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Bangsamoro, officially the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM; Filipino: Rehiyong Awtonomo ng Bangsamoro sa Muslim Mindanao; Arabic: منطقة بانجسامورو ذاتية الحكم في مينداناو المسلمة‎, romanized: Minṭaqah Banjisāmūrū dhātiyyah al-ḥukm fī Mīndānāw al-muslimah), is an autonomous region in the Philippines, located in the southwestern portion of the island of Mindanao.

Key Information

Replacing the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), the BARMM was formed with the ratification of its basic law, the Bangsamoro Organic Law, following a two-part legally binding plebiscite in Western Mindanao held on January 21 and February 6, 2019. The ratification was confirmed a few days later on January 25 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).

The establishment of Bangsamoro was the culmination of several years of peace talks between the Philippine government and several autonomist groups; in particular the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which rejected the validity of the ARMM and called for the creation of a region with more powers devolved from the national government. A framework agreement known as the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro was negotiated between the national government and the MILF in 2014. After continued negotiations and debates over certain provisions, the Congress of the Philippines created and ratified a basic law for the region, now referred to as the Bangsamoro Organic Law; the bill was signed into law on July 26, 2018.

Despite questions on the region's constitutionality, as it would have adopted a parliamentary system in an area of a country with a presidential system of government, no judicial ruling was made against the organic law and consequently a two-part plebiscite was held: one by ARMM citizens determining whether to dissolve the ARMM and immediately replace it with the Bangsamoro and, following the approval on the first part,[9][10][11] a second part taken by neighboring municipalities and barangays in the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Cotabato regarding their cession to the Bangsamoro region.[12][13][14][15] As a result of the second part of the plebiscite, 63 barangays of Cotabato province were handed over to the Bangsamoro government, adding to the autonomous region's territory.[16][12]

The Bangsamoro took the place of the ARMM as the only Muslim-majority autonomous region in the Philippines.[17] Currently in transition until 2025, the Bangsamoro government has been considered a testing ground for the wider debate on constitutional reform and federalism in the Philippines.[citation needed]

On September 9, 2024, the Supreme Court of the Philippines, voting unanimously, mostly upheld the constitutionality of the Bangsamoro Organic Law but declared the province of Sulu to not be part of the autonomous region because of its simple majority vote against its inclusion therein during the 2019 Bangsamoro autonomy plebiscite.[18]

Etymology

[edit]

The recently coined term Bangsamoro is derived from the Old Malay word bangsa ("race" or "nation") and Moro (the collective term for the various predominantly Muslim ethnic groups in the Philippines, from Spanish moro, "Moor"[19]).

History

[edit]
A view of Cotabato City as seen in February 2018
See also: History of Mindanao

Early history and arrival of Islam

[edit]
Approximate historical extent of the Muslim sultanates of Sulu, Maguindanao and Lanao

For the most part of Philippines' history, the region and most of Mindanao have been a separate territory, which enabled it to develop its own culture and identity. The westernmost and west-central areas have been the traditional homeland of Muslim Filipinos since the 15th century, even before the arrival of the Spanish, who began to colonize most of the Philippines in 1565. The majority of Mindanao was the homeland of indigenous Lumad groups, who were neither Christians nor Muslims.

Sunni Sufi scholars from the Ba 'Alawi sada who were also merchant arrived in Tawi-Tawi in 1380 and started doing business while also preaching Islam teaching to the native of the area which led to the conversion of the native population to Islam. In 1457, the Sultanate of Sulu was founded, and not long after that, the sultanates of Maguindanao and Buayan were also established. At the time when most of the Philippines was under Spanish rule, these sultanates maintained their independence and regularly challenged Spanish domination of the Philippines by conducting raids on Spanish coastal towns in the north and repulsing repeated Spanish incursions in their territory. It was not until the last quarter of the 19th century that the Sultanate of Sulu formally recognized Spanish suzerainty, but these areas remained loosely controlled by the Spanish as their sovereignty was limited to military stations and garrisons and pockets of civilian settlements in Zamboanga and Cotabato,[20] until they had to abandon the region as a consequence of their defeat in the Spanish–American War.

Spanish and American colonial rule

[edit]
Darul Jambangan (Palace of Flowers) in Maimbung, Sulu before it was destroyed by a typhoon in 1932.

The Moros had a history of resistance against Spanish, American, and Japanese rule for over 400 years. The violent armed struggle against the Japanese, Filipinos, Spanish, and Americans is considered by modern Moro Muslim leaders as part of the four centuries long "national liberation movement" of the Bangsamoro (Moro Nation), although the term is only used in mainland Mindanao as those in the Sulu archipelago had a much distinct culture.[21] The 400-year-long resistance against the Japanese, Americans, and Spanish by the Moro Muslims persisted and morphed into a war for independence against the Philippine state.[22]

The Filipinos in the northern and central Philippines either volunteered or were forced to surrender the existing city-states to become a part of the Spanish regime except for the islands occupied by the Muslims in the southern Philippines. The three-century rule of the Spaniards did not result in the full conquest of the archipelago due to the resistance of the Moros. The violence and brutality of the Spaniards in their attempts to suppress the Moro groups have resulted in killing numerous families and setting villages on fire.[23]

The United States' Insular Government of the Philippine Islands had only been in existence for two years in 1903 when it initiated the "Homestead Program," which was meant to encourage migration of landless populations from non-Muslim areas of the country into the Muslim-majority areas in Mindanao. Lanao and Cotabato in particular saw an influx of migrants from Luzon and Visayas. This influx of migrants led to tensions about land ownership and disenfranchisement of Lumads and Muslims, because the mostly-Christian migrants established claims on the land, whereas the native peoples of Mindanao didn't have a land titling system in place at the time. This US-led Homestead Program, which was later continued or copied by Philippine administrations after independence, is therefore often cited as one of the root-causes of what would later become the larger Moro conflict.[24]

In 1942, during the early stages of the Pacific War of the Second World War, troops of the Japanese Imperial Forces invaded and overran Mindanao, and the native Moro Muslims waged an insurgency against the Japanese.[citation needed]

Three years later, in 1945, combined United States and Philippine Commonwealth Army troops liberated Mindanao, and with the help of local guerrilla units, ultimately defeated the Japanese forces occupying the region.

Postwar era

[edit]

Under pressure to resolve agrarian unrest in various parts of the country and noting that Mindanao was rich in mineral resources and weather favorable to agriculture, later Philippine presidents continued the promotion of migration which the American colonial government began in 1903. Massive arrivals of non-Muslim migrants happened particularly during the Commonwealth period under President Manuel Quezon and later under right-wing presidents Ramon Magsaysay and Ferdinand Marcos.[25] As a result, the proportion of indigenous peoples in Mindanao to shrink from majority in 1913 to minority by 1976.[25] The best lands in Mindanao were given to settlers and owners of corporate agriculture, while most development investments and government services were offered to the Christian population. This caused the Muslim population to be backward and rank among the poorest in their own country.[26] The resettlement programme was not entirely peaceful as some settlers managed to obtain land from the native Muslims through harassment and other violent efforts which drove the Muslims out of their own lands.[27]

The Muslims felt alienated by the Philippine government and felt threatened by the migrants' economic and political domination in their own homeland, the same way the Lumads were displaced centuries ago when Islam arrived in the Philippines. Some Muslim groups turned to extortion and violence to protect their land and avoid being displaced. These activities prevented the Muslims from easily integrating with the rest of the country.[28]

The Philippine government did not immediately recognize Islamic laws which resulted in the system of education and the socioeconomic development of the Muslims. Children studying in public schools were forced to learn about Christianity while the Bangsamoros struggled with their economy, land, and ownership, and the persistence of hostile and unjust actions compared to the Christian communities in Mindanao.[23]

As an effect of the resettlement, traditional Muslim leaders (also referred as datu) were also voted out during the polls as Christians, who made up a significant majority of the voters, preferred the Christian politicians over them. These local datus suffered a loss in prestige as they could no longer control the Muslim lands.[29] These politicians lost much of the capabilities they had possessed initially to manage the Muslim populace.[30]

Moro conflict

[edit]
Main article: Moro conflict

In March 1968, fishermen in Manila Bay rescued a Muslim man named Jibin Arula from the waters. They discovered that he had suffered from gunshot wounds, and he later recounted that he was the lone survivor of what would later be termed the "Jabidah Massacre."[27][31]

According to Jibin Arula's account, the Marcos administration had gathered a group of Tausūg recruits for an operation called "Project Merdeka" (merdeka being the Malay "freedom"). The military began training them on the island of Corregidor to form a secret commando unit called Jabidah, which would destabilize and take over Sabah.[32] The trainees eventually rejected their mission, for reasons that are still debated by historians today. Jibin Arula said that whatever the reasons behind their objections, all of the recruits aside from him were killed, and he escaped only by pretending to be dead.[31] Marcos loyalist Juan Ponce Enrile, who served as Justice Secretary and Defense Minister during the Marcos administration, claimed this was a hoax, which was reputed as fake news and an attempt "absolve him (Enrile) of his crimes as the architect of martial law".[33][34][35]

In Lanao del Sur, Domocao Alonto established the Ansar El Islam (Helpers of Islam) along with Sayyid Sharif Capt. Kalingalan Caluang, Rashid Lucman, Salipada Pendatun, Hamid Kamlian, Udtog Matalam, and Atty. Macapantun Abbas Jr. Accordingly, "it is a mass movement for the preservation and development of Islam in the Philippines".[36] The advocacy of Ansar El Islam would, later on, inspire the creation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the MILF.

Then Lanao del Sur congressman Rashid Lucman called for Congress to begin proceedings to impeach President Marcos after the exposé implied that Marcos was ultimately responsible for the massacre.[37] When his proposal didn't get enough congressional support, he became convinced that Muslims should rule themselves in Muslim Mindanao - a conviction which led him to eventually establish the Bangsamoro Liberation Organization (BMLO),[38] which later joined forces with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).[37]

Cotabato governor Datu Udtog Matalam [39] saw the anger of the Muslim people of Mindanao and established the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM), which openly called for the secession of the region to create a Muslim state.[40] The MIM did not last long because Datu Udtog Matalam negotiated with Marcos and accepted a post in his cabinet, but many of its members broke away and became the main force of the MNLF.[41]

On September 23, 1972, Ferdinand Marcos announced that he had placed the entirety of the Philippines, including Muslim Mindanao, under martial law. During this tumultuous period, relationships and alliances played a critical role in shaping the events. Tun Mustapha, then Chief Minister of Sabah, shared a common lineage with Sayyid Capt. Kalingalan “Apuh Inggal” Caluang, both tracing their ancestry back to the Sultans of Sulu. This shared heritage fostered a close bond between the two leaders, promoting goodwill and cooperation between their respective territories. With Tun Mustapha's support, the first cadre of MNLF fighters, including figures like Al Hussein Caluang, received training in Sabah after their time in Luuk, Sulu (now known as Kalingalan Caluang). While Datu Udtog Matalam's MIM was already defunct, one of its former members, Nur Misuari, established the MNLF a month after the declaration of Martial Law, on October 21, 1972.[41]

Proclamation 1081 dissolved the various political groups that had been previously established in the Moro provinces, and with the MIM having already been dissolved, Marcos' declaration of martial law effectively assured the MNLF, which was more radical than its predecessors, would come to dominate the Moro separatist movement.[42]

Peace process

[edit]
Main article: Bangsamoro peace process

On December 23, 1976, the Tripoli Agreement was signed between the Philippine government and the MNLF with the deal brokered by then-Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. Under a deal an autonomous region was to be created in Mindanao.[43]

Marcos would later implement the agreement by creating two regional autonomous governments, rather than one, in Regions 9 and 12,[43] which cover ten (instead of thirteen) provinces. This led to the collapse of the peace pact and the resumption of hostilities between the MNLF and Philippine government forces.[44][45]

In signing the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, however, Misuari did not consult one of the MNLF's key commanders, Salamat Hashim. Salamat formed a splinter faction along with 57 other MNLF ground commanders, which then became the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).[46]

A year after Marcos was ousted from power during the People Power Revolution, the government under President Corazon Aquino signed the 1987 Jeddah Accord in Saudi Arabia with the MNLF, agreeing to hold further discussions on the proposal for autonomy to the entirety of Mindanao and not just the thirteen provinces stated in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. In 1989, however, an act establishing the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was passed. The MNLF demanded that the thirteen Tripoli Agreement provinces, majority of which were Christian provinces, be included in the ARMM, but the government refused; eight of those provinces were predominantly Christian. Shortly thereafter, the government held only four provinces as only Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi voted to be included in the ARMM. The four provinces were the only Muslim-majority provinces at the time.[45]

Formation of ARMM and 1996 peace deal

[edit]
Main articles: Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and 1996 Final Peace Agreement

A plebiscite was held in 1989 for the ratification of the charter which created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), with Zacaria Candao, a counsel of the MNLF as the first elected regional governor. On September 2, 1996, a final peace deal was signed between the MNLF and the Philippine government under President Fidel Ramos. MNLF leader and founder Nur Misuari was elected regional governor three days after the agreement.[43] Another plebiscite was held in 2001 for the expansion of the region, with the city of Marawi and the province of Basilan (excluding Isabela) joining the region.

Peace talks with the MILF

[edit]

In 1996, peace talks between the Philippine government and MNLF's rival group, the MILF, began.[43] The first deal between the national government and the MILF was made in 2008: the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The agreement would be declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court many weeks later.[43] The deal would have led to the creation of the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). Under the administration of President Benigno Aquino III, two deals were agreed upon between the national government and the MILF: the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, which was signed on October 15, 2012, and the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro, on March 27, 2014,[47][48] which included plans regarding the establishment of a new autonomous region. In 2012, Aquino announced intentions to establish a new autonomous political entity to be named Bangsamoro to replace the ARMM, which he called a "failed experiment".[49] Under his administration, a draft for a Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) was formulated but failed to gain traction to become law, owing in part to the Mamasapano clash that occurred in January 2015[43] that involved the murder of 44 mostly-Christian Special Action Force (SAF) personnel by allegedly combined forces of the MILF and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) after an operation to kill Malaysian militant Zulkifli Abdhir, known by the alias "Marwan".[50]

Creation of Bangsamoro

[edit]
Voters look for their names at a precinct in Marawi during the January 21 BOL plebiscite.

Under the presidency of Aquino's successor, Rodrigo Duterte, a new draft for the BBL was made and became legislated into law as the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) in 2018.[43] A plebiscite to ratify the BOL was held on January 21, 2019, with a majority of ARMM voters deciding for the ratification of the law. Voters in Cotabato City voted to join the new autonomous region, while voters in Isabela City voted against inclusion. The Commission on Elections proclaimed that the BOL was "deemed ratified" on January 25, 2019.[51][52] The provincial government of Sulu, where majority voted against inclusion, was also not in favor of the law, with its governor challenging the constitutionality of the law before the Supreme Court. Despite voting against inclusion, Sulu was still included in the Bangsamoro region due to rules stated in the BOL, sparking outrage from residents.[53][54]

In February 2019, the second round of the plebiscite was held in the province of Lanao del Norte and some towns in North Cotabato. The plebiscite resulted in the inclusion of 63 of 67 barangays in North Cotabato that participated. It also resulted in the rejection from the province of Lanao del Norte against the bid of six of its Muslim-majority towns to join the Bangsamoro, despite the six towns (Balo-i, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangcal) opting to join the Bangsamoro by a sheer majority, with one town even voting for inclusion by 100%. A major camp of the MILF was within the Muslim areas of Lanao del Norte.[55][56]

Transition process

[edit]
Main article: Bangsamoro transition period
President Rodrigo Duterte sounds the agung during the inauguration of Bangsamoro. He is joined by Chief Minister Murad Ebrahim.

With the ratification of the BOL following the plebiscite on January 21, 2019, the abolition process of the ARMM began, paving way for the setting up of the Bangsamoro autonomous region. Under the BOL, a transitional body, the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA), was organized pending the election of the new region's government officials in 2022. The second part of the plebiscite held on February 6, 2019, expanded the scope of the future Bangsamoro region to include 63 barangays in North Cotabato.[57] The members of the BTA took their oaths on February 22, 2019, along with the ceremonial confirmation of the plebiscite results of both the January 21, and February 6, 2019, votes. The official turnover from the ARMM to BARMM took place on February 26, 2019, which meant the full abolition of the former.[58][59]

The inauguration of BARMM and the inaugural session of the Bangsamoro Parliament took place on March 29, 2019.[60]

Murad Ebrahim took office as the region's first chief minister.[61]

In 2020, the Bangsamoro parliament requested that the BTA be extended for an additional three years past 2022, to allow further time for the transition.[62]

On October 28, 2021, Duterte signed Republic Act No. 11593, postponing BARMM's first regular parliamentary elections from 2022 to 2025. The law also extended the transition period of the Bangsamoro until 2025.[63]

Following a plebiscite on September 17, 2022, Maguindanao was split into two provinces; Maguindanao del Sur and Maguindanao del Norte.[64]

On September 9, 2024, the Supreme Court ruled against the constitutionality of the inclusion of Sulu in BARMM due to the simple majority of residents voting against the province's inclusion in the region during the 2019 Bangsamoro autonomy plebiscite.[65] The status of which administrative region Sulu belongs to is unclear although the Commission on Elections en banc had the consensus that Sulu should revert to the Zamboanga Peninsula, the region it belonged to prior its inclusion in the ARMM back in 1989.[66][67][68]

Administrative divisions

[edit]

Provinces

[edit]

Bangsamoro consists of 5 provinces, 3 component cities, 105 municipalities and 2,135 barangays. The city of Isabela, despite being part of Basilan, is not under the administrative jurisdiction of the autonomous region. Likewise, 63 barangays in North Cotabato also are part of Bangsamoro as the Special Geographic Area (SGA), despite North Cotabato and their respective parent municipalities not being under the administrative jurisdiction of the autonomous region.[69] The barangays were reconstituted into eight municipalities following a plebiscite on April 13, 2024.[70]

Additionally Sulu province was de facto part of Bangsamoro from 2019 to 2024.

Administrative divisions of Bangsamoro
  •  †  Regional center
Province Capital Population (2020)A Area[71] Density Cities Muni. Bgy.
km2 sq mi /km2 /sq mi
Basilan Lamitan 10.8% 426,207 1,103.50 426.06 390 1,000 1 11 165
Lanao del Sur Marawi 30.3% 1,195,518 3,872.89 1,495.33 310 800 1 39 1,159
Maguindanao del Norte Datu Odin Sinsuat 23.9% 943,500 3,988.82 1,540.09 240 620 1 12 258
Maguindanao del Sur Buluan 18.8% 741,221 4,973.48 1,920.27 150 390 0 24 287
Tawi-Tawi Bongao 11.2% 440,276 1,087.40 419.85 400 1,000 0 11 203
Special Geographic Area † — 5.5% 215,433 824.31 318.27 260 670 0 8 63
Total 3,944,692 11,935.7 4,608.40 330 850 3 105 2,135
  • Figures for Basilan exclude the component city of Isabela, which is under the administration of Region IX.
  • Figures for Maguindanao del Norte include the independent component city of Cotabato.

 †  63 barangays of Cotabato province are part of the region.

^A The Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) used the scope of the former Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao as its geographic reference for the 2020 census when it was released on July 7, 2021. Cotabato City and the Special Geographic Area were then not included its population count for Bangsamoro. Statistics for said localities were included in the PSA's count for Soccsksargen.[5][6] On November 9, 2021, as per PSA Board Resolution No. 13 Series of 2021, Cotabato City and the Special Geographic Area were included in its population count for Bangsamoro and removed from Soccsksargen.[7][8]

Governors and vice governors

[edit]
Province Governor Political party Vice Governor
Basilan
 Mujiv S. Hataman BUP Hadjiman S. Hataman Salliman
Lanao del Sur
 Mamintal Adiong Lakas Mohammad Khalid Adiong
Maguindanao del Norte
 Tucao O. Mastura PFP Datu Marshall I. Sinsuat
Maguindanao del Sur
 Ali M. Midtimbang PFP Hisham S. Nando
Tawi-Tawi
 Yshmael Sali PFP Al-Syed Abdulla Sali

Demographics

[edit]
Marawi Grand Mosque

As per the organic law, the people "at the advent of the Spanish colonization, were considered natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago and its adjacent islands, shall have the right to identify themselves, their spouses and descendants" as part of the Bangsamoro people.[72]

The Moro people are an umbrella term for ethnic groups who are mainly Muslim. The Maranaos and Iranun form a large portion of the region's population. The Maguindanaons are the primary population in the Bangsamoro's Special Geographic Area in the Soccsksargen region province of Cotabato. The Tausūg, Yakan and Sama peoples are the main groups in the Sulu archipelago.[73]

There are two other main minority groups which lives in the region among the Moros; the Lumad and the settler communities. There are five main groups under the Lumads, the largest of which are the Teduray.[72] The settlers are primarily Christian which includes various ethnic groups such as the Tagalog, the Ilocanos, the Visayans, the Zamboangueños, and the Chinese.[72][74]

Population census of Bangsamoro
YearPop.±% p.a.
1918 308,024—    
1939 517,695+2.50%
1948 677,520+3.03%
1960 1,167,928+4.64%
1970 1,466,414+2.30%
1975 1,484,424+0.25%
1980 1,648,272+2.12%
1990 2,234,781+3.09%
1995 2,509,079+2.19%
2000 2,966,894+3.66%
2007 4,379,948+5.52%
2010 3,527,926−7.57%
2015 4,080,825+2.81%
2020 4,944,800+4.12%
2024 5,691,583+3.43%
Source: Philippine Statistics Authority[75][76][77][78][79][7]

Languages

[edit]

The Moro and Lumad speak their native languages. Non-native languages spoken are Ilocano, Chabacano, Hiligaynon, Cebuano, and Tagalog, of which the latter two serve as lingua francas. This is the case for Cebuano because of the mass arrival of Cebuano settlers to Mindanao. Tausug are at ease in speaking Cebuano, because both Tausug and Cebuano are Visayan languages. Chabacano may be the lingua franca of the natives in Sulu Archipelago, along with Tagalog, but it is the main lingua franca in Basilan. Many locals and barter traders in Sulu Archipelago can also speak Sabah Malay (see Malay language in the Philippines).

Government

[edit]
Main article: Bangsamoro Transition Authority

Between the ratification of the BOL and the inauguration of its first permanent government in 2025, the BTA will head the region. After the ratification of the BOL, the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC) begins to transition the ARMM into the BARMM.

Organizational structure

[edit]
Chief Minister Murad Ebrahim

Based on the organic law, the autonomous Bangsamoro government system is parliamentary-democratic, similar to that practiced in the United Kingdom, a Westminster system which is based on a political party system.[80]

Ceremonial

[edit]

The ceremonial head of the region is the wa'lī. The Bangsamoro Parliament selects and appoints the wa'lī. The wa'lī has ceremonial functions and powers such as moral guardianship of the territory and convocation and dissolution of the legislature.[81]

Executive

[edit]

The regional government is headed by a chief minister. Murad Ebrahim is the current chief minister, who was appointed by the former Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte, on an interim basis. The interim chief minister is also the head of the BTA, which also serves the function of serving as the transitional Bangsamoro Parliament.

Once the first regular session of the Bangsamoro Parliament is organized come 2025, the chief minister will be elected by the members of the Bangsamoro Parliament from the majority party or coalition holding the most seats won. The chief minister of the Bangsamoro is the chief executive of the regional government and is assisted by a cabinet having a minimum of 10 ministers and two deputy chief ministers. The holder of this position appoints the members of the cabinet, subject to confirmation by Parliament. The chief minister has control of all the regional executive commissions, agencies, boards, bureaus, and offices.

Cabinet
The Bangsamoro Cabinet is composed of two deputy chief ministers and ministers, all appointed among members of the parliament. The deputy chief ministers are selected through nomination of the chief minister and are elected by the members of the Parliament. The ministers in the cabinet on their part are appointed by the chief minister.[82]

Council of Leaders
The Council of Leaders advises the chief minister on matters of governance of the autonomous region. It is roughly an equivalent of an unelected Senate, though only advisory, without legislative powers, and not part of the Parliament.[82]

Legislative

[edit]
The Bangsamoro Parliament in session.

Under the BOL, the Bangsamoro Parliament serves as the legislature of the autonomous region, mandated to have 80 deputies and is led by the speaker. The wa'lī, a ceremonial head, could dissolve the parliament at his discretion.

Regional ordinances are created by the Bangsamoro Parliament, composed of members of Parliament. Members are meant to be elected by direct vote. Regional elections are planned to be held one year after general elections (national and local) depending on legislation from Congress. The first Bangsamoro regional elections are to be held in 2025. Regional officials have a fixed term of three years, which can be extended by an act of Congress.

Under the BOL, the BTA was organized as a transitional body pending the election of the new region's government officials in 2025, with the first regular session of the parliament to be held in 2025 following the elections.[citation needed]

Judiciary

[edit]
See also: Shari'ah in the Philippines § Organization

The Bangsamoro Autonomous Region has its own regional justice system which applies Shari'ah to its residents like its predecessor, the ARMM. Unlike its predecessor though, the BOL, which became effective as of August 10, 2018,[83] has a provision for the creation of a Shari'ah High Court, which, if and when realized, would consist of five justices including a presiding justice and would oversee appellate courts, district courts, and circuit courts. Non-Muslims could also volunteer to submit themselves under the jurisdiction of Shari'ah law. The Bangsamoro justice system also recognizes traditional or tribal laws but these would only apply to disputes of indigenous peoples within the region.[84]

Relation to the central government

[edit]

The Bangsamoro Organic Law provides that BARMM "shall remain an integral and inseparable part of the national territory of the Republic." The Philippine president exercises general supervision over the regional chief minister. The regional government has fiscal autonomy or the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges, subject to Constitutional provisions and the provisions of Republic Act 11054. The regional government has to gain approval from the central government's Department of Finance to receive donations and grants from foreign entities.[85]

Economy

[edit]
Port of Polloc in Parang, Maguindanao del Norte

Poverty incidence of Bangsamoro

10
20
30
40
50
60
70
2000
66.59
2003
52.80
2006
47.14
2009
47.45
2012
55.82
2015
59.39
2018
61.82
2021
29.80

Source: Philippine Statistics Authority[86][87][88][89][90][91][92][93]

Before the various successes in the Bangsamoro peace processes, economic development in the region had been described as seeing "decades of sluggish economic growth,"[94] with much economic activity coming from the informal sector - effectively "shadow economies" which were identified as drivers of conflict.[95]

Three years after the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro and in anticipation of the passage of the Bangsamoro Organic Law, economic growth in the Bangsamoro began to see rapid expansion beginning in 2017.[94]

In 2021, the BARMM recorded regional growth rate of 7.5%, exceeding its pre-pandemic gross domestic product levels, and making it the 2nd fastest growing region in the Philippines for that year.[96] That same year, the Philippine Statistics Authority praised the region for its reduction in poverty incidence citing a 17.4 percent reduction among Philippine regions. The PSA noted that infrastructure projects and peace deals had a significant impact.[97]

Education

[edit]

The government provides free education at the primary (grade school) and secondary (high school) levels. Some state-run universities / colleges in the region are the Mindanao State University - Marawi (MSU-Marawi), Mindanao State University - Lanao National College of Arts and Trades (MSU-LNCAT), Mindanao State University - Maguindanao (MSU-Maguindanao), Mindanao State University - Tawi-Tawi College of Technology and Oceanography (MSU-TCTO), Basilan State College (BasSC), Tawi-Tawi Regional Agricultural College (TRAC), Adiong Memorial State College (AMSC) and Cotabato State University (CotSU). Private universities / colleges in Bangsamoro region include Notre Dame University (NDU), Sultan Kudarat Islamic Academy Foundation College (SKIAFC), Philippine Muslim Teachers' College (PMTC), Jamiatul Philippine al-Islamia (JPI), Jamiatu Muslim Mindanao (JMM), STI College - Cotabato and AMA Computer University - Cotabato.

Culture

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Main articles: Music of the Philippines, Kulintang, List of Cultural Properties of the Philippines in Bangsamoro, List of mosques in the Philippines, and Spanish Colonial Fortifications of the Philippines
The Shariff Kabunsuan Cultural Complex
Tausug dancers
Guinakit Fluvial Parade as part of the Shariff Kabunsuan Festival celebrations.
Kuyog Street Dancing Competition, Cotabato City

The people of the Bangsamoro region, including Muslims, Lumads, and Christians, have a culture that revolves around kulintang music, a specific type of gong music, found among both Muslim and non-Muslim groups of the Southern Philippines. Each ethnic group in BARMM also has their own distinct architectures, intangible heritage, and craft arts.[98][99] A fine example of a distinct architectural style in the region is the Royal Sulu architecture which was used to make the Daru Jambangan (Palace of Flowers) in Maimbung, Sulu. The palace was demolished during the American period after being heavily damaged by a typhoon in 1932, and was never rebuilt.[100][101] It used to be the largest royal palace built in the Philippines. A campaign to faithfully re-establish it in Maimbung town has been ongoing since 1933. A very small replica of the palace was made in a nearby town in the 2010s, but it was noted that the replica does not mean that the campaign to reconstruct the palace in Maimbung has stopped as the replica does not manifest the true essence of a Sulu royal palace. In 2013, Maimbung was designated as the royal capital of the former Sultanate of Sulu by one of the family claimants to the Sulu Sultanate throne where the pretenders are buried there.[clarification needed][102][103]

Natural heritage

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The region possesses a vast array of natural landscapes and seascapes with different types of environs. The mainland area includes the Liguasan Marsh, a proposed UNESCO tentative site, and Lake Lanao, one of the 17 most ancient lakes in the world. The Sulu archipelago region includes the Turtle Islands Wildlife Sanctuary (a UNESCO tentative site), Bongao Peak, and the Basilan Rainforest.

Notable people

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See also

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Notes

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Bangsamoro

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The Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) is an autonomous political entity within the , encompassing the provinces of , , , , and , as well as the independent cities of and Isabela, covering approximately 12,000 to 36,000 square kilometers of territory in southern and parts of the , with a exceeding 4 million predominantly ethnic Moro . Established by Republic Act No. 11054, the , signed into effect in July 2018 and ratified via plebiscites in January and February 2019, BARMM replaced the earlier to provide expanded self-rule following the 2014 between the Philippine government and the . Governed initially by a transitional authority dominated by former members under Ahod "Al-Hadj , BARMM exercises powers over education, health, agriculture, and local governance, while sharing fiscal responsibilities with the national government, including a and revenue-sharing mechanisms. The region's creation stems from centuries of Moro resistance to external domination—beginning with Spanish colonization in the 16th century, continuing under American rule, and intensifying post-independence amid perceived cultural erasure and economic neglect—which fueled insurgencies by groups like the and , resulting in over 120,000 deaths and displacing millions before peace accords shifted toward autonomy rather than secession. Despite these advances, BARMM faces persistent challenges, including the highest poverty incidence in the at around 71% in some areas, reliance on and fisheries amid underinvestment in , and ongoing issues from clan feuds (rido) and splinter insurgent factions, though the has demobilized thousands of combatants and initiated normalization programs. Economic growth averaged 4-6% annually post-establishment, driven by services and consumption, but remains low at roughly 57,000 pesos, underscoring the need for diversification beyond subsistence farming and fisheries. The Supreme Court's 2024 ruling excluding Sulu province highlighted territorial disputes, reflecting incomplete consensus among Moro factions.

Etymology

Origins and Meaning

The term "Bangsamoro" combines "bangsa," an old Malay word denoting "," "race," or "people," with "Moro," the Spanish colonial label for . This yields a meaning of "Moro " or " of Moros," conceptualizing a distinct ethno-national identity for indigenous Muslim groups in the southern . The "Moro" component derives from the Spanish "Moro," itself from "Moor," referring to Muslim inhabitants of the and who resisted Christian reconquest. Spanish colonizers applied it in the to Filipino who similarly rejected conversion and maintained sultanate-based polities, framing the identity in terms of localized defiance against imperial imposition rather than transnational Islamic solidarity. Though the "Moro" label carried pejorative connotations during colonial eras, it was reclaimed in the 1970s by the to assert collective , transforming it into a marker of unified political aspiration distinct from earlier fragmented identities. This usage elevated "Bangsamoro" as a for a cohesive national claim, diverging from pre-modern connotations tied solely to religious adherence or anti-colonial holdouts.

Geography

Physical Features and Natural Resources

The Bangsamoro region encompasses a varied tropical terrain, including rugged mountainous interiors, narrow coastal lowlands, and extensive island chains in the Sulu Archipelago. Mainland areas feature rolling to steep slopes, with significant elevations supporting diverse ecosystems, while coastal strips provide flat lands suitable for settlements and ports. Key water bodies include Lake Lanao, Mindanao's largest lake at 340 square kilometers, located in Lanao del Sur province, and the vast Ligawasan Marsh, spanning approximately 2,200 square kilometers across multiple provinces as the island's largest wetland complex. The region's climate is tropical, characterized by high temperatures, humidity, and seasonal rainfall, rendering it vulnerable to hydrometeorological hazards such as floods, landslides, and occasional typhoons despite Mindanao's relative shelter from the most intense Pacific storms. Seismic activity poses additional risks due to the Philippines' position on the Pacific Ring of Fire, with earthquakes capable of triggering secondary disasters in the steep terrain. Biodiversity hotspots, particularly in the Sulu Archipelago, host unique flora and fauna, including endemic species like the Sulu hornbill, though conflict has contributed to reduced species richness and forest cover in affected areas. Natural resources abound, with rich fisheries in surrounding seas, rivers, and lakes supporting extensive aquatic yields, alongside agricultural potential in fertile lowlands and forests covering portions of the 4.2 million hectares of land area. Timber resources from forested regions offer economic value, while untapped minerals and potential deposits, such as in the Ligawasan Marsh, indicate further endowments, though extraction remains limited. opportunities exist from river systems and elevation gradients, but challenges like and have degraded forest cover and ecosystem services.

Administrative Divisions

The Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) encompasses five provinces—, , , , and —three cities (, , and ), 116 municipalities, and the (SGA). These divisions were ratified through plebiscites following the Bangsamoro Organic Law's enactment in 2019, with Maguindanao subdivided into del Norte and del Sur in 2022. The SGA consists of eight municipalities—Nabalawag, Old , Tungawan, , Upper Silway, Dahig, , and Pahamuddin—established in May 2024 from 63 barangays in province that voted to join BARMM via a 2022 plebiscite, covering approximately 824 square kilometers. Provincial governance in BARMM follows a structure akin to other Philippine provinces, with each headed by an elected as chief executive, responsible for local administration, public services, infrastructure, and enforcement of laws in coordination with the regional government. Vice governors oversee the (provincial councils), which legislate on local matters and approve budgets. The Bangsamoro Local Government Code integrates these units into the regional framework, devolving certain powers while ensuring alignment with BARMM policies on fiscal autonomy, integration, and intergovernmental relations. Sulu's exclusion, affirmed by the in September 2024 after its 2022 plebiscite rejection, reduced BARMM's territorial extent and prompted recalibrations for the May 2025 regional and local elections, including adjusted voter rolls and district configurations excluding Sulu's 24 municipalities. This ruling upheld constitutional requirements for plebiscite-based inclusion, preserving the region's focus on ratified areas.

History

Pre-Colonial Era and Islamization

Prior to the arrival of , the regions encompassing modern were inhabited by diverse Austronesian ethnolinguistic groups, including ancestors of the Tausug, Maranao, and peoples, organized in decentralized units centered on kinship and local datus. These societies sustained economies through swidden , rice cultivation, , and inter-island trade networks extending to , the , and beyond, exchanging goods such as abaca, gold, and marine products for ceramics, textiles, and spices. Social structures emphasized communal labor and fluid alliances, with conflicts often arising from resource disputes rather than unified polities. Islam reached the and in the late 13th to early 14th centuries via maritime traders from the , , and the , who established settlements and intermarried with local elites. Karim ul-Makhdum, an Arab missionary, arrived around 1380 and constructed the first on Jolo Island, marking an early foothold for Islamic propagation through commerce rather than conquest. This process accelerated with the founding of the Sulu Sultanate in 1405 by Sharif ul-Hashim, a Johor-born scholar who unified local datus under Islamic governance focused on controlling trade routes for pearls, bird's nests, and slaves. Subsequent sultanates, such as the Sultanate established around 1515 by , emerged independently on the mainland, prioritizing economic ties with Southeast Asian ports over ideological unity. These polities remained fragmented, with identities tied to specific ethnic groups like the Tausug in or Maranao in Lanao, rather than a cohesive "Moro" ; intertribal warfare and shifting alliances, often over and tribute, were commonplace, undermining any centralized . Islamization proceeded gradually, blending with pre-existing animist practices and serving primarily to legitimize rule and facilitate trade, not as a prelude to expansive .

Colonial Domination and Resistance

Spanish attempts to dominate Moro territories commenced with the arrival of Miguel López de Legazpi in Cebu in 1565, but effective control over Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago eluded them for over three centuries. Despite launching numerous expeditions and establishing fortified outposts, such as Fort Pilar in Zamboanga in 1635, the Spanish military repeatedly failed to subdue the independent Sultanates of Maguindanao and Sulu, which mounted fierce guerrilla resistance and exploited their naval prowess for hit-and-run tactics. Moro forces conducted extensive slave raids on Christianized coastal regions in the Visayas and Luzon, capturing an estimated tens of thousands of individuals between the 16th and 19th centuries for domestic labor and export to regional traders, thereby sustaining their economies and challenging Spanish demographic expansion. Although intermittent tribute systems were imposed—such as annual payments from the Sulu Sultanate following naval blockades—these arrangements proved unstable and did little to foster assimilation, as Moro societies preserved their Islamic governance, trade networks, and cultural autonomy. The American assumption of Philippine sovereignty after the 1898 Treaty of Paris shifted the dynamics of Moro resistance, prompting a more systematic pacification effort from to under the Department of and , later formalized as the in 1903. U.S. forces, led by figures like , employed superior firepower—including artillery and Thompson submachine guns in later stages—to dismantle fortified strongholds, resulting in decisive victories at sites like on March 7-8, 1906, where approximately 900-1,000 Moros were killed, and Bud Bagsak on June 15, , marking the effective end of organized opposition. Parallel to military campaigns, American administrators invested in , constructing over 300 kilometers of roads and numerous systems by , alongside establishing public schools that enrolled thousands of Moro children in secular curricula emphasizing English and American civics, which curtailed and slave trading that had plagued regional commerce. However, the overlay of uniform civil codes and property laws supplanted traditional authority and Sharia-based , eliciting Moro grievances over the erosion of customary practices and social hierarchies. Both colonial powers' incursions exacted a heavy toll through direct warfare, introduced epidemics, and disrupted trade, contributing to localized population declines among Moro communities amid broader Philippine demographic collapses estimated at 50-90% in early Spanish contact zones due to factors like and famines. These hardships, juxtaposed with the Moros' sustained independence relative to northern , cultivated enduring narratives of dispossession, though historical resistance patterns indicate a pragmatic defense of , structures, and resource access rather than ideological quests for separation from non-Moro kin.

Post-Independence Marginalization

Following Philippine independence on July 4, 1946, the Moro population in and was formally integrated as equal citizens under the new republic's , which promised equal rights and representation without explicit recognition of their distinct cultural or systems. However, central government initiatives, continuing pre-independence resettlement patterns, prioritized national development through sponsored migration of Christian lowlanders from and the to sparsely populated regions traditionally used by under communal or ancestral claims rather than formal titles. These policies, including expanded under the National Land Settlement Administration established in 1939 and amplified post-1946, allocated up to 24 hectares per settler family, often on lands overlapping Moro kaingin (swidden) farming areas, leading to displacement and internal migrations among Muslim communities as they lost access to arable plots without compensation or consultation. By the and , this influx accelerated demographic shifts, with Christian settlers comprising approximately 24% of Mindanao's by 1939—rising to over 67% by 1970—diluting Moro control over land from a pre-war (around 60% effective usage in key areas) to roughly 20% registered ownership by the mid-1970s amid titling biases favoring newcomers with documentation. Economic neglect compounded this, as Manila's focus on industrializing northern islands left southern underdeveloped; for instance, in Moro- provinces lagged 30-50% behind national averages by 1960, with limited investment in or tailored to local agro-pastoral economies. Such disparities stemmed less from deliberate ethnic targeting than from bureaucratic oversight of Moro customary and a developmentalist ethos viewing Mindanao as a "frontier" for surplus relief, fostering resentment without immediate unified Moro pushback. Internally, Moro society fragmented along clan lines, where traditional datus and sultans retained influence through patronage networks rather than emerging pan-Moro institutions, perpetuating rido—inter-clan blood feuds over honor, resources, or slights that dated to pre-colonial eras but intensified amid land pressures. These feuds, often resolving only via protracted mediation or blood money (diwata), diverted energies from collective advocacy; for example, elite capture of nascent political quotas under the 1940s Commission on National Integration allowed clan leaders to monopolize local patronage, prioritizing familial vendettas over broader territorial claims. This clan-centric power structure, rooted in maraboutic alliances rather than ethnic solidarity, hindered proto-nationalist cohesion until external shocks in the late 1960s, underscoring how endogenous divisions amplified Manila's benign neglect into de facto marginalization.

Rise of the Moro Insurgency

The Jabidah Massacre, occurring on March 18, 1968, on Corregidor Island, involved the killing of an estimated 11 to 64 Moro recruits during a botched military training exercise for a covert operation to infiltrate Sabah, Malaysia, after some mutinied upon discovering the mission's true intent. While Moro nationalist narratives portray it as a pivotal atrocity sparking widespread resistance against perceived genocide, contemporary accounts and later analyses question the event's scale and orchestration, suggesting elements of exaggeration to mobilize support amid existing grievances over land resettlement and economic exclusion. This incident contributed to the formalization of organized Moro resistance through the (MNLF), founded in 1972 by and other exiles in , which framed its campaign as a secular nationalist struggle for an independent Bangsamoro republic. Libyan government funding and arms, provided from 1971 to 1976 under Muammar Gaddafi's influence and belief in Philippine anti-Muslim policies, enabled the MNLF's early operations, though such external patronage also reflected opportunistic alignment with pan-Islamic agendas rather than purely endogenous Moro aspirations. Internal drivers included disruptions to traditional Moro-controlled networks in the , exacerbated by Philippine territorial claims, which incentivized armed groups to reclaim economic control under the guise of . By the late 1970s, the MNLF's insurgency had escalated into widespread clashes with Philippine forces under , but factionalism emerged as ideological rifts deepened. In 1984, the (MILF) splintered from the MNLF under , criticizing Misuari's secular leanings and willingness to negotiate autonomy short of independence, instead emphasizing stricter Islamic governance and forging ties to transnational Islamist networks for ideological and material support. This shift aligned the MILF with groups advocating jihadist elements, though empirical patterns of violence—totaling approximately 120,000 deaths from the 1970s through the 2000s—reveal that a significant portion stemmed from intra-Moro feuds (rido) and inter-factional rivalries rather than solely anti-state , undermining claims of unified Moro . Sustaining the through the 1980s were economies centered on rackets, for —often targeting civilians and foreigners—and control of illicit trades like and , which provided revenue streams independent of popular Moro backing for self-rule. These opportunistic dynamics, amplified by foreign funding, perpetuated conflict cycles more than principled ideological commitment, as groups profited from perpetual instability while ideological rhetoric masked personal and factional power consolidation.

Peace Processes and Failed Agreements

The (MNLF), founded in 1972, engaged in initial peace negotiations with the Philippine government mediated by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), culminating in the Tripoli Agreement signed on December 23, 1976. This accord outlined autonomy for 13 provinces and two cities in and , including provisions for an autonomous government with legislative, executive, and judicial powers, while recognizing Islamic institutions and law. However, implementation collapsed by 1977 due to disputes over territorial scope—President proposed only 10 provinces, which the MNLF rejected as insufficient—and underlying tensions over the MNLF's secular orientation clashing with demands for Islamic governance, leading to renewed hostilities and the emergence of the more Islamist (MILF) as a splinter group. The agreement's failure highlighted maximalist insurgent demands for expansive self-rule that exceeded constitutional limits, compounded by government reluctance to cede significant control without broader consensus. Subsequent talks with the MNLF under President Fidel Ramos produced the 1996 Peace Agreement, signed on September 2 in and facilitated by the OIC, which expanded the (ARMM) to include five provinces and established the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development. Intended to integrate MNLF fighters into structures and devolve powers, the accord faltered in execution due to implementation gaps, including limited territorial inclusion and failure to deliver promised , while ARMM governance became synonymous with and clan-based patronage. Despite receiving billions in internal revenue allotments and —estimated at over PHP 50 billion annually by the —ARMM's incidence rose to 60.1% in 2012 from 47.4% in 2006, reflecting funds squandered on graft rather than or services. The Philippine under President Benigno Aquino III later deemed ARMM a "failed experiment" in 2011, citing pervasive that undermined trust and perpetuated marginalization. Parallel negotiations with the , which had grown dominant after the MNLF's partial integration, spanned the 2000s under Presidents and Ramos's frameworks but repeatedly stalled over territorial and governance ambitions. A key setback occurred with the Memorandum of Agreement on (MOA-AD), initialed on July 27, 2008, which proposed a Bangsamoro encompassing expanded claims across 712 barangays and asymmetric governance structures. The Philippine voided the MOA-AD on October 14, 2008, ruling it unconstitutional for usurping Congress's constituent powers to define territory and domain without , and for binding future governments to unratified terms. This rejection, amid MILF demands for de jure recognition of Moro sovereignty elements, triggered clashes killing hundreds and exposed irreconcilable gaps between insurgent maximalism—seeking sub-state status akin to —and Manila's adherence to unitary constitutional bounds. Overall, these processes from the to faltered due to insurgent insistence on expansive concessions often verging on secessionist ideals, coupled with governmental implementation shortfalls and judicial safeguards preserving national integrity.

Formation of BARMM and Transition Challenges

The (Republic Act No. 11054) was signed into law by President on July 27, 2018, establishing the framework for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) to replace the (ARMM). The law was ratified through plebiscites held on January 21, 2019, in the ARMM provinces, , and Isabela City, with approval by a majority vote initiating the transition period. The BARMM transition commenced immediately upon ratification, with the (BTA)—an interim 80-member body dominated by (MILF) representatives—assuming governance responsibilities, led by Ahod "Murad" Ebrahim from the MILF. Subsequent plebiscites on September 17 and November 6, 2022, approved the creation of BARMM's internal administrative divisions, including the splitting of Maguindanao into and , but excluded Sulu province following its rejection of the in the 2019 plebiscite and subsequent affirmation of its non-inclusion. This exclusion stemmed from Sulu voters' majority "no" vote in the initial ratification, preserving the province's alignment with Region IX () rather than BARMM. Transition challenges intensified with stalled normalization efforts, including incomplete decommissioning of MILF combatants and arms, where only partial phases were executed by mid-2024, with the final phase involving approximately 14,000 remaining fighters and 2,450 weapons deferred by the MILF amid political tensions. The Supreme Court ruled on October 1, 2025, that BARMM's parliamentary elections scheduled for October 13, 2025, could not proceed due to unconstitutional districting laws violating the Organic Law's requirements, postponing polls to no later than March 31, 2026, and extending the BTA's interim rule. This delay exacerbated empirical hurdles, as election-related violence surged, with monitors reporting a worrying spike in clashes and over 700 incidents linked to political rivalries in the lead-up to the intended vote. Underlying these issues, local conflicts in BARMM have persisted more as clan-based feuds (rido) driven by familial vendettas and resource disputes than ideological insurgencies, complicating normalization by prioritizing parochial loyalties over unified Moro goals. Such dynamics have vetoed broader ideological progress, as entrenched clans leverage private groups to influence transitions, hindering the full disbandment of forces and integration into state structures as mandated by the agreement.

Demographics

Population Composition and Ethnic Groups

The Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) recorded a population of 4,404,288 in the 2020 of Population and Housing conducted by the . This figure reflects a diverse ethnic composition dominated by Moro Muslim ethnolinguistic groups, which lack a unified identity and are instead fragmented along subgroup lines shaped by distinct languages, territorial bases, and historical polities. The three largest such groups—Maguindanaon, Maranao, and Tausug—collectively comprise over 70% of the Moro , with Maguindanaon speakers numbering around 1.3 million primarily in central provinces, Maranao speakers about 1.2 million concentrated in , and Tausug speakers predominant in . Smaller Moro subgroups include the Iranun, , Yakan, and Jama Mapun, each with localized distributions and cultural variations that have historically fueled inter-group rivalries rather than cohesion. Non-Moro elements add further diversity, encompassing indigenous peoples such as the Teduray, Lambangian, and Manobo, alongside Christian migrants of Cebuano and Hiligaynon descent who settled during the under government resettlement programs. These non-Moro groups, while a minority, are unevenly distributed, often in upland or frontier areas, contributing to ethnic tensions over land and resources. High fertility sustains rapid growth, with BARMM's at 3.1 children per woman as of recent surveys—elevated compared to the national average of 1.9—exacerbating pressures on , , and amid limited infrastructure. distribution features stark urban-rural divides, with over 70% rural residency per census patterns, though urban hubs like and draw internal migrants seeking opportunities, reversing some historical outflows tied to insecurity.

Religious Dynamics

Islam predominates in Bangsamoro, with the vast majority of its inhabitants adhering to under the of , a rooted in the religion's arrival via and Malay traders starting in the . This shapes orthodox legal and ritual practices, emphasizing interpretations adapted to Southeast Asian contexts. Pre-modern Islamization involved syncretic fusions, where incoming doctrines merged with indigenous animist beliefs, Hindu-Buddhist influences, and local folk traditions, resulting in hybridized rituals, spirit veneration alongside , and sultanate customs that blended shar'ia with . Such elements persisted in rural and tribal settings, tempering purist orthodoxy with pragmatic accommodations to pre-Islamic cosmologies. Politicized extremism diverges from this mainstream, with radical strains amplified by transnational jihadist networks. The Group, originating as a splinter from Moro fronts in the , forged operational alliances with , receiving training and funding that imported Salafi-jihadist tactics into local insurgencies. By 2014, ASG factions pledged to ISIS, enabling recruitment of foreign fighters and ideological propagation via propaganda videos and networks. The (), while pursuing ethno-nationalist autonomy over global aims, has seen defections to extremists; groups like Maute, comprising ex- combatants, embraced doctrine, culminating in the 2017 Marawi occupation where they hoisted black flags and enforced punishments. These ties underscore causal pathways from peripheral grievances to ideologically driven violence, distinct from routine Shafi'i observance. Religious identity in Bangsamoro intertwines with ethnopolitical and tribal structures, where unity often yields to clan-based loyalties, as seen in identity surveys revealing superordinate "Bangsamoro" affiliations competing against subgroup fissures. This dynamic prioritizes kinship networks in social cohesion and , subordinating doctrinal uniformity to pragmatic tribal .

Linguistic Diversity

The Bangsamoro region features extensive linguistic diversity, with over a dozen indigenous languages tied to its Moro ethno-linguistic groups, including Maguindanaon, Maranao, Tausug, Yakan, Iranun, and various Sama-Bajaw dialects. These languages, primarily Austronesian in origin, reflect the historical settlement patterns of distinct Moro subgroups across provinces like , , , and . English, Filipino (Tagalog-based), and Arabic serve as official languages under the Bangsamoro Organic Law framework, with Arabic emphasized for Islamic contexts and English for administration. However, penetration of these languages remains limited in rural and clan-based settings, where indigenous tongues dominate daily interactions and local governance. This diversity fosters fragmentation rather than cohesion, as no bridges the major language groups, complicating unified identity formation and inter-ethnic coordination. Dialectal variations within groups, such as sub-dialects of Maguindanaon or Tausug, further impede administrative efficiency, necessitating translation efforts for laws, signage, and services to ensure accessibility across linguistic divides.

Government and Governance

Constitutional Framework and Autonomy Limits

The Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) operates under the framework of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, particularly Article X, Sections 15 to 21, which authorize the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao to address historical demands for self-governance while preserving national unity. The Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL), Republic Act No. 11054, enacted on July 27, 2018, and ratified via plebiscite on January 21, 2019, serves as the organic act establishing BARMM, granting it asymmetrical autonomy distinct from other regions like the Cordillera Administrative Region. This asymmetry includes a parliamentary system and authority over sectors such as education, local governance, and natural resources, encompassing approximately 55 specified powers, but subordinated to the national government's residual authority on matters like defense, foreign policy, and monetary standards. BARMM's autonomy is constrained by fiscal mechanisms that perpetuate dependency on , with the Annual Block Grant (ABG) constituting the primary funding source—equivalent to 5% of national internal revenue collections from the second preceding , totaling PHP 337.53 billion from 2020 to 2024. This , disbursed directly by the national government, covers over 90% of BARMM's operational budget in practice, limiting independent revenue generation despite provisions for taxation and resource sharing, as regional collections remain minimal compared to national allocations. Such dependency enables central oversight, including conditional releases tied to metrics, undermining claims of full fiscal . The BOL's delineation of powers contains ambiguities that facilitate national override, particularly in security and normalization processes, where national laws supersede regional enactments in conflicts of interest, allowing presidential intervention to safeguard sovereignty. Unlike symmetrically devolved units, BARMM's permits de facto tolerance of private armed groups (PAGs) affiliated with s and remnants, as decommissioning efforts under the law have progressed unevenly, with normalization tracks failing to fully disband non-MILF combatants despite mandates for their integration or dissolution. This persistence reflects causal gaps in enforcement, where vague transitional provisions prioritize political stability over strict , contrasting with stricter national prohibitions on armed formations elsewhere in the . Empirical outcomes, including ongoing clan feuds and incomplete transitions, underscore how these limits preserve central leverage amid incomplete .

Organizational Structure

The executive branch of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) is headed by the , who exercises executive authority and nominates cabinet members subject to confirmation by the . The is elected by a majority vote of Parliament members from among themselves, with up to two Chief Ministers also elected to assist in governance. As of October 2025, Interim Chief Minister Abdulraof Macacua, chief of staff of the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces affiliated with the (), holds the position following the March 2025 replacement of previous Chief Minister Ahod "Al Haj Murad" Ebrahim, the chairman. This leadership reflects the 's entrenched role in BARMM's interim governance, stemming from the 2014 peace agreement that positioned the group to lead the transition. Legislative power resides in the unicameral , composed of 80 members during the transitional phase under the (BTA). The intended structure allocates approximately 40 seats to representatives via party-list elections, up to 32 to single-member districts, and the remainder to sectoral and reserved representatives including , settlers, and women. All current BTA Parliament members were appointed by the Philippine President, with nominees dominating appointments to ensure the group's oversight during the transition. In March 2025 reappointments for the third BTA iteration, 58 of the 80 seats were retained from prior members, preserving MILF-aligned control amid delays in full elections. The judicial system operates in parallel, integrating Shari'ah courts for personal, family, and property disputes among with regular courts for other matters, all under the supervision of the Philippine . BARMM exercises administrative control over Shari'ah courts, including Shari'ah District Courts and Circuit Courts staffed by qualified Muslim jurists, as outlined in Republic Act No. 11054 (). During the BTA period, judicial appointments and operations remain interim, with the regional government advancing Shari'ah modules and infrastructure to strengthen the system, though full is constrained by national oversight. This structure underscores influence, as transitional appointments prioritize former insurgent leaders in key judicial roles to align with peace accord commitments.

Electoral System and Political Transitions

The Bangsamoro Parliament's electoral system combines district-based and elements, allocating 40 seats through single non-transferable votes in parliamentary districts and 40 seats via to reflect broader sectoral and party support. This framework, outlined in the (Republic Act No. 11054), aims to ensure representation for (MILF) affiliates alongside other groups, with the United Bangsamoro Justice Party—closely tied to the MILF—positioned to secure a substantial share of proportional seats due to its organizational reach and interim dominance. Implementation has faced repeated delays, underscoring the system's fragility; initial polls planned for 2022 were postponed to align with national elections, but on October 1, 2025, the Philippine declared Bangsamoro Autonomy Acts 58 and 77—governing district reapportionment—unconstitutional for violating equal protection and locality requirements, nullifying preparations for the , 2025, vote and extending the transition period with elections now mandated no later than , 2026. This third deferral, following legislative gridlock and legal challenges, risks eroding public trust in the transition from the interim —led by figures since 2019—to a fully elected government. Potential fragmentation looms from Sulu province's exclusion, ratified by a 54.5% rejection in the 2019 plebiscite and affirmed by the Supreme Court's September 2024 ruling that its involuntary inclusion violated principles, reducing the region's voter base by over 800,000 and complicating seat allocations without reconfiguration. In electoral contests, clan-based pacts often eclipse policy platforms, as traditional families leverage kinship networks for endorsements and vote blocs, sidelining ideological competition and reinforcing patronage dynamics that prioritize personal alliances over governance reforms.

Sharia Implementation and Judicial Authority

The judicial system in Bangsamoro operates under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws (Presidential Decree No. 1083), enacted in 1977, which codifies aspects of Islamic law applicable to Filipino Muslims in matters of personal status, including marriage, divorce, succession, and property relations, while excluding punishments and broader criminal jurisdiction. This framework was expanded under the (Republic Act No. 11054, effective 2019), empowering the to legislate on Islamic personal, family, property, and commercial laws, and establishing a tiered judiciary comprising circuit courts, district courts, and a prospective Sharia High Court under supervision. Sharia courts handle cases exclusively involving Muslim parties in designated personal law domains, with jurisdiction limited to the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) and select areas outside it, as affirmed by Republic Act No. 12006 signed in August 2024, which added five new Sharia District Courts nationwide, increasing the total to eight. Enforcement remains constrained by low caseloads—pre-BARMM data from the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) indicated Sharia circuit courts processed roughly as many cases as filed annually, often under 100 per court, reflecting underutilization and capacity gaps—leading to overlaps with civil courts that cause procedural delays and jurisdictional disputes. Non-Muslims are exempt from Sharia jurisdiction, with the system emphasizing voluntary application aligned with constitutional limits, though hybrid legal pluralism has raised concerns over inconsistent rulings and reduced trust in state-backed Sharia institutions. Critiques highlight selective enforcement patterns, where elite clans or influential figures reportedly leverage proceedings to resolve family disputes in their favor, exacerbating inequities in a marked by networks, while alienating non-Muslim minorities through perceived favoritism toward Islamic norms in shared jurisdictions. Expansion efforts, including the law, have drawn evangelical opposition for potentially eroding civil court primacy and complicating interfaith , underscoring enforcement's reliance on judicial discretion amid weak institutional safeguards. Empirical legitimacy challenges persist, as hybrid -civil overlaps foster perceptions of inefficiency, with studies noting lower public recourse to Sharia courts due to doubts over fairness and finality compared to national civil processes.

Security and Conflict

Clan Feuds and Internal Violence

Rido, or clan feuds, constitute a persistent form of internal in Bangsamoro, rooted in codes of honor among Moro ethnolinguistic groups such as the Tausug, Maranao, and Maguindanaon, where perceived insults, disputes, or killings trigger retaliatory cycles that prioritize vengeance over resolution. These feuds often escalate through networks, drawing in members and affiliates, and persist across generations unless interrupted by traditional involving blood money (diyah) or oaths of . Causal dynamics emphasize personal and familial honor as the primary driver, distinct from ideological insurgencies, with feuds frequently spilling into civilian areas and disrupting local economies through displacement and fear. In the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), rido accounts for approximately 80% of recorded clan violence events since 2018, with over 150 incidents documented, many involving major clans in provinces like , , and . Incidents have intensified ahead of electoral periods, as clans leverage private armies for political advantage, exacerbating s; for instance, midterm election-related violence in 2025 contributed to heightened clashes, including ambushes and retaliatory killings masked under broader crime statistics. Specific cases illustrate the toll: a 50-year Tausug in ended in March 2024 after claiming at least 100 lives across both sides, while a November 2024 clash in killed two and wounded others. The perpetuation of rido stems from entrenched cultural norms codified among groups like the Iranun and Maranao, where failure to avenge a kin's invites social dishonor, creating self-reinforcing loops that state interventions alone rarely break without integrating tribal elders. Annual casualties vary but accumulate significantly; peak years like 2011, 2014–2016, 2019, and 2022 saw elevated rido-related s, often intertwined with electoral contests that weaponize loyalties. Recent efforts, such as the settlement of four long-standing feuds in the in October 2025, highlight potential for culturally attuned resolutions, yet unresolved disputes continue to claim dozens in isolated incidents, underscoring rido's role as a decentralized surpassing centralized rebellions in frequency. The (ASG), an Islamist militant outfit operating primarily in Bangsamoro's , , and provinces, has maintained affiliations with affiliates despite the 2019 establishment of the (BARMM) under the peace accord with the (MILF). ASG factions pledged allegiance to as early as 2014, enabling recruitment and operational ties that facilitated attacks including kidnappings and beheadings of foreigners and locals for ransom, with incidents persisting into the . For instance, ASG conducted high-profile beheadings, such as those of two Canadian hostages in 2016, and continued ransom-driven abductions targeting sailors and tourists in Bangsamoro waters post-2019, generating funds estimated in millions of dollars to sustain operations amid ideological appeals to global . Links between ASG/ISIS networks and mainstream Moro separatist groups like the and (MNLF) stem largely from splinter factions rejecting peace processes. The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), a MILF splinter formed in 2010 by commanders opposed to negotiations, aligned with by 2014 and conducted bombings and ambushes in and North , areas overlapping BARMM territories. Similarly, rogue MNLF elements have merged with ASG, as seen in joint operations in where ISIS-aligned ASG factions absorbed defectors, amplifying attack capabilities through shared training and logistics. These splinters exploit ungoverned spaces in Bangsamoro, with BIFF alone responsible for over 20 IED attacks on security forces between 2020 and 2023. While ideological rhetoric ties these groups to Salafi-jihadism, empirical patterns indicate criminal profiteering as the primary sustainer, with ASG deriving up to 80% of funding from kidnappings yielding ransoms averaging $500,000 per victim in the 2010s, a model persisting despite pressure. Non-decommissioned camps in and have been cited in reports as potential safe havens for BIFF and ASG remnants, enabling regrouping for attacks like the December 2023 in City, which killed four and injured dozens in an ISIS-claimed assault on civilians. This incident, occurring in a BARMM core area, underscores how incomplete allows extremists to leverage Moro insurgent infrastructure for opportunistic violence rather than purely doctrinal ends.

State Responses and Normalization Failures

The normalization process under the 2014 , particularly its Annex on Normalization, has seen limited progress in decommissioning (MILF) combatants and weapons, with only partial implementation despite initial symbolic handovers. As of August 2022, approximately 19,345 out of a targeted 40,000 MILF combatants—about 48%—had been decommissioned, often involving ceremonial surrenders of small arms caches rather than comprehensive . By July 2025, the MILF halted further decommissioning of its remaining estimated 14,000 combatants, citing insufficient parallel government commitments to socio-economic development, policing reforms, and as stipulated in the annex. This stall reflects broader shortfalls, including the failure to fully constitute normalized policing structures and persistent arms proliferation amid clan-based rido feuds and splinter group activities. State responses by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and have emphasized joint operations and enhanced visibility to maintain security in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), including partnerships with MILF's Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces for under the Joint Peace and Security Teams. Efforts include intensified patrols, election security deployments, and community engagement pilots aimed at transitioning to localized policing, with the AFP providing support to PNP-led operations to curb violence. However, these initiatives have faltered due to deep-seated distrust between communities and , rooted in historical grievances and perceived biases, leading to uneven implementation of programs that prioritize militarized presence over genuine local buy-in. Persistent underscores these normalization failures, with BARMM recording a rate approximately three times the national average; for instance, from to 2023, the region saw 340 murders at a daily average of 1.6, equating to roughly 12-15 per 100,000 population compared to the ' 4-5 per 100,000. Aid distribution for rehabilitation often requires AFP/PNP escorts due to insecurity, effectively militarizing humanitarian efforts and reinforcing perceptions of state overreach rather than normalization. Differing assessments between the government and on progress have further complicated trust-building, with MILF leaders highlighting unmet benchmarks in transformative programs as justification for pausing .

Economy

Sectoral Composition and Dependencies

The economy of Bangsamoro is predominantly agrarian, with , , and accounting for 51.1 percent of the (GRDP) as of recent estimates. This sector encompasses subsistence farming of crops like and corn, alongside small-scale in coastal and inland waters, supporting a large portion of the engaged in low-productivity, informal activities vulnerable to weather disruptions and limitations. Informal trade, often cross-border or localized in goods such as agricultural produce and , further characterizes economic activity, though it remains undercapitalized and unregulated. Industrial output is limited, contributing approximately 25.6 percent to GRDP, primarily through basic and agro-processing rather than advanced , reflecting infrastructural deficits and security constraints that deter investment. Services, including retail and , fill the remainder but are heavily dependent on . Household incomes increasingly rely on remittances from overseas Filipino workers originating from the region, which supplement subsistence earnings amid stagnant local wages, though precise regional inflows are not disaggregated in national data. Fiscal dependencies center on annual block grants from the national government, equivalent to 5 percent of net internal collections, totaling around PHP 75 billion in 2023 to fund operations and development. However, erodes these allocations, as evidenced by scandals involving PHP 6.4 billion in misused local funds disbursed to politically aligned barangays, prompting admissions from regional officials that graft hampers growth. Such leakages, often through ghost projects or favoritism, reduce effective resource utilization and perpetuate reliance on external transfers over endogenous .

Resource Management and Exploitation

Bangsamoro possesses significant untapped reserves of oil, natural gas, coal, and minerals, particularly in offshore areas like the Sulu Sea and onshore sites in Tawi-Tawi and Maguindanao provinces. Geological surveys indicate potential hydrocarbon deposits in the Sulu Sea basin, with recent seismic and aeromagnetic studies identifying drillable prospects in Mapun, Tawi-Tawi. Coal seams have been mapped in BARMM's energy zones, leading to the first coal operating contract awarded in October 2024 for exploration in the region. Mineral resources, including gold and copper, remain largely unexplored due to security constraints and overlapping claims. Governance of resource extraction falls under the Bangsamoro Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources, and Energy (MENRE), which coordinates with the Philippine Department of Energy (DOE) for petroleum service contracts (PSCs). In October 2025, BARMM secured PSCs for oil and gas exploration in Tawi-Tawi through joint agreements with the DOE, involving international consortia for geophysical surveys. The Bangsamoro Organic Law grants shared authority over natural resources, with BARMM receiving 75% of revenues from regional taxes on extractive activities and 100% from non-metallic minerals like sand and gravel, though major contracts require central government approval. This structure limits BARMM's fiscal autonomy, as strategic resources like oil and gas remain subject to national vetoes and DOE oversight, resulting in low direct revenue capture—BARMM's resource-derived income constituted less than 5% of its budget in 2024. Exploitation is hampered by , where clan leaders and former control access to resource sites, often through private militias. and small-scale mining in areas like and fund armed groups and perpetuate clan feuds, with proceeds from timber extraction and mineral panning evading MENRE regulation. Warlords have historically titled public lands illegally for logging concessions, channeling profits into patronage networks rather than public coffers. Despite formal contracts, benefits from emerging explorations risk similar capture absent robust measures, as fiscal without inclusive institutions enables entrenched elites to dominate revenue streams.

Poverty Persistence and Development Barriers

In 2023, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) recorded a poverty incidence among families of 23.5 percent, the highest in the Philippines and a decline from 52.6 percent in 2018, according to Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) data. This rate significantly exceeds the national average of 10.9 percent for the same year. At the individual level, approximately 42.2 percent of BARMM's population lived below the poverty line in 2023, compared to the national figure of 15.5 percent. Persistent poverty stems from entrenched clan-based conflicts, known as rido, which disrupt local economies and deter (FDI). These feuds, often involving armed groups tied to political clans, have escalated around electoral periods, exacerbating insecurity and hindering infrastructure development essential for job creation. risk premiums make BARMM unattractive to investors, with conflict dynamics linked to resource disputes amplifying perceptions of instability despite formal peace agreements. dominance in further entrenches networks over merit-based economic policies, perpetuating . Heavy reliance on transfers and international aid sustains short-term relief but fosters dependency, as fiscal transfers constituted over 90 percent of BARMM's in recent years, limiting incentives for local generation or diversification. Without resolving horizontal conflicts like rido, which PSA data indirectly correlates with stalled through disrupted agricultural and trade activities, structural barriers to sustainable growth remain unaddressed. Efforts by the Bangsamoro government to mediate feuds via task forces have yielded limited results, as clan loyalties often override state authority.

Education and Social Indicators

Literacy Rates and Educational Infrastructure

The Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) exhibits the lowest basic rate in the at 81% among individuals aged five years and older, according to the 2024 Functional Literacy, Education, and Mass Media Survey (FLEMMS) conducted by the (PSA). This figure lags behind the national basic literacy rate of 90%, with BARMM's illiteracy rate reaching 14.4%—more than double the country's 6.9% average. Functional literacy rates are substantially lower, as evidenced by province within BARMM, where only 33.2% of residents achieve functional literacy, highlighting deficiencies in comprehension and practical application skills despite basic reading and writing proficiency. Educational infrastructure in BARMM is characterized by the dominance of madrasahs, which serve as primary institutions for delivering Islamic-focused education to Muslim learners, supplemented by public schools. Over 5,900 asatidz (Islamic teachers) provide instruction in and (ISAL) across both madrasah and public systems, underscoring the integral role of . The region's , governed by the Bangsamoro Education Code, mandates integration of language and core Islamic subjects—such as Quranic studies and seerah (prophetic biography)—for Muslim students in public elementary and secondary schools, while allowing opt-outs for non-Muslims. In July 2024, BARMM inaugurated the country's first public madrasah in , blending the national Matatag with standardized madrasah programs to address gaps in formal Islamic learning. Despite these reforms, infrastructure challenges persist, with many schools lacking adequate facilities, prompting ongoing interventions by the Ministry of Basic, Higher, and Technical Education (MBHTE) to rehabilitate and construct buildings region-wide as of 2024. High dropout rates exacerbate literacy stagnation, particularly in higher education where attrition reaches 93.4%—far exceeding the national average of 39%—due to factors like and inadequate support systems. The Madrasah Education Strategic (MESP), launched in 2024, aims to standardize and elevate madrasah quality through teacher training and curriculum alignment, though implementation remains uneven amid resource constraints.

Access Barriers and Quality Deficiencies

Access to in Bangsamoro remains hindered by geographical isolation and ongoing security challenges, particularly in remote and conflict-affected areas where learners face long travel distances and disruptions from feuds or insurgent activities. In 2023, initiatives like the Ministry of Basic, Higher and Technical Education's (MBHTE) AKAP targeted geographically isolated communities using alternative delivery modes, yet systemic ambiguities between national and regional governments continue to block the delivery of programs such as school feeding and textbooks. These overlaps, stemming from the region's transitional , exacerbate rates—34.3% among children under five, the highest nationally—which impair attendance and . Quality deficiencies manifest in persistently low learning outcomes, with Bangsamoro recording the nation's lowest basic rate of 81.0% and functional literacy at around 70%, compared to national averages of 90.0% and higher. (NAT) results for Grade 6 learners show low proficiency in core subjects, with scores hovering near 52% in English and as of 2023, reflecting inadequate instructional quality amid teacher shortages and limited training. High dropout and rates in alternative learning systems () programs, often exceeding 10 percentage points below national norms, are linked to insufficient support and poor monitoring, compounded by conflict-driven recruitment of youth into armed groups that disproportionately affects male enrollment. Gender gaps in access are relatively narrow at primary levels, with female completion rates sometimes surpassing males due to lower recruitment into conflicts, but rural girls face acute barriers from early marriage practices that drive secondary dropouts. rates remain elevated, with reporting persistence in 2025 driven by cultural norms and premarital stigma, leading to an estimated 88,600 cases region-wide and interrupting for adolescent females in provinces like . Governance failures, including clan-influenced resource allocation, perpetuate these issues by prioritizing patronage over merit-based teacher deployment, undermining overall instructional efficacy.

Culture and Identity

Traditional Moro Practices

Traditional Moro practices encompass a range of customs rooted in pre-Islamic animist beliefs, which persist through syncretic integration with Islamic elements following the religion's arrival in the region during the 13th to 15th centuries. These include reverence for ancestral spirits (anito) and nature-based rituals, evident in oral epics that predate Islamization and detail mythological narratives of cosmology, heroism, and social norms. Among the Maranao people, the Darangen epic, comprising 17 cycles and over 72,000 lines, serves as a primary repository of such knowledge, recited by specialized singers during rituals, weddings, and communal gatherings to transmit cultural values and historical lore. Musical traditions further illustrate this pre-Islamic foundation, with the —a row of eight graduated gongs played melodically alongside suspended gongs (, ) and a (dabakan)—tracing origins to ancient Southeast Asian gong-chime practices predating Islamic influence. Performed by Moro groups such as the Maguindanaon and Maranao for celebratory events including harvests, weddings, and rites of passage, evokes communal harmony and spiritual invocation, often incorporating improvisational elements that blend animist rhythmic patterns with later Islamic motifs. Craft practices like among the of reflect enduring animist symbolism, where handwoven textiles using plant fibers and natural dyes feature geometric patterns denoting protection, fertility, and ancestral motifs, produced on backstrap looms for garments and ceremonial purposes. Harvest-linked festivals and rituals, such as those involving spirit offerings for bountiful yields, demonstrate by merging pre-Islamic animist of nature deities with Islamic prayers, ensuring agricultural prosperity in rice and corn-dependent communities. These customs underscore a causal continuity from indigenous worldviews, where environmental interdependence shaped social and spiritual life prior to external religious overlays.

Intergroup Tensions and Identity Politics

Christian and Lumad minorities within the proposed Bangsamoro territories have expressed persistent fears of marginalization under the autonomy framework, which prioritizes Moro Muslim and risks subordinating non-Muslim interests to Islamic structures. indigenous groups, such as the Teduray and Lambangian in areas like , have historically lacked robust political representation, positioning them as "second-order minorities" vulnerable to displacement in land and resource allocation dominated by Moro clans. These concerns intensified during plebiscites on the , where communities opposed territorial expansions that could dilute their claims in favor of a Moro-centric . The 2019 plebiscite in Province, where 54% of voters rejected ratification of the (103,341 against versus 91,689 in favor), exemplified identity-based resistance even among Muslim-majority areas, driven by Tausug assertions of distinct ethnic identity against perceived and dominance in the Bangsamoro construct. This outcome, upheld by the in 2024 declaring Sulu outside the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, highlighted intra-Moro fractures but also broader apprehensions among non-Muslims elsewhere, such as Christians in , who cited risks to religious freedoms and equal access under Sharia-influenced codes. The Bangsamoro identity, forged in the 1960s as a unifying response to events like the Jabidah Massacre, encompasses diverse Muslim ethnolinguistic groups but often frames non-inclusionary autonomy as essential, exacerbating intergroup distrust. Moro advocacy narratives emphasize historical victimhood from colonial and post-independence marginalization to rationalize , yet this overlooks empirical integration successes of Muslim communities outside , such as in and provinces, where shared national institutions have fostered socioeconomic parity without dedicated autonomies. These cases suggest that clan-based power dynamics and elite incentives, rather than irreducible ethnic incompatibility, underpin ongoing tensions, as evidenced by critiques of assimilationist policies that fail to address but also do not necessitate secessionist remedies. In contrast, the victimhood frame risks perpetuating zero-sum , where non-Muslim calls for inclusive are dismissed as obstructing Moro self-rule.

Criticisms and Debates

Autonomy's Empirical Shortcomings

Since its establishment in 2019, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) has exhibited persistent security challenges, with violent incidents failing to decline substantially. Clan-based conflicts known as rido have continued unabated, recording over 150 events since 2018, predominantly within BARMM territories, undermining social cohesion and local stability. Reports indicate a surge in such violence as recently as early 2025, despite normalization efforts under the peace framework, highlighting the fragility of post-conflict coalitions among Moro groups and their limited capacity to enforce ceasefires. Economic performance has similarly lagged, with BARMM's GDP growth reaching only 2.7% in , compared to the national rate of 5.7%, contributing a mere 0.04 percentage points to the ' overall expansion and representing just 1.3% of national output. This disparity persists amid sectoral weaknesses, including a declining industry contribution and high costs exceeding the national average by 23%, which deter and perpetuate underdevelopment. While some provinces like achieved 5.02% growth in 2023, the regional average of around 4.3% still trails national benchmarks, reflecting structural barriers to broad-based recovery. Analyses from the underscore the precariousness of BARMM's political coalitions, where competing Moro factions and unresolved power-sharing arrangements foster instability rather than unified governance, exacerbating investor hesitancy. This coalition fragility, compounded by enduring violence, has led to and stalled projects, as external actors perceive heightened risks in a marked by incomplete normalization and weak institutional trust. rates remain entrenched at levels far above the national average, with widespread perpetuating dependency on central government transfers rather than autonomous revenue generation.

Governance Corruption and Clan Dominance

The Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA), established in 2019 to govern the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) during its transitional phase, has been marred by corruption scandals involving misallocation of public funds, often benefiting elites and kin networks rather than public services. In August 2025, the Commission on Audit (COA) ordered a special audit into ₱2.2 billion in alleged anomalous disbursements by the Ministry of Basic, Higher and Technical Education (MBHTE), which has faced persistent accusations of irregularities such as selling teaching positions and fraudulent procurement under long-serving leadership. BARMM Interim Chief Minister Abdulraof Macacua publicly acknowledged in September 2025 that corruption is rampant across the region, citing uncovered instances of procurement fraud that undermine development efforts and public trust. These issues reflect patterns of elite capture, where transitional funds—intended for infrastructure and social programs—are diverted through opaque processes, echoing concerns raised by oversight bodies akin to Transparency International's assessments of governance vulnerabilities in conflict-affected areas. Clan dominance exacerbates governance failures by prioritizing familial loyalties over merit-based policy, entrenching a system where powerful families control political appointments and resources. In BARMM, clan-based rule constitutes the primary social and political order, with influential families dominating electoral and economic spheres, often sidelining broader institutional reforms. A 2025 study by the Center for People Empowerment in Governance found political clans entrenched in 94 percent of BARMM's municipalities, correlating with persistent poverty and underdevelopment as clan interests supersede equitable resource distribution. The March 2025 expansion of the interim regional parliament further bolstered clan representation, with family networks securing additional seats amid reduced female participation, illustrating how kinship ties dictate power-sharing rather than competency or public needs. Approaching the delayed 2025 parliamentary elections—postponed by the Supreme Court in October 2025 to no later than March 2026 due to invalid districting laws—clans have maneuvered aggressively for control, framing the polls as opportunities for power consolidation rather than democratic renewal. At least 72 private armed groups, frequently linked to clans, operate with impunity, fueling rido (blood feuds) that threaten electoral violence and perpetuate elite hold over governance. Analysts from the International Crisis Group warn that unchecked clan politics risks derailing BARMM's normalization process, as family elites capture autonomous institutions to maintain patronage networks, diverting focus from anti-corruption measures and equitable development. This dynamic underscores a causal link between clan hegemony and governance stagnation, where policy decisions serve to perpetuate elite privileges over systemic reforms.

Separatism vs National Integration Perspectives

Proponents of Moro separatism emphasize historical grievances stemming from centuries of external domination, including Spanish colonization, American annexation, and post-independence marginalization by Manila-centric governance, which they claim necessitated armed resistance to preserve Islamic cultural and political autonomy. This perspective posits that through independence or enhanced autonomy would rectify land dispossession and cultural erosion, enabling governance aligned with Moro traditions rather than assimilation into a predominantly Christian national framework. Critics of , however, highlight empirical evidence of Moro integration yielding socioeconomic mobility, with numerous professionals thriving in Philippine urban centers like , as demonstrated by the Young Moro Professionals Network's activities in since the early 2000s, which facilitate career advancement and advocacy without regional isolation. Economic assessments further reveal no verifiable upside to full , as the Bangsamoro region's persistent —marked by high rates and limited —stems more from dynamics than national exclusion, with likely amplifying risks of isolation and stalled growth akin to protracted insurgencies elsewhere. From a national integration standpoint, autonomy expansions have arguably empowered radical Islamist factions within Moro fronts, enabling parallel sharia-based systems that undermine uniform rule of law and foster extremism, as seen in influences from conservative returnees exacerbating ideological divides rather than resolving them. Integration advocates stress that Philippine institutional frameworks provide stability and resource access, evidenced by Moro successes in national professions, contrasting with autonomy's track record of delayed normalization and economic underspending that perpetuates clan-based fragmentation over cohesive development.

Notable Figures

Ahod "Al Haj Murad" Ebrahim, born May 15, 1949, served as the inaugural of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) from February 22, 2019, to March 2025. A founding member and long-time chairman of the (MILF) since 2003, Ebrahim was instrumental in negotiating the 2014 and the subsequent ratified on January 21, 2019, which established BARMM. Orphaned early and educated in , he transitioned from MILF military roles to lead the during its formative years. Abdulraof Macacua assumed the role of interim in March 2025 following Ebrahim's resignation. As secretary-general of the United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP)—the MILF's political arm—and of the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, Macacua oversees ongoing transitional governance amid preparations for BARMM's first regular elections in May 2025. Pangalian Balindong, Speaker of the since 2019, has been a prominent advocate for peace and regional , drawing from prior national political experience before BARMM's creation. Historically, Udtog Matalam spearheaded the (MIM), established May 1, 1968, which mobilized Moro elites against perceived marginalization and presaged armed separatist campaigns by groups like the MNLF and .

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