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2001 anthrax attacks
2001 anthrax attacks
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2001 anthrax attacks
Laboratory technician holding an anthrax-laced letter sent to Senator Patrick Leahy
Location
DateSeptember 18, 2001 (2001-09-18) – October 12, 2001 (2001-10-12)
TargetU.S. senators, media figures
Attack type
Bioterrorism
WeaponsAnthrax bacteria
Deaths5 (Bob Stevens, Thomas Morris Jr., Joseph Curseen, Kathy Nguyen, and Ottilie Lundgren)
Injured17
MotiveUnknown[1]
AccusedBruce Edwards Ivins, Steven Hatfill (exonerated)

The 2001 anthrax attacks, also known as Amerithrax (a portmanteau of "America" and "anthrax", from its FBI case name),[1] occurred in the United States over the course of several weeks beginning on September 18, 2001, one week after the September 11 attacks. Letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to several news media offices and to senators Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy, killing five people and infecting seventeen others. Capitol police officers and staffers working for Senator Russ Feingold were exposed as well. According to the FBI, the ensuing investigation became "one of the largest and most complex in the history of law enforcement".[2] They are the only lethal attacks to have used anthrax outside of warfare.[3]

The FBI and CDC authorized Iowa State University to destroy its anthrax archives in October 2001, which hampered the investigation. Thereafter, a major focus in the early years of the investigation was bioweapons expert Steven Hatfill, who was eventually exonerated. Bruce Edwards Ivins, a scientist at the government's biodefense labs at Fort Detrick in Frederick, Maryland, became a focus around April 4, 2005. On April 11, 2007, Ivins was put under periodic surveillance and an FBI document stated that he was "an extremely sensitive suspect in the 2001 anthrax attacks".[4] On July 29, 2008, Ivins died by suicide with an overdose of acetaminophen (paracetamol).[5]

Federal prosecutors declared Ivins the sole perpetrator on August 6, 2008, based on DNA evidence leading to an anthrax vial in his lab.[6] Two days later, Senator Chuck Grassley and Representative Rush D. Holt Jr. called for hearings into the Department of Justice and FBI's handling of the investigation.[7][8] The FBI formally closed its investigation on February 19, 2010.[9]

In 2008, the FBI requested a review of the scientific methods used in their investigation from the National Academy of Sciences, which released their findings in the 2011 report Review of the Scientific Approaches Used During the FBI's Investigation of the 2001 Anthrax Letters.[10] The report cast doubt on the government's conclusion that Ivins was the perpetrator, finding that the type of anthrax used in the letters was correctly identified as the Ames strain of the bacterium, but that there was insufficient scientific evidence for the FBI's assertion that it originated from Ivins' laboratory.

The FBI responded by saying that the review panel asserted that it would not be possible to reach a definite conclusion based on science alone, and said that a combination of factors led the FBI to conclude that Ivins had been the perpetrator.[11] Some information is still sealed concerning the case and Ivins' mental health.[1]: 8 footnote [12] The government settled lawsuits that were filed by the widow of the first anthrax victim Bob Stevens for $2.5 million with no admission of liability. The settlement was reached solely for the purpose of "avoiding the expenses and risks of further litigations", according to a statement in the agreement.[13]

Context

[edit]

The anthrax attacks began a week after the 9/11 attacks, which had caused the destruction of the original World Trade Center in New York City, damage to the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, and the crash of an airliner in an empty field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The anthrax attacks came in two waves. The first set of letters containing anthrax had a Trenton, New Jersey, postmark dated September 18, 2001. Five letters are believed to have been mailed at this time to ABC News, CBS News, NBC News and the New York Post, all located in New York City, and to the National Enquirer at American Media, Inc., (AMI) in Boca Raton, Florida.[14]

The first known victim of the attacks, Robert Stevens, who worked at the Sun tabloid, also published by AMI, died on October 5, 2001, four days after entering a Florida hospital with an undiagnosed illness that caused him to vomit and be short of breath.[15][16] The presumed letter containing the anthrax which killed Stevens was never found. Only the New York Post and NBC News letters were actually identified;[17] the existence of the other three letters is inferred because individuals at ABC, CBS and AMI became infected with anthrax. Scientists examining the anthrax from the New York Post letter said it was a clumped coarse brown granular material which looked similar to dog food.[18]

Two more anthrax letters, bearing the same Trenton postmark, were dated October 9, three weeks after the first mailing. The letters were addressed to two U.S. senators, Tom Daschle of South Dakota and Patrick Leahy of Vermont. At the time, Daschle was the Senate majority leader and Leahy was head of the Senate Judiciary Committee; both were members of the Democratic Party. The Daschle letter was opened by an aide, Grant Leslie, on October 15, after which the government mail service was immediately shut down. The unopened Leahy letter was discovered in an impounded mailbag on November 16. The Leahy letter had been misdirected to the State Department mail annex in Sterling, Virginia, because a ZIP Code was misread; a postal worker there, David Hose, contracted inhalational anthrax.

More potent than the first anthrax letters, the material in the Senate letters was a highly refined dry powder consisting of about one gram of nearly pure spores. A series of conflicting news reports appeared, some claiming the powders had been "weaponized" with silica. Bioweapons experts who later viewed images of the anthrax used in the attacks saw no indication of "weaponization".[19] Tests at Sandia National Laboratories in early 2002 confirmed that the attack powders were not weaponized.[20][21]

At least 22 people developed anthrax infections, 11 of whom contracted the especially life-threatening inhalational variety. Five died of inhalational anthrax: Stevens; two employees of the Brentwood mail facility in Washington, D.C. (Thomas Morris Jr. and Joseph Curseen),[22] and two whose source of exposure to the bacteria is still unknown: Kathy Nguyen, a Vietnamese immigrant resident of the New York City borough of the Bronx who worked in the city,[23] and the last known victim, Ottilie Lundgren, a 94-year-old widow of a prominent judge from Oxford, Connecticut.[24]

Because it took so long to identify a culprit, the 2001 anthrax attacks have been compared to the Unabomber attacks which took place from 1978 to 1995.[25]

Letters

[edit]

Authorities believe that the anthrax letters were mailed from Princeton, New Jersey.[26] Investigators found anthrax spores in a city street mailbox located at 10 Nassau Street near the Princeton University campus. About 600 mailboxes were tested for anthrax which could have been used to mail the letters, and the Nassau Street box was the only one to test positive.

The Tom Brokaw (NBC) note

The New York Post and NBC News letters contained the following note:

09–11–01
THIS IS NEXT
TAKE PENACILIN [sic] NOW
DEATH TO AMERICA
DEATH TO ISRAEL
ALLAH IS GREAT

The second anthrax note

The second note was addressed to Senators Daschle and Leahy and read:

09–11–01
YOU CAN NOT STOP US.
WE HAVE THIS ANTHRAX.
YOU DIE NOW.
ARE YOU AFRAID?
DEATH TO AMERICA.
DEATH TO ISRAEL.
ALLAH IS GREAT.

All of the letters were copies made by a copy machine, and the originals were never found. Each letter was trimmed to a slightly different size. The Senate letter uses punctuation, while the media letter does not. The handwriting on the media letter and envelopes is roughly twice the size of the handwriting on the Senate letter and envelopes. The envelopes addressed to Senators Daschle and Leahy had a fictitious return address:

4th Grade
Greendale School
Franklin Park NJ 08852

Franklin Park, New Jersey, exists, but the ZIP Code 08852 is for nearby Monmouth Junction, New Jersey. There is no Greendale School in Franklin Park or Monmouth Junction, though there is a Greenbrook Elementary School in adjacent South Brunswick Township, New Jersey.

False leads

[edit]

The Amerithrax investigation involved many leads which took time to evaluate and resolve. Among them were numerous letters which initially appeared to be related to the anthrax attacks but were never directly linked.

For example, before the New York letters were found, hoax letters mailed from St. Petersburg, Florida, were thought to be the anthrax letters or related to them.[27][28] A letter received at the Microsoft offices in Reno, Nevada, after the discovery of the Daschle letters, gave a false positive in a test for anthrax.[29] Later, because the letter had been sent from Malaysia, Marilyn W. Thompson of The Washington Post connected the letter to Steven Hatfill, whose girlfriend was from Malaysia.[30] The letter merely contained a check and some pornography, and was neither a threat nor a hoax.[31]

A copycat hoax letter containing harmless white powder was opened by reporter Judith Miller in The New York Times newsroom.[32][33]

Also unconnected to the anthrax attacks was a large envelope received at American Media, Inc., in Boca Raton, Florida (which was among the victims of the attacks), in September 2001. It was addressed "Please forward to Jennifer Lopez c/o The Sun", containing a metal cigar tube with a cheap cigar inside, an empty can of chewing tobacco, a small detergent carton, pink powder, a Star of David pendant, and "a handwritten letter to Jennifer Lopez. The writer said how much he loved her and asked her to marry him."[34] Another letter, which mimicked the original anthrax letter to Senator Daschle, was mailed to Daschle from London in November 2001, at a time when Hatfill was in England, not far from London.[35][36][37] Shortly before the discovery of the anthrax letters, someone sent a letter to authorities stating, "Dr. Assaad is a potential biological terrorist."[38] No connection to the anthrax letters was ever found.[39]

During the first years of the FBI's investigation, Don Foster, a professor of English at Vassar College, attempted to connect the anthrax letters and various hoax letters from the same period to Steven Hatfill.[35] Foster's beliefs were published in Vanity Fair and Reader's Digest. Hatfill sued and was later exonerated. The lawsuit was settled out of court.[40]

Anthrax material

[edit]
Envelope addressed to Senator Thomas Daschle, postmarked October 9, 2001

The letters sent to the media contained a coarse brown material, while the letters sent to the two U.S. Senators contained a fine powder.[41][42] The brown granular anthrax mostly caused cutaneous anthrax infections (9 out of 12 cases), although Kathy Nguyen's case of inhalational anthrax occurred at the same time and in the same general area as two cutaneous cases and several other exposures. The AMI letter which caused inhalation cases in Florida appears to have been mailed at the same time as the other media letters. The fine powder anthrax sent to Daschle and Leahy mostly caused the more dangerous form of infection known as inhalational anthrax (8 out of 10 cases). Postal worker Patrick O'Donnell and accountant Linda Burch contracted cutaneous anthrax from the Senate letters.

All of the material was derived from the same bacterial strain known as the Ames strain.[43] The Ames strain is a common strain isolated from a cow in Texas in 1981. The name "Ames" refers to the town of Ames, Iowa, but was mistakenly attached to this isolate in 1981 because of a mix-up about the mailing label on a package.[44][45] First researched at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), at Fort Detrick, Maryland, the Ames strain was subsequently distributed to sixteen bio-research labs within the U.S., as well as three international locations (Canada, Sweden and the United Kingdom).[46]

DNA sequencing of the anthrax collected from Robert Stevens (the first victim) was conducted at The Institute for Genomic Research (TIGR) beginning in December 2001. Sequencing was finished within a month and the analysis was published in the journal Science in early 2002.[47]

Radiocarbon dating conducted by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in June 2002 established that the anthrax was cultured no more than two years before the mailings.[48]

Mutations

[edit]
RMR-1029, the anthrax flask believed to have been used in the attacks, pictured in Ivins' office

Early in 2002, an FBI microbiologist noted that there were variants or mutations in the anthrax cultures grown from powder found in the letters. Scientists at TIGR sequenced the complete genomes from 21 of these isolates during the period from 2002 to 2004. The bioinformatics scientists at TIGR, including Steven Salzberg, Mihai Pop, and Adam M. Phillippy, identified three relatively large changes in some of the isolates, each comprising a region of DNA that had been duplicated or triplicated. The size of these regions ranged from 823 to 2607 base pairs, and all occurred near the same genes. Details of these mutations were published in 2011 in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.[49] These changes became the basis of PCR assays used to test other samples to find any that contained the same mutations. The assays were validated over the many years of the investigation, and a repository of Ames samples was also built. From roughly 2003 to 2006, the repository and the screening of the 1,070 Ames samples in that repository were completed.[50]

Controversy over coatings and additives

[edit]

On October 24, 2001, USAMRIID scientist Peter Jahrling was summoned to the White House after he reported signs that silicon had been added to the anthrax recovered from the letter addressed to Daschle. Silicon would make the anthrax more capable of penetrating the lungs. Seven years later, Jahrling told the Los Angeles Times on September 17, 2008, "I believe I made an honest mistake,” adding that he had been "overly impressed" by what he thought he saw under the microscope.[51]

Richard Preston's book The Demon in the Freezer[52] provides details of conversations and events at USAMRIID during the period from October 16, 2001, to October 25, 2001. Key scientists described to Preston what they were thinking during that period. When the Daschle spores first arrived at USAMRIID, the key concern was that smallpox viruses might be mixed with the spores. "Jahrling met [John] Ezzell in a hallway and said, in a loud voice, 'Goddamn it, John, we need to know if the powder is laced with smallpox.'" Thus, the initial search was for signs of smallpox viruses. On October 16, USAMRIID scientists began by examining spores that had been "in a milky white liquid" from "a field test done by the FBI's Hazardous Materials Response Unit.” Liquid chemicals were then used to deactivate the spores. When scientists turned up the power on the electron beam of the Transmission Electron Microscope (TEM), "The spores began to ooze." According to Preston,

"Whoa," Jahrling muttered, hunched over the eyepieces. Something was boiling off the spores. "This is clearly bad stuff," he said. This was not your mother's anthrax. The spores had something in them, an additive, perhaps. Could this material have come from a national bioweapons program? From Iraq? Did al-Qaeda have anthrax capability that was this good?

On October 25, 2001, the day after senior officials at the White House were informed that "additives" had been found in the anthrax, USAMRIID scientist Tom Geisbert took a different, irradiated sample of the Daschle anthrax to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) to "find out if the powder contained any metals or elements.” AFIP's energy-dispersive X-ray spectrometer reportedly indicated "that there were two extra elements in the spores: silicon and oxygen. Silicon dioxide is glass. The anthrax terrorist or terrorists had put powdered glass, or silica, into the anthrax. The silica was powdered so finely that under Geisbert's electron microscope it had looked like fried-egg gunk dripping off the spores."

The "goop" Peter Jahrling had seen oozing from the spores was not seen when AFIP examined different spores killed with radiation.

The controversy began the day after the White House meeting. The New York Times reported, "Contradicting Some U.S. Officials, 3 Scientists Call Anthrax Powder High-Grade – Two Experts say the anthrax was altered to produce a more deadly weapon,” [53] and The Washington Post reported, "Additive Made Spores Deadlier.” [54] Countless news stories discussed the "additives" for the next eight years, continuing into 2010.[55][56]

Later, the FBI claimed a "lone individual" could have created the anthrax spores for as little as $2,500, using readily available laboratory equipment.[57]

A number of press reports appeared suggesting the Senate anthrax had coatings and additives.[58][59] Newsweek reported the anthrax sent to Senator Leahy had been coated with a chemical compound previously unknown to bioweapons experts.[60] On October 28, 2002, The Washington Post reported "FBI's Theory on Anthrax is Doubted,” [61] suggesting that the senate spores were coated with fumed silica. Two bioweapons experts that were utilized as consultants by the FBI, Kenneth Alibek and Matthew Meselson, were shown electron micrographs of the anthrax from the Daschle letter. In a November 5, 2002 letter to the editors of The Washington Post, they stated that they saw no evidence the anthrax spores had been coated with fumed silica.[19]

In Science magazine, one group of scientists said that the material could have been made by someone knowledgeable with standard laboratory equipment. Another group said it "was a diabolical advance in biological weapons technology.”[62] The article describes "a technique used to anchor silica nanoparticles to the surface of spores" using "polymerized glass.”[62]

An August 2006 article in Applied and Environmental Microbiology, written by Douglas Beecher of the FBI labs in Quantico, Virginia, states "Individuals familiar with the compositions of the powders in the letters have indicated that they were comprised simply of spores purified to different extents."[63] The article also specifically criticizes "a widely circulated misconception" "that the spores were produced using additives and sophisticated engineering supposedly akin to military weapon production.”[63] The harm done by this misconception is described this way: "This idea is usually the basis for implying that the powders were inordinately dangerous compared to spores alone. The persistent credence given to this impression fosters erroneous preconceptions, which may misguide research and preparedness efforts and generally detract from the magnitude of hazards posed by simple spore preparations."[63] Critics of the article complained that it did not provide supporting references.[64][65]

False report of bentonite

[edit]

In late October 2001, ABC chief investigative correspondent Brian Ross linked the anthrax sample to Saddam Hussein because of its purportedly containing the unusual additive bentonite. On October 26, Ross said, "sources tell ABCNEWS the anthrax in the tainted letter sent to Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle was laced with bentonite. The potent additive is known to have been used by only one country in producing biochemical weapons—Iraq. ... [I]t is a trademark of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's biological weapons program ... The discovery of bentonite came in an urgent series of tests conducted at Fort Detrick, Maryland, and elsewhere." On October 28, Ross said that "despite continued White House denials, four well-placed and separate sources have told ABC News that initial tests on the anthrax by the U.S. Army at Fort Detrick, Maryland, have detected trace amounts of the chemical additives bentonite and silica",[66] a charge that was repeated several times on October 28 and 29.[67]

On October 29, 2001, White House spokesman Scott Stanzel "disputed reports that the anthrax sent to the Senate contained bentonite, an additive that ha[d] been used in Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's biological weapons program.” Stanzel said, "Based on the test results we have, no bentonite has been found.”[68] The same day, Major General John Parker at a White House briefing stated, "We do know that we found silica in the samples. Now, we don't know what that motive would be, or why it would be there, or anything. But there is silica in the samples. And that led us to be absolutely sure that there was no aluminum in the sample, because the combination of a silicate, plus aluminum, is sort of the major ingredients of bentonite."[69] Just over a week later, Homeland Security Advisor Tom Ridge in a White House press conference on November 7, 2001, stated, "The ingredient that we talked about before was silicon."[70] Neither Ross at ABC nor anyone else publicly pursued any further claims about bentonite, despite Ross's original claim that "four well-placed and separate sources" had confirmed its detection.

Dispute over silicon content

[edit]

Some of the anthrax spores (65–75%) in the anthrax attack letters contained silicon inside their spore coats. Silicon was even reportedly found inside the natural spore coat of a spore that was still inside the "mother germ,” which was asserted to confirm that the element was not added after the spores were formed and purified, i.e., the spores were not "weaponized.”[20][21]

In 2010, a Japanese study reported, "silicon (Si) is considered to be a "quasiessential" element for most living organisms. However, silicate uptake in bacteria and its physiological functions have remained obscure." The study showed that spores from some species can contain as much as 6.3% dry weight of silicates.[71] "For more than 20 years, significant levels of silicon had been reported in spores of at least some Bacillus species, including those of Bacillus cereus, a close relative of B. anthracis." According to spore expert Peter Setlow, "Since silicate accumulation in other organisms can impart structural rigidity, perhaps silicate plays such a role for spores as well."[72]

The FBI lab concluded that 1.4% of the powder in the Leahy letter was silicon. Stuart Jacobson, a small-particle chemistry expert stated that:

This is a shockingly high proportion [of silicon]. It is a number one would expect from the deliberate weaponization of anthrax, but not from any conceivable accidental contamination.[56]

Scientists at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory conducted experiments in an attempt to determine if the amount of silicon in the growth medium was the controlling factor which caused silicon to accumulate inside a spore's natural coat. The Livermore scientists tried 56 different experiments, adding increasingly high amounts of silicon to the media. All of their results were far below the 1.4% level of the attack anthrax, some as low as .001%. The conclusion was that something other than the level of silicon controlled how much silicon was absorbed by the spores.[56][73]

Richard O. Spertzel, a microbiologist who led the United Nations' biological weapons inspections of Iraq, wrote that the anthrax used could not have come from the lab where Ivins worked.[74] Spertzel said he remained skeptical of the Bureau's argument despite the new evidence presented on August 18, 2008, in an unusual FBI briefing for reporters. He questioned the FBI's claim that the powder was less than military grade, in part because of the presence of high levels of silica. The FBI had been unable to reproduce the attack spores with the high levels of silica. The FBI attributed the presence of high silica levels to "natural variability".[75] This conclusion of the FBI contradicted its statements at an earlier point in the investigation, when the FBI had stated, based on the silicon content, that the anthrax was "weaponized", a step that made the powder more airy and required special scientific know-how.[76]

"If there is that much silicon, it had to have been added," stated Jeffrey Adamovicz, who supervised Ivins' work at Fort Detrick.[56] Adamovicz explained that the silicon in the anthrax attack could have been added via a large fermentor, which Battelle and some other facilities use but "we did not use a fermentor to grow anthrax at USAMRIID ... [and] We did not have the capability to add silicon compounds to anthrax spores." Ivins had neither the skills nor the means to attach silicon to anthrax spores. Spertzel explained that the Fort Detrick facility did not handle anthrax in powdered form. "I don't think there's anyone there who would have the foggiest idea how to do it."[56]

Investigation

[edit]
FBI divers searching for evidence in a pond near Frederick, Maryland during their Amerithrax investigation
A reward for information totalling $2.5 million is being offered by the FBI, U.S. Postal Service and ADVO, Inc.

Authorities traveled to six continents, interviewed over 9,000 people, conducted 67 searches and issued over 6,000 subpoenas. "Hundreds of FBI personnel worked the case at the outset, struggling to discern whether the Sept. 11 al-Qaeda attacks and the anthrax murders were connected before eventually concluding that they were not."[77]

Anthrax archive destroyed

[edit]

The FBI and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) both gave permission for Iowa State University to destroy the Iowa anthrax archive and the archive was destroyed on October 10 and 11, 2001.[78]

The FBI and CDC investigation was hampered by the destruction of the large collection of anthrax spores collected over more than seven decades and kept in more than 100 vials at Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. Many scientists claim that the quick destruction of the anthrax spores collection in Iowa eliminated crucial evidence useful for the investigation. A precise match between the strain of anthrax used in the attacks and a strain in the collection would have offered hints as to when bacteria had been isolated and, perhaps, as to how widely it had been distributed to researchers. Such genetic clues could have given investigators the evidence necessary to identify the perpetrators.[78]

Al-Qaeda and Iraq blamed for attacks

[edit]

Immediately after the anthrax attacks, White House officials pressured FBI Director Robert Mueller to publicly blame al-Qaeda following the September 11 attacks.[79] During the president's morning intelligence briefings, Mueller was "beaten up" for not producing proof that the killer spores were the handiwork of Osama bin Laden, according to a former aide. "They really wanted to blame somebody in the Middle East," the retired senior FBI official stated.

The FBI knew early on that the anthrax used was of a consistency requiring sophisticated equipment and was unlikely to have been produced in "some cave". At the same time, President Bush and Vice President Cheney in public statements speculated about the possibility of a link between the anthrax attacks and al-Qaeda.[80] The Guardian reported in early October that American scientists had implicated Iraq as the source of the anthrax,[81] and the next day The Wall Street Journal editorialized that al-Qaeda perpetrated the mailings, with Iraq the source of the anthrax.[82] A few days later, John McCain suggested on the Late Show with David Letterman that the anthrax may have come from Iraq,[83] and the next week ABC News did a series of reports stating that three or four (depending on the report) sources had identified bentonite as an ingredient in the anthrax preparations, implicating Iraq.[66][67][84]

Statements by the White House[68] and public officials[69] quickly stated that there was no bentonite in the attack anthrax. "No tests ever found or even suggested the presence of bentonite. The claim was just concocted from the start. It just never happened."[85] Nonetheless, a few journalists repeated ABC's bentonite report for several years,[86] even after the invasion of Iraq proved there was no involvement. In an interview with Hamid Mir, Osama bin Laden denied any knowledge of the Anthrax attacks.[87]

"Person of interest"

[edit]

Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, a molecular biologist at the State University of New York at Purchase and chairwoman of a biological weapons panel at the Federation of American Scientists, and others began claiming that the attack might be the work of a "rogue CIA agent" in October 2001, as soon as it became known that the Ames strain of anthrax had been used in the attacks, and she told the FBI the name of the "most likely" person.[88] On November 21, 2001, she made similar statements to the Biological and Toxic Weapons convention in Geneva.[89] In December 2001, she published "A Compilation of Evidence and Comments on the Source of the Mailed Anthrax" via the web site of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), claiming that the attacks were "perpetrated with the unwitting assistance of a sophisticated government program".[90] She discussed the case with reporters from The New York Times.[91] In Rosenberg's assessment, the suspect(s) must have had "the right skills, experience with anthrax, up-to-date anthrax vaccination, forensic training and access to USAMRIID and its biological agents."[88]

On January 4, 2002, Nicholas Kristof of The New York Times published a column titled "Profile of a Killer"[92] stating "I think I know who sent out the anthrax last fall." For months, Rosenberg gave speeches and stated her beliefs to many reporters from around the world. She posted "Analysis of the Anthrax Attacks" to the FAS web site on January 17, 2002. On February 5, 2002, she published "Is the FBI Dragging Its Feet?"[93] In response, the FBI stated, "There is no prime suspect in this case at this time".[94] The Washington Post reported, "FBI officials over the last week have flatly discounted Dr. Rosenberg's claims".[95] On June 13, 2002, Rosenberg posted "The Anthrax Case: What the FBI Knows" to the FAS site.[96] On June 18, 2002, she presented her theories to Senate staffers working for Senators Daschle and Leahy.[97]

On June 25, the FBI publicly searched Steven Hatfill's apartment, and he became a household name. "The FBI also pointed out that Hatfill had agreed to the search and is not considered a suspect."[98] American Prospect and Salon.com reported, "Hatfill is not a suspect in the anthrax case, the FBI says."[99] On August 3, 2002, Rosenberg told the media that the FBI asked her if "a team of government scientists could be trying to frame Steven J. Hatfill".[100] In August 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft labeled Hatfill a "person of interest" in a press conference, though no charges were brought against him. Hatfill is a virologist, and he vehemently denied that he had anything to do with the anthrax mailings and sued the FBI, the Justice Department, Ashcroft, Alberto Gonzales, and others for violating his constitutional rights and for violating the Privacy Act. On June 27, 2008, the Department of Justice announced that it would settle Hatfill's case for $5.8 million.[101]

Hatfill also sued The New York Times and its columnist Kristof, as well as Donald Foster, Vanity Fair, Reader's Digest, and Vassar College for defamation. The case against The New York Times was initially dismissed,[102] but it was reinstated on appeal. The dismissal was upheld by the appeals court on July 14, 2008, on the basis that Hatfill was a public figure and malice had not been proven.[103] The Supreme Court rejected an appeal on December 15, 2008.[104] Hatfill's lawsuits against Vanity Fair and Reader's Digest were settled out of court in February 2007, but no details were made public. The statement released by Hatfill's lawyers[40] said, "Dr. Hatfill's lawsuit has now been resolved to the mutual satisfaction of all the parties".

Bruce Edwards Ivins

[edit]
Bruce Edwards Ivins in 2003

Bruce E. Ivins had worked for 18 years at the government's bio defense labs at Fort Detrick as a biodefense researcher. The Associated Press reported on August 1, 2008, that he had apparently committed suicide at the age of 62. It was widely reported that the FBI was about to press charges against him, but the evidence was largely circumstantial and the grand jury in Washington reported that it was not ready to issue an indictment.[105] Rush D. Holt Jr. represented the district where the anthrax letters were mailed, and he said that circumstantial evidence was not enough and asked FBI director Robert S. Mueller to appear before Congress to provide an account of the investigation.[106] Ivins' death left two unanswered questions. Scientists familiar with germ warfare said that there was no evidence that he had the skills to turn anthrax into an inhalable powder. Alan Zelicoff aided the FBI investigation, and he stated: "I don't think a vaccine specialist could do it... This is aerosol physics, not biology".[107]

W. Russell Byrne worked in the bacteriology division of the Fort Detrick research facility. He said that Ivins was "hounded" by FBI agents who raided his home twice, and he was hospitalized for depression during that time. According to Byrne and local police, Ivins was removed from his workplace out of fears that he might harm himself or others. "I think he was just psychologically exhausted by the whole process," Byrne said. "There are people who you just know are ticking bombs. He was not one of them."[108]

On August 6, 2008, federal prosecutors declared Ivins the sole perpetrator of the crime when US Attorney Jeffrey A. Taylor laid out the case to the public. "The genetically unique parent material of the anthrax spores... was created and solely maintained by Dr. Ivins." But other experts disagreed, including biological warfare and anthrax expert Meryl Nass, who stated: "Let me reiterate: no matter how good the microbial forensics may be, they can only, at best, link the anthrax to a particular strain and lab. They cannot link it to any individual." At least 10 scientists had regular access to the laboratory and its anthrax stock, and possibly quite a few more, counting visitors from other institutions and workers at laboratories in Ohio and New Mexico that had received anthrax samples from the flask.[109] The FBI later claimed to have identified 419 people at Fort Detrick and other locations who had access to the lab where flask RMR-1029 was stored, or who had received samples from flask RMR-1029.[110]

Mental health issues

[edit]

Ivins told a mental health counselor more than a year before the anthrax attacks that he was interested in a young woman who lived out of town and that he had "mixed poison" which he took with him when he went to watch her play in a soccer match. "If she lost, he was going to poison her," said the counselor, who treated Ivins at a Frederick clinic four or five times in mid-2000. She said that Ivins emphasized that he was a skillful scientist who "knew how to do things without people finding out". The counselor was so alarmed by his emotionless description of a specific, homicidal plan that she immediately alerted the head of her clinic and a psychiatrist who had treated Ivins, as well as the Frederick Police Department. She said that the police told her that nothing could be done because she did not have the woman's address or last name.[111]

In 2008, Ivins told a different therapist that he planned to kill his co-workers and "go out in a blaze of glory". That therapist stated in an application for a restraining order that Ivins had a "history dating to his graduate days of homicidal threats, actions, plans, threats and actions towards therapists". Dr. David Irwin, his psychiatrist, called him "homicidal, sociopathic with clear intentions."[112]

Evidence of consciousness of guilt

[edit]
Bruce Ivins' office at Fort Detrick, where he allegedly wrote the letters

According to the report on the Amerithrax investigation published by the Department of Justice, Ivins engaged in actions and made statements that indicated a consciousness of guilt. He took environmental samples in his laboratory without authorization and decontaminated areas in which he had worked without reporting his activities. He also threw away a book about secret codes, which described methods similar to those used in the anthrax letters. Ivins threatened other scientists, made equivocal statements about his possible involvement in a conversation with an acquaintance, and put together outlandish theories in an effort to shift the blame for the anthrax mailings to people close to him.[1]: 9 

The FBI said that Ivins' justifications for his actions after the environmental sampling, as well as his explanations for a subsequent sampling, contradicted his explanation for the motives for the sampling.[113]

According to the Department of Justice, flask RMR-1029, which was created and controlled by Ivins, was used to create "the murder weapon".[46][114][115][116]

In 2002, researchers did not believe it was possible to distinguish between anthrax variants.[117] In January 2002, Ivins suggested that DNA sequencing should show differences in the genetics of anthrax mutations which would allow the source to be identified. Despite researchers advising the FBI that this may not have been possible, Ivins tutored agents on how to recognize them. Considered cutting edge at the time, the technique is now commonplace.[117]

In February 2002, Ivins volunteered to provide samples from several variants of the Ames strain in order to compare their morphs. He submitted two test tube "slants" each from four samples of the Ames strain in his collection. Two of the slants were from flask RMR-1029. Although the slants from flask RMR-1029 were later reported to be a positive match, all eight slants were reportedly in the wrong type of test tube and would therefore not be usable as evidence in court. On March 29, 2002, Ivins' boss instructed Ivins and others in suites B3 and B4 on how to properly prepare slants for the FBI Repository. The subpoena also included instructions on the proper way to prepare slants. When Ivins was told that his February samples did not meet FBIR requirements, he prepared eight new slants. The two new slants prepared from flask RMR-1029 submitted in April by Ivins did not contain the mutations that were later determined to be in flask RMR-1029.[118][119]

It was reported that in April 2004, Henry Heine found a test tube in the lab containing anthrax and contacted Ivins.[117] In an email sent in reply, Ivins reportedly told him it was probably RMR-1029 and for Heine to forward a sample to the FBI.[117] Doubts regarding the reliability of the FBI tests were later raised when the FBI tested Heine's sample and a further one from Heine's test tube: one tested negative and one positive.[117]

A DOJ summary report of February 19, 2010, said that "the evidence suggested that Dr. Ivins obstructed the investigation either by providing a submission which was not in compliance with the subpoena, or worse, that he deliberately submitted a false sample."[1]: 79  Records released under the Freedom of Information Act in 2011 show that Ivins provided four sets of samples from 2002 to 2004, twice the number the FBI reported. Three of the four sets tested positive for the morphs.[117]

The FBI said that "At a group therapy session on July 9, 2008, Dr. Ivins was particularly upset. He revealed to the counselor and psychologist leading the group, and other members of the group, that he was a suspect in the anthrax investigation and that he was angry at the investigators, the government, and the system in general. He said he was not going to face the death penalty, but instead had a plan to 'take out' co-workers and other individuals who had wronged him. He noted that it was possible, with a plan, to commit murder and not make a mess. He stated that he had a bullet-proof vest, and a list of co-workers who had wronged him, and said that he was going to obtain a Glock firearm from his son within the next day, because federal agents were watching him and he could not obtain a weapon on his own. He added that he was going to 'go out in a blaze of glory.'"[1]: 50 

While in a mental hospital, Ivins allegedly made menacing phone calls[120] to his social worker Jean Duley on July 11 and 12.

Alleged hidden texts

[edit]

In the letters sent to the media, the characters 'A' and 'T' were sometimes emboldened or highlighted by tracing over, according to the FBI suggesting that the letters contained a hidden code.[1]: 58 [9][121][122][123][124]

Some believe the letters to the New York Post[125] and Tom Brokaw[126] contained a "hidden message" in such highlighted characters. Below is the media text with the highlighted As and Ts:

09-11-01
THIS IS NEXT
TAKE PENACILIN [sic] NOW
DEATH TO AMERICA
DEATH TO ISRAEL
ALLAH IS GREAT

According to the FBI, Summary Report issued on February 19, 2010, following the search of Ivins' home, cars, and office on November 1, 2007, investigators began examining his trash.[1]: 64  A week later, just after 1:00 a.m. on the morning of November 8, the FBI stated that Ivins was observed throwing away "a copy of a book entitled Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid, published by Douglas Hofstadter in 1979" and "a 1992 issue of American Scientist Journal which contained an article entitled 'The Linguistics of DNA,' and discussed, among other things, codons and hidden messages".[1]: 61 

The book Gödel, Escher, Bach contains a lengthy description of the encoding/decoding procedures, including an illustration of hiding a message within a message by emboldening certain characters.[127] According to the FBI Summary Report, "[w]hen they lifted out just the bolded letters, investigators got TTT AAT TAT – an apparent hidden message". The 3-letter groups are codons, "meaning that each sequence of three nucleic acids will code for a specific amino acid".[1]: 59 

TTT = Phenylalanine (single-letter designator F)
AAT = Asparagine (single-letter designator N)
TAT = Tyrosine (single-letter designator Y)

The FBI Summary Report proceeds to say: "From this analysis, two possible hidden meanings emerged: (1) 'FNY' – a verbal assault on New York, and (2) PAT – the nickname of [Dr. Ivins'] Former Colleague #2." Ivins was known to have a dislike for New York City, and four of the media letters had been sent to New York.[1]: 60  The report states that it "was obviously impossible for the Task Force to determine with certainty that either of these two translations was correct", however, "the key point to the investigative analysis is that there is a hidden message, not so much what that message is".[1]: 60  According to the FBI, Ivins showed a fascination with codes and also had an interest in secrets and hidden messages,[1]: 60 ff and was familiar with biochemical codons.[1]: 59 ff

Ivins' "non-denial" denials

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Experts have suggested that the anthrax mailings included a number of indications that the mailer was trying to avoid harming anyone with his warning letters.[35][90]

Examples:

  1. None of the intended recipients of the letters were infected.
  2. The seams on the backs of the envelopes were taped over as if to make certain the powders could not escape through open seams.[128]
  3. The letters were folded with the "pharmaceutical fold", which was used for centuries to safely contain and transport doses of powdered medicines (and currently to safely hold trace evidence).[citation needed]
  4. The media letters provided "medical advice": "TAKE PENACILIN [sic] NOW."
  5. The Senate letters informed the recipient that the powder was anthrax: "WE HAVE THIS ANTHRAX."
  6. At the time of the mailings, it was generally believed that such powders could not escape from a sealed envelope except through the two open corners where a letter opener is inserted, which had been taped shut.[129]

In June 2008, Ivins was involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital. The FBI stated that during a June 5 group therapy session there, Ivins had a conversation with an unnamed witness, during which he made a series of statements about the anthrax mailings that the FBI said could best be characterized as "non-denial denials".[1]: 70–71  When asked about the anthrax attacks and whether he could have had anything to do with them, the FBI said that Ivins admitted he suffered from loss of memory, stating that he would wake up dressed and wonder if he had gone out during the night. Some of his responses allegedly included the following selected quotes:

  • "I can tell you I don't have it in my heart to kill anybody."
  • "I do not have any recollection of ever have doing anything like that. As a matter of fact, I don't have no clue how to, how to make a bio-weapon and I don't want to know."
  • "I can tell you, I am not a killer at heart."
  • "If I found out I was involved in some way, and, and ..."
  • "I don't think of myself as a vicious, a, a nasty evil person."
  • "I don't like to hurt people, accidentally, in, in any way. And [several scientists at USAMRIID] wouldn't do that. And I, in my right mind wouldn't do it [laughs] ... But it's still, but I still feel responsibility because [the RMR-1029 flask containing the anthrax spores] wasn't locked up at the time ..."

In an interview with a confidential human resource (CHR) which took place on January 8, 2008, the FBI said that the CHR told FBI agents that since Ivins' last interview with the FBI (on November 1, 2007), Ivins had "on occasion spontaneously declared at work, 'I could never intentionally kill or hurt someone'".[130]

Doubts about FBI conclusions

[edit]

After the FBI announced that Ivins acted alone, many people with a broad range of political views, some of whom were colleagues of Ivins, expressed doubts.[131] Reasons cited for these doubts include that Ivins was only one of 100 people who could have worked with the vial used in the attacks and that the FBI could not place him near the New Jersey mailbox from which the anthrax was mailed.[131][132] The FBI's own genetic consultant, Claire Fraser-Ligget, stated that the failure to find any anthrax spores in Ivins' house, vehicle or on any of his belongings seriously undermined the case.[119] Noting unanswered questions about the FBI's scientific tests and lack of peer review, Jeffrey Adamovicz, one of Ivins' supervisors in USAMRIID's bacteriology division, stated, "I'd say the vast majority of people [at Fort Detrick] think he had nothing to do with it."[133] More than 200 colleagues attended his memorial service following his death.[134]

Alternative theories proposed include FBI incompetence, that Syria or Iraq directed the attacks, or that similar to some 9/11 conspiracy theories the US government knew in advance that the attacks would occur.[131] The Washington Post called for an independent investigation in the case saying that reporters and scientists were poking holes in the case.[135]

On September 17, 2008, Senator Patrick Leahy told FBI Director Robert Mueller during testimony before the Judiciary Committee which Leahy chairs, that he did not believe Army scientist Bruce Ivins acted alone in the 2001 anthrax attacks, stating:

I believe there are others involved, either as accessories before or accessories after the fact. I believe that there are others out there. I believe there are others who could be charged with murder.[136]

In 2011 Leahy maintained to the Washington Post that the attacks had certainly involved other "people who at the very least were accessories after the fact," and also found it "strange that one person would target such an odd collection of media and political figures".[137]

Tom Daschle, the other Democratic senator targeted, believes Ivins was the sole culprit.[138]

Although the FBI matched the genetic origin of the attack spores to the spores in Ivins' flask RMR-1029, the spores within that flask did not have the same silicon chemical "fingerprint" as the spores in the attack letters. The implication is that spores taken out of flask RMR-1029 had been used to grow new spores for the mailings.[139]

On April 22, 2010, the U.S. National Research Council, the operating arm of the National Academy of Sciences, convened a review committee that heard testimony from Henry Heine, a microbiologist who was formerly employed at the Army's biodefense laboratory in Maryland where Ivins had worked. Heine told the panel that it was impossible that the deadly spores had been produced undetected in Ivins' laboratory, as maintained by the FBI. He testified that at least a year of intensive work would have been required using the equipment at the army lab to produce the quantity of spores contained in the letters and that such an intensive effort could not have escaped the attention of colleagues.

Heine also told the panel that lab technicians who worked closely with Ivins have told him they saw no such work. He stated further that biological containment measures where Ivins worked were inadequate to prevent Anthrax spores from floating out of the laboratory into animal cages and offices. "You'd have had dead animals or dead people," Heine said.[140] According to Science Magazine,[141] "Heine caveated his remarks by saying that he himself had no experience making anthrax stocks." Science magazine provides additional comments by Adam Driks of Loyola who stated that the amount of anthrax in the letters could be made in "a number of days". Emails by Ivins state, "We can presently make 1 X 10^12 [one trillion] spores per week."[142] And The New York Times reported on May 7, 2002, that the Leahy letter contained .871 grams of anthrax powder [equivalent to 871 billion spores][143]

In a technical article to be published in the Journal of Bioterrorism & Biodefense in 2011, three scientists argued that the preparation of the spores did require a high level of sophistication, contrary to the position taken by federal authorities that the material would have been unsophisticated. The paper is largely based on the high level of tin detected in tests of the mailed anthrax, and the tin may have been used to encapsulate the spores, which required processing not possible in laboratories to which Ivins had access. According to the scientific article, this raises the possibility that Ivins was not the perpetrator or did not act alone.

Earlier in the investigation, the FBI had named tin as a substance "of interest" but the final report makes no mention of it and fails to address the high tin content. The chairwoman of the National Academy of Sciences panel that reviewed the FBI's scientific work and the director of a separate review by the Government Accountability Office said that the issues raised by the paper should be addressed. Other scientists, such as Johnathan L. Kiel, a retired Air Force scientist who worked on anthrax for many years, did not agree with the authors' assessments — saying that the tin might be a random contaminant rather than a clue to complex processing.[144] Kiel said that tin might simply be picked up by the spores as a result of the use of metal lab containers, although he had not tested that idea.[144]

In 2011, the chief of the Bacteriology Division at the Army laboratory, Patricia Worsham, said it lacked the facilities in 2001 to make the kind of spores in the letters. In 2011, the government conceded that the equipment required was not available in the lab, calling into question a key pillar of the FBI's case, that Ivins had produced the anthrax in his lab. According to Worsham, the lab's equipment for drying spores, a machine the size of a refrigerator, was not in containment so that it would be expected that non-immunized personnel in that area would have become ill. Colleagues of Ivins at the lab have asserted that he could not have grown the quantity of anthrax used in the letters without their noticing it.[145]

A spokesman for the Justice Department said in 2011 that the investigators continue to believe that Ivins acted alone.[144]

Congressional oversight

[edit]

Congressman Rush Holt, whose district in New Jersey includes a mailbox from which anthrax letters are believed to have been mailed, called for an investigation of the anthrax attacks by Congress or by an independent commission he proposed in a bill entitled the Anthrax Attacks Investigation Act (H.R. 1248).[146] Other members of Congress have also called for an independent investigation.[147]

An official of the U.S. administration said in March 2010 that President Barack Obama probably would veto legislation authorizing the next budget for U.S. intelligence agencies if it called for a new investigation into the 2001 anthrax attacks, as such an investigation "would undermine public confidence" in an FBI probe.[148] In a letter to congressional leaders, Peter Orszag, the director of the Office of Management and Budget at the time, wrote that an investigation would be "duplicative", and expressed concern about the appearance and precedent involved when Congress commissions an agency Inspector General to replicate a criminal investigation, but did not list the anthrax investigation as an issue that was serious enough to advise the President to veto the entire bill.[149]

National Academy of Sciences review

[edit]

In what appears to have been a response to lingering skepticism, on September 16, 2008, the FBI asked the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to conduct an independent review of the scientific evidence that led the agency to implicate U.S. Army researcher Bruce Ivins in the anthrax letter attacks of 2001.[10] However, despite taking this action, Director Mueller said that the scientific methods applied in the investigation had already been vetted by the research community through the involvement of several dozen nonagency scientists.[10]

The NAS review officially got underway on April 24, 2009.[140] While the scope of the project included the consideration of facts and data surrounding the investigation of the 2001 Bacillus anthracis mailings, as well as a review of the principles and methods used by the FBI, the NAS committee was not given the task to "undertake an assessment of the probative value of the scientific evidence in any specific component of the investigation, prosecution, or civil litigation", nor to offer any view on the guilt or innocence of any of the involved people.[150]

In mid-2009, the NAS committee held public sessions, in which presentations were made by scientists, including scientists from the FBI laboratories.[151][152][153] In September 2009, scientists, including Paul Keim of Northern Arizona University, Joseph Michael of Sandia National Laboratory and Peter Weber of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, presented their findings.[154][155] In one of the presentations, scientists reported that they did not find any silica particles on the outside of the spores (i.e., there was no "weaponization"[citation needed]), and that only some of the spores in the anthrax letters contained silicon inside their spore coats. One of the spores was still inside the "mother germ", yet it already had silicon inside its spore coat.[20][156]

In October 2010, the FBI submitted materials to NAS that it had not previously provided. Included in the new materials were results of analyses performed on environmental samples collected from an overseas site. Those analyses yielded evidence of the Ames strain in some samples. NAS recommended a review of those investigations.[157]

The NAS committee released its report on February 15, 2011, concluding that it was "impossible to reach any definitive conclusion about the origins of the anthrax in the letters, based solely on the available scientific evidence".[157] The report also challenged the FBI and U.S. Justice Department's conclusion that a single-spore batch of anthrax maintained by Ivins at his laboratory at Fort Detrick in Maryland was the parent material for the spores in the anthrax letters.[157][158]

Government Accountability Office

[edit]

A study by the United States Government Accountability Office found shortcomings in the FBI's testing methods. In particular, according to the GAO analysis, the FBI's testing method lacked an understanding of the conditions that enable genetic mutations, which is necessary to differentiate between anthrax samples; the FBI failed to institute rigorous controls over the anthrax sampling procedures; and the FBI failed to include measures of uncertainty, which is important for accurate statistical interpretation of testing results.[159]

Aftermath

[edit]
Contaminated mail flow
A 2010 United States Department of Justice report on the attacks

Contamination and cleanup

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Dozens of buildings were contaminated with anthrax as a result of the mailings. New York-based Bio Recovery Corporation and Ohio-based Bio-Recovery Services of America were placed in charge of the cleanup and decontamination of buildings in New York City, including ABC Headquarters and a midtown Manhattan building that was part of the Rockefeller Center and was home to the New York Post and Fox News.[160] Bio Recovery provided the labor and equipment, such as HEPA filtered negative pressure air scrubbers, HEPA vacuums, respirators, cyclone foggers, and decontamination foam licensed by the Sandia National Laboratories. Ninety-three bags of anthrax-contaminated mail were removed from the New York Post alone.[161]

The decontamination of the Brentwood postal facility took 26 months and cost $130 million. The Hamilton, New Jersey, postal facility[162] remained closed until March 2005; its cleanup cost $65 million.

The United States Environmental Protection Agency led the collaborative effort to clean up the Hart Senate Office Building, where Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle's office was located, as well as the Ford Office Building and several other locations around the capitol.[163] It used $27 million of its funds for its Superfund program on the Capitol Hill anthrax cleanup.[164] One FBI document said the total damage exceeded $1 billion.[165]

Preparedness and research

[edit]

The anthrax attacks, as well as the September 11, 2001 attacks, spurred significant increases in U.S. government funding for biological warfare research and preparedness. For example, biowarfare-related funding at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) increased by $1.5 billion in 2003. In 2004, Congress passed the Project Bioshield Act, which provides $5.6 billion over ten years for the purchase of new vaccines and drugs.[166] These included the monoclonal antibody raxibacumab, which treats anthrax as well as an Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed, both of which are stockpiled by the US government.[167]

Immediately after 9/11, well before the mailing of any of the letters involved in the anthrax attacks, the White House began distributing ciprofloxacin, the only drug approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for the treatment of inhalational anthrax,[168] to senior staffers.[169][170]

Ciprofloxacin manufacturer Bayer agreed to provide the United States with 100,000 doses for $.95 per dose, a cut in the price from $1.74.[171] The Canadian government had previously overridden the Bayer patent,[172] and the US was threatening the same measure if Bayer did not agree to negotiate the price.[173] Shortly afterward, it was recommended that doxycycline was a more appropriate drug to treat anthrax exposure.[171] A widened use of the broad-spectrum antibiotic ciprofloxacin had also raised serious concerns amongst scientists about the creation and increased spread of drug-resistant bacteria strains.[171] Numerous corporations offered to supply drugs free of charge, contingent on the Food and Drug Administration approving their products for anthrax treatment. They included Bristol Myers Squibb (gatifloxacin), Johnson and Johnson (levofloxacin) and GlaxoSmithKline (two drugs). Eli Lilly and Pfizer also offered to provide drugs at cost.[171]

U.S. mail crackdowns

[edit]

The attack led to the widespread confiscation and curtailment of US Mail, especially to US media companies: "checks, bills, letters, and packages simply stopped arriving. For many people and businesses that had resisted the cultural shift to e-mail, this was the moment that pushed them online."[79]

Policy

[edit]

After the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent anthrax mailings, lawmakers were pressed for legislation to combat further terrorist acts. Under heavy pressure from then Attorney General John D. Ashcroft, a bipartisan compromise in the House Judiciary Committee allowed legislation for the Patriot Act to move forward for full consideration later that month.[174][175]

A theory that Iraq was behind the attacks, based upon purported evidence that the powder was weaponized and some reports of alleged meetings between 9/11 conspirators and Iraqi officials, may have contributed to the hysteria which ultimately enabled the 2003 Invasion of Iraq.[176]

Adverse health effects

[edit]

Years after the attack, several anthrax victims reported lingering health problems including fatigue, shortness of breath and memory loss.[177]

A 2004 study proposed that the total number of people harmed by the anthrax attacks of 2001 should be raised to 68.[178]

A postal inspector, William Paliscak, became severely ill and disabled after removing an anthrax-contaminated air filter from the Brentwood mail facility on October 19, 2001. Although his doctors, Tyler Cymet and Gary Kerkvliet, believe that the illness was caused by anthrax exposure, blood tests did not find anthrax bacteria or antibodies, and therefore the CDC does not recognize it as a case of inhalational anthrax.[179]

Media

[edit]

Television

[edit]

The case was referenced on season 4, episode 24 of Criminal Minds.[citation needed]

The second season of the National Geographic TV series The Hot Zone focused on the attack.[180]

Season 12, episode 13 of Unsolved Mysteries prominently featured the anthrax attacks in detail.[citation needed]

Dan Krauss's The Anthrax Attacks: In the Shadow of 9/11 from Netflix and the BBC takes a "quasi-documentary" approach to the investigation. First streamed on September 8, 2022.[181][182]

Season 8, episode 3 of How It Really Happened covers the timeline of the attacks and investigation; it was first streamed in June 2024.[citation needed]

Season 1, episode 13 of House, M.D., titled "Cursed" (March 2005), references Amerithrax. When Dr. House diagnoses a 12-year-old child with anthrax, he jokingly mentions Saddam Hussein, although Saddam had no involvement with 9/11 or Amerithrax. Shortly after, the patient's father, an U.S. Air Force test pilot, sarcastically mentions terrorism.

Season 2, episode 23, Law and Order: Criminal Intent, in a straight out of the headlines type story, in this case involving a scientist falsely accused of an anthrax attack who appears to commit suicide because of the accusations. https://www.rottentomatoes.com/tv/law-and-order-criminal-intent/s02/e23

See also

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References

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Further reading

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The 2001 anthrax attacks involved the mailing of letters containing Bacillus anthracis spores to targets in the United States, causing five deaths and seventeen non-fatal infections from inhalational and cutaneous anthrax. The letters, postmarked September 18, 2001, for media recipients including offices of the New York Post, National Enquirer, and NBC News, and October 9, 2001, for U.S. Senators Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy, bore handwritten messages such as "09-11-01," "DEATH TO AMERICA," "DEATH TO ISRAEL," and "ALLAH IS GREAT," evoking Islamist extremism amid the recent September 11 attacks. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Amerithrax investigation traced the spores to the Ames strain held at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick, Maryland, and concluded in 2010 that USAMRIID microbiologist Bruce Ivins acted alone as the perpetrator, citing genetic matching to his flask RMR-1029, behavioral evidence, and his suicide in July 2008 shortly before anticipated charges. However, a 2011 National Academy of Sciences review of the FBI's scientific methods found that microbial forensics could not definitively attribute the attack material to Ivins' specific flask or exclude other laboratories with access to the widely distributed Ames strain, leaving unresolved questions about the evidence's exclusivity and contributing to persistent skepticism among microbiologists and investigators regarding the lone-actor determination. The attacks amplified post-9/11 bioterrorism fears, prompted enhanced U.S. biodefense measures, and exposed limitations in microbial attribution techniques reliant on genetic analysis amid potential laboratory access by multiple parties.

Background and Context

Biodefense Research Prior to 2001

The United States terminated its offensive biological weapons program in 1969 via executive order from President Richard Nixon, redirecting resources to defensive biodefense efforts aimed at countermeasures against potential adversarial use of pathogens like Bacillus anthracis. This shift aligned with the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), ratified by the US in 1975, which prohibited development, production, and stockpiling of biological agents for offensive purposes while permitting research for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful objectives, including vaccine development and threat assessment. Defensive programs emphasized studying aerosolized anthrax dynamics, pathogenesis in primate models, and efficacy of protective equipment to inform military and civilian preparedness. The of B. anthracis, isolated on December 23, 1981, from a 14-month-old heifer that died in Sarita, , emerged as a key virulent isolate for studies due to its consistent lethality in inhalation models, surpassing earlier strains like Vollum in reproducibility for experiments. Shipped to the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at , —the primary US facility for high-containment infectious disease research—it was propagated for validation, testing, and exposure simulations to evaluate respirators and protocols. By the late , the was held in approximately 15 US laboratories and three foreign sites, often in lyophilized or liquid suspensions refined through serial passaging to enhance sporulation yields for challenge studies. USAMRIID's anthrax work built on the , licensed in 1970 for human use, with ongoing refinements through the and to address lot variability and booster requirements observed in field trials. Revelations from Soviet defector in 1999 detailed Biopreparat's massive offensive program, including genetically engineered strains resistant to vaccination, prompting accelerated US defensive R&D on detection assays and . Concurrently, a February 2001 National Defense Panel report warned of lax in US labs handling select agents like Ames , noting insufficient access controls and risks, as pathogens were routinely shared among researchers without rigorous tracking. These efforts occurred amid heightened proliferation concerns, including Iraq's documented during the 1980s Iran-Iraq War and the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax release in the USSR, which killed at least 66 and exposed covert offensive activities despite BWC commitments. Domestic research at sites like supplemented USAMRIID by testing non-pathogenic simulants for dispersal patterns, though live anthrax challenges remained confined to BSL-3/4 facilities to mimic weaponized dissemination scenarios for countermeasure validation. Pre-2001 funding, though modest compared to post-attack surges, supported genetic sequencing initiatives that later aided strain attribution, underscoring the dual-use nature of such work where refined spores suitable for inhalation studies paralleled attributes of potential bioweapons.

Post-9/11 Security Environment

The September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and created an immediate atmosphere of national vulnerability, with U.S. intelligence and security agencies anticipating potential secondary strikes involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) agents. Al-Qaeda's prior statements on acquiring weapons of mass destruction amplified concerns over , as the group's operational sophistication demonstrated capacity for unconventional attacks beyond hijackings. This led to a surge in domestic alerts, with federal agencies like the FBI prioritizing threats from dispersed pathogens that could evade traditional border controls and exploit public infrastructure. The letters, postmarked September 18, 2001, emerged in this context of acute fear, initially interpreted by officials as a likely bioterrorist escalation tied to Islamist extremists rather than isolated domestic actors. systems, though pre-existing, faced unprecedented strain; the CDC reported heightened monitoring for aerosolized biological agents, while the U.S. Postal Service implemented emergency protocols amid disruptions to mail flow. Between September and December 2001, over 20,000 suspicious incidents were investigated nationwide, taxing laboratory resources and reflecting societal panic over everyday mail as a vector for mass casualties. Government responses emphasized rapid containment and deterrence, with President George W. Bush's administration allocating emergency funds—totaling over $1 billion by 2002—for biodefense enhancements, including antibiotic stockpiling (e.g., 100 million doses of by late 2001) and interagency task forces. Vulnerabilities in bioweapons research oversight became evident, prompting interim restrictions on select agents like , though full regulatory overhauls via the occurred later. This environment prioritized foreign-linked threats, influencing early investigative assumptions despite eventual evidence pointing to U.S.-based origins.

The Attacks

Mailing of Letters and Initial Discovery

The 2001 anthrax attacks involved two waves of letters containing spores mailed through the U.S. postal system. The first wave consisted of letters postmarked September 18, 2001, at a , postal facility, addressed to media outlets including at in and the editorial department, also in . These letters were likely deposited in a mailbox at 10 Nassau Street in , on September 17 or 18, 2001. Each contained a handwritten note reading: "09-11-01 / THIS IS NEXT / TAKE PENACILIN NOW / DEATH TO AMERICA / DEATH TO ISRAEL / ALLAH IS GREAT." A second wave of letters was postmarked October 9, 2001, also from Trenton, New Jersey, targeted at U.S. Senate offices in Washington, D.C., specifically Senators Thomas Daschle (D-SD) and Patrick Leahy (D-VT). These were mailed between October 6 and 9, 2001, from the same Princeton mailbox. The notes in these letters stated: "09-11-01 / YOU CAN NOT STOP US / WE HAVE THIS ANTHRAX. / YOU DIE NOW. ARE YOU AFRAID? / DEATH TO AMERICA / DEATH TO ISRAEL / ALLAH IS GREAT," with a fictitious return address of "4TH GRADE, GREENDALE SCHOOL, FRANKLIN PARK NJ 08852." The envelopes for both waves were traced to paper stock available at stores in Frederick, Maryland, and Hamilton, New Jersey. Initial discoveries stemmed from handling the contaminated mail, leading to early cases of anthrax infection before the letters themselves were fully identified. On October 3, 2001, Robert Stevens, a photo editor at American Media, Inc. (AMI) in —which received contaminated mail processed alongside the targeted media letters—was diagnosed with inhalational anthrax, marking the first confirmed case. Stevens died on October 5, 2001, prompting intensified scrutiny of mail at media outlets. The Brokaw letter was recovered by the FBI on October 12, 2001, after white powder was noticed in the NBC offices. The letter was discovered on October 19, 2001, similarly containing suspicious powder. The Daschle letter was opened on October 15, 2001, in the , confirming presence and leading to evacuations and quarantines. The Leahy letter was found later, on November 16, 2001, during a search of quarantined mail in a Washington, D.C., processing facility. These discoveries revealed the deliberate nature of the mailings, with spores finely milled for , though initial responses focused on containment and victim treatment amid post-9/11 heightened alerts.

Victims, Timeline, and Immediate Response

The anthrax letters were mailed in two batches from . The first set, postmarked September 18, 2001, targeted media outlets including the and anchor ; a similar letter likely reached American Media Inc. (AMI) in , though its envelope was not recovered. The second batch, postmarked October 9, 2001, was addressed to U.S. Senators and . Contaminated mail spread through postal facilities, leading to initial detections in early October: anthrax was confirmed in Robert Stevens on October 4, with his death the next day marking the first U.S. inhalation anthrax fatality since 1976; the Brokaw letter was recovered on October 12; the Daschle letter opened on October 15; and the letter found on October 19. The Leahy letter surfaced on November 16. The attacks resulted in 22 confirmed cases of anthrax infection—11 inhalational and 11 cutaneous—and five deaths, all from inhalational anthrax. Infections occurred via direct exposure to the letters or secondary contamination in mail processing sites like the Brentwood Postal Facility in Washington, D.C., and the Hamilton Postal Facility in New Jersey. The victims were:
NameAgeOccupation/LocationDate of DeathNotes
Robert Stevens63Photo editor, AMI, Boca Raton, FLOctober 5, 2001First confirmed case; symptoms began late September.
Thomas L. Morris Jr.55Postal worker, Brentwood PO, DCOctober 21, 2001Inhalation anthrax from contaminated mail sorting.
Joseph P. Curseen Jr.47Postal worker, Brentwood PO, DCOctober 22, 2001Died alongside Morris; facility closed October 23.
Kathy T. Nguyen61Hospital worker, New York, NYOctober 31, 2001Exposure source unclear; handled contaminated mail.
Ottilie Lundgren94Resident, Oxford, CTNovember 21, 2001Likely exposed via cross-contaminated mail; no direct link to letters.
Cutaneous cases included media employees and a child of an ABC producer, with positive tests reported October 12–18. The (FBI) launched the Amerithrax Task Force immediately after Stevens's death, involving 25–30 full-time agents who conducted thousands of interviews, issued over 5,750 subpoenas, and collected environmental samples from affected sites. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) deployed over 350 staff to six epicenters, coordinated Laboratory Response Network testing of more than 120,000 samples, and issued guidelines for and treatment. measures included closing contaminated facilities like AMI's building (October 8) and Brentwood (October 23), distributing antibiotics such as and for prophylaxis to over 10,000 potentially exposed individuals (initially 60 days, extended to 100), and conducting mass screening clinics. The FDA approved for post-exposure use on , amid challenges like delayed diagnoses, prophylaxis side effects reducing compliance to about 40%, and inter-agency coordination strains.

Early False Leads and Misdirections

The anthrax letters contained handwritten notes with phrases such as "Death to America," "Death to Israel," and "Allah is Great," which initially directed suspicion toward Islamist extremists or state-sponsored actors like al-Qaeda, especially given the attacks' timing mere weeks after the September 11, 2001, hijackings. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) pursued this foreign terrorism hypothesis aggressively in the early months, conducting interviews with over 10,000 witnesses across six continents and exploring potential links to known bioterror programs. However, no credible connections emerged; genetic analysis of the Ames strain used in the letters traced it exclusively to U.S. laboratories, particularly the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick, Maryland, and linguistic experts highlighted non-idiomatic phrasing (e.g., "Allah is Great" rather than the standard Arabic "Allahu Akbar") indicative of domestic origin rather than native Arabic speakers. Compounding the foreign lead, media reports in late October 2001 cited anonymous U.S. government sources claiming the presence of —a clay additive purportedly used by to weaponize —in the spore powder from the letter sent to Senator , suggesting state-level sophistication beyond lone actors. These assertions, disseminated by outlets like ABC News based on four separate "well-placed" officials, implied Iraqi involvement, as bentonite was said to enhance , though the reports acknowledged inconclusive testing at facilities like . The initially denied the finding, with spokesman stating no aluminum (a bentonite indicator) was detected, but the claims persisted in public discourse. Subsequent scientific examination by using (TEM) in 2002 revealed only naturally occurring silica on coats, with no bentonite or deliberate additives for weaponization, debunking the Iraq link and highlighting early analytical misinterpretations of silicon-oxygen signals. Domestically, the FBI's focus shifted by mid-2002 to , a virologist and former USAMRIID contractor, after his name surfaced eight times in initial tips due to his anthrax research background, access to relevant labs until 1999, and a June 2001 prescription for (Cipro), an antibiotic effective against . Searches of Hatfill's possessions uncovered anthrax handling protocols and a simulant powder, fueling suspicions of insider knowledge, and the FBI subjected him to intense surveillance, polygraphs, and leaks portraying him as a ""—a term then-Attorney General used publicly in June 2002. Despite this, Hatfill lacked access to the specific RMR-1029 flask of implicated, and microbial forensics excluded him; the pursuit ended without charges, leading to a $5.8 million settlement from the U.S. government in 2008 for privacy violations and reputational harm. These leads diverted resources for years, delaying the pivot to USAMRIID microbiologist Bruce Ivins until genetic matches emerged in 2007–2008.

Anthrax Characteristics

Strain Identification and Genetic Mutations

The anthrax spores in the 2001 attack letters were identified as Bacillus anthracis of the through genetic analysis performed by Paul Keim's laboratory at . Using multi-locus variable-number tandem repeat analysis (MLVA), researchers determined the genotype matched the , a subtype isolated from a diseased cow in in 1981 and widely used in U.S. research programs. This identification, confirmed by October 2001, shifted suspicion toward domestic sources, as the was primarily held in American laboratories rather than foreign ones. Subsequent MLVA and (AFLP) testing refined the genetic , linking the attack material to a specific sub-population within the maintained at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). Among approximately 15 domestic and three foreign repositories of material identified post-attacks, the FBI's analysis traced the matching genotype to flask RMR-1029, a working stock at USAMRIID containing spores derived from the original Ames isolate. Of over 1,000 B. anthracis samples examined in the FBI repository, only those originating from or contaminated by RMR-1029 shared the precise MLVA profile of the letters' anthrax. In early 2002, FBI microbiologists observed rare morphological variants in cultures grown from the attack letters, prompting whole-genome sequencing that revealed four specific single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs)—mutations at positions pXO1-117, pXO2-61, pXO1-203, and pXO2-179—absent in the standard Ames reference genome. These SNPs appeared in the letter material and were detected in RMR-1029 isolates only after prolonged subculturing (approximately 36 hours), consistent with slow-emerging mutants rather than stable genetic markers. Testing of the FBI's extensive sample collection found that only eight isolates contained all four mutations, each directly traceable to RMR-1029 through documented transfers or potential cross-contamination within USAMRIID. The 2011 National Academy of Sciences review affirmed that the attack anthrax matched the RMR-1029 genotype based on MLVA and SNP data but noted limitations: the mutations' rarity did not preclude independent emergence in other Ames cultures or undetected transfers from RMR-1029 to external labs, preventing conclusive proof that RMR-1029 was the attack source to the exclusion of all others. Despite this, the FBI maintained that the cumulative genetic evidence, combined with access controls and chain-of-custody records, strongly implicated RMR-1029 as the origin, with no viable alternative sources identified after exhaustive repository audits.

Preparation Method and Additives Disputes

The (FBI) concluded that the anthrax powder was prepared through standard microbiological techniques available in research laboratories, involving the growth of Bacillus anthracis spores in a nutrient-rich medium, followed by harvesting via , purification through repeated washing to remove vegetative cells and debris, and drying using equipment such as a lyophilizer or speed-vacuum concentrator. This process, estimated to require approximately 2-3 days for culturing and hours for drying, produced a highly concentrated preparation (over 99% pure spores by refractile count) with electrostatic and dispersible properties matching the attack material, without requiring specialized bioweapons facilities. The FBI replicated comparable powders in controlled tests, attributing the material's flowability to the spores' natural morphology and purification rather than mechanical milling or electrostatic deposition. Disputes centered on whether this method adequately explained the powder's advanced aerosol characteristics, including its fine particle size (1-1.5 micrometers), low clumping, and ability to remain suspended in air despite lacking a visible coating. Critics, including bioweapons experts, contended that such uniformity and stability implied more sophisticated processing, such as spray drying, ball milling, or incorporation of undisclosed dispersants to prevent aggregation—techniques typically linked to state-sponsored programs like those historically pursued by the Soviet Union or Iraq. For instance, early analyses suggested possible additives like polymers or silicates for enhanced dispersibility, based on the powder's behavior in postal sorting equipment and initial electron microscopy observations. The ' 2011 review of the FBI's scientific methods affirmed that no evidence supported the use of intentional additives, chemical coatings, or genetic modifications to improve , aligning with the FBI's findings of a relatively straightforward preparation. However, the highlighted limitations in physicochemical analyses, noting that the did not conclusively distinguish between simple lab and potentially more refined methods, as multiple U.S. facilities possessed similar capabilities and sample repositories showed inconsistencies in and tracking. These gaps fueled ongoing about attributing the exact preparation exclusively to suspect Ivins' flask RMR-1029, though non-scientific evidence bolstered the FBI's case.

Silicon Content and Bentonite Misinformation

Early analyses by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) using detected elevated levels of and oxygen in the spores from the attack letters, with present inside the spore coats of approximately 65-75% of the examined spores. This finding initially prompted speculation that the silicon represented an added silica coating for weaponization, potentially enhancing dispersibility. Subsequent investigations, including transmission electron microscopy by Sandia National Laboratories, determined that the silicon was biologically incorporated into the spore coats during natural sporulation processes, rather than exogenously applied as a dispersant or coating. Virologist Peter Jahrling, who had earlier suggested weaponization based on preliminary data, publicly retracted that assessment following the Sandia results, aligning with the FBI's conclusion that the anthrax lacked evidence of sophisticated additives for state-level bioweapon enhancement. The 2011 National Academy of Sciences review confirmed silicon's presence in the spores but found no forensic evidence indicating intentional addition of silicon-based materials for weaponization, attributing it instead to endogenous incorporation consistent with biology. This refuted claims of artificial refinement, as the spore morphology and purity—lacking inert fillers—were inconsistent with advanced military-grade preparations. Parallel early media reports, including from ABC News, alleged the presence of bentonite—a silicon-rich clay purportedly used in Iraqi bioweapons programs—as an additive in the Daschle letter , fueling speculation of foreign state sponsorship. These assertions were disseminated without verification and later contradicted by federal testing, which detected no or similar clays; Director explicitly dismissed in favor of signatures on November 7, 2001. The , possibly sourced from unconfirmed government or intelligence channels, amplified post-9/11 narratives linking the attacks to despite the Ames strain's exclusive traceability to U.S. stocks. Such claims lacked empirical support and were undermined by the absence of additives in chemical analyses, highlighting vulnerabilities in early investigative sourcing amid heightened geopolitical pressures.

Investigation Process

Initial FBI Probe and Destroyed Archives

The FBI's Amerithrax investigation commenced after Robert Stevens, a photo editor at American Media Inc. in , died from inhalational anthrax on October 5, 2001, with the cause confirmed as infection by October 4, prompting an initial CDC and local probe that the FBI joined as suspicions arose. The scope intensified on October 12, 2001, when anthrax spores were identified in nasal swabs of media workers and in mail at ABC News and offices, linking cases to mailed letters containing powdered anthrax and notes referencing the . Early investigative efforts focused on mail tracing from postmarks in , on September 18 (media targets) and October 9, 2001 (senatorial targets), alongside environmental sampling and interviews exceeding 10,000 individuals, while securing U.S. laboratories amid post-9/11 panic. Forensic analysis by USAMRIID rapidly identified the as the , a laboratory-adapted subtype derived from a 1981 isolate from a cow and distributed to numerous U.S. facilities, narrowing domestic sourcing but complicating attribution due to its prevalence in government programs. Initial leads emphasized potential foreign terrorism, including connections, given the letters' anti-American rhetoric and timing, though parallel domestic scrutiny of scientists and labs began, with the FBI deploying specialized teams for bioforensic evidence collection. Concurrently, security-driven actions hindered evidence preservation: after FBI consultation, Iowa State University's National Veterinary Services Laboratories destroyed its comprehensive anthrax strain repository—accumulated over seven decades and including diverse global isolates—on October 11–12, 2001, to avert potential theft or accidental release amid bioterror fears. This archive, which housed reference samples valuable for genetic baseline comparisons, was eliminated just as the Ames strain's role emerged, prompting expert criticism that the hasty destruction compromised forensic capabilities by removing irreplaceable comparative material early in the probe. The 2001 anthrax attacks, occurring in the weeks immediately following the terrorist strikes, prompted widespread initial suspicions of foreign , with emerging as a primary focus due to the temporal proximity and the letters' explicit invocation of Islamist extremism. The envelopes contained handwritten messages in reading "," "," "," and "09-11-01" alongside the anthrax powder, phrasing that mirrored jihadist propaganda and suggested an intent to associate the mailings with 's ongoing campaign against the . President described the incidents as a "second wave of terrorist attacks" in a November 3, 2001, radio address, reflecting the administration's operating assumption of possible ties to international actors. White House Press Secretary stated on October 23, 2001, that investigators were pursuing connections to the 9/11 hijackers and broader international networks. Al-Qaeda's documented pursuit of biological weapons further fueled these suspicions, as the group had expressed interest in acquiring and weaponizing pathogens like to amplify its asymmetric threats against Western targets. The later confirmed al-Qaeda's efforts to develop a rudimentary bioweapons capability in by 2001, including experiments with crude production, though limited by technical expertise and resources. Terrorism expert Richard Spertzel speculated on October 19, 2001, that sympathizers of could be responsible, citing the attacks' potential to sow long-term disruption. echoed concerns about al-Qaeda's weapons of mass destruction ambitions, though without direct evidence linking the group to the mailings. Some reports, such as a March 23, 2002, claim by physician Christos Tsonas of possible cutaneous lesions on hijacker , raised theories of pre-attack testing or exposure among operatives, but FBI testing of hijacker remains and effects yielded negative results for . Suspicions also extended to under , given its established biological weapons program documented by inspectors, which included production and weaponization research in the and 1990s. Former CIA Director hypothesized Iraqi involvement based on the letters' lack of return addresses and Saddam's demonstrated hostility, while UN inspector Richard Butler suggested in October that might have transferred to al-Qaeda-linked terrorists, potentially via meetings between hijacker and Iraqi intelligence in . Media reports amplified claims of Iraqi-sourced additives, with ABC News citing anonymous sources on October 26, , that the contained —a clay used in Iraqi weapons programs—to enhance , though subsequent FBI and laboratory analyses found no such additive and identified the strain as the U.S.-specific Ames variant unavailable to foreign actors. Director noted on October 25, , that preliminary tests indicated the material did not originate from or , undermining state-sponsored theories despite the Bush administration's intensive efforts to establish a connection. The FBI's Amerithrax task force conducted global inquiries, including interviews on six continents and examinations of foreign labs and personnel with potential or Iraqi ties, but uncovered no evidence of overseas sourcing, access to the RMR-1029 flask of used, or operational links to the mailings. Linguistic analysis of the letters revealed non-native phrasing inconsistencies, such as "ALLAH IS GREAT" instead of the standard "Allahu Akbar," which some experts interpreted as deliberate rather than authentic jihadist authorship. By late 2001, the absence of foreign forensic matches—coupled with the anthrax's genetic profile tracing to U.S. military stocks—shifted focus domestically, though the initial foreign hypotheses influenced early policy responses and heightened alerts.

Domestic Person of Interest: Steven Hatfill

Steven , a virologist and biodefense consultant born on October 24, 1953, served as a researcher at the Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) from 1997 to 1999, focusing on and other pathogens. After leaving USAMRIID, he worked as a on bioweapons defense projects, including simulations of biological attacks. In early 2002, the FBI identified Hatfill as a "" in the Amerithrax investigation due to his expertise in biological agents and prior professional activities that included discussing mailed anthrax scenarios in training exercises before , 2001. Eight individuals independently suggested Hatfill to investigators in the first four months of the probe, citing his access to relevant strains and behavioral patterns observed by colleagues. Suspicion intensified because Hatfill had prescribed himself ciprofloxacin—a potent effective against —starting September 20, 2001, weeks before the letters' contents were publicly known to contain . Investigators noted alignments between his documented travels and the postmarks on the anthrax envelopes, such as a trip to near a mailing site, though no tied him to the letters. His home, vehicles, and storage units in were searched and swabbed for traces in 2002, yielding no spores or incriminating materials. Hatfill's eccentric personal habits, including owning equipment and conducting mock bioweapons drills, fueled perceptions of oddity among peers and agents, though these were consistent with his field of work. The FBI's focus on Hatfill involved extensive surveillance, including tailing him publicly and hiring a former girlfriend to surreptitiously record conversations, but yielded no forensic links to the attack strain, Ames, which Hatfill had handled only in non-weaponized forms during his USAMRIID tenure. Media leaks portraying him as the likely perpetrator, amplified by outlets citing anonymous FBI sources, led to professional ostracism; Hatfill lost contracts and consulting work by mid-2002. He publicly denied involvement in a June 2002 press conference and filed lawsuits against the Justice Department for Privacy Act violations and media for defamation. In June 2008, the Department of Justice settled Hatfill's Privacy Act suit for $5.82 million, comprising a $2.825 million and an of $150,000 annually for 20 years, without admitting liability but resolving claims of improper information disclosures. The settlement coincided with the FBI's shift to Ivins as the primary suspect, and on August 8, 2008, the Justice Department formally stated Hatfill was not involved in the attacks, exonerating him after over six years of scrutiny. The 2010 Amerithrax Investigative Summary later affirmed no evidence connected Hatfill to the mailings, highlighting investigative missteps in prioritizing him over lab records and genetic analysis.

Primary Suspect: Bruce Ivins Profile

was born on April 22, 1946, in , to Randall Ivins, a Princeton-educated , and Mary Ivins, a homemaker. He grew up in a family with pharmaceutical roots, as one ancestor had established a in the area in 1893. Ivins was married to Diane Ivins and had two children, a son named Andy and a daughter named Amanda; he maintained annual vacations with his brother Charles but had a reportedly estranged relationship with another brother, Tom. Ivins pursued higher education at the , earning a B.S. in in 1968, an M.S. in in 1971, and a Ph.D. in in 1976, all with honors. Following his doctorate, he conducted postdoctoral research at the before entering government service. In 1980, Ivins joined the Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at , , as a in the Bacteriology Division, where he worked for over 27 years until his death. His research focused on the genetics, immunology, and vaccine development for Bacillus anthracis, the bacterium causing , contributing to efforts to protect U.S. troops with improved vaccines. In 2003, Ivins and three colleagues received the Department of Defense's highest civilian honor for their advancements. By the late , he was among USAMRIID's senior scientists, handling high-security (BSL-3) work with the of anthrax in flask RMR-1029, which later became central to the FBI's investigation. Ivins died by suicide on July 29, 2008, at age 62, from an intentional overdose of acetaminophen leading to organ failure, shortly before federal charges were anticipated in the Amerithrax case.

Evidence Linking Ivins to the Attacks

Genetic analysis conducted by the FBI identified the anthrax spores in the attack letters as deriving from the RMR-1029 flask, a specific subculture created and maintained by Bruce Ivins at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). This flask contained spores exhibiting four unique morphological mutations that matched those in the mailed , a combination found in none of the over 1,070 other samples tested from U.S. and international laboratories. Ivins submitted samples from RMR-1029 to the FBI in February 2002 that aligned with the attack material, though a subsequent April 2002 submission from the same flask lacked these mutations, raising questions about sample integrity. Ivins held primary custody of the RMR-1029 flask, stored in a walk-in cooler in his B-313 within USAMRIID's Building 1425, and possessed unrestricted access to the B3 biosafety suite containing equipment essential for spore production, including fermenters, centrifuges, and a lyophilizer for drying spores into a fine . As a senior with over two decades of experience in research, Ivins demonstrated expertise in cultivating and purifying high-concentration spore preparations, as documented in his laboratory notebooks describing RMR-1029 as achieving 99% refractile s with minimal contaminants—characteristics consistent with the unusually pure and concentrated in the letters. In the weeks preceding the mailings, Ivins recorded atypical late-night and weekend hours working alone in the B3 suite, totaling 31 hours and 28 minutes in September 2001 and 16 hours and 13 minutes in early October, without corresponding research tasks or explanations tied to ongoing projects. Specific instances included 2 to 2.5 hours nightly from to 16, aligning with preparation before the first mailing of September 18, and 1 to 3.5 hours nightly from September 28 to October 5, preceding the second mailing on October 9. The double-walled envelopes used in the attacks matched a type sold in bulk at post offices in , approximately 1.5 miles from Ivins' home and USAMRIID.

Behavioral and Consciousness of Guilt Indicators

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) identified several behaviors and statements by Bruce Ivins as indicative of consciousness of guilt in the 2001 anthrax mailings, including deviations from his routine, evasive responses to investigators, and actions suggesting awareness of impending scrutiny. These were interpreted by investigators as efforts to conceal involvement, though critics have attributed some to Ivins' documented mental health issues, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder and depression, rather than deliberate culpability. Ivins conducted extensive late-night and weekend work in the B3 containment lab (B-313) at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) in the weeks preceding the mailings, logging 31 hours and 28 minutes alone during off-hours in September 2001 and 16 hours and 13 minutes in October 2001—patterns unprecedented before or after the attacks and unsupported by his research needs. He provided inconsistent explanations for these hours, initially claiming they allowed escape from home stresses but later admitting no scientific justification, despite contemporaneous emails indicating improving domestic circumstances. On September 17, 2001—within the presumed mailing window—Ivins took unexplained annual leave with no verifiable alibi. Post-mailing actions included unauthorized environmental sampling of his workspace in December 2001 and April 2002, where he detected anthrax contamination exclusively in his area (27% positive swabs versus 0.18% in broader surveys) but failed to report it, instead secretly decontaminating the site. Ivins submitted misleading RMR-1029 flask samples to the FBI in February and April 2002, with the latter lacking key genetic variants matching attack material, suggesting an attempt to obscure the flask's role. Under 24/7 surveillance in November 2007, following a search warrant, he discarded a book on secret codes (Gödel, Escher, Bach) containing references to codon usage—mirroring disputes over the spores' silicon content—and an article on DNA coding, then checked his trash at 1:00 a.m. in long underwear while peering into nearby woods, behaviors anomalous compared to prior trash disposals. Statements and communications further fueled suspicions: On September 26, 2001, Ivins emailed colleagues speculating that "Bin Laden terrorists for sure have and gas" and quoting Osama bin Laden's "death to all and all ," phrasing echoing the letters' threats. Shortly after early media reports on the attacks, he phoned a former colleague at home, stating he was "not well" and asking to "give his children a hug for him," interpreted by the FBI as a veiled admission amid rising panic. In sessions by July , as loomed, Ivins threatened to "take out" co-workers and investigators with a gun, smiling when questioned about his innocence. He expressed fears of revealing hidden involvement and sent a June equivocating, "If I found out I was involved in some way..." Counter-surveillance efforts included using bug detectors, testing monitoring via provocative self-s, and mailing packages under pseudonyms from distant locations, aligning with the attacks' evasion tactics. Ivins' by Tylenol overdose on July 29, , occurred days before anticipated charges, which the FBI cited as ultimate evidence of guilt awareness.

Controversies and Doubts

Scientific Uncertainties in Attribution

![RMR-1029 anthrax flask][float-right] The genetic analysis conducted by the FBI identified four specific mutations in the spores from the attack letters that matched those in the RMR-1029 flask maintained by Bruce Ivins at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). However, the (NAS) review in 2011 concluded that this genetic evidence alone could not definitively attribute the spores to RMR-1029, as the analysis did not account for potential or identical mutations in untested samples from other laboratories holding the . The NAS emphasized that comprehensive sampling from all relevant U.S. and international labs was incomplete, leaving open the possibility that the attack material derived from another source with similar markers. Morphological examinations revealed silicon-containing spheres in the letter spores, which the FBI attributed to natural silica uptake during sporulation or processing variations reproducible in Ivins' lab. Independent analyses, however, questioned the uniqueness of these features, noting inconsistencies between the silicon signatures in RMR-1029 samples and the attack material, potentially indicating unaccounted additives or external not explained by standard USAMRIID protocols. The GAO's audit further highlighted limitations in the validation of the FBI's statistical models for these morph assays, finding that the methods lacked sufficient rigor to exclude alternative origins with high confidence. Uncertainties persist regarding the preparation method, as the finely milled, highly concentrated powder in the letters suggested advanced and milling techniques beyond routine lab practices at USAMRIID, with no of Ivins employing such processes at the required scale. Peer-reviewed critiques have pointed out that while the FBI demonstrated replication of similar powders, the exact formulation—including potential stabilizers or anti-caking agents—remained unverified against Ivins' documented workflows, raising doubts about lone culpability without collaborative or external involvement. These gaps underscore that scientific attribution relies heavily on circumstantial integration rather than standalone empirical proof.

National Academy of Sciences Review Findings

In 2008, the commissioned the (NAS) to independently review the scientific methods and evidence used in the Amerithrax investigation, particularly the microbial forensics linking the anthrax spores to suspect Bruce Ivins. The NAS committee, composed of experts in , , and forensics, issued its report on February 16, 2011, focusing solely on the validity of the FBI's scientific analyses without assessing behavioral or . The review affirmed the overall rigor of the FBI's genetic sequencing but concluded that the scientific data could not definitively exclude other potential sources for the attack spores. The core finding centered on multilocus variable-number analysis (MLVA) and (SNP) genotyping, which identified four unique SNPs in the letter spores matching those in flask RMR-1029—a virulent subculture maintained by Ivins at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). The committee deemed these methods scientifically valid and the match highly probable, estimating the likelihood of an unrelated origin as extremely low based on the FBI's repository of over 1,000 Ames isolates. However, it emphasized that RMR-1029 had been shared with at least 100 researchers across multiple laboratories, including international ones, over years, meaning derivatives could exist elsewhere without direct traceability to Ivins. Thus, while consistent with Ivins' access, the genetics alone neither proved he was the perpetrator nor ruled out accomplices or alternative domestic sources. Regarding the spores' unusual silicon content—initially speculated to indicate sophisticated weaponization—the NAS found no evidence of deliberate additives like bentonite (a clay associated with Iraqi programs) or morphological engineering. Electron microscopy and elemental analysis showed silicon fused within spore coats, likely from natural uptake during growth in silica-containing media or post-exposure contamination, not intentional refinement for aerosolization. The report criticized some FBI practices, such as incomplete documentation of analytical controls and reliance on non-peer-reviewed MLVA without full genome sequencing at the time, though it validated the results against later whole-genome data. The FBI and Department of Justice responded in February 2011, arguing that the NAS findings reinforced their case when integrated with non-scientific evidence, like Ivins' late-night lab hours and issues, but acknowledged the review's scope limitations. Critics, including some microbiologists, noted the report highlighted gaps in proving Ivins produced the dry powder form independently, as USAMRIID protocols emphasized wet suspensions, fueling ongoing doubts about sole attribution. The NAS recommended enhanced standards for future biothreat forensics, including broader strain archiving and Bayesian probabilistic modeling to quantify source uncertainties.

FBI Methodological Criticisms and Oversight Reports

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a 2014 review of the FBI's genetic and statistical methodologies in the Amerithrax investigation, identifying significant shortcomings in validation processes and analytical rigor. The GAO highlighted that the FBI's genetic assays, used to attack spores to RMR-1029 flask material from USAMRIID, lacked adequate blinded proficiency testing, with one key test exhibiting a 43 percent false negative rate due to insufficient controls and validation against diverse strains. Statistical methods for estimating the rarity of genetic mutations were criticized for relying on unverified assumptions about strain diversity and incomplete sampling from global repositories, potentially inflating the probability of a unique and understating alternative source possibilities. These gaps, according to the GAO, diminished the reliability of conclusions attributing the spores solely to the identified flask, though the did not invalidate the overall genetic findings. The (NAS), at the FBI's request, issued a independent review of the investigation's scientific approaches, affirming the soundness of core microbial forensics techniques like multilocus variable-number analysis (MLVA) but critiquing limitations in supporting methods. Physicochemical analyses failed to conclusively determine the spore preparation process, including unexplained elevated content in the attack material, which could indicate additives or growth conditions not replicated in FBI-controlled experiments. The NAS emphasized that genetic evidence from RMR-1029 could not exclude contamination from other labs handling the same parent strain, as historical transfer records were incomplete and no exhaustive survey of all potential U.S. and international repositories was performed prior to Ivins' identification as the sole perpetrator. While the review validated the FBI's use of external experts and sample handling protocols as generally acceptable for forensic standards at the time, it underscored the need for broader validation data to support attribution claims. The FBI and Department of Justice responded to the findings by asserting that methodological strengths, combined with non-scientific evidence like Ivins' access and behavior, justified closing the case in 2010, but acknowledged commissioning the review to enhance future microbial forensics protocols. Critics, including some microbiologists involved in biodefense research, argued that these oversight reports revealed systemic issues such as overreliance on circumstantial genetic matches without rigorous falsification testing, potentially reflecting investigative after initial foreign leads dissipated. No formal Department of Office of the Inspector General probe specifically targeted Amerithrax methodologies, though congressional hearings in questioned the FBI's handling of early evidence and amid post-9/11 pressures. These reports collectively prompted recommendations for improved interagency validation standards in biothreat investigations, influencing subsequent FBI guidelines on forensic statistics and blind testing.

Alternative Theories and Unresolved Questions

Despite the FBI's conclusion that Bruce Ivins acted alone, some experts have proposed that he may have had accomplices or been innocent, with the anthrax originating from classified U.S. government research programs or other unexamined sources within the community. Microbiologists Martin E. Hugh-Jones, Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, and Stuart Jacobsen contended in a 2011 paper that the presence of tin and in the spores indicated an advanced manufacturing process beyond Ivins' solo capabilities, as the material's refinement exceeded simple flask-derived production. These elements, initially pursued by the FBI as potential additives, were later dismissed without full , fueling of external involvement or from shared lab . Alternative theories have also revisited foreign actors, positing that adversaries like or could have acquired the through defection, theft, or intelligence channels, given pre-2001 reports of Iraqi bioweapons interest and Atta's documented inquiries into . However, the FBI maintained that genetic analysis uniquely tied the letters to U.S. lab stocks, rendering foreign sourcing improbable without evidence of domestic transfer. Critics, including Senator , expressed doubt over the dismissal of such links, citing the attacks' timing amid post-9/11 intelligence on jihadist biothreats. Unresolved questions persist regarding the production timeline and feasibility: genetic consultant Claire Fraser-Liggett noted the improbability of Ivins evading traceable DNA contamination during aerosolization, while microbiologist Henry Heine estimated 30 to 50 weeks for sufficient spore growth without industrial fermenters, conflicting with the FBI's compressed September 2001 window. No attack powder residues were found in Ivins' lab or home despite exhaustive searches, and multiple researchers at USAMRIID had access to flask RMR-1029, undermining exclusivity claims. Ivins' suicide on July 29, 2008, precluded trial, leaving motive—tied to funding boosts for biodefense—as circumstantial and his late-night lab hours unproven for powder creation. The National Academy of Sciences affirmed that scientific evidence linked the strain to Ivins' flask but could not conclusively rule out other sources or independent mutations, highlighting overstatements in the FBI's attribution.

Aftermath and Impacts

Contamination Cleanup and Health Consequences

The 2001 anthrax attacks contaminated multiple U.S. Postal Service facilities, including the Brentwood Processing and Distribution Center in , which handled letters to offices and was closed on October 21, 2001, after detecting Bacillus anthracis spores; decontamination involved vacuuming, HEPA filtration, and repeated fumigation with chlorine dioxide gas, rendering the facility operational again by December 2003. The Morgan Processing and Distribution Center in , which processed the initial letters, also required closure and remediation using similar gaseous methods after widespread spore detection in sorting equipment and air systems. The U.S. Department of Justice mail facility in , underwent vacuuming, liquid decontamination, and gas-phase chlorine dioxide treatment following confirmed contamination from cross-contaminated mail, with post-remediation sampling verifying spore reduction below actionable levels. Government buildings faced targeted cleanups led by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The , contaminated via the letter to Senator opened on November 16, 2001, was evacuated and treated with chlorine dioxide gas over 90 cycles from December 2001 to August 2002, incurring costs of approximately $27 million from EPA's allocation amid challenges from uneven spore distribution and validation testing uncertainties. The and other sites, including media offices like and the , employed liquid disinfectants, HEPA vacuuming, and , with total decontamination expenses across all affected sites estimated at $320 million, encompassing sampling, worker relocation, and disposal of contaminated materials. These efforts prioritized gaseous agents over liquids due to anthrax spores' resilience, though residual risk assessments highlighted potential for undetected viable spores in porous surfaces. Health consequences included 22 confirmed infections: 11 inhalational cases, of which 5 were fatal (Robert Stevens on October 5, 2001; Thomas Morris Jr., Joseph Curseen Jr., Kathy Nguyen, and Ottilie Lundgren in October-November 2001), and 11 cutaneous cases, primarily among postal and media workers exposed via cross-contaminated mail. Inhalational victims presented with flu-like symptoms progressing to and shock, treated with antibiotics like and supportive care, while cutaneous cases involved skin lesions responsive to antibiotics but risking dissemination in immunocompromised individuals. Over 30,000 individuals received with antibiotics and , averting widespread secondary infections but incurring substantial medical costs exceeding $200 million, dominated by self-initiated treatments amid public fear. Long-term effects persisted among survivors, with a one-year assessment of 14 adult inhalational and high-exposure cutaneous cases revealing chronic symptoms in over 80%, including fatigue, , joint and muscle pain, , and sleep disturbances, alongside elevated psychological distress scores and reduced compared to pre-attack baselines. Cutaneous survivors reported scarring and sensory changes at sites, while no evidence emerged of ongoing in exposed populations, though monitoring highlighted needs for extended regimens in vulnerable groups. Broader impacts included heightened anxiety and healthcare utilization for unrelated symptoms among prophylaxed individuals, underscoring gaps in communication during mass-exposure events.

Policy Reforms in Biodefense and Mail Security

In response to the 2001 anthrax attacks, which exposed vulnerabilities in the U.S. postal system as a vector for , the (USPS) implemented protocols for mail processing. Starting in late November 2001, mail bound for high-risk federal facilities in the Washington, D.C., area was rerouted to off-site facilities equipped with electron beam and systems to neutralize potential biological contaminants like spores. By the end of 2003, approximately 4,000 tons of letter mail and 200 tons of parcels had undergone this decontamination process. These measures, while effective against pathogens, raised concerns about residual radiation effects on mail integrity, prompting ongoing evaluations by the USPS and agencies like the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Broader mail security enhancements included the deployment of biohazard detection equipment in postal facilities and improved coordination with federal law enforcement through the U.S. Postal Inspection Service. The attacks, which resulted in contamination spreading via automated sorting machines, led to procedural changes such as enhanced screening for suspicious packages and the establishment of dedicated response protocols within the USPS. On the biodefense front, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, signed by President on June 12, 2002, represented a foundational legislative response, mandating registration and security for laboratories handling select agents like , the anthrax-causing bacterium. The Act allocated resources for improving state and local public health infrastructure, including grants for emergency preparedness, hospital surge capacity, and rapid diagnostic capabilities, directly addressing gaps revealed by the delayed detection of anthrax exposures in 2001. It also expanded the authority of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to regulate biological agents and toxins, establishing the Federal Select Agent Program to oversee transfers and possession. Building on this, the Project BioShield Act of 2004, enacted on July 21, 2004, authorized $5.6 billion over 10 years to procure and stockpile medical countermeasures against agents, with a priority on and treatments. The legislation enabled the government to guarantee markets for developers of , antibiotics, and diagnostics, facilitating the acquisition of -specific countermeasures like stockpiles and next-generation , while streamlining emergency use authorizations. These reforms shifted federal strategy toward proactive stockpiling and research incentives, though implementation faced challenges such as procurement delays for new , as noted in subsequent GAO reviews.

Preparedness Enhancements and Research Shifts

The 2001 anthrax attacks exposed vulnerabilities in the U.S. (SNS), including insufficient medical countermeasures for and limited laboratory diagnostic capacity, prompting rapid enhancements in . In response, the federal government expanded antibiotic stockpiles, acquiring doses sufficient for approximately 41 million people to enable against inhalation . departments and hospitals received targeted funding through the Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness to bolster planning, surveillance, and response capabilities, marking a shift from reactive to proactive infrastructure. Legislative measures formalized these efforts, with the Project BioShield Act of 2004 authorizing $5.6 billion over 10 years to accelerate procurement and stockpiling of vaccines, antimicrobials, and diagnostics for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats, including anthrax-specific countermeasures. Signed into law on July 21, 2004, the Act enabled emergency use authorizations for unapproved products during crises and addressed procurement challenges with the existing , leading to contracts for next-generation vaccines like anthrax vaccine adsorbed (AVA) alternatives. Subsequent expansions, such as the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006, further integrated into broader frameworks, emphasizing rapid deployment of countermeasures. Research priorities shifted markedly toward , with federal funding for such programs increasing nearly 11-fold from 2001 levels to $6.42 billion by fiscal year 2011, prioritizing pathogen detection, vaccine efficacy, and aerosolized spore mitigation. The attacks highlighted limitations in the Department of Defense's program, which had faced implementation delays pre-2001, spurring investments in improved inhalation models and post-exposure therapeutics beyond and . This funding surge facilitated advancements in recombinant protective antigen-based vaccines and monoclonal antibodies, though critics noted risks of dual-use research amplifying proliferation without proportional security gains. By fiscal years 2001–2005, allocations across agencies like the and Department of totaled billions, redirecting resources from natural disease research to engineered threat scenarios.

Media Coverage and Public Perception

The discovery of anthrax-laced letters postmarked September 18, 2001, to media outlets including NBC News and the New York Post, and subsequent mailings to Senators Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy postmarked October 9, dominated U.S. media coverage in the wake of the September 11 attacks. Reports emphasized the letters' handwritten messages invoking "Death to America, Death to Israel, Allah is Great," framing the incidents as likely extensions of Islamist terrorism. This narrative amplified fears of coordinated bioterrorism, with outlets like ABC News citing anonymous government sources claiming the spores contained bentonite, an additive purportedly used only by Iraq for weaponizing anthrax. Such speculation, echoed across broadcasts, contributed to public perceptions of state-sponsored threats, though federal tests later confirmed no bentonite presence and attributed additives to domestic processing methods. Public anxiety surged amid relentless reporting, prompting behavioral shifts such as avoidance of unopened mail and spikes in antibiotic purchases; Cipro demand rose dramatically as prophylaxis against inhalation . A poll conducted October 10-14, 2001, revealed 69% of respondents expressed concern over additional attacks, with 52% personally worried about exposure, though overall composure held without widespread panic. Health authorities distributed antibiotics to over 30,000 potentially exposed individuals, including postal workers and staff, while media coverage of the five deaths and 17 infections underscored vulnerabilities in mail systems and urban infrastructure. Constant telecast repetition heightened unease, likened by observers to exacerbating rather than contextualizing risks. As investigations pivoted to domestic sources, media scrutiny shifted to U.S. biodefense researchers, first targeting in 2002 with leaks portraying him as a suspect—claims later retracted after his exoneration and lawsuit settlement. Coverage intensified in 2008 following Bruce Ivins' suicide, with the FBI naming him the sole perpetrator in 2010 based on like late-night lab access and flask origins. Subsequent reporting highlighted evidentiary gaps, including the 2011 review questioning whether Ivins' strain definitively matched the letters absent silicon signature explanations, fostering public doubts about the lone-actor conclusion and reviving discussions of investigative overreach. This evolution reflected broader skepticism toward official narratives, influenced by the absence of a or direct forensic ties, and contrasted initial foreign-terror emphases with unresolved questions over alternative actors or accomplices.

References

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