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9K38 Igla
9K38 Igla
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The 9K38 Igla (Russian: Игла́, "needle", NATO reporting name SA-18 Grouse) is a Soviet/Russian man-portable infrared homing surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. A simplified, earlier version is known as the 9K310 Igla-1 (NATO: SA-16 Gimlet), and the latest variant is the 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch).

Key Information

The Igla-1 entered service in 1981, the Igla in 1983, and the Igla-S in 2004.[citation needed] The Igla has been supplemented by the 9K333 Verba since 2014.[4]

History

[edit]
Russian soldiers demonstrate use of Igla MANPADS.

The development of the Igla short-range man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) began in the Kolomna OKB in 1972. Contrary to what is commonly reported, the Igla is not an improved version of the earlier Strela family (Strela-2 and Strela-3), but an all-new project.[citation needed] The main goals were to create a missile with better resistance to countermeasures and wider engagement envelope than the earlier Strela series MANPADS systems.

Technical difficulties in the development quickly made it obvious that the development would take far longer than anticipated, however, and in 1978 the program split in two: while the development of the full-capability Igla would continue, a simplified version (Igla-1) with a simpler IR seeker based on that of the earlier Strela-3 would be developed to enter service earlier than the full-capability version could be finished.

Igla-1

[edit]
9K38 Igla (SA-18) missile and launcher top and 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16) missile and launcher below.

The 9K310 Igla-1 system and its 9M313 missile were accepted into service in the Soviet Army on 11 March 1981. The main differences from the Strela-3 included an optional Identification Friend or Foe system to prevent firing on friendly aircraft, an automatic lead and super elevation to simplify shooting and reduce minimum firing range, a slightly larger rocket, reduced drag and better guidance system extend maximum range and improve performance against fast and maneuverable targets, an improved lethality on target achieved by a combination of delayed impact fuzing, terminal maneuver to hit the fuselage rather than jet nozzle, an additional charge to set off the remaining rocket fuel (if any) on impact, an improved resistance to infrared countermeasures (both decoy flares and ALQ-144 series jamming emitters), and slightly improved seeker sensitivity.

The seeker has two detectors – a cooled MWIR InSb detector for detection of the target and uncooled PbS SWIR detector for detection of IR decoys (flares). The built-in logic determines whether the detected object is a target or a decoy. The latest version (Igla-S) is reported to have additional detectors around the main seeker to provide further resistance against pulsed IRCM devices commonly used on helicopters.

The 9M313 missile features a drag-reducing aerospike mounted on a tripod (Igla's 9M39 missile has an aerospike attached directly to the seeker dome, resembling a needle, which is perhaps not coincidentally the translation of its codename, Russian: игла), which reduces a shock wave, thus providing less dome heating and greater range. The name Igla is derived from these devices.

Like many other MANPADS, Igla-1 and Igla feature so-called rolling airframe missiles. These missiles roll in flight (900–1,200 rpm) so steering the missile requires just a single pair of control surfaces, unlike roll-stabilized missiles, which require separate control surfaces for pitch and yaw. Both 9M313 and 9M39 missiles contain a gas generator, which drives a small gas turbine to provide electrical power, and the pistons, which move the canards used to steer the missile in a bang-bang mode. In addition to that, two exhaust tubes of the gas generator are placed perpendicular to the steering canards to provide maneuverability immediately after launch when the missile airspeed is too low for canards to be effective. Later versions of Igla are reported to use proportional control to drive the canards, which enables greater precision and less oscillation of the flight path.

According to the manufacturer, South African tests have shown the Igla's superiority over the contemporary (1982 service entry) but smaller and lighter American FIM-92A Stinger missile. According to Kolomna OKB, the Igla-1 has a Pk (probability of kill) of 0.30 to 0.48 against unprotected targets which is reduced to 0.24 in the presence of decoy flares and jamming.[5] In another report, the manufacturer claimed a Pk of 0.59 against an approaching and 0.44 against receding F-4 Phantom II fighter not employing infrared countermeasures or evasive maneuvers.[citation needed]

Igla

[edit]
Brazilian soldier with 9K38 Igla (SA-18).

The full-capability 9K38 Igla with its 9M39 missile was finally accepted into service in the Soviet Army in 1983. The main improvements over the Igla-1 included much improved resistance against flares and jamming, a more sensitive seeker, expanding forward-hemisphere engagement, capability to include a tandem charge against armored targets, capability to engage straight-approaching fighters (all-aspect capability) under favourable circumstances, a slightly longer range, a higher-impulse, shorter-burning rocket with higher peak velocity (but approximately same time of flight to maximum range). The new 9E410 seeker operated in both IR and UV wavelengths, which decreased its susceptibility to flares, and was effective in countering lamp-style IR jammers (but not shutter-types).[6] The Finnish Defense Forces--which operated the Igla in the army and the French Mistral in the navy--felt that the Igla's seeker was superior over the Mistral's.[6]

The naval variant of 9K38 Igla has the NATO reporting name SA-N-10 Grouse.

The Igla–1M missile consists of a Ground Power Supply Source (GPSS), Launching Tube, Launching Mechanism & Missile (9M313–1).

There is also a two-barrel 9K38 missile launcher called Dzhigit.[7][8]

9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch)

[edit]

The newest variant, which is a substantially improved variant with longer range, more sensitive seeker, improved resistance to latest countermeasures, and a heavier warhead. Manufacturer reports hit probability of 0.8–0.9.[9] State tests were completed in December 2001 and the system entered service in 2002. Series produced by the Degtyarev plant since 1 December 2004.[3]

Replacement

[edit]

Since 2014 the Igla is being replaced in Russian service by the new 9K333 Verba (Willow) MANPADS.[4] The Verba's primary feature is its multispectral optical seeker, using three sensors as opposed to the Igla-S' two. Cross-checking sensors against one another better discriminates between relevant targets and decoys, and decreases the chance of disruption from countermeasures, including lasers that attempt to blind missiles.[10]

Operational history

[edit]
Tail section of a USAF A-10A Thunderbolt II aircraft showing damage sustained from an Iraqi SA-16 missile during Operation Desert Storm, 15 February 1991.
Rear view.

India

[edit]

Operation Trishul Shakti (1992)

[edit]
Main article: Siachen conflict

From 28 July 1992 to 2 August 1992 the Indian Army mounted Operation Trishul Shakti to protect the Bahadur post in Chulung when it was attacked by a large Pakistani assault team. On 1 August 1992, Pakistani helicopters were attacked by an Indian Igla missile and Brig. Masood Navid Anwari (PA 10117) then Force Commander Northern Areas and other accompanying troops were killed. This led to a loss of momentum on the Pakistani side and the assault stalled.[11]

Iraq

[edit]

Desert Storm (1991)

[edit]
Main article: US aircraft losses in Desert Storm

The first combat use of the Igla-1E was during the Gulf War Operation GRANBY. On 17 January 1991, a Panavia Tornado bomber of the Royal Air Force was shot down by an Iraqi MANPADS that may have been an Igla-1E (or Strela-3) after an unsuccessful bombing mission. The crew, Flt Lts J G Peters and A J Nichol, were both captured and held as prisoners of war (POWs) until the cessation of hostilities.[12][13]

In addition, an Igla-1E shot down an American F-16 on 27 February 1991. The pilot was captured.[14]

It is uncertain if an AC-130H lost was hit by a 'Strela' missile or a more recent Igla since Iraq had SA-7, SA-14 and SA-16 missiles at the time, according to the SIPRI database.

From 2003

[edit]
Main article: List of aviation shootdowns and accidents during the Iraq War

Among the Coalition force losses to MANPADS during the Iraq War some were reported as losses to Igla-1E (SA-16) missiles.

Rwanda

[edit]

Igla-1E missiles were used in the 1994 shoot down of a Rwandan government flight, killing the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi and sparking the Rwandan genocide.[15]

Cenepa War

[edit]

During the Cenepa War between Ecuador and Peru, both the Ecuadorian Army and the Peruvian Army (which had 90 functioning firing units) utilized Igla-1E missiles against aircraft and helicopters.

A Peruvian Air Force Mi-25 attack helicopter was shot down on 7 February 1995 around Base del Sur, killing the three crewmen, while an Ecuadorian Air Force A-37 Dragonfly was hit but managed to land on 11 February. Hits on additional Ecuadorian aircraft were claimed but could not be confirmed.[16]

Bosnia

[edit]

On 16 April 1994 during the Siege of Goražde, while attempting to bomb a Serbian tank an RAF Sea Harrier was shot down by an Igla fired by the Army of Republika Srpska. The pilot ejected and was rescued by the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[17][18]

During Operation Deliberate Force, on 30 August 1995; a French Mirage 2000D was shot down over Pale by an Igla fired by air defence units of the Army of Republika Srpska.[19] The pilots, Lt. Jose-Manuel Souvignet (pilot) and Capt. Frederic Chiffot (back-seater), were captured and freed in December 1995.[20]

Yugoslavia

[edit]

During Operation Allied Force, two A-10 Thunderbolt II aircraft were hit by Igla-1E missiles. On 2 May 1999, one A-10 was hit over Kosovo and was forced to make an emergency landing at Skopje Airport in north Macedonia due to damage. The following day, an A-10 was hit beneath the cockpit, however serious damage was avoided due to the warhead failing to detonate.[21]

Chechnya

[edit]
See also: List of Russian aircraft losses in the Second Chechen War

The 2002 Khankala Mi-26 crash occurred on 19 August 2002 when a team of Chechen separatists brought down a Russian Mil Mi-26 helicopter in a minefield with an Igla; this resulted in the death of 127 Russian soldiers in the greatest loss of life in the history of helicopter aviation. It was also the most deadly aviation disaster ever suffered by the Russian armed forces.[22]

Egypt

[edit]

On 26 January 2014, the militant group Ansar Bait al-Maqdis shot down an Egyptian Mi-17 over the northern Sinai peninsula using a suspected Igla-1E or Igla. How the group came to obtain the weapon is currently unknown.[23]

Libya

[edit]

During the 2011 military intervention in Libya, Libyan loyalist forces engaged coalition aircraft with a certain number of Igla-S. Three Igla-S were fired against British Apache attack helicopters of the 656 Squadron Army Air Corps operating from the amphibious assault ship HMS Ocean. According to the squadron commander at the time, they were all dodged by insistent use of decoy flares by the gunships who in exchange successfully engaged the shooters.[24][25]

On 23 March 2015, a Libya Dawn-operated MiG-23UB was shot down with an Igla-S (reportedly a truck-mounted Strelets variant) while bombing Al Watiya airbase (near Zintan), controlled by forces from the internationally recognized House of Representatives. Both pilots were killed.[26][27]

Plot against Air Force One

[edit]

On 12 August 2003, as a result of a sting operation arranged as a result of cooperation between the American, British and Russian intelligence agencies, Hemant Lakhani, a British national, was intercepted attempting to bring what he had thought was an older-generation Igla into the United States. He is said to have intended the missile to be used in an attack on Air Force One, the American presidential plane, or on a commercial US airliner, and is understood to have planned to buy 50 more of these weapons.

After the FSB detected the dealer in Russia, he was approached by US undercover agents posing as terrorists wanting to shoot down a commercial plane. He was then provided with an inert Igla by undercover Russian agents, and arrested in Newark, New Jersey, when making the delivery to the undercover US agent. An Indian citizen residing in Malaysia, Moinuddeen Ahmed Hameed and an American Yehuda Abraham who allegedly provided money to buy the missile were also arrested.[28] Yehuda Abraham is president and CEO of Ambuy Gem Corp.[29][30] Lakhani was convicted by jury in April 2005, and was sentenced to 47 years in prison.[31]

Syria

[edit]
See also: List of aviation shootdowns and accidents during the Syrian Civil War

Video has surfaced showing rebels using an Igla-1E on a Syrian government helicopter. Such weapons were believed to have been looted from a Syrian army base in Aleppo in February 2013. In 2014, a member of the rebel group Harakat Hazm was filmed aiming an Igla-1E into the air on the same day that the group was filmed operating BGM-71 TOW missiles.[32] Whether these weapons were raided from regime stockpiles or supplied via overseas is unknown.[citation needed] However, Russia reportly denied Syrian demand for Iglas in 2005 and 2007, fearing these weapons to be used by Hezbollah.[33]

Ukraine

[edit]
Main article: List of aircraft losses during the Russo-Ukrainian War

On 14 June 2014, Russian separatist forces near Luhansk International Airport in Eastern Ukraine shot down an IL-76 of the Ukrainian Airforce probably using an Igla MANPADS, killing all 49 Ukrainian service personnel on board.[34]

The Igla saw extensive use by Ukrainian forces during the early stages of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

On March 22, 2022, the Ukrainian 80th Air Assault Brigade claimed to have shot down a Russian cruise missile over the Mykolaiv Oblast with an Igla system.[35]

On April 17, 2022, Ukrainian forces reported shooting down a Ka-52 attack helicopter with an Igla MANPADS.[36]

On April 21, 2022, Ukrainian forces located in the Kharkiv Oblast reportedly shot down a Russian Su-34 aircraft with an Igla system.[37]

On May 22, 2022, Ukrainian paratroopers from Lviv downed a Russian Su-25 attack aircraft with an Igla system.[38]

On June 18, 2022, Ukraine's 72nd Separate Mechanized Brigade downed a Russian Sukhoi Su-25 attack aircraft with an Igla system.[39]

On October 10, 2022, Ukrainian soldiers claimed to have shot down a Russian cruise missile with a 9K38 Igla. [40]

On June 28, 2024, the National Guard of Ukraine claimed to have shot down a Russian Su-25 fighter jet over Donetsk Oblast using an Igla missile.[41][42]

On February 8, 2025, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry announced the destruction of a Su-25 near Toretsk in Donetsk Oblast, probably with an Igla MANPADS.[43][44]

Nagorno Karabakh

[edit]
Main article: 2014 Armenian Mil Mi-24 shootdown

On 12 November 2014, Azerbaijani forces shot down an Armenian Army Mi-24 of a formation of two which were flying near the Azerbaijani border. All three on board died when the helicopter was hit by an Igla-S MANPADS fired by Azerbaijani soldiers while flying at low altitude, and crashed.[45][46][47]

During the 2020 conflict, reports suggest that Armenian air defence units used Igla-S and Igla-E1 to shootdown a multitude of Azerbaijani aircraft, including several Bayraktar TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV).[48]

Turkey

[edit]

On 13 May 2016, PKK militants shot down a Turkish Army Bell AH-1W SuperCobra attack helicopter using 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse) version of this missile system. The missile severed the tail section from the rest of the helicopter, causing it to fragment in midair and crash, killing the two pilots on board. The Turkish government first claimed that it fell due to technical failure before it became clear that it was shot down. The PKK later released video footage of the rocket being fired and striking the helicopter.[49]

Variants

[edit]
An Igla-S missile with its launch tube.
  • Igla-1 is a simplified early production version. It is known in the West as SA-16 Gimlet. It had a maximum range of 5000 m and could reach targets at a maximum altitude of 2500 m.
  • Igla-1E is an export version. It has been exported to a number of countries.
  • Igla (SA-18 Grouse) is a standard production version. It was adopted in 1983. Currently it is in service with more than 30 countries, including Russia.
  • Igla-D, version developed specially for the Soviet airborne troops. Its launch tube can be disassembled and carried in two separate sections in order to reduce dimensions.
  • Igla-M is a naval version for the naval boats. Its Western designation is SA-N-10 Grouse.
  • Igla-V is an air-to-air version, used on helicopters.
  • Igla-N is a version with much larger and more powerful warhead.
  • Igla-S, sometimes referred as Igla-Super. It is an improved variant in the Igla, which entered service with Russian Army in 2004. It is known in the West as SA-24 Grinch.

Comparison chart to other MANPADS

[edit]
9K34 Strela-3 /SA-14 9K38 Igla /SA-18 9K310 Igla-1 /SA-16 9K338 Igla-S /SA-24 FIM-92C Stinger Grom
[50] 		Starstreak
[51][52]
Service entry 1974 1983 1981 2004 1987 1995 1997
Weight,
full system,
ready to shoot
kg (lb) 		16.0 (35.3) 17.9 (39) 17.9 (39) 19 (42) 14.3 (32) 16.5 (36) 20.00 (44.09)
Weight, missile
kg (lb) 		10.3 (23) 10.8 (24) 10.8 (24) 11.7 (26) 10.1 (22) 10.5 (23) 14.00 (30.86)[51]
Weight, warhead
kg (lb)
g (oz) 		1.17 (2.6),
390 (14) HMX 		1.17 (2.6),
390 (14) HMX 		1.17 (2.6),
390 (14) HMX

2.5 (5.5),
585 (20.6) HMX

1.0 (2.2)
HTA-3[53]

1.27 (2.8)

3x 0.90 (2.0) tungsten alloy darts,
3x 450 (16) PBX-98
Warhead type Directed-energy
blast fragmentation 		Directed-energy
blast fragmentation 		Directed-energy
blast fragmentation 		Directed-energy
blast fragmentation 		Blast fragmentation Blast fragmentation Blast fragmentation
Fuze type Impact and grazing fuze. Delayed impact,
magnetic and grazing. 		Delayed impact,
magnetic and grazing. 		Delayed impact,
magnetic and grazing. 		Delayed impact. Impact. Delayed impact, armour-piercing.
Flight speed, average / peak
m/s (mph) 		470 (1,100)
sustained 		600 (1,300)
/ 800 (1,800) 		570 (1,300)
sustained
(in + temperature) 		? 700 (1,600)
/ 750 (1,700) 		580 (1,300)
/ 650 (1,500) 		1,190 (2,700)
/ 1,360 (3,000)[54]
Maximum range
m (ft) 		4,100 (13,500) 5,200 (17,100) 5,000 (16,000) 6,000 (20,000) 4,500 (14,800) 5,500 (18,000) 7,000 (23,000)+
Maximum target speed, receding
m/s (mph) 		260 (580) 360 (810) 360 (810) 400 (890) ? 320 (720) ?
Maximum target speed, approaching
m/s (mph) 		310 (690) 320 (720) 320 (720) 320 (720) ? 360 (810) ?
Seeker head type Nitrogen-cooled,
lead sulfide (PbS) 		Nitrogen-cooled,
Indium antimonide (InSb)
and
uncooled lead sulfide (PbS) 		Nitrogen-cooled,
Indium antimonide (InSb) 		? Argon-cooled,
Indium antimonide (InSb)
and UV flare rejection channel 		? Laser beam rider (LBR)
Seeker scanning FM-modulated FM-modulated FM-modulated FM-modulated Rosette-scanning FM-modulated Low intensity modulated-laser-homing darts
Seeker notes Aerospike to reduce
supersonic wave drag 		Tripod-mounted nosecone
to reduce supersonic wave drag 		Low laser beam energy levels ensuring no warning to target

Operators

[edit]
In Slovenian service showing storage crates.

Igla and Igla-1 SAMs have been exported from the former Soviet Union to over 30 countries, including Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria,peshmarga, Croatia, Cuba, East Germany, Egypt, Hamas, Ecuador, Eritrea, Finland, Hungary, India, Iran, Iraq, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, North Korea, North Macedonia, Peru, Poland, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Vietnam and Zimbabwe. Several guerrilla and terrorist organizations are also known to have Iglas. Alleged Operatives of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam a terrorist organization fighting for a homeland for Tamils in the island of Sri Lanka were arrested in August 2006 by undercover agents of the FBI posing as arms dealers, while trying to purchase the Igla. In 2003 the unit cost was approximately US$60,000–80,000.

Large numbers have been sold to the government of Venezuela, raising United States concerns that they may end up in the hands of Colombian guerrillas.[55] Photo evidence of the truck mounted twin version in service with the Libyan Army emerged in March 2011. 482 Igla-S missiles were imported from Russia in 2004. Some were unaccounted at the end of the civil war and they could have ended up in Iranian inventory.[56][57][58] Israeli officials say Igla-S systems were looted from Libyan warehouses in 2011 and transported by Iranians through Sudan and turned over to militants in Gaza and Lebanon.[59]

Igla-1 (SA-16)

[edit]
SA-16 operators
  Current
  Former

Current operators

[edit]
Mexican Marines manning a Russian 9K38 Igla surface-to-air missile (SAM) dual missile launch platform mounted on a Mercedes-Benz Unimog truck of the Mexican Navy in 2009

Former operators

[edit]
Sri Lankan Army captured a number of 9K38 Igla launch tubes from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and these were used by the LTTE to target Sri Lankan Air Force aircraft on several occasions. Today, these captured launch tubes are displayed at the Sri Lanka Air Force Museum.

Evaluation-only operators

[edit]
  •  Poland: It was planned to implement the production of the 9K310 Igla-1E at the Mesko plant. Due to the political changes and the lack of transfer of some documentation by the Soviet side, it was decided to develop its own systems of a portable anti-aircraft missile launcher called Grom and later Piorun.[64]

Igla (SA-18)

[edit]
SA-18 operators
  Current
  Former

Current operators

[edit]

Former operators

[edit]

Evaluation-only operators

[edit]

Igla-S (SA-24)

[edit]
SA-24 operators
  Current

Current operators

[edit]

Potential operators

[edit]

Argentina: Russia offered the Igla-S to the Argentine Military as part of a bigger deal to modernize Argentina Air Defence.[107]

Failed bids

[edit]
  • Finland: Newer models were offered to the Finnish Army to replace older models in service, but American FIM-92 Stinger was selected instead.[108]

Other uses

[edit]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

9K38 Igla

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The 9K38 Igla (NATO reporting name SA-18 Grouse) is a Soviet-designed man-portable air-defense system (MANPADS) that employs an infrared-homing surface-to-air missile to intercept low-altitude fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. Adopted by the Soviet military in 1983 following development in the late 1970s, the system features a seeker head resistant to infrared countermeasures such as flares, enabling all-aspect engagements including from rear approaches. The Igla missile, designated 9M39, weighs approximately 10.8 kg, measures 1.57 m in length, and achieves speeds near Mach 2.3, with an effective range of up to 5.2 km and altitude ceiling of 3.5 km. Its warhead, a 1.17 kg high-explosive fragmentation type, is triggered by contact or proximity fuzes to maximize lethality against aerial targets. The system's portability allows a single operator to acquire, track, and launch the missile from the shoulder in under 13 seconds, with ergonomic design enhancements improving usability in combat conditions. Widely exported and proliferated, the Igla has equipped armed forces in over 30 countries and non-state actors, contributing to its combat deployments in conflicts including the Soviet-Afghan War, Gulf Wars, and recent hostilities in and the . Its effectiveness against assets, coupled with upgrades like the Igla-S variant (SA-24 ), underscores its enduring role in despite proliferation risks to terrorist groups.

Development History

Origins in Soviet MANPADS Evolution

The Soviet man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) originated with the , introduced in the mid-1960s as a lightweight, shoulder-fired infrared-guided missile primarily effective against rear-aspect targets due to its uncooled lead-sulfide seeker, which was highly vulnerable to emerging infrared countermeasures like flares. This system's limitations became evident in early combat uses, such as Egyptian deployments during the 1969 , where it struggled against maneuvering low-altitude aircraft, prompting iterative improvements. The follow-on , fielded in the early 1970s, incorporated a cryogenically cooled seeker for greater sensitivity and some front-aspect potential, yet retained susceptibility to decoys and restricted engagement geometry, achieving only marginal gains in operational effectiveness against countermeasure-equipped jets. These shortcomings, underscored by empirical performance data from Arab-Israeli conflicts—including the 1973 , where Soviet-supplied MANPADS yielded low aircraft attrition rates amid Israeli use of tactical maneuvers and early flare dispensers—drove a reevaluation of core design principles. Soviet analysts recognized that Strela-series kill probabilities often fell below expectations for infantry-held systems, with hit rates hampered by poor seeker discrimination against background heat and decoys, necessitating a shift toward with enhanced spectral selectivity and reduced false-alarm susceptibility. This causal impetus prioritized fundamental enhancements in detection physics over incremental tweaks, aiming for reliable all-aspect engagements irrespective of target aspect or countermeasures. In response, the (OKB) launched the 9K38 Igla program in 1972 as a clean-sheet design, diverging from direct Strela lineage to integrate advanced seeker technologies for superior flare rejection and target discrimination. Development emphasized infantry-centric attributes, including a compact form factor under 18 kg for individual portability and rapid acquisition times under 3 seconds to suit dynamic battlefield mobility, validated through 1970s field trials simulating frontline ambushes against simulated low-flying threats. These efforts reflected a first-principles focus on causal factors like engine exhaust plume variability and atmospheric interference, yielding a system capable of engaging targets at speeds up to 400 m/s across broader angles, thereby evolving MANPADS from niche rear-hemisphere weapons to versatile anti-aircraft tools.

Design Iterations from Igla-1 to Igla-S

The 9K310 Igla-1, accepted into service in 1981, advanced beyond the through the adoption of a liquid nitrogen-cooled seeker, which heightened sensitivity to target heat emissions and bolstered tracking against approaching aircraft. This cooling mechanism addressed limitations in the Strela-3's uncoded detector, enabling more reliable lock-on at ranges up to 4.5 km while incorporating an optional (IFF) interrogator to mitigate risks. The system's missile velocity reached approximately 570 m/s, surpassing the Strela-3's performance and facilitating intercepts of faster-moving threats. The 9K38 Igla, introduced in , refined the Igla-1 design with a dual / (IR/UV) seeker that markedly enhanced electronic counter-countermeasure (ECCM) capabilities, including superior rejection of flares and jamming signals prevalent in Western defenses. This seeker variant expanded the engagement envelope to a forward hemisphere, increased sensitivity for detecting cooler targets, and extended to 5.2 km, with missile speed elevated to around 600 m/s for quicker time-to-target against maneuvering helicopters. Soviet evaluation tests validated these upgrades by demonstrating heightened kill probabilities in simulated jamming environments, prioritizing realism in replication. Culminating the series, the 9K338 Igla-S of incorporated a more advanced seeker with elevated sensitivity and ECCM resilience against modern decoys, achieving a 30% range extension to 6 km through optimized and yielding speeds over 650 m/s. The mass doubled to approximately 2.6 kg in a continuous-rod configuration, improving lethality against high-speed, low-signature targets like cruise missiles via proximity and grazing fuzes. Russian developmental trials confirmed efficacy, with data indicating engagement success rates exceeding prior models in head-on and crossing maneuvers up to 3.5 km altitude.
VariantIntroduction YearEffective Range (km)Seeker TypeKey ECCM Enhancement
Igla-1 (9K310)19814.5Cooled IRBasic flare resistance; IFF integration
Igla (9K38)19835.2Dual IR/UVAdvanced /jamming rejection
Igla-S (9K338)20046.0Enhanced IRSuperior discrimination; small target optimization

Post-Soviet Upgrades and Production Continuity

Following the Soviet Union's dissolution, Russian engineers at advanced the Igla series with the 9K338 Igla-S variant, completing state trials in 2001 and achieving adoption by the in 2004. This upgrade incorporated a dual-band seeker for enhanced resistance and increased engagement range up to 6 km, reflecting refinements oriented toward export competitiveness amid post-Soviet economic constraints. Production emphasized reliability and extended storage viability, with MANPADS batteries supporting shelf lives of up to 20 years under proper conditions, facilitating sustained availability for international sales. The introduction of the in 2014, featuring multispectral seekers, positioned it as a partial successor to Igla-S, yet the latter's production endures due to established manufacturing lines and unit costs of approximately $60,000–$80,000, offering cost advantages over pricier Western equivalents like the . Export contracts, such as India's 2023 acquisition of Igla-S systems, underscore ongoing refinements and output tailored to global demand rather than full displacement by Verba. In 2023–2025, non-Russian adaptations highlighted Igla's versatility, including Ukrainian integration of launchers onto unmanned ground vehicles with remote targeting modules, as developed by the 28th Mechanized in 2025 to enable concealed operations against low-flying threats. Concurrently, supplied 120 Igla units to on April 17, 2025, utilizing ex-Warsaw Pact stockpiles to bolster defenses economically. These developments affirm Igla's production continuity, rooted in its proven efficacy and affordability amid fiscal pressures.

Design and Technical Features

Infrared Seeker and Guidance System

The 9K38 Igla's seeker, designated 9E410, incorporates a dual-channel passive system with two independent detectors operating in different spectral bands, typically including a photoreceiver sensitive in the 1.8-3 μm range for hot exhaust detection and a primary cooled channel for broader signatures. This configuration improves flare rejection by comparing signal characteristics across bands, distinguishing true targets from decoys more effectively than the single-band seeker in the preceding 9K32 Strela-3, which relied solely on short-wavelength and exhibited higher vulnerability to countermeasures. The dual-channel approach thus represents a core advancement in the Igla's design, enabling reliable amid jamming attempts. Unlike the rear-aspect-only constraint of the earlier , the Igla's seeker supports engagements, permitting intercepts from head-on, lateral, or trailing positions by detecting engine plumes and airframe hotspots across a full 360-degree relative to the target. This expanded envelope, combined with enhanced seeker sensitivity, reduces the angular windows available for evasive maneuvers by pilots, as the system can lock onto targets approaching at steep angles without requiring exhaust plume alignment. Guidance is achieved through proportional navigation logic, where the missile's control surfaces adjust in proportion to the rate of change in the line-of-sight to the target, facilitating pursuit of maneuvering aircraft with sustained tracking accuracy. The minimum effective range is approximately 800 meters, imposed to allow booster separation, sustainer ignition, and proximity fuze arming, thereby preventing inadvertent detonation near the launch site or during close-in passes. Overall, these seeker attributes provide the Igla with superior performance against countermeasures and dynamic threats relative to Strela-series systems.

Propulsion, Warhead, and Aerodynamics

The 9K38 Igla employs a solid-fuel rocket motor for , accelerating the 9M39 to a peak speed of approximately 570–800 m/s, equivalent to Mach 1.7–2.3, enabling rapid intercepts of low-flying . This motor design supports a maximum of 5.2 km and an engagement altitude up to 3.5 km, with the missile's compact 72 mm diameter and 1.57 m length minimizing drag for sustained velocity. The consists of a 1.17 kg high-explosive fragmentation , containing approximately 390–450 g of or equivalent explosive, optimized for directed-energy blast effects upon direct impact. It utilizes a primary contact or grazing impact fuse, prioritizing kinetic collision lethality over proximity to ensure destruction against maneuvering targets, though some analyses note enhanced fragmentation for post-impact damage. Aerodynamically, the missile features deployable cruciform wings and tail control surfaces that unfold post-launch, providing stability and maneuverability at high speeds while reducing susceptibility to wind gusts. The spin-stabilized flight path, induced by the rocket's nozzle design, combined with a low-drag body, allows for effective velocity maintenance, outperforming earlier MANPADS like the 9K32 Strela-2 in crosswind conditions during empirical evaluations.

Launcher Mechanics and Operator Interface

The 9K38 Igla employs the 9P516 launch mechanism paired with the 9P39 launch tube, enabling shoulder-fired operation by a single operator for rapid engagement of low-flying aerial targets. The system's design emphasizes ergonomic handling, with a single trigger mechanism that simplifies firing procedures and supports quick transitions from transport to in ≤13 seconds. Reaction time from target detection to launch is ≤5 seconds, facilitating deployment in dynamic conditions. Operator interface integrates a portable electronic tablet (1L110) for wired target designation, which aids in accelerating search and capture processes, particularly when used with the 9P516's built-in ground radar (1L14). An optional Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) interrogator mounts on the launch tube to interrogate transponders and prevent engagement of friendly aircraft, enhancing operational safety. The interface supports one-man operation in standing or prone positions, with minimal procedural complexity compared to larger surface-to-air missile systems. The launcher operates reliably across a temperature range of -40°C to +50°C, ensuring functionality in extreme environmental conditions without significant degradation in performance. for proficient use focuses on basic handling and , leveraging the system's intuitive design; effective operator proficiency can be achieved with limited sessions, as evidenced by dedicated simulators that replicate scenarios for skill development. This contrasts with more complex SAM platforms requiring extended multi-day instruction, underscoring the Igla's emphasis on human factors for infantry-level air defense.

Variants and Derivatives

9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet)

The 9K310 Igla-1, designated SA-16 Gimlet by NATO, is the initial variant of the Igla man-portable air-defense system, accepted into Soviet Army service in 1981 following state trials completed in 1980. It employs the 9M313 missile, which uses passive infrared homing guidance via a dual-detector seeker: a cooled mid-wavelength infrared (MWIR) indium antimonide detector for target acquisition and an uncooled short-wavelength infrared (SWIR) lead sulfide detector for decoy identification. This configuration enables engagement of low-flying aircraft and helicopters primarily in rear and side aspects, with the seeker's sensitivity to airframe emissions aiding discrimination from background heat. The system's baseline performance includes a maximum of 5.2 km against receding targets and 4.5 km against approaching ones, with an effective altitude ceiling of 2.5 km and speeds allowing pursuit of targets near Mach 1. Propulsion is provided by a dual-thrust solid-fuel motor, delivering the to supersonic velocities shortly after launch from the disposable 9P516 tube. The , a 1.17 kg high-explosive fragmentation type with contact and proximity fuzing, enhances lethality over predecessors by relying on both impact force and blast effects. Key limitations of the Igla-1 stem from its seeker design, which, despite improved two-color operation for flare mitigation compared to earlier Strela systems, remains vulnerable to advanced infrared countermeasures, prompting phase-out in many inventories during the as exports favored successors with enhanced jamming resistance. Production occurred at the Machine-Building Design Bureau, with the variant serving as a foundational precursor to refined Igla models while seeing widespread export distribution to allied nations in the post-Cold War period.

9K38 Igla (SA-18 )

The 9K38 Igla, designated SA-18 by , is the standard production variant of the Igla man-portable air-defense system (), featuring the 9M39 missile. Accepted into service in 1983, it succeeded the earlier 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet) with enhancements focused on countering evolving aircraft countermeasures. Key advancements over the Igla-1 include much improved resistance to flares and jamming, achieved through a more sensitive dual-band seeker that better discriminates target signatures from decoys. This seeker enables expanded forward-hemisphere engagement, allowing intercepts from head-on approaches rather than primarily rear-aspect pursuits limited in prior systems. The maintains a maximum effective range of 5.2 km and operational ceiling of 3.5 km, with speeds approaching Mach 2.3. The system's jamming resistance stems from advanced in the seeker, which filters infrared jamming and emissions more effectively than the Igla-1's design, reducing susceptibility in electronic warfare environments. This made the 9K38 a staple for Soviet and post-Soviet forces, serving as the primary MANPADS for numerous operators into the and beyond due to its balance of portability, reliability, and countermeasures evasion.

9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch)

The 9K338 Igla-S, designated SA-24 Grinch by NATO, entered service with the Russian Army in 2004 as an upgraded man-portable air-defense system designed to counter modern aerial threats including low-flying aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. It features a maximum effective range of 6 kilometers against aircraft and improved capabilities against smaller targets such as remotely piloted vehicles. The missile's flight speed reaches 570 meters per second, enabling engagement of jet aircraft at altitudes up to 3.5 kilometers. Key enhancements include a non-cryogenic seeker with advanced passive homing guidance, providing greater resistance to infrared countermeasures and eliminating the need for pre-launch cooling, which reduces preparation time compared to prior models. The employs a continuous-rod design with increased weight for enhanced lethality against armored targets, while the system's overall tactical characteristics allow destruction of threats at altitudes up to 5-7 kilometers under optimal conditions. These improvements make the Igla-S particularly effective against maneuvering targets and infrared decoys, addressing vulnerabilities observed in earlier Igla variants. In 2025, Ukrainian forces integrated Igla-S launchers into robotic platforms, mounting them on unmanned ground vehicles with remote targeting modules to enable operator-safe engagements against helicopters and drones without direct exposure. This adaptation, developed by frontline units such as the 28th Mechanized Brigade, represents an innovative use for , allowing mobile air defense without risking personnel. Concurrently, received multiple batches of Igla-S systems, including a final delivery in August 2025 under emergency procurement contracts valued at over Rs 260 , with additional tenders for at least 48 launchers and 90 missiles, exceeding 100 units to bolster against drones and low-altitude threats. Local production under the ARKA designation by Adani Defence further supports these acquisitions, signaling confidence in the system's reliability for high-threat environments.

Specialized and Export Modifications

The naval adaptation of the 9K38 Igla, known as the SA-N-10 Grouse under designation, modifies the system for maritime use on Soviet and Russian warships, enabling rapid deployment against low-altitude aircraft and missiles from shipboard launchers while retaining core capabilities. This variant incorporates reinforced components for humid and corrosive environments but maintains the standard missile's resistance to infrared countermeasures. The Igla-D represents a specialized configuration tailored for , featuring a launch tube that disassembles into two sections for compact transport during drops, facilitating quicker reassembly in field conditions without altering the 's seeker or . For export markets, the Igla-1E variant streamlines the original design by reducing certain non-essential features to meet international sales criteria, allowing broader proliferation to allied states while preserving effective engagement ranges up to 5 kilometers. Iran has produced the Misagh-2 as a reverse-engineered derivative, tracing its lineage through the Chinese QW-1 (itself an Igla copy), with modifications including localized manufacturing of seekers and boosters to support exports to proxies like and Houthi forces. In response to ongoing conflicts, initiated modernizations of captured or stockpiled Igla systems starting in 2023, integrating commercial thermal imaging sights and electronic upgrades via volunteer efforts to enhance night-time detection and counter drone threats, with at least six units refurbished by the Come Back Alive Foundation for frontline deployment.

Operational Deployment

Initial Combat Tests and Early Uses

The 9K38 Igla underwent initial operational testing in the 1980s after entering Soviet service in 1983, with evaluations emphasizing its dual-band infrared seeker and resistance to common countermeasures like flares, as demonstrated in comparative trials against Western systems such as the . These tests confirmed the missile's improved target acquisition over predecessors like the , though real-world combat validation occurred later through exports. Iraqi forces deployed Igla variants during the 1991 as part of layered air defenses against coalition airstrikes, marking one of the system's earliest combat applications. Despite this, effectiveness was severely limited; coalition aircraft maintained high altitudes above MANPADS engagement envelopes, employed infrared decoys, and benefited from suppression campaigns that degraded Iraqi radar integration, resulting in negligible overall impact on air operations. The sole fixed-wing loss to shoulder-fired missiles was a GR.1 downed on January 17, 1991, near , attributed to an SA-16 (9K310 Igla-1) rather than the full 9K38 configuration. In the 1995 Cenepa War over disputed Andean territory, both Ecuadorian and Peruvian armies integrated Igla MANPADS into ground defenses against low-level air support, with Peru fielding up to 90 operational launchers to counter Ecuadorian Kfir fighters and helicopters. The systems' presence deterred in rugged terrain, validating the design's portability for , though documented hits remain scarce amid mutual claims of aerial victories and the conflict's rapid on February 28, 1995.

Engagements in Asymmetric Conflicts

In the , during 's in August 1995, air defense units of the employed the 9K38 Igla to shoot down a French Mirage 2000D fighter-bomber on August 30, targeting NATO aircraft conducting airstrikes against Bosnian Serb positions. This engagement highlighted the system's effectiveness in asymmetric air defense scenarios, where irregular or separatist forces lacked fixed-wing air superiority and relied on portable systems to contest coalition bombing campaigns. A prominent instance occurred on May 13, 2016, when (PKK) militants in southeastern used a 9K38 Igla to down a Turkish Army AH-1W SuperCobra during operations against insurgent positions near the Iraqi border. Video footage released by PKK-affiliated media depicted the missile launch and impact, severing the rotor blades and causing the helicopter to crash, resulting in the deaths of two pilots. The incident underscored the Igla's proliferation to non-state actors via black-market channels, enabling guerrilla forces to challenge state helicopter gunships in low-altitude missions. In the Syrian Civil War, opposition rebels captured limited numbers of 9K38 Igla systems from government stockpiles or Libyan transfers during the 2010s, using them sporadically against regime helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft in urban and rural insurgent-held areas. However, verified shootdowns remain scarce, with most rebel MANPADS engagements involving older Strela variants rather than the more advanced Igla, reflecting supply constraints in prolonged asymmetric warfare. Similarly, in Libya's 2011 civil war, rebel factions accessed Igla units from overrun Gaddafi-era depots, deploying them defensively against pro-government airstrikes, though documented successes were limited by operator inexperience and countermeasures.

Performance in Conventional Wars

In the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War between and , Armenian forces employed the 9K38 Igla against Azerbaijani operating at low altitudes. Reports indicate that Armenian air defense units downed at least one Azerbaijani Su-25 using the Igla MANPADS during the conflict's intense ground offensives, contributing to efforts to contest Azerbaijani air support in the disputed region's mountainous terrain. This state-on-state engagement highlighted the system's deployment in a high-intensity conventional war involving coordinated armored advances and aerial strikes over a six-week period. The , commencing its full-scale conventional phase on February 24, 2022, has seen extensive use of the 9K38 Igla by to counter Russian low-flying aircraft amid large-scale mechanized operations across multiple fronts. On May 13, 2025, a soldier from Ukraine's 58th Separate Motorized Brigade, callsign "Taliban," downed a Russian Su-25 jet with a single Igla shot near the operational direction, as captured in released footage; this marked the operator's fourth aircraft kill with the system. Earlier, on May 23, 2023, Ukrainian troops used an Igla to shoot down a Russian Mi-24 during operations in , demonstrating the weapon's role in disrupting rotary-wing assaults supporting advances. These incidents reflect the Igla's integration into layered air defenses during sustained state-versus-state combat, where Ukrainian units have fired the system against Russian Su-25s and helicopters in volumes tied to the war's scale—over 100 confirmed Russian fixed-wing and rotary losses to various MANPADS by mid-2025, with Igla comprising a portion of Soviet-era stockpiles employed in frontline ambushes. In Iraq following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion's conventional phase, Igla systems reportedly surfaced in plots against coalition aircraft, including a foiled attempt targeting Air Force One on November 5, 2003, near Baghdad International Airport, though executed by residual Ba'athist elements rather than organized state forces. Such uses underscore the system's persistence in post-invasion environments transitioning from conventional to hybrid threats.

Combat Effectiveness Analysis

Verified Kills and Hit Probabilities

The 9K38 Igla exhibits high hit probabilities in controlled trials against low-speed, low-altitude targets such as helicopters, with the manufacturer reporting rates of 0.8 to 0.9 at engagement ranges under 2 km under optimal conditions without countermeasures. These figures derive from state acceptance tests emphasizing the system's seeker improvements over predecessors, enabling better discrimination of exhaust signatures against background clutter. Independent assessments estimate probabilities of 0.5 to 0.6 against maneuvering , rising substantially for hovering or slow-moving helicopters due to reduced evasion and deployment opportunities. In the , rebel forces reportedly achieved a verified kill of a Syrian Arab MiG-23 fighter using a 9K38 Igla on August 18, 2013, with the pilot ejecting after the missile impact severed control surfaces, as confirmed by video footage and opposition claims cross-verified by aviation tracking sources. Islamist groups also downed Syrian government helicopters with Igla variants in multiple incidents, including a documented tail-section severance on a Mi-8 equivalent, leading to midair fragmentation and crew fatalities, per battlefield videos analyzed by conflict monitors. During the 2016 Turkey-PKK conflict, militants confirmed a kill of a Turkish AH-1W SuperCobra on May 13 using a 9K38 Igla, with released video evidence showing the missile's proximity-fused detonating near the boom, causing loss of control and crash; Turkish military acknowledged the downing without specifying the weapon. In the from 2022 to 2025, Ukrainian operators secured multiple verified kills against Russian using inherited 9K38 Igla systems, including Su-25 ground-attack jets struck on June 30, 2023 (video-captured missile impact and crash), June 28, 2024 ( brigade confirmation with wreckage), and May 14, 2025 (58th Brigade's fourth such success, per on-camera footage). A Russian Mi-24 was also downed on May 23, 2023, via Igla fire, with Ukrainian General Staff reports corroborated by geolocated impact visuals showing the descending in flames. These successes, often at low altitudes during close air support runs, align with trial probabilities for short-range engagements against jets lacking immediate countermeasures.

Countermeasure Evasion and Limitations

The 9K38 Igla incorporates a dual-band seeker designed to discriminate against flares by comparing wavelengths, providing greater resistance to countermeasures than first-generation MANPADS like the SA-7 Strela-2. Nonetheless, spectral flares deployed by modern can still seduce the seeker, particularly if dispensed in sufficient quantity and pattern, reducing the (Pk) from baseline figures of 0.3–0.5 against unprotected targets to approximately 0.24 or lower in contested environments. Directed countermeasures (DIRCM), which actively jam or spoof the seeker's guidance signals, further degrade , with some evaluations indicating near-zero hit rates against equipped platforms. Pilot evasion tactics exacerbate these vulnerabilities, including high-speed dashes at low altitudes (below 50 meters), aggressive turns to break lock, and terrain masking to deny acquisition. The Igla's effective engagement range of 0.5–5.2 km limits its utility against standoff munitions or operating beyond visual range, while its minimum altitude constrains intercepts of diving attackers. Empirical data from conflicts underscores these limitations; during the 1991 Gulf War, Iraqi forces deployed MANPADS including second-generation systems akin to the Igla's predecessors, yet achieved few fixed-wing kills against coalition jets due to integrated countermeasures and tactical flying, with most successes confined to helicopters or slow-movers lacking robust evasion. Overall, in high-threat scenarios with layered defenses, Igla efficacy against alerted aircrews drops to 30–50 percent or less, highlighting reliance on surprise for viability.

Adaptations Against Drones and Cruise Missiles

Ukrainian forces in 2025 mounted the 9K38 Igla launcher on 4x4 unmanned ground vehicles to create remote-operated air defense platforms, allowing operators to engage low-altitude threats without direct exposure. The 28th Mechanized Brigade introduced this adaptation in August 2025, integrating the Igla with a custom targeting module for rapid repositioning and firing against drones and helicopters. This robotic configuration exploits the missile's seeker to lock onto signatures from small, fast-moving targets like Shahed-136 drones, whose engine exhaust provides sufficient contrast despite the system's original aircraft-centric design. Manual Igla firings have downed Shahed drones in multiple engagements, with thermal imaging attachments enhancing nighttime detection and guidance. Footage from units in December 2023 and subsequent operations, including April 2025 brigade actions, shows successful intercepts by targeting the drones' propulsion heat, demonstrating the seeker's sensitivity to compact IR sources beyond its baseline parameters for jet exhaust. The Igla's uncaging and launch sequence, aided by these modifications, enables quick response to low-speed, low-altitude UAVs, with hit rates supported by operator training on drone signatures. Against cruise missiles, Igla operators achieved intercepts of Kh-101 munitions, which emit detectable engine heat during low-level flight phases. In November 2024, a mobile group downed a Kh-101 using Igla, followed by verified successes in April 2025 and December 2024 by Air Command West teams. These engagements relied on the missile's seeker tracking the missile's turbofan exhaust, effective at ranges under 5 km when visually acquired, though success depends on the Kh-101's flight profile avoiding high-speed evasion. The Igla's and flare-rejection features contribute to viability against such subsonic threats, repurposing the system for asymmetric defense.

Proliferation and Risks

Export Patterns and State Transfers

The primary export patterns for the 9K38 Igla MANPADS have centered on Russian sales to strategic partners in , , and the since the early , often as part of broader defense packages to counter low-altitude aerial threats amid regional instabilities. These exports prioritized countries seeking affordable, infrared-homing systems compatible with Soviet-era infrastructure, with leveraging the Igla's export variants like the Igla-1E and Igla-S to penetrate markets restricted by Western sanctions or preferences for non-NATO equipment. Quantities have varied, but documented transfers include Brazil's 1994 acquisition of 56 launchers paired with 112 missiles to modernize its short-range air defenses. Similarly, procured Igla systems in 1997 to integrate into its layered defense architecture despite a predominantly Western inventory. In the , supplied with an estimated 200 Igla missiles around 2007, alongside compatible Strelets launchers, to bolster regime air defense capabilities during escalating internal conflicts; these were later supplemented by 200 Igla-S units. Latin American exports extended to , which amassed approximately 5,000 Igla-S MANPADS by the 2010s, representing one of the largest non-Russian stockpiles and raising concerns over potential diversion due to the system's portability and regional political volatility. Recent patterns show continued Russian outreach to BRICS-aligned states, exemplified by a November 2023 contract with for Igla-S supply and licensed production, followed by delivery of 24 systems with 100 missiles in April 2024 and additional shipments in May 2025 despite . State transfers of Igla systems have occurred outside commercial channels, primarily through post-Soviet inheritance and wartime aid. Upon the USSR's 1991 dissolution, Igla stockpiles were divided among successor republics, equipping forces in countries like , , Georgia, and others with inherited Soviet-era units for territorial defense. In a notable Western deviation, announced in April 2025 the transfer of 120 Soviet-origin Igla MANPADS to from seized or allied stocks, the first such handover by a state to counter Russian aerial operations, highlighting adaptive reuse of legacy systems in hybrid conflicts. These transfers underscore proliferation risks, as Igla units have surfaced in unauthorized hands via state-to-state diversions in unstable regions.

Non-State Actor Acquisitions

Pro-Russian separatists in reportedly acquired 9K38 Igla MANPADS in 2014, allegedly supplied via Russian channels, enabling them to target Ukrainian fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft during the early phases of the conflict. On June 14, 2014, separatist forces near used an Igla to shoot down a Il-76 transport aircraft, killing nine crew members and marking one of the system's early confirmed uses by non-state actors in the theater. These acquisitions highlighted vulnerabilities in state-controlled stockpiles, as the weapons appeared in separatist hands shortly after Russia's annexation of Crimea, despite denials from Moscow regarding direct transfers. The (PKK), a designated terrorist organization, obtained 9K38 Igla systems through illicit networks, including possible diversions from Syrian conflict zones, and employed them against Turkish military assets. Turkish security forces recovered Russian-origin MANPADS, identified as Igla variants, from PKK hideouts in northern in December 2019, underscoring cross-border proliferation risks. On May 13, 2016, PKK militants downed a Turkish Army AH-1W SuperCobra using a 9K38 Igla near Hakkari , killing two pilots and demonstrating the system's operational integration into insurgent tactics against low-flying helicopters. Intelligence assessments estimated the PKK possessed up to 50 MANPADS by mid-2016, with Igla-1 (SA-16) models among them, sourced potentially from black market channels or regional proxies. In Libya, following the 2011 overthrow of , militias looted state arsenals containing 9K38 Igla and advanced Igla-S (SA-24) systems, leading to widespread non-state possession amid the ensuing civil war. Gaddafi-era stockpiles included thousands of MANPADS, with Igla variants documented in militia hands by 2012, exacerbating threats to and rival factions. Various armed groups, including Islamist militias and tribal forces, integrated these systems into their arsenals, contributing to uncontrolled proliferation as central authority fragmented. Post-conflict environments in Libya, Syria, and other theaters have funneled Igla MANPADS onto black markets, with global estimates indicating thousands of such systems—part of an overall MANPADS pool exceeding 500,000—circulating illicitly and accessible to terrorist networks. Black market prices for functional Igla units range from $5,000 to $250,000, driven by demand in unstable regions, as evidenced by recoveries and seizures in diverse hotspots. U.S. assessments highlight these loose systems as a persistent terrorist threat, capable of targeting civilian airliners due to their portability and infrared-homing reliability, with proliferation failures traced to inadequate post-conflict stockpile security.

Mitigation Efforts and International Controls

The , established in 1996, promotes transparency and responsibility in transfers of conventional arms, including man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) like the 9K38 Igla, through non-binding guidelines adopted in December 2000. These elements require participating states to conduct end-user assessments, deny exports to non-state actors, and report MANPADS transfers annually via specific information exchanges to mitigate risks of diversion or misuse. , an original member, applied these controls to Igla exports until its suspension from the Arrangement in February 2022 following the invasion of , after which adherence became inconsistent. Complementary U.S.-led initiatives, such as the MANPADS Reduction Program launched in , focus on securing and destroying excess s in partner nations to prevent proliferation, though these primarily target non-Russian systems and have indirectly influenced global norms applicable to Igla equivalents. International cooperation under UN frameworks, including Security Council resolutions on arms embargoes, has aimed to curb diversions in conflict zones, with empirical data showing a decline in verified MANPADS-related civilian aviation incidents globally since the early due to enhanced stockpile tracking and export verifications—down from peaks in the 1990s- era of post-Cold War surpluses. Despite these measures, proliferation persists through battlefield captures and illicit transfers, as evidenced in Syria where 9K38 Igla and advanced Igla-S variants, originally supplied to the Assad regime, leaked to rebel groups including the Farouq Brigades by February 2013, enabling their use against regime and coalition aircraft. Ongoing monitoring by organizations like the indicates that such diversions have sustained access, undermining mitigation efficacy in unstable regions despite improved reporting and seizure operations.

Current Operators and Recent Supplies

Active Military Users

The operate extensive stocks of the 9K38 Igla, with documented adaptations including mounting systems on helicopters to engage Ukrainian drones during patrols in the conflict as of October 2025. Ukrainian forces on both sides of the conflict maintain operational Igla inventories; Russian units employ it routinely against low-flying targets, while Ukrainian personnel have used inherited Soviet-era systems for intercepts such as downing Su-25 aircraft and have received upgrades to six units alongside international donations, including 120 from announced on April 17, 2025. The integrated a new batch of 24 Igla-S systems with 100 missiles delivered from in May 2025, deploying them to forward positions along the border and equipping with indigenous Rajak thermal sights for enhanced low-light performance. Finnish evaluations of the Igla, conducted prior to its phase-out in favor of Western systems, noted superior seeker resistance to countermeasures compared to the Mistral despite shorter effective range, informing operational assessments in comparable environments.

Recent Acquisitions and Upgrades (Post-2022)

In April 2025, announced its first transfer of Soviet-era 9K38 Igla man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) to , planning to supply 120 units from national stockpiles to bolster capabilities amid ongoing Russian aerial threats. This move marked a departure from predominant Western MANPADS donations like the , leveraging Igla's compatibility with Ukrainian training and logistics from pre-war Soviet inventories. India advanced its Igla-S variant acquisition despite international sanctions on Russian defense exports imposed following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, with Russia delivering systems in May 2025 and enabling licensed assembly by Adani Defence. A contract signed in November 2023 facilitated initial supplies and technology transfer for domestic production, resulting in the manufacture of an initial batch by February 2025 to enhance border air defense, particularly along contested regions like Jammu and Kashmir. Ukrainian forces pursued upgrades to captured or donated Igla systems for improved operational reliability, with the Come Back Alive Foundation funding the modernization of six units through component replacements and enhancements coordinated with military experts. These modifications addressed vulnerabilities in aging Soviet electronics and seekers, extending service life for frontline use against low-flying threats; by August 2025, units like the 28th Mechanized Brigade integrated upgraded Iglas into experimental robotic platforms for remote air defense operations.

Comparisons with Peer Systems

Versus Western MANPADS (Stinger, Mistral)

The 9K38 Igla and its improved Igla-S variant exhibit several key differences from Western counterparts like the and Mistral in operational specifications. The Igla-S achieves a maximum range of 6 km, surpassing the 's 4.8 km , while both systems reach similar top speeds around Mach 2.2–2.3. The Mistral matches the Igla-S range at approximately 6 km but features a larger 3 kg with a proximity fuse for enhanced lethality without requiring a direct impact, in contrast to the Igla's contact-fuzed emphasizing precision hits. In seeker technology, the Igla employs a dual-band sensor with improved flare rejection and jamming resistance compared to earlier models, providing an edge in countermeasure-heavy environments over the Stinger's imaging seeker, though the latter benefits from more mature for . Finnish evaluations highlighted the Igla's superior performance against electronic jamming relative to the Mistral, despite the latter's advantages in seeker sensitivity and size; however, the Igla demonstrated limitations in minimum range and overall detection thresholds. Head-to-head trials underscore mixed outcomes. South African tests indicated the Igla's superiority to the baseline FIM-92A in engagement probability against maneuvering targets, attributed to its robust seeker discrimination. Conversely, the 's proximity fuze offers higher kill probability in near-miss scenarios, potentially compensating for guidance deviations, while the Igla's direct-hit requirement demands tighter accuracy. Cost comparisons favor the Igla, with unit prices estimated at around $50,000 versus over $100,000 for the (adjusted for inflation from 1980s baselines) and up to four times higher for the Mistral, reflecting differences in production scale and technology integration. This economic disparity positions the Igla as a more proliferable option for resource-constrained operators, though Western systems may retain edges in reliability and integration with platforms.

Versus Successor Russian Systems (Verba)

The 9K333 Verba MANPADS, introduced to Russian service in 2014, surpasses the 9K38 Igla in key performance metrics, including an effective range of up to 6.5 km against aerial targets and a maximum altitude of 4.5 km. Its primary advancement is a three-channel optical seeker operating in ultraviolet, near-infrared, and mid-infrared bands, which improves target discrimination and resistance to infrared countermeasures compared to the Igla's dual-band infrared seeker. This design enables the Verba to engage faster-moving threats, up to 500 m/s, and provides enhanced lethality against low-signature aircraft or decoys. Despite these superior capabilities, the Igla-S variant persists in Russian inventories and exports due to its lower production and acquisition costs, driven by the Verba's more complex seeker assembly. In operational contexts like the , where both systems are deployed in tandem, the Igla has proven sufficient for intercepting helicopters, cruise missiles, and drones at typical engagement ranges, achieving practical hit probabilities against non-stealthy, low-altitude threats without the need for Verba's specialized countermeasures. Russia's continued of Igla systems reflects logistical familiarity, established supply chains, and the adequacy of its performance envelope for massed, cost-effective air defense, reserving the Verba for elite or high-intensity units facing advanced jamming or stealth. This dual-system approach maximizes overall force effectiveness while mitigating the economic burden of full-spectrum upgrades.

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