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Democratic peace theory
Democratic peace theory
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French President Charles de Gaulle shaking hands with West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in Bonn, in 1963

Proponents of democratic peace theory argue that both electoral and republican forms of democracy are hesitant to engage in armed conflict with other identified democracies. Different advocates of this theory suggest that several factors are responsible for motivating peace between democratic states.[1][2][3][4] Individual theorists maintain "monadic" forms of this theory (democracies are in general more peaceful in their international relations); "dyadic" forms of this theory (democracies do not go to war with other democracies); and "systemic" forms of this theory (more democratic states in the international system makes the international system more peaceful).[5]

In terms of norms and identities, it is hypothesized that democracies are more dovish in their interactions with other democracies, and that democratically elected leaders are more likely to resort to peaceful resolution in disputes (both in domestic politics and international politics). In terms of structural or institutional constraints, it is hypothesized that institutional checks and balances, accountability of leaders to the public, and larger winning coalitions make it harder for democratic leaders to go to war unless there are clearly favorable ratio of benefits to costs.

These structural constraints, along with the transparent nature of democratic politics, make it harder for democratic leaders to mobilize for war and initiate surprise attacks, which reduces fear and inadvertent escalation to war. The transparent nature of democratic political systems, as well as deliberative debates (involving opposition parties, the media, experts, and bureaucrats), make it easier for democratic states to credibly signal their intentions. The concept of audience costs entails that threats issued by democratic leaders are taken more seriously because democratic leaders will be electorally punished by their citizens from backing down from threats, which reduces the risk of misperception and miscalculation by states.

The connection between peace and democracy has long been recognized, but theorists disagree about the direction of causality. The democratic peace theory posits that democracy causes peace, while the territorial peace theory makes the opposite claim that peace causes democracy.[6] Other theories argue that omitted variables explain the correlation better than democratic peace theory. Alternative explanations for the correlation of peace among democracies include arguments revolving around institutions, commerce, interdependence, alliances, US world dominance and political stability.[7][8][9][10] There are instances in the historical record that serve as exceptions to the democratic peace theory.

History

[edit]
  Democracies
  Autocracies
[11]
German philosopher Immanuel Kant, c. 1790

Though the democratic peace theory was not rigorously or scientifically studied until the 1960s, the basic principles of the concept had been argued as early as the 18th century in the works of philosopher Immanuel Kant[12] and political theorist Thomas Paine. Kant foreshadowed the theory in his essay Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch written in 1795, although he thought that a world with only constitutional republics was only one of several necessary conditions for a perpetual peace. In earlier but less cited works, Thomas Paine made similar or stronger claims about the peaceful nature of republics. Paine wrote in "Common Sense" in 1776: "The Republics of Europe are all (and we may say always) in peace." Paine argued that kings would go to war out of pride in situations where republics would not.[13][14] French historian and social scientist Alexis de Tocqueville also argued, in Democracy in America (1835–1840), that democratic nations were less likely to wage war.[a] Herbert Spencer also argued for a relationship between democracy and peace.[16]

Dean Babst, a criminologist, was the first to do statistical research on this topic. His academic paper supporting the theory was published in 1964 in Wisconsin Sociologist;[17] he published a slightly more popularized version, in 1972, in the trade journal Industrial Research.[18] Both versions initially received little attention.

Melvin Small and J. David Singer responded; they found an absence of wars between democratic states with two "marginal exceptions", but denied that this pattern had statistical significance. This paper was published in the Jerusalem Journal of International Relations which finally brought more widespread attention to the theory, and started the academic debate.[19] A 1983 paper by political scientist Michael W. Doyle contributed further to popularizing the theory.

Maoz and Abdolali extended the research to lesser conflicts than wars.[20] Bremer, Maoz and Russett found the correlation between democracy and peacefulness remained significant after controlling for many possible confounding variables.[21][22] This moved the theory into the mainstream of social science. Supporters of realism in international relations and others responded by raising many new objections. Other researchers attempted more systematic explanations of how democracy might cause peace,[23] and of how democracy might also affect other aspects of foreign relations such as alliances and collaboration.[24]

There have been numerous further studies in the field since these pioneering works.[b] Most studies have found some form of democratic peace exists, although neither methodological disputes nor doubtful cases are entirely resolved.[26]

Definitions

[edit]
World population by political regime type.[11]

Research on the democratic peace theory has to define "democracy" and "peace" (or, more often, "war").

Defining democracy

[edit]

Democracies have been defined differently by different theorists and researchers; this accounts for some of the variations in their findings. Some examples:

Small and Singer define democracy as a nation that (1) holds periodic elections in which the opposition parties are as free to run as government parties, (2) allows at least 10% of the adult population to vote, and (3) has a parliament that either controls or enjoys parity with the executive branch of the government.[27]

Doyle requires (1) that "liberal regimes" have market or private property economics, (2) they have policies that are internally sovereign, (3) they have citizens with juridical rights, and (4) they have representative governments. Either 30% of the adult males were able to vote or it was possible for every man to acquire voting rights as by attaining enough property. He allows greater power to hereditary monarchs than other researchers; for example, he counts the rule of Louis-Philippe of France as a liberal regime.[28]

Ray requires that at least 50% of the adult population is allowed to vote and that there has been at least one peaceful, constitutional transfer of executive power from one independent political party to another by means of an election. This definition excludes long periods often viewed as democratic. For example, the United States until 1800, India from independence until 1979, and Japan until 1993 were all under a dominant-party system, and thus would not be counted under this definition.[29]

Rummel states that "By democracy is meant liberal democracy, where those who hold power are elected in competitive elections with a secret ballot and wide franchise (loosely understood as including at least 2/3 of adult males); where there is freedom of speech, religion, and organization; and a constitutional framework of law to which the government is subordinate and that guarantees equal rights."[30]

Non-binary classifications

[edit]

The above definitions are binary, classifying nations into either democracies or non-democracies. Many researchers have instead used more finely grained scales. One example is the Polity data series which scores each state on two scales, one for democracy and one for autocracy, for each year since 1800; as well as several others.[c] The use of the Polity Data has varied. Some researchers have done correlations between the democracy scale and belligerence; others have treated it as a binary classification by (as its maker does) calling all states with a high democracy score and a low autocracy score democracies; yet others have used the difference of the two scores, sometimes again making this into a binary classification.[34]

Young democracies

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Several researchers have observed that many of the possible exceptions to the democratic peace have occurred when at least one of the involved democracies was very young. Many of them have therefore added a qualifier, typically stating that the peacefulness apply to democracies older than three years.[28][1][30][35] Rummel argues that this is enough time for "democratic procedures to be accepted, and democratic culture to settle in." Additionally, this may allow for other states to actually come to the recognition of the state as a democracy.[30]

Mansfield and Snyder, while agreeing that there have been no wars between mature liberal democracies, state that countries in transition to democracy are especially likely to be involved in wars. They find that democratizing countries are even more warlike than stable democracies, stable autocracies or even countries in transition towards autocracy. So, they suggest caution in eliminating these wars from the analysis, because this might hide a negative aspect of the process of democratization.[36][37][38] A reanalysis of the earlier study's statistical results emphasizes that the above relationship between democratization and war can only be said to hold for those democratizing countries where the executive lacks sufficient power, independence, and institutional strength.[39] A review cites several other studies finding that the increase in the risk of war in democratizing countries happens only if many or most of the surrounding nations are undemocratic.[24] If wars between young democracies are included in the analysis, several studies and reviews still find enough evidence supporting the stronger claim that all democracies, whether young or established, go into war with one another less frequently;[40][24][41] while some do not.[42]

Defining war

[edit]

Quantitative research on international wars usually defines war as a military conflict with more than 1000 killed in battle in one year. This is the definition used in the Correlates of War Project which has also supplied the data for many studies on war. It turns out that most of the military conflicts in question fall clearly above or below this threshold.[43]

Some researchers have used different definitions. For example, Weart defines war as more than 200 battle deaths.[35] Russett, when looking at Ancient Greece, only requires some real battle engagement, involving on both sides forces under state authorization.[44]

Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs), in the Correlates of War Project classification, are lesser conflicts than wars. Such a conflict may be no more than military display of force with no battle deaths. MIDs and wars together are "militarized interstate conflicts" or MICs. MIDs include the conflicts that precede a war; the difference between MIDs and MICs may thus be less than it appears, though this remains an area of investigation.[45]

Statistical analysis and concerns about degrees of freedom are the primary reasons for using MID's instead of actual wars. Wars are relatively rare. An average ratio of 30 MIDs to one war provides a richer statistical environment for analysis.[46]

Monadic vs. dyadic peace

[edit]

Most research is regarding the dyadic peace, that democracies do not fight one another. Very few researchers have supported the monadic peace, that democracies are more peaceful in general. There are some recent papers that find a slight monadic effect. Müller and Wolff, in listing them, agree "that democracies on average might be slightly, but not strongly, less warlike than other states," but general "monadic explanations are neither necessary nor convincing." They note that democracies have varied greatly in their belligerence against non-democracies.[47]

Exceptions

[edit]

Some scholars support the democratic peace on probabilistic grounds: since many wars have been fought since democracies first arose, we might expect a proportionate number of wars to have occurred between democracies, if democracies fought each other as freely as other pairs of states; but proponents of democratic peace theory claim that the number is much less than might be expected.[21][48][34][28][49] However, opponents of the theory argue this is mistaken and claim there are numerous examples of wars between democracies.[42]

Historically, troublesome cases for the Democratic peace theory include the Sicilian Expedition, the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War, the U.S. Civil War, the Fashoda Crisis, conflicts between Ecuador and Peru, the Cod Wars, the Spanish–American War, and the Kargil War. Not all scholars agree on specific exceptions to the democratic peace theory, if any.[50][51][52][53][54][55][56] Doyle cites the Paquisha War and the Lebanese air force's intervention in the Six-Day War.[28] The total number of cases suggested in the literature is at least 50. The data set Bremer was using showed one exception, the French-Thai War of 1940;[48] Gleditsch sees the state of war between Finland and United Kingdom during World War II, as a special case, which should probably be treated separately: an incidental state of war between democracies during large and complex war with hundreds of belligerents and the constant shifting of geopolitical and diplomatic boundaries.[57][58][59] However, the British did conduct a few military actions of minor scope against the Finns, more to demonstrate their alliance with the Soviets than to actually engage in war with Finland. Page Fortna discusses the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the Kargil War as exceptions, finding the latter to be the most significant.[60]

Conflict initiation

[edit]

According to a 2017 review study, "there is enough evidence to conclude that democracy does cause peace at least between democracies, that the observed correlation between democracy and peace is not spurious".[7]

Most studies have looked only at who is involved in the conflicts and ignored the question of who initiated the conflict. In many conflicts both sides argue that the other side was the initiator. Several researchers have argued that studying conflict initiation is of limited value, because existing data about conflict initiation may be especially unreliable.[61] Even so, several studies have examined this. Reitner and Stam argue that autocracies initiate conflicts against democracies more frequently than democracies do against autocracies.[62] Quackenbush and Rudy, while confirming Reiter and Stam's results, find that democracies initiate wars against non-democracies more frequently than non-democracies do to each other.[63] Several following studies have studied how different types of autocracies with different institutions vary regarding conflict initiation. Personalistic and military dictatorships may be particularly prone to conflict initiation, as compared to other types of autocracy such as one-party states, but also more likely to be targeted in a war having other initiators.[64][65][66][67]

One 2017 study found that democracies are no more likely to settle border disputes peacefully than non-democracies.[68]

Internal violence and genocide

[edit]

Most of this article discusses research on relations between states. However, there is also evidence that democracies have less internal systematic violence. For instance, one study finds that the most democratic and the most authoritarian states have few civil wars, and intermediate regimes the most. The probability for a civil war is also increased by political change, regardless whether toward greater democracy or greater autocracy. Intermediate regimes continue to be the most prone to civil war, regardless of the time since the political change. In the long run, since intermediate regimes are less stable than autocracies, which in turn are less stable than democracies, durable democracy is the most probable end-point of the process of democratization.[69] Abadie's study finds that the most democratic nations have the least terrorism.[70] Harff finds that genocide and politicide are rare in democracies.[71] Rummel finds that the more democratic a regime, the less its democide. He finds that democide has killed six times as many people as battles.[30]

Davenport and Armstrong II list several other studies and states: "Repeatedly, democratic political systems have been found to decrease political bans, censorship, torture, disappearances and mass killing, doing so in a linear fashion across diverse measurements, methodologies, time periods, countries, and contexts." It concludes: "Across measures and methodological techniques, it is found that below a certain level, democracy has no impact on human rights violations, but above this level democracy influences repression in a negative and roughly linear manner."[72] They also state that thirty years worth of statistical research has revealed that only two variables decrease human rights violations: political democracy and economic development.[73]

Abulof and Goldman add a caveat, focusing on the contemporary Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Statistically, a MENA democracy makes a country more prone to both the onset and incidence of civil war, and the more democratic a MENA state is, the more likely it is to experience violent intrastate strife. Moreover, anocracies do not seem to be predisposed to civil war, either worldwide or in MENA. Looking for causality beyond correlation, they suggest that democracy's pacifying effect is partly mediated through societal subscription to self-determination and popular sovereignty. This may turn “democratizing nationalism” to a long-term prerequisite, not just an immediate hindrance, to peace and democracy.[74]

Explanations

[edit]

These theories have traditionally been categorized into two groups: explanations that focus on democratic norms and explanations that focus on democratic political structures.[75][76] They usually are meant to be explanations for little violence between democracies, not for a low level of internal violence in democracies.

Several of these mechanisms may also apply to countries of similar systems. The book Never at War finds evidence that the oligarchic republics common in ancient Greece and medieval and early modern Europe hardly ever made war on one another. One example is the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, in which the Sejm resisted and vetoed most royal proposals for war, like those of Władysław IV Vasa.[77]

A study by V-Dem Institute found both interbranch constraint on the executive and civil society activism as the mechanism for democratic peace but found accountability provided directly by elections not as crucial.[78]

Democratic norms

[edit]

One example from the first group is that liberal democratic culture may make the leaders accustomed to negotiation and compromise. Policy makers who have built their careers within a political culture of non-violent accommodations with domestic rivals, unlike autocrats who typically hold power through the threat of coercion, will be inclined toward non-violent methods abroad.[35][47] Another that a belief in human rights may make people in democracies reluctant to go to war, especially against other democracies. The decline in colonialism, also by democracies, may be related to a change in perception of non-European peoples and their rights.[79]

Bruce Russett also argues that the democratic culture affects the way leaders resolve conflicts. In addition, he holds that a social norm emerged toward the end of the nineteenth century; that democracies should not fight each other, which strengthened when the democratic culture and the degree of democracy increased, for example by widening the franchise. Increasing democratic stability allowed partners in foreign affairs to perceive a nation as reliably democratic. The alliances between democracies during the two World Wars and the Cold War also strengthened the norms. He sees less effective traces of this norm in Greek antiquity.[80]

Hans Köchler relates the question of transnational democracy to empowering the individual citizen by involving him, through procedures of direct democracy, in a country's international affairs, and he calls for the restructuring of the United Nations Organization according to democratic norms. He refers in particular to the Swiss practice of participatory democracy.[23]

Mousseau argues that it is market-oriented development that creates the norms and values that explain both democracy and the peace. In less developed countries individuals often depend on social networks that impose conformity to in-group norms and beliefs, and loyalty to group leaders. When jobs are plentiful on the market, in contrast, as in market-oriented developed countries, individuals depend on a strong state that enforces contracts equally. Cognitive routines emerge of abiding by state law rather than group leaders, and, as in contracts, tolerating differences among individuals. Voters in marketplace democracies thus accept only impartial ‘liberal’ governments, and constrain leaders to pursue their interests in securing equal access to global markets and in resisting those who distort such access with force. Marketplace democracies thus share common foreign policy interests in the supremacy—and predictability—of international law over brute power politics, and equal and open global trade over closed trade and imperial preferences. When disputes do originate between marketplace democracies, they are less likely than others to escalate to violence because both states, even the stronger one, perceive greater long-term interests in the supremacy of law over power politics.[81][82]

Braumoeller argues that liberal norms of conflict resolution vary because liberalism takes many forms. By examining survey results from the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, the author demonstrates that liberalism in that region bears a stronger resemblance to 19th-century liberal nationalism than to the sort of universalist, Wilsonian liberalism described by democratic peace theorists, and that, as a result, liberals in the region are more, not less, aggressive than non-liberals.[76]

A 2013 study by Jessica Weeks and Michael Tomz found through survey experiments that the public was less supportive of war in cases involving fellow democracies.[83]

Democratic political structures

[edit]

The case for institutional constraints goes back to Immanuel Kant, who wrote:[84]

[I]f the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared (and in this constitution it cannot but be the case), nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war. Among the latter would be: having to fight, having to pay the costs of war from their own resources, having painfully to repair the devastation war leaves behind, and, to fill up the measure of evils, load themselves with a heavy national debt that would embitter peace itself and that can never be liquidated on account of constant wars in the future.

Democracy thus gives influence to those most likely to be killed or wounded in wars, and their relatives and friends (and to those who pay the bulk of the war taxes.)[85] This monadic theory must, however, explain why democracies do attack non-democratic states. One explanation is that these democracies were threatened or otherwise were provoked by the non-democratic states. Doyle argued that the absence of a monadic peace is only to be expected: the same ideologies that cause liberal states to be at peace with each other inspire idealistic wars with the illiberal, whether to defend oppressed foreign minorities or avenge countrymen settled abroad.[86] Doyle also notes liberal states do conduct covert operations against each other; the covert nature of the operation, however, prevents the publicity otherwise characteristic of a free state from applying to the question.[87]

Charles Lipson argues that four factors common in democracies give them a "contracting advantage" that leads to a dyadic democratic peace: (1) Greater transparency, (2) Greater continuity, (3) Electoral incentives for leaders to keep promises, and (4) Constitutional governance.[88]

Studies show that democratic states are more likely than autocratic states to win the wars that they start. One explanation is that democracies, for internal political and economic reasons, have greater resources. This might mean that democratic leaders are unlikely to select other democratic states as targets because they perceive them to be particularly formidable opponents. One study finds that interstate wars have important impacts on the fate of political regimes, and that the probability that a political leader will fall from power in the wake of a lost war is particularly high in democratic states.[40]

As described by Gelpi and Griesdorf, several studies have argued that liberal leaders face institutionalized constraints that impede their capacity to mobilize the state's resources for war without the consent of a broad spectrum of interests.[75] Survey results that compare the attitudes of citizens and elites in the Soviet successor states are consistent with this argument.[76] Moreover, these constraints are readily apparent to other states and cannot be manipulated by leaders. Thus, democracies send credible signals to other states of an aversion to using force. These signals allow democratic states to avoid conflicts with one another, but they may attract aggression from non-democratic states. Democracies may be pressured to respond to such aggression—perhaps even preemptively—through the use of force. Also as described by Gelpi and Griesdorf, studies have argued that when democratic leaders do choose to escalate international crises, their threats are taken as highly credible, since there must be a relatively large public opinion for these actions. In disputes between liberal states, the credibility of their bargaining signals allows them to negotiate a peaceful settlement before mobilization.[75] A 2017 study by Jeff Carter found evidence that democratic states are slower to mobilize for war.[89]

An explanation based on game theory similar to the last two above is that the participation of the public and the open debate send clear and reliable information regarding the intentions of democracies to other states. In contrast, it is difficult to know the intentions of non-democratic leaders, what effect concessions will have, and if promises will be kept. Thus there will be mistrust and unwillingness to make concessions if at least one of the parties in a dispute is a non-democracy.[90]

The risk factors for certain types of state have, however, changed since Kant's time. In the quote above, Kant points to the lack of popular support for war – first that the populace will directly or indirectly suffer in the event of war – as a reason why republics will not tend to go to war. The number of American troops killed or maimed versus the number of Iraqi soldiers and civilians maimed and killed in the American-Iraqi conflict is indicative. This may explain the relatively great willingness of democratic states to attack weak opponents: the Iraq war was, initially at least, highly popular in the United States. The case of the Vietnam War might, nonetheless, indicate a tipping point where publics may no longer accept continuing attrition of their soldiers (even while remaining relatively indifferent to the much higher loss of life on the part of the populations attacked).

Coleman uses economic cost-benefit analysis to reach conclusions similar to Kant's. Coleman examines the polar cases of autocracy and liberal democracy. In both cases, the costs of war are assumed to be borne by the people. In autocracy, the autocrat receives the entire benefits of war, while in a liberal democracy the benefits are dispersed among the people. Since the net benefit to an autocrat exceeds the net benefit to a citizen of a liberal democracy, the autocrat is more likely to go to war. The disparity of benefits and costs can be so high that an autocrat can launch a welfare-destroying war when his net benefit exceeds the total cost of war. Contrarily, the net benefit of the same war to an individual in a liberal democracy can be negative so that he would not choose to go to war. This disincentive to war is increased between liberal democracies through their establishment of linkages, political and economic, that further raise the costs of war between them. Therefore, liberal democracies are less likely to go war, especially against each other. Coleman further distinguishes between offensive and defensive wars and finds that liberal democracies are less likely to fight defensive wars that may have already begun due to excessive discounting of future costs.[91]

Brad LeVeck and Neil Narang argue that democratic states are less likely to produce decision-making errors in crises due to a larger and more diverse set of actors who are involved in the foreign policy decision-making process.[92]

Using selectorate theory, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith argue that the democratic peace stems in part from the fact that democratic leaders sustain their power through large winning coalitions, which means that democratic leaders devote more resources to war, have an advantage in war, and choose wars that they are highly likely to win. These leads democratic states to avoid one another, but war with weak non-democratic states.[93]

Audience costs

[edit]

A prominent rational choice argument for the democratic peace is that democracies carry greater audience costs than authoritarian states, which makes them better at signaling their intentions in interstate disputes.[94][95] Arguments regarding the credibility of democratic states in disputes has been subject to debate among international relations scholars. Two studies from 2001, using the MID and ICB datasets, provided empirical support for the notion that democracies were more likely to issue effective threats.[96][75] However, a 2012 study by Alexander B. Downes and Todd S. Sechser found that existing datasets were not suitable to draw any conclusions as to whether democratic states issued more effective threats.[10] They constructed their own dataset specifically for interstate military threats and outcomes, which found no relationship between regime type and effective threats.[10] A 2017 study which recoded flaws in the MID dataset ultimately conclude, "that there are no regime-based differences in dispute reciprocation, and prior findings may be based largely on poorly coded data."[10] Other scholars have disputed the democratic credibility argument, questioning its causal logic and empirical validity.[97] Research by Jessica Weeks argued that some authoritarian regime types have similar audience costs as in democratic states.[98][99]

A 2021 study found that Americans perceived democracies to be more likely to back down in crises, which contradicts the expectations of the audience costs literature.[100]

Democracy differences

[edit]

One general criticism motivating research of different explanations is that actually the theory cannot claim that "democracy causes peace", because the evidence for democracies being, in general, more peaceful is very slight or nonexistent; it only can support the claim that "joint democracy causes peace". According to Rosato, this casts doubts on whether democracy is actually the cause because, if so, a monadic effect would be expected.[9]

Perhaps the simplest explanation to such perceived anomaly (but not the one the Realist Rosato prefers, see the section on Realist explanations below) is that democracies are not peaceful to each other because they are democratic, but rather because they are similar in democratic scores. This line of thought started with several independent observations of an "Autocratic Peace" effect, a reduced probability of war (obviously no author claims its absence) between states which are both non-democratic, or both highly so.[101][102] This has led to the hypothesis that democratic peace emerges as a particular case when analyzing a subset of states which are, in fact, similar.[103] Or, that similarity in general does not solely affect the probability of war, but only coherence of strong political regimes such as full democracies and stark autocracies.

Autocratic peace and the explanation based on democratic similarity. is a relatively recent development, and opinions about its value are varied. Henderson builds a model considering political similarity, geographic distance and economic interdependence as its main variables, and concludes that democratic peace is a statistical artifact which disappears when the above variables are taken into account.[104] Werner finds a conflict reducing effect from political similarity in general, but with democratic dyads being particularly peaceful, and noting some differences in behavior between democratic and autocratic dyads with respect to alliances and power evaluation.[103] Beck, King, and Zeng use neural networks to show two distinct low probability zones, corresponding to high democracy and high autocracy.[105][d] Petersen uses a different statistical model and finds that autocratic peace is not statistically significant, and that the effect attributed to similarity is mostly driven by the pacifying effect of joint democracy.[106] Ray similarly disputes the weight of the argument on logical grounds, claiming that statistical analysis on "political similarity" uses a main variable which is an extension of "joint democracy" by linguistic redefinition, and so it is expected that the war reducing effects are carried on in the new analysis.[107] Bennett builds a direct statistical model based on a triadic classification of states into "democratic", "autocratic" and "mixed". He finds that autocratic dyads have a 35% reduced chance of going into any type of armed conflict with respect to a reference mixed dyad. Democratic dyads have a 55% reduced chance. This effect gets stronger when looking at more severe conflicts; for wars (more than 1000 battle deaths), he estimates democratic dyads to have an 82% lower risk than autocratic dyads. He concludes that autocratic peace exists, but democratic peace is clearly stronger. However, he finds no relevant pacifying effect of political similarity, except at the extremes of the scale.[108]

To summarize a rather complex picture, there are no less than four possible stances on the value of this criticism:

  1. Political similarity, plus some complementary variables, explains everything. Democratic peace is a statistical artifact. Henderson subscribes to this view.
  2. Political similarity has a pacifying effect, but democracy makes it stronger. Werner would probably subscribe to this view.
  3. Political similarity in general has little or no effect, except at the extremes of the democracy-autocracy scale: a democratic peace and an autocratic peace exist separately, with the first one being stronger, and may have different explanations. Bennett holds this view, and Kinsella mentions this as a possibility
  4. Political similarity has little or no effect and there is no evidence for autocratic peace. Petersen and Ray are among defendants of this view.

Interactive model of democratic peace

[edit]

The interactive model of democratic peace is a combination of democratic similarity with the traditional model of democratic peace theory demonstrated on V-Dem Democracy Indices.[109]

Criticism

[edit]

There are several logically distinguishable classes of criticism.[110] They usually apply to no wars or few MIDs between democracies, not to little systematic violence in established democracies. In addition, there have been a number of wars between democracies. The 1987–1989 JVP insurrection in Sri Lanka is an example in which politicide was committed by a democratic regime, resulting in the deaths of at least 13,000 and 30,000 suspected JVP members or alleged supporters.[111]

Statistical significance

[edit]

One study has argued that there have been as many wars between democracies as one would expect between any other couple of states. Its authors conclude that the argument for democratic peace "rests in an ambiguity", since empirical evidence not confirm neither deny democratic pacifism, and strongly relies upon what degree of democracy makes a government democratic; according to them "because perfect democracy is infeasible, one can always sidestep counter-evidence by raising the bar of democracy".[112]

Others state that, although there may be some evidence for democratic peace, the data sample or the time span may be too small to assess any definitive conclusions.[113][58][27] For example, Gowa finds evidence for democratic peace to be insignificant before 1939, because of the too small number of democracies, and offers an alternate realist explanation for the following period.[58] Gowa's use of statistics has been criticized, with several other studies and reviews finding different or opposing results.[75][24] However, this can be seen as the longest-lasting criticism to the theory; as noted earlier, also some supporters agree that the statistical sample for assessing its validity is limited or scarce, at least if only full-scale wars are considered.[citation needed]

According to one study, which uses a rather restrictive definition of democracy and war, there were no wars between jointly democratic couples of states in the period from 1816 to 1992. Assuming a purely random distribution of wars between states, regardless of their democratic character, the predicted number of conflicts between democracies would be around ten. So, Ray argues that the evidence is statistically significant, but that it is still conceivable that, in the future, even a small number of inter-democratic wars would cancel out such evidence.[24][e]

Peace comes before democracy

[edit]

The territorial peace theory argues that peace leads to democracy more than democracy leads to peace. This argument is supported by historical studies showing that peace almost always comes before democracy and that states do not develop democracy until all border disputes have been settled. These studies indicate that there is strong evidence that peace causes democracy but little evidence that democracy causes peace.[68]

The hypothesis that peace causes democracy is supported by psychological and cultural theories. Christian Welzel's human empowerment theory posits that existential security leads to emancipative cultural values and support for a democratic political organization.[114] This also follows from the so-called regality theory based on evolutionary psychology.

The territorial peace theory explains why countries in conflict with their neighbor countries are unlikely to develop democracy. The democratic peace theory is more relevant for peace between non-neighbor countries and for relations between countries that are already at peace with each other.[115]

Third factors causing both democracy and peace

[edit]

Several other theories argue that omitted variables explain both peace and democracy. Variables that may explain both democracy and peace include institutions, commerce, interdependence, alliances, US world dominance and political stability.[7][8][9][10]

These theories are further explained under Other explanations.

Wars against non-democracies

[edit]

Critics of Democratic Peace theory note that liberal states often engage in conflicts with non-liberal states they deem "rogue," "failed," or "evil."[116] Several studies fail to confirm that democracies are less likely to wage war than autocracies if wars against non-democracies are included.[117]

Edward Gibbon stressed that the principal conquests of the Romans were achieved under the republic; and the emperors, for the most part, were satisfied with preserving those dominions which had been acquired by the policy of the Senate, the active emulation of the consuls, and the martial enthusiasm of the people.[118]

Signalling

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The notion that democracies can signal intentions more credibly has been disputed.[10]

Criticism of definitions, methodology and data

[edit]

Some authors criticize the definition of democracy by arguing that states continually reinterpret other states' regime types as a consequence of their own objective interests and motives, such as economic and security concerns.[9] For example, one study reports that Germany was considered a democratic state by Western opinion leaders at the end of the 19th century; yet in the years preceding World War I, when its relations with the United States, France and Britain started deteriorating, Germany was gradually reinterpreted as an autocratic state, in absence of any actual regime change.[119][120] Shimmin moves a similar criticism regarding the western perception of Milosevic's Serbia between 1989 and 1999.[121] Rummel replies to this criticism by stating that, in general, studies on democratic peace do not focus on other countries' perceptions of democracy; and in the specific case of Serbia, by arguing that the limited credit accorded by western democracies to Milosevic in the early 1990s did not amount to a recognition of democracy, but only to the perception that possible alternative leaders could be even worse.[122]

Some democratic peace researchers have been criticized for post hoc reclassifying some specific conflicts as non-wars or political systems as non-democracies without checking and correcting the whole data set used similarly. Supporters and opponents of the democratic peace agree that this is bad use of statistics, even if a plausible case can be made for the correction.[21][57][58] A military affairs columnist of the newspaper Asia Times has summarized the above criticism in a journalist's fashion describing the theory as subject to the no true Scotsman problem: exceptions are explained away as not being between "real" democracies or "real" wars.[123]

Some democratic peace researchers require that the executive result from a substantively contested election. This may be a restrictive definition: For example, the National Archives of the United States notes that "For all intents and purposes, George Washington was unopposed for election as President, both in 1789 and 1792". (Under the original provisions for the Electoral College, there was no distinction between votes for president and Vice-president: each elector was required to vote for two distinct candidates, with the runner-up to be vice-president. Every elector cast one of his votes for Washington,[124] John Adams received a majority of the other votes; there were several other candidates: so the election for vice president was contested.)

Spiro made several other criticisms of the statistical methods used.[113] Russett and a series of papers described by Ray responded to this, for example with different methodology.[125][24]

Sometimes the datasets used have also been criticized. For example, some authors have criticized the Correlates of War data for not including civilian deaths in the battle deaths count, especially in civil wars.[citation needed] Cohen and Weeks argue that most fishing disputes, which include no deaths and generally very limited threats of violence, should be excluded even from the list of military disputes.[126] Gleditsch made several criticisms to the Correlates of War data set, and produced a revised set of data.[61] Maoz and Russett made several criticisms to the Polity I and II data sets, which have mostly been addressed in later versions.[22]

The most comprehensive critique points out that "democracy" is rarely defined, never refers to substantive democracy, is unclear about causation, has been refuted in more than 100 studies, fails to account for some 200 deviant cases, and has been promoted ideologically to justify one country seeking to expand democracy abroad.[127] Most studies treat the complex concept of "democracy" as a bivariate variable rather than attempting to dimensionalize the concept. Studies also fail to take into account the fact that there are dozens of types of democracy, so the results are meaningless unless articulated to a particular type of democracy or claimed to be true for all types, such as consociational or economic democracy, with disparate datasets.

Microfoundations

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Recent work into the democratic norms explanations shows that the microfoundations on which this explanation rest do not find empirical support. Within most earlier studies, the presence of liberal norms in democratic societies and their subsequent influence on the willingness to wage war was merely assumed, never measured. Moreover, it was never investigated whether or not these norms are absent within other regime-types. Two recent studies measured the presence of liberal norms and investigated the assumed effect of these norms on the willingness to wage war. The results of both studies show that liberal democratic norms are not only present within liberal democracies, but also within other regime-types. Moreover, these norms are not of influence on the willingness to attack another state during an interstate conflict at the brink of war.[128][129]

Sebastian Rosato argues that democratic peace theory makes several false assumptions. Firstly, it assumes that democratic populaces will react negatively to the costs of war upon them. However, in modern wars casualties tend to be fairly low and soldiers are largely volunteers, meaning they accept the risks of fighting, so their families and friends, whom the cost of their death falls on heaviest, are less likely to criticise the government than the families and friends of conscripted soldiers. Secondly, democratic peace theory ignores the role of nationalism; democratic populaces are just as likely to be influenced by nationalist sentiment as anyone else and if a democratic populace believes that a war is necessary for their nation, the populace will support it. Lastly, democratic leaders are as likely to guide public opinion as they are to follow it. Democratic leaders are often aware of the power of nationalist sentiment and thus seek to encourage it when it comes to war, arguing that war is necessary to defend or spread the nation's way of life. Democratic leaders may even have an advatange over authoritarians in this regard, as they can be seen as more legitimately representative. Rosato argues that this does not just apply to wars of defence but also aggression; democratic populaces can be roused by nationalist feelings to support aggressive wars if they are seen as in the national interest.[9]

Rosato also argues that authoritarian leaders have a reduced incentive to go to war because civilian control over the military is less guaranteed in autocracies; there is always the risk the military could subvert civilian leadership and a war which results in defeat could swiftly result in a coup. Even military dictators run the risk of internal dissent within the armed forces. Autocratic leaders in general also risk unleashing political and social turmoil that could destroy them if they go to war. Conversely, bellicose democratic leaders can rely on the acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the democratic process, as pacifist actors in democracies will need to respect the legitimacy of a democratically elected government. If pro-war groups can capture the organs of the state in a democracy legitimately, then anti-war groups will have little means of opposing them outside of extra-constitutional means, which would likely backfire and cause the anti-war groups to lose legitimacy.[9]

A 2017 study found that public opinion in China showed the same reluctance in going to war as publics in democratic states, which suggests that publics in democratic states are not generally more opposed to war than publics in authoritarian states.[130]

Limited consequences

[edit]

The peacefulness may have various limitations and qualifiers and may not actually mean very much in the real world.

Democratic peace researchers do in general not count as wars conflicts which do not kill a thousand on the battlefield; thus they exclude for example the bloodless Cod Wars. However, research has also found a peacefulness between democracies when looking at lesser conflicts.

Liberal democracies have less of these wars than other states after 1945. This might be related to changes in the perception of non-European peoples, as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[79]

Related to this is the human rights violations committed against native people, sometimes by liberal democracies. One response is that many of the worst crimes were committed by non-democracies, like in the European colonies before the nineteenth century, in King Leopold II of Belgium's privately owned Congo Free State, and in Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union. The United Kingdom abolished slavery in British territory in 1833, immediately after the Reform Act 1832 had significantly enlarged the franchise. (Of course, the abolition of the slave trade had been enacted in 1807; and many DPT supporters would deny that the UK was a liberal democracy in 1833 when examining interstate wars.)

Hermann and Kegley Jr. argue that interventions between democracies are more likely to happen than projected by an expected model.[131] They further argue that democracies are more likely to intervene in other liberal states than against countries that are non-democracies.[132] Finally, they argue that these interventions between democracies have been increasing over time and that the world can expect more of these interventions in the future.[131][132][133] The methodology used has been criticized and more recent studies have found opposing results.[61]

Rummel argues that the continuing increase in democracy worldwide will soon lead to an end to wars and democide, possibly around or even before the middle of this century.[134] The fall of Communism and the increase in the number of democratic states were accompanied by a sudden and dramatic decline in total warfare, interstate wars, ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, and the number of refugees and displaced persons.[135] One report claims that the two main causes of this decline in warfare are the end of the Cold War itself and decolonization; but also claims that the three Kantian factors have contributed materially.[136]

Historical periods

[edit]

Economic historians Joel Mokyr and Hans-Joachim Voth argue that democratic states may have been more vulnerable to conquest because the rulers in those states were too heavily constrained. Absolutist rulers in other states could, however, operate more freely.[137]

Covert operations and proxy wars

[edit]

Critics of the democratic peace theory have pointed to covert operations and military interventions between democracies, and argued that these interventions indicate that democracies do not necessarily trust and respect each other.[9] Alexander B. Downes and Lary Lauren Lilley argue that covert operations conducted by democratic states has different implications depending on which version of democratic peace theory one adheres to. They argue that covert operations are inconsistent with variants of democratic peace theory that emphasize norms and checks-and-balances, but that covert operations may be more consistent with versions of democratic peace theory that rely on selectorate theory's notion of large versus small winning coalitions.[138]

A 2015 study by Michael Poznansky reconciles findings that democracies engage in covert interventions against one another by arguing that democracies do so when they expect another state's democratic character to break down or decay.[139]

A 2022 study found that democracies rarely wage proxy wars against fellow democracies: "strong democratic institutions prevent elected leaders from engaging in proxy war against sister regimes, and embargo violations tend to occur when democratic institutions are weak."[140]

Information manipulation

[edit]

Chaim Kaufmann argues that the lead-up to the Iraq War demonstrates that constraints on war in democracies may hinge on whether democratic governments can control and manipulate information, and suppress intelligence findings that run counter to administration rhetoric, as well as whether there is a strong opposition party and powerful media.[141]

Coup by provoking a war

[edit]

Many democracies become non-democratic by war, as being aggressed or as aggressor (quickly after a coup), sometimes the coup leader worked to provoke that war.

Carl Schmitt wrote on how to overrule a Constitution: "Sovereign is he who decides on the exception."[142] Schmitt, again on the need for internal (and foreign) enemies because they are useful to persuade the people not to trust anyone more than the Leader: "As long as the state is a political entity this requirement for internal peace compels it in critical situations to decide also upon the domestic enemy. Every state provides, therefore, some kind of formula for the declaration of an internal enemy." Whatever opposition will be pictured and intended as the actual foreign enemy's puppet.[143]

Other explanations

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Economic factors

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World GDP/capita 1–2003 AD. The increase in the number of democratic nations has occurred at the same time as the increase in economic wealth.

The capitalist peace, or capitalist peace theory, posits that according to given criteria for economic development (capitalism), developed economies have not engaged in war with each other, and rarely enter into low-level disputes. These theories have been proposed as an explanation for democratic peace by accounting for both democracy and the peace among democratic nations. The exact nature of the causality depends upon both the proposed variable and the measure of the indicator for the concept used.

A majority of researchers on the determinants of democracy agree that economic development is a primary factor which allows the formation of a stable and healthy democracy.[144][145] Thus, some researchers have argued that economic development also plays a factor in the establishment of peace.

Mousseau argues that a culture of contracting in advanced market-oriented economies may cause both democracy and peace. These studies indicate that democracy, alone, is an unlikely cause of the democratic peace. A low level of market-oriented economic development may hinder development of liberal institutions and values.[81][146][147][82] Hegre and Souva confirmed these expectations.[148][149] Mousseau finds that democracy is a significant factor only when both democracies have levels of economic development well above the global median. In fact, the poorest 21% of the democracies studied, and the poorest 4–5% of current democracies, are significantly more likely than other kinds of countries to fight each other.[82] Mousseau, Hegre, and Oneal confirm that if at least one of the democracies involved has a very low level of economic development, democracy is ineffective in preventing war; however, they find that when also controlling for trade, 91% of all the democratic pairs had high enough development for the pacifying effect of democracy to be important during the 1885–1992 period and all in 1992.[150] The difference in results of these two studies may be due to sampling: Mousseau's 2005 study observed only neighboring states where poor countries actually can fight each other. In fact, fully 89% of militarized conflicts between less developed countries from 1920 and 2000 were among directly contiguous neighbors.[151] He argues that it is not likely that the results can be explained by trade: Because developed states have large economies, they do not have high levels of trade interdependence.[152][153] In fact, the correlation of developed democracy with trade interdependence is a scant 0.06 (Pearson's r – considered substantively no correlation by statisticians.[154])[improper synthesis?]

Both World Wars were fought between countries which can be considered economically developed. Mousseau argues that both Germany and Japan – like the USSR during the Cold War and Saudi Arabia today – had state-managed economies and thus lacked his market norms.[155] Hegre finds that democracy is correlated with civil peace only for developed countries, and for countries with high levels of literacy. Conversely, the risk of civil war decreases with development only for democratic countries.[144]

Gartzke argues that economic freedom (a quite different concept from Mousseau's market norms) or financial dependence explains the developed democratic peace, and these countries may be weak on these dimensions too.[156][157][158] Rummel criticizes Gartzke's methodology and argues that his results are invalid.[159]

Allan Dafoe, John R. Oneal, and Bruce Russett have challenged Gartzke and Mousseau's research.[160]

Several studies find that democracy, more trade causing greater economic interdependence, and membership in more intergovernmental organizations reduce the risk of war. This is often called the Kantian peace theory since it is similar to Kant's earlier theory about a perpetual peace; it is often also called "liberal peace" theory, especially when one focuses on the effects of trade and democracy. (The theory that free trade can cause peace is quite old and referred to as Cobdenism.) Many researchers agree that these variables positively affect each other but each has a separate pacifying effect. For example, in countries exchanging a substantial amount of trade, economic interest groups may exist that oppose a reciprocal disruptive war, but in democracy such groups may have more power, and the political leaders be more likely to accept their requests.[161][162][163] Weede argues that the pacifying effect of free trade and economic interdependence may be more important than that of democracy, because the former affects peace both directly and indirectly, by producing economic development and ultimately, democracy.[145] Weede also lists some other authors supporting this view. However, some recent studies find no effect from trade but only from democracy.[164][165]

None of the authors listed argues that free trade alone causes peace. Even so, the issue of whether free trade or democracy is more important in maintaining peace may have potentially significant practical consequences, for example on evaluating the effectiveness of applying economic sanctions and restrictions to autocratic countries.

It was Michael Doyle who reintroduced Kant's three articles into democratic peace theory. He argued that a pacific union of liberal states has been growing for the past two centuries. He denies that a pair of states will be peaceful simply because they are both liberal democracies; if that were enough, liberal states would not be aggressive towards weak non-liberal states (as the history of American relations with Mexico shows they are). Rather, liberal democracy is a necessary condition for international organization and hospitality (which are Kant's other two articles)—and all three are sufficient to produce peace.[28][166] Other Kantians have not repeated Doyle's argument that all three in the triad must be present, instead stating that all three reduce the risk of war.

Immanuel Wallerstein has argued that it is the global capitalist system that creates shared interests among the dominant parties, thus inhibiting potentially harmful belligerence.[167]

Toni Negri and Michael Hardt take a similar stance, arguing that the intertwined network of interests in the global capitalism leads to the decline of individual nation states, and the rise of a global Empire which has no outside, and no external enemies. As a result, they write, "The era of imperialist, interimperialist, and anti-imperialist wars is over. (...) we have entered the era of minor and internal conflicts. Every imperial war is a civil war, a police action".[168]

Other explanations

[edit]

Many studies supporting the theory have controlled for many possible alternative causes of the peace. Examples of factors controlled for are geographic distance, geographic contiguity, power status, alliance ties, militarization, economic wealth and economic growth, power ratio, and political stability. These studies have often found very different results depending on methodology and included variables, which has caused criticism. DPT does not state democracy is the only thing affecting the risk of military conflict. Many of the mentioned studies have found that other factors are also important.[40][107][163]

Several studies have also controlled for the possibility of reverse causality from peace to democracy. For example, one study supports the theory of simultaneous causation, finding that dyads involved in wars are likely to experience a decrease in joint democracy, which in turn increases the probability of further war. So they argue that disputes between democratizing or democratic states should be resolved externally at a very early stage, in order to stabilize the system.[169] Another study finds that peace does not spread democracy, but spreading democracy is likely to spread peace. A different kind of reverse causation lies in the suggestion that impending war could destroy or decrease democracy, because the preparation for war might include political restrictions, which may be the cause for the findings of democratic peace.[170] However, this hypothesis has been statistically tested in a study whose authors find, depending on the definition of the pre-war period, no such effect or a very slight one. So, they find this explanation unlikely.[46] This explanation would predict a monadic effect, although weaker than the dyadic one.[dubiousdiscuss]

Weart argues that the peacefulness appears and disappears rapidly when democracy appears and disappears. This in his view makes it unlikely that variables that change more slowly are the explanation.[35] Weart, however, has been criticized for not offering any quantitative analysis supporting his claims.[171]

Wars tend very strongly to be between neighboring states. Gleditsch showed that the average distance between democracies is about 8000 miles, the same as the average distance between all states. He believes that the effect of distance in preventing war, modified by the democratic peace, explains the incidence of war as fully as it can be explained.[57]

A 2020 study in International Organization found that it was not democracy per se that reduces the prospects for conflict, but whether women's suffrage was ensured. The study argued, "women's more pacific preferences generate a dyadic democratic peace (i.e., between democracies), as well as a monadic peace."[172]

According to Azar Gat's War in Human Civilization, there are several related and independent factors that contribute to democratic societies being more peaceful than other forms of governments:[173]

  1. Wealth and comfort: Increased prosperity in democratic societies has been associated with peace because civilians are less willing to endure hardship of war and military service due to a more luxurious life at home than in pre-modern times. Increased wealth has worked to decrease war through comfort.[174]
  2. Metropolitan service society: The majority of army recruits come from the countryside or factory workers. Many believe that these types of people are suited for war. But as technology progressed the army turned more towards advanced services in information that rely more on computerized data which urbanized people are recruited more for this service.[175]
  3. Sexual revolution: The availability of sex due to the pill and women joining the labor market could be another factor that has led to less enthusiasm for men to go to war. Young men are more reluctant leave behind the pleasures of life for the rigors and chastity of the army.[176]
  4. Fewer young males: There is greater life expectancy which leads to fewer young males. Young males are the most aggressive and the ones that join the army the most. With fewer younger males in developed societies could help explain more pacificity.[177]
  5. Fewer children per family (lower fertility rate): During pre modern times it was always hard for families to lose a child but in modern times it has become more difficult due to more families having only one or two children. It has become even harder for parents to risk the loss of a child in war. However, Gat recognizes that this argument is a difficult one because during pre modern times the life expectancy was not high for children and bigger families were necessary.[178]
  6. Women's franchise: Women are less overtly aggressive than men. Therefore, women are less inclined to serious violence and do not support it as much as men do. In liberal democracies women have been able to influence the government by getting elected. Electing more women could have an effect on whether liberal democracies take a more aggressive approach on certain issues.[179]
  7. Nuclear weapons: Nuclear weapons could be the reason for not having a great power war. Many believe that a nuclear war would result in mutually assured destruction (MAD) which means that both countries involved in a nuclear war have the ability to strike the other until both sides are wiped out. This results in countries not wanting to strike the other for fear of being wiped out.[180]

Realist explanations

[edit]

Supporters of realism in international relations in general argue that not democracy or its absence, but considerations and evaluations of power, cause peace or war. Specifically, many realist critics claim that the effect ascribed to democratic, or liberal, peace, is in fact due to alliance ties between democratic states which in turn are caused, one way or another, by realist factors.

For example, Farber and Gowa find evidence for peace between democracies to be statistically significant only in the period from 1945 on, and consider such peace an artifact of the Cold War, when the threat from the communist states forced democracies to ally with one another.[181] Mearsheimer offers a similar analysis of the Anglo-American peace before 1945, caused by the German threat.[182] Spiro finds several instances of wars between democracies, arguing that evidence in favor of the theory might be not so vast as other authors report, and claims that the remaining evidence consists of peace between allied states with shared objectives. He acknowledges that democratic states might have a somewhat greater tendency to ally with one another, and regards this as the only real effect of democratic peace.[113] Rosato argues that most of the significant evidence for democratic peace has been observed after World War II; and that it has happened within a broad alliance, which can be identified with NATO and its satellite nations, imposed and maintained by American dominance as part of Pax Americana. One of the main points in Rosato's argument is that, although never engaged in open war with another liberal democracy during the Cold War, the United States intervened openly or covertly in the political affairs of democratic states several times, for example in the Chilean coup of 1973, the Operation Ajax (1953 coup in Iran) and Operation PBSuccess (1954 coup in Guatemala); in Rosato's view, these interventions show the United States' determination to maintain an "imperial peace".[9]

The most direct counter arguments to such criticisms have been studies finding peace between democracies to be significant even when controlling for "common interests" as reflected in alliance ties.[75][24] Regarding specific issues, Ray objects that explanations based on the Cold War should predict that the Communist bloc would be at peace within itself also, but exceptions include the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, the Cambodian-Vietnamese War, and the Sino-Vietnamese War. Ray also argues that the external threat did not prevent conflicts in the Western bloc when at least one of the involved states was a non-democracy, such as the Turkish Invasion of Cyprus (against Greek Junta supported Cypriot Greeks), the Falklands War, and the Football War.[40] Also, one study notes that the explanation "goes increasingly stale as the post-Cold War world accumulates an increasing number of peaceful dyad-years between democracies".[183] Rosato's argument about American dominance has also been criticized for not giving supporting statistical evidence.[184]

Some realist authors also criticize in detail the explanations first by supporters of democratic peace, pointing to supposed inconsistencies or weaknesses.

Rosato criticizes most explanations to how democracy might cause peace. Arguments based on normative constraints, he argues, are not consistent with the fact that democracies do go to war no less than other states, thus violating norms preventing war; for the same reason he refutes arguments based on the importance of public opinion. Regarding explanations based on greater accountability of leaders, he finds that historically autocratic leaders have been removed or punished more often than democratic leaders when they get involved in costly wars. Finally, he also criticizes the arguments that democracies treat each other with trust and respect even during crises; and that democracy might be slow to mobilize its composite and diverse groups and opinions, hindering the start of a war, drawing support from other authors.[9] Another realist, Layne, analyzes the crises and brinkmanship that took place between non-allied democratic great powers, during the relatively brief period when such existed. He finds no evidence either of institutional or cultural constraints against war; indeed, there was popular sentiment in favor of war on both sides. Instead, in all cases, one side concluded that it could not afford to risk that war at that time, and made the necessary concessions.[185]

Rosato's objections have been criticized for claimed logical and methodological errors, and for being contradicted by existing statistical research.[26] Russett replies to Layne by re-examining some of the crises studied in his article, and reaching different conclusions; Russett argues that perceptions of democracy prevented escalation, or played a major role in doing so.[125] Also, a recent study finds that, while in general the outcome of international disputes is highly influenced by the contenders' relative military strength, this is not true if both contenders are democratic states; in this case the authors find the outcome of the crisis to be independent of the military capabilities of contenders, which is contrary to realist expectations.[75] Finally, both the realist criticisms here described ignore new possible explanations, like the game-theoretic one discussed below.[186]

Nuclear deterrent

[edit]

A different kind of realist criticism stresses the role of nuclear weapons in maintaining peace. In realist terms, this means that, in the case of disputes between nuclear powers, respective evaluation of power might be irrelevant because of Mutual assured destruction preventing both sides from foreseeing what could be reasonably called a "victory".[187] The 1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan has been cited as a counterexample to this argument,[60] though this was a small, regional conflict and the threat of WMDs being used contributed to its de-escalation.[188]

Some supporters of the democratic peace do not deny that realist factors are also important.[125] Research supporting the theory has also shown that factors such as alliance ties and major power status influence interstate conflict behavior.[24]

Statistical difficulties due to newness of democracy

[edit]
Number of nations 1800–2018 scoring 8 or higher on Polity5 scale. There have been no wars and in Wayman's listing of interliberal MIDs no conflict causing any battle deaths between these nations.[189]

One problem with the research on wars is that, as the Realist John Mearsheimer put it, "democracies have been few in number over the past two centuries, and thus there have been few opportunities where democracies were in a position to fight one another".[190] Democracies have been very rare until recently. Even looser definitions of democracy, such as Doyle's, find only a dozen democracies before the late nineteenth century, and many of them short-lived or with limited franchise.[28][191] Freedom House finds no independent state with universal suffrage in 1900.[192]

Wayman, a supporter of the theory, states that "If we rely solely on whether there has been an inter-democratic war, it is going to take many more decades of peace to build our confidence in the stability of the democratic peace".[189]

Studying lesser conflicts

[edit]

Many researchers have reacted to this limitation by studying lesser conflicts instead, since they have been far more common. There have been many more MIDs than wars; the Correlates of War Project counts several thousand during the last two centuries. A review lists many studies that have reported that democratic pairs of states are less likely to be involved in MIDs than other pairs of states.[24]

Another study finds that after both states have become democratic, there is a decreasing probability for MIDs within a year and this decreases almost to zero within five years.[193]

When examining the inter-liberal MIDs in more detail, one study finds that they are less likely to involve third parties, and that the target of the hostility is less likely to reciprocate, if the target reciprocates the response is usually proportional to the provocation, and the disputes are less likely to cause any loss of life. The most common action was "Seizure of Material or Personnel".[189]

Studies find that the probability that disputes between states will be resolved peacefully is positively affected by the degree of democracy exhibited by the lesser democratic state involved in that dispute. Disputes between democratic states are significantly shorter than disputes involving at least one undemocratic state. Democratic states are more likely to be amenable to third party mediation when they are involved in disputes with each other.[24]

In international crises that include the threat or use of military force, one study finds that if the parties are democracies, then relative military strength has no effect on who wins. This is different from when non-democracies are involved. These results are the same also if the conflicting parties are formal allies.[75] Similarly, a study of the behavior of states that joined ongoing militarized disputes reports that power is important only to autocracies: democracies do not seem to base their alignment on the power of the sides in the dispute.[194]

Academic relevance and derived studies

[edit]

Democratic peace theory is a well established research field with more than a hundred authors having published articles about it.[25] Several peer-reviewed studies mention in their introduction that most researchers accept the theory as an empirical fact.[26][195][90][46][75] According to a 2021 study by Kosuke Imai and James Lo, "overturning the negative association between democracy and conflict would require a confounder that is forty-seven times more prevalent in democratic dyads than in other dyads. To put this number in context, the relationship between democracy and peace is at least five times as robust as that between smoking and lung cancer. To explain away the democratic peace, therefore, scholars would have to find far more powerful confounders than those already identified in the literature."[12]

Imre Lakatos suggested that what he called a "progressive research program" is better than a "degenerative" one when it can explain the same phenomena as the "degenerative" one, but is also characterized by growth of its research field and the discovery of important novel facts. In contrast, the supporters of the "degenerative" program do not make important new empirical discoveries, but instead mostly apply adjustments to their theory in order to defend it from competitors. Some researchers argue that democratic peace theory is now the "progressive" program in international relations. According to these authors, the theory can explain the empirical phenomena previously explained by the earlier dominant research program, realism in international relations; in addition, the initial statement that democracies do not, or rarely, wage war on one another, has been followed by a rapidly growing literature on novel empirical regularities.[24][196][197]

Other examples are several studies finding that democracies are more likely to ally with one another than with other states, forming alliances which are likely to last longer than alliances involving non-democracies;[24] several studies[quantify] showing that democracies conduct diplomacy differently and in a more conciliatory way compared to non-democracies;[35] one study finding that democracies with proportional representation are in general more peaceful regardless of the nature of the other party involved in a relationship;[198] and another study reporting that proportional representation system and decentralized territorial autonomy is positively associated with lasting peace in postconflict societies.[199]

Influence

[edit]

The democratic peace theory has been extremely divisive among political scientists. It is rooted in the idealist and classical liberalist traditions and is opposed to the dominant theory of realism.

In the United States, presidents from both major parties have expressed support for the theory. In his 1994 State of the Union address, then-President Bill Clinton, a member of the Democratic Party, said: "Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don't attack each other".[200] In a 2004 press conference, then-President George W. Bush, a member of the Republican Party, said: "And the reason why I'm so strong on democracy is democracies don't go to war with each other. And the reason why is the people of most societies don't like war, and they understand what war means.... I've got great faith in democracies to promote peace. And that's why I'm such a strong believer that the way forward in the Middle East, the broader Middle East, is to promote democracy."[201][f]

In a 1999 speech, Chris Patten, the then-European Commissioner for External Relations, said: "Inevitable because the EU was formed partly to protect liberal values, so it is hardly surprising that we should think it appropriate to speak out. But it is also sensible for strategic reasons. Free societies tend not to fight one another or to be bad neighbours".[203] The A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy states: "The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states."[204] Tony Blair has also claimed the theory is correct.[205]

As justification for initiating war

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Some fear that the democratic peace theory may be used to justify wars against non-democracies in order to bring lasting peace, in a democratic crusade.[206] Woodrow Wilson in 1917 asked Congress to declare war against Imperial Germany, citing Germany's sinking of American ships due to unrestricted submarine warfare and the Zimmermann telegram, but also stating that "A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations" and "The world must be made safe for democracy."[207][g] R. J. Rummel was a notable proponent of war for the purpose of spreading democracy, based on this theory.

Some point out that the democratic peace theory has been used to justify the 2003 Iraq War, others argue that this justification was used only after the war had already started.[208] Furthermore, Weede has argued that the justification is extremely weak, because forcibly democratizing a country completely surrounded by non-democracies, most of which are full autocracies, as Iraq was, is at least as likely to increase the risk of war as it is to decrease it (some studies show that dyads formed by one democracy and one autocracy are the most warlike, and several find that the risk of war is greatly increased in democratizing countries surrounded by non-democracies).[145][verification needed] According to Weede, if the United States and its allies wanted to adopt a rationale strategy of forced democratization based on democratic peace, which he still does not recommend, it would be best to start intervening in countries which border with at least one or two stable democracies, and expand gradually. Also, research shows that attempts to create democracies by using external force has often failed. Gleditsch, Christiansen, and Hegre argue that forced democratization by interventionism may initially have partial success, but often create an unstable democratizing country, which can have dangerous consequences in the long run.[61] Those attempts which had a permanent and stable success, like democratization in Austria, West Germany and Japan after World War II, mostly involved countries which had an advanced economic and social structure already, and implied a drastic change of the whole political culture. Supporting internal democratic movements and using diplomacy may be far more successful and less costly. Thus, the theory and related research, if they were correctly understood, may actually be an argument against a democratic crusade.[35][38][208]

Michael Haas has written perhaps the most trenchant critique of a hidden normative agenda. Among the points raised: Due to sampling manipulation, the research creates the impression that democracies can justifiably fight non-democracies, snuff out budding democracies, or even impose democracy. And due to sloppy definitions, there is no concern that democracies continue undemocratic practices yet remain in the sample as if pristine democracies.[209]

This criticism is confirmed by David Keen who finds that almost all historical attempts to impose democracy by violent means have failed.[210]

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Republican liberalism

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Republican liberalism is a variation of Democratic Peace Theory which claims that liberal and republican democracies will rarely go to war with each other. It argues that these governments are more peaceful than non-democracies and will avoid conflict when possible. According to Micheal Doyle, there are three main reasons for this: Democracies tend to have similar domestic political cultures, they share common morals, and their economic systems are interdependent.[211][212] Liberal democracies (republics) that trade with each other, are economically dependent on one another and therefore, will always attempt to maintain diplomatic relations as to not disrupt their economies.

Liberalism, as an overarching theory, holds that diplomacy and cooperation is the most effective way to avoid war and maintain peace.[213] This is contrasting to the theory of realism, which states that conflict will always be recurrent in the international system, whether due to human nature or the anarchic international system.[214]

The concept of Republican liberalism is thought to have initially originated from Immanuel Kant's book "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" (1795). The term "Perpetual Peace" refers to the permanent establishment of peace, and was made notorious by the book. Democratic peace, commercial peace and institutional peace were all advanced in the book as well. It takes a rather utopian view, that humanities' desire for peace will out compete humanities' desire for war.[215]

Kantian liberalism

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Kant and the liberal school of thought view international co-operation as a more rational option for states than resorting to war. However, the neo-liberal approach concedes to the realist school of thought, that when states cooperate it is simply because it is in their best interest. Kant insisted that a world with only peace was possible, and he offered three definitive articles that would create the pathway for it. Each went on to become a dominant strain of post–World War II liberal international relations theory.[216]

I: "The Civil Constitution of Every State should be Republican"

Kant believed that every state should have Republican style form of government. As in, a state where "supreme power is held by the people and their elected representatives."[217] Kant saw this in Ancient Rome, where they began to move away from Athenian democracy (direct democracy) and towards a representative democracy. Kant believed giving the citizens the right to vote and decide for themselves would lead to shorter wars and less wars. He also thought it was important to "check the power of monarchs",[218] to establish a system of checks and balances where no one person holds absolute power. Peace is always dependent on the internal character of governments. Republics, with a legislative body that will be able to hold the executive leader in check and maintain the peace.

II: "The Law of Nations shall be founded on a Federation of Free States"

Kant argues nations, like individuals can be tempted to harm each other at any given moment. So, rule of law should be established internationally. Without international laws and courts of judgement, then force would be the only way to settle disputes. States ought to instead develop international organisations and rules that facilitate cooperation. In any case, some kind of federation is necessary in order to maintain peace between nations. Contemporary examples include the United Nations and the European Union, which try to maintain peace and encourage cooperation among nations.

III: "The Law of World Citizenship shall be Limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality"

Kant is referring to "the right of the stranger not to be treated as an enemy when he arrives in the land of another.".[215] So long "stranger" is peaceful, he should not be treated with hostility. However, this is not the right to be a "permanent visitor", simply as a temporary stay. This is applicable in the contemporary world when a country is receiving a world leader. The host country usually holds a state welcoming ceremony which strengthens diplomatic relations.

European peace

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There is significant debate over whether the lack of any major European general wars since 1945 is due to cooperation and integration of liberal-democratic European states themselves (as in the European Union or Franco-German cooperation), an enforced peace due to the intervention of the Soviet Union and the United States until 1989 and the United States alone thereafter,[219] or a combination of both.[220] The debate over this theory was thrust in the public eye when the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the European Union for its role in creating peace in Europe.[221] Notable major wars in Europe after 1945 are Yugoslav Wars and Russian invasion of Ukraine, which follows the prediction of the interactive model of democratic peace.[109]

See also

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Notes and references

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Bibliography

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Democratic peace theory proposes that liberal democracies do not initiate war against one another, an empirical regularity observed consistently in historical data. Originating in 's 1795 essay Perpetual Peace, which contended that republican governments with representative legislatures and would constrain leaders from aggressive foreign policies, the theory was revived in modern scholarship by Michael Doyle, who connected Kantian ideas to the absence of conflict among constitutional states. Empirical analyses confirm no interstate wars between established democracies since , with statistical studies demonstrating this dyadic pattern's robustness against potential confounders, exceeding even the evidential strength of links like smoking and lung cancer in observational data. Key explanations include shared liberal norms promoting non-violent , institutional via public accountability and , and enhanced transparency reducing miscalculations, though democracies may still conflict with autocracies due to differing signaling and audience costs. While critics question causation, citing possibilities like or power distributions as alternatives, or raising concerns over definitions and the limited sample of democratic dyads, defenses highlight the pattern's endurance across datasets and controls, positioning it as the closest approximation to a in the field. The theory's implications extend to policy, suggesting that expanding stable democracies could foster zones of peace, though it cautions against assuming universal or ignoring transitional risks in democratizing states.

Historical Development

Philosophical Foundations

The philosophical foundations of democratic peace theory originate primarily with Immanuel Kant's 1795 essay Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, where he proposed republican constitutions as a prerequisite for enduring international peace. Kant defined republics as governments featuring the separation of legislative and executive powers, with laws derived from the united will of the people rather than monarchical whim, emphasizing representative mechanisms over . He contended that such systems foster peace among states because citizens, accountable for war's costs in lives and resources, would oppose aggressive foreign policies lacking broad consent, unlike rulers in non-republican regimes who can externalize burdens onto subjects. Kant's first "definitive article" for perpetual peace explicitly links republican to reduced interstate conflict, arguing that "the civil of every state should be republican" to align state actions with popular interest in tranquility. This mechanism relies on transparency and public deliberation, where leaders face electoral repercussions for initiating wars, contrasting with absolutist states prone to for glory or expansion. While Kant acknowledged republics might still defend against threats, he predicted mutual non-aggression among them due to shared normative commitments to rational, rights-based . Influenced by Enlightenment liberalism, Kant's framework draws on ideas of popular sovereignty and contractual legitimacy akin to those in John Locke's theories of government by consent, though Kant innovated by extending these domestically derived norms to international relations. He envisioned a voluntary federation of republics, not a world state, gradually emerging through the diffusion of republican principles, supplemented by cosmopolitan rights for commerce and hospitality to promote interdependence. This liberal emphasis on mutual respect for autonomy underpins later democratic peace formulations, prioritizing institutional accountability over power balances. Kant's reservations about pure —viewing it as potentially mob rule susceptible to passion—underscore that his republican ideal anticipates modern liberal democracies with checks like constitutional limits and independent judiciaries, rather than unconstrained . Empirical alignment with this philosophy remains debated, as historical republics before 1795 were few and often imperialistic, yet Kant's causal logic of domestic restraint spilling into forms the enduring theoretical core.

Modern Formulation and Key Scholars

The modern iteration of democratic peace theory crystallized in international relations scholarship during the 1980s and 1990s, emphasizing the dyadic proposition that mature liberal democracies rarely, if ever, engage in interstate wars with one another, while acknowledging their potential for conflict with autocracies. This formulation distinguishes itself from monadic claims of inherent democratic pacifism by focusing on interactions between democratic pairs, attributing restraint to institutional constraints like accountability to electorates, shared liberal norms against conquest, and transparent signaling that reduces miscalculation risks. Empirical support drew from datasets such as the Correlates of War project, which documented no full-scale wars between constitutional democracies since 1816, though critics note definitional debates over what qualifies as a "democracy" or "war." Michael W. Doyle played a pivotal role in reformulating the theory, publishing two influential articles in 1983 that reinterpreted Immanuel Kant's Perpetual Peace through a liberal lens, positing that constitutional governments with representative institutions foster mutual peace via republican accountability and pacific foreign policies toward kindred states, even as they pursue imperial or realist policies elsewhere. Doyle's analysis of historical cases from the 18th to 20th centuries highlighted how liberal states avoided wars among themselves but clashed with non-liberals, influencing subsequent debates by integrating normative and structural explanations. Bruce M. Russett advanced the empirical and theoretical rigor of the theory, notably in his 1993 book Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World, where he used statistical models on interstate disputes from 1816 to 1986 to demonstrate that joint independently predicts lower conflict incidence, controlling for factors like power, alliances, and contiguity. Russett collaborated with scholars like John R. Oneal to expand this into a "Kantian triangle," incorporating and international organizations as complementary pacifiers, with dyadic reducing militarized disputes by approximately 35% in joint democratic pairs. Other key contributors include Zeev Maoz, whose joint work with Russett in the 1990s refined operational definitions of democracy using Polity scores, confirming the absence of wars between states scoring 6 or higher on the -10 to 10 scale since 1816, and testing robustness against alternative explanations like capitalist peace. John Owen IV, in his 1997 book Liberal Peace, Liberal War, argued that liberal ideology—encompassing rights protections and market orientations—underpins the peace, evidenced by historical avoidance of conquest among liberal states from 1789 to 1989, though vulnerable to illiberal ideologies during crises. These scholars collectively shifted DPT from philosophical speculation to a testable , though academic critiques often stem from datasets selective to post-1945 periods or overlook near-misses like the 1898 .

Evolution in Post-Cold War Scholarship

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, scholarship on democratic peace theory proliferated amid a rapid expansion in the number of democracies worldwide, from approximately 30 in 1988 to over 80 by 2000 according to Polity IV data. This surge provided larger samples of democratic dyads for empirical testing, reinforcing the theory's core observation that established democracies have avoided interstate wars with one another since 1816, including in the post-Cold War era. Quantitative studies, such as those by Oneal and Russett, extended analyses to include post-1991 militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), finding that joint democracy significantly reduces conflict initiation even after controlling for alliances and power balances. A key debate emerged over whether the democratic peace was an artifact of Cold War bipolarity and Western alliances, with critics like Gowa arguing in 2011 that dyadic dispute rates among democracies converged with non-democratic pairs after 1991, attributing prior peace to shared anti-Soviet alignments rather than domestic institutions. Countering this, research by Prins and Sprecher in 2013 analyzed data up to 2001 and demonstrated that the pacifying effect of joint persisted and even strengthened post-, with democratic dyads experiencing fewer fatal MIDs independent of alliance structures. These findings prompted refinements, emphasizing liberal institutional features—such as independent judiciaries and free press—over mere electoral competition, as electoral democracies like have engaged in conflicts without triggering dyadic war with peers. Post-2000 scholarship shifted toward robustness tests and causal mechanisms, incorporating advanced statistical methods like selection models to address potential biases in MID data. Hegre et al. (2010) confirmed the dyadic effect's endurance through 2007, while critiques highlighted rare near-misses, such as U.S.-UK tensions during the (1956, pre-post-Cold War but illustrative), or post-1991 interventions like NATO's 1999 campaign against non-democratic . Extensions integrated , with Mousseau (2013) proposing a "contract-intensive" variant linking market norms to peace, tested on post-Cold War trade data showing reduced conflict in high-capitalist dyads. By the , meta-analyses affirmed the theory's empirical strength, estimating the democracy-peace link as robustly as smoking-lung cancer associations, though scholars urged caution against overgeneralizing to unstable or illiberal regimes amid democratic backsliding in places like and .

Core Concepts and Definitions

Criteria for Democracy

In empirical studies of democratic peace theory, democracy is operationalized using standardized indices that emphasize institutional features such as competitive executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and broad political participation. The Polity dataset, widely employed by scholars including Bruce Russett, classifies regimes as democratic if they score 6 or higher on a -10 to +10 scale, assessing openness and competitiveness in selecting chief executives, the presence of institutionalized constraints on executive power (e.g., legislatures or judiciaries), and the extent of competitive participation in politics. These criteria distinguish consolidated democracies from partial or transitional regimes, as lower scores indicate limited competition or autocratic dominance. Michael Doyle, drawing on Kantian liberal republicanism, extends the criteria beyond electoral mechanics to include representative institutions, ideological commitments to individual rights (such as and property), and constitutional limits on arbitrary power, arguing that these elements foster mutual recognition and restraint among "liberal" states. Complementary measures like Vanhanen's Index of Democratization incorporate electoral competition (e.g., the via vote shares) and participation rates, requiring a score above 5 for democratic status, while ratings add evaluations of and political rights. Robustness tests across these definitions confirm the dyadic peace pattern persists, though narrower electoral-only criteria (e.g., Schumpeterian competition without rights protections) yield weaker or less consistent results. Debates persist over minimal versus maximal thresholds, with some indicating that "mature" democracies—those sustaining high Polity scores for at least a —better embody the theory's prerequisites, as nascent regimes may lack entrenched norms or institutions to deter escalation. Variations in criteria, such as excluding illiberal electoral autocracies with manipulated polls, influence case inclusion but do not overturn the core finding when confounders like alliances or economic ties are controlled. This operational rigor underscores that democratic peace hinges not merely on labels but on verifiable structural attributes enabling and peaceful .

Defining Interstate War and Conflict

In empirical analyses of democratic peace theory, interstate war is typically defined according to the criteria established by the (COW) project, which has been the standard dataset since the 1960s. An interstate war involves sustained combat between the organized armed forces of two or more sovereign states that are members of the international system, occurring on the distinct territories of those states, and resulting in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related deaths within a twelve-month period. This threshold excludes sporadic clashes or civil conflicts misclassified as interstate, ensuring focus on high-intensity engagements between recognized states, as cataloged in COW's version 4.0 dataset covering 1816–2007, with updates extending to recent years. The definition emphasizes state sovereignty and territorial separation to distinguish interstate wars from intra-state or colonial variants, with 95 such wars identified through 2007. "Conflict" in this context often encompasses a broader category than full-scale , including lower-level militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) as defined by COW, which involve threats, displays, or limited uses of force by one state against another without reaching the 1,000-death war threshold. A MID requires a unified governmental effort to impose demands through armed forces, with disputes classified by hostility level—from no fatalities to those escalating toward —and coded dyadically for each pair of opposing states. This allows testing of weaker democratic peace claims, such as reduced incidence of crises or fatal disputes between democracies, beyond the binary war/no-war outcome; for instance, studies using COW MIDs from 1816–2001 find democracies engage in fewer high-hostility disputes with each other compared to mixed or autocratic dyads. These definitions are not without critique; some scholars argue the 1,000-death cutoff arbitrarily excludes deadly conflicts (e.g., the 1982 with 907 deaths) or overincludes ambiguous cases, prompting alternative datasets like the Interstate War Data (IWD) version 1.1, which applies COW rules but corrects coding errors, identifying 82 interstate wars from 1816–2010. In democratic peace research, definitional choices influence findings: stricter war criteria strengthen the "no war" claim for democratic dyads, while inclusive conflict measures test preventive mechanisms like dispute avoidance. Nonetheless, COW's transparency and replicability underpin most quantitative validations, with over 100 studies since the 1980s relying on it to affirm the absence of wars between mature democracies post-1816.

Monadic, Dyadic, and Systemic Variants

The monadic variant of democratic peace theory posits that democratic regimes are inherently more peaceful in their behavior, exhibiting lower propensity for initiating or participating in interstate conflicts regardless of the opponent's regime type. This perspective implies that democracies possess universal pacifying traits—such as accountable leadership, public aversion to war costs, or normative commitments to non-violence—that restrain aggression toward all states. Proponents, including Rudolf Rummel, argued that democracies have historically initiated fewer wars overall, with data from 1816 to 2007 showing democracies involved in fewer militarized disputes than autocracies. However, rigorous empirical tests, including those controlling for selection effects and conflict initiation, reveal weak or inconsistent support; democracies initiate conflicts against non-democracies at rates comparable to autocratic dyads, undermining the monadic claim as a general law. In contrast, the dyadic variant—the most empirically substantiated formulation—focuses on interactions between pairs of states, asserting that mature democracies rarely engage in war or severe militarized disputes with one another, though they may conflict with autocracies. This dyadic effect has held across datasets spanning 1816 to the present, with no clear interstate wars between consolidated democracies (e.g., Polity scores above 6) since the between Britain and the U.S., and statistical models showing odds of conflict between democratic dyads up to 50% lower than mixed or autocratic pairs after accounting for confounders like contiguity and power parity. Scholars like Bruce Russett and John Oneal attribute this to dyad-specific mechanisms, such as mutual transparency and resolved domestic opposition, rather than monadic traits alone; robustness checks, including nonparametric sensitivity analyses, confirm the finding persists under alternative democracy measures and conflict definitions. The systemic variant extends the theory to the international system level, hypothesizing that a preponderance of democracies fosters broader peace by diffusing democratic norms, reducing overall belligerence, or creating interdependent institutions that deter conflict across regime types. Drawing from Immanuel Kant's Perpetual Peace (1795), it predicts that as democracies comprise a larger share of the global system—rising from about 10% in to over 50% by —aggregate violence declines, with empirical proxies like joint democracy models showing negative associations between system-wide and dyadic dispute rates. Unlike the monadic version, systemic claims integrate dyadic effects while allowing for feedback loops, such as normative convergence; however, direct tests remain limited, often relying on simulations or historical trends rather than causal identification, and critics note that rising democracies have coincided with interventions in non-democracies, suggesting incomplete pacification.

Empirical Foundations

Quantitative Analyses of Democratic Dyads

Quantitative analyses of democratic dyads employ dyad-year datasets to model the onset of interstate wars or militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), typically using or techniques, with controls for factors such as contiguity, , alliances, and distance. These studies draw on the (COW) project for conflict data covering 1816 onward and regime measures from IV or V-Dem, classifying states as democratic based on thresholds like scores of 6 or higher. The dyadic approach tests whether joint uniquely reduces conflict risk compared to mixed or autocratic pairs. Empirical findings consistently indicate that joint democratic dyads experience near-zero probability of full-scale ; for instance, no interstate wars have been recorded between states both meeting standard democratic criteria in the COW from to 2014. Similarly, MIDs between democratic pairs occur at rates 35-50% lower than expected under null hypotheses, with persisting across model specifications. Bruce Russett's analyses, for example, demonstrate that during periods of global peace (no dyads at ), the probability of between democracies aligns perfectly with observed outcomes, while diverging sharply in conflict-prone eras. Robustness tests, including nonparametric sensitivity analyses to omitted variables and , affirm the dyadic democratic peace effect's resilience; even under assumptions of substantial unobserved confounders favoring conflict, the joint coefficient remains negative and significant in datasets spanning 1950-1992. Recent extensions to post-2000 data, incorporating updated scores and conflict records through 2021, continue to show democratic dyads averting escalation, though critics attribute part of the pattern to confounding variables like rather than regime type alone. Despite such debates, the empirical regularity holds across diverse codings of and conflict thresholds.

Qualitative Evidence from Historical Cases

Qualitative analyses of democratic dyads highlight instances where established democracies confronted territorial disputes, imperial rivalries, or alliance strains but averted escalation to interstate war through diplomatic , , and mutual restraint. These cases, spanning the 19th and 20th centuries, illustrate the theory's dyadic variant by demonstrating how shared democratic institutions and norms facilitate peaceful resolution, contrasting with conflicts involving non-democracies. Scholars attribute this pattern to mechanisms such as public accountability constraining leaders, transparent signaling reducing miscalculation, and cultural affinity fostering compromise. The and provide a paradigmatic example, having maintained no direct war since the , when Britain's parliamentary system lacked full adult male and responsible government. Post-1832 Reform Act in Britain and amid U.S. , crises like the 1840s and 1895 Venezuela boundary were settled via negotiation and international commissions, avoiding despite naval mobilizations. The in 1872, resolving Union grievances over British-built Confederate ships during the U.S. Civil War, set a precedent for democratic through legalistic processes, yielding $15.5 million in compensation to the U.S. without rupture. Franco-German relations exemplify post-World War II transformation, shifting from recurrent wars—Franco-Prussian (1870–1871), World War I (1914–1918), and World War II (1939–1945)—to enduring peace after both solidified democratic governance: West Germany's in 1949 and France's Fifth Republic in 1958. The 1963 formalized cooperation, underpinned by integration from 1951, which pooled sovereignty over war-prone industries and prevented unilateral aggression. No bilateral military confrontation has occurred since 1945, with joint commitments and EU structures channeling competition into economic interdependence, supporting claims of institutional constraints promoting stability. Near-misses further underscore restraint, as in the 1956 , where democratic allies and coordinated with against but yielded to U.S. diplomatic and economic pressure—threatening oil embargoes and IMF leverage—forcing withdrawal by November 7, 1956, amid domestic political backlash in London and Paris. This episode highlights audience costs: British Prime Minister resigned in January 1957 due to parliamentary and public opposition, while U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower faced no such reversal for enforcing alliance norms, illustrating how electoral accountability deters intra-democratic escalation. Additional dyads, such as U.S.-Canada border stabilizations post-1818 Rush-Bagot Agreement demilitarizing the , and Anglo-American cooperation in World Wars I and II without preemptive clashes, reinforce the absence of war among mature democracies since 1816, per historical surveys excluding civil or colonial conflicts. These cases, while not proving causality absent quantitative controls, provide process-tracing of normative and institutional barriers to war, though critics note selection effects from small historical samples of simultaneous democracies.

Robustness Tests and Recent Studies (2000–2025)

Scholars in the 2000s and 2010s conducted numerous robustness tests on the democratic peace, examining sensitivity to alternative model specifications, such as zero-inflated negative binomial regressions for rare events and corrections for temporal dependence in dyadic data. These analyses addressed critiques alleging fragility due to selection bias or omitted variables, demonstrating that the dyadic association persists across specifications using Correlates of War (COW) interstate war and militarized interstate dispute (MID) datasets from 1816 to 2001. For instance, Oneal et al. (2011) rebutted statistical challenges by Gartzke, showing that joint democracy reduces MID initiation by approximately 35% after controlling for economic interdependence, alliances, and contiguity, with the effect holding under varying thresholds for democracy (Polity scores ≥6 or ≥8). Advanced sensitivity analyses further bolstered the empirical foundation. Imai and Li (2021) applied nonparametric methods to dyadic data up to 2007, finding the democratic peace robust to unobserved confounders; nullifying the effect would require such factors to exert influences at least five times stronger than observed variables like trade or capabilities, a threshold exceeding the robustness of the smoking-lung cancer link in . Tests incorporating post-Cold War expansions, including over 50 additional democratic dyads by 2010, confirmed no interstate wars between regimes scoring 8+ on Polity IV, with MIDs remaining infrequent (less than 5% of democratic dyads experiencing fatal disputes annually). Alternative explanations, such as Mousseau's (2013) claim of spuriousness from contract-intensive economies, were refuted by Ray et al. (2017), who showed joint democracy retains independent pacifying effects (reducing war probability by 50-70%) even after disaggregating economic development and controlling for endogeneity via instrumental variables. Studies from 2010-2025 integrated newer datasets like V-Dem, which disaggregates liberal, electoral, and components, yielding refined measures for robustness checks. Dafoe et al. (2020) modeled an interactive dyadic peace using V-Dem v9 data through 2018, finding that high similarity in institutional constraints (e.g., executive constraints and electoral participation) reduces conflict propensity by 40-60% in democracies, robust to fixed effects for dyad-specific heterogeneity and spatial dependence. Empirical updates through 2025 reveal no qualifying interstate wars between established democracies (e.g., ≥7 bilaterally), despite rising global tensions; conflicts like the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war involved an autocratic initiator against a transitioning democracy, aligning with dyadic predictions. Micro-level evidence from survey experiments corroborates macro findings, with respondents in democracies less supportive of force against perceived fellow democracies by 20-30 percentage points. These tests underscore the theory's endurance amid increasing numbers of democracies (from 33 in 2000 to 45 by 2020 per ), without corresponding dyadic conflicts.

Causal Mechanisms

Normative and Cultural Explanations

Normative explanations of the democratic peace posit that democratic regimes cultivate internal practices of non-violent conflict resolution, compromise, and respect for legal constraints, which leaders extend to interactions with other democracies. These norms, rooted in republican governance as articulated by in his 1795 essay Perpetual Peace, emphasize mutual recognition of sovereignty and diplomatic negotiation over coercion among like-minded states. Democracies, having socialized their elites through electoral accountability and deliberative processes, view fellow democracies as legitimate counterparts unlikely to harbor aggressive intentions, thereby reducing escalatory risks in disputes. Cultural explanations complement this by highlighting shared ideological frameworks and values—such as , tolerance, and emancipative principles—that foster and predictability between democratic societies. This cultural affinity minimizes misperceptions that often precipitate , as democratic publics and leaders anticipate reciprocal restraint from counterparts with analogous political cultures. Proponents argue that these mechanisms operate dyadically, where mutual identification as "democratic kin" promotes trust and , distinct from interactions with non-democracies perceived as normatively alien. Empirical assessments of these explanations often integrate them with institutional factors, but qualitative analyses of historical dyads, such as U.S.-UK relations post-1812, illustrate how normative convergence averted escalation during crises like the 1895 boundary dispute. Critics, however, contend that normative may not universally prevent conflict, as evidenced by intra-democratic tensions in early 20th-century , suggesting cultural similarities alone insufficiently explain the absent structural incentives.

Institutional and Structural Factors

Democratic institutions impose domestic constraints on leaders, making interstate more costly and less likely, especially between democracies that mutually recognize these barriers to hasty . , a hallmark of many democratic systems, divides authority among executive, legislative, and judicial branches, requiring legislative approval for declarations, funding, and troop deployments. This structure creates multiple veto points, as seen in systems like the where holds the constitutional power to declare (Article I, Section 8), though presidents have often circumvented it through authorizations; however, the deliberative process still elevates the political costs of conflict initiation. Empirical analyses show that democracies with strong legislative oversight experience fewer escalations in disputes with other democracies, as parliaments represent constituencies sensitive to 's human and economic tolls. These institutional checks foster transparency and accountability, compelling leaders to justify military actions publicly and anticipate electoral repercussions. In dyadic interactions between democracies, leaders on both sides expect similar institutional hurdles, leading to prolonged and negotiated resolutions rather than force, as mutual understanding of processes reduces miscalculation risks. For instance, quantitative studies of interstate crises from to find that democratic dyads are 35-50% less likely to escalate to militarized disputes due to these domestic structures, controlling for power balances and alliances. Critics note that this explanation overlaps with rationalist signaling but holds independently, as non-democracies lack equivalent constraints, facing fewer barriers to opportunistic attacks. Structural factors within democracies, such as and bureaucratic pluralism, further diffuse war-making authority, embedding decisions in diverse interest groups that prioritize domestic welfare over . Unlike autocracies where rulers can centralize power for rapid , democratic structures demand coalition-building across branches and levels of government, which correlates with lower initiation rates in democratic pairs; data from the project (1816-2007) indicate zero system-member wars between mature democracies, attributed partly to these diffused power arrangements. This mechanism aligns with Kant's republican ideal, updated in modern theory to emphasize how institutional pluralism resolves internal conflicts peacefully, extending caution to external democratic counterparts.

Rationalist Mechanisms: Audience Costs and Signaling

Democratic leaders in electoral systems face elevated audience costs—domestic political repercussions, such as electoral defeat or loss of public support, for initiating threats and subsequently retreating without achieving objectives—due to mechanisms like free press scrutiny, opposition criticism, and voter . These costs incentivize democratic governments to issue threats only when backed by genuine resolve, as bluffing risks severe backlash; for instance, experimental studies simulate crises where participants punish leaders more harshly for failed escalations in democratic contexts compared to autocratic ones. In contrast, autocratic regimes often exhibit lower audience costs, enabling leaders to absorb failures privately or through repression, which diminishes signal reliability. Within democratic dyads, mutual awareness of these asymmetric costs facilitates signaling during : public commitments or escalatory actions serve as costly signals of intent, allowing opponents to distinguish genuine resolve from bluffs without resorting to , as both sides anticipate high domestic penalties for miscalculation. This resolves the rationalist puzzle of —why states fight despite ex ante bargains preferable to conflict—by mitigating private information asymmetries; democratic transparency in threat-making, amplified by audience costs, enables efficient crisis resolution, as evidenced in post-World War II U.S.-European disputes where verbal escalations de-escalated without kinetic conflict. Fearon's framework posits that such signaling prevents the commitment problems or indivisibilities that precipitate in mixed or autocratic dyads. Empirical extensions link audience costs to democratic peace by modeling how institutional constraints—e.g., legislative oversight and media exposure—amplify these effects, with quantitative analyses of Militarized Interstate Disputes (1816–2001) showing democracies initiate fewer conflicts against similarly accountable foes due to anticipated mutual signaling . However, critics note that audience costs may not uniformly generate across all democratic subtypes; for example, newer democracies incur higher risks from unresolved crises than consolidated ones, potentially complicating signaling in transitional dyads. Territorial salience further conditions this mechanism, as democracies leverage audience costs selectively in high-stakes disputes to signal firmness without overcommitment. Overall, this rationalist lens emphasizes endogenous incentives over exogenous norms, portraying democratic peace as an equilibrium outcome of verifiable commitments in repeated interactions.

Exceptions, Boundary Conditions, and Internal Dynamics

Apparent Democratic Conflicts and Near-Misses

While no full-scale interstate wars have occurred between established liberal democracies since the early , several militarized disputes and high-stakes crises—known as near-misses—have arisen between states meeting basic democratic criteria, prompting over the theory's robustness. These episodes typically feature limited violence, rapid via or , and reliance on shared norms or institutions, distinguishing them from conflicts involving autocracies. Proponents argue such outcomes affirm the theory, as democratic leaders face audience costs for against perceived peers, while critics contend they reveal vulnerabilities when interests clash intensely. The (1812–1815) between the —a constitutional republic with male suffrage for most white adults—and the —a parliamentary with voting restricted to about 5% of adult males via property qualifications—marks an early apparent exception. Triggered by U.S. grievances over British of sailors and trade restrictions amid the , the conflict involved amphibious invasions, naval battles, and the burning of Washington, D.C., in 1814, with total casualties exceeding 25,000. It concluded with the on December 24, 1814, restoring pre-war boundaries without territorial gains. Advocates of the theory exclude it due to Britain's incomplete democratization, lacking elements like secret ballots or broad accountability, which emerged later via reforms in 1832 and 1867; at the time, U.S. leaders perceived Britain as insufficiently liberal, reducing normative restraints. The Venezuelan crisis of 1895–1896 exemplifies a near-miss between mature democracies: the and . Venezuela invoked U.S. support under the for its border dispute with ; President Grover Cleveland's December 17, 1895, message demanded , leading to U.S. naval and British contingency plans for war, amid fears of escalation given Britain's Boer War commitments. Britain relented in 1897, accepting a that awarded most territory to in 1899, due to U.S. leverage, Liberal Party electoral pressures favoring , and mutual Anglo-American economic ties. Critics view this as evidence that power balances, not , drove restraint, yet the peaceful resolution via joint commission aligns with institutional explanations. The Fashoda Incident of September 1898 pitted Britain and France—both parliamentary democracies with elected legislatures—against each other in Sudan, where French forces under met British troops led by Herbert Kitchener, claiming the Upper Nile to block British control. Nationalist fervor in both nations raised war risks, with French Premier Henri Brisson facing domestic collapse and British peaking; however, strategic calculations, favoring avoidance, and diplomatic talks prompted French evacuation by November, averting hostilities and enabling the 1904 . This case illustrates normative convergence, as democratic publics and leaders prioritized compromise over imperial rivalry. Post-World War II examples include the (1958, 1972–1973, 1975–1976) between the and , both allies with parliamentary systems and competitive elections. Disputes over 's unilateral extensions of its —from 4 to 200 nautical miles—led to naval patrols, deliberate ship collisions (e.g., over 50 rammings in 1976), and actions damaging British trawlers, costing the £1 million in 1975–1976 alone. No shots were fired, and no deaths occurred; resolutions involved concessions to via agreements in 1961, 1973, and 1976, mediated partly through to preserve alliance cohesion. Analyses find partial consistency with democratic peace, as trade interdependence and institutional forums constrained escalation, though 's asymmetric dependence fueled persistence. These incidents, while challenging the theory's absolutism, rarely progress beyond low-level militarization—defined as threats or uses of force short of war in data—supporting claims that democratic dyads average fewer fatalities and quicker terminations than others. Recent studies (post-2000) confirm zero wars but persistent MIDs, attributing aversion to signaling failures and reputational costs in electoral contexts.

Proxy Wars, Covert Operations, and Non-Kinetic Conflicts

Scholars examining proxy warfare have identified a "democratic embargo," wherein established democracies seldom initiate or sustain proxy conflicts against other democracies, attributing this restraint to institutional constraints like electoral and normative aversion to undermining peer regimes. Empirical analysis of post-1945 proxy wars reveals that while democracies frequently back proxies against autocracies—such as U.S. support for in (1979–1989) or Soviet proxies in (1975–1991)—instances of democracies arming opposing sides in third-party conflicts with each other are exceedingly rare, with no major cases documented where mutual proxy escalation risked direct confrontation. This pattern holds even in ideologically charged contexts, as democratic leaders face heightened domestic costs for actions perceived as betraying shared liberal principles, contrasting with autocrats' freer use of proxies like Iran's backing of against or Russia's in . Covert operations present a partial exception, though they typically avoid lethal force or regime overthrow against consolidated democracies. The , for example, conducted CIA-funded election interference in during the 1948 parliamentary vote to bolster Christian Democrats against communist gains, involving millions in covert subsidies to media and parties without kinetic elements. Similarly, U.S. operations in (1970–1973) included economic and liaison to destabilize President Salvador Allende's government, culminating in the September 11, 1973 coup, though declassified records show the CIA did not directly orchestrate the overthrow. Experimental surveys indicate public tolerance for such covert actions against democracies exceeds expectations under strict DPT norms, suggesting normative barriers weaken in low-visibility scenarios, yet actual escalations to overt conflict remain absent. These cases, often targeting states with fragile democratic institutions, underscore that while covert meddling occurs, it rarely involves peer liberal democracies like those in Western post-1950. Non-kinetic conflicts between democracies, encompassing cyber intrusions, economic coercion, and intelligence gathering, occur more frequently but exhibit self-imposed limits to prevent spillover into violence. Revelations from Edward Snowden's 2013 leaks documented U.S. surveillance of German Chancellor Angela Merkel's phone communications starting in 2002, alongside bulk data collection from EU allies, framing such espionage as routine despite allied status—yet these provoked diplomatic protests rather than retaliation in kind or escalation. Trade disputes, such as the U.S.-EU steel tariffs imposed by President in 2002 (affecting $5 billion in exports) and retaliatory measures, resolved via WTO arbitration without militarization, illustrating institutional channels that democracies leverage over coercive alternatives. Cyber operations, like alleged Israeli intrusions into U.S. defense networks (reported in 2010s), remain deniable and non-disruptive to core security, aligning with findings that democracies prioritize signaling and audience costs to de-escalate even in grey-zone domains. Overall, these indirect frictions reinforce DPT by channeling rivalry into reversible, non-lethal forms, with empirical datasets showing zero transitions to interstate war since 1816 among mature democratic dyads.

Internal Repression, Genocide, and Democratic Stability

Empirical studies consistently find that consolidated democracies exhibit significantly lower levels of state-sponsored repression and mass atrocities compared to autocratic regimes. Analysis of global data from 1955 to 1994 indicates that democratic governance reduces the onset and magnitude of internal wars and state-sponsored , with democracies being approximately three times less likely to perpetrate such violence due to institutional checks and electoral . Similarly, cross-national research on physical integrity rights violations—encompassing killings, disappearances, , and arbitrary —demonstrates that democracies maintain higher respect for these rights, even during periods of domestic unrest, as opposition voices and judicial oversight constrain executive overreach. Genocide and politicide, defined as intentional destruction of ethnic, national, racial, or political groups, overwhelmingly occur under autocratic or transitional regimes rather than stable democracies. From 1900 to 1987, democratic states accounted for fewer than 1% of global deaths (, politicide, and mass murder), while totalitarian regimes like the under (approximately 62 million deaths) and (21 million) dominated the toll, totaling over 169 million victims worldwide from government actions. Scholarly risk assessments confirm autocracies are 3.5 times more prone to than democracies, attributing this to the absence of power-sharing and transparency in non-democratic systems that enable unchecked elite mobilization for extermination campaigns. Consolidated democracies, with robust and opposition pluralism, have no recorded instances of full-scale , though flawed or anocratic regimes (partial democracies) show elevated risks during transitions, as in (1994) or under the (1975–1979), where incomplete institutionalization allowed radical factions to seize power. This internal restraint contributes to democratic stability, as electoral competition and media scrutiny deter leaders from repressive policies that could provoke backlash or regime collapse. Data from the Polity5 project, spanning 1800–2018, correlates higher democracy scores with reduced internal conflict and greater regime durability, evidenced by fewer coups and civil wars in high-Polity states (scoring 6+ on the -10 to +10 scale). V-Dem indicators further quantify this, showing democracies scoring over 0.7 on the Liberal Democracy Index experience repression levels (measured via deliberate state killings and torture) below 0.2 on a 0–1 scale, versus 0.5+ in autocracies, underscoring causal links from accountable governance to restrained coercion. Exceptions, such as limited wartime internments (e.g., U.S. Japanese-American relocation in 1942, affecting 120,000 individuals) or emergency laws in India (e.g., Armed Forces Special Powers Act since 1958), involve temporary suspensions rather than systematic genocide, and public accountability typically leads to reversals and reparations, reinforcing long-term stability. Critics like argue that "organic" ethnic nationalism in democracies can foster cleansing, citing cases like the under (1915–1923, pre-full democracy) or (1990s, amid democratic breakdowns), but empirical aggregation reveals these as products of authoritarian backsliding rather than inherent democratic flaws, with stable liberal democracies averting such escalations through inclusive norms. Overall, internal peace under democracies supports the broader democratic peace by preventing destabilizing purges or civil strife that might spill externally, as repressive autocracies often externalize threats to consolidate power.

Major Criticisms

Definitional and Methodological Disputes

Definitional disputes in democratic peace theory primarily revolve around the criteria for classifying states as democracies, with scholars relying on indices like the project's 21-point scale (ranging from -10 for to +10 for full ), typically applying a threshold of +6 or higher to denote democratic regimes. This cutoff has been contested for encompassing "anocracies" or hybrid regimes with electoral facades but deficient and , potentially overstating the prevalence of true liberal democracies in historical dyads and weakening the theory's normative causal claims. Proponents counter that stricter thresholds, such as requiring +8 alongside ratings for liberal components, produce fewer but more robustly peaceful dyads, aligning better with Kantian republican ideals of representative consent over mere . Historical regime classifications exacerbate these issues, as retrospective coding often involves subjective judgments influenced by contemporary biases; for example, U.S. perceptions of Imperial as undemocratic in 1917 contrasted with earlier views, illustrating how definitional standards shift and may retroactively exclude potential counterexamples to favor the theory. Cases like the 1898 Spanish-American War highlight disputes, with Spain's and limited male suffrage debated as insufficiently democratic, while the U.S. qualified under expanded but still imperfect electoral norms; such ambiguities risk in dataset construction. Critics like Spiro argue that small numbers of qualifying democratic dyads pre-1945 (fewer than 20 in some codings) render the absence of wars statistically unremarkable, though defenders emphasize probabilistic patterns over absolute zeros. Methodological disputes further concern operationalizing "peace" through war definitions, with the (COW) dataset requiring 1,000 battle-related deaths for interstate war classification, excluding lower-intensity militarized disputes that could involve emerging democratic pairs, such as the 1982 Falklands conflict between the UK's established and Argentina's fragile post-junta regime. Variability across datasets (e.g., COW vs. earlier Singer-Small codings) and time frames—often limited to post-1816 or post-1945—yields inconsistent findings, as shorter periods inflate recent democratic dyads while ignoring transitional instabilities that heighten conflict risk. The dyadic focus of the theory, examining joint democratic interactions rather than monadic traits, addresses some critiques but invites debate over controlling for confounders like power symmetry in logit models of conflict onset.

Statistical and Selection Bias Challenges

Critics of democratic peace theory contend that its empirical foundation is undermined by arising from the non-random composition of democratic dyads in historical datasets. Prior to the mid-20th century, the number of contemporaneous liberal democracies was exceedingly small, resulting in a limited pool of dyads and heightened vulnerability to statistical artifacts or coincidence rather than systematic causation. For example, analyses of interstate wars from to 1980 reveal only a handful of democratic pairs with opportunities for conflict, inflating the apparent absence of wars into an unreliable pattern. This small-N problem is exacerbated by the rarity of wars overall, making it challenging to distinguish genuine effects from noise in binary outcome models commonly used in the . A prominent form of temporal and geopolitical selection bias manifests in the concentration of evidence post-World War II, when most democracies clustered in Western alliances like , sharing and opposition to the . Farber and Gowa (1997) demonstrate that the dyadic democratic peace effect vanishes when restricting data to the pre-1945 period, attributing post-1945 non-conflict to common alliances and capitalist orientations rather than regime type alone. Similarly, excluding or censoring dyads involving communist states—often due to data availability or coding choices—can artificially strengthen the correlation, as these regimes frequently clashed with democracies but among themselves exhibited internal variation. Further statistical challenges involve sample selection on conflict opportunities and model dependencies. Democratic dyads are often geographically distant or allied, reducing militarized dispute initiation and biasing estimates toward without accounting for unobserved opportunities for . Slantchev, Sharman, and Zhang (2005) argue that standard probabilistic interpretations of the democratic peace overlook selection effects, where observed peaceful outcomes reflect self-selection into low-risk interactions rather than institutional restraint. Sensitivity analyses, such as those applying Heckman corrections for selection into disputes, reveal fragility: results hinge on variable inclusions (e.g., contiguity, capabilities), time lags, or democracy thresholds, suggesting the effect may proxy for omitted confounders like power symmetry or . These issues imply that while no wars between mature democracies is empirically observable, inferring robust requires caution against overinterpreting sparse, contextually clustered .

Microfoundational and Causal Inference Issues

Critics argue that democratic peace theory (DPT) suffers from underdeveloped , as its explanations often rely on untested assumptions about individual-level behaviors, such as how democratic publics or leaders respond differently to conflict signals from fellow democracies compared to autocracies. For instance, mechanisms like audience costs—where democratic leaders face higher domestic punishment for backing down in crises—lack comprehensive micro-level validation, with experimental evidence showing inconsistent public sensitivity to regime type in opponent states. Similarly, normative theories positing that democratic citizens internalize pacifist values toward other democracies find weak support in survey data, where regime type and liberal norms exert minimal influence on mass attitudes toward interstate disputes. At the causal inference level, DPT faces endogeneity problems, as joint democracy may correlate with unobserved confounders like or alliance structures that independently promote , rather than democracy causing restraint. Reverse causality poses another challenge: periods of may foster through reduced and increased , inverting the posited direction from regime type to . Sensitivity analyses reveal that the empirical regularity weakens under nonparametric tests for hidden confounders, suggesting the democratic dyad effect is not robust to alternative specifications of or omitted variables, such as capitalist economic ties. These issues are compounded by the rarity of potential democratic conflicts, yielding few observations for rigorous identification strategies like instrumental variables, which remain scarce in DPT research. While some studies employ matching or fixed-effects models to mitigate bias, they often fail to fully address time-varying unobservables, leaving causal claims tentative at best. Overall, without stronger micro-level experimentation or quasi-experimental designs, DPT's macro-level correlations risk overinterpretation as causation.

Alternative Explanations

Economic Interdependence and Trade

Economic interdependence posits that high levels of and economic ties raise the opportunity costs of conflict, incentivizing peaceful as disruptions to impose mutual losses. Proponents argue this mechanism provides an alternative or complementary explanation to democratic norms for the observed absence of wars between established democracies, suggesting that democracies maintain higher volumes with one another due to shared institutions, property rights protections, and lower transaction costs, rendering the democratic correlation spurious. Empirical analyses indicate that dyads with greater interdependence experience fewer militarized interstate disputes, with studies finding that a one-standard-deviation increase in trade-to-GDP ratios correlates with a 20-30% reduction in conflict initiation probabilities post-1950. This view draws from liberal economic theories, where trade fosters vested interests among exporters, importers, and investors who lobby against war, as evidenced by models showing that symmetric interdependence amplifies these domestic pressures more effectively than asymmetric ties. on post-World War II data supports that commercial openness, rather than democratic dyads alone, accounts for much of the variance in interstate peace, with capitalist peace models outperforming strict democratic variables in regression analyses of conflict onset from 1816 to 2001. However, source selection in such studies often favors datasets like the , which may undercount low-level conflicts, and overlooks how trade data aggregates flows without disaggregating strategic sectors like arms or resources that heighten tensions. Critics counter that economic ties do not reliably deter war, citing historical cases where high interdependence preceded conflict, such as Anglo-German trade averaging 10-15% of GDP in the decade before , or U.S.-Japanese commerce peaking at $400 million annually by 1940 prior to . Realist perspectives highlight that interdependence can exacerbate disputes over access to markets or assets, increasing short-term militarized incidents by 15-20% in asymmetric relationships, as seen in resource-dependent dyads. Moreover, endogeneity issues persist: prosperous, stable pairs trade more regardless of regime type, and sanctions or embargoes often follow rather than prevent escalations, undermining claims of robust . While trade correlates with reduced fatalities in disputes among advanced economies since 1945, it fails to explain intra-authoritarian peace or why low-trade democratic pairs, like and , avoid full-scale war despite nuclear deterrents.

Territorial and Geographic Factors

Territorial peace theory posits that the resolution of border disputes and the establishment of stable frontiers independently drive both democratization and interstate peace, rendering the democratic peace epiphenomenal to geographic and territorial conditions rather than a causal effect of regime type. According to this framework, states facing persistent territorial threats prioritize militarized regimes to deter invasions, whereas secure borders reduce such pressures, enabling leaders to pursue liberal reforms without risking exploitation of domestic openness by adversaries. Empirical studies support this by showing that border settlements precede democratic transitions in over 70% of cases since 1816, with stable frontiers correlating to lower conflict initiation rates among neighbors by diminishing grievances over sovereignty and resources. Geographic factors like contiguity and further confound the democratic , as adjacent states experience militarized disputes at rates up to 50 times higher than non-contiguous pairs due to opportunities for rapid escalation and historical border frictions. Many democratic dyads, such as those between the and European nations, are separated by oceans, which historically lower probabilities by increasing logistical costs and reducing incentives for conquest-oriented policies. Statistical models controlling for these variables often attenuate the apparent democratic effect, suggesting that regime similarity proxies for geographic separation rather than normative or institutional restraints. This clustering of democracies in territorially pacified regions—evident in post-1945 and the —amplifies the illusion of a regime-driven , as resolved disputes diffuse stability regionally and foster joint satisfaction with the status quo. Proponents like Douglas Gibler argue that such dynamics explain why democracies rarely border revisionist autocracies today, with data from 1816–2001 indicating that over 80% of enduring democratic pairs share settled frontiers inherited from colonial or settlements. Critics counter that non-contiguous cases still show restraint, but territorial theory maintains that baseline from distance underscores how , not per se, constrains conflict.

Realist Power Dynamics and Nuclear Deterrence

Realist scholars contend that the observed absence of among established democracies stems primarily from balance-of-power dynamics in the international system, rather than inherent democratic norms or institutions. In an anarchic environment, states prioritize survival through alliances and deterrence based on relative capabilities, leading powerful democracies—often economically advanced and militarily capable—to align against common threats without direct confrontation. For instance, post-World War II, Western democracies formed cohesive blocs like in 1949, counterbalancing the Soviet-led , which maintained stability through mutual deterrence rather than shared regime type. This configuration reflects realist logic where geographic proximity to autocratic rivals and hegemonic influence, such as U.S. leadership, foster restraint among like-minded powers to avoid costly escalation. Nuclear weapons further reinforce this realist framework by imposing existential costs on potential aggressors, rendering full-scale war between major powers—disproportionately democratic since —rationally untenable. The doctrine of (MAD), formalized in U.S. strategy by the 1960s, ensures that any nuclear exchange would devastate both sides, deterring initiation regardless of regime. Empirical evidence supports this: no two nuclear-armed states have engaged in direct military conflict since the first atomic tests in , despite tensions such as the Cuban Missile Crisis in or Indo-Pakistani skirmishes post-1998. Nuclear possessors include democracies like the (arsenal operational ), United Kingdom (1952), and (1960), whose capabilities extend deterrence to allied democracies under extended umbrellas, such as NATO members. Scholars like and have argued that nuclear proliferation stabilizes relations by equalizing destructive potential, potentially explaining the "long peace" among great powers more convincingly than democratic attributes alone. , in works emphasizing , posits that nuclear arsenals compel caution in power balancing, as seen in the U.S.-Soviet standoff from 1947 to 1991, where ideological divides did not precipitate war due to strategic parity. similarly highlights how views nuclear deterrence as a counter to hegemony-seeking, rendering democratic peace correlations spurious when controlling for and alliance structures. This perspective challenges DPT by attributing restraint to material factors: democracies' preponderance among nuclear states amplifies deterrence effects, but autocratic nuclear powers like and have also avoided peer conflicts, underscoring regime-irrelevance.

Policy Implications and Influence

Democracy Promotion in Foreign Policy

Democratic peace theory has provided a theoretical foundation for efforts in the foreign policies of established democracies, particularly by suggesting that increasing the number of democratic states would expand a "zone of peace" and diminish the likelihood of interstate conflicts. This rationale posits that shared democratic norms and institutions foster mutual restraint and peaceful among such regimes, thereby justifying interventions or to transition autocracies toward electoral and liberal as a security-enhancing . In U.S. foreign policy, President explicitly invoked democratic peace logic during his 1994 address, asserting that "democracies don't attack each other" to frame promotion as integral to and economic prosperity. His administration's "democratic enlargement" allocated over $2.5 billion annually in by the late to support post-communist transitions in , emphasizing multilateral institutions like expansion to consolidate nascent democracies and prevent revanchist threats. Similarly, the European Union's 2004 enlargement incorporated ten former Soviet-bloc states through conditionality on democratic reforms, leveraging economic incentives to achieve Polity IV scores above 6 for all entrants by 2005, arguably stabilizing the region without major interstate wars. The administration elevated promotion to a doctrinal priority post-9/11, with the 2002 National Security Strategy declaring that "the best way to secure peace is to spread freedom," drawing on democratic peace to justify the 2003 invasion as a catalyst for Middle Eastern to curb and authoritarian . Over $60 billion in U.S. reconstruction followed, aiming to install elections and institutions, yet descended into sectarian by 2006, with over 100,000 civilian deaths and the emergence of by 2014, underscoring how rapid, coercive transitions often exacerbate internal divisions absent organic liberal traditions or economic prerequisites. Barack Obama's approach shifted toward pragmatic support for endogenous movements, as in the 2011 intervention under UN auspices, but the ensuing led to conditions and proxy conflicts persisting into the 2020s, with Libya's score worsening from 70.7 in 2010 to 87.1 in 2020. Empirical assessments reveal democracy promotion's uneven track record in realizing democratic peace benefits, with successes confined to contexts of high receptivity and —such as South Korea's transition from military rule in , supported by U.S. totaling $12.7 billion from 1946–1970s, yielding a stable democracy by 1997—while forceful or aid-heavy efforts in low-capacity states frequently yield hybrid regimes prone to coups or illiberalism. A analysis of 67 promotion cases from 1990–2005 found only 18% transitioned to full democracies within five years, often reverting due to or ethnic fragmentation, challenging the causal assumption that imposed institutions reliably internalize democratic peace mechanisms. Critics, including realist scholars, contend that such policies overlook power asymmetries and domestic spoilers, prioritizing ideological goals over stability, as evidenced by the 20-year Afghan intervention (2001–2021) costing $2.3 trillion yet culminating in resurgence despite $145 billion in governance .

Lessons from Contemporary Conflicts (e.g., Russo-Ukrainian War)

The Russo-Ukrainian War, initiated by Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, exemplifies a conflict between an authoritarian regime and a hybrid or flawed democracy, aligning with rather than contradicting the empirical pattern observed in democratic peace theory (DPT). Russia, classified as an authoritarian regime with an Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Democracy Index score of approximately 2.22 in 2023 (declining further amid the war), features centralized power under President Vladimir Putin, suppressed opposition, and manipulated elections, rendering it a consolidated autocracy per Polity5 metrics scoring -6 or lower. Ukraine, scoring 5.06 on the EIU index pre-invasion (hybrid regime category, 4-5.99 range) and Polity scores around +6 (indicative of limited democracy), maintains competitive elections and civil liberties despite corruption and oligarchic influences, but has faced democratic erosion under martial law since 2022, including postponed elections. This dyad—autocracy versus partial democracy—avoids direct interstate war between mature liberal democracies, consistent with DPT's core observation that no two such states have fought since 1816. A key lesson emerges from the unified response of established Western democracies, which imposed coordinated sanctions on totaling over $300 billion in frozen assets by mid-2023 and provided with $100 billion+ in military and economic aid by 2024, reflecting normative solidarity and institutional constraints absent in autocracies. members, all scoring 8+ on as full democracies, avoided direct combat involvement while enabling 's defense, underscoring DPT's institutional explanation: democratic leaders face public accountability and alliance norms that deter escalation into mutual war. This cohesion, stronger than anticipated amid domestic political divides (e.g., U.S. congressional delays in 2024 aid packages), revitalized scholarly interest in DPT by demonstrating how liberal democracies collectively counter autocratic revisionism without fracturing into intra-democratic conflict. However, outliers like Hungary's , leading a Polity +10 democracy yet advocating negotiation over full support, highlight definitional ambiguities in DPT: illiberal democracies may prioritize national interests over collective liberal norms. The war also illustrates autocracies' propensity for due to fewer domestic checks, as Putin's regime pursued territorial revisionism unchecked by electoral repercussions or free media, contrasting with democratic restraint in similar disputes (e.g., no U.S.- invasion despite provocations). Casualty estimates exceeding 500,000 combined by late underscore the human cost of autocratic miscalculation, reinforcing DPT's causal claim that democratic transparency and reduce risks. Yet, Ukraine's wartime centralization—suspending parties and media—temporarily lowered its scores, testing DPT's resilience: even flawed democracies under existential threat maintain alliances with full democracies, avoiding the isolation autocracies face. Broader contemporary cases, such as Azerbaijan's 2023 reconquest of from (a flawed democracy Polity +7 vs. hybrid Polity +1), similarly involve non-mature democratic dyads, preserving DPT's dyadic among consolidated democracies. These patterns suggest DPT's utility in explaining restraint amid global autocratic assertiveness, though they caution against overextension to hybrid regimes without robust liberal institutions.

Critiques of DPT as Justification for Intervention

Critics of using democratic peace theory (DPT) as a rationale for military intervention contend that the theory describes an empirical regularity among consolidated democracies but offers no prescriptive imperative for forcible , as such actions often produce rather than enduring peace. Christopher Layne argues that DPT's observed non-war among democracies stems primarily from structural factors like power balances and geographic separation, not inherent democratic norms, rendering it unreliable for justifying interventions that assume will causally generate peace. This misapplication ignores the theory's limitations to mature, stable regimes, where transitional democracies exhibit heightened risks of and external aggression due to weak institutions and elite manipulation. Historical invocations of DPT to support intervention, such as in the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of , have yielded counterproductive outcomes that undermine the theory's purported benefits. Proponents, including President , framed the as a means to foster a democratic that would pacify the under DPT logic, yet the overthrow of triggered sectarian civil war, the rise of by 2014, and over 200,000 civilian deaths by 2023, with no consolidated democracy emerging. U.S. efforts cost approximately 4,500 American military lives and $2.9 trillion in expenditures through 2023, diverting resources from core security interests while empowering and jihadist groups. Similarly, the 2001 intervention in aimed to install democratic to prevent and align with DPT, but after $2.3 trillion spent and 2,400 U.S. troop deaths, the recaptured in August 2021, exposing the fragility of externally imposed regimes in tribal, non-state-centric societies. Realist scholars further critique DPT-based interventionism for conflating correlation with causation and neglecting power dynamics, where interventions erode the intervener's strength through overextension and unintended blowback. and others note that forcible disrupts local balances, invites proxy conflicts, and fails to account for cultural prerequisites like civic , which DPT assumes transplantable but empirical cases refute. and Snyder's analysis shows transitional democracies are twice as likely to engage in militarized disputes as stable autocracies or democracies, as elections mobilize revanchist factions without institutional checks, a pattern evident in post-intervention Iraq's militia proliferation. These failures highlight DPT's policy peril: by prioritizing regime type over geopolitical containment, interventions foster that democracies then must police at escalating costs, contradicting the theory's .

Kantian and Republican Liberalism

Immanuel Kant's 1795 essay Toward Perpetual Peace outlined a framework for enduring global peace through three "definitive articles," with the first emphasizing republican constitutions as a prerequisite for pacific relations among states. In this article, Kant argued that representative governments, where executives are accountable to citizens who bear the burdens of war—including taxation, , and destruction—would restrain leaders from initiating conflicts, particularly against similarly constituted states. He distinguished republics from direct democracies, viewing the latter as potentially despotic due to majority tyranny, while republics embody and to ensure deliberation over impulsive decisions. Republican in builds on Kant's first article, positing that states with liberal democratic institutions—characterized by representative governance, , and institutional checks—rarely engage in with one another due to shared norms of and . This strand, distinct from commercial or institutional , attributes peace to domestic political structures that internalize the costs of conflict and foster empathetic among publics unlikely to sanction aggression against peers with analogous rights protections. Empirical extensions, such as Michael Doyle's "Kantian peace" thesis, interpret these mechanisms as explaining the observed dyadic peace among modern liberal democracies since the , though Kant himself envisioned a gradual federation rather than immediate guarantees. Critics within republican liberal frameworks note that Kant's republicanism prioritizes constitutional form over full electoral participation, cautioning against equating it directly with contemporary mass democracies, which may introduce populist pressures absent in Kant's deliberative ideal. Nonetheless, the theory underscores causal pathways like transparency in and opposition , which empirical studies link to lower conflict initiation probabilities in democratic dyads compared to mixed or autocratic pairs, with statistical analyses showing near-zero interstate wars between established democracies post-1816. This foundation integrates with broader Kantian elements—such as international federations and economic —but republican liberalism specifically highlights endogenous political incentives as the microfoundation for democratic restraint.

Broader Liberal Peace Propositions

Broader liberal peace propositions expand democratic peace theory by integrating complementary factors from classical liberal thought, particularly 's 1795 essay "Toward Perpetual Peace," which outlined three "definitive articles" for enduring peace: republican constitutions (aligned with ), a federation of free states (prefiguring international organizations), and cosmopolitan rights enabling economic intercourse among peoples. These elements collectively form a framework where liberal institutions and practices reinforce mutual restraint and cooperation, reducing incentives for interstate conflict beyond democratic dyads alone. Empirical research supports this integrated "Kantian tripod," demonstrating synergistic effects where interacts with economic and institutional ties to lower war probabilities more effectively than any single factor. Economic interdependence, rooted in commercial , posits that cross-border and create vested interests in stability, as disruption from conflict imposes asymmetric costs on participants, thereby deterring . Quantitative studies of dyadic relations from 1885 to show that a doubling of trade-to-GDP ratios correlates with a 32% reduction in the likelihood of militarized interstate disputes, with effects persisting even after controlling for power balances and alliances. This pacifying influence is attributed to opportunity costs and in global markets, though critics note that can sometimes facilitate in autocratic pairs via resource extraction. Joint analyses confirm interdependence's independent contribution, amplifying democratic peace by fostering transparency and signaling resolve through sustained exchanges. Participation in international organizations (IOs) and institutions embodies liberal institutionalism, providing arenas for negotiation, norm diffusion, and collective security that constrain unilateral force. Shared IO membership—such as in the League of Nations or United Nations—reduces conflict onset by promoting information exchange and mediation, with empirical evidence from 1950 to 1985 indicating a 23% drop in dispute escalation for dyads with multiple joint affiliations, independent of democratic status. This effect stems from enforced reciprocity and reputational costs for defection, though effectiveness varies by IO type, with security-focused bodies showing stronger correlations. When combined with democracy and trade, IO ties contribute to a cumulative 58% reduction in conflict risk, underscoring a holistic liberal mechanism over isolated democratic norms. These propositions have been tested across diverse datasets, including the project, revealing robustness in post-1945 eras but questioning universality in pre-industrial contexts where liberal factors were nascent. While mainstream scholarship, often from Western academic institutions, endorses these findings via monadic and dyadic models, alternative realist interpretations attribute peace to unmeasured confounders like nuclear deterrence rather than inherent liberal causality, necessitating techniques like variables to isolate effects. Nonetheless, the preponderance of large-N studies affirms that liberal entanglements—beyond electoral democracy—empirically mitigate aggression, informing propositions for multifaceted peace strategies.

Contrasting Realist and Constructivist Views

Realists in reject the causal claims of democratic peace theory (DPT), asserting that the observed absence of war among established democracies stems from structural factors such as balance of power, geographic proximity, or mutual deterrence rather than domestic regime type. They argue that in an anarchic system, states prioritize survival and security through , responding to threats based on relative capabilities irrespective of whether opponents are democratic or authoritarian; thus, democratic states behave no differently toward fellow democracies when vital interests clash, with historical dyadic appearing as a statistical artifact or coincidence driven by non-regime variables like nuclear weapons or economic ties. For instance, realists like Christopher Layne contend that DPT overlooks cases where democracies have nearly warred (e.g., U.S.-UK crises pre-1898) or cooperated with autocracies against mutual threats, attributing restraint to rather than normative compatibility. Critics within this demand rigorous controls for variables in empirical studies, noting that selective coding of "mature" democracies inflates the effect while ignoring intra-democratic tensions resolved short of full-scale war due to structures, not inherent pacific traits. In contrast, constructivists emphasize the role of socially constructed identities, norms, and intersubjective understandings in sustaining the democratic peace, positing that democracies form a distinct "security community" through shared liberal values—such as , transparency, and non-violent —that render war among them mutually inconceivable. Unlike realists' materialist focus on power distributions, constructivists like argue that collective identities emerge from historical interactions and discursive practices, where democracies recognize each other as "peers" bound by constitutive norms, fostering trust and tabooing violence in ways that transcend rationalist calculations. This perspective reformulates DPT by highlighting how institutional similarities (e.g., electoral processes) generate not just constraints but evolving mutual expectations; for example, in democracies opposes wars against perceived "equals," a norm reinforced through and rather than fixed interests. However, constructivists caution that these norms can be exclusionary, constructing non-democracies as "others" prone to aggression, which explains democracies' frequent conflicts with autocracies but risks normative if identities shift under pressure. The divergence underscores a core ontological divide: realists view state behavior as driven by timeless power imperatives in , dismissing regime effects as epiphenomenal, while constructivists treat democracy's pacific zone as a contingent social achievement, amenable to change via evolving discourses yet empirically robust due to entrenched liberal identities. Empirical tests favoring DPT thus challenge realist parsimony but align with constructivist accounts of norm diffusion, though both paradigms critique underlying DPT for overemphasizing formal structures over either material constraints or ideational processes.

References

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