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Staff (military)
Staff (military)
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Staff meeting of the U.S. 112th Regimental Combat Team in Arawe with General Julian Cunningham (seated), standing left to right: unidentified, Lieutenant Colonel C. E. Grant, Major D. M. McMains, Colonel A. M. Miller and Lieutenant Colonel P. L. Hooper

A military staff or general staff (also referred to as army staff, navy staff, or air staff within the individual services) is a group of officers, enlisted, and civilian staff who serve the commander of a division or other large military unit in their command and control role through planning, analysis, and information gathering, as well as by relaying, coordinating, and supervising the execution of their plans and orders, especially in case of multiple simultaneous and rapidly changing complex operations. They are organised into functional groups such as administration, logistics, operations, intelligence, training, etc. They provide multi-directional flow of information between a commanding officer, subordinate military units and other stakeholders.[1][2] A centralised general staff results in tighter top-down control but requires larger staff at headquarters (HQ) and reduces accuracy of orientation of field operations, whereas a decentralised general staff results in enhanced situational focus, personal initiative, speed of localised action, OODA loop, and improved accuracy of orientation.[2]

A commander "commands" through their personal authority, decision-making and leadership, and uses general staff to exercise the "control" on their behalf in a large unit. Most NATO nations, including the United States and most European nations, use the Continental Staff System which has origin in Napoleon's military. The Commonwealth Staff System, used by most of the Commonwealth, has its origin in the British military.[2]

Functions

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Information management

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One of the key purposes of a military staff is to provide accurate, timely information (which includes the results of contingency planning) on which command decisions are based. A goal is being able to suggest approaches or help produce well-informed decisions that will effectively manage and conserve unit resources.

In addition to generating information, the staff also manages the flow of communication within the unit and around it. While controlled information flow toward the commander is a priority, those useful or contingent in nature are communicated to lower-level units and/or through their respective staffs. If the information is not pertinent to the unit, it is redirected to the command level which can best utilize the condition or information.

Staffs are generally the first to know of issues that affect its group. Issues that require major decisions affecting the unit's operational capability are communicated to the commanding officer. However, not all issues will be handled by the commander. Smaller matters that arise are given to a more appropriate tasker within the unit to be handled and resolved, which would otherwise be an unnecessary distraction for the Commanding Officer who already makes numerous decisions every day.

In addition, a staff aims to carefully craft any useful situations and utilize that information.

Structure

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In a generic command staff, more seasoned and senior officers oversee staff sections of groups organized by the needs of the unit. Senior Enlisted Personnel task personnel in the maintenance of tactical equipment and vehicles. Senior Analysts are tasked with the finalizing of reports, and their enlisted personnel participate in the acquisition of information from subordinate staffs and units. This hierarchy places decision making and reporting under the auspices of the most experienced personnel and maximizes information flow of pertinent information sent out of the command overall, clarifying matters overall. This frees up the most senior members of the command at each level for decision making and issuing direction for further research or information gathering (perhaps requiring men to put their lives at risk to gather additional intelligence).

Operations staff officers also are tasked with battle planning both for offensive and defensive conditions, and issuing contingency plans for handling situations anticipated during the foreseeable future.

History

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Prior to the late 18th century, there was generally no organizational support for staff functions such as military intelligence, logistics, planning or personnel. Unit commanders handled such functions for their units, with informal help from subordinates who were usually not trained for or assigned to a specific task.

Austria

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Count Leopold Joseph von Daun, in a letter to Empress Maria Theresa in January 1758, pressed for a more important role for the Generalquartiermeister (Chief of Staff).[3] The failures in the army, especially at the Battle of Leuthen made it clear that Austria had no "great brain" and the command needed to spread the workload to allow the Commander-in-chief the time to consider the strategic picture. The 1757 regulations had created the Grosse Feldgeneralstab and Kleine Generalstab (large and small general staff) and after changes in 1769, a permanent staff of 30 officers was established under the direction of Franz Moritz von Lacy, which would be expanded in wartime with junior officers.[4] The Grosse staff was divided into three: First, the Intrinsecum, which handled internal administration and directing operations; secondly, external activities, including the Pioneers; thirdly, the Inspection Service, which handled the issuing of orders and prisoners of war. Alongside the General Staff was the General Adjutant, who led a group of Adjutant staff selected by the army commanders to handle the details of internal administration and collating intelligence, and answered to the Commander-in-chief. The Chief of Staff became the chief adviser to the Commander-in-chief and, in a fundamental move away from the previous administrative role, the Chief of Staff now undertook operational planning, while delegating the routine work to his senior staff officers. Staff officers were drawn from line units and would later return to them, the intention being that they would prove themselves as leaders during their time with the staff. In a battle or when the army had detached corps, a small number of staff would be allocated to the column commander as a smaller version of headquarters. The senior man, usually a Major, would be the chief of the column staff and his principal task would be to help the commander to understand what was intended.

When Karl Mack von Leiberich became chief of staff of the army under Prince Josias of Saxe-Coburg-Saalfeld in the Netherlands, he issued the Instruktionspunkte für gesammte Herren Generals, the last of 19 points setting out the roles of staff officers, dealing with offensive and defensive operations, while helping the Commander-in-chief. In 1796, Archduke Charles, Duke of Teschen augmented these with his own Observationspunkte, writing of the Chief of Staff: "he is duty bound to consider all possibilities related to operations and not view himself as merely carrying out those instructions".[5] On 20 March 1801, Feldmarschalleutnant Duka became the world's first peacetime Generalquartiermeister at the head of the staff and the wartime role of the Chief of Staff was now focused on planning and operations to assist the Commander. Archduke Charles, Duke of Teschen himself produced a new Dienstvorschrift on 1 September 1805,[6] which divided the staff into three: 1) Political Correspondence; 2) the Operations Directorate, dealing with planning and intelligence; 3) the Service Directorate, dealing with administration, supply and military justice. The Archduke set out the position of a modern Chief of Staff: "The Chief of Staff stands at the side of the Commander-in-Chief and is completely at his disposal. His sphere of work connects him with no specific unit". "The Commander-in-Chief decides what should happen and how; his chief assistant works out these decisions, so that each subordinate understands his allotted task". With the creation of the Korps in 1809, each had a staff, whose chief was responsible for directing operations and executing the overall headquarters plan. The staff on the outbreak of war in 1809 numbered over 170. Finally in 1811, Joseph Radetzky von Radetz produced his Über die bessere Einrichtung des Generalstabs,[7] which prioritised the Chief of Staff's managerial and supervisory role with the departments (Political Correspondence, Operations and Service) under their own directors, effectively merging the Adjutants and General Staff officers. In this system lay the beginnings of a formal staff corps, whose members could specialise in operations, intelligence and logistics.[8]

France

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Despite a short lived permanent staff under St-Cyr (1783–90), the French reverted to the old system in 1790, when the Revolutionary Government abolished the staff corps. When General Louis Alexandre Berthier was appointed Chief of Staff to the French Army of Italy in 1795, his was the old administrative role, accurately described by Jomini and Vachee as "the chief clerk" and "of limited competence".[9] His manual is merely a reporting system as a kind of office manual.[10] Staff officers were rotated out of the line on the Austrian model, but received no training and merely became efficient in the administrative tasks, especially the rapid issuance of orders. It suited Napoleon Bonaparte from the moment he took over the army the following year and he would use Berthier's system throughout his wars. Crucially, Napoleon remained his own intelligence chief and operational planner, a workload which, ultimately, not even he could cope with.

Prussia

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Prussia adopted Austria's approach in the following years, especially when Gerhard von Scharnhorst, who as a Hanoverian staff officer had worked with the Austrian army in the Austrian Netherlands in the early 1790s, took charge. Initially, the Prussian Army assigned a limited number of technical expert officers to support field commanders. Before 1746, however, reforms had added management of intelligence and contingency planning to the staff's duties. Later, the practice was initiated of rotating officers from command to staff assignments and back to familiarize them with both aspects of military operations, a practice that, with the addition of enlisted personnel, continues to be used. After 1806, Prussia's military academies trained mid-level officers in specialist staff skills. In 1814, Prussia formally established by law a central military command—Prussian General Staff—and a separate staff for each division and corps. Despite some professional and political issues with the Prussian system, especially when viewed through the prism of the 20th century World Wars, their General Staff concept has been adopted by many large armies in existence today.[citation needed]

United Kingdom

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Before the Crimean War staff work was looked at "with great disdain" in the British Army; the hardships of that war caused by disorganization led to a change in attitude.[11] The General Staff in Britain was formed in 1905, and reorganized again in 1908. Unlike the Prussian staff system, the British Army was thought too small to support separate staff and command career streams. Officers would typically alternate between staff and command.[11] Beevor, Inside the British Army, says instead that the terrible cleavages between staff and line units caused by the enormous losses during the trench warfare of the World War I meant that senior British officers consequently decided that all officers would rotate between staff and line responsibilities, preventing the development of a separate general staff corps.

United States

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The National Security Act of 1947 instead created a Joint Staff populated by military service members who, rather than becoming career staff officers on the German general staff model, rotate into (and back out of) joint staff positions. Following the major revision of Title 10 of the United States Code by the Goldwater–Nichols Act in 1986, the Joint Staff of today works directly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff rather than the corporate Joint Chiefs of Staff, as they did from 1947 to 1986. Under this scheme, operational command and control of military forces are not the province of the Joint Staff, but that of combatant commanders, who report through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff unless otherwise directed, to the Secretary of Defense.

Continental Staff System

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The "Continental Staff System", also known as the "General Staff System" (GSS), is used by most NATO countries in structuring their militaries' staff functions. In this system, which is based on one originally employed by the French Army in the 19th century, each staff position in a headquarters or unit is assigned a letter-prefix corresponding to the formation's element and one or more numbers specifying a role.

The staff numbers are assigned according to custom, not hierarchy, traceable back to French practice; i.e., 1 is not "higher ranking" than 2. This list reflects the SHAPE structure:[12]

Since the original continental staff system only covered branches 1 through 6, it is not uncommon to see 7 through 9 omitted or having various meanings.[14] Common variation include merging of 3 and 5 to 3, Operations and Plans; omitting the training branch and utilizing 7 for engineering (as seen in US Military Sealift Command[15] and Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I)[16]) and replacing 9 with a legal branch (making CIMIC a part of another branch, i.e. 2 or 4) as seen with the UK Permanent Joint Headquarters.[17]

Derived from the Prussian Große Generalstab (Great General Staff), traditionally these staff functions were prefixed by the simple G, which is retained in place for modern army usage. However, the increasing complexity of modern armies and the spread of the staff concept to naval, air, and other elements, has demanded the addition of new prefixes. These element prefixes are:

  • A, for air force headquarters;
  • C, for combined headquarters (multiple nations) headquarters;
  • F, for certain forward or deployable headquarters;
  • G, for army or marine general staff sections within headquarters of organizations commanded by a general officer and having a chief of staff to coordinate the actions of the general staff, such as divisions or equivalent organizations (e.g., USMC Marine Aircraft Wing and Marine Logistics Group) and separate (i.e., non-divisional) brigade level (USMC MEB) and above;[18]
  • J, for joint (multiple services) headquarters, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff[19]);
  • M, for Marine Corps headquarters;
  • N, for navy headquarters;
  • S, for army or marines executive staff sections within headquarters of organizations commanded by a field grade officer (i.e., major through colonel) and having an executive officer to coordinate the actions of the executive staff (e.g., divisional brigades, regiments, groups, battalions, and squadrons; not used by all countries);[18] S is also used in the Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (SeaBees)[20] and in the Air Force Security Forces Squadron.[21]
  • U, is used for United Nations military operations mission headquarters.
  • CG, is unique to the US Coast Guard's Assistant Commandants (Headquarters staff), previously using the G prefix.

On some occasions the letter E can also be observed, though it is not an official term. In that case it is for element and it will be used to identify a small independent element, that is a part of a non-staff organization; i.e., an E3 is an operational element on a logistics site or an E4 is a logistics element on a forward medical support site.

Thus, the personnel officer of a naval headquarters would be referred to as N1. In reality, in large organizations each of these staff functions will require the support of its own large staff, so N1 refers both to the office and the officer in charge of it. The continental staff system can be carried down to the next level: J1.3 (or J13, sometimes the dot-separator is omitted) is thus the operations officer of the personnel office of a joint headquarters, but the exact definition of the roles at this level may vary. Below this, numbers can be attached following a hyphen, but these are usually only positional numbers assigned arbitrarily to identify individuals (G2.3-2 could be the budget officer in the operations section of the intelligence department; A1.1-1-1 might simply be a receptionist).

Manpower or personnel

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The manpower or personnel officer supervises personnel and administration systems. This department functions as the essential administrative liaison between the subordinate units and the headquarters, handling personnel actions coming from the bottom up (such as a request for an award to be given to a particular soldier) or from the top down (such as orders being received from the army level directing that a particular soldier be reassigned to a new unit outside the command). In army units, this person is often called the Adjutant. The S-1 also works with the postal mailing office, and deals with awards and ranks as well.

Intelligence, security, and information operations

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The intelligence section is responsible for collecting and analyzing intelligence information about the enemy to determine what the enemy is doing or might do, to prevent the accomplishment of the enemy's mission. This office may also control maps and geographical information systems and data. At the unit level, the S-2 is the unit's security officer, and the S-2 section manages all security clearance issues for the unit's personnel. Other duties of the S-2 often include intelligence oversight and physical security.

Operations

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The operations office may include plans and training. The operations office plans and coordinates operations, and all things necessary to enable the formation to operate and accomplish its mission. In most units, the operations office is the largest of the staff sections and considered the most important. All aspects of sustaining the unit's operations, planning future operations, and additionally planning and executing all unit training, fall under the responsibility of operations. The operations office is also tasked with keeping track of the weekly training schedules. In most military units (i.e., battalion, regiment, and brigade), the operations officer carries the same rank as the executive officer (XO), but ranks third in the unit's chain of command while the other staff officers are one rank lower. For example, in a battalion, the S-3 would hold the rank of major (like the battalion XO), while the remaining staff officers are captains or lieutenants.

Logistics

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The logistics office is responsible for managing the wide scope of materiel, transport, facilities, services and medical/health support:

  • Design, development, acquisition, storage, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel.
  • Transport of personnel and materiel.
  • Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities.
  • Acquisition or furnishing of services.
  • Medical and health service support.

By NATO doctrine, the logistic staff is tasked with overseeing logistic aspects and principles, where the focus is that "logistic support must be focused towards ensuring the success of the operation" and prescriptions of elements such as responsibility and authority.[22] A logistic staff may be divided into sections based on branch or geographic area. Each section may in turn also be divided into tasks and roles. The size of the logistic staff can vary greatly, depending on the environment and complexity of operations. NATO in example work with a "Multinational Joint Logistic Centre",[23] which exists outside of the force commander's staff, but runs as a separate entity/unit, with only a few logistic personnel in the commander's staff who act as liaisons.

Plans and strategy

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The plans and strategy office is responsible for civil military operations (CMO) strategy planning. At the unit level, the S-5 is the primary adviser to the commander on the civilian-to-military and military-to-civilian impact of the mission/operation within the host nation's (HN) area of interest (AOI), area of operations (AO), or the target area of interest (TAOI). The G5 serves as the mission support office (MSO) at the division level and HHC[clarification needed] for civil military plans and strategy.

Signal (communications and IT)

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The signal office directs all communications and is the point of contact for the issue of communications instructions and protocol during operations as well as for communications troubleshooting, issue, and preventative maintenance. Communications at this level is paired with digital as well as voice (radio, computer, etc.). At the unit level, S-6 is also usually responsible for all electronic systems within a unit to include computers, faxes, copy machines, and phone systems.

Training

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The training branch will organize and coordinate training activity conducted by a Headquarters and also supervise and support subordinate units.

Finance

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The finance branch, not to be confused with Administration from which it has split, sets the finance policy for the operation. Operationally, the Administration and Finance may be interlinked, but have separate reporting chains.

CIMIC: Civil-Military Co-operation

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Civil-Military Co-operation or civil affairs are the activities that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between the military forces, the government or non-government civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate and achieve mission objectives.[24]

Commonwealth staff system

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The "Commonwealth staff system", used by most Commonwealth nations, is largely based on the British military's staff system with nation-specific variations.[2]

By country

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Myanmar

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Example of a Commonwealth style command structure organisation

Overall staff system structure is generally similar to the pre 1984 British Army system with G Branch, A Branch and Q Branch with slightly different staff officer position names. Unlike the continental system, 1 is higher ranking than 2 followed by 3. Despite being called GSO, ASO and QSO in English, all of them are translated as either စစ်ဦးစီးမှူး for G (or) ဦးစီးအရာရှိ for A and Q in Burmese. The 2010/2011 military command structure of Myanmar in the photo shown below which still uses the same staff system

G Branch (စစ်ဦးစီး)
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G Branch, called စစ်ဦးစီး or ဦး for short in Burmese, is responsible for Responsible for intelligence, training and every aspect of operations.

General Staff Officer (Grade 1), informally known as G1: Ranked Lieutenant Colonel or a Colonel

General Staff Officer (Grade 2), informally known as G2: Ranked Major

General Staff Officer (Grade 3), informally known as G3: Ranked Captain

A Branch (စစ်ရေး)
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A Branch, called စစ်ရေး or ရေး for short in Burmese, is responsible for every aspect of personnel management such as medical and military.

Adjutant Staff Officer (Grade 1), informally known as A1: Ranked Lieutenant Colonel or a Colonel

Adjutant Staff Officer (Grade 2), informally known as A2: Ranked Major

Adjutant Staff Officer (Grade 3), informally known as A3: Ranked Captain

Q Branch (စစ်ထောက်)
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Q Branch, called စစ်ထောက် or ထောက် for short in Burmese, is responsible for logistical aspects such as supply and transport as well as ordnance service.

Quartermaster Staff Officer (Grade 1), informally known as Q1: Ranked Lieutenant Colonel or a Colonel

Quartermaster Staff Officer (Grade 2), informally known as Q2: Ranked Major

Quartermaster Staff Officer (Grade 3), informally known as Q3: Ranked Captain [25]

Australia

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Following Australia's Federation in 1901, the Australian Commonwealth Military Forces (now the Australian Army) adopted many of the practices of the British Army, including its staff system.[26]: 126–131  While this approach was modified and adapted over the course of the 20th Century, the British three branch system and nomenclature remained a feature of Australian practice until 1997 when it adopted the Common Joint Staff System, based on the NATO or Continental/General Staff System, across all three services.[26]: 126–131  The primary reasons given for this were the ability to standardise staff organisations across the breadth and depth of the services, and; improve interoperability between America, Britain, Canada and Australia, as well as NATO partners that employed this system.[27] At this time the Australian Defence Force also developed its own Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP), itself derived from the US Tactical Decision-Making Process and UK Individual Estimate.[26]: 126–131 

Canada

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The head of the Royal Canadian Navy, Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy, is also titled as Chief of Naval Staff.

The head of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force, is also titled as Chief of Air Force Staff.

The head of the Canadian Army, Commander of the Canadian Army, is also titled as Chief of Army Staff.

United Kingdom

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Army staff
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The British Staff System was a product of the Esher Committee Report of 1904, which investigated the conduct of the late Victorian era British Army in the Second Anglo-Boer War and the Haldane Reforms from 1906–1912.[26]: 118–126  This staff system was captured in Field Service Regulations, Part II, Organisation and Administration, released in 1909 and later in the Staff Manual 1912.[26]: 118–126  This system remained in use until 1984, when the United Kingdom began to use the Continental or NATO system. The British Staff System was based on the following:

  • Three branches:
    • G branch: The general branch, responsible for operations, intelligence and training.
    • A branch: The administration branch, responsible for all aspects of personnel management.
    • Q branch: The quartermaster branch, responsible for logistic and equipment support.
  • Positions: positions were labelled as follows, may also be styled GSO I, GSO II, GSO III:
    • GSO1, General Staff Officer (Grade 1): The chief of staff, ranked a lieutenant colonel or colonel. He was in charge of the general staff branch, responsible for training, intelligence, planning operations and directing the battle as it progressed. Most orders from the general officer commanding (GOC) were actually written up and signed by the GSO1.[28]
    • GSO2, General Staff Officer (Grade 2): Ranked a major.
    • GSO3, General Staff Officer (Grade 3): Ranked a captain.

In the British system, staff are outranked by command officers. The staff cannot in theory (and largely in practice) say "no" to a subordinate unit; only the commander has that ability. This ensured a clear chain of command, and reinforced the idea that staff do not command, but exercise control on behalf of their commander. By contrast, in the American system, commanders are frequently outranked by staff officers. For example, within an American-style battalion, the S-3 is a major while company commanders are captains. In the British system, the principal staff officers at any HQ were always outranked by the subordinate commanders:

  • Lieutenant colonels commanding battalions or units in a brigade outrank the brigade major and the deputy assistant adjutant and quartermaster general
  • Brigadiers commanding brigades in a division outrank the colonel GS and colonel AQ
  • Major generals commanding divisions outrank the brigadier GS and assistant adjutant general and assistant quartermaster general at a corps HQ
Brigade level
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Branches as brigade were as follows. A and Q branches might be combined under a deputy assistant adjutant and quartermaster general, rank major (DAA&QMG).[11]

  • G branch (operations) plans and executes operations.
    The senior staff officer in brigade HQ held the appointment of brigade major (BM) with rank of captain or major, who coordinated the HQ. While the BM was responsible for the entire HQ, he concentrated mainly on "G" operational matters. A deputy BM GSO III generally looked after non-operational matters. Under the BM were several GSO III (rank captain) officers:
    • Operations (the senior captain)
    • Intelligence
    • Liaison. The Liaison section often had several lieutenants attached from the brigade's combat units.
    • Air
  • A branch:
    It handled all personnel matters such as awards, postings, promotions, medical, chaplains, military police and so forth. There were usually one or two GSO III officers in A branch.
  • Q Branch:
    It handled logistics, supply, transport, clothing, maintenance. There was usually one GSO III officer, with a learner captain or lieutenant, and several advisors, all captains:
Division level
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G branch was under the colonel GS (a lieutenant-colonel).

The combined "A" and "Q" staffs was headed by a colonel AQ, who was assisted by an assistant adjutant and quartermaster general (AA&QMG, rank lieutenant-colonel).

Members of the G staff:

  • A GSO II, acting as deputy to the GSO I. He was responsible for the preparation of orders and instructions as directed by the GSO I; the general organization and working of the "G" office; detailing of duty officers at the Div HQ; coordinating arrangements for moving the Main HQ; details of movement by road in consultation with the DAAG and DAQMG; and general policy regarding HQ defence and the preparation and promulgation of HQ standing orders. (In an armoured division headquarters, the GSO II was responsible for the division tactical HQ and the above duties were done by the GSO III (Operations).)
  • The GSO III (Operations) was the understudy to the GSO II; he maintained the situation map; prepared situation reports; supervised the acknowledgement register; maintained the command matrix; prepared orders for the move of the orders group; and prepared orders for the move of the division's main HQ.
  • The GSO III (Operations)(Chemical Warfare) was responsible for all matters dealing with chemical warfare that affected the division; coordinated courses; was responsible for the camouflage policy; maintained the war diary; prepared and maintained location statements; received and distributed codes, call sign lists and other signals information from the divisional signals; coordinated traffic control and organization of routes in the divisional forward area under the GSO II and APM; was understudy to the GSO III (Operations) on all matters less CW.
  • The GSO III (Intelligence) coordinated all intelligence training and work in the division; coordinated the collection and collation of information about enemy dispositions, methods and intentions; prepared daily intelligence summaries; coordinated interpretation of air photographs with the Army Photographic Interpretation Section (APIS); effected liaison with the APIS, the field security office and the Intelligence Officer, Royal Artillery (at CRA); and was responsible for briefing and handling of press correspondents.
  • The GSO III (Liaison) coordinated the work of the liaison officers, was responsible for the division information room and served as an understudy to the GSO III (Operations).
Corps level
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G branch was headed by the brigadier general staff (BGS, rank: brigadier). The BGS was usually superior to the AAG and AQMG, despite all three having the same rank.

A branch was headed by the Assistant adjutant general (AAG, rank: brigadier). He was assisted by the deputy assistant adjutant general (DAAG, rank lieutenant-colonel).

Q branch was headed by the assistant quartermaster general (AQMG, rank: brigadier).

The G staff for a corps might appear as below:

  • Operations and staff duties:
    • GSO I
    • GSO II (Ops)
    • GSO II (Ops)(CW)
    • GSO II (SD) – Staff Duties
    • 2 × GSO III (SD)
  • Air:
    • GSO II (Air)
  • Intelligence:
    • GSO II (Int)
    • 2 × GSO III (Int)
  • Liaison:
    • GSO II (L)
    • 3 × GSO III (L)
  • Royal Artillery:
    • GSO II (RA)
    • GSO II (AA)
    • GSO III (RA)
[edit]

The Admiralty War Staff[29] was a former senior command, operational planning department within the Admiralty during World War I. It was instituted on 8 January 1912 and was in effect a war council whose head reported directly to the First Sea Lord. It existed until 1917. After the war ended, it was replaced by the Admiralty Naval Staff department.[30][31]

The Admiralty Naval Staff[32] was the senior command, operational planning, policy and strategy department within the British Admiralty. It was established in 1917 and existed until 1964 when the department of the Admiralty was abolished and was replaced by the Naval Staff, Navy Department (Ministry of Defence).

See also

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References

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Further reading

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
A staff comprises a cadre of specialized officers, enlisted personnel, and civilians who assist commanders in exercising over units ranging from battalions to theater-level forces, primarily through planning, coordination, and execution of operations across functional domains such as , , and personnel . This emerged prominently in the early from Prussian reforms following defeats by Napoleonic forces, where and August von Gneisenau institutionalized staff training via the Kriegsakademie to professionalize advisory roles and enable . The facilitated decisive victories, such as those under Helmuth von Moltke in the , by integrating detailed with real-time adaptation, contrasting earlier ad hoc arrangements reliant on individual aides. In U.S. practice, staffs adopted a continental model post-World War I, organizing into sections like G-1 for personnel administration, G-2 for , G-3 for operations and training, and G-4 for sustainment, ensuring commanders receive synthesized information to direct complex, maneuvers without micromanaging subordinates. While enabling scalable warfare, staffs have faced critiques for potential bureaucratic that can delay decisions or dilute commander intent, as observed in analyses of historical campaigns where overstaffing correlated with slower .

Definition and Core Principles

Role in Command and Control

Military staff augments the capacity to exercise (C2) by providing specialized support in information processing, , and coordination, enabling effective direction of forces across operational scales. In this role, staff officers collect, analyze, and disseminate critical data on enemy actions, friendly capabilities, and environmental factors, thereby enhancing the commander's situational understanding and decision-making speed. For instance, U.S. Army emphasizes that staff functions ensure the commander receives timely, relevant information to direct operations without being overwhelmed by details. This division of responsibilities stems from the practical necessity that a single commander cannot manage all aspects of large-scale endeavors, necessitating delegated expertise to maintain coherence in execution. The (COS), as the principal staff officer, oversees the integration of staff efforts into the C2 process, supervising tasks, coordinating sections, and synchronizing plans to align with the commander's intent. The COS directs coordinating and special staff officers, resolves conflicts, and ensures efficient , such as in personnel (G-1), (G-2), operations (G-3), (G-4), and civil-military operations (G-5). In joint environments, this extends to supporting force commanders through similar structures, where staff facilitates the C2 functions of directing, leading, and assessing across services. Historical applications, such as during operations, demonstrate staff coordinating , , and support elements to control effectively, as seen in Pacific theater engagements. Staff contributions to C2 also include monitoring execution, assessing outcomes, and recommending adjustments, forming a feedback loop that sustains operational momentum. from multiple services underscores that without robust staff support, commanders risk or delayed responses, compromising mission success; for example, publications highlight staff roles in providing C2 to theater commands. Marine Corps principles similarly describe staff as enabling friction reduction in command through disciplined processes. This structured assistance has proven essential in scaling C2 from tactical units—where staffs may number a dozen—to theater levels with hundreds, ensuring causal links between decisions and effects remain intact.

First-Principles Rationale for Staff Organization

Military commanders face inherent cognitive and temporal constraints in processing the vast quantities of information generated by large-scale operations, necessitating a staff to filter, analyze, and synthesize data for informed decision-making. Warfare introduces "friction"—unpredictable elements such as incomplete intelligence, logistical delays, and human error—that amplify these limits, as articulated in analyses of operational uncertainty where individual oversight alone cannot mitigate risks effectively. Staff organization addresses this by delegating routine and specialized functions, allowing commanders to concentrate on overarching strategy and intent while staff handles execution details, thereby reducing decision latency and enhancing adaptability to dynamic conditions. Functional specialization forms the core of staff structure, dividing responsibilities into domains like personnel, , operations, , and to exploit expertise and ensure comprehensive coverage without overwhelming any single actor. This division mirrors organizational principles of limited , where effective supervision typically extends to no more than five to six direct subordinates due to the in coordination demands. By assigning officers to monitor specific areas—such as preparation or —staff enables synchronized efforts across echelons, transforming raw data into actionable insights that support centralized and decentralized execution. A coordinates these elements, acting as an intermediary to maintain unity of effort and prevent fragmentation, which could otherwise lead to misaligned actions or resource waste. This hierarchical oversight ensures staff recommendations align with the commander's vision, fostering initiative at lower levels while preserving overall coherence. Empirical underscores that such organization directly correlates with operational efficiency, as uncoordinated commands historically succumb to overload, whereas structured staffs mitigate causal chains of failure through proactive anticipation and .

Historical Evolution

Pre-Modern and Early Modern Staff Practices

In ancient civilizations, military staffs emerged to support command through basic administrative, logistical, and functions amid growing army sizes. Egyptian forces in (c. 2686–2160 BCE) employed quartermasters for supply management and specialists for desert operations, while the Middle Kingdom (c. 2040–1786 BCE) introduced officers and roles like "master of the secrets of the king." Assyrian armies maintained officers overseeing horse for up to 3,000 animals monthly, integrating supply and training coordination. In , texts like the (c. 4th century BCE) described staffs under (r. 321–297 BCE) handling training, across four , and . Chinese armies from the 4th century BCE featured merit-selected advisors, including strategists akin to (c. 544–496 BCE), focusing on tactical counsel rather than formalized . The and developed the most sophisticated pre-modern staff system, with dedicated sections for intelligence (via scouts), engineering, supply, and personnel records maintaining files on each soldier's service. Commanders convened staffs including legates, military tribunes, and the (senior ) for operational conferences, enabling sustained campaigns across vast territories with over 400,000 troops at peak. This structure emphasized accountability, with quaestors managing finances and contubernales (tent companions) assisting in administration, contributing to Rome's logistical superiority in conflicts like the (264–146 BCE). Greek armies, by contrast, lacked comparable formality, relying on strategoi (generals) advised informally by citizen-soldiers in hoplite phalanxes, as professional specialization was minimal outside mercenary contingents. Medieval European armies operated without centralized staffs, depending on feudal hierarchies where commanders—kings, dukes, or lords—consulted personal retinues of trusted nobles, kin, or bannerets for counsel. High offices like the oversaw overall command, mercenary payments, and , as in the Kingdom of where the constable ranked as the senior officer. Marshals managed camp setup, stables, discipline, and horse , often under the king's direct authority during feudal levies. Clerks handled documentation for musters and supplies, accompanying forces to battlefields, but coordination remained due to decentralized feudal obligations and short campaigns. This system suited smaller, levy-based forces of 10,000–20,000, prioritizing personal loyalty over systematic planning. During the (c. 1500–1800), the shift to standing armies and warfare necessitated proto-staff roles for and administration, though without integrated general staffs. Quartermasters, originating from responsibilities for billeting and supply, appeared in European records by the late ; the appointed its first Quartermaster-General in 1667, formalizing the post in 1686 to oversee transport, provisioning, and encampments amid conflicts like the (1688–1697). Adjutants emerged to relay orders and manage communications, evolving from aides-de-camp in noble-led forces to structured positions supporting commanders in larger formations of 50,000+ troops, as seen in the (1618–1648). These functions remained fragmented, often filled by nobles purchasing commissions, with effectiveness limited by patronage over merit until 19th-century reforms. Innovations like Sweden's under (r. 1611–1632) introduced regimental-level administrators for artillery and supply, but overall command still hinged on the general's charisma and informal councils rather than doctrinal processes.

19th-Century Innovations and the Prussian Model

Following Prussia's humiliating defeat at the Battle of Jena-Auerstedt on October 14, 1806, which led to the loss of half its territory and the imposition of a 42,000-man army cap by , reformers including restructured the military to emphasize merit-based officer selection and professional staff work over aristocratic privilege. , as head of the Military Reorganization Commission from 1807, abolished the sale of commissions and introduced examinations for promotions, laying the groundwork for a competent cadre of staff officers. In 1810, he founded the Kriegsakademie in , a three-year institution designed to cultivate intellectual officers skilled in , , and through rigorous curriculum including map-making, historical studies, and problem-solving exercises. August von Gneisenau, succeeding Scharnhorst as to the in 1813, expanded the General Staff into a permanent focused on contingency planning and unified command, integrating figures like who contributed theoretical underpinnings via works on friction in war and the moral elements of combat. By the , the staff operated as an elite body of approximately 30–40 officers at headquarters, selected via competitive exams and rotated between staff and command roles to maintain practical experience, with duties encompassing , mobilization schedules, and operational orders. This system rejected aides in favor of specialized branches for personnel, intelligence, and supplies, enabling scalable planning for larger forces. Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, appointed in 1857, institutionalized annual staff rides—terrain-based simulations of historical battles—and wargames to test plans, incorporating emerging technologies like the telegraph for real-time coordination and railroads for troop concentrations, as demonstrated in the 1866 mobilization against where 250,000 men were rail-transported in 11 days. Moltke's approach emphasized "centralized strategic direction with decentralized tactical execution," allowing commanders initiative within overall , which proved decisive in the Seven Weeks' War (1866), yielding a victory at Königgrätz on July 3 with fewer than 10,000 Prussian casualties against 44,000 Austrian. In the (1870–1871), staff-orchestrated encirclements at Sedan on September 1–2 captured Emperor and 100,000 troops, attributing success to prewar rail timetables and signal detachments. The Prussian model's emphasis on apolitical expertise, continuous education, and evidence-based planning—evident in its 19th-century triumphs expanding into the by 1871—influenced continental staff systems, with observers from Britain, , and the adopting elements like staff colleges by the 1870s, though Prussian dominance stemmed from integrating staff work with national and industrial capacity rather than isolated genius. Conservative resistance persisted, as seen in debates over noble exemptions from exams until 1850s reforms, but empirical victories validated the system's causal efficacy in overcoming numerical disadvantages through superior preparation.

20th-Century Developments Through World Wars

The outbreak of in 1914 exposed limitations in pre-war staff structures, prompting rapid adaptations to manage the unprecedented scale of industrialized warfare. Armies transitioned from expectations of short, mobile campaigns to prolonged attrition battles, requiring staffs to expand roles in coordinating , , and intelligence across vast fronts. The , inheriting the Prussian model, demonstrated proficiency in , as evidenced by the initial success of the Schlieffen Plan's execution through meticulous railroad timetables and troop movements, though it faltered due to overextension rather than staff incompetence. In contrast, Allied forces, particularly the British Expeditionary Force, initially struggled with staffs but evolved toward more systematic organizations, incorporating specialized sections for signals and supply by 1916. The ' entry in 1917 under General marked a pivotal adoption of formalized staff procedures, influenced by European models. Pershing established a standardized division staff organization mirroring the French system, with G-1 (personnel), G-2 (intelligence), G-3 (operations), and G-4 () sections, and founded the Army General Staff College in , , in 1918 to train officers in these functions. This structure emphasized merit-based selection and rigorous planning, enabling effective integration of into Allied operations, such as the Meuse-Argonne Offensive in September 1918, where staffs managed over 1.2 million troops and coordinated with French artillery groups tailored to specific tasks. thus validated the general staff's value in , with U.S. mobilization policy shifts leading to the creation of the First Army on August 10, 1918, as a centralized command entity. Interwar reforms refined these lessons amid technological shifts like tanks and , which demanded integrated planning. The German , constrained by Versailles Treaty limits, preserved General Staff expertise through clandestine training, fostering officers who would lead operations in 1939. Other nations, including the U.S., reorganized general staffs; the 1921 Reorganization Act centralized planning under a , dividing functions into operations, intelligence, and supply branches. World War II amplified staff complexities with global theaters, combined arms, and joint service coordination. German forces retained a centralized General Staff under the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH), enabling rapid maneuver warfare, as in the 1940 Blitzkrieg through France, where operations officers synchronized panzer divisions with Luftwaffe support via detailed war games and radio communications. Allied headquarters grew massively; the U.S. Army replaced its General Headquarters with the Army Ground Forces in March 1942, assigning explicit G-series functions and expanding staffs to handle logistics for millions, including the 1944 Normandy invasion where SHAEF staff under Eisenhower coordinated over 2 million troops across air, sea, and land domains. The war's demands also birthed permanent joint mechanisms, such as the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff formalized in 1942, blending Army and Navy planning to oversee global strategy. These developments underscored the staff's causal role in scaling command from divisional to theater levels, prioritizing empirical coordination over rigid doctrine.

Post-World War II and Cold War Adaptations

Following , military staffs in major powers adapted to rapid , the shift to nuclear deterrence, and the onset of bipolar confrontation with the . In the United States, the Army Staff underwent reorganization under the 1947 National Security Act, which established the Department of Defense and formalized the (JCS) with an expanded joint staff to coordinate inter-service planning for potential global conflicts. This structure emphasized strategic-level staff functions for nuclear war planning, including the development of single integrated operational plans (SIOPs) by the mid-1950s, integrating air, land, and sea elements under centralized JCS oversight. Army-specific adaptations included the evolution of the G-3 (Operations) section to incorporate forward-deployed readiness in , with staff officers focusing on rapid reinforcement plans like REFORGER exercises starting in 1963 to counter threats. During the Cold War, staffs integrated technological advancements such as computers and operations research to enhance planning efficiency. The U.S. Army introduced automated data processing in staff sections by the late 1950s, particularly in logistics (G-4) and intelligence (G-2), enabling quantitative modeling for sustainment in prolonged conflicts; for example, the 1958 adoption of the Unit Equipment System streamlined staff resource allocation across divisions reorganized into the ROAD (Reorganization Objective Army Division) structure in 1963, which featured flexible brigades supported by specialized staff cells. NATO's military staff adapted through the creation of integrated multinational commands, such as Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in 1951, where staff officers from member nations coordinated theater-level operations under a unified structure emphasizing consensus-based planning for collective defense against Soviet invasion scenarios. This required adaptations like bilingual staffing and harmonized procedures across continental and Anglo-American systems, with the International Military Staff at NATO headquarters growing to handle alliance-wide logistics and intelligence fusion by the 1970s. Soviet military staffs, drawing from the pre-war General Staff model, expanded to manage massive conventional forces optimized for deep battle doctrines, incorporating nuclear delivery systems and electronic warfare elements by the ; the Main Operations Directorate within the General Staff coordinated theater commands for potential offensives in , with staff emphasis on deception and operational depth to exploit NATO's perceived vulnerabilities. Western adaptations also addressed asymmetric threats, such as staff functions during proxy conflicts like Korea (1950-1953) and (1965-1973), where U.S. division staffs added provisional sections for advisory roles and pacification, reflecting a broadening of staff responsibilities beyond high-intensity warfare. By the late , reforms like the U.S. Army's 1980s emphasis on doctrine integrated joint staff planning for maneuvers, supported by enhanced communications staffs to synchronize precision-guided munitions and real-time . These changes prioritized causal factors like technological parity with adversaries and the need for scalable deterrence, though institutional inertia often delayed full implementation until validated by exercises or crises.

Principal Staff Systems

Continental Staff System

The Continental Staff System organizes military headquarters into functionally specialized sections designated by sequential numbers, enabling systematic support to commanders in planning, execution, and coordination of operations. This structure, formalized in the during the early 19th century and refined through European military practices, divides responsibilities to handle the complexities of large-scale warfare by distributing cognitive and administrative loads across dedicated experts. It forms the basis for staff operations in most member states' armies, prioritizing clear delineation of duties to enhance efficiency in . At higher echelons such as divisions, , or armies, sections are prefixed with "G" (for general staff), while lower units like brigades or battalions use "S" prefixes; a oversees integration under the commander's authority. The core sections include:
  • G1/S1 (Personnel): Manages , including recruitment, assignments, morale, discipline, and administrative services to sustain force readiness.
  • G2/S2 (): Handles collection, analysis, and dissemination of enemy information, , and security assessments to inform decision-making.
  • G3/S3 (Operations and ): Directs current and future operations, programs, and tactical execution, often serving as the primary interface for operational coordination.
  • G4/S4 (): Oversees supply, maintenance, transportation, and sustainment to ensure material support for sustained combat effectiveness.
  • G5/S5 (Plans): Develops long-term strategies, civil-military relations, and contingency planning, focusing on future-oriented and alliances.
  • G6/S6 (Communications and Systems): Manages signal networks, cybersecurity, and infrastructure critical for command connectivity.
Additional sections, such as for training integration or for resource management, may augment the structure in larger formations to address evolving demands like joint operations. This numeric hierarchy facilitates and , as evidenced by its adoption in doctrines post-World War II, where it supported rapid and decentralized execution in conflicts involving millions of personnel. Unlike alphabetic systems historically used in British forces, the Continental model emphasizes numeric universality for cross-national alignment, reducing ambiguity in multinational commands.

British and Commonwealth Staff System

The British and Commonwealth staff system emerged from reforms following the Committee's 1903–1904 inquiry into , which recommended establishing a centralized general staff to coordinate operations while preserving functional specialization across . This system divides headquarters staff into three principal : the General Staff (G Branch) for operations, planning, intelligence, and training; the Adjutant General's Staff (A Branch) for personnel management, administration, discipline, and legal matters; and the Quartermaster General's Staff (Q Branch) for , supply, transportation, and maintenance. Unlike the Continental system, which integrates all functions under a unified general staff with numbered sections (e.g., G1 for personnel, G3 for operations), the British model emphasizes branch-specific expertise, with officers typically drawn from or support corps rather than a dedicated general staff elite. ![Military staff briefing during operations in Arawe, New Britain, December 1943][float-right] In practice, each operates semi-autonomously under a principal director or deputy , advising the on domain-specific issues while coordinating through a . Staff officer grades follow a hierarchical notation: General Staff Officer Grade 1 (GSO1, typically ) leads sub-divisions; GSO2 (major) handles detailed planning; and GSO3 () manages execution and routine duties, with specialized roles like Assistant (AQMG) or Deputy Assistant (DAAG) in A and Q branches. This structure, formalized in the 1912 Staff Manual, prioritized practical specialization over theoretical integration, reflecting a cultural preference for regimental and branch professionalism amid limited pre-World War I staff training. forces, including Canadian, Australian, and Indian armies, adopted variants during the world wars, adapting the model to imperial coordination needs, such as unified command under British oversight in theaters like the Western Front (1914–1918) and (1942–1945). The system's resilience stemmed from its alignment with British military traditions of decentralized execution and empirical adaptation, as evidenced by its retention through , where G Branch coordinated Allied operations via mechanisms without fully adopting U.S. or German hierarchical models. Post-1945, interoperability prompted partial convergence toward numbered designations (e.g., G1 for personnel in modern British doctrine), but core branch distinctions persist, distinguishing it from the U.S. J-series (J1–J8) or fully Continental frameworks by maintaining corps-specific staffing and avoiding a permanent general staff cadre. This evolution underscores causal trade-offs: enhanced functional depth at the cost of initial coordination friction, validated by operational successes like the 1944 Normandy breakout, where specialized Q Branch sustained rapid advances exceeding 300 miles in 76 days.

United States Staff System

The utilize a staff organization derived from the continental system but adapted to emphasize functional specialization, alphabetic designations, and strong , with staffs serving primarily in advisory and coordinative roles without independent command powers. This structure evolved from reforms initiated in 1903, when the established a General Staff to address inefficiencies exposed during the Spanish-American War, such as fragmented planning and failures that contributed to high disease-related exceeding losses by a factor of five to one. The system designates staff officers by function—using "G" for echelons above , "S" for battalion through , "N" for , "A" for , and "J" for commands—enabling consistent support across services while integrating operations under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which mandated unified commands with J-series staffs reporting directly to commanders. In Army units, the coordinating staff includes G-1 for personnel and manpower (managing over 1.3 million active-duty soldiers' readiness, assignments, and welfare programs), G-2 for (analyzing threats and providing ), G-3 for operations (overseeing training, current operations, and force deployment), G-4 for (sustainment planning for , , and across global theaters), and G-5 for plans (long-term strategy and policy integration). Special staff elements, such as engineers, signal, and medical officers, handle domain-specific tasks, while personal staff like the and aides-de-camp provide direct support; this division ensures broad mission coverage without diluting the commander's decision-making primacy, as codified in Army doctrine FM 6-0. Navy and parallels use N-1 through N-8 and A-1 through A-8, respectively, with adaptations for maritime and air-centric operations, such as N-3 focusing on fleet tactics and A-4 on sustainment. Joint staffs, operational since the 1970s expansion under the and formalized post-1986, employ J-codes for unified commands: J-1 (manpower), J-2 (intelligence, coordinating with national agencies like the DIA), J-3 (operations, directing real-time actions), J-4 (logistics, integrating multi-service supply chains), J-5 (strategy and policy), J-6 (communications and cyber), J-7 ( and doctrine), and J-8 (force structure and resources, assessing capabilities against threats like peer competitors). This J-series facilitates , as seen in operations like Desert Storm in , where joint staffs synchronized over 500,000 troops across services, reducing friction in . Unlike rigid hierarchical models, the U.S. system prioritizes flexibility, with staff officers rotating through billets to build expertise—typically requiring 20-25 years of service for senior roles—and emphasizing principles that delegate execution while retaining accountability at the top.

Operational Functions

Planning, Operations, and Strategy

The operations and plans staff, typically designated as G3 or S3 in army formations under the Continental staff system, bear primary responsibility for developing, synchronizing, and executing operational plans that translate strategic objectives into actionable military activities. These officers advise commanders on the employment of forces, integrate warfighting functions such as maneuver, , and fires, and ensure plans account for enemy capabilities, terrain, and time constraints. In U.S. , the G3/S3 leads the synchronization of current and future operations, including the preparation of operation orders, warning orders, and fragmentary orders to adapt to dynamic conditions. Planning processes emphasize analytical rigor, with the G3/S3 directing the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP), a structured seven-step methodology commencing with mission receipt and proceeding through mission analysis, course of action (COA) development, war-gaming, COA comparison, approval, and orders production. During mission analysis, staff identify critical tasks, constraints, and information requirements, formulating initial COAs that align with the commander's visualization of the operational environment. War-gaming refines these COAs by simulating enemy responses and friendly countermeasures, often employing techniques like belt or avenue-in-depth methods to evaluate feasibility across METT-TC factors (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civil considerations). This process, detailed in FM 6-0, enables commanders to select COAs that maximize decisive points while mitigating risks, with staff producing supporting products such as synchronization matrices and decision support templates. In operations execution, the operations staff oversees real-time synchronization via current operations integration cells, monitoring the , assessing progress against measures of (MOEs) and (MOPs), and issuing adjustments to maintain . For instance, they coordinate rehearsals—such as full, reduced, or model variants—to validate schemes of maneuver and identify points before commitment of forces. These functions extend to training integration, where G3/S3 staff develop exercise plans that replicate operational demands, fostering unit readiness for high-intensity conflicts. Strategic contributions from staff involve bridging operational plans to higher national or theater-level goals, often through running estimates that continuously evaluate the operational environment and recommend shifts in emphasis. In joint commands, the J-5 directorate handles , formulating campaign plans, policy recommendations, and contingency options that link military ends to political objectives, as outlined in CJCSI 3100.01F. This includes oversight of the Joint Strategic Planning System, where staff analyze global threats and propose force posture adjustments. Joint Publication 5-0 further delineates staff roles in the Joint Planning Process (JPP), an adaptive framework that incorporates commander-led operational design—framing problems, defining objectives, and sequencing actions—to ensure strategic coherence across services and allies. Empirical assessments, such as those tracking enemy disruption or friendly sustainment rates, inform strategic revisions, underscoring the staff's role in causal linkages between tactical actions and end-state achievement.
MDMP StepKey G3/S3 Role
Receipt of MissionInitiate process, notify staff, gather initial data.
Mission AnalysisIdentify facts/assumptions, develop CCIRs, propose mission statement.
COA DevelopmentGenerate feasible COAs with schemes, tasks, and risks.
COA Analysis (War-Gaming)Simulate actions, identify branches/sequels, refine synchronization.
COA ComparisonEvaluate against criteria like feasibility and acceptability.
COA ApprovalBrief commander, incorporate guidance for finalization.
Orders ProductionDraft/distribute OPORDs, annexes, and graphics.

Intelligence, Security, and Information Management

In staff structures, the directorate—typically designated G-2/S-2 in echelons or J-2 in commands—functions as the commander's principal advisor on dispositions, capabilities, and probable courses of action (COAs), drawing from all-source analysis including (HUMINT), (SIGINT), and (IMINT). This staff element coordinates collection requirements, evaluates raw data for relevance to the operational environment, and produces tailored intelligence products such as estimates, briefings, and predictive assessments to inform , targeting, and risk mitigation. For example, in U.S. , the G-2/S-2 integrates synchronization with operations to anticipate adversary actions and support maneuver forces, ensuring the commander's intent is realized through timely, accurate dissemination. Security responsibilities within this domain emphasize (CI) and (OPSEC) to deny adversaries exploitable vulnerabilities, with staff officers identifying critical information, analyzing threats, and implementing protective measures across personnel, physical assets, and communications networks. CI efforts focus on detecting and neutralizing foreign intelligence activities, such as or , often through liaison with specialized units like the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), which executes worldwide CI synchronization. OPSEC, as defined in joint doctrine, involves a systematic to control indicators—unclassified but sensitive details—that could reveal operational patterns, with staff oversight ensuring unit-level compliance to prevent adversarial adaptation. Information management extends these functions to the lifecycle of sensitive , encompassing secure storage, access controls, and protocols to maintain operational amid cyber and electronic threats. Staff personnel manage markings, trails, and assessments for systems, integrating cyber to counter digital intrusions that could compromise mission outcomes. In environments, the J-2 directorate oversees support to operations, including policy for sharing with allies and assessing warfighting capabilities against tactics. This holistic approach mitigates leaks and supports operations (IO), where controlled narratives influence adversary decision-making without escalating to kinetic effects.

Logistics, Personnel, and Training

In military staffs employing the Continental system, the G-4 or S-4 section serves as the principal coordinator, integrating supply, , transportation, and sustainment operations to enable force mobility and endurance during campaigns. This role encompasses forecasting requirements for , , and rations; managing distribution networks; and mitigating disruptions through , as evidenced by U.S. emphasizing as a force multiplier in joint operations. The G-4 develops policies for readiness, including oversight of contract support and host-nation resources, with historical precedents like supply lines demonstrating causal links between efficient and operational outcomes, where deficiencies contributed to setbacks such as the 1944 Bulge Offensive. Personnel functions fall under the G-1 or S-1, which handles strength management, assignments, promotions, and administrative welfare to maintain and . Responsibilities include casualty tracking, pay entitlements, and legal assistance coordination, with the U.S. G-1 executing policies for total force manpower as of 2023, supporting over 1.3 million active and reserve personnel through data-driven assignments and retention programs. Staff personnel officers advise commanders on morale factors, such as support and enforcement, recognizing empirical correlations between personnel stability and reduced attrition rates in high-tempo deployments. Training oversight primarily resides with the G-3 or S-3 operations section, which designs cycles of individual, collective, and mission-rehearsal exercises to build proficiency and assess readiness metrics. This involves for simulations, live , and evaluations, integrated with G-1 inputs for skill certification and G-4 provisioning of and facilities, per U.S. Army frameworks updated in 2022 that prioritize measurable outcomes like weapons qualification rates exceeding 90% in evaluated units. Staff plans emphasize realism and repetition to counter decay in skills, with doctrines underscoring that inadequate preparation causally undermines tactical execution, as seen in post-action reviews of exercises like those conducted by forces in 2024. Coordination across these areas prevents silos, ensuring training events align with personnel availability and logistic feasibility for scalable force generation.

Communications, Finance, and Civil-Military Coordination

In military staff organizations, the communications function, typically designated as G-6 or S-6 in the Continental Staff System, encompasses planning, implementation, and maintenance of command, control, communications, computers, and cyber (C4/Cyber) systems to ensure reliable for operational decision-making. This includes developing communications estimates that integrate network requirements with mission objectives, securing electronic systems against threats, and coordinating signal operations such as radio, , and data networks. For instance, U.S. doctrine outlines that the G-6 prepares annexes for signal support in operation orders, prioritizing redundancy to mitigate disruptions in contested environments. In U.S. structures, the J-6 directorate validates C4 requirements, conducts capability assessments, and supports warfighter needs through policy development for integrated networks. The function within staffs focuses on , budgeting, and fiscal to sustain operations without compromising mission readiness. Staff officers in this role, such as U.S. officers under area of concentration 36A, manage disbursements, certification for military and civilian personnel, vendor payments, and audits of appropriated funds. They interpret financial directives, process claims, and advise commanders on cost-benefit analyses for and sustainment. In contexts, the J-8 directorate handles programming and budgeting for force structure, including multilateral war games and resource assessments to align expenditures with strategic priorities. This ensures fiscal discipline, as evidenced by requirements for verifying transactions against regulations like the . Civil-military coordination, often executed through specialized staff elements like or CIMIC units, bridges military operations with civilian entities to facilitate stability, humanitarian support, and local governance without subordinating military objectives to non-combat priorities. In multinational operations, such as UN , UN-CIMIC serves as a staff function to enable dialogue between military forces, police, and civilian components, including NGOs and host-nation authorities, for tasks like information sharing, infrastructure assessment, and consent-building. This coordination mitigates risks of inadvertent civilian harm and supports post-conflict reconstruction, as seen in doctrines emphasizing liaison roles to negotiate access and respect for . Empirical outcomes, such as reduced friction in theater through pre-planned interfaces, underscore its causal role in enhancing operational legitimacy and efficiency.

Modern Adaptations and Challenges

Integration of Emerging Technologies

Military staff systems are increasingly incorporating (AI) and (ML) to enhance processes, particularly in and operations. For instance, the U.S. has developed tools such as the Command Post Computing Environment (CPCE) and Army Planning Framework (APF), which integrate AI for unified battlefield visualization, course-of-action (COA) development, and evaluation, aiming to accelerate the military process (MDMP) from hours to minutes. Similarly, AI systems support in intelligence fusion, enabling staff officers to process vast datasets for threat assessment and more efficiently than traditional methods. Autonomous systems and are being adapted into staff workflows for and , with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) investing in unmanned systems to reduce human exposure in contested environments while feeding into command structures. and cloud integration facilitate this by enabling decentralized processing, allowing joint staff to maintain operational tempo amid disrupted communications. In cyber domains, staff roles now include AI-driven to counter threats to command-and-control (C2) networks, as cyberattacks can degrade and information flows critical to staff coordination. The Joint Staff of the U.S. DoD has proposed establishing a dedicated chief and AI office to oversee integration, reflecting recognition that legacy structures hinder rapid adoption. DoD's C3 Modernization Strategy emphasizes flexible incorporation of AI and self-healing networks into staff functions, collaborating with entities like the Joint Staff J6 for C5 integration. However, integration faces technical and human challenges, including biases leading to erroneous outputs, overreliance risking skill atrophy, and issues with existing systems. To mitigate these, militaries require upskilling planners in AI tools and incorporating vendor expertise, as outlined in Army War College analyses, while maintaining human oversight to address causal uncertainties in dynamic battlespaces. Empirical evidence from simulations shows AI augments but does not supplant techniques in mission planning, underscoring the need for hybrid human-AI staff models to preserve amid technological dependencies.

Joint, Combined, and Asymmetric Operations

operations involve coordinated actions across multiple services of the same armed forces, such as , , , and , to achieve unified effects beyond single-service capabilities. staff in commands employ a J-series structure, with sections like J-3 for operations, J-5 for plans, and J-2 for , facilitating integrated and execution as outlined in Joint Publication 5-0. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 mandated staffing by requiring officers to serve in billets for promotion eligibility, enhancing and reducing service , which had hindered operations like the 1983 invasion involving fragmented command. This reform centralized operational control under combatant commanders, supported by a Staff assisting the Chairman of the , enabling more effective synchronization in conflicts such as Operation Desert Storm in 1991, where air-land campaigns integrated over 500,000 personnel. Combined operations extend joint efforts to multinational coalitions, requiring staff adaptations for with allied forces, including shared doctrines, communication protocols, and liaison officers. In , the (ACO) oversees such activities through a command structure that includes multinational staffs at various levels, as reformed post-2018 to focus on collective defense with 32 member states contributing forces. Staff functions emphasize common operational pictures via tools like the Joint Operations Center, addressing challenges like differing national caveats—restrictions nations impose on their troops' employment—which complicated missions such as the 1999 with 50,000 troops from 40 countries. The (CJTF) concept, developed in the 1990s, allows flexible, ad hoc multinational headquarters for crisis response, with staff cells for current and future operations to integrate diverse capabilities. Asymmetric operations confront irregular threats from non-state actors or weaker adversaries employing unconventional tactics to offset conventional superiority, demanding staff shifts from rigid hierarchies to agile, intelligence-driven processes. Challenges include rapid adaptation to tactics like improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in , where U.S. staff incorporated counter-IED cells into task forces, analyzing over 10,000 incidents annually by 2007 to inform route clearance and pattern-of-life targeting. Staff must prioritize (HUMINT) integration in real-time, as delays in asymmetric environments like eroded operational tempo, with adaptations involving teams (OPTs) to handle multiple lines of effort simultaneously. Doctrinal evolutions, such as U.S. Field Manual updates post-2003, emphasize decentralized execution and civil-military coordination to counter insurgent adaptability, though persistent issues like over-reliance on kinetic operations have drawn criticism for insufficient cultural and political analysis in staff planning.

Reforms Addressing Bureaucracy and Efficiency

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 centralized operational control under unified combatant commanders and strengthened the role of the Chairman of the , reducing service-specific silos in staff planning and thereby improving coordination efficiency across joint staff functions, though it inadvertently expanded administrative layers within . This addressed pre-existing bureaucratic fragmentation that had hindered rapid decision-making in operations, as evidenced by lessons from and earlier conflicts where inter-service staff rivalries delayed responses. However, by the , critiques emerged that the Act contributed to bureaucratic growth, prompting calls for further streamlining, such as reinstating service chiefs' acquisition authorities to bypass layered staff approvals. In recent U.S. initiatives, the Department of Defense under Secretary issued a 2025 memorandum directing civilian workforce realignment to identify and eliminate duplicative staff roles, reopening the Defense Reform Program to conduct honest analyses of overhead and reject excessive administrative processes. Complementary legislative efforts, including Senator Roger Wicker's 2024 reform proposal and the SPEED Act introduced in 2025, targeted reductions in Title 10 regulatory burdens by repealing hundreds of unnecessary provisions, delegating approvals, and simplifying acquisition staff workflows to accelerate technology fielding while curbing compliance-driven delays. The FY2026 further advanced acquisition system reforms to minimize bureaucratic hurdles in staff-led , emphasizing faster development cycles for critical capabilities. In the British and context, the UK's Strategic Defence Review of 2025 mandated reshaping the and military staff structures, with a goal of at least 10% cost savings by 2030 through performance-based productivity enhancements and skills realignment to trim administrative bloat. This built on earlier Levene Reforms, which disaggregated responsibilities to align incentives and reduce centralized staff bottlenecks, though persistent issues like excessive senior roles prompted outgoing Chiefs of Defence Staff in 2025 to advocate for fewer positions and accelerated decision-making in . Concurrently, establishment of a National Armaments Director Group streamlined acquisition staff processes, ending fragmented oversight that had inflated timelines and costs. These measures reflect a broader push to counter civil-military staff expansion, prioritizing empirical reductions in overhead to enhance readiness without compromising core warfighting functions.

Achievements, Criticisms, and Controversies

Key Successes in Military Effectiveness

The Prussian General Staff, established as a professional cadre of trained officers, demonstrated exceptional effectiveness in the of 1870–1871 through precise mobilization planning and railroad logistics, enabling the rapid assembly of over 1.2 million troops against French forces scattered across multiple fronts. Under , staff officers conducted wargames and contingency planning years in advance, which facilitated encirclement maneuvers culminating in the on September 1, 1870, where 120,000 Prussian troops captured Emperor and 100,000 French soldiers, hastening the war's end and German unification. This system's emphasis on merit-based selection and continuous staff training contrasted with the French army's ad hoc command structure, underscoring how institutionalized staff processes enhanced operational tempo and decision-making under uncertainty. In , the Allied staff under (SHAEF), led by General , achieved a landmark success in planning , the Normandy invasion of June 6, 1944, through integrated multinational coordination of over 156,000 initial assault troops across five divisions and supporting naval forces exceeding 5,000 vessels. Initial planning by the Chief of Staff to the (COSSAC) team, starting in 1943, developed detailed deception operations like , which misled German intelligence on invasion sites, while staff sections synchronized logistics for 2 million follow-on troops and 500,000 vehicles by August 1944. This staff-driven synchronization of air, sea, and ground elements overcame logistical challenges, such as tidal predictions and mulberry harbors, contributing to the liberation of within 11 months and the defeat of by May 1945. The U.S.-led coalition staff in Operation Desert Storm (1991) exemplified modern joint staff effectiveness by orchestrating a 38-day air campaign followed by a 100-hour ground offensive, destroying 42 Iraqi divisions while sustaining minimal coalition losses of 292 fatalities. Centcom staff under General Norman Schwarzkopf integrated real-time intelligence fusion with precision strikes, employing over 116,000 sorties that neutralized 80% of Iraq's armored forces before ground phases, leveraging staff planning for phased deception and that expelled Iraqi forces from on February 28, 1991. This success stemmed from prewar staff exercises emphasizing among 30+ nations, highlighting how professional staffs mitigate coalition frictions through standardized procedures and adaptive command posts. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) staff planning in the of June 5–10, 1967, showcased rapid operational art, with preemptive airstrikes destroying 452 Arab aircraft on the ground in hours, achieving and enabling armored advances that captured the Sinai, , , and Gaza, tripling Israel's controlled territory despite numerical inferiority. Staff officers under coordinated concurrent fronts through decentralized execution and real-time intelligence, such as Operation Focus's timing at dawn to exploit Arab air vulnerabilities, resulting in over 20,000 Arab fatalities versus 800 Israeli. This outcome reflected years of staff-honed practices in maneuver doctrine and logistics sustainment, proving the causal link between rigorous staff preparation and disproportionate battlefield results against larger coalitions.

Criticisms of Bureaucratic Overreach and Inefficiency

The expansion of military staffs since the mid-20th century has drawn criticism for fostering bureaucratic layers that prioritize process over operational agility, leading to delayed and resource misallocation. In the United States Department of Defense (DoD), this manifests in an inability to account for trillions in assets, as evidenced by repeated failures; for fiscal year 2024, independent auditors identified 28 material weaknesses in internal controls, including deficiencies in financial reporting and property valuation, marking the seventh consecutive year of unqualified opinions. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) projects that the DoD will likely fail to achieve a clean until at least 2028, attributing delays to entrenched bureaucratic silos and outdated systems that hinder remediation efforts. Such inefficiencies extend to personnel management, where rigid staffing protocols and administrative burdens exacerbate talent retention issues. A 2017 analysis highlighted how DoD's personnel bureaucracy—encompassing extensive evaluation cycles and compliance requirements—contributes to officer attrition, with surveys indicating that mid-level leaders cite paperwork overload as a primary deterrent to continued service. Critics, including evaluators, further note heightened fraud risks from weak oversight, as seen in untracked government-furnished property worth billions provided to contractors, underscoring how staff proliferation diverts focus from core missions. Historically, similar concerns emerged in critiques of general staff systems post-World War II, where the shift toward specialized bureaus in Western militaries was faulted for creating duplication and inertia. For instance, analyses of U.S. Army structures in the pointed to an overreliance on staff planning that slowed tactical adaptations, a pattern echoed in later operations like where multi-layered approvals impeded rapid response. These issues persist, with GAO reports on legacy IT systems—many unmodernized since the —illustrating how bureaucratic inertia perpetuates vulnerabilities in and processing. Proponents of argue that trimming staff ratios to combatants, currently inverted in some branches, could restore efficiency without compromising capability.

Debates on Politicization and Structural Reforms

Debates over the politicization of military staffs center on the risk that staff officers, traditionally expected to remain apolitical professionals loyal to constitutional oaths rather than partisan agendas, may prioritize political or ideological alignment, thereby eroding operational effectiveness and . According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a politicized military manifests as to a single or consistent advocacy for partisan positions, which can compromise the military's role as a neutral instrument of national defense. In the United States, surveys of service members have revealed growing internal concerns, with 62 percent of respondents in a 2022 poll citing loss of trust due to perceived over-politicization of leadership, often linked to public statements by senior officers on domestic social issues. Critics from conservative outlets argue that prior administrations introduced ideological biases through (DEI) initiatives in staff selection and training, diluting merit-based promotions, while progressive sources contend that recent dismissals of senior officers signal a dangerous shift toward partisan purges. In early 2025, the U.S. Department of Defense under Secretary dismissed several high-ranking officers, including judge advocates general, prompting accusations of installing loyalists over experts, which Democrats described as an "unprecedented" threat to apolitical traditions established since the Founding era to prevent military subservience to any executive. Proponents of the moves, however, frame them as corrective actions against a resistant to reforms, echoing broader debates on whether staff politicization stems from entrenched interests or executive overreach, with from declining enlistment rates (down 25 percent in some branches by 2023) attributed partly to perceived cultural shifts in leadership. Parallel discussions on structural reforms advocate reorganizing military staffs to combat bureaucratic inertia, reduce redundancies, and enhance agility in response to peer competitors like and . In May 2025, the U.S. Army launched the Transformation Initiative, directing cuts to general officer billets—aiming to eliminate redundant commands and reallocate resources to combat units—under the mantra "less generals, more GIs" to create a leaner force structure. This builds on prior efforts like the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, which centralized joint staffs but arguably proliferated headquarters; reformers argue excessive staff layers, with hosting over 800,000 civilian and military personnel in non-combat roles as of 2024, hinder decision-making speed. Opponents warn that hasty reductions could impair institutional knowledge and oversight, potentially echoing failed post-Cold War drawdowns that left capabilities gaps, though data from recent indicate streamlined staffs improve responsiveness in multi-domain operations. These intertwined debates highlight tensions between preserving staff professionalism amid political pressures and adapting structures for , where empirical analyses from think tanks emphasize that unchecked politicization correlates with historical failures—like the Wehrmacht's entanglement in Nazi —while reforms must balance efficiency gains against risks of understaffing critical functions. Prioritizing verifiable metrics, such as readiness rates and promotion timelines, over subjective tests remains a core contention, with ongoing seeking to enforce in staff assignments.

References

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