] In October 1919 and again in May 1920 (after another brief legalization), the Left SRs ended their confrontations with the Government in order to focus on opposing the counterrevolutionary threat of the White Armies.[160] With the subsequent red victory, the socialist revolutionaries resumed their opposition activities in the late 1920s.[162] The remains of the party were removed by the arrests carried out during the Kronstadt rebellion,[158] that the party had supported.[162] A number of Left Socialist Revolutionaries, such as Alexander Antonov, played a significant political and military role during the Russian Civil War, joining the green rebels and fighting both the Bolsheviks and the White Guards. They survived residually until 1923–1924.[162] The Left Socialist Revolutionaries divided into a number of factions. The Left SR "activists", led by Donat Cherepanov, Spiridonova and Kamkov, took part in armed demonstrations against the leadership of the Soviet Union. The "legalist" movement, led by Steinberg, advocated public criticism of the Bolsheviks and the struggle against them only by peaceful means. In the years 1922–1923, the legalist movement united with the Socialist-Revolutionary-Maximalist groups and the Socialist-Revolutionary "People's" group in the Association of Left Narodism.[citation needed] The leaders who survived this stage, either in prison or in internal exile, fell victims to the Great Purge in the late 1930s (Algasov, Kamkov and Karelin were shot in 1938, while Spiridonova was executed in 1941).[163]

Ideas

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After the Fourth Party Congress (September–October 1918), the political and economic program of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries moved to positions close to anarchism and revolutionary syndicalism. In their opinion, industrial enterprises should be transferred to the self-government of labor collectives, united in a common federation of manufacturers. Consumption had to be organized through a union of cooperatives – local self-governing consumer societies, united in a common federation. Economic life should be organized by the joint arrangements of these two associations, for which it was necessary to create special economic councils, elected from production and consumer organizations. Political and military power should have been concentrated in the hands of political councils elected by the working people on a territorial basis.[164]

The Ukrainian Left Socialist Revolutionaries (led by Yakov Brown) believed that along with economic and political councils, councils on ethnic issues should be elected by representatives of various ethnic communities of workers – Jews, Ukrainians, Russians, Greeks, etc., which, in their opinion, would be especially relevant for multinational Ukraine. Each person received the right to freely "enroll" in any community of their choice – ethnicity was considered by the Left Socialist Revolutionaries to be a matter of free self-determination of a person, the result of his personal choice, and not a question of blood. The ethnic councils of workers, forming, as it were, the third chamber of power of councils, were to deal with the development of culture, schools, institutions, educational systems in local languages, etc.[citation needed]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Bibliography

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (Left SRs), formally the Party of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries or Left SRs-Internationalists, emerged as a radical splinter faction from the in November 1917 amid the deepening divisions over Russia's continued participation in and the pace of socialist transformation. Composed primarily of agrarian socialists emphasizing immediate land socialization for peasants, federalist soviet structures, and opposition to centralized Bolshevik authority, the Left SRs positioned themselves as champions of rural radicalism against both the Provisional Government's moderation and the urban proletarian focus of their erstwhile allies. Key figures included , who rose to prominence through her revolutionary activism and leadership in peasant soviets, Boris Kamkov, a theorist advocating decentralized socialism, and , a veteran organizer bridging old and new radicals. Initially aligning with the Bolsheviks after the , the Left SRs joined the in December 1917, securing positions such as the Commissariat of Agriculture and contributing to the , which drew directly from their party's agrarian program to redistribute estates to peasant committees without compensation. This coalition reflected their shared commitment to soviet power and worker-peasant alliances, with Left SRs holding significant sway in the All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Soviets, where they elected Spiridonova as chair. However, irreconcilable tensions arose over the Bolsheviks' ratification of the in March 1918, which the Left SRs viewed as a capitulation enabling German and betraying revolutionary internationalism; they withdrew from the government, decrying it as a deviation from genuine socialism toward . The defining crisis came in July 1918 with the in , triggered by their of German ambassador to provoke renewed war against the and rally peasant discontent against Bolshevik policies like grain requisitioning. Leaders like Kamkov and Spiridonova aimed to seize key institutions and declare a Committee of Revolutionary Struggle, but the poorly coordinated revolt—lacking broad peasant mobilization and facing swift Bolshevik countermeasures, including loyal to Lenin—was crushed within days. The failure marked the effective dissolution of the party as a legal entity, with hundreds arrested, Spiridonova imprisoned, and surviving elements driven underground or co-opted, highlighting the causal primacy of Bolshevik military consolidation over ideological pluralism in the early Soviet state's survival amid exigencies.

Formation and Early Development

Background in the Socialist Revolutionary Party

The (SR), founded in late 1901 and formally constituted at its first congress in December 1905–January 1906, drew from the 19th-century narodnik movement, advocating centered on the ry as the revolutionary force. Its core program called for the socialization of all land, to be managed by peasant committees, rejecting both private ownership and state farms in favor of communal use. The party combined legal agitation with terrorist acts against tsarist officials, achieving significant peasant support by , when it became Russia's largest political party, polling over 16 million votes in the elections of November 1917. Following the of 1917, which released many SR leaders from exile or prison, internal divisions sharpened within the party over the Provisional Government's policies, the ongoing , and the role of soviets. The emerging Left SR faction, representing urban radicals, soldiers, and radical peasants, criticized the SR Central Committee for supporting the bourgeois and its defensive war stance, instead pushing for immediate transfer of power to soviets and land expropriation. This split originated in a May 1917 dispute at the SR Party conference, where Left-leaning delegates, influenced by internationalist anti-war sentiments, opposed the majority's conditional support for the war until a democratic peace congress. Key leaders of the Left SRs included , a prominent SR terrorist convicted in 1906 for assassinating a brutal provincial , and , a veteran narodnik. Spiridonova, amnestied in March 1917, rapidly rose as a symbol of uncompromising radicalism, denouncing SR compromises with liberals and advocating peasant soviets over parliamentary assemblies. By August 1917, the Left faction had seized control of the SR organization, and in September, the Petrograd city committee, solidifying their organizational base amid growing peasant unrest over delayed land reforms. These developments reflected deeper ideological rifts, with Left SRs prioritizing revolutionary class struggle and soviet democracy against the Right SRs' emphasis on legalistic evolution toward a .

Split and Key Demands

The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries emerged from deepening divisions within the during the summer of 1917, primarily over attitudes toward the and . The right-wing SR leadership, favoring participation in coalition governments and a defensive continuation of the war, clashed with the left faction's insistence on rejecting bourgeois alliances and pursuing revolutionary opposition to the conflict. This irreconcilable rift led to the left wing's withdrawal from party congresses and structures by late summer, with formal separation accelerating after the Bolshevik-led . Key demands of the Left SRs centered on the immediate transfer of state power to soviets of workers', soldiers', and peasants' deputies, bypassing the until soviet authority was consolidated. They advocated socialization of all —abolishing private ownership without compensation and placing it under control of elected committees for communal use, drawing from but radicalizing the SR agrarian program to prioritize direct producer management over centralized state farms. On , they condemned the as imperialist, demanding its termination through international rather than or defensive posture, reflecting their commitment to global socialist upheaval. These positions, articulated by leaders like , Boris Kamkov, and , positioned the Left SRs as a bridge between SR populism and Bolshevik radicalism, emphasizing autonomy, , and worker-peasant alliances while critiquing both right SR moderation and Bolshevik centralization. The demands gained traction among radical peasants, as evidenced by the Left SR majority at the First All-Russian Peasant Congress in November 1917.

Initial Organization and Relations with Bolsheviks

The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries began as a radical faction within the , forming in the summer of amid deepening divisions over the Provisional Government's policy and its failure to enact immediate reforms. This faction, emphasizing uncompromising socialization of and soviet power, gained traction among radical s and soldiers disillusioned with the SR central committee's moderation. By autumn , the Left SRs constituted a significant portion—up to one-third—of SR membership, particularly in urban soviets and peasant congresses. The faction's formal organization crystallized during the Socialist Revolutionary Party's Third Extraordinary Congress in Petrograd from November 25 to December 5, 1917 (Old Style), where delegates led by Boris Kamkov, , and rejected reconciliation with the right-wing leadership under and walked out to establish an independent party structure. Immediately thereafter, the Left SRs convened their own constituent congress alongside the All-Russian Peasant Congress (November 25–December 8, 1917), electing a chaired by Kamkov and adopting a platform prioritizing agrarian revolution and opposition to bourgeois parliamentarism. This rapid institutionalization positioned the Left SRs as a cohesive force, with strong representation in rural soviets—evidenced by their 37 delegates at the Extraordinary Peasant Soviets Congress in November 1917—contrasting with the fragmented right SRs. Relations with the Bolsheviks were initially symbiotic, rooted in mutual opposition to the . The Left SRs endorsed the Bolshevik-led (October 25–26, 1917, Old Style), with 179 delegates remaining at the Second after right SRs departed, tipping the balance to a pro-Bolshevik of approximately 60%. This support secured Left SR participation in the new regime; on December 10, 1917 (Old Style), the restructured the (Sovnarkom) into a coalition, granting the Left SRs seven commissariats out of 18, including under Andrei Kolegayev and posts in internal affairs and posts/telegraphs. The alliance also yielded 29 Left SR seats in the 101-member , less than the ' 62 but pivotal for rural legitimacy. Early cooperation manifested in joint decrees, such as the November 1917 , which nationalized estates while incorporating SR-derived peasant mandates against private ownership, aligning with Left SR demands for over Bolshevik state control. , lacking deep peasant roots, benefited from Left SR influence in agrarian soviets, where the latter held sway through figures like Spiridonova, enabling policy implementation amid civil unrest. Tensions simmered over centralization and war policy, but until early 1918, the partnership stabilized Bolshevik rule by bridging urban proletarian and rural revolutionary forces.

Ideological Positions

Core Doctrines on Land, Revolution, and Soviets

The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (Left SRs) centered their agrarian doctrine on the rapid of , rejecting both private and centralized in favor of direct transfer to tillers via local committees. This approach, formalized in the Bolshevik-Left SR coalition's February 1918 , drew from SR mandates compiled during 1917 elections, which documented widespread demands for expropriation without compensation from landlords, church, and state holdings—totaling over 370 million dessiatins by Soviet estimates. Left SR leaders like Boris Kamkov argued this worker- control would prevent bureaucratic distortion, prioritizing use and local redistribution over state monopolization, as evidenced in their advocacy during the First All-Russian Congress of Land Departments in November 1917. In terms of revolutionary strategy, the Left SRs promoted a federated rooted in Russia's peasant majority, viewing urban proletarian models as insufficient without rural upheaval against kulaks and speculators. They contended that genuine required immediate class struggle in the countryside to dismantle feudal remnants, as articulated by Kamkov in party platforms opposing gradualism; this peasant-centric dynamism, they claimed, would sustain revolutionary momentum beyond urban soviets, integrating agrarian upheaval with worker strikes for a holistic transformation. Their emphasized empirical peasant initiatives over top-down decrees, critiquing Bolshevik urban bias as risking isolation from the 80% rural population that backed SR land policies in the November 1917 elections, where SRs secured 58% of votes. On Soviets, Left SRs endorsed "all power to the Soviets" as the organizational form for revolutionary , but insisted on broadening representation to include congresses and committees to counter proletarian dominance. They participated in the from November 1917 to March 1918 to embed these principles, pushing for decentralized soviet where policies emerged from below rather than Moscow's center; this stance, per party theoreticians, aligned Soviets with , enabling direct producer control and averting the centralization they later accused of imposing post-coalition.

Divergences from Right SRs and Bolsheviks

The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (Left SRs) diverged from the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries primarily in their rejection of the and support for the Bolshevik-led . While the Right SRs collaborated with the and advocated armed resistance against the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917, the Left SRs opposed the and aligned with the by November 1917, viewing the revolution as a necessary step toward socialist transformation. This split was formalized after the Second on October 25-26, 1917 (), when Right SR delegates walked out in protest, whereas Left SRs remained and participated in the new Soviet government. On the , Right SRs defended it as the supreme democratic body, leading to their suppression after its dissolution on January 6, 1918, while Left SRs initially supported it but ultimately backed Bolshevik actions prioritizing Soviet authority over parliamentary forms. In land policy, both factions endorsed and redistribution to peasants, but Left SRs emphasized immediate through local peasant committees and revival of the traditional Russian (communal ) for egalitarian purposes, as codified in the January 27, , land law they influenced. Right SRs, having lost peasant support by late 1917 due to perceived delays in reform under the , focused on broader but less radical redistribution without the same insistence on revolutionary immediacy. Regarding war policy, Left SRs adhered to intransigent internationalism, rejecting defensive postures favored by Right SRs, who aligned more with nationalist elements continuing efforts. The Left SRs differed from the in their advocacy for a more decentralized, peasant-inclusive over proletarian centralism. prioritized urban worker and eventual state of land, viewing peasant-based reforms as transitional and ultimately subordinating them to centralized planning, whereas Left SRs championed direct to peasants via egalitarian collectives, criticizing food requisition policies as exploitative of rural producers. In governance, Left SRs sought to balance executive power through oversight of the (Sovnarkom) by the (VTsIK), as agreed on November 17, 1917, reflecting their preference for soviet federalism against consolidation of authority. A critical rupture emerged over , particularly the signed on March 3, 1918. Left SRs opposed the treaty as a capitulation that betrayed revolutionary internationalism, favoring continued "revolutionary war" to spread abroad; this led to their resignation from the Sovnarkom and the of German ambassador on July 6, 1918, by Left SR members to provoke renewed conflict. , prioritizing civil war survival and internal consolidation, ratified the treaty despite internal left-wing opposition, highlighting their pragmatic against Left SR emphasis on immediate global revolution. Left SRs also critiqued Bolshevik centralism for marginalizing peasant soviets, positioning peasants as co-equal revolutionary agents rather than auxiliaries to proletarian .

Critiques of Internationalism and War Policy

The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries critiqued Bolshevik war policy primarily through their rejection of the , signed on March 3, 1918, which ended Russia's participation in but at the cost of ceding vast territories—including , , , , , and parts of the —to and its allies. This agreement transferred approximately 34% of the Russian population (over 55 million people), 32% of arable land, and critical industrial and mineral resources, which the Left SRs viewed as a capitulation enabling German imperialist exploitation of Russian peasants and undermining the agrarian socialist revolution. In response, Left SR leaders, including , withdrew from the in March 1918 and denounced the treaty at the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets, arguing it betrayed the October Revolution's anti-imperialist promises and exposed rural communities to renewed feudal-like oppression under foreign occupation. Rather than endorsing the Bolshevik strategy of "peace at any price" to consolidate power internally, the Left SRs advocated for a defensive revolutionary war against the Central Powers, positing that continued resistance could ignite uprisings within German and Austro-Hungarian armies and align with proletarian solidarity across fronts. This stance reflected their initial support for the Bolshevik Decree on Peace in November 1917—which called for an immediate end to the war without annexations—but diverged sharply when Bolshevik negotiators, under Leon Trotsky's "no war, no peace" policy, accepted harsh terms after failed talks at Brest-Litovsk from December 1917 to February 1918. The Left SRs' position emphasized national defense of socialist gains, particularly land reforms benefiting peasants, over what they saw as Bolshevik defeatism that prioritized regime survival amid civil war threats. In critiquing Bolshevik internationalism, the Left SRs contended that it manifested as abstract insufficiently attuned to Russia's peasant-majority context, favoring urban proletarian doctrines that neglected agrarian and local soviet in favor of centralized export of . They argued this approach, exemplified by the treaty's facilitation of German advances into territories, compromised genuine anti-imperialist by allowing occupiers to suppress soviets and exploit resources, thus hindering spontaneous international worker-peasant alliances. At their Fifth Party Conference in June 1918, Left SR delegates formalized opposition, declaring the Bolshevik policy a deviation from true internationalism that subordinated Russian interests to opportunistic , potentially isolating the soviets from broader European socialist movements. This ideological rift culminated in the on July 6, 1918, triggered by the assassination of German ambassador as a against the treaty's .

Governmental Involvement and Policies

Coalition Formation with Bolsheviks

Following the Bolshevik-led on October 25, 1917 (), the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (Left SRs) provided critical support at the Second , where they endorsed the Bolshevik decrees on land nationalization and peace negotiations, distinguishing themselves from the Right SR walkout. This alignment stemmed from shared opposition to the and emphasis on immediate socialist transformation, particularly agrarian reform to empower peasants, whom the Left SRs represented more effectively than the urban-focused . Vladimir promptly invited the Left SRs to join the (Sovnarkom) to form a , aiming to legitimize Bolshevik rule by incorporating interests and securing a in the Central Executive Committee (CEC), where Left SRs held 29 of 101 seats alongside 62 . Initially, Left SR leaders like Boris Kamkov rejected the offer, insisting on a broader "united socialist front" that included Menshevik-Internationalists and other moderates to prevent Bolshevik dominance; however, Bolshevik refusal and the Left SRs' First Party Congress (November 20–26, 1917) shifted their stance toward conditional participation to influence policy directly. The coalition formalized in early December 1917, with seven Left SRs entering Sovnarkom, including Andrei Kolegayev as People's Commissar for to oversee land socialization and Isaac Steinberg for . , a prominent Left SR figurehead, chaired the Peasant Department of the Sovnarkom, amplifying rural voices in decrees like the November 1917 land socialization measures, which echoed Left SR agrarian platforms by transferring estates to committees while deferring full collectivization. This partnership reflected pragmatic convergence on anti-war internationalism and soviet , though underlying tensions over centralized authority persisted, as Left SRs prioritized decentralized soviets over Bolshevik state control.

Implementation of Agrarian Reforms

Following the formation of the Bolshevik-Left SR coalition in December 1917, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries assumed control of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture, with Andrei Kolegayev appointed as on December 23. In this capacity, the party oversaw the initial execution of the , promulgated by on October 26, 1917 (), which abolished private landownership and transferred , , and estates—totaling approximately 150 million hectares—to a national land fund for distribution to peasant households via local land committees without compensation. The Left SRs endorsed this measure, viewing it as aligned with their long-standing agrarian program of land socialization, whereby land would be managed collectively by rural communes (obshchinas) and peasant associations rather than centralized state ownership. Under Kolegayev's leadership, regulations were drafted to operationalize the , empowering provincial and district land committees—dominated by Left SR sympathizers in rural soviets—to inventory estates, confiscate surplus , and allocate it based on labor capacity and local needs. These committees, numbering over 30,000 by early 1918, facilitated the redistribution of roughly 100 million desyatins (about 109 million hectares) of in the first months, though implementation was chaotic, marked by spontaneous seizures and uneven enforcement amid ongoing civil unrest. , as chair of the All-Russian Executive Committee of Peasants' Soviets following the party's majority at the November 1917 Peasant Congress, advocated for self-governance in , criticizing Bolshevik tendencies toward bureaucratic control and emphasizing egalitarian norms derived from 242 local mandates compiled by Socialist Revolutionaries. Despite initial cooperation, fissures emerged as Bolshevik policies shifted toward state intervention, including the formation of model farms on confiscated estates, which conflicted with Left SR preferences for decentralized socialization. By February 1918, Left SR influence waned as urban Bolshevik soviets prioritized food requisitions for cities over rural , leading to peasant resistance against early drives that bypassed local committees. The coalition's collapse in March 1918 over the Brest-Litovsk Treaty curtailed Left SR oversight, paving the way for Bolshevik consolidation via the Committees of the Village Poor in June 1918, which further centralized agrarian control and exacerbated rural Bolshevik-Left SR tensions.

Stance on Constituent Assembly and Soviet Congresses

The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, inheriting the Socialist Revolutionary emphasis on the as the primary vehicle for enacting and democratic governance, initially advocated convening it while insisting it recognize Soviet supremacy and subordinate its decisions to decrees from the . This position reflected their post-October alignment with , prioritizing revolutionary organs over formal parliamentary bodies deemed insufficiently responsive to proletarian and peasant demands. In the November–December 1917 elections, the Left SRs secured a minority representation in the 707-seat Assembly, contrasting sharply with the Right SRs' dominant plurality, which they viewed as misaligned with the radical transformations achieved through Soviet power. Upon the Assembly's opening on , 1918, Left SR delegates joined in walking out after the chairmanship election of Right SR and the refusal to adopt "All Power to the Soviets" as its foundational declaration, signaling their rejection of the body as a forum. The (VTSIK), where and Left SRs held the majority, dissolved the Assembly the following day, January 6, a measure the Left SRs endorsed as necessary to preserve Soviet authority amid threats. In contrast, the Left SRs regarded Soviet Congresses as the authentic expression of revolutionary democracy, actively participating to advance peasant interests within a worker-peasant soviet framework. At the Third (January 10–18, ), convened concurrently with the peasant soviets congress, they contributed to ratifying the Assembly's dissolution and merging the two bodies, securing 29 seats in the expanded VTSIK of 200 members alongside Bolshevik majorities. This engagement underscored their belief in the Congresses' superior dynamism and class representativeness over the Constituent Assembly's bourgeois-influenced composition, though tensions later arose over at subsequent gatherings like the Fifth Congress in July .

Internal and External Conflicts

Involvement in State Security and Terror

The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (Left SRs), as junior partners in the from December 1917, secured positions within the nascent state security apparatus, including the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (), established on December 20, 1917, to combat counter-revolution and sabotage. Left SR members held significant roles in the , such as Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich serving as deputy to , reflecting their alignment with Bolshevik efforts to consolidate power through repressive measures against perceived enemies like forces and speculators. Other prominent Left SRs, including Dmitry Popov and , were active operatives, leveraging the organization's authority for operations that blurred the line between state security and revolutionary violence. This involvement extended to endorsing terror tactics rooted in the party's agrarian socialist heritage, where figures like , a veteran of pre-revolutionary SR terrorism, viewed targeted violence as a legitimate tool against oppressors, including during the early Civil War phase. Left SRs participated in Cheka-led suppressions of unrest, such as peasant revolts and urban disorders in 1918, contributing to the precursors of the formalized by sanctioning executions and arrests of class adversaries to defend Soviet authority. Their deputies in commissariats often collaborated with Bolshevik security organs to enforce decrees against and , resulting in thousands of detentions and summary punishments by mid-1918. Tensions arose as Left SR influence in security waned amid policy divergences, culminating in their exploitation of Cheka credentials for independent actions, exemplified by Blumkin's July 6, , assassination of German ambassador in , intended to derail the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and provoke renewed war. This act, involving around 1,800 Left SR-aligned combatants seizing key sites, marked a shift from collaborative terror to factional insurgency, prompting Bolshevik purges of Left SR elements from the and accelerating the party's marginalization. Prior to this rupture, however, Left SR participation reinforced the regime's coercive framework, aiding in the neutralization of approximately 500-800 suspects in Petrograd and alone during spring 1918 sweeps.

Escalation over Brest-Litovsk Treaty

The , signed on March 3, 1918, between Soviet Russia and the , marked a pivotal point of contention for the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (Left SRs), who viewed its terms—ceding vast territories including , , and the Baltic regions—as a humiliating capitulation that sacrificed revolutionary gains to imperialist demands. Left SR leaders, including and Boris Kamkov, argued that the treaty undermined the potential for sparking international proletarian uprisings by freeing German forces for the Western Front and isolating the . During the Extraordinary Fourth on March 14-16, 1918, the Left SR delegation of 283 members fiercely opposed ratification, with Kamkov delivering a key speech denouncing the as a of socialist principles and advocating instead for a policy of revolutionary defense to appeal directly to German soldiers and workers. Despite their efforts, the Bolshevik majority prevailed, ratifying the treaty and deepening the rift within the formed in November 1917, where Left SRs held positions such as People's Commissar for Justice Isaac Steinberg. In response to ratification, the Left SRs withdrew from the (Sovnarkom) around mid-March 1918, effectively ending their participation in executive power and signaling the collapse of the Bolshevik-Left SR alliance. This exit escalated internal conflicts, as Left SRs retained influence in rural soviets and the but shifted toward oppositional activities, including calls to nullify the treaty and preparations for confrontation, viewing Bolshevik compliance with the treaty's implementation as complicity in counter-revolutionary policy. The withdrawal highlighted irreconcilable divergences on war policy, with Left SRs prioritizing agrarian socialist internationalism over Lenin's tactical retreat to preserve soviet power amid threats.

Peak Influence and Strategic Miscalculations

Following their formal split from the right-wing Socialist-Revolutionaries in November 1917, the Left SRs rapidly ascended to significant influence within the nascent Soviet apparatus, leveraging their strong base among rural s. By December 1917, they secured three key positions in the : Andrei Kolegayev as People's Commissar for Agriculture, Isaac Steinberg for Justice, and Prokofy Japaridze or V. N. Karelin in related roles, enabling them to shape early agrarian policies aligned with their doctrine of socialization. This coalition with , formalized after Lenin's overtures at the Third in January 1918, granted the combined bloc over 90% of the votes, solidifying Left SR sway in peasant soviets and the . Their peak manifested in widespread adherence to the Land Decree of October 25, 1917 (October 12 Old Style), which expropriated landlord estates without compensation—a policy they championed and which peasant committees under their influence began implementing locally, distributing over 100 million hectares by mid-1918. However, this influence rested on fragile strategic alignments, as Left SR internationalism clashed with Bolshevik pragmatism amid the German advance. The ratification of the on March 15, 1918, which ceded vast territories including and to , prompted Left SR commissars to vote against it and resign from the government, withdrawing their support from the Sovnarkom. This decision underestimated Bolshevik consolidation of urban proletarian and military loyalty, isolating the Left SRs despite their rural dominance—peasant soviets represented only a fraction of overall soviet power, with Bolsheviks controlling key industrial centers and the Red Guard. The ensuing miscalculation peaked in their July 1918 gambit at the Fifth , where leaders like orchestrated the assassination of German ambassador on July 6 to derail the and reignite revolutionary war, anticipating mass peasant mobilization against perceived Bolshevik capitulation. This act, intended to force a soviet declaration nullifying Brest-Litovsk, backfired catastrophically: Bolshevik forces, under Leon Trotsky's command, swiftly suppressed the in , arresting over 500 members and expelling them from soviets. Their overreliance on ideological purity and expectation of spontaneous rural revolt ignored ' superior organizational discipline and control over telegraph and rail networks, which enabled rapid reinforcement and framing the rebels as counter-revolutionaries. By July 7, 1918, the Left SRs' parliamentary strength plummeted from around 300 delegates to irrelevance, marking the dissolution of their governmental foothold.

Uprising, Repression, and Dissolution

Events of the Fifth Soviet Congress

The Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets convened on July 4, 1918, at the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow, with 1,164 delegates holding voting rights, including 773 Bolsheviks and 353 Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (Left SRs). The assembly occurred amid escalating tensions over the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, which the Left SRs opposed as a capitulation enabling renewed German offensives, while Bolsheviks defended it as necessary to preserve Soviet power against internal and external threats. Early sessions debated domestic policies, including agrarian reforms and suppression of counter-revolution, but underlying divisions surfaced as Left SR delegates criticized Bolshevik centralization and treaty ratification. On July 5, , a prominent Left SR leader, delivered a vehement speech denouncing Bolshevik as a betrayal of revolutionary internationalism and predicting armed resistance if the treaty's implications persisted. She declared the Left SRs' intent to combat Bolshevik deviations publicly, framing their stance as defense of peasant interests and socialist principles against perceived compromises with . Bolshevik responses, including from , emphasized the congress's role in unifying soviet authority, rejecting Left SR appeals for renewed war mobilization. The congress's dynamics shifted dramatically on when news broke of the Left SR-orchestrated assassination of German ambassador in , intended to provoke into abrogating Brest-Litovsk and reignite hostilities. Bolshevik forces, under Leon Trotsky's direction, swiftly moved to arrest Left SR delegates within the Bolshoi Theatre hall, including Spiridonova and other faction leaders like Boris Kamkov, effectively neutralizing their presence. Approximately 29 Left SRs had initially been elected to the new Central Executive Committee of 101 members before the crackdown, but the Bolshevik majority condemned the uprising as adventurism undermining soviet unity. Subsequent sessions, dominated by Bolsheviks, passed resolutions denouncing the Left SR actions as counter-revolutionary and justifying defensive measures, including the dispersal of armed Left SR units in and provinces. The congress affirmed the treaty's framework while endorsing expansion, marking the effective purge of Left SR influence from soviet institutions and accelerating their marginalization in revolutionary governance.

Armed Rebellion and Assassinations

On July 6, 1918, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (Left SRs) initiated an armed uprising in against Bolshevik authority, primarily to nullify the by provoking a German military response and resuming hostilities. The rebellion began with the assassination of German Ambassador at the German Embassy, carried out by Left SR operatives Yakov Blyumkin and Nikolai Andreyev, who posed as representatives to gain entry. Mirbach was shot multiple times during the encounter, an act intended as a catalyst for international conflict to rally domestic opposition to Bolshevik concessions. Following the killing, Left SR forces, numbering around 700-800 armed militants, seized strategic sites including the central post office, telephone exchange, and portions of the Kremlin to consolidate control and broadcast their declaration of overthrowing the Bolshevik government. Maria Spiridonova, a prominent Left SR leader, announced the assassination and uprising at the ongoing Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, framing it as a defense of revolutionary internationalism against perceived Bolshevik betrayal. The rebels proclaimed the restoration of the Committee of Public Safety and called for renewed war against Germany, aiming to exploit peasant discontent and anti-treaty sentiment. Bolshevik countermeasures swiftly unfolded, with forces under and units recapturing key positions through targeted assaults, including on the Left SR-occupied parts of the . By the afternoon of July 7, 1918, the uprising was crushed, resulting in dozens of rebel deaths and the of leading figures such as Spiridonova and Boris Kamkov. Blyumkin and Andreyev evaded immediate capture, fleeing the scene, while the failed revolt marked a decisive turning point, accelerating the Bolshevik consolidation of power and the marginalization of Left SR influence. No further significant assassinations were directly tied to the Left SRs in this episode, though the Mirbach killing underscored their tactical reliance on to achieve strategic ends.

Bolshevik Response and Party Suppression

The swiftly mobilized loyal forces, including under the command of Colonel Vacietis, to retake the and other seized positions in on July 7, 1918, following the Left SRs' assassination of German ambassador and their occupation of the Fifth . By evening, the military response had quelled the rebellion, expelling insurgents from telegraph stations, printing presses, and the itself, with reports of disorganized Left SR retreats and ongoing pursuits yielding further captures. In the immediate aftermath, the arrested over 400 Left SR delegates and members at the Congress site alone, alongside hundreds more across and provincial centers, framing the action as a defense against a " conspiracy" allied with German interests. Key leaders, including and Boris Kamkov, were detained; Spiridonova was tried by the and sentenced to life imprisonment in , though later commuted and released under in 1919 before re-arrest. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee, dominated by Bolsheviks, declared the Left SR Party an outlawed organization on July 9, 1918, expelling its remaining soviet representatives and prohibiting its press and activities, effectively dissolving it as a legal entity. Trials of captured leaders in August 1918 resulted in acquittals for some due to procedural issues, but the party was irreparably fragmented, with surviving factions either going underground, defecting to the Bolsheviks, or splintering into minor pro-Soviet groups by 1919. This purge eliminated the last significant non-Bolshevik presence in the soviet apparatus, enabling undivided Communist Party control amid the escalating Civil War.

Legacy and Historiographical Assessment

Immediate Consequences for the Revolution

The suppression of the on July 6–7, , marked the decisive elimination of organized socialist opposition within the Soviet apparatus, enabling to consolidate unchallenged authority. Bolshevik forces, including the and units under Bela Kun, swiftly quelled the rebellion in after Left SR agents assassinated German ambassador , with approximately 300 to 800 rebels captured and key leaders like imprisoned. This rapid military response prevented the Left SRs' aim of provoking renewed war with via treaty abrogation, avoiding immediate escalation amid the ongoing Civil War. In the political sphere, initiated a nationwide , expelling all Left SR delegates from the Central Executive Committee and local soviets, while disbanding or dismissing their adherents in provincial and rural councils. This action dissolved the fragile coalition, which had included Left SRs in roles such as People's Commissars for Justice and Agriculture, effectively establishing Bolshevik monopoly over Soviet governance by mid-July 1918. The Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, convened amid the unrest, reaffirmed exclusive Bolshevik control over war and peace decisions, rejecting Left SR agitation for decentralized soviet autonomy. These events accelerated the transition to one-party rule, intensifying centralization as Bolsheviks viewed the uprising—despite its socialist framing—as counter-revolutionary alignment with external foes, justifying expanded Cheka operations and the onset of systematic repression against dissenting factions. Rural implementation of policies like the Committees of the Village Poor (kombedy) faced reduced resistance post-purge, bolstering food requisitions critical to Red Army sustenance during the Civil War. While Left SR remnants splintered or integrated into Bolshevik structures, the revolt's failure underscored the fragility of multi-faction alliances, paving the way for undivided command under Lenin and Trotsky.

Long-Term Evaluations and Criticisms

Historians have long critiqued the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries for their strategic miscalculations, particularly the July 1918 uprising, which Cinnella describes as a "quixotic quest for internationalism" that prioritized opposition to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty over pragmatic power consolidation, leading to their rapid marginalization. This action, including the assassination of German ambassador Wilhelm von Mirbach on July 6, 1918, alienated potential allies and provided Bolsheviks with pretext for suppression, as evidenced by the immediate arrest of Left SR Central Committee members and dissolution of their press organs. Lenin and Trotsky framed the revolt as a deliberate shift to counter-revolutionary terrain, arguing it undermined Soviet authority amid civil war threats, a view rooted in Bolshevik assessments of the Left SRs' peasant-based radicalism as incompatible with disciplined proletarian governance. Western historiography, drawing on Radkey's foundational analyses of Socialist Revolutionary dynamics, often portrays the Left SRs as organizationally ineffective, with a "wavering" approach that blended utopian agrarian federalism and terror tactics without sustaining a viable military or administrative base. While Häfner challenges earlier dismissive labels like "Don Quixotes of the revolution" by emphasizing their mass peasant appeal—evident in control of rural soviets until mid-1918—critics note their failure to adapt to industrial realities or build coalitions beyond temporary Bolshevik alliances, resulting in ideological isolation. Empirically, their peak influence waned after boycotting the Constituent Assembly and rejecting land nationalization decrees, policies that prioritized immediate socialization over peasant incentives, contributing to rural unrest but not revolutionary success. Long-term assessments underscore the Left SRs' negligible institutional legacy, as their suppression on July 7-8, , facilitated Bolshevik one-party dominance, foreclosing multi-factional soviet democracy. Some scholars attribute this to inherent contradictions in their program—romanticizing spontaneous peasant communes while underestimating centralized coercion's role in wartime survival—causally enabling policies like that exacerbated famines. Conversely, their advocacy for decentralized and anti-imperialist revolt prefigured later critiques of Stalinist bureaucratization, though without empirical continuity, as surviving members were co-opted, exiled, or executed by 1922. This historiographical debate reflects broader tensions: Bolshevik sources decry their "petty-bourgeois" inconsistency, while revisionist views highlight suppressed democratic potentials, yet consensus affirms their tactical errors sealed a path to authoritarian consolidation.

Comparative Role in Revolutionary Dynamics

The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (Left SRs) occupied a pivotal yet transient position in the revolutionary dynamics of 1917-1918, functioning as a radical agrarian counterweight to the Bolsheviks' urban proletarian focus and the Right SRs' moderation. Emerging from a split in the Socialist-Revolutionary Party at the party's Second Congress on December 20-22, 1917 (Old Style), the Left SRs rejected alliances with bourgeois elements, prioritizing immediate land socialization through peasant committees and worker self-management, which aligned temporarily with Bolshevik calls for soviet power but diverged in execution. Their strategy emphasized spontaneous mass action over centralized party discipline, drawing from narodnik traditions of peasant communalism, in contrast to the Bolsheviks' vanguardist model that subordinated local initiatives to Moscow's directives. This approach garnered significant peasant support, evidenced by their control of rural soviets in regions like Ukraine and the Volga, where they implemented decentralized land redistribution experiments by early 1918. Comparatively, the Left SRs' role mirrored radical splinter groups in other socialist contexts, such as the Menshevik-Internationalists' opposition to , but with a stronger populist bent that prioritized agrarian upheaval over industrial . While the Right SRs, holding a plurality in the elected on November 12, 1917 (with 40% of votes versus ' 24%), sought parliamentary legitimacy and reconciliation with the , the Left SRs dismissed such forums as bourgeois traps, endorsing the dissolution of the Assembly on January 6, 1918. Their with the from November 1917 to March 1918, securing four commissariats including under Ivan Kolegayev, enabled policies like the Land Decree of October 26, 1917, which nationalized private estates and validated seizures—reforms substantively SR-derived but enforced through Bolshevik state mechanisms. This partnership temporarily broadened the soviet regime's base, mitigating urban-rural tensions, yet exposed fault lines: Left SR advocacy for "federalist" soviets clashed with centralism, fostering administrative frictions documented in Central Executive Committee debates. The Brest-Litovsk Treaty's ratification on March 15, 1918, crystallized these divergences, as Left SRs, led by figures like Maria Spiridonova, viewed the territorial concessions (ceding 34% of Russia's population and 32% of its arable land) as capitulation to imperialism, incompatible with their vision of revolutionary war to ignite European uprisings. Unlike Bolshevik realpolitik, which traded space for time to build Red Army strength amid civil war onset, Left SR strategy invoked voluntarist internationalism, culminating in the July 6, 1918, assassination of German ambassador Wilhelm von Mirbach by Yakov Blumkin and the subsequent Moscow uprising, where Left SR forces briefly seized key buildings before Bolshevik counteraction dispersed them. This event, involving roughly 3,000 armed Left SRs against superior Bolshevik-Latvian riflemen, accelerated the regime's shift to one-party rule, suppressing multi-factional dynamics evident in the All-Russian Congresses. Historiographically, such rigidity—prioritizing ideological purity over pragmatic adaptation—contrasts with Bolshevik flexibility, which causal analysis attributes to their survival: Left SRs' decentralized structure, reliant on peasant militias prone to desertion, lacked the Bolsheviks' 50,000-strong party cadre for sustained mobilization. In broader revolutionary terms, their trajectory parallels factions like the French Revolution's Hébertists, whose ultra-radicalism invited Thermidorian purge, underscoring how peripheral radicals can catalyze centralization when challenging core power-holders' compromises.

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