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Principles of war
Principles of war
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Principles of war are rules and guidelines that represent truths in the practice of war and military operations.

The earliest known principles of war were documented by Sun Tzu, c. 500 BCE, as well as Chanakya in his Arthashastra c. 350 BCE. Machiavelli published his "General Rules" in 1521 which were themselves modeled on Vegetius' Regulae bellorum generales (Epit. 3.26.1–33). Henri, Duke of Rohan established his "Guides" for war in 1644. Marquis de Silva presented his "Principles" for war in 1778. Henry Lloyd proffered his version of "Rules" for war in 1781 as well as his "Axioms" for war in 1781. Then in 1805, Antoine-Henri Jomini published his "Maxims" for war version 1, "Didactic Resume" and "Maxims" for war version 2. Carl von Clausewitz wrote his version in 1812 building on the work of earlier writers.

There are no universally agreed-upon principles of war. The principles of warfare are tied into military doctrine of the various military services. Doctrine, in turn, suggests but does not dictate strategy and tactics.

Historical principles

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Arthashastra

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Arthaśāstra is an ancient Indian Sanskrit treatise on statecraft and military strategy among other things.

Biblical

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The Book of Deuteronomy prescribes how the Israelite army was to fight, including dealing with plunder, enslavement of the enemy women and children and forbidding the destruction of fruit-bearing trees.

Sun Tzu

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Sun Tzu's The Art of War, written c. 400 BCE, listed five basic factors for a commander to consider:

  • The Moral Law, or discipline and unity of command
  • Heaven, or weather factors
  • Earth, or the terrain
  • The Commander;
  • Method and discipline, which included logistics and supply

However, Sun Tzu implied individual initiative as a principle of warfare, stating "According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one's plans."

Napoleon Bonaparte

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Since the first appearance in English of the military maxims of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1831, all English translations have relied upon the extremely incomplete French edition of General Burnod[a] published in 1827.[citation needed][2][3] This has contributed to the erroneous belief that Napoléon Bonaparte had pioneered the "Principles of War". Napoléon was a keen follower of famous military generals of the past, who influenced his thoughts greatly. Albeit, "The armies of today are based on the organization created by Napoleon [sic] for his Grand Army and it has been used ever since." (Weider, par. 12).[4] Since the mid-19th century, due to the influence of the Prussian army, the maxims have become a guide for many military organizations to focus the thinking of military commanders and political leaders toward concepts and methods of successful prosecution of wars and smaller military operations.[citation needed] Although originally concerned with strategy, grand strategy and tactics, due to the changing nature of warfare and military technology, since the interwar period, the principles are largely applied[citation needed] to the strategic decision-making, and in some cases, to operational mobility of forces.

Carl von Clausewitz

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The principles of war identified by Carl von Clausewitz in his essay Principles of War,[5] and later enlarged in his book, On War, have been influential in military thinking in the North Atlantic region.

The initial essay dealt with the tactics of combat, and suggested the following general principles:

  • discover how we may gain a preponderance of physical forces and material advantages at the decisive point
  • to calculate moral factors
  • make the best use of the few means at our disposal
  • never lack calmness and firmness...without this firm resolution, no great results can be achieved in the most successful war
  • always have the choice between the most audacious and the most careful solution...no military leader has ever become great without audacity

Based on the above, Clausewitz went on to suggest principles for tactics, the scale of combat that dominated European warfare at the time:

  • The Defence
  • The Offense
  • The Use of Troops
  • The Use Of Terrain
  • forces are more effective in a concentric rather than in a parallel attack; attack concentrically without having decisive superiority in an engagement
  • always seek to envelop that part of the enemy against which we direct our main attack
  • cut off the enemy from his line of retreat

Clausewitz also included in the essay general principles of strategy by saying that Warfare has three main objects:

  • (a) To conquer and destroy the armed power of the enemy; always direct our principal operation against the main body of the enemy army or at least against an important portion of his forces
  • (b) To take possession of his material and other sources of strength, and to direct our operations against the places where most of these resources are concentrated
  • (c) To gain public opinion, won through great victories and the occupation of the enemy's capital
  • use our entire force with the utmost energy
  • the decisive point of attack
  • never to waste time
  • surprise plays a much greater role in tactics than in strategy
  • pursuit
  • forces concentrated at the main point
  • an attack on the lines of communication takes effect only very slowly, while victory on the field of battle bears fruit immediately
  • In strategy, therefore, the side that is surrounded by the enemy is better off than the side which surrounds its opponent, especially with equal or even weaker forces
  • To cut the enemy's line of retreat, however, strategic envelopment or a turning movement is very effective
  • be physically and morally superior
  • stores of supplies, on whose preservation operations absolutely depend
  • The provisioning of troops is a necessary condition of warfare and thus has great influence on the operations
  • independent action

Strategic Defense

  • Politically speaking defensive war is a war which we wage for our independence

Strategic Offense

  • The strategic offensive pursues the aim of the war directly, aiming straight at the destruction of the enemy's forces

Jomini

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Antoine Henri Jomini in his book, Precis de l'Art de Guerre, published in 1838, also developed theories of warfare based on the concepts and methods used during the Napoleonic Wars.

Ardant du Picq

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Colonel Ardant du Picq, a French infantry officer who was killed in the Franco-Prussian War, prepared drafts based on his observations of military history which became the book Battle Studies. In it two of Du Picq's observations stand out:

  • Combat is the object, the cause of being, and the supreme manifestation of an army and must be the focus of training, even in peacetime.
  • The human element is more important than theories. War is still more of an art than a science.[6]

20th century theory

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Applied to specific forms of warfare, such as naval warfare, Julian Corbett argued that maritime strategy should play a significant role in the principles of war.[7] Admiral William S. Sims, who commanded the U.S. Navy's contribution to the British Grand Fleet in World War I, wrote of the U.S. Naval War College:

The college aims to supply principles, not rules, and by training, develop the habit of applying these principles logically, correctly, and rapidly to each situation that may arise.

This habit can be acquired only through considerable practice, hence the numerous problems in strategy and tactics.[8]

National principles of war

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Variations exist and differences are minor and semantic or reflect a cultural persuasion for a particular approach. A closer examination of the values and culture of origin reveals its war priorities.

UK

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The UK uses 10 principles of war, as taught to all officers of the Royal Navy, British Army, and Royal Air Force:

The British Army's principles of war were first published after the First World War and based on the work of the British general and military theorist, J. F. C. Fuller. The definition of each principle has been refined over the following decades and adopted throughout the British armed forces. The tenth principle, added later, was originally called Administration. The first principle has always been stated as pre-eminent and the second is usually considered more important than the remainder, which are not listed in any order of importance.

The 2011 edition of British Defence Doctrine (BDD)[9] states and explains the principles with the following preface: "Principles of War guide commanders and their staffs in the planning and conduct of warfare. They are enduring, but not immutable, absolute or prescriptive, and provide an appropriate foundation for all military activity. The relative importance of each may vary according to context; their application requires judgement, common sense and intelligent interpretation. Commanders also need to take into account the legitimacy of their actions, based on the legal, moral, political, diplomatic and ethical propriety of the conduct of military forces, once committed."

The ten principles as listed and defined in the 2011 edition, unchanged from the 2008 edition, of BDD (which also provides explanation) are:

  • Selection and Maintenance of the Aim – A single, unambiguous aim is the keystone of successful military operations. Selection and maintenance of the aim is regarded as the master principle of war.
  • Maintenance of Morale – Morale is a positive state of mind derived from inspired political and military leadership, a shared sense of purpose and values, well-being, perceptions of worth and group cohesion.
  • Offensive Action – Offensive action is the practical way in which a commander seeks to gain advantage, sustain momentum and seize the initiative.
  • Security – Security is the provision and maintenance of an operating environment that affords the necessary freedom of action, when and where required, to achieve objectives.
  • Surprise – Surprise is the consequence of shock and confusion induced by the deliberate or incidental introduction of the unexpected.
  • Concentration of Force – Concentration of force involves the decisive, synchronized application of superior fighting power (conceptual, physical, and moral) to realize intended effects, when and where required.
  • Economy of Effort – Economy of effort is the judicious exploitation of manpower, materiel and time in relation to the achievement of objectives.
  • Flexibility – the ability to change readily to meet new circumstances – comprises agility, responsiveness, resilience, acuity and adaptability.
  • Cooperation – Cooperation entails the incorporation of teamwork and a sharing of dangers, burdens, risks and opportunities in every aspect of warfare.
  • Sustainability – To sustain a force is to generate the means by which its fighting power and freedom of action are maintained.

These principles of war are commonly used by the armed forces of Commonwealth countries such as Australia.

Soviet Union and Russia

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Soviet adoption of the principles of war is considered a part of military art, and is therefore a system of knowledge that is

the theory and practice of preparing and conducting military operations on the land, at sea, and in the air.[10]

As such it includes the following principles[11]

  • High combat readiness
  • surprise, decisiveness and active seeking to secure the initiative
  • full use of all means of combat
  • coordination and interaction of all types and branches
  • decisive concentration
  • simultaneous attack in depth
  • full use of morale-political factor
  • firm and continuous command and control
  • inexorability and decisiveness during the mission
  • security of combat operations
  • timely restoration of troop combat readiness

The Soviet principles of military science, from Soviet AirLand Battle Tactics ISBN 0-89141-160-7. Similar principles continue to be followed in CIS countries.

  • Preparedness – The ability to fulfill missions under any conditions for starting or the conduct of war.
  • Initiative – Utilizing surprise, decisiveness, and aggressiveness to continuously strive to achieve and retain the initiative. Initiative, in this sense describes efforts to fulfill the plan in spite of difficulties. This is in contrast to the western usage of the term which means attacking (or threatening to attack) to force enemy reaction, thus denying his ability to act.
  • Capability – Full use of the various means and capabilities of battle to achieve victory.
  • Cooperation – Coordinated application of and close cooperation between major units of the armed forces.
  • Concentration – Decisive concentration of the essential force at the needed moment and in the most important direction to achieve the main mission.
  • Depth – Destruction of the enemy throughout the entire depth of their deployment.
  • Morale – Use of political and psychological factors to demoralize opponents and break their will to resist.
  • Obedience – Strict and uninterrupted obedience. Orders are to be followed exactly and without question. Commanders are expected to directly supervise subordinates in a detailed manner in order to ensure compliance.
  • Steadfastness – Subordinate commanders are to carry out the spirit and the letter of the plan.
  • Security – Security complements surprise. All aspects of security, from deception and secrecy, to severe discipline of subordinates who through action or inaction allow information to fall into the hands of ourselves are to be vigorously carried out.
  • Logistics – Restoration of reserves and restoration of combat capability is of paramount concern of the modern, fast paced battlefield.

Thus it can be seen that in Military art, the Soviet and Western systems are similar, but place their emphasis in wildly differing places. Western systems allow more control and decision-making at lower levels of command, and with this empowerment comes a consistent emphasis. Offensive, mass, and maneuver principles for the western commander all place a sense of personal responsibility and authority to ensure these principles are followed by appropriate action. In contrast the Soviet system stresses preparedness, initiative, and obedience. This places more responsibility at the better prepared and informed centers of command, and provide more overall control of the battle.

United States

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(Refer to US Army Field Manual FM 3–0)

The United States Armed Forces use the following nine principles of war:

  • Objective – Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective. The ultimate military purpose of war is the destruction of the enemy's ability to fight and will to fight.
  • Offensive – Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined common objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. This is fundamentally true across all levels of war.
  • Mass – Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time. Synchronizing all the elements of combat power where they will have decisive effect on an enemy force in a short period of time is to achieve mass. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results, while limiting exposure to enemy fire.
  • Economy of Force – Employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. No part of the force should ever be left without purpose. The allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations is measured in order to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time on the battlefield.
  • Maneuver – Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to gain positional advantage. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and protects the force. It is used to exploit successes, to preserve freedom of action, and to reduce vulnerability. It continually poses new problems for the enemy by rendering his actions ineffective, eventually leading to defeat.
  • Unity of Command – For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort. At all levels of war, employment of military forces in a manner that masses combat power toward a common objective requires unity of command and unity of effort. Unity of command means that all the forces are under one responsible commander. It requires a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of a unified purpose.
  • Security – Never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by a commander to protect his forces. Knowledge and understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, doctrine, and staff planning improve the detailed planning of adequate security measures.
  • Surprise – Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Surprise can decisively shift the balance of combat power. By seeking surprise, forces can achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Surprise can be in tempo, size of force, direction or location of main effort, and timing. Deception can aid the probability of achieving surprise.
  • Simplicity – Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. Everything in war is very simple, but the simple thing is difficult. To the uninitiated, military operations are not difficult. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. Other factors being equal, parsimony is to be preferred.

Officers in the U.S. Military sometimes use the acronyms "MOSS MOUSE", "MOOSE MUSS", "MOUSE MOSS", "MOM USE SOS", and "SUMO MOSES" to remember the first letters of these nine principles.

Comparisons
MOSSMOUSE Equivalent Nine Principles
Mass Concentration & Distribution
Objective Direction
Simplicity Not applicable. Simplicity was never listed as a principle by Fuller in his final draft.
Security Security
Maneuver Mobility
Offensive Offensive Action (Disorganisation of Force)
Unity of Command Determination & Endurance
Surprise Surprise (Demoralisation of Force)
Economy of Force Not applicable. Economy of Force was seen by Fuller as the goal of the Nine Principles, rather than a Principle in itself.

According to a United States Government document from 2010, the rule governing targeting in a non-international armed conflict is the international humanitarian law which is commonly known as the laws of war.[12] The United States government stated in an undated Department of Justice White paper entitled "Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al Qa’ida or An Associated Force" that the four fundamental law-of-war principles governing the use of force are necessity, distinction, proportionality and humanity i.e. the avoidance of unnecessary suffering.[13][14]

There is a debate within the American military establishment to adopt flexibility as the tenth principle of war. Frost argues that the concept of flexibility should be integrated with America's warfighting doctrine.[15] Americans[who?] soundly retort that flexibility is a given that pervades all aspects of each principle.

Many,[who?] however, hold that the principle of simplicity implicitly includes flexibility. One of the oldest dicta states that the simple plan is the flexible plan.

In 2007, Armed Forces Journal published a proposal by LCDR Chris van Avery, USN, 12 New Principles of War,[16] to completely overhaul and expand the U.S. principles of war from nine to thirteen. The article was subsequently forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Air Force Chief of Staff General Moseley and an effort to overhaul current U.S. doctrine was initiated using Van Avery's framework.

In 2011, three new "principles of joint operations" were added to the cited nine principles of war. These principles are:

  • Restraint – to limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force. Restraint requires the careful and disciplined balancing of the need for security, the conduct of military operations, and the national strategic end state.
  • Perseverance – to ensure the commitment necessary to attain the national strategic end state. The underlying causes of the crisis may be elusive, making it difficult to achieve decisive resolution. The patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives often is essential to success.
  • Legitimacy – to maintain legal and moral authority in the conduct of operations. Legitimacy, which can be a decisive factor in operations, is based on the actual and perceived legality, morality, and rightness of the actions from the various perspectives of interested audiences.

Together, these 12 concepts form the Principles of Joint Operations.[17]

Canada

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The Canadian Armed Forces principles of war/military science are defined by the Royal Military College of Canada or Canadian Forces College website to focus on principles of command, principles of war, operational art and campaign planning, and scientific principles.

  • principles of command – Lead By Example; Know Your subordinates And Promote Their Welfare; Develop Leadership Potential; Make Sound And Timely Decisions; Train subordinates As A Team; Communicate Ideas Clearly; Keep subordinates Informed Of All Activities And New Developments; Take Initiatives; Know Yourself And Pursue Self-Improvement; Treat subordinates As You Wish To Be Treated
  • principles of war – Selection and maintenance of the aim; maintenance of morale; offensive action; surprise; security; concentration of force; economy of effort; flexibility; co-operation; and administration. These principles are not listed in any order of importance.
  • operational art and campaign planning – the organization and synchronization of the planning process and maritime, land and air forces.
  • scientific principles – involved in military reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition in the context of military operations.

France

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The French Army recognizes three principles to be applied to operation of land forces at the tactical level:[18]

  • Freedom of action – "The ability of a commander to use his means at any time and to act despite the presence of the enemy and the various constraints imposed by both the environment and circumstances, in order to achieve the assigned goal. [...] Freedom of Action consists of maintaining the initiative with regards to the enemy in order to 'control upcoming action' and seize opportunities."
  • Unity of effort – "Convergence in space and time of actions and effects of the different operational functions. [...] Unity of Effort distinguishes itself from the concentration of forces through the need to combine actions and optimize effects in order to increase the effectiveness on the chosen objective." This principle includes the psychological effects of surprise and troop morale, in addition to the more conventional principle of concentration of forces.
  • Economy of means – "Proper distribution and use of assets in order to obtain the best ratio of capabilities vs. effects in order to achieve the assigned goal." The instruments for this principle are modularity, the "task organization" of the forces, and support.

According to French doctrine, new principles should be observed, primarily to protect the principle of "Freedom of Action":

  • Legitimacy – Among the local population, in national public opinion, and among international institutions.
  • Necessity – The appropriate amount of force is to be used for each desired objective.
  • Reversibility – The military actor should be prepared to quickly change its course of action depending on the opponent's attitude. Organize military actions to limit human losses and material damages. Remain open to opportunities for de-escalation, and prepare to "support the failure of the enemy" rather than needlessly seeking total destruction. "[Keep] the operation’s level of intensity as low as possible."

Israel

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The principles of war according to Israeli doctrine are:[19]

  • Maintenance of the aim;
  • Morale;
  • Initiative;
  • Stratagem;
  • Concentration of effort;
  • Security;
  • Optimal utilization of force;
  • Continuity;
  • Depth and reserve;
  • Simplicity.

People's Republic of China

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The military principles of war of the People's Liberation Army were loosely based on those of the Soviet Union until the 1980s when a significant shift begun to be seen in a more regionally-aware, and geographically-specific strategic, operational and tactical thinking in all services. The PLA is currently influenced by three doctrinal schools which both conflict and complement each other: the People's war, the Regional war, and the Revolution in military affairs that led to substantial increase in the defence spending and rate of technological modernisation of the forces.

  • People's war – which is derived from the Maoist notion of warfare as a war in which the entire society is mobilized
  • Regional war – which envisions future wars to be limited in scope and confined to the Chinese border
  • Revolution in military affairs – which is a school of thought which believes that technology is transforming the basis of warfare and that these technological changes present both extreme dangers and possibilities for the Chinese military.

In recent years, 'Local war under high-tech conditions' has been promoted.

Other uses

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These principles can be applied to non-military uses when Unity of command is separated into coordination and reality, Economy of Force is redefined as use of resources, Mass is separated into renewable and non-renewable resources, and relationships are separated from unity of command.

In 1913 Harrington Emerson proposed 12 principles of efficiency,[20] the first three of which could be related to principles of war: Clearly defined ideals – Objective, Common sense – Simplicity, Competent counsel – Unity of Command.

Some of the twelve non-military principles of efficiency were formulated by Henry Ford at the turn of the 20th century,[21] and are suggested to be[citation needed]: objective, coordination, action, reality, knowledge, locations (space and time), things, obtaining, using, protecting, and losing. Nine, ten, or twelve principles all provide a framework for efficient development of any objective.

Principles of War was also a book published in 1969 for the Japan Self-Defense Forces.[22] It outlines the basic military principles and strategies by which the Japanese army was to operate. The book was used for most military exams in Japan. The book backs up all military principles with historical examples.

See also

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Notes and citations

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The principles of war are a set of distilled guidelines and fundamental truths, derived from the empirical study of historical campaigns and operational successes, that provide military leaders with a framework for directing forces to achieve decisive results while minimizing unnecessary risks and resources. First articulated systematically by in his 1838 treatise , these principles emphasize concentrating superior combat power at critical points, securing lines of communication, and maneuvering to exploit enemy vulnerabilities, drawing directly from observations of Napoleonic maneuvers where such applications often determined battlefield outcomes. In modern , the principles have been refined and enumerated differently across nations, reflecting adaptations to technological and strategic evolutions while retaining core causal mechanisms like and initiative seizure. The , for instance, doctrinally recognizes nine principles—objective (directing efforts toward a clearly defined goal), offensive (seizing and exploiting initiative), mass (concentrating effects at decisive points), (allocating minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts), maneuver (placing enemies at a disadvantage through flexible application of combat power), unity of command (ensuring cohesive action under a single responsible commander), security (preventing enemy exploitation of vulnerabilities), surprise (striking at a time or place rendered unexpected), and (preparing clear, uncomplicated plans to reduce misinterpretation)—as enduring tools for large-scale combat operations. These have proven causally linked to victories in empirical cases, such as Allied campaigns, where adherence amplified combat effectiveness against numerically superior foes, though deviations in complex environments like counterinsurgencies highlight their nature rather than absolute . While Jomini's geometric focus on lines of operation and decisive engagement points offered practical heuristics for conventional warfare, Carl von Clausewitz's contemporaneous analysis in On War complemented this by underscoring war's probabilistic "friction"—unpredictable variables like fog, morale erosion, and political interplay—that principles must navigate rather than override, fostering a realist view of strategy as adaptive application amid uncertainty. Debates persist on their universality in asymmetric or multidomain conflicts involving cyber elements or drones, where traditional massing yields to distributed precision effects, yet data from recent operations affirm their baseline validity in prioritizing causal leverage over attritional waste.

Definition and Foundations

Core Definition and Objectives

The principles of war comprise a set of doctrinal guidelines distilled from historical experience, designed to inform commanders in the planning, execution, and of operations to achieve superior outcomes against adversaries. These principles function as flexible heuristics rather than inflexible rules, emphasizing the integration of power, timing, and to exploit vulnerabilities while conserving one's own resources. In U.S. , they are articulated as nine core elements—objective, offensive, , , maneuver, unity of command, , surprise, and —serving as the foundational paradigm for the art of warfare across operational levels. The primary objective of applying these principles is to align military efforts with national strategic goals, typically by directing operations toward the decisive neutralization of the enemy's armed forces, logistical base, or will to resist, thereby compelling submission or capitulation with minimal expenditure of friendly assets. This involves prioritizing attainable ends, such as the destruction of hostile capabilities that threaten political aims, over vague or peripheral pursuits that dilute focus. For instance, historical analyses underscore that success hinges on concentrating superior force at critical points while allocating minimal forces elsewhere, ensuring that tactical actions cumulatively contribute to campaign-level victory. Broader objectives extend to fostering adaptability in dynamic environments, where principles guide responses to —unpredictable factors like , , and —without prescribing specific tactics. By promoting offensive initiative and unified , they aim to impose costs on the disproportionate to one's own, rooted in the causal that wars are resolved through the asymmetric application of and . Empirical validation from conflicts, such as Napoleonic campaigns analyzed by early theorists, confirms their in reducing operational failures attributable to dispersion or hesitation.

Empirical and Philosophical Basis

The principles of war derive their empirical foundation from systematic analyses of historical battles, where recurring patterns of success and failure reveal causal mechanisms linking specific actions to outcomes. For instance, British officer , drawing from engagements, identified early principles such as and offensive action as heuristics explaining operational victories, emphasizing concentration of to achieve local superiority over numerical parity. Quantitative military historians like Trevor N. Dupuy further validated these through models such as the Quantified Judgment Model (QJM) and Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model (TNDM), which aggregate data from over 600 and other engagements to quantify factors like surprise and , showing they amplify by 1.2 to 2.0 times beyond troop strength alone. These empirical derivations underscore that principles are not dogmatic rules but probabilistic guides, tested against real-world where deviations, such as dispersed forces in the 1940 , predictably led to defeats due to diluted combat power. Philosophically, the principles rest on causal realism about conflict as a domain of incomplete information, human agency, and resource constraints, where victory hinges on exploiting enemy vulnerabilities rather than abstract ideals. 's (circa BCE) posits and foreknowledge as foundational, arguing that superior positioning—knowing oneself and the enemy—enables triumph without exhaustive battle, a reasoning rooted in rational of to minimize costs. In contrast, Carl von Clausewitz's Principles of War (1812) emphasizes moral and physical preponderance at decisive points, introducing "" as inherent uncertainty from chance, enemy resistance, and logistical hazards, which demands audacity and concentration to overcome, as passive forces dissipate through doubt and delay. Both frameworks reject utopian views of , instead deriving tenets from first-order causes: Clausewitz links erosion to sustained attrition, while ties strategic paralysis to perceptual manipulation, illustrating principles as tools for navigating war's probabilistic causality rather than deterministic engineering. This dual basis integrates causation into strategy, where empirical patterns inform philosophical abstraction; for example, understanding mechanisms like through maneuver allows prediction of outcomes, as counterfactual analyses reveal that absent surprise, even superior numbers falter due to unexploited dispositions. doctrines thus evolve these principles not as immutable truths but as refined instruments, continually assessed against historical to discern genuine leverage from illusory correlations, ensuring applicability amid variables like and technology.

Historical Evolution

Ancient and Eastern Origins

The earliest evidence of systematic military thought in ancient civilizations appears in during the Akkadian period (circa 2334–2154 BCE), where concepts of war involved organized campaigns emphasizing , resource extraction, and divine justification, as reflected in royal inscriptions and administrative records detailing troop mobilizations and operations. These practices prioritized massed formations, usage for mobility, and rudimentary , but lacked explicit doctrinal principles, relying instead on adaptations to terrain and enemy strength, with warfare often framed as a tool for territorial expansion and economic dominance. In parallel, ancient Egyptian military efforts from (circa 2686–2181 BCE) focused on defensive fortifications, riverine via the , and armed with bows, spears, and maces, incorporating elements and pharaonic to maintain unity, though strategic guidance remained tied to practical necessities rather than codified tenets. Eastern traditions produced the first comprehensive treatises on warfare, beginning with 's The Art of War in ancient during the late Spring and Autumn period (circa 5th century BCE). This text articulates foundational ideas such as the supremacy of subduing the enemy without direct combat, the critical role of intelligence ("If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles"), ("All warfare is based on "), and adaptation to , speed, and , emphasizing indirect approaches over brute force to conserve resources and exploit weaknesses. These principles, derived from observations of interstate conflicts among Warring States, prefigure modern emphases on maneuver, surprise, and , with advocating comprehensive preparation including and psychological operations to achieve decisive outcomes efficiently. In ancient India, Kautilya's Arthashastra (circa 4th–3rd century BCE), composed during the Mauryan Empire, extends strategic thought into a holistic framework of statecraft integrating with , , and . It delineates principles like the theory of concentric alliances and enmities, the fourfold policy of (sama), gifts (dana), dissension (bheda), and force (danda), and detailed army organization into structured units with emphasis on discipline, logistics, and terrain-specific tactics such as and fortified camps. Kautilya stresses realistic power assessments, internal security to prevent , and the use of spies for preemptive , viewing as a calculated extension of policy to expand the vijigishu (conqueror king's) domain while minimizing risks through superior preparation and asymmetric methods. These Eastern doctrines, grounded in empirical analyses of prolonged conflicts, highlight causal linkages between leadership, , and operational flexibility as determinants of victory, influencing subsequent global .

Classical Western and Biblical Influences

Classical Western thought on warfare drew from historical analyses and practical treatises emphasizing realism, discipline, and logistical preparation. , in his (completed circa 411 BCE), outlined causal drivers of conflict as fear, honor, and interest, underscoring that preemptive action arises from perceived threats rather than abstract justice. His account of Athenian strategy highlights the interplay of naval power, alliances, and resource denial, illustrating how overextension and internal divisions undermine sustained operations, principles echoed in later doctrines on objective and unity of command. Xenophon's Anabasis (circa 370 BCE) demonstrates leadership imperatives during the Ten Thousand's retreat from Persia (401 BCE), stressing improvisation under duress, leading by example, morale-building through shared hardship, and disciplined cohesion to counter numerical inferiority. Roman military doctrine, synthesized in Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus's (late 4th century CE), prioritized skill and discipline over mere manpower or bravery, asserting that Roman conquests stemmed from rigorous training regimens, standardized equipment, and tactical formations like the manipular system. Vegetius advocated securing ample provisions while inducing enemy famine, recognizing as paramount since "famine is more terrible than the sword." He emphasized centralized authority under a skilled , orderly marches, fortified camps, and versatility in sieges and field battles, influencing enduring tenets such as and . Biblical narratives in the Old Testament depict warfare as divinely sanctioned for covenantal purposes, with tactical principles derived from accounts like Joshua's campaigns (circa 1400–1200 BCE). These include ambushes, as in the trap at Ai where forces feigned retreat to draw out pursuers before counterattacking from hidden positions (Joshua 8:1–29), prefiguring maneuver and surprise. Deuteronomy 20:10–15 mandates offering peace terms before assaulting distant cities, enforcing a restraint on unnecessary destruction while permitting total devotion (herem) against specific idolatrous foes like Canaanites to eliminate cultural threats. Reliance on divine intervention, such as the psychological impact of trumpets at Jericho (Joshua 6), combined with human preparation, underscores moral purpose tied to operational execution, though empirical outcomes hinged on adherence to commands amid logistical realities like manna provision (Exodus 16).

Enlightenment and Napoleonic Developments

The Enlightenment era marked a transition in military thought toward rational systematization, with theorists drawing on historical to articulate foundational rules for conducting operations. Jacques François de Puységur's Art de la guerre par principes et par règles (1748) pioneered this approach by analyzing past campaigns to derive universal tenets, including the selection of bases of operations, geometric maneuvers for envelopment, and the prioritization of decisive points over dispersed actions. Maurice de Saxe's Mes Rêveries (1757) complemented this by emphasizing practical fundamentals such as troop mobility through light formations, logistical self-sufficiency via foraging, and the pursuit of battle to shatter enemy cohesion rather than mere positional gains. These works reflected broader Enlightenment influences, applying reason to mitigate war's uncertainties while critiquing feudal inefficiencies in favor of disciplined, forces. Frederick II of Prussia operationalized such principles during the (1740–1748) and (1756–1763), achieving local superiority through attacks that concentrated force against enemy flanks, as at Leuthen on December 5, 1757, where 36,000 Prussians routed 66,000 via surprise and maneuver. His "General Principles of War" (1747) advocated aggressive offensives, rapid provisioning to sustain momentum, and exploitation of terrain for surprise, underscoring by avoiding unnecessary engagements while prioritizing the enemy's vulnerable points. These applications demonstrated causal links between disciplined execution and battlefield outcomes, influencing continental doctrines amid linear and dominance. The Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) tested and refined these ideas through mass mobilization and innovative organization, with Napoleon Bonaparte's Grande Armée leveraging corps systems for sustained marches covering up to 20 miles daily, enabling concentrations of 70,000–100,000 troops at critical junctures like Austerlitz on December 2, 1805, where interior lines divided and defeated a larger Russo-Austrian force. Antoine-Henri Jomini, initially an admirer of Napoleon's methods, distilled observational principles from campaigns like Ulm (October 1805) and Jena-Auerstedt (October 1806), including operations on interior lines to outmaneuver divided foes, selection of decisive points via geometric bases, and massing forces for offensive thrusts, as outlined in his Traité des grandes opérations militaires (1804–1810). Jomini's framework posited eternal "great principles" applicable across eras, prioritizing strategic geometry and moral superiority through speed, though critiqued for overemphasizing Napoleonic successes without accounting for logistical overextension in Russia (1812). Carl von Clausewitz, serving in Prussian and Russian armies against , countered with empirical realism in his Principles of War (1812), advocating moral forces to overcome "" in execution, relentless offensive pressure to accumulate advantages, and unity of command to align political aims with tactical decisions, informed by defeats like . His later Vom Kriege (published 1832) integrated Enlightenment dialectics to frame war as a of primordial violence, probability, and rational policy, rejecting rigid formulas for adaptive genius amid uncertainty. These Napoleonic-era articulations shifted principles from Enlightenment abstraction toward of scale, speed, and human factors, laying groundwork for 19th-century doctrines while highlighting biases in source interpretations favoring victors' rationalizations over comprehensive failures.

19th and Early 20th Century Theorization

, a Swiss military writer active during the , formalized early 19th-century views on the principles of war in his 1838 work Précis de l'Art de la Guerre, positing that success hinged on a limited set of immutable rules, including offensive maneuvers to mass superior forces against enemy vulnerabilities at decisive points while securing lines of operation and interior lines for logistical advantage. treated warfare as a geometric amenable to systematic application, crediting Napoleon's victories to adherence to these tenets, such as and the pursuit of battles of annihilation, which he contrasted with the attritional errors of prior campaigns like Frederick the Great's. His framework influenced European general staffs, prioritizing calculation over intuition, though critics later noted its underemphasis on political context and in execution. In parallel, Prussian general , in his unfinished Vom Kriege published posthumously in 1832, advanced a dialectical theory rejecting Jomini's rigid prescriptions in favor of war's inherent uncertainties, describing it as an extension of by other means shaped by a "remarkable trinity" of primordial violence, chance and probability (friction), and rational policy. Clausewitz outlined tactical principles like exploiting enemy weaknesses and maintaining reserves but subordinated them to strategic absolutes, such as the annihilation of the enemy's armed forces to compel submission, while cautioning against formulaic adherence amid the "fog of war" and moral forces. His emphasis on culmination points—where offensive momentum peaks before logistical or morale exhaustion sets in—provided a causal lens for assessing operational limits, influencing 19th-century thinkers to integrate empirical observation with over abstract . Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, Prussian from 1857 to 1888, operationalized these ideas through reforms emphasizing railroads for rapid mobilization, telegraphic coordination, and decentralized execution, as demonstrated in the 1866 where concentrated forces achieved decisive encirclement at Königgrätz via . Moltke adapted Clausewitzian by advocating flexible directives over detailed orders—"as little as possible in orders, as much freedom as possible for the commander"—foreshadowing , while prioritizing national resources and political will to sustain campaigns against fortified positions, as in the 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War's siege of Paris. His approach highlighted causal interdependencies between , , and troop , critiquing overextension as a violation of strategic economy. French colonel Charles Ardant du Picq, in Études sur le Combat compiled posthumously in 1880 from notes gathered during the 1859 Italian campaign and observations, shifted focus to empirical psychology, asserting that moral cohesion among soldiers determined battle outcomes more than material superiority, with morale outweighing physical factors in a 3:1 ratio per Napoleonic dictum. Through questionnaires and historical analyses of ancient phalanxes to modern , du Picq demonstrated how shock combat revealed human limits— inducing bunching and flight under fire—advocating training for instinctive and small-unit cohesion to mitigate these, as unchecked eroded . His work, prescient for early 20th-century mechanized warfare, critiqued parade-ground drills for ignoring visceral realities, urging leaders to base principles on direct rather than theoretical . These theorizations collectively bridged Napoleonic legacies to industrialized conflict, embedding principles like unity of command, surprise via morale disruption, and amid evolving technologies, though pre-World War I doctrines often over-relied on offensive without fully reconciling friction's empirical toll.

Mid-20th Century Formalization and World Wars

The principles of war underwent significant institutional adoption and doctrinal integration during the era, building on interwar theorization to address the demands of mechanized, total warfare on a global scale. The , drawing from J.F.C. Fuller's 1926 articulation of nine principles—including direction, concentration, and surprise—incorporated them into post-World War I publications, which informed training and operations as conflict resumed in 1939. These principles emphasized offensive action and , adapting to the rapid tempo of armored and air-integrated maneuvers observed in early campaigns like the 1940 German invasion of France, where concentrated Panzer divisions achieved breakthroughs by prioritizing speed and initiative over static defense. In the United States, the Army had listed nine principles—objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity—in its 1921 Training Regulation No. 10-5, but World War II accelerated their practical formalization through field manuals and command education. Field Manual 100-5, Operations (1941), outlined combined-arms tactics that implicitly embodied these principles, such as massing artillery and infantry for decisive engagements, which proved critical in operations like the 1944 Normandy landings where Allied forces applied unity of command under General Dwight D. Eisenhower to coordinate over 150 divisions across multiple theaters. By 1949, post-war revisions to FM 100-5 explicitly introduced the principles in the opening chapter on operations, reflecting lessons from campaigns where failures, such as dispersed efforts in the 1942 Dieppe Raid, underscored the need for concentration and surprise. Soviet doctrine during World War II, formalized in works like the 1936 Provisional Field Manual for Combined Arms and refined through Stavka directives, paralleled Western principles with emphases on deep battle—integrating offensive mass, maneuver, and surprise to penetrate enemy lines, as seen in the 1943 Kursk offensive where over 1.3 million troops and 20,000 artillery pieces enabled breakthroughs despite heavy losses. German successes in 1939–1941, conversely, highlighted violations of economy of force in overextended logistics, contributing to stagnation after 1942. These wartime applications validated the principles' utility in scaling from tactical to strategic levels, though nuclear developments post-1945 prompted initial reconsiderations of their universality in high-intensity conflict. Overall, the World Wars entrenched the principles as core doctrinal tools, with mid-century manuals prioritizing their interrelation for achieving decisive results amid industrialized attrition.

Core Principles Across Doctrines

The Standard Nine Principles

The standard nine principles of war, as articulated in United States Army doctrine and shared across many Western militaries, serve as enduring guidelines distilled from historical analysis of successful campaigns, emphasizing nonphysical factors that influence operational effectiveness at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. These principles originated in British interwar writings, such as those by Major General J.F.C. Fuller in the 1920s, and were formalized in U.S. Field Service Regulations in 1921 before integration into Field Manual 100-5 by 1941. They are not rigid rules but aids for commanders to achieve decisive results through focused application, validated empirically in conflicts from World War II to recent operations, where deviations often correlated with failures, as analyzed in post-action reviews by the U.S. Army's Combined Arms Center. Objective: Every operation must direct toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable end, ensuring all actions contribute to the ultimate political-military goal, as failure to maintain focus led to prolonged engagements like the U.S. experience in , where shifting aims diluted effort. Offensive: Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to maintain momentum and dictate terms, rooted in the causal reality that passivity cedes advantage to the enemy, as evidenced by Allied successes in the 1944 breakout where aggressive pursuit prevented German regrouping. Mass: Concentrate combat power at the decisive point in time and space to overwhelm the enemy, maximizing force ratios empirically shown to correlate with victory rates above 3:1 in tactical engagements per historical data from the U.S. Army's Dupuy Institute analyses. Economy of Force: Allocate minimum essential power to secondary efforts, preserving resources for the main objective, as inefficient dispersion contributed to defeats like the British at in 1942 despite numerical superiority. Maneuver: Position forces advantageously to gain a positional advantage, enabling application of power before or alongside engagement, demonstrated in the U.S. Marine Corps' island-hopping in the Pacific Theater, which bypassed strongpoints to isolate and reduce them. Unity of Command: Ensure unity of effort under a single responsible commander for combining and directing forces, critical in joint operations where fragmented authority, as in early Allied coordination, delayed responses and increased casualties. Security: Prevent the enemy from acquiring unexpected combat power, through measures like and , as lapses enabled the German offensive in 1944, nearly reversing Western Front momentum. Surprise: Strike the enemy at a time, place, or manner for which he is unprepared, amplifying other principles via psychological disruption, as in the Israeli preemptive strikes of June 5, 1967, which destroyed Arab air forces on the ground within hours. Simplicity: Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding and execution, reducing friction in complex environments, per Clausewitzian insights adapted in modern doctrine, where overly elaborate schemes failed in operations like the 1942 . These principles interlink causally—e.g., and maneuver enable surprise—forming a framework resilient to technological shifts, though their application requires to context, as rigid adherence without empirical adjustment risks in asymmetric scenarios.

Interrelations and First-Principles Underpinnings

The principles of war constitute an interdependent system of guidelines, where individual tenets reinforce, overlap, or occasionally conflict with one another based on operational context. For example, —concentrating superior power at decisive points—relies on to allocate minimal resources to secondary efforts, thereby enabling localized superiority even for numerically inferior forces when integrated with maneuver and surprise. Maneuver, in turn, overlaps with offensive initiative by positioning forces to exploit enemy weaknesses, while unity of command ensures synchronized application across these elements to maintain coherence amid battlefield friction. Conflicts emerge situationally, such as between and , where aggressive concentration risks exposure to counterattacks, necessitating trade-offs informed by the overarching objective. aids resolution by favoring clear plans that reduce miscommunication in complex interplays, as excessive elaboration can amplify uncertainty. These interrelations arise from causal foundations rooted in war's immutable nature as a violent contest under constraints of uncertainty, human psychology, and physical limits. Carl von Clausewitz's paradoxical trinity frames war as a dynamic interplay of primordial and enmity (driven by the people's passions), chance and probability (embodied in the commander's and army's responses to and ), and subordination to policy (the government's rational ends), forming a nonlinear where small initial variations yield unpredictable escalations or resolutions. This trinity causally necessitates principles like offensive and surprise to harness passion and chance toward political aims, countering inherent unpredictability through disciplined adaptation rather than rigid formulas. distilled a geometric : the fundamental imperative to maneuver the greatest possible force onto a decisive vulnerability, derived from empirical patterns in campaigns by and , where victory hinged on achieving local superiority via coordinated lines of operation. Empirically, these underpinnings manifest in historical validations, such as Napoleon's concentrations at Austerlitz (1805), which exemplified enabled by and maneuver, overcoming coalition numerical advantages through causal exploitation of . Modern applications, including the 2003 invasion's "left hook" maneuver, affirm dependencies on unity to synchronize and surprise against friction-induced delays. Human constants—fear disrupting cohesion, willpower sustaining effort amid attrition, and resource scarcity demanding prioritization—underlie timeless applicability, as principles mitigate these without altering war's essence as a scaled to nations. Deviations, like overemphasizing security at expense of offensive, historically yield stagnation, as in World War I's trench stalemates, underscoring causal realism: principles succeed by aligning force application with war's trinitarian tensions rather than ignoring them.

National and Doctrinal Variations

United States

The military doctrine endorses nine principles of war—objective, offensive, mass, , maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity—as fundamental guidelines for planning and conducting operations, a framework first formally adopted by the in and retained across services thereafter. These principles, derived from historical analysis of successful campaigns, emphasize directing operations toward decisive ends while balancing force application and risk, and they appear in Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, as enduring rules applicable to large-scale combat and other missions. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, similarly recognizes them as core to synchronized armed forces action, integrating them with joint functions like , , and fires to achieve national objectives. In U.S. practice, objective requires every operation to target a clearly defined, attainable goal that contributes to strategic success, as seen in doctrinal emphasis on aligning tactical actions with campaign aims. Offensive prioritizes seizing initiative to dictate terms, exploiting enemy weaknesses rather than passive defense. Mass concentrates combat power at decisive points for overwhelming effect, calculated via force ratios often exceeding 3:1 for attackers in ground operations per historical validations. Economy of force allocates minimum essential resources to secondary efforts, preserving strength for main thrusts. Maneuver positions forces advantageously to gain positional advantage, often through mobility and deception. Unity of command ensures single direction under one commander for unified effort, critical in joint environments to avoid friction from divided authority. Security safeguards forces against surprise, incorporating calculated risks and intelligence to deny enemy intelligence. Surprise achieves unexpected effects through speed, deception, or misdirection to disrupt enemy cohesion. Simplicity favors clear plans and procedures to minimize misunderstanding, enhancing execution under stress. These are not rigid formulas but interdependent tools, with FM 3-0 (updated as of March 2025) framing their use within multidomain operations to counter peer threats by integrating land, air, sea, space, and cyber domains. U.S. doctrine adapts these principles to joint and contexts, emphasizing their scalability from tactical engagements to theater-level campaigns, as validated in post-World War II analyses and retained amid shifts toward and great-power competition. Unlike some doctrines that expand or prioritize differently, the U.S. maintains the nine as a concise set without additions, viewing them as "bedrock" for training and planning, though critics note limitations in asymmetric conflicts where factors like political will or dominate. Applications in operations like Desert Storm (1991) demonstrated and maneuver through rapid coalition ground advances, achieving surprise via air campaign prelude, while unity of command under CENTCOM streamlined multinational efforts. Recent FM 3-0 revisions stress their role in defeating aggression through decisive operations, integrating with tenets like surprise and simultaneity for against adversaries employing anti-access/area-denial strategies.

United Kingdom and Commonwealth

The 's armed forces employ ten principles of war as articulated in Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 (JDP 0-01, 6th Edition, 2022), which serve as enduring guides for and execution amid the evolving character of conflict driven by technology and information domains. These principles trace their formalization to British theorist and general , who outlined foundational concepts in the , influencing British Field Service Regulations and subsequent doctrines. Originally emphasizing mechanical and administrative aspects suited to industrialized warfare, the principles have adapted; for example, "Concentration of Force" evolved into "Concentration of Effect" to account for integrated lethal and non-lethal capabilities, while "Cooperation" became "Integration" to reflect multi-domain synchronization. "Selection and Maintenance of the Aim" remains the master principle, ensuring unified focus, with others applied judiciously based on context rather than as rigid rules. The ten principles are:
  • Selection and Maintenance of the Aim: Establishes a clear, unambiguous objective as the basis for all actions and decision-making.
  • Maintenance of Morale: Sustains fighting spirit through effective leadership, perceived legitimacy, and alignment with national will.
  • Offensive Action: Prioritizes seizing and retaining initiative to dictate terms of engagement.
  • Security: Protects forces and operations to preserve combat effectiveness and freedom of maneuver.
  • Surprise: Exploits unpredictability to disrupt adversary decision-making and achieve disproportionate effects.
  • Concentration of Effect: Directs capabilities at decisive points for maximum impact, beyond mere physical massing.
  • Economy of Effort: Allocates resources efficiently to avoid dilution across secondary efforts.
  • Flexibility: Enables rapid adaptation to friction, uncertainty, and enemy responses.
  • Integration: Harmonizes joint, interagency, and multinational elements for cohesive action.
  • Sustainability: Ensures long-term operational endurance via robust logistics and strategic support.
These principles underpin the UK's manoeuvrist approach, emphasizing decision superiority and integrated action over attritional methods, as evidenced in operations like the 1991 where concentrated effects and offensive momentum routed Iraqi forces in 100 hours of ground combat. nations, inheriting British imperial military traditions, adopt similar principles with minor doctrinal tailoring to national contexts. The Australian Defence Force (ADF), for instance, employs nine principles—selection and maintenance of the aim, offensive action, concentration of force, economy of effort, surprise, security, flexibility, cooperation, and sustainment—directly derived from UK formulations but streamlined without explicit morale or integration emphases in core listings. Canada's Armed Forces similarly draw from Fuller-era UK influences, integrating principles like objective, offensive, and surprise into joint doctrine, though adapted toward interoperability and effects-based operations post-2001 deployments where sustainment proved critical amid prolonged . Such variations reflect localized priorities, like Australia's focus on maritime domains, yet maintain causal fidelity to UK-derived emphases on aim-driven maneuver to generate superior combat power.

Soviet Union and Russia

Soviet viewed as a continuation of by violent means, aligned with Marxist-Leninist that posited inevitable class struggle leading to socialist triumph, often through offensive operations despite public claims of defensiveness. Operational art, developed in the by theorists such as and , bridged and tactics to enable "deep battle," involving simultaneous strikes across the enemy's entire depth to encircle, disrupt command, and destroy reserves rather than mere positional advances. This approach, formalized in regulations like PU-36, drew from stalemates and the , prioritizing cumulative operational maneuvers over isolated tactical engagements to achieve decisive strategic results. Core principles of Soviet operational art encompassed:
  • Simultaneity: Concurrent deep operations across broad fronts using multiple army groups.
  • Combined arms: Integration of , armor, , and air forces to maximize combat potential against unprepared defenses.
  • Surprise: Deception (maskirovka) to strike undetected and seize initiative.
  • Tempo: Sustained high-speed advances to outpace enemy reactions.
  • Mass: Concentrating overwhelming forces at critical points throughout enemy depth.
  • Depth: Penetrating and exploiting far beyond front lines to paralyze overall operations.
  • Mobility and pursuit: Rapid maneuver to encircle and annihilate retreating forces.
Tactical-level principles reinforced these, including mobility with high combat rates, concentration for local superiority, combat activeness to maintain offensive pressure, and coordination of fires and maneuvers to preserve forces while aligning with higher objectives. Stalin's 1937-1938 purges disrupted implementation, contributing to early setbacks, but Soviet forces revived deep battle principles by 1943, enabling operations like Bagration in June 1944 that destroyed German Army Group Center through echeloned assaults and encirclements. Post-1991, Russian doctrine retained Soviet operational art's emphasis on mass, depth, and while incorporating nuclear deterrence, , and hybrid elements under an "active defense" framework that integrates preemptive strikes, dominance, and maneuver to deny enemy victory. The 2014 Military Doctrine prioritized high combat readiness, surprise, and full-spectrum force employment, including non-military means, to counter threats and regional conflicts. Updates in the 2020s, amid the Ukraine operation starting February 24, 2022, highlight massing and echeloned offensives reminiscent of Soviet tactics, though critiques note deviations from tempo and surprise due to logistical constraints and underestimation of resistance. Russian principles stress strategic stability through escalation dominance, with conventional operations aiming for rapid neutralization via fires and reserves, adapting deep battle to modern precision and hybrid contexts.

People's Republic of China

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) doctrine emphasizes active defense as its foundational strategic posture, characterized as strategically defensive while permitting operationally offensive actions to counter threats and safeguard sovereignty. This approach, articulated since the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, dictates that China "will not attack unless attacked; if attacked, we will certainly counterattack," integrating deterrence, rapid response, and escalation control to avoid initiating conflict but ensuring decisive retaliation if provoked. Active defense evolved from Mao Zedong's principles of protracted people's war, which prioritized mobilizing the masses to offset material inferiority through guerrilla tactics, political indoctrination, and phased escalation from defense to offense. By the 1980s, PLA guidance shifted from Mao-era total war preparations to localized, limited conflicts, incorporating informatization and joint operations under subsequent leaders like Deng Xiaoping and Xi Jinping. Modern PLA operational principles, as outlined in the 2020 Science of Military Strategy, stress multi-domain integration across , , , cyber, and electromagnetic spectra, with information dominance enabling system destruction warfare—targeting enemy command nodes, , and networks for paralysis rather than attritional battles. Key guiding tenets for implementation include obeying overarching political objectives, conducting full preparations, maintaining unified command, and concentrating forces at decisive points to achieve political aims with minimal escalation. Operational guidance further enumerates six principles: grasping the overall situation; employing information-led operations to dismantle enemy systems; enforcing centralized command for forces; integrating offensive and defensive actions; seizing and maintaining initiative through rapid maneuvers; and ensuring comprehensive logistical and preparation. These principles prioritize precision strikes, force deployment, and adaptability in "informatized local wars," reflecting Xi's 2015 directive to prepare for high-tech, limited conflicts near China's periphery, such as potential contingencies. Under Xi Jinping's reforms since 2015, PLA doctrine has redefined active defense to encompass global power projection, strategic deterrence via nuclear and conventional precision capabilities, and ""—psychological, media, and legal operations—to shape perceptions and erode enemy will pre-kinetically. This includes building "three superiorities" in , air, and maritime domains to control operational tempo, alongside target-centric warfare that exploits vulnerabilities in adversary systems for cascading effects. Political loyalty remains paramount, with the Chinese Communist Party's absolute leadership ensuring military actions align with national rejuvenation goals, as evidenced by structural changes like theater commands for joint operations and emphasis on for technological edge. Unlike Western doctrines focused on maneuver and , PLA principles embed causal emphasis on systemic confrontation and national resource mobilization, viewing as an extension of where and deterrence forestall or shorten kinetic phases.

Other Nations

French military doctrine draws heavily from the writings of Marshal Ferdinand Foch, who in his 1917 book The Principles of War outlined core tenets including concentration of forces, economy of forces, and freedom of action to enable offensive maneuvers. The modern formalizes five principles—liberty of action, concentration, economy of effort, initiative, and unity of command—emphasizing audacity, rapid decision-making, and decentralized execution under "command by objective" to adapt to high-intensity conflicts. This framework prioritizes offensive spirit and , allowing subordinate units flexibility while maintaining cohesion, as evidenced in operations like the 2013 intervention in where French forces achieved rapid territorial gains through and air-ground integration. German doctrine, evolving from Prussian reforms under Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, eschews rigid lists in favor of Auftragstaktik (), which delegates execution to subordinates while specifying only the intent and end state. Key operational principles include tempo, surprise through maneuver, and the integration of to exploit enemy weaknesses, as refined during elastic defense tactics and later in Blitzkrieg concepts emphasizing Schwerpunkt (focal point) for concentrated effort. The contemporary , aligned with , retains this emphasis on initiative and flexibility, applying it in missions like where decentralized units adapted to asymmetric threats without . The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) adapt principles to existential threats, prioritizing deterrence, early warning, rapid defense, and decisive defeat of enemies through preemptive strikes and short-duration offensives conducted on adversary territory. Doctrine stresses qualitative military edge via technology and training, unity of command, and the "purity of arms" ethic limiting force to military necessity, though operational concepts like the Dahiya Doctrine advocate disproportionate infrastructure targeting to impose costs and deter non-state actors, as applied in the 2006 Lebanon War. Empirical success in conflicts such as the 1967 Six-Day War underscores principles of surprise, concentration, and maneuver, enabling Israel to neutralize numerically superior foes through air supremacy and armored thrusts. Indian Army doctrine incorporates ten principles—selection and maintenance of aim, offensive action, concentration of force, economy of effort, cooperation, surprise, security, mobility, exploitation, and simplicity—derived from historical campaigns like the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, where integrated offensives secured East Pakistan's surrender. The 2018 Land Warfare Doctrine refines these for integrated battle groups, emphasizing jointness with air and naval forces, proactive border management, and adaptation to hybrid threats along the , as seen in the 2020 Galwan clash response prioritizing defensive depth and escalation control. This framework balances conventional mass with sub-conventional operations, reflecting 's diverse threats from state and insurgent actors.

Applications in Evolving Warfare

Conventional and Symmetric Conflicts

Conventional and symmetric conflicts, characterized by state-on-state engagements between militaries of comparable conventional capabilities using massed formations, armored divisions, and in direct confrontations, represent the archetypal domain for which the principles of war were originally formulated. In such scenarios, principles like objective, offensive, , and maneuver prioritize achieving decisive superiority through concentrated force at critical points, exploiting enemy weaknesses via rapid initiative, and disrupting cohesion to compel surrender or annihilation of the opponent's . These guidelines, rooted in empirical observations from linear warfare eras, underscore causal mechanisms such as —unpredictable delays and errors amplifying in large-scale operations—and the moral forces sustaining troop discipline under fire. Historical precedents from the 18th and 19th centuries demonstrate the principles' efficacy when rigorously applied. At the on December 5, 1757, of achieved victory over a numerically superior Austrian force by concentrating his smaller army on a , attaining local superiority and routing the enemy through surprise and offensive audacity, thereby preserving Prussian territory during the Seven Years' War. Similarly, in the on June 18, 1815, Allied commanders and Blücher exemplified unity of command and by coordinating defensive positions with timely reinforcement, holding the initiative against Napoleon's assaults until Prussian arrival enabled a counteroffensive that shattered French cohesion and ended the . These outcomes hinged on adhering to simplicity in orders amid battlefield fog, avoiding分散 of effort that could dilute mass. In 20th-century applications, World War II's early phases highlighted the principles' adaptation to mechanized warfare. Germany's 1940 invasion of via the Forest employed tactics integrating tanks, aircraft, and infantry to execute maneuver and surprise, bypassing the to achieve rapid encirclement of Allied forces, resulting in France's capitulation by June 22 after six weeks of operations despite initial parity in divisions. This success stemmed from offensive concentration disrupting French command unity and security, though later German overextension in the violated culmination limits inherent to sustained mass. The 1991 further validated the framework in a symmetric armored clash, where U.S.-led coalition forces under General Schwarzkopf applied maneuver through the "Left Hook" flanking operation, enveloping Iraqi divisions and destroying over 3,000 tanks in 100 hours of ground combat following , compelling Iraq's withdrawal from . Such cases affirm that while principles enable dominance in symmetric engagements by prioritizing empirical force ratios and operational tempo, misapplication—such as dispersed objectives or inadequate security—invites reversal through enemy counter-concentration.

Asymmetric and Guerrilla Warfare

Asymmetric warfare encompasses conflicts where belligerents possess markedly unequal conventional military capabilities, prompting the inferior force to exploit the superior's vulnerabilities through unconventional methods rather than symmetric engagements. , a core tactic within this , involves dispersed, lightly armed units executing ambushes, raids, and to inflict cumulative attrition while evading decisive battles. These approaches adapt the principles of war by inverting traditional emphases: rather than concentrating mass for breakthrough, guerrillas leverage to husband limited resources, applying minimal strength against isolated enemy elements to achieve disproportionate effects. U.S. military analyses note that such tactics disrupt and , as seen in guerrilla operations targeting rear areas to undermine . Central to guerrilla success is maneuver and surprise, enabling fluid repositioning to strike fleeting opportunities while maintaining security through concealment and popular support. Mao Zedong, in his 1937 treatise, codified this as protracted people's war, where insurgents retreat before enemy advances, harass static positions, attack fatigued forces, and pursue withdrawing units—preserving initiative via the offensive principle despite apparent inferiority. Empirical evidence from the Chinese Civil War (1927–1949) demonstrates this: Communist forces, numbering around 1.2 million by 1945, transitioned from guerrilla harassment to conventional offensives by eroding Nationalist supply lines and isolating garrisons, culminating in victories like the Huaihai Campaign where maneuver outflanked superior numbers. Unity of command manifests decentralized yet ideologically cohesive structures, allowing local initiative under central political direction, as opposed to rigid hierarchies vulnerable to decapitation strikes. In (1965–1973), and North Vietnamese Army units applied these adaptations against U.S. forces, using tunnel networks and jungle mobility for surprise attacks—such as the 1968 , which, though militarily costly to insurgents (estimated 45,000–58,000 casualties), shattered American public resolve by exposing overreliance on firepower without corresponding in . Joint U.S. recognizes that asymmetric actors succeed by prolonging conflicts, forcing stronger opponents into dilemmas across theaters, as insurgents allocate scant resources to high-leverage targets like convoys or outposts. Historical data underscores limitations: guerrilla efficacy hinges on terrain familiarity and civilian basing, with failures like the (1948–1960) where British measures and population relocation neutralized insurgent maneuver, reducing Communist strength from 8,000 to under 500 by 1952. Modern adaptations, per U.S. analyses, integrate principles like objective—eroding political will over territorial gains—with hybrid elements, but empirical outcomes in (2001–2021) reveal insurgents' persistent use of surprise via IEDs (over 120,000 incidents, causing 60% of coalition casualties) to offset conventional disparities.

Cyber, Hybrid, and Information Operations

Cyber operations encompass offensive, defensive, and doctrinal information network activities conducted in the domain, where traditional principles of war such as objective, offensive, mass, and surprise apply but demand adaptation to the domain's non-physical, borderless nature and attribution difficulties. U.S. affirms that no new principles are required for cyber warfare, as existing ones from Joint Publication 3-0 guide operations effectively across domains. For instance, the principle of mass involves concentrating cyber effects on critical nodes, akin to kinetic fires, while offensive principles emphasize persistent engagement to seize initiative, as outlined in cyberspace doctrine integrating with joint all-domain operations. However, non-kinetic cyber actions prioritize and over Clausewitzian mass, drawing from to exploit relational network dynamics rather than physical destruction. The 2010 Stuxnet operation exemplifies application of economy of force and maneuver, targeting specific Iranian nuclear centrifuges via worm propagation to induce failures without broader collateral damage, delaying uranium enrichment by an estimated one to two years while adhering to law of armed conflict principles like distinction and proportionality. This precision offensive achieved a clear objective through surprise insertion into air-gapped systems, demonstrating cyberspace's potential for strategic effects below kinetic thresholds, though scalability remains limited by target-specific tailoring and forensic reversibility. Security and simplicity principles are challenged by cyberspace's volatility, necessitating robust operational security to mitigate counterintelligence risks inherent in code-based maneuvers. Hybrid warfare integrates conventional, irregular, cyber, and information tools to coerce adversaries asymmetrically, preserving core war principles like objective and unity of command while expanding beyond kinetics into psychological and economic realms. Defined as blending military and nonmilitary instruments for surprise and initiative, hybrid approaches do not alter war's coercive essence but amplify complexity through deniable proxies and non-attributable actions. Russia's 2014 Crimea annexation illustrated this via "little green men" , campaigns, and cyber disruptions coordinated under unified political direction, achieving control without escalating to full conventional war, aligning with by leveraging irregulars for mass effects. In the 2022 Ukraine invasion, Russian hybrid elements—including pre-invasion cyber attacks on and information operations sowing division—aimed to support offensive maneuver but faltered due to poor unity of command and underestimation of Ukrainian resilience, highlighting limitations in applying surprise against prepared defenses. Hybrid tactics demand synchronized command to avoid fragmented efforts, as disjointed cyber and info ops can undermine overall objectives, per doctrinal emphasis on integrated campaigns. Information operations, encompassing psychological operations, electronic warfare, and , directly embody principles of surprise and by shaping adversary perceptions and decisions to support physical maneuvers. Military doctrine treats information as a warfighting domain where unity of command ensures synchronized effects across kinetic and nonkinetic lines, with enabling offensive advantage through —manipulating enemy OODA loops via tailored narratives. In hybrid contexts, such as Russian efforts in , info ops deployed false flags and amplified internal divisions to erode pre-invasion, though empirical success was mixed due to counter-narratives and platform transparency. Attribution challenges in info domains parallel cyber, requiring to prioritize high-impact messaging over volume, while objective drives measurable outcomes like reduced enemy cohesion. These operations underscore that principles remain timeless, but their efficacy hinges on empirical adaptation to digital amplification and audience skepticism.

Criticisms, Limitations, and Debates

Challenges to Timeless Applicability

Classical principles of war, such as mass, offensive, and maneuver, originated from experiences in eras dominated by massed formations and decisive battles, like the and World Wars, rendering their direct application problematic in conflicts shaped by different historical conditions. These tenets assume symmetric engagements between state actors with comparable capabilities, but modern warfare's shift toward information dominance over sheer capital investment challenges their foundational logic, as battlefield superiority now hinges more on and precision than concentrated force. For instance, in the nuclear age, nullifies traditional offensive imperatives, prioritizing deterrence and limited operations over unlimited aggression. In asymmetric and low-intensity conflicts, principles like unity of command and falter against non-state actors who exploit urban environments, decentralized networks, and ideological persistence rather than territorial control. Classical approaches, emphasizing physical isolation and kinetic operations, prove inadequate against global insurgencies that thrive on virtual —such as al-Qaeda's online magazines Al-Shamikha and Inspire—which propagate without requiring physical bases, undermining efforts to sever insurgent support through traditional means. Empirical outcomes in post-World War II interventions, including failures to achieve in and , highlight how these principles reflect an outdated paradigm ill-suited to protracted, hybrid threats involving liminal warfare tactics employed by states like and . Cyberspace introduces further disruptions, as a domain unbound by or visibility, where anonymous actors—ranging from hackers to nation-states—launch operations with low risk and high deniability, evading principles reliant on maneuver, surprise, and attribution in tangible battlespaces. Traditional tenets, calibrated for domains with clear fronts and , do not account for cyber's borderless interconnectivity or the ease of entry for non-state threats, necessitating frameworks focused on adaptability and population-centric effects over conventional . Overall, these evolutions demand reevaluation, as rigid adherence risks preparing forces for historical echoes rather than emergent realities.

Empirical Failures and Successes

In conventional conflicts, the principles of war have demonstrated empirical effectiveness when properly applied. During Operation Desert Storm in the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S.-led coalition under General Norman Schwarzkopf employed maneuver through the "left hook" envelopment, concentrating mass with over 500,000 troops against Iraqi forces in , while achieving surprise via deception operations that misled Iraqi commanders about the main axis of attack. This integration routed the Iraqi divisions, liberating in a 100-hour ground campaign following a 38-day air phase, with coalition casualties at approximately 300 versus over 20,000 Iraqi deaths and 75,000 wounded. Similarly, in , the on June 4-7, 1942, exemplified mass and surprise: U.S. naval forces, informed by intelligence, concentrated carrier-based air power to sink four Japanese aircraft carriers, shifting Pacific theater momentum despite being outnumbered in ships. The Allied invasion of in further illustrated surprise and offensive action, landing 107,000 troops at multiple points undetected, which compelled Axis forces to divert resources and contributed to eventual victories in by May 1943. Failures often stem from misapplication or contextual mismatches, particularly in . The U.S. involvement in the (1965-1973) highlighted deficiencies in objective and unity of command; despite massive application of offensive operations like Rolling Thunder bombing (1965-1968), which dropped 864,000 tons of ordnance, national objectives remained ambiguous, with surveys indicating nearly 70% of generals uncertain of goals until 1969, eroding public support and leading to withdrawal without decisive victory as unified the country in 1975. Security lapses have also proven costly, as in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, where U.S. forces failed to integrate and command structures effectively, resulting in the loss of 18 ships and 188 aircraft with over 2,400 killed, though it galvanized American entry into . In irregular contexts like , principles such as faltered against guerrilla tactics, as dispersed U.S. forces struggled to concentrate mass without ceding initiative to North Vietnamese infiltration via the , underscoring limitations against protracted, politically embedded insurgencies.

Modern Adaptations and Proposed Revisions

Military doctrines have adapted classical principles of war to address the integration of cyber, , and information domains, emphasizing multi-domain operations where traditional elements like maneuver incorporate unmanned systems and precision strikes for . For example, the U.S. Army's emphasis on large-scale operations against peer competitors reframes mass and through distributed lethality and joint fires, enabling simultaneous effects across domains without physical concentration. These adaptations prioritize systems resilience and information dominance, recognizing that modern conflicts involve depleting adversary networks rather than solely destroying forces. Scholars have proposed explicit revisions to better align principles with 21st-century realities. A 1995 U.S. Army War College revised the nine classical principles for strategic application, substituting "offensive" with "initiative" to encompass defensive retention of , "" with "focus" for synchronized national power, and "maneuver" with "" for dynamic resource management in information-heavy environments. Similarly, a 2007 analysis in Armed Forces Journal introduced 12 principles tailored to , adding "pervasive awareness" via sensors and , "continuous planning" for adaptive decision cycles, and "integration of actors" to incorporate non-military partners like NGOs, driven by technological revolutions in communications and precision effects. Further modernizations address irregular and perceptual dimensions of conflict. In a scholarly paper, Charles J. Dunlap Jr. proposed principles such as "perceived worthiness" to prioritize eroding enemy through narrative control, "informed insight" for cognitive superiority amid saturation, and "adaptability" to counter asymmetric threats, differing from classics by integrating psychological and global media influences over purely kinetic focus. A more recent Association of the United States Army framework reorganizes principles around systems competition, introducing "" for manipulating adversary , "" for resilient architectures, and "overwhelm" to saturate , while assuming intelligent foes and adaptive dynamics in peer-level engagements. These proposals, informed by theorists like and Robert Leonhard, argue for periodic reevaluation to avoid obsolescence, though core doctrines like U.S. Joint Publication 1 retain foundational tenets with contextual applications rather than full replacement.

References

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