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Inter-Services Intelligence
Inter-Services Intelligence
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Inter-Services Intelligence
انٹر سروسز انٹیلی جنس
Seal of ISI
Flag of ISI

Satellite imagery of Inter Services Intelligence Headquarter in Islamabad, Pakistan
Agency overview
Formed1 January 1948; 77 years ago (1948-01-01)
JurisdictionGovernment of Pakistan
HeadquartersIslamabad, Pakistan
Mottoخُذُواحِذرُکُم [Quran 4:71]
(Take your precautions)
EmployeesClassified
Annual budgetClassified
Agency executive
Parent departmentMinistry of Defence
Child agency

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI; Urdu: انٹر سروسز انٹیلی جنس) is the foreign intelligence agency agency of the Pakistan. It is responsible for gathering, processing, and analyzing information from around the world that is deemed relevant to Pakistan's national security. The main objective of the ISI is to integrate the Pakistan Armed Forces during wartime with real-time intelligence and support. The ISI reports to its agency executive and is primarily focused on providing intelligence to the Government of Pakistan and the Pakistan Armed Forces. It is part of the Pakistan Intelligence Community.

The ISI primarily consists of serving military officers drawn on secondment from the three service branches of the Pakistan Armed Forces: the Pakistan Army, Pakistan Navy, and Pakistan Air Force, hence the name "Inter-Services"; the agency also recruits civilians. Since 1971, it has been formally headed by a serving three-star general of the Pakistan Army, who is appointed by the Prime Minister of Pakistan in consultation with the Chief of Army Staff, who recommends three officers for the position. As of 30 September 2024, the ISI is headed by Lt. Gen. Asim Malik.[1] The Director-General reports directly to both the Prime Minister and the Chief of Army Staff.

Relatively unknown outside of Pakistan since its inception, the agency gained global recognition and fame in the 1980s when it backed the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet Union during the Soviet–Afghan War in the former Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Over the course of the conflict, the ISI worked in close coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States and the Secret Intelligence Service of the United Kingdom to run Operation Cyclone, a program to train and fund the mujahideen in Afghanistan with support from China, Saudi Arabia, and other Muslim nations.[2][3][4]

Following the dissolution of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in 1992, the ISI provided strategic support and intelligence to the Taliban against the Northern Alliance during the Afghan Civil War in the 1990s.[5][6][7] The ISI has strong links with jihadist groups, particularly in Afghanistan and Kashmir.[8][9][10][11][12][13] Its special warfare unit is the Covert Action Division. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in their first ever open acknowledgement in 2011 in US Court, said that the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) sponsors and oversees the insurgency in Kashmir by arming separatist militant groups.[12][13]

History

[edit]

The Inter-Services Intelligence was established in 1948 by officers of the Pakistan Army after the First Kashmir War, the first of several Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts. It was the brainchild of Brigadier Syed Shahid Hamid who became its first Director-General.[14]

The Kashmir War had exposed weaknesses in intelligence gathering, sharing, and coordination between military branches and Pakistani Intelligence Bureau (IB) and Military Intelligence (MI). The ISI was thus established to be operated by officers from the newly-independent Pakistan's three main military services, and to specialize in the collection, analysis, and assessment of external military and non-military intelligence.[15]

Naval Commander Syed Mohammad Ahsan, who served as Deputy Director Naval Intelligence of Pakistan and helped formulate ISI procedure, undertook and managed the recruitment and expansion of the ISI. After the 1958 coup d'état, all national intelligence agencies were directly controlled by the president and Chief Martial Law Administrator. The maintenance of national security, which was the principal function of these agencies, resulted in the consolidation of the Ayub regime. Any criticism of the regime was seen as a threat to national security.[16]

The ISI is headquartered in Pakistan's capital, Islamabad. The complex consists of various low-rise buildings separated by lawns and fountains. The entrance to the complex is next to a private hospital. Declan Walsh from The Guardian stated that the entrance is "suitably discreet: no sign, just a plainclothes officer packing a pistol who directs visitors through a chicane of barriers, soldiers, and sniffer dogs".[17] Walsh noted that the complex "resembles a well-funded private university" and that the buildings are "neatly tended," the lawns are "smooth," and the fountains are "tinkling." He described the central building, which houses the director general's office on the top floor, as "a modern structure with a round, echoing lobby".[18]

On 5 July 1977 through Operation Fair Play, the ISI began collecting intelligence on the Pakistan Communist Party and the Pakistan Peoples Party.[19] The Soviet–Afghan War in the 1980s saw the enhancement of the ISI's covert operations. A special Afghanistan section known as the SS Directorate was created under the command of Brigadier Mohammed Yousaf to oversee day-to-day operations in Afghanistan. Officers from the ISI's Covert Action Division received training in the United States, and "many covert action experts of the CIA were attached to the ISI to guide it in its operations against Soviet troops by using the Afghan Mujahideen".[20]

Many analysts (mainly Indian and American) believe that the ISI provides support to militant groups, though others think these allegations remain unsubstantiated.[21][22]

The ISI has often been accused of playing a role in major terrorist attacks across India including militancy in Kashmir, the July 2006 Mumbai Train Bombings,[23] the 2001 Indian Parliament attack,[24] the 2006 Varanasi bombings, the August 2007 Hyderabad bombings,[25] and the 2008 Mumbai attacks.[26][27]

The ISI has been accused of supporting Taliban forces[28] and recruiting and training mujahideen[29] to fight in Afghanistan[30] and Kashmir. Based on communication interceptions, US intelligence agencies concluded Pakistan's ISI was behind the attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul on 7 July 2008, a charge that the governments of India and Afghanistan had laid previously.[31] It is believed to be aiding these organisations in eradicating perceived enemies or those opposed to their cause, including India, Russia, China, Israel, the United States, the United Kingdom, and other members of NATO.[32][33] Satellite imagery from the Federal Bureau of Investigation[34] suggest the existence of several terrorist camps in Pakistan, with at least one militant admitting to being trained in the country. As part of the ongoing Kashmir conflict, Pakistan is alleged to be backing separatist militias.[35] Many nonpartisan sources believe that officials within Pakistan's military and the ISI sympathise with and aid Islamic terrorists, saying that the "ISI has provided covert but well-documented support to terrorist groups active in Kashmir, including the al-Qaeda affiliate Jaish-e-Mohammed".[36]

General Javed Nasir confessed to assisting the besieged Bosnian Muslims, supporting Chinese Muslims in Xinjiang despite a UN arms embargo, rebel Muslim groups in the Philippines, and some religious groups in Central Asia.[37] The National Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICC) of Pakistan is headed by the Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence. The overarching intelligence coordination body was given assent by the Prime Minister of Pakistan in November 2020. It held its inaugural session on 24 June 2021, marking the date the committee became functional.[38]

Organizational structure

[edit]

A director-general, who is traditionally a serving lieutenant general in the Pakistan Army,[citation needed] heads the ISI.[39] Three deputy director generals, who are serving two-star military officers, report directly to the director general with each deputy heading three wings respectively:[40]

  • Internal Wing – responsible for domestic intelligence, domestic counter-intelligence, counter-espionage, and counter-terrorism.
  • External Wing – responsible for external intelligence, external counter-intelligence, and espionage.
  • Foreign Relations Wing – responsible for diplomatic intelligence and foreign relations intelligence.

Military officers of the three branches of the Pakistan Armed Forces and paramilitary forces such as ANF, ASF, Pakistan Rangers, Frontier Corps, Gilgit-Baltistan Scouts and Maritime Security Agency as well as civilian officers from the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), Pakistan Customs, Police, Judiciary and Ministry of Defence make up ISI's general staff. They are recruited on deputations for three to four years and enhance the ISI's professional competence. According to some experts, the ISI is the largest intelligence agency in the world in terms of total staff. While the total number has never been made public, experts estimate around 10,000 officers and staff, which does not include informants or assets.[41]

Directorates

[edit]

The wings are further divided into various directorates, which are sub-divided into departments, each directorate is usually headed by a major general, air marshal, or rear admiral.

Directorates
Director-General, Security and Administration (DG S&A)
Director-General Analysis (DG A)
Director-General H (DG H)
Director-General Counter-Terrorism (DG CT)
Director-General Personnel (DG P)
Director-General, K (DG K)
Director-General X (DG X)
Director-General, F (DG F)
Director-General, Technical (DG T)
Director-General, Counter Intelligence (DG CI)
Director-General, Media (DG M)

Departments

[edit]
  • Covert Action Division: Its roles are similar to the Special Activities Division of the CIA and a handful of officers are trained by that division. The division has been active since the 1960s.[42]
  • Joint Intelligence X: Coordinates the other departments in the ISI.[41] Intelligence and information gathered from the other departments are sent to JIX which prepares and processes the information and from there prepares reports which are presented.
  • Joint Intelligence Bureau: Responsible for gathering anti-state intelligence and fake drugs, fake currency, and TTP.[41]
  • Joint Counterintelligence Bureau: Focused on foreign intelligence agencies.
  • Joint Intelligence North: Exclusively responsible for the Jammu and Kashmir region and Gilgit-Baltistan.[41]
  • Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous: Responsible for espionage, including offensive intelligence operations, in other countries.[41]
  • Joint Signal Intelligence Bureau: Operates intelligence collections along the India-Pakistan border.[41] The JSIB is the ELINT, COMINT, and SIGINT directorate that is charged with diverting attacks from foreign non-communications electromagnetic radiations emanating from sources other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources.[41]
  • Joint Intelligence Technical: Deals with development of science and technology to advance Pakistani intelligence gathering. The directorate is charged with taking steps against electronic warfare attacks in Pakistan.[41] Without any exception, officers from this division are reported to be engineer officers and military scientists who deal with the military promotion of science and technology.[41] There are also separate explosives and chemical and biological warfare sections.[41]
  • SS Directorate: Comprises officers from the Special Services Group. It monitors the activities of terrorist groups that operate against Pakistan. It is comparable to the FBI and the National Clandestine Service (NCS), and is responsible for special operations against terrorists.
  • Political Internal Division: Monitors the financial funding of the right-wing political science sphere against left-wing political science circles. This department was involved in providing funds to anti-left wing forces during the general elections of 1965, 1977, 1985, 1988, and 1990.[43] The department has been inactive since March 2012 with the new director general taking operational charge of the ISI.[44]

Director generals

[edit]

The Director General of the ISI is among the most powerful posts in Pakistan.[39] For example, according to Mohammad Sohail, shares at the Pakistan Stock Exchange went down in October 2021 over concerns regarding the appointment of the ISI chief. The benchmark KSE-100 index fell 1.51%.[45][46][47] According to retired air marshal Shahzad Chaudhry, three to four names are provided by the Chief of Army Staff, and the prime minister selects the director general from that list,[48] and the appointed serves for two to three years.[48] Before 2021, the appointment process of the Director-General followed no formal protocol other than verbal discussion between the Prime Minister and the head of the army.[49]

Walter Cawthorn was the first head of the ISI. His successor, Syed Shahid Hamid is said to have supported Ayub Khan's rise to power.[50] After his retirement, he helped President Muhammed Zia-ul-Haq.[51]

Director General Start of term End of term
1 Major General

Walter Cawthorn

January 1948 June 1948
2 Brigadier

Syed Shahid Hamid[52]
HJ

14 July 1948 22 August 1950
3 Brigadier

Mirza Hamid Hussain[52]

23 August 1950 May 1951
4 Colonel

Muhammad Afzal Malik[52]

May 1951 April 1953
5 Brigadier

Syed Ghawas[52]

April 1953 August 1955
6 Brigadier[52]

Sher Bahadur

August 1955 September 1957
7 Brigadier[52]

Muhammad Hayat

September 1957 October 1959
8 Brigadier[1]

Riaz Hussain[52]

October 1959 May 1966
9 Major General

Muhammed Akbar Khan[53]

May 1966 September 1971
10 Major General[2]

Ghulam Jilani Khan

September 1971[54] 16 September 1978[55]
11 Lieutenant General

Muhammad Riaz Khan

17 September 1978 20 June 1979
12 Lieutenant General

Akhtar Abdur Rahman
NI(M) HI(M)

21 June 1979 29 March 1987
13 Lieutenant General

Hamid Gul
HI(M) SBt

29 March 1987 29 May 1989
14 Lieutenant General

Shamsur Rahman Kallu
HI(M) TBt

30 May 1989 August 1990
15 Lieutenant General

Asad Durrani
HI(M)

August 1990 13 March 1992
16 Lieutenant General

Javed Nasir
HI(M) SBt

14 March 1992 13 May 1993
17 Lieutenant General

Javed Ashraf Qazi
HI(M) SBt

14 May 1993 October 1995
18 Lieutenant General

Naseem Rana

October 1995 October 1998[55]
19 Lieutenant General

Ziauddin Butt
HI(M)

October 1998 12 October 1999
20 Lieutenant General

Mahmud Ahmed
HI(M)

20 October 1999 7 October 2001
21 Lieutenant General

Ehsan ul Haq
HI(M)

7 October 2001 5 October 2004
22 Lieutenant General

Ashfaq Parvez Kayani
HI(M) SI(M) TI(M)

5 October 2004 8 October 2007
23 Lieutenant General

Nadeem Taj
HI(M) TBt

9 October 2007 29 September 2008
24 Lieutenant General

Ahmad Shuja Pasha
HI(M)

1 October 2008 18 March 2012
25 Lieutenant General

Zaheerul Islam
HI(M)

19 March 2012 7 November 2014
26 Lieutenant General

Rizwan Akhtar

7 November 2014 11 December 2016
27 Lieutenant General

Naveed Mukhtar

11 December 2016 25 October 2018
28 Lieutenant General

Asim Munir
HI(M)

25 October 2018 16 June 2019
29 Lieutenant General

Faiz Hameed
HI(M)

17 June 2019 19 November 2021
30 Lieutenant General

Nadeem Anjum[17]

20 November 2021 29 September 2024
31 Lieutenant General

Asim Malik

30 September 2024 Incumbent

Recruitment and training

[edit]

Both civilians and members of the armed forces can join the ISI. For civilians, recruitment is advertised and handled by both the Federal Public Services Commission (FPSC); they are considered employees of the Ministry of Defence. The FPSC conducts examinations that test the candidate's knowledge of current affairs, English, and various analytical abilities. Based on the results, the FPSC shortlists the candidates and sends the list to the ISI who conduct the initial background checks. Selected candidates are then invited for an interview which is conducted by a joint committee comprising both ISI and FPSC officials, and are then sent to the Defence Services Intelligence Academy (DSIA) for six months of training. The candidates are transferred to different sections for open source information where they serve for five years. After five years of basic service, officers are entrusted with sensitive jobs and considered part of the core team.[56]

Operations

[edit]

By country

[edit]

Afghanistan

[edit]
  • 1982–1997: ISI is believed to have had access to Osama bin Laden in the past.[57][58] B. Raman, former Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) officer, claims that the Central Intelligence Agency through the ISI promoted the smuggling of heroin into Afghanistan to turn Soviet troops into heroin addicts and thus greatly reduce their fighting potential.[59]
  • 1986: Worrying that among the large influx of Afghan refugees who had come into Pakistan because of the Soviet–Afghan War were members of KHAD (Afghan Intelligence), the ISI convinced Mansoor Ahmed, who was the chargé d'affaires of the Afghan embassy in Islamabad, to turn his back on the Soviet-backed Afghan government. He and his family were secretly escorted out of their residence and given safe passage on a London-bound British Airways flight in exchange for classified information in regard to Afghan agents in Pakistan. The Soviet and Afghan diplomats did not find his family.[60]
  • 1990: According to Peter Tomsen, the United States Special Envoy to Afghanistan, neighboring Pakistan had tried to bring Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to power in Afghanistan against the opposition of all other mujahideen commanders and factions as early as 1990.[61] In October 1990, the ISI had devised a plan for Hekmatyar to conduct a mass bombardment of the Afghan capital Kabul, then still under communist rule, with possible Pakistani troop reinforcements.[61] This unilateral ISI-Hekmatyar plan was carried out, though the thirty most-important mujahideen commanders had agreed to hold a conference inclusive of all Afghan groups to decide on a common future strategy.[61] The United States finally put pressure on Pakistan to stop the 1990 plan, which was subsequently called off until 1992.[61]
  • 1994: Former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf admitted to supporting the Taliban until 9/11.[62] According to Pakistani Afghanistan expert Ahmed Rashid, "between 1994 and 1999, an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 Pakistanis trained and fought in Afghanistan" on the side of the Taliban.[63]
  • 2008: Militants attacked the Indian Consulate General in Jalalabad in 2007. According to Afghanistan's National Directorate of Security, individuals arrested by the Afghan government stated that the ISI was behind the attack and had given them ₹120,000 for the operation.[64]
  • 2001 onwards: American officials believe members of the Pakistani intelligence service are alerting militants to imminent American missile strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas.[65] In October 2009, Davood Moradian, a senior policy adviser to foreign minister Rangeen Dadfar Spanta, said the British and American governments were fully aware of the ISI's role but lacked the courage to confront Islamabad. He claimed that the Afghan government had given British and American intelligence agents evidence that proved ISI involvement in bombings.[66]
  • 2010: A new report by the London School of Economics (LSE) claimed to provide the most concrete evidence that the ISI is providing funding, training, and sanctuary to the Taliban insurgency on a scale much larger than previously thought. The report's author, Matt Waldman, spoke to nine Taliban field commanders in Afghanistan and concluded that Pakistan's relationship with the insurgents ran far deeper than previously realised. Some of those interviewed suggested that the organisation even attended meetings of the Taliban's supreme council, the Quetta Shura.[67][68][69] A spokesman for the Pakistani military dismissed the report, describing it as "malicious".[70][71][72] General David Petraeus, commander of the US Central Command, refused to endorse this report in a US congressional hearing and suggested that any contacts between ISI and extremists are for legitimate intelligence purposes; in his words, "you have to have contact with bad guys to get intelligence on bad guys".[73]
  • 2021: The Fall of Kabul was seen as a major strategic victory for ISI that has long been seeking a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul.[74] The ISI has always aspired to see Islamists as the rulers of Afghanistan. The rise of Taliban in Kabul was considered as an achievement for ISI's strategic depth in Afghanistan.
  • 2021: It was reported that ISI mediated talks between different factions of Taliban on the power sharing. ISI ensured Haqqani Network holds lion's share in the Taliban's Cabinet of Afghanistan.[75]
  • 2025:Pakistan cooperated with the CIA intelligence and detained a senior ISIS commander who the U.S. claims plotted the deadly Abbey Gate bombing during the U.S. evacuation from Afghanistan in 2021, according to two U.S. officials familiar with the issue. President Trump revealed the arrest in his address to Congress on Tuesday night.Mohammad Sharifullah, one of the leaders of an ISIS branch in Afghanistan and Pakistan, is believed to have devised and coordinated the attack that killed 13 U.S. service members and about 170 Afghan citizens, one official said.[76]

Bosnia

[edit]
  • 1993: The ISI was involved in supplying arms to the Bosnian mujahideen in Bosnia-Herzegovina to prevent a total genocide of Muslims at the hands of the Serbs.[77]

India

[edit]

Indian intelligence agencies have claimed they have proof of ISI involvement with the Naxalites. ISI is also reportedly engaged in supporting Khalistani Separatism in India.[78] A classified report accessed by the Indian newspaper Asian Age said "the ISI in particular wants Naxals to cause large-scale damage to infrastructure projects and industrial units operating in the interior parts of the country where ISI's own terror network is non-existent".[79]

  • 1965: The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 in Kashmir provoked a major crisis in intelligence. When the war began, there was a complete collapse of operations across all intelligence agencies. They were unable to locate an Indian armored division because of their preoccupation with political affairs. Ayub Khan set up a committee headed by General Yahya Khan to examine the agencies' workings.[80]
  • 1969–1974: According to Indian spymaster B. Raman, the Central Intelligence Agency and ISI worked with the Nixon administration to assist the Khalistan movement in Punjab.[81]
  • 1980: An Indian agent captured by the PAF Field Intelligence Unit in Karachi said the leader of the spy ring was being headed by the food and beverages manager at the Intercontinental Hotel in Karachi and a number of serving Air Force officers and ratings were on his payroll. The ISI decided to question the manager to see who he was in contact with, but the former president of Pakistan, Zia-ul-Haq, intervened and wanted the manager and anyone else involved in the case arrested immediately. The manager was proven completely innocent afterwards.[60]
  • 1983: Ilam Din, also known as Ilmo, was an Indian spy working in Pakistan who had eluded capture multiple times. On 23 March at 3:00 a.m., Ilmo and two other Indian spies were apprehended by Pakistani Rangers as they illegally crossed into Pakistan from India. Their mission was to spy and report back on the new military equipment that Pakistan would be showing in their annual 23 March Pakistan Day Parade. After being thoroughly interrogated, ISI forced Ilmo to send false information to his Research and Analysis Wing handlers in India. This process continued and many more Indian spies in Pakistan, such as Roop Lal, were discovered.[60]
  • 1984: ISI uncovered a secret deal in which Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi granted naval base facilities to the USSR in Vizag and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and the alleged attachment of KGB advisers to then-Lieutenant General Sunderji who was the commander of Operation Blue Star in the Golden Temple in Amritsar in June 1984.[81]
  • 1984: ISI failed to perform a proper background check on the British company which supplied the Pakistan Army with its Arctic-weather gear. When Pakistan attempted to secure the top of the Siachen Glacier in 1984, it placed a large order for Arctic-weather gear with the same company that also supplied the Indian Army with its gear. The Indians were alerted to the large Pakistani purchase and deduced that this large purchase could be used to equip troops to capture the glacier.[82] India mountedOperation Meghdoot and captured the entire glacier.
  • 1988: The ISI implemented Operation Tupac, a three-part action plan for covertly supporting Kashmiri militants in their fight against Indian authorities in Kashmir, initiated by President Zia-ul-Haq in 1988[83] After the success of Operation Tupac, support of Kashmiri militants became Pakistan's state policy.[84] ISI is widely believed to train and support militancy in the Kashmir region.[85][86][87]
  • 2014: In February (disclosed in March 2015), the then-Indian chief of army staff General Bikram Singh issued orders to deploy troops along the borders with Pakistan in the Rajasthan and Jammu-Kashmir regions, but the ISI got the information in a few hours and in reaction the Pakistan Army deployed its troops near the Indian borders, which alarmed Indian authorities.[88][89][90][91]
2016: Home Minister Balochistan, Pakistan, Sarfraz Bugti stated on 26 March that a serving Indian Naval officer, Kulbhushan Yadav, was arrested in Balochistan by the ISI.[92]

Pakistan

[edit]

The ISI was accused of being involved in the Mehran bank scandal, in which high-ranking ISI and Army officers were allegedly given large sums of money by Yunus Habib, owner of the Mehran Bank, to deposit the ISI's foreign exchange reserves in his bank.[93]

  • 1980: The ISI became aware of a plot to assassinate Zia-ul-Haq and launch a coup to depose replace the government with an Islamic one. The attempted assassination and coup were planned for 23 March 1980, during the annual 23 March Pakistan Day Parade. The masterminds behind the coup were high-ranking military and intelligence officers, and were led by Major General Tajammal Hussain Malik; his son Captain Naveed; and his nephew Major Riaz, a former military intelligence officer. The ISI decided against arresting the men outright because they did not know how deep the conspiracy went, and kept them under strict surveillance. As the date of the annual parade approached, the ISI was satisfied that it had identified the major players in the conspiracy and arrested the men along with some high-ranking military officers.[60]
  • 1985: The ISI's Internal Political Division was accused by various members of the Pakistan People's Party of assassinating Shahnawaz Bhutto, one of Benazir Bhutto's two brothers, by poisoning in the French Riviera in the middle of 1985 as an attempt to intimidate her into not returning to Pakistan to direct the movement against Zia-ul-Haq's military government, but no proof has been found implicating the ISI.[81]
  • 1987: The ISI failed to prevent the KHAD/KGB terror campaign in Pakistan in 1987, which led to the deaths of about 324 Pakistanis in separate incidents.[94]
  • 1990: The 1990 elections were widely believed to have been rigged by the ISI in favor of the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) party, a conglomerate of nine mainly rightist parties by the ISI under Lieutenant General Hameed Gul, to ensure the defeat of Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) in the polls.[95]
  • 2000s: The ISI engaged with Pakistan armed forces in the War in North-West Pakistan against Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, and is reported to have lost 78 ISI personnel.[96]
  • 2006: Rangzieb Ahmed brought a civil claim against MI5 for suggesting the ISI arrested him in 2006 and colluded in torturing him by submitting questions which were put to him under torture in Pakistan.[97]
  • 2011: The ISI arrested five Pakistanis who worked as CIA informants who passed information that led to the death of Osama bin Laden.[98] However, among them in particular, the US was trying to seek the release of Shakil Afridi,[99][100] who ran a fake vaccination campaign that provided critical intelligence for the raid on the bin Laden compound.[101] However, the Pakistani government and military establishment refused to release Afridi, who has since been serving a 33-year prison sentence.[102]

Libya

[edit]
  • 1978: The ISI spied on the residence of Colonel Hussain Imam Mabruk, who was a military attaché to the Libyan embassy in Islamabad, after he made some inflammatory statements about the military regime of Zia-ul-Haq. Mabruk was seen talking with two Pakistani men who entered and left the compound suspiciously. The ISI monitored the two men, who were later identified as Pakistani exiles who hated the current military regime and were Bhutto loyalists. They had received terrorist training in Libya and were ready to embark on a terrorist campaign in Pakistan to force the Army to step down from power. All members of the conspiracy were apprehended before any damage could be done.[60]
  • 1981: A Libyan security company called Al Murtaza Associates sent recruiters to Pakistan to entice former soldiers and servicemen to take high-paying security jobs in Libya. In reality, Libya was recruiting mercenaries to fight against Chad and Egypt, as it had border disputes with both nations. ISI became aware of the plot and the scheme was stopped.[60] (See also CIA transnational anti-crime and anti-drug activities#Southwest Asia, Operation Cyclone, Badaber Uprising.)

Iran

[edit]
  • 2000s: ISI has been accused by Iran for supporting insurgency in Sistan-Baluchistan province by aiding groups like Jundallah which carried out score of terror attacks against Iranian forces.2010s.
  • 2000s: ISI has been under repeated accusation of aiding Jaish-ul-Adl which is fighting for the separation of Sistan-Baluchistan from Iran.
  • 2010s. ISI was locked into proxy war with IRGC of Iran to gain the maximum influence in the Southern Afghanistan.[103]
  • 2016: Uzair Baloch, a gangster of the Lyari Gang War who holds Iranian nationality,[104] was arrested in an intelligence-based operation by Sindh Rangers. In his handwritten confession, Baloch stated that officials of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence offered him an all-expenses-paid residence in Tehran in exchange for providing sensitive information about the Pakistan Army's operations in Karachi. He says that the offer came through a third-party while he was staying in Iran's port city of Chabahar.[105]
  • 2021: Iranian Ministry of Intelligence also known as VAJA adopting ISI model to curb the internal dissent which Iranian regime is facing. It was believed that VAJA wants to promote same discipline as ISI to better fight with threats that Iran is facing from the internal chaos.[106]

Qatar

  • 2023: Qatar' State Security arrested eight former Indian Navy officials working for RAW who were spying on Qatar's stealth submarine programme at the behest of Israel. It was alleged by Indian media that Qatar was able to unearth spy network with the information provided by the ISI.

Iraq

  • 2017: After ISIS's defeat in Mosul, Iraqi envoy to Pakistan, Ali Yasin Muhammad Karim, held a press conference where he expressed his government's appreciation for Pakistan's help during the fight against the terrorist organization. He praised the intelligence-sharing of the ISI and expressed interest in continuing the intelligence cooperation between the two countries.[107]
  • Early 2024: After conducting airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran targeted Koh-e-Sabz, a locality in the Panjgur District of Pakistan's Balochistan province, about 50 kilometres (31 mi) from the Iran–Pakistan border, which resulted in the death of two Pakistani nationals and injury of three. Iran justified its actions by claiming that it had aimed at Jaish ul-Adl, a Baloch insurgent group involved in the Sistan and Baluchestan insurgency. Jaysh al-Adl itself claimed that six drones and rockets struck the residences of its fighters' families, killing two and injuring three.[108]
  • Late 2024: After Pakistan's designation of Jaysh al-Adl as a terrorist organization and a joint military operation between Iran and Pakistan against Jaysh al-Adl which killed its founder and leader, the ISI's support for the group seems to have stopped.[109][110][111][112]

France

[edit]
  • 1979: The ISI discovered a surveillance mission at the Kahuta Research Laboratories nuclear complex on 26 June 1979 by the French Ambassador to Pakistan Le Gourrierec and First Secretary Jean Forlot. Both were arrested and their cameras and other sensitive equipment were confiscated. Documents intercepted later showed that the two were recruited by the CIA.[60]

Soviet Union and post-Soviet states

[edit]
  • 1980: The ISI had placed a mole in the Soviet Union's embassy in Islamabad. They reported that the Third Secretary in the Soviet Embassy was after information regarding the Karakoram Highway and was getting it from a middle-level employee, Ejaz, in the Northern Areas Transport Corporation (NATCO). The ISI contacted Ejaz, who confessed that a few months earlier a Soviet diplomat approached him and threatened his family unless he divulged sensitive information about the highway such as the road's alignment, bridge locations, and the number of Chinese personnel working on the highway. Instead of confronting the Soviet diplomat, the ISI gave him false information until the Soviet diplomat was satisfied that Ejaz had no further information and dropped him as a source.[60]
  • 1991–1993: Major General Sultan Habib, who was an operative of the ISI's Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous department, successfully procured nuclear material while being posted as the defence attaché in the Pakistani Embassy in Moscow from 1991 to 1993 and concurrently obtained other materials from Central Asian Republics, Poland and the former Czechoslovakia. After Moscow, Habib coordinated shipping missiles from North Korea and the training of Pakistani experts in missile production, both of which strengthened Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and their missile delivery systems.[113]

United Kingdom

[edit]

United States

[edit]
  • 1980s: The ISI intercepted two American private-sector weapons dealers during the Soviet-Afghan war of the 1980s. One American diplomat lived in the F-7/4 sector of Islamabad and was spotted by an ISI agent in a seedy part of Rawalpindi, drawing attention because of his automobile's diplomatic plates. He was bugged and subsequently trailed and found to be in contact with tribal groups and supplying them with weapons for their fight against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan. The second American weapons dealer was Eugene Clegg, a teacher in the American International School. One American International School employee and undercover agent, Naeem, was arrested while waiting to clear a shipment from Islamabad customs. All of them were put out of business.[60]
  • 2000s: The ISI was suspicious about the CIA's attempted penetration of Pakistan nuclear assets and intelligence gathering in the Pakistani lawless tribal areas. Based on these suspicions, it was speculated that the ISI pursued a counter-intelligence program against CIA operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan.[114] Former director general Ashfaq Parvez Kayani is also reported to have said, the "real aim of U.S. [war] strategy is to denuclearize Pakistan".[115]
  • 2011: In the aftermath of a shooting involving American CIA agent Raymond Davis, the ISI became more alert and suspicious about the CIA's spy network in Pakistan, which had disrupted ISI-CIA cooperation.[116] At least 30 suspected covert American operatives have suspended their activities in Pakistan and 12 have reportedly left the country.[117]
A Chinese woman believed to be an ISI agent, who headed the Chinese unit of a US manufacturer, was charged with illegally exporting high-performance coatings for Pakistan's nuclear power plants. Xun Wang, a former managing director of PPG Paints Trading in Shanghai, a Chinese subsidiary of United States-based PPG Industries, Inc., was indicted on a charge of conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and related offences. Wang was accused of conspiring to export and re-export specially designed, high-performance epoxy coatings to the Chashma 2 Nuclear Power Plant in Pakistan via a third-party distributor in the People's Republic of China.[118] Alleged ISI operative Mohammed Tasleem, an attaché in the New York consulate, was discovered to be issuing threats against Pakistanis living in the United States to prevent them from speaking openly about Pakistan's government in 2010 by the FBI. US officials and scholars say the ISI has a systematic campaign to threaten those who speak critically of the Pakistani military.[119]

Sri Lanka

[edit]
  • 2000s: ISI played pivotal role in crushing Tamil Insurgency in Sri Lanka which was being supported by India's RAW to carve out separate Tamil country for the Tamils of Sri Lanka. ISI, in response to the RAW's machinations, started to equip, train and provide logistical support to the Sri Lankan Armed Forces in their war against Tamil rebels. ISI supplied multi-barrel rocket launcher systems and other weaponry, which halted the offensive. ISI, by supplying high-tech military equipment such as 22 Al-Khalid main battle tanks, 250,000 rounds of mortar ammunition and 150,000 hand grenades, and sending army officers to Sri Lanka, played a key role in the ultimate defeat of Tamil Tigers in May 2009. The victory of Sri Lankan Armed Forces on Tamil Tigers ultimately strengthened Pakistan-Sri Lanka ties.[120]
  • 2011: ISI started to train State Police of Sri Lanka and Sri Lankan State Intelligence Service on intelligence gathering.

Turkiye

[edit]
  • 2025:Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) conducted a joint precision operation that resulted in the capture of Ozgur Altun, a high-level Daesh terrorist wanted in the orange category, at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. According to security sources, Altun, who operated under the code name "Abu Yasir Al Turki," served as a senior Turkish media official within Daesh's so-called Khorasan structure and was involved in organizing Daesh member transfers from Europe and Central Asia to the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Turkish-origin individual was organizing the transit of Daesh members from Europe and Central Asia to the Afghanistan-Pakistan area while simultaneously serving as the terrorist organization's "highest-level Turkish Daesh leader" in media and logistics operations. Pakistan's intelligence service ISI was informed about the Daesh terrorist operating in Afghanistan and planning to cross into Pakistan, they assured MIT that all necessary support would be provided. ISI emphasized that "Türkiye's enemy is also Pakistan's enemy," demonstrating the strong counter-terrorism cooperation between the two countries. Following this assurance, MIT and ISI conducted the precision operation that led to Altun's capture at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and his subsequent extradition to Türkiye.[121]

Al Qaeda and Taliban militants captured

[edit]

Reception

[edit]

Critics of the ISI say that it has become a state within a state and not accountable enough. Some analysts say that it is because intelligence agencies around the world remain secretive. Critics argue the institution should be more accountable to the president or the prime minister.[136] The Pakistani government disbanded the ISI's political wing in 2008 after its discovery.[137]

U.S. government

[edit]

During the Cold War, the ISI and the CIA worked together to send spy planes over the Soviet Union.[138] The two organisations also worked closely during the Soviet–Afghan War supporting groups such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i Islami and Jalaluddin Haqqani, leader of the Haqqani network.[139]

Some[who?] report the ISI and CIA stepped up cooperation in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks to kill and capture senior Al Qaeda leaders such as Sheikh Younis Al Mauritan and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the planner of the 9/11 attacks who was residing in Pakistan. Pakistan claims that around 100 top level al-Qaeda leaders/operators were killed or arrested by the ISI.[140] Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said Pakistan is paying a "big price for supporting the U.S. war against terror groups. [...] I think it is important to note that as they have made these adjustments in their own assessment of their national interests, they're paying a big price for it."[141]

Other senior international officials maintain that senior Al Qaeda leaders such as bin Laden have been hidden by the ISI in major settled areas of Pakistan with the full knowledge of the Pakistani military leadership.[142] A December 2011 analysis report by the Jamestown Foundation came to the conclusion that

In spite of denials by the Pakistani military, evidence is emerging that elements within the Pakistani military harbored Osama bin Laden with the knowledge of former army chief General Pervez Musharraf and possibly former Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani. Former Pakistani General Ziauddin Butt (a.k.a. General Ziauddin Khawaja) revealed at a conference on Pakistani-U.S. relations in October 2011 that according to his knowledge the then former Director-General of Intelligence Bureau of Pakistan (2004–2008), Brigadier Ijaz Shah (retd.), had kept Osama bin Laden in an Intelligence Bureau safe house in Abbottabad.[143]

Pakistani general Ziauddin Butt said bin Laden had been hidden in Abbottabad by the ISI "with the full knowledge" of General Pervez Musharraf[143] but later denied making any such statement, saying his words were altered by the media, he said: "It is the hobby of the Western media to distort the facts for their own purposes."[144] U.S. military officials have increasingly said they do not notify Pakistani officials before conducting operations against the Afghan Taliban or Al Qaeda, because they fear Pakistani officials may tip them off.[145] International officials have accused the ISI of continuing to support and even lead the Taliban during the 2001-2021 War in Afghanistan. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mike Mullen stated:

The fact remains that the Quetta Shura [Taliban] and the Haqqani Network operate from Pakistan with impunity ... Extremist organizations serving as proxies of the government of Pakistan are attacking Afghan troops and civilians as well as US soldiers. ... For example, we believe the Haqqani Network—which has long enjoyed the support and protection of the Pakistani government ... is, in many ways, a strategic arm of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency.[146]

The Associated Press reported that "the president said Mullen's statement 'expressed frustration' over the insurgent safe havens in Pakistan. But Obama said 'the intelligence is not as clear as we might like in terms of what exactly that relationship is.' Obama added that whether Pakistan's ties with the Haqqani network are active or passive, Pakistan has to deal with it."[147][148]

The Guantanamo Bay files leak showed that the US authorities unofficially consider the ISI a terrorist organization that was equally as dangerous as Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and many allegations of it supporting terrorist activities have been made.[149][150]

In 2017, General Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, accused the ISI of having ties to terror groups.[151] In a Senate hearing, Dunford told members of the U.S. Senate: "It is clear to me that the ISI has connections with terrorist groups."[152]

Indian government

[edit]

India has accused the ISI of plotting the 1993 Bombay bombings.[153] According to the United States diplomatic cables leak, the ISI had previously shared intelligence information with Israel regarding possible terrorist attacks against Jewish and Israeli sites in India in late 2008.[154] The ISI is also accused of supporting pro independence militias in Jammu and Kashmir[155] while Pakistan denies all such claims,[156][157][158] or says it gives them moral support only.[159]

Controversies

[edit]

The ISI has been accused of using designated terrorist groups and militants to conduct proxy wars against its neighbors.[160][161][162] According to Grant Holt and David H. Gray, "The agency specializes in utilizing terrorist organizations as proxies for Pakistani foreign policy, covert action abroad, and controlling domestic politics."[163] James Forest says, "There has been increasing proof from counter-terrorism organizations that militants and the Taliban continue to receive assistance from the ISI, as well as the establishment of camps to train terrorists on Pakistani territory."[164] All external operations are carried out under the supervision of the ISI's S Wing.[165] Joint Intelligence/North is responsible for conducting operations in Jammu and Kashmir and Afghanistan.[166] The Joint Signal Intelligence Bureau (JSIB) provides support with communications to groups in Jammu and Kashmir.[166] According to Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, both former members of the National Security Council, the ISI acted as a "kind of terrorist conveyor belt" radicalizing young men in the Madrassas in Pakistan and delivering them to training camps affiliated with or run by Al-Qaeda and from there moving them into Jammu and Kashmir to launch attacks.[167]

Support for militants

[edit]

Since the 1990s, the ISI began communicating with the jihadists who emerged from the conflict against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and by 2000 most militant groups operating in Kashmir were based in Pakistan or were pro-Pakistan. These groups are used to conduct a low-intensity conflict against India.[168] According to Stephen P. Cohen and John Wilson, the ISI's aid to and creation of designated terrorist groups and religious extremist groups is well-documented.[169][170] The ISI has been accused of having close ties to Lashkar-e-Taiba, who carried out the attacks in Mumbai in 2008.[171] The organisation has also given aid to Hizbul Mujahideen.[172] Terrorism expert Gus Martin said, "The ISI has a long history of supporting designated terrorist groups and pro-Independence groups operating in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir which fight against Indian interests."[159][173] The ISI also helped with the founding of the group Jaish-e-Mohammed.[174]

Hizbul Mujahideen

[edit]

The group Hizbul Mujahideen was created as the Kashmiri branch of Jamaat-i-Islami.[175] It was reported that JI founded Hizbul Mujahideen at the request of the ISI to counter the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front who are advocates for the independence of Kashmir.[176] The failure of 1987 elections in Kashmir, and afterwards the arrest of Muhammad Yusuf, a.k.a. Syed Salahuddin, led to the events that created armed struggle in the valley.

Al-Badr

[edit]

There have been three incarnations of Al-Badr. According to Tomsen, the ISI, in conjunction with Jamaat-e-Islami, formed the first Al-Badr, who resisted the Indian-trained influx of Mukti Bahini in Bangladesh in the 1970s.[177][178]

Al-Qaeda and bin Laden

[edit]

The ISI supported Al-Qaeda during the war along with the CIA against the Soviet government, through the Taliban, and it is believed by some that there is still contact between Al-Qaeda and the ISI.[179] An assessment by British Intelligence in 2000 into Al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan showed the ISI were playing an active role in some of them.[180] In 2002, it was alleged that when the Egyptian investigators tracked down Al-Qaeda member Ahmed Said Khadr in Pakistan, the Egyptian authorities informed Pakistani authorities of his location. However, the Afghan Taliban at night came in a car and took Khadir along with them to Afghanistan. The next day, Pakistani authorities claimed they were unable to capture Khadir.[181] The leak in 2012 of e-mails from Stratfor claimed papers captured during all the compounds during the raid in Abbottabad on Osama bin Laden's compound showed up to 12 ISI officials knew where he was and that Bin Laden had been in regular contact with the ISI.[182]

Despite the allegations, Steve Coll stated that as of 2019 there is no direct evidence showing Pakistani knowledge of bin Laden's presence in Abbottabad, even by a rogue or compartmented faction within the government, other than the circumstantial fact of bin Laden's compound being located near (albeit not directly visible from) the Pakistan Military Academy. Documents captured from the Abbottabad compound generally show that bin Laden was wary of contact with ISI and Pakistani police, especially in light of Pakistan's role in the arrest of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed; it has also been suggested that the $25 million U.S. reward for information leading to bin Laden would have been enticing to Pakistani officers given their reputation for corruption. The compound itself, although unusually tall, was less conspicuous than sometimes envisaged by Americans, given the common local habit of walling off homes for protection against violence or to ensure the privacy of female family members.[183]

Al-Qaeda has repeatedly labelled ISI their enemy, and claimed the Pakistani military and intelligence are their main targets in Pakistan.[184] In 2019, Ayman al-Zawahari labelled ISI and the Pakistani military a "puppet" of the United States in a video message.[185][186]

Harkat-ul-Mujahideen

[edit]

The Harkat-ul-Mujahideen was founded in the 1980s by the ISI to fight against Indian interests.[187]

Jammu and Kashmir

[edit]

in 1984, under the orders of Zia-ul-Haq, the ISI prepared for a rebellion, which was to be set in motion in 1991.[188]

Haqqani network

[edit]

The ISI allegedly have links to the Haqqani network[189] and contributed to their funding.[190] It is widely believed the suicide attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul in 2008 was planned with the help of the ISI.[191] A report in 2008 from the US director of National Intelligence stated that the ISI provides intelligence and funding to help with attacks against the International Security Assistance Force, the Afghan government, and Indian targets.[192] On 5 November 2014, Lieutenant-General Joseph Anderson, a senior commander for US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, said that the Haqqani network is now "fractured" like the Taliban in a Pentagon-hosted video briefing from Afghanistan. "They are fractured. They are fractured like the Taliban is. That's based pretty much on Pakistan's operations in North Waziristan this entire summer-fall," he said, acknowledging the effectiveness of Pakistan's military offensive in North Waziristan. "That has very much disrupted their efforts in Afghanistan and has caused them to be less effective in terms of their ability to pull off an attack in Kabul," Anderson added.[193]

Insubordination controversies

[edit]

The army has ruled Pakistan for more than half of its history and has always been unwilling to see its influence being compromised by any civilian leaders.[194] In the 1990s, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto appointed retired army officer Shamsur Rahman Kallu as director-general, but army leaders refused to cooperate with Kallu because he had refused to engage in martial-law duties under the previous dictator. In October 1998, Ziauddin Butt was chosen as director general. Though Butt was not the preferred choice of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, he grew close with him, and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Pervez Musharraf took over important ISI files. During a military coup a year later, Musharraf arrested Butt, who had been promoted to Chief of Army Staff by Sharif.[195][50][196]

On 6 October 2016, the daily newspaper Dawn published a report about a government meeting allegedly arranged by Sharif. The article detailed a presentation by Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry about international pressure to crack down on Pakistan's extremist segments such as Masood Azhar, the Jaish-i-Mohmmad, Hafiz Saeed, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Haqqani network. According to Ghazi Salahuddin of The News International, controversy ensued after the October meeting and the Dawn report, which lingered until May 2016.[197][198] During the October 2016 meeting, Punjab chief minister Shahbaz Sharif allegedly revealed that, whenever action had been taken against certain extremist groups by civilian authorities, the security agency had worked secretly to free the arrested parties.[197][198] According to Salahuddin Ghazi, information minister Pervaiz Rashid lost his portfolio over the Dawn news leak, and a government notification was released about the civilian government's decision after the meeting. On 29 April 2017, the director general released a tweet that said: "Notification on Dawn Leak is incomplete and not in line with recommendations by the Inquiry Board. Notification is rejected." Ghazi stated that a meeting was eventually held between the prime minister and the chief of army staff, and a press conference was held to announce the decision to withdraw the tweet.[198]

2021 disagreement over appointment of ISI Chief

[edit]

Pakistan's mainstream media reported on the October 2021 constitutional rift between civil and armed wings over the appointment of the director general post only after ministers spoke on the matter.[199][200] On 6 October 2021, the Pakistan military's media affairs wing announced the replacement of Faiz Hameed with Nadeem Anjum.[201] After two days, it became apparent on social media that the federal government of Pakistan had yet to issue any formal notification for the appointment of the new director general.[199] Rumors became more substantiated when Hameed attended the National Security Committee meeting instead of the expected new director general.[199][200]

On 13 October 2021, Information Minister Fawad Chaudhry informed media that the process of appointing a new director general was in progress, and that the selection is Prime Minister Imran Khan's prerogative. He also noted that the army chief and the prime minister agreed on following correct procedures of appointment according to the Constitution.

Malik Dogar, the Special Assistant to the Prime Minister on Political Affairs, later said in a talk show that PM Imran Khan wanted Hameed to continue as DG ISI for some more months after taking into consideration Hameed's expertise on the situation in Afghanistan. Dogar further stated that during the cabinet meeting, the prime minister stressed that if the army is a respected institution then the PM Office is also a respected one.[202][203][39]

Attacks on journalists

[edit]

Amnesty International published a document concerning the investigation of ISI over the murder of Saleem Shahzad.[204]

Death of Arshad Sharif

[edit]

Following General Bajwa's retirement, the mother of slain journalist Arshad Sharif requested the Chief Justice of Pakistan to formally charge General Bajwa, among other military officers, for the "targeted, premeditated, planned and calculated murder" of her son, claiming members of the military's Public Relations division began threatening Sharif after he emerged as a critic of General Bajwa following the success of the vote-of-no-confidence against Imran Khan, particularly in a program called "Woh Kon Tha", aired on ARY News, in which Sharif insinuated General Bajwa had a hand in overthrowing his democratically elected Prime Minister.[205][206]

Interference in Judicial Matters

[edit]

Islamabad High Court Judges Letter

[edit]

Aljazeera reported[207] that six judges of the Islamabad High Court (IHC) accused the ISI of interference in judicial matters, citing abduction, torture, and surveillance. Despite assurances from ISI leadership, these claims persisted, leading to an investigation by the Supreme Judicial Council of Pakistan. The incident underscored ongoing tensions between Pakistan's judiciary and intelligence agencies, reflecting broader issues of governance and institutional integrity.

See also

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References

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Bibliography

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Further reading

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), formally the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, is Pakistan's primary intelligence agency, responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence on threats to national security, both foreign and domestic. Established in 1948 in the aftermath of partition and the first Indo-Pakistani War, it was formed to coordinate intelligence efforts across the Pakistan Army, Navy, and Air Force, addressing the fragmented structure inherited from British India. Headquartered in Islamabad and led by a Director-General holding the rank of Lieutenant General from the Army, the ISI operates under the Prime Minister's oversight but maintains close ties to the military establishment, enabling it to conduct covert operations and counterintelligence activities. Notable for its pivotal role in channeling U.S. aid to Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989), which facilitated the Soviet withdrawal and bolstered Pakistan's regional influence, the agency has also been embroiled in controversies, including allegations of supporting Taliban elements and involvement in domestic political manipulations, claims frequently advanced by adversarial governments and Western intelligence assessments amid Pakistan's geopolitical rivalries.

History

Establishment and Early Development (1948–1979)

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was formally established on 1 January 1948, less than six months after Pakistan's independence from , to address the lack of coordinated intelligence among the newly formed , , and branches. The agency was created under the directive of Pakistan's first Defense Minister, , with the primary mandate to integrate service-specific intelligence during wartime operations and provide real-time support to the armed forces. Walter Cawthorn, a officer retained in Pakistan's service, was appointed as the inaugural Director-General, bringing expertise from his prior role in to structure the nascent organization. Initially headquartered in and operating with limited personnel drawn from the three services, the ISI focused on and basic coordination, reflecting Pakistan's early security priorities amid partition-related and border tensions with . In its formative decade, the ISI encountered operational constraints, including inadequate resources and fragmented inter-service rivalries, which hampered its effectiveness in gathering actionable on regional threats. Under President Ayub Khan's military regime from , the agency expanded its scope to include political , monitoring domestic opponents and influencing elections, which diverted resources from external . This internal focus contributed to significant shortcomings during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, where the ISI failed to detect and track an Indian armored division's movements, leading to tactical surprises and overall intelligence lapses. Post-1965 evaluations prompted structural reforms: the ISI was reorganized in 1966 to enhance analytical capabilities and field coordination, followed by further expansion in 1969 to incorporate more specialized departments for and covert operations. These changes aimed to wartime deficiencies, though the agency's entanglement in political intrigue persisted. During the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, the ISI again demonstrated vulnerabilities, unable to effectively anticipate or counter Bengali separatist activities in or the full extent of Indian intervention, culminating in of over prisoners of war and the creation of . By the mid-1970s, under Prime Minister , the ISI underwent leadership purges and reorientation toward countering internal subversion and ethnic insurgencies, such as in , where it supported operations against separatists between 1973 and 1977. This period marked a shift toward greater and paramilitary assets, with the agency growing to approximately 4,000 personnel by the late 1970s, laying groundwork for its pivotal involvement in regional proxy conflicts. General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq's 1977 coup further entrenched the ISI's alignment with priorities, enhancing its in ahead of escalating Afghan dynamics.

Soviet-Afghan War and Strategic Depth Doctrine (1979–1989)

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 24, 1979, prompted Pakistan's military regime under General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq to intensify support for Afghan resistance fighters known as the Mujahideen, with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) designated as the primary conduit for operations. ISI Director General Akhtar Abdur Rahman, who assumed the role in June 1979, restructured the agency to establish dedicated Afghan operations, including a specialized bureau in Rawalpindi for logistics, intelligence, and guerrilla coordination, drawing on Pakistan's proximity to the conflict zone and its Pashtun ethnic ties across the border. This marked a shift from ISI's prior focus on internal and Indian threats, expanding its covert infrastructure with new training facilities in northwestern Pakistan to prepare Afghan fighters for asymmetric warfare against Soviet forces. ISI coordinated the distribution of foreign aid, particularly from the United States' Central Intelligence Agency via Operation Cyclone, which allocated roughly $630 million annually by the mid-1980s—totaling over $3 billion across the decade—funneled through Pakistani channels to evade direct U.S. involvement and leverage local expertise. Saudi Arabia matched U.S. contributions dollar-for-dollar, while China supplied weapons, enabling ISI to arm and train tens of thousands of Mujahideen in border camps emphasizing sabotage, ambushes, and Stinger missile use against Soviet aircraft after 1986. Under Rahman and his successor Lieutenant General Hamid Gul (1987–1989), ISI personnel embedded with fighter networks, providing real-time intelligence and prioritizing ideologically aligned Islamist groups like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami over more moderate or nationalist factions, which skewed the resistance's composition toward radical Pashtun elements. This operational focus intertwined with Pakistan's emerging , formalized under Zia-ul-Haq in the late as a defensive posture against India's superior conventional forces, positing as a vital rearward buffer to compensate for Pakistan's narrow territorial depth—spanning only about 1,000 kilometers east-west. ISI's selective allocation aimed to cultivate a post-war Afghan government amenable to Pakistani influence, ensuring loyalty from Kabul in any future India-Pakistan conflict by promoting Pashtun irredentism and Islamist governance models over Soviet-backed or neutral alternatives. Empirical outcomes included the Soviet withdrawal on February 15, 1989, after over 15,000 Union losses and unsustainable occupation costs, but also ISI's institutional empowerment: its budget surged from minimal pre-war levels to hundreds of millions annually, personnel expanded to several thousand, and operational autonomy grew, embedding it as a quasi-independent power center within Pakistan's state apparatus.

Post-Cold War Realignments and Nuclear Focus (1990–2001)

Following the in February 1989, the ISI redirected its efforts toward influencing the ensuing Afghan civil war to establish a friendly regime in , prioritizing Pakistan's against . The agency provided covert support to various factions, including arms, funding, and training, but increasingly favored the emerging movement by the mid-1990s as a means to counter forces backed by , , and . This assistance enabled the to consolidate control, capturing in 1994 and in September 1996, with ISI operatives reportedly coordinating and operations from Pakistani regions. The ISI's support for the Taliban persisted openly until 2001, despite international criticism, as Pakistan viewed the group as a buffer against Indian influence in Afghanistan; this included facilitating the movement of fighters and supplies through Quetta and Peshawar, where Taliban leaders received sanctuary. Concurrently, the agency intensified its role in the Kashmir insurgency, which had erupted in 1989, by establishing at least 57 training camps along the Pakistan-administered Kashmir border and supporting over 91 militant groups with logistical, financial, and doctrinal aid. This proxy strategy aimed to bleed Indian resources in Jammu and Kashmir, with ISI channeling funds and weapons to groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizbul Mujahideen, contributing to thousands of attacks and cross-border infiltrations throughout the 1990s. Amid these regional operations, the ISI shifted internal focus toward safeguarding Pakistan's nascent nuclear program, which accelerated in the 1990s amid escalating tensions with . The agency conducted intelligence operations to acquire dual-use technologies covertly, evading imposed under the U.S. Pressler Amendment in October 1990, which halted due to evidence of uranium enrichment at . ISI protection extended to key figures like , whose network sourced centrifuge designs and materials from Europe and Asia, culminating in Pakistan's six nuclear tests on May 28, 1998, in response to India's detonations two weeks earlier; these tests asserted deterrence but invited further U.S. sanctions and heightened proliferation scrutiny. Post-Cold War realignments strained ISI-U.S. relations, as Washington's priorities shifted from anti-Soviet cooperation to countering and militancy; by 1998, U.S. officials expressed alarm over ISI ties to Kashmiri militants and the , leading to intelligence-sharing cutoffs and diplomatic pressure on . The agency's autonomy grew under directors like Naseem Rana (1995–1998), who prioritized nuclear security and Afghan proxies over alignment with U.S. nonproliferation demands, setting the stage for the 1999 conflict where ISI-backed incursions tested India's nuclear posture. This period marked ISI's pivot to and indigenous capabilities, reducing reliance on external patrons while navigating domestic political instability, including the October 1999 military coup by General .

Post-9/11 Counter-Terrorism Era (2001–2019)

Following the , 2001, attacks, under President reversed its prior support for the regime and joined the -led global war on terrorism, with the ISI providing critical that facilitated the arrest of numerous leaders. Notable captures included on March 28, 2002, in ; on , 2002; and , the principal architect of the 9/11 plot, on March 1, 2003, in . These operations, often conducted jointly with agencies, disrupted 's command structure and earned approximately $33 billion in coalition support funds and reimbursements between 2002 and 2018 for logistical and military costs. In exchange, the ISI shared real-time on militant movements along the Afghan border, contributing to the breakdown of networks in 's tribal areas, where over 80,000 Pakistani troops were deployed by the mid-2000s, suffering hundreds of casualties. Despite this cooperation against Al-Qaeda, persistent allegations emerged of ISI's ongoing ties to the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network, viewed by Pakistani strategists as proxies for "strategic depth" against India in post-Taliban Afghanistan. A 2010 London School of Economics report, drawing on interviews with nine Taliban field commanders, former ministers, and UN officials, asserted that ISI support—including funding, training, sanctuary, and attendance at the Taliban's Quetta shura—was official policy to counter Indian influence. US intelligence leaks via WikiLeaks in July 2010 and statements by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen in September 2011 described the Haqqani network as an ISI "veritable arm," citing evidence of ISI orchestration of attacks like the 2008 Indian embassy bombing in Kabul and safe havens in Quetta and North Waziristan. Pakistani officials, including Musharraf in 2006, acknowledged possible involvement by retired ISI officers but denied institutional backing, attributing claims to biased Western narratives amid Pakistan's sacrifices of over 60,000 lives to militancy by 2019. Domestic blowback from militancy prompted ISI-supported military offensives against Pakistan-focused groups like the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In May 2009, Operation Rah-e-Rast, bolstered by ISI human intelligence, expelled TTP forces from Swat Valley after their imposition of parallel governance and beheadings, displacing 2 million civilians but restoring state control. Similarly, Operation Zarb-e-Azb, launched June 15, 2014, in North Waziristan following the TTP's December 16, 2014, Army Public School attack in Peshawar that killed 149 (mostly children), targeted TTP, Al-Qaeda remnants, and Uzbek fighters, destroying 900 militants' hideouts and killing over 3,500 insurgents per military claims, though it displaced 1.3 million and faced criticism for incomplete clearance of Afghan-oriented groups. ISI's role emphasized pre-operation surveillance and targeting, yet selectivity persisted, as operations spared Haqqani and Taliban assets per US assessments. The May 2, 2011, US unilateral raid killing Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, 1 km from the Pakistan Military Academy, intensified scrutiny of ISI efficacy. The compound's fortified features—18-foot walls, barbed wire—evaded detection for six years despite proximity to ISI facilities, prompting the Abbottabad Commission to decry "incompetence bordering on criminal negligence" in ISI's border intelligence directorate, though it found no direct evidence of high-level complicity while noting possible links via jihadi networks like Harkat ul Mujahideen. Pakistan protested the raid as a sovereignty violation, suspending NATO supply lines briefly, while ISI faced internal purges and US aid suspensions. Further strains included ISI's alleged role in the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, where 10 Lashkar-e-Taiba gunmen killed 166; Indian and US probes traced handlers to ISI-linked figures in Karachi, leading to Pakistan's 2009 arrests but no trials. By 2019, ISI's bifurcated strategy—aggressive against TTP (reducing attacks by 90% post-Zarb-e-Azb) but tolerant of Afghan militants—had eroded US trust, evidenced by the Trump administration's 2018 aid freeze and exclusion from early Afghan peace talks, underscoring causal tensions between Pakistan's India-centric security doctrine and counter-terror imperatives.

Contemporary Challenges and Reforms (2020–Present)

Following the ' withdrawal from in 2021, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) encountered heightened challenges from the resurgence of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which exploited safe havens across the Afghan border to launch over 800 attacks in in 2022 alone, marking a significant escalation from prior years. The TTP's operational revival, bolstered by ideological alignment with the Afghan —who refused to restrain cross-border activities—strained ISI's efforts, as Pakistani operations like those in yielded tactical gains but failed to dismantle TTP entrenched in . This dynamic exposed ISI's historical "" policy in as counterproductive, fostering blowback from groups it had once tolerated or indirectly supported against common foes. Domestically, ISI faced scrutiny for its perceived interference in political affairs, particularly amid the April no-confidence vote that ousted Prime Minister , which critics attributed to military-ISI orchestration to curb his independent stances. Subsequent events, including the February 2024 general elections marred by allegations of vote manipulation favoring military-backed parties, reinforced perceptions of ISI as a "state within a state," exerting influence over civilian institutions such as the through a notification granting it oversight powers. These actions, while defended by Pakistani officials as necessary for stability, drew international concern over democratic erosion, with ISI's media monitoring and opposition suppression tactics echoing patterns from prior decades. In response to these pressures, ISI underwent leadership transitions to adapt to evolving threats. Lieutenant General Nadeem Anjum assumed the role of Director General in June 2021, overseeing intensified border fencing and drone strikes against TTP, but was replaced by Lieutenant General Muhammad Asim Malik on September 30, 2024, amid calls for renewed focus on internal security. Malik's concurrent appointment as National Security Adviser in May 2025 expanded ISI's purview into diplomatic coordination, signaling an institutional push toward integrating intelligence with broader policy amid cyber and hybrid threats, though no comprehensive structural overhauls were publicly announced. Efforts to counter emerging cyber vulnerabilities, including state-sponsored incursions linked to regional rivals, involved ISI collaboration with Pakistan's National Cyber Security Centre, but persistent resource constraints and technological gaps limited proactive reforms. These challenges underscored ISI's dual role in external proxy management and internal stabilization, with ongoing TTP violence—peaking at levels unseen since —prompting tactical shifts like enhanced networks, yet without verifiable evidence of fundamental doctrinal reforms to address root causes such as past . By 2025, ISI's adaptation remained incremental, prioritizing short-term operations over long-term accountability, as economic instability in compounded operational funding issues.

Organizational Structure

Leadership and Director Generals

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is led by a Director-General (DG), typically a Lieutenant General from the , who serves as the agency's operational head and exercises authority over its directorates, field operations, and strategic initiatives. The DG reports primarily to the Chief of Staff (COAS), with formal appointment by the , often reflecting the military's dominant influence in the selection process. Terms are nominally three years but can be shortened or extended amid political transitions, security crises, or internal army dynamics, as seen in multiple instances where DGs were removed or retained beyond standard durations for continuity in counter-terrorism or regional operations. Successive DGs have shaped the ISI's evolution, from early focus on conventional threats to proxy warfare and counter-insurgency, with appointments frequently tied to the COAS's preferences and national priorities. The role demands expertise in military intelligence, often drawn from corps commanders or specialized branches like counter-terrorism wings.
No.NameRankTerm StartTerm End
1Syed Shahid HamidMajor GeneralJuly 1948June 1950
2Robert CawthomeMajor General19501959
...(Historical DGs from 1959–2014, averaging ~3-year terms, include figures like Akhtar Abdur Rahman and Hamid Gul, pivotal during the Soviet-Afghan War era).........
23Rizwan AkhtarLieutenant General1 October 201415 May 2016
24Naveed MukhtarLieutenant General12 December 201616 June 2019
25Faiz Hameed (interim, then full)Lieutenant GeneralJune 2019October 2021
26Nadeem AnjumLieutenant GeneralNovember 202130 September 2024
27Muhammad Asim MalikLieutenant General30 September 2024Incumbent (extended October 2025)
The current DG, Muhammad Asim Malik, previously commanded the XVI Corps in and led military operations in , bringing experience in border security and internal threats to the role; his extension reflects ongoing in and domestic militancy challenges. Earlier DGs like (1987–1989) expanded the agency's regional footprint through support for Afghan mujahideen, while post-2001 leaders navigated U.S.-Pakistan alliances amid accusations of double-dealing on militant networks. Leadership transitions often coincide with army chief changes, underscoring the ISI's alignment with rather than civilian oversight.

Internal Directorates and Departments

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) maintains an organizational structure comprising several specialized joint intelligence bureaus and technical divisions, coordinated through a central secretariat. This framework, as detailed in disclosures from former ISI Director General Lieutenant General (Retd.) Javed Nasir's 1996 petition to a Lahore anti-terrorism court, emphasizes functional specialization in political monitoring, counter-intelligence, regional operations, signals intelligence, and technical support. The structure supports an estimated workforce of around 10,000 personnel, excluding external assets, and operates from headquarters in Islamabad. Joint Intelligence X (JIX) serves as the administrative secretariat, coordinating activities across other wings, handling personnel management, and producing consolidated intelligence estimates and threat assessments for senior military and government leadership. Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB) focuses on political gathering and analysis, divided into subsections for monitoring foreign political developments—particularly in India—anti-terrorism efforts, and VIP security protocols within Pakistan. It gained prominence during the late 1980s for its influence in domestic political assessments. Joint Counter Intelligence Bureau (JCIB) conducts surveillance on Pakistani diplomats stationed abroad and oversees counter-espionage operations targeting threats from regions including the , , , , and former Soviet Muslim republics. Its activities emphasize defensive measures against foreign infiltration. Joint Intelligence/North (JIN) directs operations related to Jammu and Kashmir, including infiltration support, exfiltration of personnel, propaganda dissemination, and monitoring of Indian movements in the . Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous (JIM) manages offensive and covert actions in foreign territories, with capabilities scaled for wartime contingencies. Joint Signal Intelligence Bureau (JSIB) operates electronic intelligence (ELINT), communications intelligence (COMINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT) stations primarily along the India-Pakistan border, with additional facilities in cities such as Islamabad, Quetta, Karachi, Lahore, and Peshawar. Staffed partly by Army Signal Corps personnel, it monitors adversary communications and has provided technical aid to Kashmiri militants. Joint Intelligence Technical Division (JIT) encompasses specialized sections for explosives handling and applications, supporting operational logistics in high-risk environments. A related Joint Division of addresses broader technical collection needs. These directorates reflect ISI's evolution toward integrated inter-service functions, though official details remain classified, with public knowledge derived from judicial petitions and defectors' accounts rather than releases. Variations in reporting may stem from operational secrecy and post-2016 reforms, but core divisions have persisted in documented analyses.

Operational Assets and Infrastructure

The Inter-Services Intelligence's central infrastructure consists of its headquarters complex situated in the neighborhood of , adjacent to a bustling local market and protected by extensive security measures. This fortified facility, established as the agency's nerve center, houses administrative offices, units, and coordination hubs for domestic and external operations. Operational assets include a cadre of roughly full-time personnel drawn primarily from 's branches, supported by a broader network of tens of thousands of informants and recruited assets operating within and abroad. These human resources enable the ISI to conduct surveillance, recruit proxies, and execute covert actions, particularly along strategic borders with and . The agency maintains undisclosed field stations, houses, and liaison points in regional hotspots, including areas near and in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, to oversee proxy training and cross-border intelligence gathering. Technical infrastructure encompasses signals intelligence capabilities and emerging cyber operations, though details remain classified; public exposures have revealed networks using digital tools for , such as encrypted communications and online recruitment in and beyond. These assets support and offensive actions, with funding and logistics often channeled through military channels to maintain operational secrecy and deniability.

Recruitment, Training, and Human Resources

Selection Processes

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) predominantly selects its operational and field personnel from active-duty officers and non-commissioned officers of the , with deputations drawn proportionally from the , , and branches. Nominations originate from unit or formation commanders, who evaluate candidates on criteria including proven operational competence, loyalty to the state, specialized skills in or tactics, and successful in prior assignments. This emphasizes internal to minimize external risks, as ISI roles demand seamless integration with armed forces operations. Civilian recruitment targets niche expertise in areas like cyber analysis, , or signals intelligence, with openings occasionally advertised via the or processed through the (FPSC). Eligible applicants, typically holding relevant degrees and experience, first complete preliminary screening via written tests assessing general knowledge, analytical reasoning, and domain-specific aptitude, followed by intelligence quotient evaluations. Successful candidates advance to ISI-FPSC interviews, rigorous psychological profiling to detect vulnerabilities or ideological inconsistencies, and exhaustive background investigations encompassing family , financial records, neighbor attestations, and home verifications. The full civilian selection timeline extends 12 to 14 months, incorporating medical examinations, trials, and or protocols to ensure resilience under duress. Military nominees undergo parallel , with added emphasis on and inter-service compatibility, reflecting ISI's mandate for covert actions where personal reliability directly impacts national security outcomes. Failures at any stage result in return to original postings without prejudice, though repeated selections underscore the agency's preference for proven performers over untested talent.

Training Methodologies

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) primarily recruits personnel from the on secondment, with training methodologies building on their prior military preparation through specialized programs focused on intelligence tradecraft, counterintelligence, human intelligence (HUMINT) collection, surveillance, and covert operational skills. These programs emphasize practical, field-oriented instruction derived from historical covert actions, such as guerrilla warfare tactics honed during operations in and , including weapons handling, bomb-making, and unconventional warfare strategies often conducted in collaboration with the Special Services Group (SSG). Instruction incorporates real-time operational experience, with early models influenced by British intelligence practices, evolving to include SSG-led courses on tactics, communications, and cultural integration for regional operations. Core training occurs at the Defence Services Intelligence Academy (DSIA), located at Ojhri Camp near Rawalpindi, where the ISI's Special Wing oversees programs for armed forces personnel and ISI cadres, covering intelligence analysis, liaison with foreign agencies, and internal security doctrines. Additional foundational courses for military intelligence, from which ISI draws officers, are provided at the School of Military Intelligence in Murree, focusing on basic intelligence gathering and counterintelligence fundamentals. For civilian candidates selected via Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) examinations and ISI interviews, training entails a six-month regimen at DSIA, integrating them into operational roles post-completion. Methodologies prioritize hands-on simulations and ideological alignment with Pakistan's strategic imperatives, such as proxy strategies in regional conflicts, though internal evaluations have highlighted deficiencies in areas like cultural and linguistic during operations, as evidenced by challenges in the . Advanced training may involve attachments to SSG facilities like Cherat for specialized skills in and , ensuring personnel can operate covertly in high-risk environments, often under resource constraints mitigated by military integration. This approach fosters a cadre experienced in blending with clandestine methods, though limits public documentation of curricula details.

Personnel Management and Challenges

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) employs an estimated 10,000 personnel, comprising serving and retired officers, personnel from other armed services, and civilian staff integrated into a hierarchical dominated by ranks. Management emphasizes operational discipline and alignment with protocols, with progression for uniformed officers tied to the broader promotion , typically involving periodic postings to ISI for 2-3 years before rotation. Civilian employees, organized into five cadres, operate in support roles but face systemic barriers in advancement, as evidenced by 2013 data showing 325 officers in Basic Pay Scales (BPS) 17-21, including only 1 in BPS-21 and 7 in BPS-20, with promotions often limited to a single increment over 25 years of service. Promotions are handled through selection boards, such as the Central Selection Board chaired by the , which in 2021 recommended elevating four BPS-20 deputy directors general to two vacant BPS-21 director general positions and 14 BPS-19 directors to BPS-20 roles, subject to Prime Ministerial approval. These processes prioritize internal candidates, with military oversight ensuring loyalty to the Chief of Staff, but civilian tracks exclude access to the apex BPS-22 role, reserved for a serving . This dual-track system has prompted , including multiple petitions to the citing undue and lack of parity. Key challenges include entrenched disparities between military and civilian personnel, fostering resentment and inefficiencies in talent retention, as civilians perceive capped mobility despite contributions to analytical and administrative functions. Politicization exacerbates issues, with appointments and reshuffles often reflecting alignments with prevailing military leadership rather than pure merit, as seen in frequent post-army chief transitions that demand purges of perceived disloyal elements to realign internal cohesion. The agency's high-risk operational environment, involving counter-terrorism and covert activities, contributes to morale strains from burnout and exposure to internal threats, compounded by limited transparency that hinders robust oversight and accountability mechanisms. Allegations of corruption within ranks, though rarely prosecuted due to institutional opacity, periodically surface, undermining trust and operational integrity, as highlighted in discussions of recent leadership arrests signaling broader human resource vulnerabilities.

Mandate and Operational Functions

Intelligence Collection and Analysis

The Inter-Services (ISI) primarily conducts intelligence collection through (HUMINT), utilizing networks of agents, informants, and proxy groups to gather on foreign threats, particularly from and . This HUMINT focus enables covert penetration of adversarial environments where technological is limited, with operations often coordinated via the Bureau (JIB), which handles political and external collection efforts. The agency's HUMINT assets include former military officers and militant affiliates, allowing for deniable operations under compartmentalized units like Directorate S, established for supporting insurgent while maintaining operational . Signals intelligence (SIGINT), including communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT), supplements HUMINT by intercepting enemy transmissions and radar emissions, primarily through strategic platforms rather than standalone ISI systems. ISI's SIGINT capabilities are integrated into broader Pakistani assets, such as aircraft equipped for electronic warfare, providing real-time data on border incursions and militant communications. Collection efforts also incorporate (OSINT) from media and diplomatic channels, coordinated across directorates to prioritize threats like cross-border . Analysis occurs through specialized units such as Joint Intelligence X (JIX), which processes raw data from collection directorates into actionable assessments disseminated to Pakistan's and . This involves evaluating HUMINT reports against SIGINT intercepts to forecasts, with a historical emphasis on regional stability amid conflicts like the Soviet-Afghan War, where ISI analyzed operations to refine proxy strategies. The process prioritizes integration, ensuring supports wartime coordination, though compartmentalization can limit inter-agency and introduce risks of stovepiped assessments.

Covert Action and Proxy Strategies

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has employed covert actions and proxy strategies primarily to counterbalance Pakistan's conventional military disadvantages against India and to secure influence in Afghanistan, often channeling resources through non-state militant groups to maintain plausible deniability. These operations, coordinated via the ISI's Covert Action Division established in the 1980s, have focused on asymmetric warfare, including arming insurgents, providing training, and facilitating infiltration across borders. Proxy use allows Pakistan to pursue revisionist goals, such as altering territorial status in Kashmir or preventing Indian dominance in Afghanistan, without direct confrontation. In Afghanistan, the ISI's proxy strategy originated during the Soviet invasion in December 1979, when it served as the conduit for U.S. aid under Operation Cyclone, distributing over $3 billion in weapons and funds to mujahideen factions from 1980 to 1989. ISI officers vetted and trained fighters in camps near Peshawar, prioritizing Pashtun groups aligned with Pakistani interests to ensure post-Soviet influence. Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the ISI shifted support to emerging Taliban militias in 1994, providing logistics, intelligence, and safe havens that enabled their rapid conquest of Kabul by 1996; Pakistani diplomatic recognition of the Taliban regime in 1997 underscored this backing. Even after the 2001 U.S. invasion, ISI maintained ties with Taliban elements, including sheltering leaders like Mullah Omar, to preserve "strategic depth" against India. Human Rights Watch documented Pakistani military supply lines sustaining Taliban offensives into the early 2000s, despite official denials. Against , particularly in , the ISI launched in 1988 to foment insurgency, recruiting, arming, and directing groups like (LeT) and (JeM) with funding estimated at tens of millions annually through networks and front charities. LeT, founded in 1987 with ISI assistance, executed the killing 166 people, using operatives trained in Pakistani camps; intercepted communications and captured planners confirmed ISI orchestration. JeM, formed in 2000 by ISI-backed leader after his release in an Indian hijacking, claimed the 2001 attack and 2019 bombing, with forensic evidence linking explosives to Pakistani military sources. These proxies extended to , where ISI supplied arms to separatist insurgents via routes in the 1990s, aiming to encircle Indian forces. Pakistan's government has consistently rejected these allegations, attributing them to Indian propaganda, though U.N. sanctions on LeT and JeM cite their operational ties to Pakistani intelligence.

Counter-Intelligence and Internal Security

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) operates a dedicated counter-intelligence apparatus, including the Joint Counter Intelligence Bureau (JCIB), which conducts of Pakistani diplomats stationed abroad to detect and neutralize potential threats. The JCIB also monitors foreign when necessary and oversees operations across regions such as , , , the , , and , focusing on identifying and countering foreign penetrations into Pakistani institutions. This wing prevents activities directed against Pakistan by integrating field operations with networks to disrupt adversarial gathering. In parallel, the ISI's internal security functions encompass a broad domestic mandate, formalized with the establishment of an Internal Wing in 1975 under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's executive order, enabling expanded oversight of political and social threats. This role involves suppressing sectarian violence, ethno-nationalist insurgencies, and other internal disruptions that could undermine national stability or military interests, often through monitoring communications and coordinating with military units. Historical instances include ISI efforts during the 1971 East Pakistan crisis, where lapses in counter-intelligence contributed to a major's defection to Bengali guerrillas, highlighting vulnerabilities in internal military loyalty assessments. The agency's counterterrorism contributions to internal security include collaboration with domestic law enforcement to dismantle militant cells via informant-driven operations, as evidenced in post-2001 efforts to prevent attacks within . Approximately 3,500 ISI personnel are allocated to tasks, supporting the in and operational disruptions against groups like Tehrik-i-Taliban . However, the ISI's domestic influence extends to shaping political outcomes and media narratives, with regimes deploying it to monitor opposition figures and alignment with state priorities, a practice rooted in its dual external-internal mandate since the . These activities have drawn scrutiny for blurring lines between security imperatives and political control, though proponents argue they are essential for maintaining cohesion in a volatile geopolitical context.

Major Operations

Afghan Theater Operations

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) played a central role in coordinating Pakistan's support for Afghan mujahideen groups during the Soviet-Afghan War from December 1979 to 1989, channeling billions in U.S. and Saudi aid through , which involved training over 80,000 fighters and distributing missiles that downed approximately 270 Soviet aircraft. ISI established seven major mujahideen alliances, prioritizing Pashtun factions like Hezb-e-Islami under , and operated training camps in Pakistan's , where up to 35,000 received instruction alongside volunteers. This effort, estimated to have cost the U.S. $3-20 billion, contributed to the Soviet withdrawal but also fostered networks later linked to , as ISI's focus on ideological Sunni fighters over secular ones sowed seeds for Islamist militancy. Following the Soviet exit, ISI shifted support to emerging Islamist factions amid Afghanistan's civil war (1989-1996), providing logistical aid, funding, and military advisors to the Taliban, which captured Kabul on September 27, 1996, after ISI-backed offensives from Pakistani border regions. Pakistan's government, including ISI, viewed the Taliban as a proxy for "strategic depth" against India, supplying an estimated $30 million annually in the mid-1990s, including fuel, ammunition, and personnel, despite official denials of direct military involvement. ISI facilitated Taliban recruitment from Pakistani madrassas, with declassified U.S. documents indicating over 80 ISI trucks daily crossing into Afghanistan carrying supplies during key 1990s battles. This support extended to protecting Taliban leadership in Quetta and Peshawar safe havens, prioritizing Pashtun dominance to counter Northern Alliance gains. Post-September 11, 2001, ISI cooperated with U.S. forces by providing intelligence leading to the capture of over 600 al-Qaeda suspects and facilitating early border operations, yet faced U.S. accusations of sustaining Taliban and Haqqani Network insurgents through safe houses in Pakistan, with Admiral Mike Mullen stating in 2011 that the Haqqani Network operated as a "veritable arm" of ISI. ISI denied these ties, attributing them to rogue elements, but evidence from Afghan and U.S. interrogations revealed ISI funding for Haqqani attacks, including the 2008 Indian Embassy bombing in Kabul that killed 58, with annual support estimated at $4-5 million via hawala networks. This duality persisted, as ISI arrested Taliban figures like Mullah Baradar in 2010 under U.S. pressure but sheltered others, including Haqqani leaders, to maintain influence over post-U.S. Afghanistan dynamics. In the lead-up to the 2021 Taliban resurgence, ISI intensified cross-border coordination, providing tactical intelligence and medical support to insurgents, contributing to the rapid collapse of Afghan forces and the Taliban's August 15, 2021, takeover of without significant resistance in southern provinces. Post-takeover, ISI engaged in Doha-brokered talks to secure Taliban recognition of the border, but relations strained over Taliban inaction against Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) sanctuaries, with over 1,000 Pakistani casualties from cross-border attacks in 2023-2024. ISI's Afghan operations, driven by geopolitical hedging against Indian influence via the successor groups, have yielded short-term border security but long-term blowback from empowered jihadists, as evidenced by TTP's growth to 6,000-7,000 fighters under Taliban protection.

Kashmir and India-Focused Activities

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has been implicated in supporting insurgent activities in the region since the late 1980s, providing , logistics, finances, and doctrinal assistance to militant groups amid the escalation of the Jammu and insurgency following the disputed 1987 state elections. This support shifted from initial backing of secular groups like the (JKLF) to Islamist outfits such as and later (LeT) and (JeM), with at least 91 camps reportedly operational in and Pakistan-administered Kashmir by the early 2000s. Pakistani officials have framed such as assistance to "Kashmiri fighters," while Indian and Western assessments describe it as state-sponsored proxy warfare to bleed Indian without direct conventional engagement. In the 1999 Kargil conflict, ISI played a key role in infiltrating Pakistani regular troops—disguised as mujahideen—across the Line of Control into Indian-held positions, occupying strategic heights and prompting a two-month Indian military operation that resulted in approximately 500 Indian and over 400 Pakistani fatalities before withdrawal under U.S. pressure. Former ISI analysis wing head Lieutenant General Shahid Aziz later confirmed the operation involved no genuine militants but Northern Light Infantry regulars under ISI orchestration, contradicting Pakistan's initial denials. Recent admissions by Pakistan Army Chief General Asim Munir in 2024 further acknowledged army participation, highlighting ISI's strategic planning despite the operation's failure to internationalize the Kashmir dispute. ISI's India-focused operations extended beyond Kashmir, notably in the orchestration of the November 26-29, , where 10 LeT gunmen killed 166 civilians and security personnel across multiple sites. U.S.-based scout , who conducted reconnaissance for LeT handlers with ISI connections, pleaded guilty to plotting , while then-ISI chief admitted agency involvement to CIA counterparts, attributing it to "rogue elements" amid broader evidence of state facilitation. Similarly, the February 14, 2019, Pulwama suicide bombing by JeM, which killed 40 Indian paramilitary personnel, bore hallmarks of ISI direction under its then-chief Lt. Gen. , including arms supply and cross-border facilitation, as inferred from perpetrator Dar's JeM in and subsequent Indian airstrikes on alleged JeM camps. denied direct complicity but faced international scrutiny, with U.S. experts questioning ISI's oversight of such groups despite post-9/11 pledges. These activities reflect ISI's doctrine of to counter India's conventional superiority, sustaining in —where over 40,000 deaths have occurred since 1989—while evading full-scale war through . Captured militants' confessions and intercepted communications have provided evidentiary links, though ISI maintains operational security, often support through non-state to limit attribution. Indian revocation of Jammu and Kashmir's special status in August 2019 prompted renewed ISI-backed incursions, underscoring persistent tensions despite intermittent diplomatic thaws.

Captures of High-Value Militants

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has been involved in the apprehension of numerous high-value militants, particularly operatives, in the aftermath of the , 2001, attacks, with operations frequently leveraging tips from U.S. agencies like the CIA and yielding transfers to U.S. custody. These captures contributed to disrupting 's command structure, though their effectiveness has been debated amid allegations of selective enforcement favoring militants aligned with Pakistani strategic interests, such as those focused on or rather than anti-Pakistani groups. By , Pakistani authorities, led by ISI, had detained and handed over approximately 369 suspected members to the , including several from the FBI's . A pivotal early occurred on , 2002, when ISI commandos raided multiple houses in , capturing , a Yemeni national and key facilitator who coordinated logistics for the 9/11 hijackers and attempted to join the plot as a fifth pilot. Bin al-Shibh, who had evaded capture after repeated visa denials for , was detained alongside other suspects during the operation, which stemmed from intelligence on al-Qaeda cells in the city. On March 1, 2003, ISI conducted a joint raid with the CIA in Rawalpindi, arresting Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), a Pakistani-Kuwaiti operative widely regarded as the principal architect of the 9/11 attacks, having proposed the operation to Osama bin Laden in 1996 and overseen its planning, including the selection of targets and operatives. KSM, who also masterminded prior plots like the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the USS Cole attack, was seized at the home of an ISI officer, highlighting internal penetration risks within Pakistani intelligence circles. Subsequent operations included the , 2005, of in Mardan, northwest , by ISI-led forces on CIA-provided ; al-Libbi, a Libyan national, had assumed al-Qaeda's operational leadership in Pakistan after KSM's capture, directing attacks against Western and managing for bin Laden. This capture, the highest-profile al-Qaeda since KSM, was announced by Pakistani officials as a major blow to the group's reconstitution efforts in the region. ISI also targeted Taliban figures, such as the February 2010 detention of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban's deputy leader and military chief, in Karachi; the operation, based on ISI surveillance, disrupted Taliban negotiations but drew U.S. criticism for delaying potential peace talks, underscoring tensions in bilateral counterterrorism cooperation. These actions, while yielding tactical successes, occurred against a backdrop of persistent accusations that ISI prioritized capturing "Arab" al-Qaeda elements over homegrown threats like Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, reflecting strategic divergences.

Other Regional Engagements

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has pursued intelligence and influence operations in Bangladesh, particularly intensified following the political upheaval in August 2024 that ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. In January 2025, a high-level ISI delegation comprising four senior officials visited Dhaka covertly, amid efforts to expand bilateral security ties in the post-Hasina era. This followed reports of ISI support for Islamist groups like Jamaat-e-Islami, which aligned with interim leader Muhammad Yunus to facilitate greater Pakistani access, including arms supplies to training camps involving Rohingya militants and local operatives. In September 2025, Bangladesh's Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) dispatched a secret team to Pakistan to bolster coordination with the ISI, explicitly aimed at countering Indian influence through enhanced intelligence sharing and joint operations. These activities reflect ISI's strategy to exploit Bangladesh's shifting alignments for regional leverage, though Indian assessments view them as destabilizing, while Pakistani sources frame them as routine counterterrorism cooperation. In the , the ISI has leveraged the archipelago as a logistical outpost for and efforts, building on post-2004 tsunami established by Pakistan-based groups like (LeT) and Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq (IKK). These entities, with alleged ISI backing, provided to secure influence among , facilitating and ; by , Maldivian authorities arrested nationals trained in Pakistani camps, including . The has emerged as a conduit for LeT operatives, with ISI-linked promoting jihadist ideologies to undermine pro-India governance, as evidenced by arrests of fighting abroad and domestic spikes tied to Pakistani . Similar patterns appear in Sri Lanka, where ISI operations targeted Muslim and Tamil communities to foster anti-India sentiment and gather intelligence on defense infrastructure. Post-2004 tsunami, LeT and IKK contingents, operating under ISI auspices, infiltrated relief efforts to build terror networks, leading to exposures in 2016 of ISI training modules for local recruits aimed at sabotage. Pakistani officials expressed concern over these revelations, which detailed ISI's use of Sri Lanka for proxy activities, including arms smuggling and ideological propagation, exploiting post-civil war vulnerabilities. Relations with Iran involve both cooperative counterinsurgency against Baloch separatists and persistent frictions over cross-border militancy. In April 2019, then-Prime Minister acknowledged that Pakistani territory, including areas under ISI oversight, served as launchpads for attacks on , prompting bilateral talks on border security. The ISI has collaborated with Iranian intelligence on shared threats like Jaish al-Adl, yet accusations persist of ISI tolerance for anti-Iranian Sunni groups operating from , contributing to an undeclared intelligence rivalry; for instance, the 2016 capture of alleged Indian spy in highlighted ISI's cross-border surveillance reach. These engagements underscore ISI's pragmatic balancing of alliances against ideological and territorial risks in the Iranian theater.

International Partnerships

Cooperation with the United States

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) established close operational ties with the (CIA) during the Soviet-Afghan War (–1989), serving as the primary conduit for U.S. covert assistance to Afghan mujahideen fighters opposing the Soviet occupation. Under , the CIA funneled approximately $3 billion in aid— including advanced weaponry such as anti-aircraft missiles—through the ISI, which distributed resources to select mujahideen factions while maintaining for direct U.S. involvement. This partnership, initiated after the Soviet invasion on December 24, , aligned with U.S. Cold War objectives to bleed Soviet resources, contributing to the eventual withdrawal of Soviet forces in February 1989. Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, cooperation resumed as , under President , joined the U.S.-led War on Terror, providing logistical support for operations in and that facilitated the capture of numerous high-value al-Qaeda operatives. Pakistani agencies, including the ISI, apprehended figures such as —the architect of the 9/11 plot—on March 1, 2003, in , along with in 2002 and in 2002, yielding critical on al-Qaeda . In exchange, the U.S. provided over $33 billion in military and economic aid to from 2002 to 2017, earmarked for counter-terrorism efforts, including reimbursements under the Coalition Support Funds program totaling about $14 billion by 2018. The ISI also tacitly endorsed U.S. drone strikes in 's tribal areas, with secret diplomatic memos from 2008 revealing high-level Pakistani approval for CIA operations targeting militants, despite public opposition. Relations deteriorated amid U.S. suspicions of ISI duplicity, particularly regarding support for and the , which provided safe havens in for attacks on U.S. forces in . Declassified U.S. diplomatic cables and war logs from 2010 exposed ISI funding and training for insurgents, including direct links to the 's 2011 assault on Kabul's U.S. embassy. American officials, including Admiral Mike Mullen, publicly accused the ISI in 2011 of maintaining ties to these groups as a against Indian influence in , prompting aid suspensions such as the $300 million Coalition Support Funds cut in 2018 over insufficient action against the . The 2011 U.S. raid killing Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad—conducted without ISI notification—further eroded trust, highlighting ISI's failure to detect or disclose al-Qaeda leadership on Pakistani soil despite prior cooperation. Despite these tensions, intermittent collaboration persisted, driven by mutual interests in containing al-Qaeda remnants, though U.S. assessments consistently viewed ISI priorities as favoring "strategic depth" in over full alignment against all militants.

Alliances with China, Saudi Arabia, and Others

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) maintains close intelligence cooperation with 's Ministry of State Security (MSS), focusing on counter-terrorism and regional security threats. In 2025, high-level meetings between Pakistani and Chinese officials resulted in agreements to enhance intelligence sharing amid escalating threats from extremism and cross-border militancy. The MSS has collaborated with the ISI on bolstering counter-terrorism operations, including joint efforts to monitor and disrupt terrorist networks in and along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. This partnership extends to early warning mechanisms and operational coordination, with committing to deepened ties in 2025 to address shared vulnerabilities from groups like the East Islamic Movement. Such alliances align with broader Sino-Pakistani strategic interests, including protection of the -Pakistan Economic Corridor, though they have drawn scrutiny for potential overreach by Chinese intelligence into Pakistani domains. Relations with involve discreet linkages, often facilitated through high-level intermediaries like Prince Mansour bin Mutaib, who has enabled access to Saudi security entities for exchanges. Historically, Saudi funding supported ISI-backed operations during the Soviet-Afghan , with providing billions in aid channeled through Pakistani networks in the . More recently, the September 17, 2025, Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement between and emphasizes joint defense capabilities, implicitly including components to counter regional threats like Iranian influence and Houthi activities. This pact builds on longstanding Saudi reliance on Pakistani military expertise, including ISI-trained personnel for Saudi internal security, amid 's diversification from U.S. partnerships. Beyond these core partners, the ISI engages in selective intelligence sharing with other nations aligned against common adversaries, such as through informal discussions linking , , and . Cooperation with Gulf states like the focuses on countering Islamist extremism, leveraging shared concerns over groups funded from the , though specifics remain opaque due to operational secrecy. These alliances prioritize pragmatic counter-threat measures over ideological alignment, reflecting ISI's focus on 's geopolitical balancing against and internal insurgencies.

Domestic Role and Influence

Interface with Pakistani Military and Government

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) functions as a specialized branch within Pakistan's armed forces, primarily staffed by personnel from the , , and air force, with the Pakistan Army providing the majority of officers and resources. Its Director-General, always a serving from the , is appointed through a process involving the Chief of Army Staff and the , as evidenced by the military's announcement of Lt. Gen. Muhammad Asim Malik's appointment on September 24, 2024, effective September 30. This structure underscores the agency's deep integration with the military hierarchy, where operational directives often align with priorities on national security and defense policy. In theory, the ISI reports to the Prime Minister as the civilian head of government, placing it under the executive's oversight for intelligence coordination. However, its reporting line also extends directly to the Chief of Army Staff, creating a dual chain of command that prioritizes military input on strategic matters. This arrangement has historically enabled the ISI to act as an extension of military authority, particularly during periods of direct army rule, such as General Zia-ul-Haq's regime from 1977 to 1988, when the agency expanded its covert capabilities under military direction to support proxy operations and internal stability. Civilian governments, by contrast, have faced persistent challenges in asserting control, with statutory limits on intelligence agencies' political roles undermined by the military's dominance over defense budgets and foreign policy. Tensions between the ISI and civilian administrations have manifested in accusations of unauthorized surveillance, election meddling, and undermining elected leaders perceived as insufficiently aligned with military objectives. For instance, successive civilian governments since the 1990s have alleged ISI overreach in domestic politics, leading to failed reform attempts to impose parliamentary oversight committees. In May 2025, the appointment of ISI Director-General Lt. Gen. Asim Malik as National Security Adviser exemplified ongoing fusion of intelligence and military roles into government functions, bypassing traditional civilian-led advisory structures amid heightened regional threats. These dynamics reflect a broader pattern where the military, via the ISI, retains de facto veto power over security policy, constraining civilian authority despite constitutional provisions for democratic governance.

Political Interventions and Stability Operations

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has frequently intervened in Pakistan's political processes to safeguard military influence and national stability, viewing civilian governments as potential risks to security priorities. Established primarily for external intelligence in 1948, the agency's domestic role expanded after the 1958 military coup led by General Ayub Khan, when it assumed responsibilities for internal surveillance, monitoring political dissidents, and supporting regime consolidation against opposition movements. This shift positioned the ISI as a key instrument in upholding structures, with operations focused on neutralizing perceived threats from leftist or regionalist factions that could undermine central authority. Under General Zia-ul-Haq's following the 1977 coup, the ISI intensified political engagements, including the creation of a dedicated political cell to track parties, fund aligned groups, and suppress rivals such as the (PPP). These efforts aligned with Zia's Islamization policies, channeling resources to Islamist coalitions while conducting intelligence operations to preempt unrest, thereby stabilizing military rule amid ethnic and ideological tensions. The agency's involvement extended to electoral manipulations, exemplified by the 1990 general elections, where former ISI Director-General admitted in a 2012 court to allocating 140 million rupees (equivalent to about $60 million at current rates) from defense budgets to the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) alliance, specifically to block a PPP victory under Benazir Bhutto, whom the establishment regarded as a destabilizing force due to her populist appeals and foreign policy stances. In stability operations, the ISI has blended political intervention with counter-insurgency tactics domestically, targeting separatist movements and militant networks that threaten state cohesion. For instance, in and the former (FATA), ISI-led initiatives have included intelligence-driven arrests, tribal negotiations, and covert actions against Baloch nationalists and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) affiliates, often coordinating with paramilitary forces to restore order without full-scale military deployments. These operations, while credited with curbing territorial fragmentation, have drawn criticism for extrajudicial methods and alliances with local power brokers to enforce political quiescence. During General Pervez Musharraf's tenure in the 2000s, the ISI facilitated "controlled democracy" by vetting candidates and monitoring media, ensuring post-coup transitions aligned with anti-terrorism imperatives and prevented power vacuums exploitable by extremists. Such interventions underscore the ISI's dual mandate: preempting instability through proactive political shaping rather than reactive defense alone.

Assessments and Controversies

Strategic Achievements and National Security Contributions

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) played a pivotal role in coordinating Pakistan's support for the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War from 1979 to 1989, channeling billions in U.S. and Saudi aid—estimated at $3-6 billion—through training camps that prepared over 80,000 fighters for guerrilla operations against Soviet forces. This effort, leveraging ISI's networks for logistics, intelligence, and proxy warfare, contributed to the Soviet Union's costly occupation, with over 15,000 Soviet deaths and eventual withdrawal on February 15, 1989, marking a strategic defeat that weakened the USSR and advanced Pakistan's regional security interests by preventing a pro-Soviet regime on its border. ISI's operational model emphasized deniability and asymmetric tactics, which inflicted sustained attrition on superior conventional forces, demonstrating effective national security doctrine in a proxy conflict. Post-9/11, ISI's counter-terrorism operations yielded tangible results in disrupting networks, including the capture of high-value targets through joint efforts with U.S. agencies; for instance, on September 5, 2011, ISI arrested Younis al-Mauritani, a senior operational planner linked to plots against Western targets, in , . By 2007, Pakistani authorities, led by ISI, had facilitated the arrest of more operatives than any other nation, with over 600 suspects detained in the initial years, including figures like Abu Faraj al-Libbi in May 2005, al-Qaeda's third-in-command at the time. These actions, often involving penetrations of militant safe havens in 's tribal areas, provided critical intelligence that degraded al-Qaeda's command structure and prevented multiple planned attacks, bolstering 's internal security amid rising domestic threats from groups like Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). ISI's contributions extended to broader national defense, including intelligence support for military operations that secured Pakistan's nuclear assets and borders; during the 1999 Kargil conflict, ISI gathered real-time data on Indian troop movements, enabling Pakistani forces to hold strategic heights despite conventional disadvantages. Domestically, ISI-led operations from 2014 onward, such as providing targeting intelligence for , resulted in the elimination of over 3,500 militants and the dismantling of TTP infrastructure in North , reducing suicide bombings and by 70% in subsequent years according to Pakistani government assessments. These efforts underscore ISI's adaptation of first-principles intelligence—prioritizing actionable human sources over —to counter existential threats, though outcomes were constrained by regional geopolitical complexities.

Allegations of Militant Support and Double-Dealing

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has been accused of providing direct military, financial, and logistical support to the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network since the early 1990s, including safe havens in Pakistan's tribal areas and intelligence assistance to conduct attacks against U.S., NATO, and Afghan forces. In September 2011, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen testified before Congress that the Haqqani Network functions as a "veritable arm" of the ISI, enabling operations such as the September 2011 attack on the U.S. embassy in Kabul and a truck bombing of a NATO outpost. A leaked 2012 NATO intelligence report, based on 27,000 interrogations of 4,000 captured Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other militants, detailed ISI orchestration of Taliban activities, including manipulation of leadership councils and knowledge of senior figures' locations near ISI facilities in Miram Shah, asserting that Pakistan could dismantle these networks but chooses not to. ISI ties extend to Pakistan-based groups targeting India, notably Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), both UN-designated terrorist organizations active in Kashmir insurgency since the 1990s. LeT, founded in the late 1980s with ISI backing during the Soviet-Afghan War, executed the November 2008 Mumbai attacks that killed 166 people, with U.S. investigations revealing ISI officers' involvement in training and planning via operatives like David Headley. JeM, formed in 2000 by ISI-linked figures, claimed responsibility for the 2019 Pulwama bombing that killed 40 Indian paramilitary personnel, prompting Indian airstrikes on alleged JeM camps in Pakistan. Pakistani authorities have denied operational control, attributing group activities to non-state actors, though U.S. and Indian intelligence assessments describe these outfits as ISI proxies for strategic depth against India. These activities exemplify double-dealing, as Pakistan received over $33 billion in U.S. aid from 2002 to 2017—primarily for —while ISI shielded militants attacking U.S. interests in . The U.S. suspended $300 million in reimbursements in 2018, citing Pakistan's failure to act against Haqqani and sanctuaries despite repeated assurances. Critics, including former U.S. officials, argue this pattern stems from Pakistan's prioritization of countering Indian influence over full alignment with U.S. goals, with ISI maintaining assets as "hedging" tools amid fears of Afghan instability fostering anti-Pakistan groups. Pakistan has countered that such allegations overlook its sacrifices, including over 70,000 deaths in domestic militancy operations since 2001, and stem from U.S. strategic frustrations.

Human Rights Concerns and Domestic Repressions

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has faced persistent allegations of involvement in enforced disappearances, particularly in province, where security forces under its purview have been accused of abducting suspected separatists, activists, and civilians without . Watch documented cases in 2011 where Pakistani and intelligence agencies, including the ISI, detained individuals in secret facilities, often labeling them as militants without , leading to thousands of unresolved cases reported by families and groups. Recent reports indicate a surge in such abductions, with Baloch organizations citing 84 forced disappearances and 33 extrajudicial killings attributed to the Pakistani Army, , and ISI-linked operations in the first half of 2025 alone. highlighted the ongoing pattern in 2020, noting that students, journalists, and human rights defenders in continue to vanish after ISI or interrogations, with recovery rates below 10% for confirmed cases. Torture allegations against ISI operatives center on interrogation centers in Rawalpindi and frontier regions, where detainees report beatings, electric shocks, and to extract confessions related to militancy or . A 2020 Guardian investigation detailed accounts from survivors of extrajudicial abductions by agencies, including the ISI, involving prolonged detention in undisclosed sites followed by , with at least 5,000-6,000 active disappearance cases nationwide as of that year. The U.S. State Department's 2024 report on Pakistan noted that authorities, including intelligence services, rarely investigate or punish officials for such abuses, enabling a cycle of amid operations. ISI officials have countered these claims by asserting that operations target verified threats from Baloch insurgent groups like the , which have conducted attacks killing hundreds of civilians and security personnel annually, though independent verification of detainee guilt remains scarce. Domestic repression extends to media and political figures, with ISI implicated in harassment, surveillance, and threats against journalists critical of military policies. In 2014, urged investigation into ISI's role in attacks on reporters covering , including the 2011 of , whose reporting on militant infiltration prompted alleged retaliation. A 2012 of the Shahzad Commission criticized it for shielding ISI from despite of agency awareness of threats, underscoring institutional protections against probes into intelligence abuses. Broader reports from 2025 describe ISI-orchestrated transnational repression, including digital and abductions abroad targeting Baloch and activists protesting domestic policies. Pakistani authorities maintain that ISI actions are lawful countermeasures to , citing over deaths from insurgencies since 2001, but rights organizations argue the agency's opaque mandate fosters unchecked power, with commissions of often stalled or biased toward exoneration.

Political Interference and Institutional Conflicts

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has faced persistent allegations of meddling in Pakistan's electoral processes to favor military-aligned outcomes, exemplified by a 2012 Supreme Court ruling that confirmed ISI officials distributed funds to politicians during the 1990 general elections to engineer victories for the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) coalition against the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). This intervention, overseen by then-ISI Director-General Lt. Gen. Asad Durrani, involved approximately 140 million rupees (equivalent to about $2.5 million at the time) disbursed to various candidates, as detailed in the court's verdict which held the agency accountable for undermining democratic integrity. Similar claims resurfaced in the 2024 elections, where a Rawalpindi election commissioner admitted to altering results under pressure from intelligence officials, contributing to widespread protests over manipulated outcomes that disadvantaged independents backed by Imran Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). Institutional tensions between the ISI and civilian governments have frequently escalated into public confrontations, particularly when prime ministers sought greater oversight of the agency. In November 2011, the Memogate scandal erupted when a unsigned memo, purportedly drafted by then-Ambassador at the behest of President , was leaked, requesting U.S. assistance to prevent a military coup following the raid and to reorganize Pakistan's apparatus, including curbing ISI influence. The episode, authenticated through testimony from businessman , highlighted deep mistrust between the Zardari administration and the military-ISI establishment, leading to Haqqani's resignation and a parliamentary commission probe that exposed ISI surveillance of government communications. Successive civilian leaders, notably Nawaz Sharif, have accused the ISI of orchestrating their ousters to preserve military dominance, with Sharif claiming in 2020 that ISI Director-General Lt. Gen. Faiz Hameed and Army Chief Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa engineered his 2017 disqualification via judicial manipulation in the Panama Papers case. These assertions stem from Sharif's broader narrative of ISI-backed "regime change operations," including support for rival politicians and media suppression, though military spokespersons have dismissed them as politically motivated fabrications. In a rare internal reckoning, Hameed—ISI chief from 2019 to 2021—was indicted by a military court in December 2024 on charges of engaging in political activities, including aiding specific parties in violation of constitutional boundaries, marking the first such prosecution of a former ISI head and underscoring intra-establishment conflicts over politicization. The agency's political wing, formally disbanded in amid outcry over its role in swaying elections and alliances, has been criticized by analysts as a mechanism for institutional entrenchment, fostering dependencies among politicians through and . Efforts to civilianize ISI control, such as Zardari's short-lived transfer to the Interior Ministry, were swiftly reversed due to operational concerns, perpetuating a cycle where the agency, nominally reporting to the but effectively army-directed, resists subordination to elected authority. These frictions reflect underlying structural realities: the ISI's mandate prioritizes amid regional threats, often interpreting political as existential , leading to preemptive interventions that civilian governments decry as overreach.

International Criticisms and Defenses

The United States has accused the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of maintaining ties to Afghan insurgent groups, including the Taliban and Haqqani network, despite Pakistan's nominal alliance in the post-9/11 counterterrorism coalition. In September 2011, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Haqqani network, responsible for attacks such as the September 2011 assault on the U.S. embassy in Kabul, functioned as a "veritable arm" of the ISI. These allegations, echoed by former U.S. officials like Robert Gates in 2009, portray ISI support as a strategic hedge to ensure influence in Afghanistan following a potential U.S. withdrawal. Evidence cited includes captured militants' confessions of ISI training and funding, as well as intercepted communications, though U.S. intelligence assessments have varied in attributing direct operational control versus passive tolerance. India has leveled similar charges, primarily regarding ISI backing for Kashmir-focused militants like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), implicated in cross-border attacks. The November 2008 Mumbai attacks, which killed 166 people including six Americans, involved LeT operatives trained and directed by ISI handlers, according to Indian investigations and confessions from arrested attacker Ajmal Kasab. Afghan leaders, including former President Hamid Karzai, have repeatedly claimed ISI orchestration of attacks within Afghanistan, such as the June 2008 attempt on Karzai's life and the July 2008 bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul. These criticisms extend to broader international concerns, including a 2010 London School of Economics report documenting ISI provision of political, financial, and military aid to the Taliban since the 1990s. Pakistan has consistently denied state-sponsored terrorism, attributing accusations to adversaries seeking to undermine its security apparatus and emphasizing ISI's contributions to global counterterrorism. Pakistani officials, including former President in 2006 and President in 2009, rejected claims of ongoing support, asserting that any historical links were severed post-9/11 and that ISI assets were merely informants rather than active backers. In response to Mullen's 2011 statements, Foreign Minister dismissed them as unsubstantiated, highlighting Pakistan's arrests of over 600 operatives, including in 2003, and military operations that incurred thousands of casualties among security forces. Pakistani defenders, including some U.S. analysts, note ISI's sacrifices—such as the loss of personnel in operations against domestic militants—and argue that criticisms overlook ISI's pivotal role in the 1980s Afghan jihad against the Soviets, which aligned with U.S. interests, while ignoring India's alleged covert support for separatists in . Despite these rebuttals, skepticism persists internationally, fueled by events like the 2011 discovery of Osama bin Laden's compound near a in , which raised questions about ISI complicity or incompetence.

References

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