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Principles of war
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Principles of war are rules and guidelines that represent truths in the practice of war and military operations.
The earliest known principles of war were documented by Sun Tzu, c. 500 BCE, as well as Chanakya in his Arthashastra c. 350 BCE. Machiavelli published his "General Rules" in 1521 which were themselves modeled on Vegetius' Regulae bellorum generales (Epit. 3.26.1–33). Henri, Duke of Rohan established his "Guides" for war in 1644. Marquis de Silva presented his "Principles" for war in 1778. Henry Lloyd proffered his version of "Rules" for war in 1781 as well as his "Axioms" for war in 1781. Then in 1805, Antoine-Henri Jomini published his "Maxims" for war version 1, "Didactic Resume" and "Maxims" for war version 2. Carl von Clausewitz wrote his version in 1812 building on the work of earlier writers.
There are no universally agreed-upon principles of war. The principles of warfare are tied into military doctrine of the various military services. Doctrine, in turn, suggests but does not dictate strategy and tactics.
Historical principles
[edit]Arthashastra
[edit]Arthaśāstra is an ancient Indian Sanskrit treatise on statecraft and military strategy among other things.
Biblical
[edit]The Book of Deuteronomy prescribes how the Israelite army was to fight, including dealing with plunder, enslavement of the enemy women and children and forbidding the destruction of fruit-bearing trees.
Sun Tzu
[edit]Sun Tzu's The Art of War, written c. 400 BCE, listed five basic factors for a commander to consider:
- The Moral Law, or discipline and unity of command
- Heaven, or weather factors
- Earth, or the terrain
- The Commander;
- Method and discipline, which included logistics and supply
However, Sun Tzu implied individual initiative as a principle of warfare, stating "According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one's plans."
Napoleon Bonaparte
[edit]Since the first appearance in English of the military maxims of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1831, all English translations have relied upon the extremely incomplete French edition of General Burnod[a] published in 1827.[citation needed][2][3] This has contributed to the erroneous belief that Napoléon Bonaparte had pioneered the "Principles of War". Napoléon was a keen follower of famous military generals of the past, who influenced his thoughts greatly. Albeit, "The armies of today are based on the organization created by Napoleon [sic] for his Grand Army and it has been used ever since." (Weider, par. 12).[4] Since the mid-19th century, due to the influence of the Prussian army, the maxims have become a guide for many military organizations to focus the thinking of military commanders and political leaders toward concepts and methods of successful prosecution of wars and smaller military operations.[citation needed] Although originally concerned with strategy, grand strategy and tactics, due to the changing nature of warfare and military technology, since the interwar period, the principles are largely applied[citation needed] to the strategic decision-making, and in some cases, to operational mobility of forces.
Carl von Clausewitz
[edit]The principles of war identified by Carl von Clausewitz in his essay Principles of War,[5] and later enlarged in his book, On War, have been influential in military thinking in the North Atlantic region.
The initial essay dealt with the tactics of combat, and suggested the following general principles:
- discover how we may gain a preponderance of physical forces and material advantages at the decisive point
- to calculate moral factors
- make the best use of the few means at our disposal
- never lack calmness and firmness...without this firm resolution, no great results can be achieved in the most successful war
- always have the choice between the most audacious and the most careful solution...no military leader has ever become great without audacity
Based on the above, Clausewitz went on to suggest principles for tactics, the scale of combat that dominated European warfare at the time:
- The Defence
- The Offense
- The Use of Troops
- The Use Of Terrain
- forces are more effective in a concentric rather than in a parallel attack; attack concentrically without having decisive superiority in an engagement
- always seek to envelop that part of the enemy against which we direct our main attack
- cut off the enemy from his line of retreat
Clausewitz also included in the essay general principles of strategy by saying that Warfare has three main objects:
- (a) To conquer and destroy the armed power of the enemy; always direct our principal operation against the main body of the enemy army or at least against an important portion of his forces
- (b) To take possession of his material and other sources of strength, and to direct our operations against the places where most of these resources are concentrated
- (c) To gain public opinion, won through great victories and the occupation of the enemy's capital
- use our entire force with the utmost energy
- the decisive point of attack
- never to waste time
- surprise plays a much greater role in tactics than in strategy
- pursuit
- forces concentrated at the main point
- an attack on the lines of communication takes effect only very slowly, while victory on the field of battle bears fruit immediately
- In strategy, therefore, the side that is surrounded by the enemy is better off than the side which surrounds its opponent, especially with equal or even weaker forces
- To cut the enemy's line of retreat, however, strategic envelopment or a turning movement is very effective
- be physically and morally superior
- stores of supplies, on whose preservation operations absolutely depend
- The provisioning of troops is a necessary condition of warfare and thus has great influence on the operations
- independent action
- Politically speaking defensive war is a war which we wage for our independence
- The strategic offensive pursues the aim of the war directly, aiming straight at the destruction of the enemy's forces
Jomini
[edit]Antoine Henri Jomini in his book, Precis de l'Art de Guerre, published in 1838, also developed theories of warfare based on the concepts and methods used during the Napoleonic Wars.
Ardant du Picq
[edit]Colonel Ardant du Picq, a French infantry officer who was killed in the Franco-Prussian War, prepared drafts based on his observations of military history which became the book Battle Studies. In it two of Du Picq's observations stand out:
- Combat is the object, the cause of being, and the supreme manifestation of an army and must be the focus of training, even in peacetime.
- The human element is more important than theories. War is still more of an art than a science.[6]
20th century theory
[edit]Applied to specific forms of warfare, such as naval warfare, Julian Corbett argued that maritime strategy should play a significant role in the principles of war.[7] Admiral William S. Sims, who commanded the U.S. Navy's contribution to the British Grand Fleet in World War I, wrote of the U.S. Naval War College:
The college aims to supply principles, not rules, and by training, develop the habit of applying these principles logically, correctly, and rapidly to each situation that may arise.
This habit can be acquired only through considerable practice, hence the numerous problems in strategy and tactics.[8]
National principles of war
[edit]Variations exist and differences are minor and semantic or reflect a cultural persuasion for a particular approach. A closer examination of the values and culture of origin reveals its war priorities.
UK
[edit]The UK uses 10 principles of war, as taught to all officers of the Royal Navy, British Army, and Royal Air Force:
The British Army's principles of war were first published after the First World War and based on the work of the British general and military theorist, J. F. C. Fuller. The definition of each principle has been refined over the following decades and adopted throughout the British armed forces. The tenth principle, added later, was originally called Administration. The first principle has always been stated as pre-eminent and the second is usually considered more important than the remainder, which are not listed in any order of importance.
The 2011 edition of British Defence Doctrine (BDD)[9] states and explains the principles with the following preface: "Principles of War guide commanders and their staffs in the planning and conduct of warfare. They are enduring, but not immutable, absolute or prescriptive, and provide an appropriate foundation for all military activity. The relative importance of each may vary according to context; their application requires judgement, common sense and intelligent interpretation. Commanders also need to take into account the legitimacy of their actions, based on the legal, moral, political, diplomatic and ethical propriety of the conduct of military forces, once committed."
The ten principles as listed and defined in the 2011 edition, unchanged from the 2008 edition, of BDD (which also provides explanation) are:
- Selection and Maintenance of the Aim – A single, unambiguous aim is the keystone of successful military operations. Selection and maintenance of the aim is regarded as the master principle of war.
- Maintenance of Morale – Morale is a positive state of mind derived from inspired political and military leadership, a shared sense of purpose and values, well-being, perceptions of worth and group cohesion.
- Offensive Action – Offensive action is the practical way in which a commander seeks to gain advantage, sustain momentum and seize the initiative.
- Security – Security is the provision and maintenance of an operating environment that affords the necessary freedom of action, when and where required, to achieve objectives.
- Surprise – Surprise is the consequence of shock and confusion induced by the deliberate or incidental introduction of the unexpected.
- Concentration of Force – Concentration of force involves the decisive, synchronized application of superior fighting power (conceptual, physical, and moral) to realize intended effects, when and where required.
- Economy of Effort – Economy of effort is the judicious exploitation of manpower, materiel and time in relation to the achievement of objectives.
- Flexibility – the ability to change readily to meet new circumstances – comprises agility, responsiveness, resilience, acuity and adaptability.
- Cooperation – Cooperation entails the incorporation of teamwork and a sharing of dangers, burdens, risks and opportunities in every aspect of warfare.
- Sustainability – To sustain a force is to generate the means by which its fighting power and freedom of action are maintained.
These principles of war are commonly used by the armed forces of Commonwealth countries such as Australia.
Soviet Union and Russia
[edit]Soviet adoption of the principles of war is considered a part of military art, and is therefore a system of knowledge that is
the theory and practice of preparing and conducting military operations on the land, at sea, and in the air.[10]
As such it includes the following principles[11]
- High combat readiness
- surprise, decisiveness and active seeking to secure the initiative
- full use of all means of combat
- coordination and interaction of all types and branches
- decisive concentration
- simultaneous attack in depth
- full use of morale-political factor
- firm and continuous command and control
- inexorability and decisiveness during the mission
- security of combat operations
- timely restoration of troop combat readiness
The Soviet principles of military science, from Soviet AirLand Battle Tactics ISBN 0-89141-160-7. Similar principles continue to be followed in CIS countries.
- Preparedness – The ability to fulfill missions under any conditions for starting or the conduct of war.
- Initiative – Utilizing surprise, decisiveness, and aggressiveness to continuously strive to achieve and retain the initiative. Initiative, in this sense describes efforts to fulfill the plan in spite of difficulties. This is in contrast to the western usage of the term which means attacking (or threatening to attack) to force enemy reaction, thus denying his ability to act.
- Capability – Full use of the various means and capabilities of battle to achieve victory.
- Cooperation – Coordinated application of and close cooperation between major units of the armed forces.
- Concentration – Decisive concentration of the essential force at the needed moment and in the most important direction to achieve the main mission.
- Depth – Destruction of the enemy throughout the entire depth of their deployment.
- Morale – Use of political and psychological factors to demoralize opponents and break their will to resist.
- Obedience – Strict and uninterrupted obedience. Orders are to be followed exactly and without question. Commanders are expected to directly supervise subordinates in a detailed manner in order to ensure compliance.
- Steadfastness – Subordinate commanders are to carry out the spirit and the letter of the plan.
- Security – Security complements surprise. All aspects of security, from deception and secrecy, to severe discipline of subordinates who through action or inaction allow information to fall into the hands of ourselves are to be vigorously carried out.
- Logistics – Restoration of reserves and restoration of combat capability is of paramount concern of the modern, fast paced battlefield.
Thus it can be seen that in Military art, the Soviet and Western systems are similar, but place their emphasis in wildly differing places. Western systems allow more control and decision-making at lower levels of command, and with this empowerment comes a consistent emphasis. Offensive, mass, and maneuver principles for the western commander all place a sense of personal responsibility and authority to ensure these principles are followed by appropriate action. In contrast the Soviet system stresses preparedness, initiative, and obedience. This places more responsibility at the better prepared and informed centers of command, and provide more overall control of the battle.
United States
[edit](Refer to US Army Field Manual FM 3–0)
The United States Armed Forces use the following nine principles of war:
- Objective – Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective. The ultimate military purpose of war is the destruction of the enemy's ability to fight and will to fight.
- Offensive – Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined common objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. This is fundamentally true across all levels of war.
- Mass – Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time. Synchronizing all the elements of combat power where they will have decisive effect on an enemy force in a short period of time is to achieve mass. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results, while limiting exposure to enemy fire.
- Economy of Force – Employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. No part of the force should ever be left without purpose. The allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations is measured in order to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time on the battlefield.
- Maneuver – Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to gain positional advantage. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and protects the force. It is used to exploit successes, to preserve freedom of action, and to reduce vulnerability. It continually poses new problems for the enemy by rendering his actions ineffective, eventually leading to defeat.
- Unity of Command – For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort. At all levels of war, employment of military forces in a manner that masses combat power toward a common objective requires unity of command and unity of effort. Unity of command means that all the forces are under one responsible commander. It requires a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of a unified purpose.
- Security – Never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by a commander to protect his forces. Knowledge and understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, doctrine, and staff planning improve the detailed planning of adequate security measures.
- Surprise – Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Surprise can decisively shift the balance of combat power. By seeking surprise, forces can achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Surprise can be in tempo, size of force, direction or location of main effort, and timing. Deception can aid the probability of achieving surprise.
- Simplicity – Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. Everything in war is very simple, but the simple thing is difficult. To the uninitiated, military operations are not difficult. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. Other factors being equal, parsimony is to be preferred.
Officers in the U.S. Military sometimes use the acronyms "MOSS MOUSE", "MOOSE MUSS", "MOUSE MOSS", "MOM USE SOS", and "SUMO MOSES" to remember the first letters of these nine principles.
| MOSSMOUSE | Equivalent Nine Principles |
|---|---|
| Mass | Concentration & Distribution |
| Objective | Direction |
| Simplicity | Not applicable. Simplicity was never listed as a principle by Fuller in his final draft. |
| Security | Security |
| Maneuver | Mobility |
| Offensive | Offensive Action (Disorganisation of Force) |
| Unity of Command | Determination & Endurance |
| Surprise | Surprise (Demoralisation of Force) |
| Economy of Force | Not applicable. Economy of Force was seen by Fuller as the goal of the Nine Principles, rather than a Principle in itself. |
According to a United States Government document from 2010, the rule governing targeting in a non-international armed conflict is the international humanitarian law which is commonly known as the laws of war.[12] The United States government stated in an undated Department of Justice White paper entitled "Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al Qa’ida or An Associated Force" that the four fundamental law-of-war principles governing the use of force are necessity, distinction, proportionality and humanity i.e. the avoidance of unnecessary suffering.[13][14]
There is a debate within the American military establishment to adopt flexibility as the tenth principle of war. Frost argues that the concept of flexibility should be integrated with America's warfighting doctrine.[15] Americans[who?] soundly retort that flexibility is a given that pervades all aspects of each principle.
Many,[who?] however, hold that the principle of simplicity implicitly includes flexibility. One of the oldest dicta states that the simple plan is the flexible plan.
In 2007, Armed Forces Journal published a proposal by LCDR Chris van Avery, USN, 12 New Principles of War,[16] to completely overhaul and expand the U.S. principles of war from nine to thirteen. The article was subsequently forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Air Force Chief of Staff General Moseley and an effort to overhaul current U.S. doctrine was initiated using Van Avery's framework.
In 2011, three new "principles of joint operations" were added to the cited nine principles of war. These principles are:
- Restraint – to limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force. Restraint requires the careful and disciplined balancing of the need for security, the conduct of military operations, and the national strategic end state.
- Perseverance – to ensure the commitment necessary to attain the national strategic end state. The underlying causes of the crisis may be elusive, making it difficult to achieve decisive resolution. The patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives often is essential to success.
- Legitimacy – to maintain legal and moral authority in the conduct of operations. Legitimacy, which can be a decisive factor in operations, is based on the actual and perceived legality, morality, and rightness of the actions from the various perspectives of interested audiences.
Together, these 12 concepts form the Principles of Joint Operations.[17]
Canada
[edit]The Canadian Armed Forces principles of war/military science are defined by the Royal Military College of Canada or Canadian Forces College website to focus on principles of command, principles of war, operational art and campaign planning, and scientific principles.
- principles of command – Lead By Example; Know Your subordinates And Promote Their Welfare; Develop Leadership Potential; Make Sound And Timely Decisions; Train subordinates As A Team; Communicate Ideas Clearly; Keep subordinates Informed Of All Activities And New Developments; Take Initiatives; Know Yourself And Pursue Self-Improvement; Treat subordinates As You Wish To Be Treated
- principles of war – Selection and maintenance of the aim; maintenance of morale; offensive action; surprise; security; concentration of force; economy of effort; flexibility; co-operation; and administration. These principles are not listed in any order of importance.
- operational art and campaign planning – the organization and synchronization of the planning process and maritime, land and air forces.
- scientific principles – involved in military reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition in the context of military operations.
France
[edit]The French Army recognizes three principles to be applied to operation of land forces at the tactical level:[18]
- Freedom of action – "The ability of a commander to use his means at any time and to act despite the presence of the enemy and the various constraints imposed by both the environment and circumstances, in order to achieve the assigned goal. [...] Freedom of Action consists of maintaining the initiative with regards to the enemy in order to 'control upcoming action' and seize opportunities."
- Unity of effort – "Convergence in space and time of actions and effects of the different operational functions. [...] Unity of Effort distinguishes itself from the concentration of forces through the need to combine actions and optimize effects in order to increase the effectiveness on the chosen objective." This principle includes the psychological effects of surprise and troop morale, in addition to the more conventional principle of concentration of forces.
- Economy of means – "Proper distribution and use of assets in order to obtain the best ratio of capabilities vs. effects in order to achieve the assigned goal." The instruments for this principle are modularity, the "task organization" of the forces, and support.
According to French doctrine, new principles should be observed, primarily to protect the principle of "Freedom of Action":
- Legitimacy – Among the local population, in national public opinion, and among international institutions.
- Necessity – The appropriate amount of force is to be used for each desired objective.
- Reversibility – The military actor should be prepared to quickly change its course of action depending on the opponent's attitude. Organize military actions to limit human losses and material damages. Remain open to opportunities for de-escalation, and prepare to "support the failure of the enemy" rather than needlessly seeking total destruction. "[Keep] the operation’s level of intensity as low as possible."
Israel
[edit]The principles of war according to Israeli doctrine are:[19]
- Maintenance of the aim;
- Morale;
- Initiative;
- Stratagem;
- Concentration of effort;
- Security;
- Optimal utilization of force;
- Continuity;
- Depth and reserve;
- Simplicity.
People's Republic of China
[edit]The military principles of war of the People's Liberation Army were loosely based on those of the Soviet Union until the 1980s when a significant shift begun to be seen in a more regionally-aware, and geographically-specific strategic, operational and tactical thinking in all services. The PLA is currently influenced by three doctrinal schools which both conflict and complement each other: the People's war, the Regional war, and the Revolution in military affairs that led to substantial increase in the defence spending and rate of technological modernisation of the forces.
- People's war – which is derived from the Maoist notion of warfare as a war in which the entire society is mobilized
- Regional war – which envisions future wars to be limited in scope and confined to the Chinese border
- Revolution in military affairs – which is a school of thought which believes that technology is transforming the basis of warfare and that these technological changes present both extreme dangers and possibilities for the Chinese military.
In recent years, 'Local war under high-tech conditions' has been promoted.
Other uses
[edit]These principles can be applied to non-military uses when Unity of command is separated into coordination and reality, Economy of Force is redefined as use of resources, Mass is separated into renewable and non-renewable resources, and relationships are separated from unity of command.
In 1913 Harrington Emerson proposed 12 principles of efficiency,[20] the first three of which could be related to principles of war: Clearly defined ideals – Objective, Common sense – Simplicity, Competent counsel – Unity of Command.
Some of the twelve non-military principles of efficiency were formulated by Henry Ford at the turn of the 20th century,[21] and are suggested to be[citation needed]: objective, coordination, action, reality, knowledge, locations (space and time), things, obtaining, using, protecting, and losing. Nine, ten, or twelve principles all provide a framework for efficient development of any objective.
Principles of War was also a book published in 1969 for the Japan Self-Defense Forces.[22] It outlines the basic military principles and strategies by which the Japanese army was to operate. The book was used for most military exams in Japan. The book backs up all military principles with historical examples.
See also
[edit]Notes and citations
[edit]- ^ Barbier, Antoine Alexandre (1875). Dictionnaire des ouvrages anonymes (in French). Vol. 3 (3 ed.). Paris: P. Daffis. p. 92. Retrieved 7 December 2024.
- ^
Compare:
Bonaparte, Napoleon (1845). Military Maxims of Napoleon. Translated by Akerly, J. New York: Wiley and Putnam. p. 4. Retrieved 7 December 2024.
The compilation was made by M. Barnow, an officer of the Russian staff, from the various Memoirs, &c., published by the military and other com[panions of the ex-Emperor in the island of St. Helena.
- ^ Compare: Bonaparte, Napoleon (1828). Maximes de guerre de Napoléon [Napoleon's war maxims] (in French). Antwerp: J. Van Esse. Retrieved 7 December 2024.
- ^ Napoleon and the Jews Archived 2010-02-08 at the Wayback Machine, The International Napoleonic Society. Florida State University, 1998. Web. 15 March 2010
- ^ Carl Von Clausewitz, Principles of War, Tr. Hans W. Gatzke.
- ^ Du Picq, Ardant. Battle Studies. Translated from the 8th Edition by Col. John N. Greely, Field Artillery, U.S. Army, and Major Robert C. Cotton, General Staff. Available on Project Gutenberg. http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/gutbook/lookup?num=7294 Archived 2016-03-03 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ p. 15, Corbett
- ^ Sims, William S. (Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy). "The United States Naval War College." Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute 45:9 [September 1919]. 1485–93
- ^ Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 (JDP 0-01) (4th Edition) dated November 2011 http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/FDB67DF9-5835-47FD-897D-CA82C17EC7A5/0/20111130jdp001_bdd_Ed4.pdf Archived 2012-04-03 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ p. 7, Glantz
- ^ Glantz, pp. 7–8
- ^ Acting Attorney General David J. Barron (U.S. States Department of Justice – Office of the Assistant Attorney General) (16 July 2010). "Memorandum for the Attorney General – Re: Applicability of Federal Crime Laws and the Constitution to the Contemplated Lethal Operations Against Shaykh Anwar al-Aulaqi". Scribd.com. p. 17. Archived from the original on 19 August 2014. Retrieved 17 August 2014.
- ^ "Undated memo entitled 'Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al Qa'ida or An Associated Force' by the U.S. Department of Justice" (PDF). NBC News. p. 8. Archived from the original (PDF) on 26 August 2014. Retrieved 15 August 2014.
- ^ Isikoff, Michael (4 February 2013). "Justice Department memo reveals legal case for drone strikes on Americans". NBC News. Archived from the original on 19 August 2014. Retrieved 15 August 2014.
- ^ p. C iii, Frost
- ^ [1], van Avery
- ^ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (11 August 2011). Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (PDF). Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. pp. A–1 – A–4. Archived from the original (PDF) on 3 March 2016. Retrieved 28 December 2015.
- ^ "FT-02 ENG". Archived from the original on 2017-05-22.
- ^ "אתר חיל-האוויר". Archived from the original on 2016-02-09. Retrieved 2017-07-10.
- ^ p. 3, Emerson
- ^ pp.122-123, Storper, Scott
- ^ "Principles of War: A Translation from the Japanese". Archived from the original on March 8, 2005. Retrieved May 31, 2005., West
References
[edit]- von Clausewitz, Carl, The most important principles of waging war to complete my course of instruction for his Royal Highness the Crown Prince (German: Die wichtigsten Grundsätze des Kriegführens zur Ergänzung meines Unterrichts bei Sr. Königlichen Hoheit dem Kronprinzen), 1812 Translated and edited by Hans W. Gatzke as "Principles of War, September 1942, The Military Service Publishing Company
- Emerson, Harrington, Twelve Principles of Efficiency, Kessinger Publishing, 2003
- Van Avery, Chris, LCDR, USN, 12 New Principles of War, Armed Force Journal, The Defense News Media Group, July 2007 [2].
- West, Joseph, Dr., Principles of War: A Translation from the Japanese, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1969 [3]
- Frost, Robert S., Lt.Col. (USAF), The growing imperative to adopt "flexibility" as an American Principle of War, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, October 15, 1999 [4]
- Storper, Michael & Scott, Allen John, Pathways to industrialization and regional development, Routledge, 1992
- Corbett, Julian Stafford, Sir, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, London, 1911, US Naval Institute Press, 1988 (The Project Gutenberg eBook [5])
- Glantz, David, Soviet Military Operational Art: In pursuit of deep battle, Frank Cass, London, 1991
Principles of war
View on GrokipediaDefinition and Foundations
Core Definition and Objectives
The principles of war comprise a set of doctrinal guidelines distilled from historical military experience, designed to inform commanders in the planning, execution, and adaptation of operations to achieve superior outcomes against adversaries. These principles function as flexible heuristics rather than inflexible rules, emphasizing the integration of combat power, timing, and deception to exploit enemy vulnerabilities while conserving one's own resources. In U.S. military doctrine, they are articulated as nine core elements—objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity—serving as the foundational paradigm for the art of warfare across operational levels.[8][9] The primary objective of applying these principles is to align military efforts with national strategic goals, typically by directing operations toward the decisive neutralization of the enemy's armed forces, logistical base, or will to resist, thereby compelling submission or capitulation with minimal expenditure of friendly assets. This involves prioritizing attainable ends, such as the destruction of hostile capabilities that threaten political aims, over vague or peripheral pursuits that dilute focus. For instance, historical analyses underscore that success hinges on concentrating superior force at critical points while allocating minimal forces elsewhere, ensuring that tactical actions cumulatively contribute to campaign-level victory.[10][9] Broader objectives extend to fostering adaptability in dynamic environments, where principles guide responses to friction—unpredictable factors like terrain, weather, and human error—without prescribing specific tactics. By promoting offensive initiative and unified decision-making, they aim to impose costs on the enemy disproportionate to one's own, rooted in the causal reality that wars are resolved through the asymmetric application of violence and coercion. Empirical validation from conflicts, such as Napoleonic campaigns analyzed by early theorists, confirms their utility in reducing operational failures attributable to dispersion or hesitation.[6][11]Empirical and Philosophical Basis
The principles of war derive their empirical foundation from systematic analyses of historical battles, where recurring patterns of success and failure reveal causal mechanisms linking specific actions to outcomes. For instance, British officer J.F.C. Fuller, drawing from World War I engagements, identified early principles such as mass and offensive action as heuristics explaining operational victories, emphasizing concentration of force to achieve local superiority over numerical parity.[7] Quantitative military historians like Trevor N. Dupuy further validated these through models such as the Quantified Judgment Model (QJM) and Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model (TNDM), which aggregate data from over 600 World War II and other engagements to quantify factors like surprise and leadership, showing they amplify combat effectiveness by 1.2 to 2.0 times beyond troop strength alone.[12] These empirical derivations underscore that principles are not dogmatic rules but probabilistic guides, tested against real-world friction where deviations, such as dispersed forces in the 1940 Battle of France, predictably led to defeats due to diluted combat power.[13] Philosophically, the principles rest on causal realism about conflict as a domain of incomplete information, human agency, and resource constraints, where victory hinges on exploiting enemy vulnerabilities rather than abstract ideals. Sun Tzu's The Art of War (circa 5th century BCE) posits deception and foreknowledge as foundational, arguing that superior positioning—knowing oneself and the enemy—enables triumph without exhaustive battle, a reasoning rooted in rational calculation of odds to minimize costs.[14] In contrast, Carl von Clausewitz's Principles of War (1812) emphasizes moral and physical preponderance at decisive points, introducing "friction" as inherent uncertainty from chance, enemy resistance, and logistical hazards, which demands audacity and concentration to overcome, as passive forces dissipate through doubt and delay.[6] Both frameworks reject utopian views of war, instead deriving tenets from first-order causes: Clausewitz links morale erosion to sustained attrition, while Sun Tzu ties strategic paralysis to perceptual manipulation, illustrating principles as tools for navigating war's probabilistic causality rather than deterministic engineering.[14] This dual basis integrates causation into strategy, where empirical patterns inform philosophical abstraction; for example, understanding mechanisms like force multiplication through maneuver allows prediction of outcomes, as counterfactual analyses reveal that absent surprise, even superior numbers falter due to unexploited dispositions.[15] Military doctrines thus evolve these principles not as immutable truths but as refined instruments, continually assessed against historical data to discern genuine leverage from illusory correlations, ensuring applicability amid variables like terrain and technology.[7]Historical Evolution
Ancient and Eastern Origins
The earliest evidence of systematic military thought in ancient civilizations appears in Mesopotamia during the Akkadian period (circa 2334–2154 BCE), where concepts of war involved organized campaigns emphasizing conquest, resource extraction, and divine justification, as reflected in royal inscriptions and administrative records detailing troop mobilizations and siege operations.[16] These practices prioritized massed infantry formations, chariot usage for mobility, and rudimentary logistics, but lacked explicit doctrinal principles, relying instead on ad hoc adaptations to terrain and enemy strength, with warfare often framed as a tool for territorial expansion and economic dominance.[17] In parallel, ancient Egyptian military efforts from the Old Kingdom (circa 2686–2181 BCE) focused on defensive fortifications, riverine logistics via the Nile, and infantry armed with bows, spears, and maces, incorporating ritual elements and pharaonic leadership to maintain unity, though strategic guidance remained tied to practical necessities rather than codified tenets.[18] Eastern traditions produced the first comprehensive treatises on warfare, beginning with Sun Tzu's The Art of War in ancient China during the late Spring and Autumn period (circa 5th century BCE). This text articulates foundational ideas such as the supremacy of subduing the enemy without direct combat, the critical role of intelligence ("If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles"), deception ("All warfare is based on deception"), and adaptation to terrain, speed, and morale, emphasizing indirect approaches over brute force to conserve resources and exploit weaknesses.[19] These principles, derived from observations of interstate conflicts among Warring States, prefigure modern emphases on maneuver, surprise, and economy of force, with Sun Tzu advocating comprehensive preparation including espionage and psychological operations to achieve decisive outcomes efficiently.[20] In ancient India, Kautilya's Arthashastra (circa 4th–3rd century BCE), composed during the Mauryan Empire, extends strategic thought into a holistic framework of statecraft integrating military doctrine with diplomacy, economics, and espionage. It delineates principles like the mandala theory of concentric alliances and enmities, the fourfold policy of conciliation (sama), gifts (dana), dissension (bheda), and force (danda), and detailed army organization into structured units with emphasis on discipline, logistics, and terrain-specific tactics such as guerrilla warfare and fortified camps.[21] Kautilya stresses realistic power assessments, internal security to prevent mutiny, and the use of spies for preemptive intelligence, viewing war as a calculated extension of policy to expand the vijigishu (conqueror king's) domain while minimizing risks through superior preparation and asymmetric methods.[22] These Eastern doctrines, grounded in empirical analyses of prolonged conflicts, highlight causal linkages between leadership, information asymmetry, and operational flexibility as determinants of victory, influencing subsequent global military theory.Classical Western and Biblical Influences
Classical Western thought on warfare drew from historical analyses and practical treatises emphasizing realism, discipline, and logistical preparation. Thucydides, in his History of the Peloponnesian War (completed circa 411 BCE), outlined causal drivers of conflict as fear, honor, and interest, underscoring that preemptive action arises from perceived threats rather than abstract justice.[23] His account of Athenian strategy highlights the interplay of naval power, alliances, and resource denial, illustrating how overextension and internal divisions undermine sustained operations, principles echoed in later doctrines on objective and unity of command.[24] Xenophon's Anabasis (circa 370 BCE) demonstrates leadership imperatives during the Ten Thousand's retreat from Persia (401 BCE), stressing improvisation under duress, leading by example, morale-building through shared hardship, and disciplined cohesion to counter numerical inferiority.[25] Roman military doctrine, synthesized in Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus's De Re Militari (late 4th century CE), prioritized skill and discipline over mere manpower or bravery, asserting that Roman conquests stemmed from rigorous training regimens, standardized equipment, and tactical formations like the manipular system.[26] Vegetius advocated securing ample provisions while inducing enemy famine, recognizing logistics as paramount since "famine is more terrible than the sword."[27] He emphasized centralized authority under a skilled commander, orderly marches, fortified camps, and versatility in sieges and field battles, influencing enduring tenets such as economy of force and security.[28] Biblical narratives in the Old Testament depict warfare as divinely sanctioned for covenantal purposes, with tactical principles derived from accounts like Joshua's campaigns (circa 1400–1200 BCE). These include ambushes, as in the trap at Ai where forces feigned retreat to draw out pursuers before counterattacking from hidden positions (Joshua 8:1–29), prefiguring maneuver and surprise.[29] Deuteronomy 20:10–15 mandates offering peace terms before assaulting distant cities, enforcing a restraint on unnecessary destruction while permitting total devotion (herem) against specific idolatrous foes like Canaanites to eliminate cultural threats.[30] Reliance on divine intervention, such as the psychological impact of trumpets at Jericho (Joshua 6), combined with human preparation, underscores moral purpose tied to operational execution, though empirical outcomes hinged on adherence to commands amid logistical realities like manna provision (Exodus 16).[31]Enlightenment and Napoleonic Developments
The Enlightenment era marked a transition in military thought toward rational systematization, with theorists drawing on historical empiricism to articulate foundational rules for conducting operations. Jacques François de Puységur's Art de la guerre par principes et par règles (1748) pioneered this approach by analyzing past campaigns to derive universal tenets, including the selection of bases of operations, geometric maneuvers for envelopment, and the prioritization of decisive points over dispersed actions.[32] Maurice de Saxe's Mes Rêveries (1757) complemented this by emphasizing practical fundamentals such as troop mobility through light formations, logistical self-sufficiency via foraging, and the pursuit of battle to shatter enemy cohesion rather than mere positional gains.[33] These works reflected broader Enlightenment influences, applying reason to mitigate war's uncertainties while critiquing feudal inefficiencies in favor of disciplined, professional forces.[34] Frederick II of Prussia operationalized such principles during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748) and Seven Years' War (1756–1763), achieving local superiority through oblique order attacks that concentrated force against enemy flanks, as at Leuthen on December 5, 1757, where 36,000 Prussians routed 66,000 Austrians via surprise and maneuver.[35] His "General Principles of War" (1747) advocated aggressive offensives, rapid provisioning to sustain momentum, and exploitation of terrain for surprise, underscoring economy of force by avoiding unnecessary engagements while prioritizing the enemy's vulnerable points.[36][37] These applications demonstrated causal links between disciplined execution and battlefield outcomes, influencing continental doctrines amid linear infantry tactics and volley fire dominance. The Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) tested and refined these ideas through mass mobilization and innovative organization, with Napoleon Bonaparte's Grande Armée leveraging corps systems for sustained marches covering up to 20 miles daily, enabling concentrations of 70,000–100,000 troops at critical junctures like Austerlitz on December 2, 1805, where interior lines divided and defeated a larger Russo-Austrian force.[38] Antoine-Henri Jomini, initially an admirer of Napoleon's methods, distilled observational principles from campaigns like Ulm (October 1805) and Jena-Auerstedt (October 1806), including operations on interior lines to outmaneuver divided foes, selection of decisive points via geometric bases, and massing forces for offensive thrusts, as outlined in his Traité des grandes opérations militaires (1804–1810).[3][2] Jomini's framework posited eternal "great principles" applicable across eras, prioritizing strategic geometry and moral superiority through speed, though critiqued for overemphasizing Napoleonic successes without accounting for logistical overextension in Russia (1812).[39] Carl von Clausewitz, serving in Prussian and Russian armies against Napoleon, countered with empirical realism in his Principles of War (1812), advocating moral forces to overcome "friction" in execution, relentless offensive pressure to accumulate advantages, and unity of command to align political aims with tactical decisions, informed by defeats like Jena.[6] His later Vom Kriege (published 1832) integrated Enlightenment dialectics to frame war as a trinity of primordial violence, probability, and rational policy, rejecting rigid formulas for adaptive genius amid uncertainty. These Napoleonic-era articulations shifted principles from Enlightenment abstraction toward causal analysis of scale, speed, and human factors, laying groundwork for 19th-century doctrines while highlighting biases in source interpretations favoring victors' rationalizations over comprehensive failures.[40]19th and Early 20th Century Theorization
Antoine-Henri Jomini, a Swiss military writer active during the Napoleonic Wars, formalized early 19th-century views on the principles of war in his 1838 work Précis de l'Art de la Guerre, positing that success hinged on a limited set of immutable rules, including offensive maneuvers to mass superior forces against enemy vulnerabilities at decisive points while securing lines of operation and interior lines for logistical advantage.[39] Jomini treated warfare as a geometric science amenable to systematic application, crediting Napoleon's victories to adherence to these tenets, such as envelopment and the pursuit of battles of annihilation, which he contrasted with the attritional errors of prior campaigns like Frederick the Great's.[41] His framework influenced European general staffs, prioritizing calculation over intuition, though critics later noted its underemphasis on political context and friction in execution. In parallel, Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz, in his unfinished Vom Kriege published posthumously in 1832, advanced a dialectical theory rejecting Jomini's rigid prescriptions in favor of war's inherent uncertainties, describing it as an extension of politics by other means shaped by a "remarkable trinity" of primordial violence, chance and probability (friction), and rational policy.[42] Clausewitz outlined tactical principles like exploiting enemy weaknesses and maintaining reserves but subordinated them to strategic absolutes, such as the annihilation of the enemy's armed forces to compel submission, while cautioning against formulaic adherence amid the "fog of war" and moral forces.[6] His emphasis on culmination points—where offensive momentum peaks before logistical or morale exhaustion sets in—provided a causal lens for assessing operational limits, influencing 19th-century thinkers to integrate empirical observation with philosophical realism over abstract geometry.[43] Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, Prussian Chief of the General Staff from 1857 to 1888, operationalized these ideas through reforms emphasizing railroads for rapid mobilization, telegraphic coordination, and decentralized execution, as demonstrated in the 1866 Austro-Prussian War where concentrated forces achieved decisive encirclement at Königgrätz via interior lines.[44] Moltke adapted Clausewitzian friction by advocating flexible directives over detailed orders—"as little as possible in orders, as much freedom as possible for the commander"—foreshadowing mission-type tactics, while prioritizing national resources and political will to sustain campaigns against fortified positions, as in the 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War's siege of Paris.[45] His approach highlighted causal interdependencies between technology, terrain, and troop morale, critiquing overextension as a violation of strategic economy.[46] French colonel Charles Ardant du Picq, in Études sur le Combat compiled posthumously in 1880 from notes gathered during the 1859 Italian campaign and Crimean War observations, shifted focus to empirical psychology, asserting that moral cohesion among soldiers determined battle outcomes more than material superiority, with morale outweighing physical factors in a 3:1 ratio per Napoleonic dictum.[47] Through questionnaires and historical analyses of ancient phalanxes to modern line infantry, du Picq demonstrated how shock combat revealed human limits—fear inducing bunching and flight under fire—advocating training for instinctive discipline and small-unit cohesion to mitigate these, as unchecked individualism eroded combat effectiveness.[48] His work, prescient for early 20th-century mechanized warfare, critiqued parade-ground drills for ignoring visceral realities, urging leaders to base principles on direct battlefield data rather than theoretical abstraction.[49] These theorizations collectively bridged Napoleonic legacies to industrialized conflict, embedding principles like unity of command, surprise via morale disruption, and economy of force amid evolving technologies, though pre-World War I doctrines often over-relied on offensive élan without fully reconciling friction's empirical toll.[40]Mid-20th Century Formalization and World Wars
The principles of war underwent significant institutional adoption and doctrinal integration during the World War II era, building on interwar theorization to address the demands of mechanized, total warfare on a global scale. The British Army, drawing from J.F.C. Fuller's 1926 articulation of nine principles—including direction, concentration, and surprise—incorporated them into post-World War I publications, which informed training and operations as conflict resumed in 1939.[7] These principles emphasized offensive action and economy of force, adapting to the rapid tempo of armored and air-integrated maneuvers observed in early campaigns like the 1940 German invasion of France, where concentrated Panzer divisions achieved breakthroughs by prioritizing speed and initiative over static defense.[5] In the United States, the Army had listed nine principles—objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity—in its 1921 Training Regulation No. 10-5, but World War II accelerated their practical formalization through field manuals and command education.[50] Field Manual 100-5, Operations (1941), outlined combined-arms tactics that implicitly embodied these principles, such as massing artillery and infantry for decisive engagements, which proved critical in operations like the 1944 Normandy landings where Allied forces applied unity of command under General Dwight D. Eisenhower to coordinate over 150 divisions across multiple theaters.[51] By 1949, post-war revisions to FM 100-5 explicitly introduced the principles in the opening chapter on operations, reflecting lessons from campaigns where failures, such as dispersed efforts in the 1942 Dieppe Raid, underscored the need for concentration and surprise.[52] Soviet doctrine during World War II, formalized in works like the 1936 Provisional Field Manual for Combined Arms and refined through Stavka directives, paralleled Western principles with emphases on deep battle—integrating offensive mass, maneuver, and surprise to penetrate enemy lines, as seen in the 1943 Kursk offensive where over 1.3 million troops and 20,000 artillery pieces enabled breakthroughs despite heavy losses.[40] German successes in 1939–1941, conversely, highlighted violations of economy of force in overextended logistics, contributing to stagnation after 1942. These wartime applications validated the principles' utility in scaling from tactical to strategic levels, though nuclear developments post-1945 prompted initial reconsiderations of their universality in high-intensity conflict.[5] Overall, the World Wars entrenched the principles as core doctrinal tools, with mid-century manuals prioritizing their interrelation for achieving decisive results amid industrialized attrition.Core Principles Across Doctrines
The Standard Nine Principles
The standard nine principles of war, as articulated in United States Army doctrine and shared across many Western militaries, serve as enduring guidelines distilled from historical analysis of successful campaigns, emphasizing nonphysical factors that influence operational effectiveness at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. These principles originated in British interwar writings, such as those by Major General J.F.C. Fuller in the 1920s, and were formalized in U.S. Field Service Regulations in 1921 before integration into Field Manual 100-5 by 1941. They are not rigid rules but aids for commanders to achieve decisive results through focused application, validated empirically in conflicts from World War II to recent operations, where deviations often correlated with failures, as analyzed in post-action reviews by the U.S. Army's Combined Arms Center.[53][8][54] Objective: Every operation must direct toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable end, ensuring all actions contribute to the ultimate political-military goal, as failure to maintain focus led to prolonged engagements like the U.S. experience in Vietnam, where shifting aims diluted effort.[55][4] Offensive: Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to maintain momentum and dictate terms, rooted in the causal reality that passivity cedes advantage to the enemy, as evidenced by Allied successes in the 1944 Normandy breakout where aggressive pursuit prevented German regrouping.[8][53] Mass: Concentrate combat power at the decisive point in time and space to overwhelm the enemy, maximizing force ratios empirically shown to correlate with victory rates above 3:1 in tactical engagements per historical data from the U.S. Army's Dupuy Institute analyses.[55][56] Economy of Force: Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts, preserving resources for the main objective, as inefficient dispersion contributed to defeats like the British at Singapore in 1942 despite numerical superiority.[8][53] Maneuver: Position forces advantageously to gain a positional advantage, enabling application of combat power before or alongside engagement, demonstrated in the U.S. Marine Corps' island-hopping strategy in the Pacific Theater, which bypassed strongpoints to isolate and reduce them.[55][56] Unity of Command: Ensure unity of effort under a single responsible commander for combining and directing forces, critical in joint operations where fragmented authority, as in early World War I Allied coordination, delayed responses and increased casualties.[4][8] Security: Prevent the enemy from acquiring unexpected combat power, through measures like reconnaissance and deception, as lapses enabled the German Ardennes offensive in 1944, nearly reversing Western Front momentum.[53][55] Surprise: Strike the enemy at a time, place, or manner for which he is unprepared, amplifying other principles via psychological disruption, as in the Israeli preemptive strikes of June 5, 1967, which destroyed Arab air forces on the ground within hours.[8][56] Simplicity: Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding and execution, reducing friction in complex environments, per Clausewitzian insights adapted in modern doctrine, where overly elaborate schemes failed in operations like the 1942 Dieppe Raid.[53][55] These principles interlink causally—e.g., mass and maneuver enable surprise—forming a framework resilient to technological shifts, though their application requires adaptation to context, as rigid adherence without empirical adjustment risks obsolescence in asymmetric scenarios.[57][9]Interrelations and First-Principles Underpinnings
The principles of war constitute an interdependent system of guidelines, where individual tenets reinforce, overlap, or occasionally conflict with one another based on operational context. For example, mass—concentrating superior combat power at decisive points—relies on economy of force to allocate minimal resources to secondary efforts, thereby enabling localized superiority even for numerically inferior forces when integrated with maneuver and surprise.[58] Maneuver, in turn, overlaps with offensive initiative by positioning forces to exploit enemy weaknesses, while unity of command ensures synchronized application across these elements to maintain coherence amid battlefield friction.[53] Conflicts emerge situationally, such as between mass and security, where aggressive concentration risks exposure to counterattacks, necessitating trade-offs informed by the overarching objective.[53] Simplicity aids resolution by favoring clear plans that reduce miscommunication in complex interplays, as excessive elaboration can amplify uncertainty.[58] These interrelations arise from causal foundations rooted in war's immutable nature as a violent contest under constraints of uncertainty, human psychology, and physical limits. Carl von Clausewitz's paradoxical trinity frames war as a dynamic interplay of primordial violence and enmity (driven by the people's passions), chance and probability (embodied in the commander's and army's responses to friction and fog), and subordination to policy (the government's rational ends), forming a nonlinear complex adaptive system where small initial variations yield unpredictable escalations or resolutions.[59] This trinity causally necessitates principles like offensive and surprise to harness passion and chance toward political aims, countering inherent unpredictability through disciplined adaptation rather than rigid formulas. Antoine-Henri Jomini distilled a geometric causality: the fundamental imperative to maneuver the greatest possible force onto a decisive enemy vulnerability, derived from empirical patterns in campaigns by Frederick the Great and Napoleon, where victory hinged on achieving local superiority via coordinated lines of operation.[60] Empirically, these underpinnings manifest in historical validations, such as Napoleon's concentrations at Austerlitz (1805), which exemplified mass enabled by economy of force and maneuver, overcoming coalition numerical advantages through causal exploitation of interior lines.[53] Modern applications, including the 2003 Iraq invasion's "left hook" maneuver, affirm dependencies on unity to synchronize mass and surprise against friction-induced delays.[53] Human constants—fear disrupting cohesion, willpower sustaining effort amid attrition, and resource scarcity demanding prioritization—underlie timeless applicability, as principles mitigate these without altering war's essence as a duel scaled to nations.[53] Deviations, like overemphasizing security at expense of offensive, historically yield stagnation, as in World War I's trench stalemates, underscoring causal realism: principles succeed by aligning force application with war's trinitarian tensions rather than ignoring them.[59]National and Doctrinal Variations
United States
The United States military doctrine endorses nine principles of war—objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity—as fundamental guidelines for planning and conducting operations, a framework first formally adopted by the Army in 1921 and retained across services thereafter.[50][52] These principles, derived from historical analysis of successful campaigns, emphasize directing operations toward decisive ends while balancing force application and risk, and they appear in Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, as enduring rules applicable to large-scale combat and other missions.[4] Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, similarly recognizes them as core to synchronized armed forces action, integrating them with joint functions like command and control, intelligence, and fires to achieve national objectives.[61][62] In U.S. practice, objective requires every operation to target a clearly defined, attainable goal that contributes to strategic success, as seen in doctrinal emphasis on aligning tactical actions with campaign aims.[9] Offensive prioritizes seizing initiative to dictate terms, exploiting enemy weaknesses rather than passive defense. Mass concentrates combat power at decisive points for overwhelming effect, calculated via force ratios often exceeding 3:1 for attackers in ground operations per historical validations. Economy of force allocates minimum essential resources to secondary efforts, preserving strength for main thrusts. Maneuver positions forces advantageously to gain positional advantage, often through mobility and deception. Unity of command ensures single direction under one commander for unified effort, critical in joint environments to avoid friction from divided authority. Security safeguards forces against surprise, incorporating calculated risks and intelligence to deny enemy intelligence. Surprise achieves unexpected effects through speed, deception, or misdirection to disrupt enemy cohesion. Simplicity favors clear plans and procedures to minimize misunderstanding, enhancing execution under stress. These are not rigid formulas but interdependent tools, with FM 3-0 (updated as of March 2025) framing their use within multidomain operations to counter peer threats by integrating land, air, sea, space, and cyber domains.[63][9] U.S. doctrine adapts these principles to joint and combined arms contexts, emphasizing their scalability from tactical engagements to theater-level campaigns, as validated in post-World War II analyses and retained amid shifts toward irregular warfare and great-power competition.[11] Unlike some doctrines that expand or prioritize differently, the U.S. maintains the nine as a concise set without additions, viewing them as "bedrock" for training and planning, though critics note limitations in asymmetric conflicts where factors like political will or logistics dominate.[9] Applications in operations like Desert Storm (1991) demonstrated mass and maneuver through rapid coalition ground advances, achieving surprise via air campaign prelude, while unity of command under CENTCOM streamlined multinational efforts.[11] Recent FM 3-0 revisions stress their role in defeating aggression through decisive operations, integrating with tenets like surprise and simultaneity for overmatch against adversaries employing anti-access/area-denial strategies.[63]United Kingdom and Commonwealth
The United Kingdom's armed forces employ ten principles of war as articulated in Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 (JDP 0-01, 6th Edition, 2022), which serve as enduring guides for operational planning and execution amid the evolving character of conflict driven by technology and information domains.[64] These principles trace their formalization to British theorist and general J.F.C. Fuller, who outlined foundational concepts in the 1920s, influencing British Field Service Regulations and subsequent doctrines.[40] Originally emphasizing mechanical and administrative aspects suited to industrialized warfare, the principles have adapted; for example, "Concentration of Force" evolved into "Concentration of Effect" to account for integrated lethal and non-lethal capabilities, while "Cooperation" became "Integration" to reflect multi-domain synchronization.[64] "Selection and Maintenance of the Aim" remains the master principle, ensuring unified focus, with others applied judiciously based on context rather than as rigid rules.[64] The ten principles are:- Selection and Maintenance of the Aim: Establishes a clear, unambiguous objective as the basis for all actions and decision-making.[64]
- Maintenance of Morale: Sustains fighting spirit through effective leadership, perceived legitimacy, and alignment with national will.[64]
- Offensive Action: Prioritizes seizing and retaining initiative to dictate terms of engagement.[64]
- Security: Protects forces and operations to preserve combat effectiveness and freedom of maneuver.[64]
- Surprise: Exploits unpredictability to disrupt adversary decision-making and achieve disproportionate effects.[64]
- Concentration of Effect: Directs capabilities at decisive points for maximum impact, beyond mere physical massing.[64]
- Economy of Effort: Allocates resources efficiently to avoid dilution across secondary efforts.[64]
- Flexibility: Enables rapid adaptation to friction, uncertainty, and enemy responses.[64]
- Integration: Harmonizes joint, interagency, and multinational elements for cohesive action.[64]
- Sustainability: Ensures long-term operational endurance via robust logistics and strategic support.[64]
Soviet Union and Russia
Soviet military doctrine viewed war as a continuation of politics by violent means, aligned with Marxist-Leninist ideology that posited inevitable class struggle leading to socialist triumph, often through offensive operations despite public claims of defensiveness.[68] Operational art, developed in the interwar period by theorists such as Mikhail Tukhachevsky and Vladimir Triandafillov, bridged strategy and tactics to enable "deep battle," involving simultaneous strikes across the enemy's entire depth to encircle, disrupt command, and destroy reserves rather than mere positional advances.[69] This approach, formalized in regulations like PU-36, drew from World War I stalemates and the Russian Civil War, prioritizing cumulative operational maneuvers over isolated tactical engagements to achieve decisive strategic results.[70] Core principles of Soviet operational art encompassed:- Simultaneity: Concurrent deep operations across broad fronts using multiple army groups.[71]
- Combined arms: Integration of infantry, armor, artillery, and air forces to maximize combat potential against unprepared defenses.[71]
- Surprise: Deception (maskirovka) to strike undetected and seize initiative.[71]
- Tempo: Sustained high-speed advances to outpace enemy reactions.[71]
- Mass: Concentrating overwhelming forces at critical points throughout enemy depth.[71]
- Depth: Penetrating and exploiting far beyond front lines to paralyze overall operations.[71]
- Mobility and pursuit: Rapid maneuver to encircle and annihilate retreating forces.[71]