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Islam in China
Islam in China
from Wikipedia

Provinces of China by proportion of Muslim population, according to 2010 data

Islam has been practiced in China since the 7th century CE.[1] There are an estimated 20 million Muslims in China, less than 2 percent of the total population.[2][needs update] Though Hui Muslims are the most numerous group,[3][4] the greatest concentration of Muslims reside in northwestern China's Xinjiang autonomous region, which contains a significant Uyghur population. Lesser yet significant populations reside in the regions of Ningxia, Gansu and Qinghai.[5] Of China's 55 officially recognized minority peoples, ten of these groups are predominantly Sunni Muslim.[5]

History

[edit]
Chinese-style minaret of the Great Mosque of Xi'an, one of China's oldest mosques built 742 AD (Tang dynasty), its current form was largely constructed in 1384 AD (Ming dynasty)
Niujie Mosque prayer hall in Beijing, originally built in 996 (Liao dynasty), and rebuilt in 1443 (Ming dynasty).[6]

The Silk Road, which comprised a series of extensive inland trade routes that spread all over the Mediterranean to East Asia, was used since 1000 BCE and continued to be used for millennia. For more than half of this long period of time, most of the traders were Muslim and moved towards the East. Not only did these traders bring their goods, they also carried with them their culture and beliefs to East Asia.[7] Islam was one of the many religions that gradually began to spread across the Silk Road during the "7th to the 10th centuries through war, trade and diplomatic exchanges".[8]

During the Tang and Song dynasties, Muslims in China worshipped various kinds of "spirits" alongside Allah.[9]

Tang dynasty

[edit]

According to Chinese Muslims' traditional accounts, Islam was first introduced to China in 616–18 by the Companions of Muhammad: Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas, Wahab ibn Abu Kabcha and another.[10][11] It is noted in other accounts that Wahab Abu Kabcha reached Canton by sea in 629 CE.[12]

The introduction of Islam mainly happened through two routes: from the southeast following an established path to Guangdong and from the northwest through the Silk Road.[13] Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas, along with the Companion Suhayla Abu Arja and Hassan ibn Thabit, and the Tabi'un Owais al-Qarani, returned to China from the Arabian Peninsula in 637 by the Yunnan-Manipur-Chittagong route, then reached Arabia by sea.[14] Some sources date the introduction of Islam in China to 650 CE, the third sojourn of Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas,[15] when he was sent as an official envoy to Tang emperor Gaozong during the reign of the Rashid Caliph Uthman's reign.[16] Emperor Gaozong, the Tang emperor who is said to have received the envoy then ordered the construction of the Huaisheng Mosque in Guangzhou in memory of Muhammad, which was the first mosque in the country.[15][17]

While modern secular historians tend to say that there is no evidence that Waqqas himself ever came to China,[17] they do believe that Muslim diplomats and merchants came to Tang China within a few decades from the beginning of the Muslim era.[17]

The Huaisheng Mosque, considered to be the oldest mosque in China, built in the 7th century. Photograph from 1860, The minaret was built in the 10th century.[citation needed]

The early Tang dynasty had a cosmopolitan culture, with intensive contacts with Central Asia and significant communities of (originally non-Muslim) Central and Western Asian merchants resident in Chinese cities, which helped the introduction of Islam.[17] The first major Muslim settlements in China consisted of Arab and Persian merchants,[18] with comparatively well-established, even if somewhat segregated, mercantile Muslim communities existing in the port cities of Guangzhou, Quanzhou and Hangzhou on China's southeastern seaboard, as well as in the interior centers such as Chang'an, Kaifeng and Yangzhou during the Tang and especially Song eras.[19] Around 879, Chinese rebels killed about 120,000–200,000 mostly Arab and Persian foreigners in Guanzhou in the Guangzhou massacre. It is believed that the profile of Muslims as traders led to the government ignoring Muslims in the 845 Huichang persecution of Buddhism, even though it virtually extinguished Zoroastrianism and the Church of the East in China.[20][21][22]

In 751, the Abbasid Caliphate defeated Tang China at the Battle of Talas, marking the end of Tang westward expansion and resulting in Muslim control of Transoxiana for the next 400 years.

Song dynasty

[edit]

By the time of the Song dynasty, Muslims had come to play a major role in the import/export industry.[15][19] The office of Director General of Shipping was consistently held by a Muslim during this period.[23] In 1070, the Song emperor Shenzong invited 5,300 Muslims from Bukhara, to settle in Song China in order to create a buffer zone between the Song and the Liao dynasties in the northeast. Later on, these Muslims settled between the Sung capital of Kaifeng and Yenching (modern day Beijing).[24] They were led by Prince Amir Sayyid "Su-fei-er"[25] (his Chinese name), who was called the "father" of the Muslim community in China. Prior to him, Islam was named by the Tang and Song Chinese as Dashi fa ("law of the Arabs").[26] He renamed it to Huihui Jiao ("the Religion of the Huihui").[27]

It is reported that "in 1080, another group of more than 10,000 Arab men and women are said to have arrived in China on horsebacks to join Sofeier. These people settled in all provinces".[25] Pu Shougeng, a Muslim foreign trader, stands out in his work to help the Yuan conquer Southern China, the last outpost of Song power. In 1276, Song loyalists launched a resistance against Mongol efforts to take over Fuzhou. The Yuanshih (Yuan dynasty official history) records that Pu Shougeng "abandoned the Song cause and rejected the emperor...by the end of the year, Quanzhou submitted to the Mongols". In abandoning the Song cause, Pu Shougeng mobilized troops from the community of foreign residents, who massacred the Song emperor's relatives and Song loyalists. Pu Shougeng and his troops acted without the help of the Mongol army. Pu Shougeng himself was lavishly rewarded by the Mongols. He was appointed military commissioner for Fujian and Guangdong.

Tombs of Imams

[edit]
The tombs of Sa-Ke-Zu and Wu-Ko-Shun at Mount Lingshan, Quanzhou

On the foothills of Mount Lingshan are the tombs of two of the four companions that Muhammad sent eastwards to preach Islam. Known as the 'Holy Tombs', they house the companions Sa-Ke-Zu and Wu-Ko-Shun. The other two companions went to Guangzhou and Yangzhou.[28] The Imam Asim, is said to have been one of the first Islamic missionaries in China. He was a man who lived in c. 1000 CE in Hotan. The shrine site includes the reputed tomb of the Imam, a mosque, and several related tombs.[29] There is also a maqam of the Shia Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq.[30]

Yuan dynasty

[edit]
Jinan Great Southern Mosque was completed during the reign of Temür Khan, Emperor Chengzong of Yuan
Phoenix Mosque in Hangzhou originally built in Tang or Song dynasty but was repaired during the Yuan dynasty, in 1281

Bukhara and Samarqand were visited by Qiu Chuji. At the same time the Mongols imported Central Asian Muslims to serve as administrators in China, the Mongols also sent ethnic Han and Khitans from China to serve as administrators over the Muslim population in Bukhara and Samarqand in Central Asia, using foreigners to curtail the power of the local peoples of both lands. The surname of Li was held by one of Yelu Ahai's staff of Han descent. There were various Han craftsmen. Tangut, Khitan and Han peoples took control over gardens and fields from the Muslims.[31] Han people were moved to Central Asian areas like Besh Baliq, Almaliq, and Samarqand by the Mongols where they worked as artisans and farmers.[32]

During the Mongol-founded Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), large numbers of Muslims settled in China. The Mongols, a minority in China, gave foreign immigrants, such as Buddhists, Christians, Muslims and Jews from West Asia an elevated status over locals including Khitan and Jurchens as part of their governing strategy, thus giving Muslims a heavy influence. Mongols recruited and forcibly relocated hundreds of thousands of Muslim immigrants from Western and Central Asia to help them administer their rapidly expanding empire.[5] The Mongols used Arab, Persian and Buddhist Uyghur administrators, generically known as semu [色目] ("various eye color"),[33] to act as officers of taxation and finance. Muslims headed many corporations in China in the early Yuan period.[34] Muslim scholars were brought to work on calendar making and astronomy. The architect Yeheidie'erding (Amir al-Din) learned from Han architecture to help design the construction of the capital of the Yuan dynasty, Dadu (also known as Khanbaliq or present-day Beijing).[35]

Genghis Khan and his successors forbade Islamic practices like halal butchering, as well as other restrictions. Muslims had to slaughter sheep in secret.[36] Genghis Khan outright called Muslims and Jews "slaves", and demanded that they follow the Mongol method of eating rather than the halal method. Circumcision was also forbidden. Jews were affected by these laws and forbidden by the Mongols to eat Kosher.[37] Towards the end of the Yuan dynasty, corruption and persecution became so severe that Muslim generals joined the Han Chinese in rebelling against the Mongols. The founder of the Ming dynasty, Hongwu Emperor, led Muslim generals like Lan Yu against the Mongols, whom they defeated in combat. Some Muslim communities had a name in Chinese which meant "barracks" or "thanks", which many Hui Muslims claim comes from the gratitude which Chinese people have towards them for their role in defeating the Mongols.[38]

Puhaddin Mausoleum complex in Yangzhou

Among all the [subject] alien peoples only the Hui-hui say "we do not eat Mongol food". [Cinggis Qa'an replied:] "By the aid of heaven we have pacified you; you are our slaves. Yet you do not eat our food or drink. How can this be right?" He thereupon made them eat. "If you slaughter sheep, you will be considered guilty of a crime." He issued a regulation to that effect ... [In 1279/1280 under Qubilai] all the Muslims say: "if someone else slaughters [the animal] we do not eat". Because the poor people are upset by this, from now on, Musuluman [Muslim] Huihui and Zhuhu [Jewish] Huihui, no matter who kills [the animal] will eat [it] and must cease slaughtering sheep themselves, and cease the rite of circumcision.[39]


Ming dynasty

[edit]
Weizhou Grand Mosque, constructed during the Ming dynasty
Hu Dahai was a Chinese Muslim general of the Hongwu Emperor
Chinese Muslim explorer and admiral, Zheng He

During the following Ming dynasty, Muslims continued to be influential around government circles. Six of Ming dynasty founder Hongwu Emperor's most trusted generals are said to have been Muslim, including Lan Yu who, in 1388, led a strong imperial Ming army out of the Great Wall and won a decisive victory over the Mongols in Mongolia, effectively ending the Mongol dream to re-conquer China. During the war fighting the Mongols, among the Ming Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang's armies was the Hui Muslim Feng Sheng.[40] Zhu Yuanzhang also wrote a praise of Islam, The Hundred-word Eulogy. It was recorded that "His Majesty ordered to have mosques built in Xijing and Nanjing [the capital cities], and in southern Yunnan, Fujian and Guangdong. His Majesty also personally wrote baizizan [a eulogy] in praise of the Prophet's virtues."[41] Additionally, the Yongle Emperor hired Zheng He, perhaps the most famous Chinese of Muslim birth although at least in later life not a Muslim himself, to lead seven expeditions to the Indian Ocean from 1405 and 1433. However, during the Ming dynasty, new immigration to China from Muslim countries was restricted in an increasingly isolationist nation. The Muslims in China who were descended from earlier immigration began to assimilate by speaking Chinese and by adopting Chinese names and culture. Mosque architecture began to follow traditional Chinese architecture. This era, sometimes considered the Golden Age of Islam in China,[42] also saw Nanjing become an important center of Islamic study.[43]

Taoism and Confucianism influenced Islam around and before this time, and because of their influence and the lack of proficiency many imams had with writing in Chinese, many Muslims had vastly different conceptions of God from Muslims in western countries.[44] They also came up with Taoist-influenced names for Allah different from the typical 99 names.[44]

The seventh voyage of Zheng He

Muslims in Ming dynasty Beijing were given relative freedom by the Chinese, with no restrictions placed on their religious practices or freedom of worship and being normal citizens in Beijing. In contrast to the freedom granted to Muslims, followers of Tibetan Buddhism and Catholicism suffered from restrictions and censure in Beijing.[45]

The Hongwu Emperor decreed the building of multiple mosques throughout China in many locations. A Nanjing mosque was built by the Xuande Emperor.[46] Weizhou Grand Mosque, considered as one of the most beautiful, was constructed during the Ming dynasty.[47][48][49][50]

When the Qing dynasty invaded the Ming dynasty in 1644, Muslim Ming loyalists led by Muslim leaders Milayin, Ding Guodong and Ma Shouying led a revolt in 1646 against the Qing during the Milayin rebellion in order to drive the Qing out and restore the Ming Prince of Yanchang Zhu Shichuan to the throne as the emperor. The Muslim Ming loyalists were crushed by the Qing with 100,000 of them, including Milayin and Ding Guodong killed.

Qing dynasty

[edit]
Depiction of a Central Asian Muslim from Altishahr, during the Qing dynasty

The Manchu-led Qing dynasty (1644–1912) witnessed multiple revolts, with several major revolts headed by Muslim leaders. During the Qing dynasty's conquest of the Ming dynasty from 1644; Muslim Ming loyalists in Gansu led by Muslim leaders Milayin[51] and Ding Guodong led a revolt in 1646 against the Qing during the Milayin rebellion in order to drive the Qing out and restore the Ming Prince Zhu Shichuan to the throne as emperor.[52] The Muslim Ming loyalists were supported by Hami's Sultan Sa'id Baba and his son Prince Turumtay.[53][54][55] The Muslim Ming loyalists were joined by Tibetan and Han peoples in the revolt.[56] After fierce fighting, and negotiations, a peace agreement was agreed in 1649, where Milayan and Ding nominally pledged allegiance to the Qing and were given ranks as members of the military.[57] When the other Ming loyalists in southern China resumed hostilities, the Qing were forced to withdraw their forces from Gansu to fight them, Milayan and Ding once again took up arms and rebelled against the Qing.[58] The Muslim Ming loyalists were then crushed by the Qing with 100,000 of them, including Milayin, Ding Guodong, and Turumtay killed in battle.

The Confucian Hui Muslim scholar Ma Zhu (1640–1710) served with the Southern Ming loyalists against the Qing.[59] Zhu Yu'ai (the Ming Prince Gui) was accompanied by Hui refugees when he fled from Huguang to the Burmese border in Yunnan and as a mark of their defiance against the Qing and loyalty to the Ming, they changed their surname to Ming.[60]

In Guangzhou, the national monuments known as "The Muslim's Loyal Trio" are the tombs of Ming loyalist Muslims who were martyred while fighting in battle against the Qing during the Ming–Qing transition period in Guangzhou.[61] The Ming Muslim loyalists were called Jiaomen sanzhong "Three defenders of the faith".[60]

Capture of Dali, the capital of the Pingnan Sultanate in Yunnan, 1873

The Muslim revolt in the northwest occurred due to violent and bloody infighting between Muslim groups (Gedimu, Khafiya and Jahriyya). The rebellion in Yunnan occurred because of repression by Qing officials, resulting in bloody Hui rebellions, most notably the Dungan revolt, which occurred mostly in Xinjiang, Shaanxi and Gansu, from 1862 to 1877. The Manchu government ordered the execution of several million rebels in the Dungan revolt.[62] The Hui Muslim population of Beijing was unaffected from the Muslim rebels during the Dungan revolt.[63]

Elisabeth Allès wrote that the relationship between Hui Muslim and Han peoples continued normally in the Henan area, with no ramifications or consequences from the Muslim rebellions of other areas. Allès wrote "the major Muslim revolts in the mid-19th century which involved the Hui in Shaanxi, Gansu and Yunnan, as well as the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, do not seem to have had any direct effect on this region of the central plain."[64]

Pagoda composed of the Shahada and other Islamic prayers; section of an 1845 scroll

However, many Muslims like Ma Zhan'ao, Ma Anliang, Dong Fuxiang, Ma Qianling and Ma Julung defected to the Qing dynasty and helped the Qing General Zuo Zongtang exterminate the Muslim rebels. These Muslim generals belonged to the Khafiya sect, and they abetted in the Qing massacre of Jahariyya rebels. Zuo relocated the Han from Hezhou as a reward for the Muslims for helping the Qing to kill other Muslim rebels.[citation needed] In 1895, another Dungan Revolt broke out, and loyalist Muslims such as Dong Fuxiang, Ma Anliang, Ma Guoliang, Ma Fulu and Ma Fuxiang suppressed and massacred the rebel Muslims led by Ma Dahan, Ma Yonglin and Ma Wanfu. The Muslim army, Kansu Braves, led by General Dong Fuxiang fought for the Qing dynasty against the foreigners during the Boxer Rebellion. They included well known generals like Ma Anliang, Ma Fulu and Ma Fuxiang.

In Yunnan, the Qing armies exterminated only the Muslims who had rebelled and spared Muslims who took no part in the uprising.[65]

Uyghurs in Turfan and Hami and their leaders like Emin Khoja allied with the Qing against Uyghurs in Altishahr. The Qing dynasty enfeoffed (granted freehold property in exchange for pledged service) the rulers of Turpan, in eastern present-day Xinjiang and Hami (Kumul) as autonomous princes, while the rest of the Uyghurs in Altishahr (the Tarim Basin) were ruled by Begs.[66]: 31  Uyghurs from Turpan and Hami were appointed by China as officials to rule over Uyghurs in the Tarim Basin.

Many Muslims chose to live among Confucians, worshipped Chinese gods and Allah, and perform religious functions, including prayer, in Confucian temples as well as mosques during the late Qing dynasty,[67] and likely before then as well. Some even prostrated before idols and made offerings to them.[67]

Republic of China

[edit]

In the 1900s decade, its estimated that there were 20 million Muslims in China proper (that is, China excluding the regions of Mongolia and Xinjiang).[68][69][70][71] Of these, almost half resided in Gansu, over a third in Shaanxi (as defined at that time) and the rest in Yunnan.[72]

The Qing dynasty fell in 1912, and the Republic of China was established by Sun Yat-sen, who immediately proclaimed the equality of the Han, Hui, Manchu, Mongol, and Tibetan peoples. This led to some improvement in relations between these different peoples. The end of dynasty also marked an increase in Sino-foreign interactions. This led to increased contact between Muslim minorities in China and the Islamic states of the Middle East.[citation needed] In 1912, the Chinese Muslim Federation was formed in the capital Nanjing. Similar organization formed in Beijing (1912), Shanghai (1925) and Jinan (1934).[73]

In the 1910s, many Chinese Muslims syncretized their beliefs with Confucianism, and worshipped Chinese gods alongside Allah.[67]

During the rule of the Kuomintang party, Muslim warlords (such as the Ma clique) were appointed as military governors of the provinces of Qinghai, Gansu and Ningxia. Bai Chongxi was a Muslim General and Defence Minister of China during this time.

During the Second Sino-Japanese war, the Japanese destroyed 220 mosques and killed countless Hui by April 1941.[74] The Hui of Dachang was subjected to slaughter by the Japanese.[40] During the Rape of Nanking, the mosques contained dead bodies after the Japanese slaughters. According to Wan Lei, "statistics showed that the Japanese destroyed 220 mosques and killed countless Hui people by April 1941." The Japanese followed a policy of economic oppression which involved the destruction of mosques and Hui communities and made many Hui jobless and homeless. Another policy was one of deliberate humiliation. This included soldiers smearing mosques with pork fat, forcing Hui to butcher pigs to feed the soldiers, and forcing girls to serve as sex slaves. Hui cemeteries were destroyed for military reasons.[75] Many Hui fought in the war against Japan.

In 1937, during the Battle of Beiping–Tianjin, the Chinese government received a telegram from Muslim General Ma Bufang that he was prepared to fight the Japanese.[76] Immediately after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Ma Bufang arranged for a cavalry division under the Muslim General Ma Biao to be sent east to battle the Japanese.[77] Ethnic Turkic Salar Muslims made up the majority of the first cavalry division which was sent by Ma Bufang.[78]

By 1939, at least 33 Hui Muslims had studied at Cairo's Al-Azhar University. Before the Sino-Japanese War of 1937, there existed more than a hundred known Muslim periodicals. Thirty journals were published between 1911 and 1937. Although the Linxia region remained a center of religious activities, many Muslim cultural activities had shifted to Beijing.[79] National organizations like the Chinese Muslim Association were established for Muslims. Muslims served extensively in the National Revolutionary Army and reached positions of importance, like General Bai Chongxi, who became Defence Minister of the Republic of China.

In the Kuomintang Islamic insurgency, Muslim Kuomintang National Revolutionary Army forces in Northwest China, in Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, as well as Yunnan, continued an unsuccessful insurgency against the communists from 1950 to 1958, after the general civil war was over. Muslims affiliated with the Kuomintang also moved to Taiwan within this time.[citation needed]

People's Republic of China

[edit]
An ethnic Hui family celebrating Eid ul-Fitr in Ningxia
Id Kah Mosque; the main mosque of Kashgar, dates back to 996 and was built in 1442

When the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, Muslims, along with all other religions in China, suffered repression especially during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Islam, like all religions including traditional Chinese religion, was persecuted by the Red Guards who were encouraged to smash the Four Olds. Numerous places of worship, including mosques, were attacked.[80]

In 1975, in what would be known as the Shadian incident, there was an uprising among Hui Muslims and became the only large scale ethnic rebellion during the Cultural Revolution.[81] In crushing the rebellion, the PLA massacred 1,600 Hui[81] with MIG fighter jets used to fire rockets onto the village. Following the fall of the Gang of Four, apologies and reparations were made.[82] During that time, the government also constantly accused Muslims and other religious groups of holding "superstitious beliefs" and promoting "anti-socialist trends".[83] The government began to relax its policies towards Muslims in 1978.[84]

After the advent of Deng Xiaoping in 1979, Muslims enjoyed a period of liberalisation. New legislation gave all minorities the freedom to use their own spoken and written languages, to develop their own culture and education and to practice their religion.[85] More Chinese Muslims than ever before were allowed to go on pilgrimage to Mecca.[86]

There is an ethnic separatist movement among the Uyghur minority, who are a Turkic people with their own language. Uyghur separatists are intent on establishing their own state, which existed for a few years in the 1930s and as a Soviet Communist puppet state, the Second East Turkestan Republic in 1944–1950. The Soviet Union supported Uyghur separatists against China during the Sino-Soviet split. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, China feared potential separatist goals of the Muslim majority in Xinjiang.

In the past, celebrating at religious functions and going on Hajj to Mecca was encouraged by the Chinese government for Uyghur members of the Communist party. From 1979 to 1989, 350 mosques were built in Turpan.[87] Whereas 30 years later, the government was building "re-education" camps for interning Muslims without charge in Turpan.[88]

In 1989, China banned a book titled "Xing Fengsu" ("Sexual Customs") which insulted Islam and placed its authors under arrest after protests in Lanzhou and Beijing by the Hui, during which the police provided protection to the Hui protestors and the government organized public burnings of the book.[89] Hui Muslim protestors who violently rioted by vandalizing property during the protests against the book were let off by the Chinese government and went unpunished while Uyghur protestors were imprisoned.[90]

Since the 1980s, Islamic private schools (Sino-Arabic schools (中阿學校)) have been supported and permitted by the Chinese government in Muslim areas, only specifically excluding Xinjiang from allowing these schools because of separatist sentiment there.[91] After secondary education is completed, Hui students are permitted to embark on religious studies under an Imam.[92]

21st century

[edit]
Eid al-Adha at Jiangwan Mosque, Shanghai

In 2007, anticipating the coming "Year of the Pig" in the Chinese calendar, depictions of pigs were banned from CCTV "to avoid conflicts with Muslim minorities".[93] This is believed to refer to China's population of 20 million Muslims (to whom pigs are considered "unclean"). Hui Muslims enjoy freedoms such as practising their religion, building mosques at which their children attend, while Uyghurs in Xinjiang experience more strict controls.[94]

There are about 24,400 mosques in Xinjiang, an average of one mosque for every 530 Muslims, which is higher than the number of churches per Christian person in England.[95][96]

In March 2014, the Chinese media estimated that there were around 300 Chinese Muslims active in ISIS territories.[97] The Chinese government stated in May 2015 that it would not tolerate any form of terrorism and would work to "combat terrorist forces, including ETIM, [to] safeguard global peace, security and stability."[98]

Muslims were reported in 2015 to have been featured as hosts and directors on the Chinese New Year Gala.[99]

In response to the 2015 Charlie Hebdo shooting, Chinese state-run media attacked Charlie Hebdo for publishing the cartoons insulting Muhammad, with the state-run Xinhua advocating limiting freedom of speech, while the Chinese Communist Party-owned tabloid Global Times said the attack was "payback" for what it characterised as Western colonialism and accusing Charlie Hebdo of trying to incite a clash of civilizations.[100]

In the five years to 2017, a 306% rise in criminal arrests was seen in Xinjiang and the arrests there accounted for 21% of the national total, despite the region contributing just 1.5% of the population. The increase was seen as driven by the government's "Strike Hard" campaign. In 2017, driven by a 92% in security spending there that year, an estimated 227,882 criminal arrests were made in Xinjiang.[101][102]

In August 2018, the authorities were vigorously pursuing the suppression of mosques, including their widespread destruction,[103] over Muslim protests.[104] Also at that time, the growing of long beards and the wearing of veils or Islamic robes for Uyghurs, were banned. All vehicle owners were required to install GPS tracking devices.[102]

NPR reported that from 2018 to 2020 the repression of non-Uyghur Muslims intensified. Imams have been restricted to practicing within the region their household is registered in. Prior to these restrictions China had hundreds of itinerant Imams. During this period the Chinese government forced nearly all mosques in Ningxia and Henan to remove their domes and Arabic script. In 2018 new language restrictions forced hundreds of Arabic schools in Ningxia and Zhengzhou to close.[105]

A 2019 paper from the Gallatin School of Individualized Study interviewed Hui Muslims in Xining, Lanzhou, and Yinchuan and found that none saw the recent policies or government as detrimental to their religious lives. Although some foresaw a future of Islam in China much different than what they were used to, they did not seem to worry if it was good or bad as long as they had access to mosques, halal food and security.[106] Arabic calligraphy was also reported by The Hindu in 2019 to be commonplace at the Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture.[107] The National reported in the same year of a female ahong in Xi'an teaching those in her mosque how to pray and read the Quran in Arabic.[108]

Chinese Muslims reportedly celebrated Ramadan on 2021 in the cities of Shanghai[109] and Beijing.[110] The Star reported in the same year that Uyghurs in Xinjiang made prayers for Aidilfitri.[111]

A policy to sincize all mosques had effectively transformed all major Islamic houses of worship by May 2024.[112]

Repression of Uyghurs

[edit]

By 2013, the repression of Uyghurs extended to the disappearance of dissidents and the imposition of life imprisonment sentences on academics who were convicted of promoting social interactions between Uyghurs.[113] Hui Muslims who are employed by the state are allowed to fast during Ramadan unlike Uyghurs in the same positions, the number of Huí going on Hajj was reported to be expanding in 2014 and Hui women are allowed to wear veils, while Uyghur women are discouraged from wearing them. Uyghurs find it difficult to get passports to go on Hajj.[114][115] The Xinjiang Muslim Association in China and the Chinese embassy in Malaysia have denied that Uyghurs are banned from fasting, inviting foreigners to come see it for themselves.[116][117]

In July 2014, Reuters reported that Uyghurs in Shanghai could practise their religion, with some expressing more freedom there than in Xinjiang.[118]

The Associated Press (AP) reported in late November 2018 that Uyghur families were required to allow local government officials to live in their homes as "relatives" in a "Pair Up and Become Family" campaign. While the official was living in a home, the residents were closely watched and not allowed to pray or wear religious clothing. Authorities said that the program was voluntary but Muslims who were interviewed by AP expressed concern that refusal to cooperate would lead to serious repercussions.[119]

As of 2024, a significant new wave of Chinese Uyghur Muslims is fleeing religious persecution in Xinjiang Province and seeking religious freedom in New York City.[120]

Tibetan-Muslim sectarian violence

[edit]

In Tibet, the majority of Muslims are Hui people. Hatred between Tibetans and Muslims stems from events during the Muslim warlord Ma Bufang's rule in Qinghai such as the Ngolok rebellions (1917–1949) and the Sino-Tibetan War. Violence subsided after 1949 under Communist Party repression but reignited as strictures were relaxed.

Riots broke out in March 2008 between Muslims and Tibetans over incidents such as suspected human bones in and deliberate contamination of soups served in Muslim-owned establishments and overpricing of balloons by Muslim vendors. Tibetans attacked Muslim restaurants. Fires set by Tibetans resulted in Muslim deaths and riots. The Tibetan exile community sought to suppress reports reaching the international community, fearing damage to the cause of Tibetan autonomy and fueling Hui Muslim support of government repression of Tibetans generally.[121][122]: 1–2  In addition, Chinese-speaking Hui have problems with Tibetan Hui (the Tibetan speaking Kache minority of Muslims).[123] The main mosque in Lhasa was burned down by Tibetans during the unrest.[124]

The majority of Tibetans viewed the wars against Iraq and Afghanistan after 9/11 positively and it had the effect of galvanizing anti-Muslim attitudes among Tibetans and resulted in an anti-Muslim boycott against Muslim owned businesses.[122]: 17  Tibetan Buddhists propagate a false libel that Muslims cremate their Imams and use the ashes to convert Tibetans to Islam by making Tibetans inhale the ashes.[122]: 19 

Internment camps and restrictions on religious freedom

[edit]

The Xinjiang internment camps are officially called "Vocational Education and Training Centers" by the Chinese government.[125] The camps have been operated by the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regional government since 2014. However, the efforts of the camps strongly intensified after a change of head for the region. Alongside the Uyghurs, other Muslim minorities have also been reported to be held in these internment camps. As of 2019, 23 nations in the United Nations have signed a letter condemning China for the camps and asking them to close them.[126]

In May 2018, news media outlets reported that hundreds of thousands of Muslims were being detained in massive extrajudicial internment camps in western Xinjiang.[127] These were called s "re-education" camps and later, "vocational training centres" by the government, intended for the "rehabilitation and redemption" to combat terrorism and religious extremism.[128][101][129][130][131]

In August 2018, the United Nations said that credible reports had led it to estimate that up to a million Uyghurs and other Muslims were being held in "something that resembles a massive internment camp that is shrouded in secrecy". The U.N.'s International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination said that some estimates indicated that up to 2 million Uyghurs and other Muslims were held in "political camps for indoctrination", in a "no-rights zone".[132] By that time, conditions in Xinjiang had deteriorated so far that they were described by political scientists as "Orwellian"[102] and observers drew comparisons with Nazi concentration camps.[133] In response to the UN panel's finding of indefinite detention without due process, the Chinese government delegation officially conceded that it was engaging in widespread "resettlement and re-education" and state media described the controls in Xinjiang as "intense", but not permanent.[134]

On 31 August 2018, the United Nations committee called on the Chinese government to "end the practice of detention without lawful charge, trial and conviction", to release the detained persons, to provide specifics as to the number of interred individuals and the reasons for their detention and to investigate the allegations of "racial, ethnic and ethno-religious profiling". A BBC report quoted an unnamed Chinese official as saying that "Uighurs enjoyed full rights", pointing out that "those deceived by religious extremism ... shall be assisted by resettlement and re-education".[135]

In October 2018, BBC News published an investigative exposé claiming based on satellite imagery and testimony that hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities are being held without trial in internment camps in Xinjiang.[115] On the other hand, the United States Department of Defense believes that around 1 million to 3 million people have been detained and placed in the internment camps.[136] Some sources quoted in the article say "as far as I know, the Chinese government wants to remove Uyghur identity from the world."[115][137] The New York Times suggests that China has been successful in keeping countries, notably Muslim majority nations, to be quiet about the camps in Xinjiang due to its diplomatic and economic power, but when countries do decide to criticize the country, they do so in groups in hopes of lessening punishments from China.[138]

On 28 April 2020, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom issued the "International Religious Freedom Annual Report 2020" . The report states that "individuals have been sent to the camps for wearing long beards, refusing alcohol, or other behaviors authorities deem to be signs of "religious extremism". Former detainees report that they suffered torture, rape, sterilization, and other abuses. In addition, nearly half a million Muslim children have been separated from their families and placed in boarding schools. During 2019, the camps increasingly transitioned from "reeducation" to forced labor as detainees were forced to work in cotton and textile factories. Outside the camps, the government continued to deploy officials to live with Muslim families and to report on any signs of "extremist" religious behavior. Meanwhile, authorities in Xinjiang and other parts of China have destroyed or damaged thousands of mosques and removed Arabic-language signs from Muslim businesses."[139][140]

On 17 June 2020, President Donald Trump signed the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act,[141] which authorizes the imposition of U.S. sanctions against Chinese government officials responsible for internment camps.[142]

People

[edit]

Ethnic groups

[edit]
Bonan children

Muslims live in every region in China.[5] The highest concentrations are found in the northwest provinces of Xinjiang, Gansu and Ningxia, with significant populations also found throughout Yunnan Province in Southwest China and Henan Province in Central China.[5] Of China's 55 officially recognized minority peoples, ten groups are predominantly Muslim. The largest groups in descending order are Hui (9.8 million in year 2000 census or 48% of the officially tabulated number of Muslims), Uyghur (8.4 million, 41%), Kazakh (1.25 million, 6.1%), Dongxiang (514,000, 2.5%), Kyrgyz (144,000), Uzbeks (125,000), Salar (105,000), Tajik (41,000), Bonan (17,000) and Tatar (5,000).[5] However, individual members of traditionally Muslim groups may profess other religions or none at all. Additionally, Tibetan Muslims are officially classified along with the Tibetan people. Muslims live predominantly in the areas that border Central Asia, Tibet and Mongolia, i.e. Xinjiang, Ningxia, Gansu and Qinghai, which is known as the "Quran Belt".[143]

Small Muslim communities exist among the Dai people (Dai Paxi), Bai people, Tibetan people, Yi people, Mongolians, and Zhuang people.[144][145]

Uyghur Muslims in a livestock market in Kashgar

Number of Muslims in China

[edit]
99 names of Allah, in Chinese Sini

There are several population estimates. Counting up the number of people of traditionally Muslim nationalities who were enumerated in the 2000 census reported a total of 20.3 million members of Muslim nationalities, of which again 96% belonged to just three groups: Hui 9.8 million, Uyghurs 8.4 million, and Kazakhs 1.25 million.[citation needed] A 2009 study done by the Pew Research Center concluded there are 21,667,000 Muslims in China, accounting for 1.6% of the total population.[15] According to the CIA World Factbook, about 1.8% of the total population in China are Muslims, meaning 25 million.[146] In 2021, NewLines Magazine estimated "around 40 million people".[147] According to the textbook, "Religions in the Modern World", it states that the "numbers of followers of any one tradition are difficult to estimate and must in China as everywhere else rely on statistics compiled by the largest institutions, either those of the state – which tend to underestimate – or those of the religious institutions themselves – which tend to overestimate. If we include all the population of those designated 'national' minorities with an Islamic heritage in the territory of China, then we can conclude that there are some 20 million Muslims in the People's Republic of China."[148]

Other nationalities that are traditionally Muslim include Kyrghyz, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Tatars, Salar, Bonan and Dongxiang. According to SARA there are approximately 36,000 Islamic places of worship, more than 45,000 imams, and 10 Islamic schools in the country.[149] Within the next two decades from 2011, Pew projects a slowing down of the Muslim population growth in China compared to previous years, with Muslim women in China having a 1.7 fertility rate. Many Hui Muslims voluntarily limit themselves to one child in China since their Imams preach to them about the benefits of population control, while the number of children Hui in different areas are allowed to have varies between one and three children.[150] Chinese family planning policy allows minorities including Muslims to have up to two children in urban areas and three to four children in rural areas.[151]

An older estimate of the Muslim population of the then Qing Empire belongs to the Christian missionary Marshall Broomhall. In his book, published in 1910, he produced estimates for each province, based on the reports of missionaries working there, who had counted mosques, talked to mullahs, etc. Broomhall admits the inadequacy of the data for Xinjiang, estimating the Muslim population of Xinjiang (i.e., virtually the entire population of the province at the time) in the range from 1,000,000 (based on the total population number of 1,200,000 in the contemporary Statesman's Yearbook) to 2,400,000 (2 million "Turki", 200,000 "Hasak" and 200,000 "Tungan", as per George Hunter). He uses the estimates of 2,000,000 to 3,500,000 for Gansu (which then also included today's Ningxia and parts of Qinghai), 500,000 to 1,000,000 for Zhili (i.e., Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei), 300,000 to 1,000,000 for Yunnan and smaller numbers for other provinces, down to 1,000 in Fujian. For Mongolia (then, part of the Qing Empire) he takes an arbitrary range of 50,000 to 100,000.[152] Summing up, he arrives to the grand total of 4,727,000 to 9,821,000 Muslims throughout the Qing Empire of its last years, i.e. just over 1–2% of the entire country's estimated population of 426,045,305.[153][154][155] The 1920 edition of New International Yearbook: A Compendium of the World's Progress gave the number "between 5,000,000 and 10,000,000" as the total number of Muslims in the Republic of China.[156]

Islamic education

[edit]

Hui Muslim Generals like Ma Fuxiang, Ma Hongkui, and Ma Bufang funded schools or sponsored students studying abroad. Imam Hu Songshan and Ma Linyi were involved in reforming Islamic education inside China.

Muslim Kuomintang officials in the Republic of China government supported the Chengda Teachers Academy, which helped usher in a new era of Islamic education in China, promoting nationalism and Chinese language among Muslims, and fully incorporating them into the main aspects of Chinese society.[157] The Ministry of Education provided funds to the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation for Chinese Muslim's education.[158][159] The President of the federation was General Bai Chongxi (Pai Chung-hsi) and the vice president was Tang Kesan (Tang Ko-san).[160] 40 Sino-Arabic primary schools were founded in Ningxia by its Governor Ma Hongkui.[161]

Imam Wang Jingzhai studied at Al-Azhar University in Egypt along with several other Chinese Muslim students, the first Chinese students in modern times to study in the Middle East.[162] Wang recalled his experience teaching at madrassas in the provinces of Henan (Yu), Hebei (Ji), and Shandong (Lu) which were outside of the traditional stronghold of Muslim education in northwest China, and where the living conditions were poorer and the students had a much tougher time than the northwestern students.[163] In 1931 China sent five students to study at Al-Azhar in Egypt, among them was Muhammad Ma Jian and they were the first Chinese to study at Al-Azhar.[164][165][166][167] Na Zhong, a descendant of Nasr al-Din (Yunnan) was another one of the students sent to Al-Azhar in 1931, along with Zhang Ziren, Ma Jian, and Lin Zhongming.[168]

Hui Muslims from the Central Plains (Zhongyuan) differed in their view of women's education than Hui Muslims from the northwestern provinces, with the Hui from the Central Plains provinces like Henan having a history of women's Mosques and religious schooling for women, while Hui women in northwestern provinces were kept in the house. However, in northwestern China reformers started bringing female education in the 1920s. In Linxia, Gansu, a secular school for Hui girls was founded by the Muslim warlord Ma Bufang, the school was named Shuada Suqin Women's Primary School after his wife Ma Suqin who was also involved in its founding.[169] Hui Muslim refugees fled to northwest China from the central plains after the Japanese invasion of China, where they continued to practice women's education and build women's mosque communities, while women's education was not adopted by the local northwestern Hui Muslims and the two different communities continued to differ in this practice.[170]

General Ma Fuxiang donated funds to promote education for Hui Muslims and help build a class of intellectuals among the Hui and promote the Hui role in developing the nation's strength.[171]

Sectarian tensions

[edit]

Hui-Uyghur tension

[edit]

Tensions between Hui Muslims and Uyghurs arise because Hui troops and officials often dominated the Uyghurs in the past, and crushed the Uyghurs' revolts.[172] Xinjiang's Hui population increased by over 520 percent between 1940 and 1982, an average annual growth of 4.4 percent, while the Uyghur population only grew at 1.7 percent. This dramatic increase in Hui population led inevitably to significant tensions between the Hui and Uyghur populations. Many Hui Muslim civilians were killed by Uyghur rebellion troops in 1933 known as the Kizil massacre.[173] During the 2009 rioting in Xinjiang that killed around 200 people, "Kill the Han, kill the Hui." is a common cry spread across social media among Uyghur extremists.[174] Some Uyghurs in Kashgar remember that the Hui army at the Battle of Kashgar (1934) massacred 2,000 to 8,000 Uyghurs, which causes tension as more Hui moved into Kashgar from other parts of China.[175] Some Hui criticize Uyghur separatism and generally do not want to get involved in conflict in other countries.[176] Hui and Uyghur live separately, attending different mosques.[177]

The Uyghur militant organization East Turkestan Islamic Movement's magazine Islamic Turkistan has accused the Chinese "Muslim Brotherhood" (the Yihewani) of being responsible for the moderation of Hui Muslims and the lack of Hui joining jihadist groups in addition to blaming other things for the lack of Hui Jihadists, such as the fact that for more than 300 years Hui and Uyghurs have been enemies of each other, no separatist Islamist organizations among the Hui, the fact that the Hui view China as their home, and the fact that the "infidel Chinese" language is the language of the Hui.[178][179]

Hui sects

[edit]

There have been many occurrences of violent sectarian fighting between different Hui sects. Sectarian fighting between Hui sects led to the Jahriyya rebellion in the 1780s and the 1895 revolt. After a hiatus after the People's Republic of China came to power, sectarian in fighting resumed in the 1990s in Ningxia between different sects. Several sects refuse to intermarry with each other. One Sufi sect circulated an anti-Salafi pamphlet in Arabic.

Tibetan Muslims

[edit]

In Tibet, the majority of Muslims are Hui people. Hatred between Tibetans and Muslims stems from events during the Muslim warlord Ma Bufang's rule in Qinghai such as Ngolok rebellions (1917–49) and the Sino-Tibetan War, but in 1949 the Communists put an end to the violence between Tibetans and Muslims, however, new Tibetan-Muslim violence broke out after China engaged in liberalization. Riots broke out between Muslims and Tibetans over incidents such as bones in soups and prices of balloons and Tibetans accused Muslims of being cannibals who cooked humans in their soup and of contaminating food with urine. Tibetans attacked Muslim restaurants. Fires set by Tibetans which burned the apartments and shops of Muslims resulted in Muslim families being killed and wounded in the 2008 mid-March riots. Due to Tibetan violence against Muslims, the traditional Islamic white caps have not been worn by many Muslims. Scarfs were removed and replaced with hairnets by Muslim women in order to hide. Muslims prayed in secret at home when in August 2008 the Tibetans burned the Mosque. The repression of Tibetan separatism by the Chinese government is supported by Hui Muslims.[121] In addition, Chinese-speaking Hui have problems with Tibetan Hui (the Tibetan-speaking Kache minority of Muslims).[123]

The main Mosque in Lhasa was burned down by Tibetans and Chinese Hui Muslims were violently assaulted by Tibetan rioters in the 2008 Tibetan unrest.[180] Tibetan exiles and foreign scholars alike ignore this and do not talk about sectarian violence between Tibetan Buddhists and Muslims.[122] The majority of Tibetans viewed the wars against Iraq and Afghanistan after 9/11 positively and it had the effect of galvanizing anti-Muslim attitudes among Tibetans and resulted in an anti-Muslim boycott against Muslim owned businesses.[122]: 17  Tibetan Buddhists propagate a false libel that Muslims cremate their Imams and use the ashes to convert Tibetans to Islam by making Tibetans inhale the ashes, even though the Tibetans seem to be aware that Muslims practice burial and not cremation since they frequently clash against proposed Muslim cemeteries in their area.[122]: 19 

Religious practices

[edit]

Islamic education in China

[edit]
Chinese Muslim students

In the two decades up to 2006, a wide range of Islamic educational opportunities were developed to meet the needs of China's Muslim population. In addition to mosque schools, government Islamic colleges and independent Islamic colleges, more students went overseas to continue their studies at international Islamic universities in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iran, Pakistan and Malaysia.[5] In Uyghur communities, Islamic education for children has been prohibited and teaching the Quran to children has resulted in criminal prosecution.[181][182][183]

Muslim groups

[edit]

The vast majority of China's Muslims are Sunni Muslims. A notable feature of some Muslim communities in China is the presence of female imams.[184][185] Islamic scholar Ma Tong recorded that the 6,781,500 Hui in China predominately followed the Orthodox form of Islam (58.2% were Gedimu, a non-Sufi mainstream tradition that opposed unorthodoxy and religious innovation), mainly adhering to the Hanafi Maturidi Madhhab.[186][187] However a large minority of Hui are members of Sufi groups. According to Tong, 21% Yihewani, 10.9% Jahriyya, 7.2% Khuffiya, 1.4% Qadariyya and 0.7% Kubrawiyya.[188] Shia Chinese Muslims are mostly Ismailis, including Tajiks of the Tashkurgan and Sarikul areas of Xinjiang.[citation needed]

The predominant religion of Äynu people is Alevism, a tradition identified with Shia Islam,[189][190][191] although a few profess Sunni Islam.[192]

Chinese Muslims and the Hajj

[edit]
Late 19th century map of Hajj pilgrimage routes, by land and by sea, from China to Mecca

It is known that Admiral Zheng He (1371–1435) and his Muslim crews had made the journey to Mecca and performed the Hajj during one of the former's voyages to the western ocean between 1401 and 1433.[193] Other Chinese Muslims may have made the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca in the following centuries; however, there is little information on this. General Ma Lin made a Hajj to Mecca.[194] General Ma Fuxiang along with Ma Linyi sponsored Imam Wang Jingzhai when he went on hajj to Mecca in 1921.[195] Yihewani Imam Hu Songshan went on Hajj in 1925.[196]

Briefly during the Cultural Revolution, Chinese Muslims were not allowed to attend the Hajj and only did so through Pakistan, but this policy was reversed in 1979. Chinese Muslims now attend the Hajj in large numbers, typically in organized groups of roughly 10,000 each year,[197] with a record 10,700 Chinese Muslim pilgrims from all over the country making the Hajj in 2007.[198] Over 11,000 from Xinjiang reportedly went to the Hajj in 2019.[199]

Representative bodies

[edit]

Islamic Association of China

[edit]
Headquarters of the Islamic Association of China in Beijing

Established by the government, the Islamic Association of China claims to represent Chinese Muslims nationwide. At its inaugural meeting on May 11, 1953, in Beijing, representatives from 10 nationalities of the People's Republic of China were in attendance. The association was to be run by 16 Islamic religious leaders charged with making "a correct and authoritative interpretation" of Islamic creed and canon. Its brief is to compile and spread inspirational speeches and help imams "improve" themselves, and vet sermons made by clerics around the country.

Some examples of the religious concessions granted to Muslims are:

  • Muslim communities are allowed separate cemeteries
  • Muslim couples may have their marriage consecrated by an Imam
  • Muslim workers are permitted holidays during major religious festivals
  • Chinese Muslims are also allowed to make the Hajj to Mecca, and more than 45,000 Chinese Muslims have done so in recent years.[200]

Culture and heritage

[edit]
The Niujie Mosque in Beijing, oldest and biggest mosque in Beijing, originally built in 996 (Liao dynasty), and rebuilt in 1443 (Ming dynasty)

Although contacts and previous conquests have occurred before, the Mongol conquest of the greater part of Eurasia in the 13th century permanently brought the extensive cultural traditions of China, central Asia and western Asia into a single empire, albeit one of separate khanates, for the first time in history. The intimate interaction that resulted is evident in the legacy of both traditions. In China, Islam influenced technology, sciences, philosophy and the arts. For example, the Chinese adopted much Islamic medical knowledge such as wound healing and urinalysis. However, the Chinese were not the only ones to benefit from the cultural exchanges of the Silk Road. Islam showed many influences from buddhist China in their new techniques in art, especially when humans began to be depicted in paintings which was thought to be forbidden in Islam.[201] In terms of material culture, one finds decorative motifs from central Asian Islamic architecture and calligraphy and the marked halal impact on northern Chinese cuisine.[citation needed]

Taking the Mongol Eurasian empire as a point of departure, the ethnogenesis of the Hui, or Sinophone Muslims, can also be charted through the emergence of distinctly Chinese Muslim traditions in architecture, food, epigraphy and Islamic written culture. This multifaceted cultural heritage continues to the present day.[202]

Military

[edit]

Muslims have often filled military positions, and many Muslims have joined the Chinese army.[203] Muslims served extensively in the Chinese military, as both officials and soldiers. It was said that the Muslim Dongxiang and Salar were given to "eating rations", a reference to military service.[204]

Islamic architecture in China

[edit]
Id Kah Mosque

In Chinese, a mosque is called qīngzhēn sì (清真寺) or "pure truth temple". The Huaisheng Mosque and Great Mosque of Xi'an (first established during the Tang era) and the Great Southern Mosque in Jinan, whose current buildings date from the Ming dynasty, do not replicate many of the features often associated with traditional mosques. Instead, they follow traditional Chinese architecture. Mosques in western China incorporate more of the elements seen in mosques in other parts of the world. Western Chinese mosques were more likely to incorporate minarets and domes while eastern Chinese mosques were more likely to look like pagodas.[205] An important feature in Chinese architecture is its emphasis on symmetry, which connotes a sense of grandeur; this applies to everything from palaces to mosques. One notable exception is in the design of gardens, which tends to be as asymmetrical as possible. Like Chinese scroll paintings, the principle underlying the garden's composition is to create enduring flow; to let the patron wander and enjoy the garden without prescription, as in nature herself. The Qingjing Mosque was built in 1009.

On the foothills of Mount Lingshan are the tombs of two of the four companions that Muhammad sent eastwards to preach Islam. Known as the "Holy Tombs", they house the companions Sa-Ke-Zu and Wu-Ko-Shun—their Chinese names, of course. The other two companions went to Guangzhou and Yangzhou.[28]

As in all regions the Chinese Islamic architecture reflects the local architecture resembling temples in its style. However, in western China the mosques resemble those of the middle east, with tall, slender minarets, curvy arches and dome shaped roofs. In northwest China where the Chinese Hui have built their mosques, there is a combination of east and west. The mosques have flared Chinese-style roofs set in walled courtyards entered through archways with miniature domes and minarets.[205] The first mosque was the Great Mosque of Xian or the Xian Mosque, which was created in the Tang dynasty in the 7th century.[206] In July 2019, Indonesian Islamic scholar Said Aqil Siradj said that Chinese authorities including those in Xinjiang were building and repairing mosques along with creating hundreds of halal restaurants.[207][208]

Ningxia officials notified on 3 August 2018 that the Weizhou Grand Mosque will be forcibly demolished on Friday because it had not received the proper permits before construction.[209][210][211] Officials in the town were saying the mosque had not been given proper building permits, because it is built in a Middle Eastern style and include numerous domes and minarets.[209][210] The residents of Weizhou alarmed each other by social media and finally stopped the mosque destruction by public demonstrations.[210] According to a September 2020 report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, since 2017, Chinese authorities have destroyed or damaged 16,000 mosques in Xinjiang – 65% of the region's total.[212][213]

Halal food in China

[edit]
A halal butcher shop at Huxi Mosque in Shanghai

Halal food has a long history in China. The arrival of Arabian and Persian merchants during the Tang and Song dynasties saw the introduction of the Muslim diet. Chinese Muslim cuisine adheres strictly to the Islamic dietary rules with mutton and lamb being the predominant ingredient. The advantage of Muslim cuisine in China is that it has inherited the diverse cooking methods of Chinese cuisine for example, braising, roasting, steaming, stewing and many more. Due to China's multicultural background Muslim cuisine retains its own style and characteristics according to regions.[214] Restaurants serving such cuisine are frequented by both Muslim and Han Chinese customers.[215]

Due to the large Muslim population in Western China, many Chinese restaurants cater to Muslims or the general public but are run by Muslims. In most major cities in China, there are small Islamic restaurants or food stalls typically run by migrants from Western China (e.g., Uyghurs), which offer inexpensive noodle soup. Lamb and mutton dishes are more commonly available than in other Chinese restaurants, due to the greater prevalence of these meats in the cuisine of western Chinese regions. Commercially prepared food can be certified Halal by approved agencies.[216] In Chinese, halal is called qīngzhēncài (清真菜) or "pure truth food". Beef and lamb slaughtered according to Islamic rituals is also commonly available in public markets, especially in North China. Such meat is sold by Muslim butchers, who operate independent stalls next to non-Muslim butchers.

In October 2018, the government launched an official anti-halal policy, urging officials to suppress the "pan-halal tendency", seen as an encroachment by religion into secular life and a source of religious extremism.[citation needed][217]

Calligraphy

[edit]

Sini

[edit]
Sini-style Arabic calligraphy of the first Shahada (La 'ilāha 'illā Allāh) at the Great Mosque of Xi'an

Sini is a Chinese Islamic calligraphic form for the Arabic script. It can refer to any type of Chinese Islamic calligraphy, but is commonly used to refer to one with thick and tapered effects, much like Chinese calligraphy. It is used extensively in mosques in Eastern China and to a lesser extent in Gansu, Ningxia and Shaanxi. A famous Sini calligrapher is Hajji Noor Deen Mi Guangjiang.

Xiao'erjing

[edit]
A Chinese-Arabic-Xiaoerjing dictionary from the early days of the People's Republic of China

Xiao'erjing (also Xiao'erjin or Xiaojing) is the practice of writing Sinitic languages such as Mandarin (especially the Lanyin, Zhongyuan and Northeastern dialects) or the Dungan language in the Arabic script. It is used on occasion by many ethnic minorities who adhere to the Islamic faith in China (mostly the Hui, but also the Dongxiang and the Salar) and formerly by their Dungan descendants in Central Asia.

Martial arts

[edit]

There is a long history of Muslim development and participation at the highest level of Chinese wushu. The Hui started and adapted many of the styles of wushu such as bajiquan, piguazhang and liuhequan. There were specific areas that were known to be centers of Muslim wushu, such as Cang County in Hebei Province. These traditional Hui martial arts were very distinct from the Turkic styles practiced in Xinjiang.[218]

Literature

[edit]

The Han Kitab was a collection of Chinese Islamic texts written by Chinese Muslim which synthesized Islam and Confucianism. It was written in the early 18th century during the Qing dynasty. Han is Chinese for Chinese and kitab (ketabu in Chinese) is Arabic for book.[219] Liu Zhi wrote his Han Kitab in Nanjing in the early 18th century. The works of Wu Sunqie, Zhang Zhong and Wang Daiyu were also included in the Han Kitab.[220]

The Han Kitab was widely read and approved of by later Chinese Muslims such as Ma Qixi, Ma Fuxiang and Hu Songshan. They believed that Islam could be understood through Confucianism.

Education

[edit]

A lot of Chinese students including male and females join International Islamic University, Islamabad to gain Islamic knowledge. For some Muslim groups in China, such as the Hui and Salar minorities, coeducation is frowned upon; for some groups such as Uyghurs, it is not.[221]

Women imams

[edit]

With the exception of China, the world has very few mosques directed by women.[222] Among the Hui, women are allowed to become imams or ahong, and a number of woman-only mosques have been established. The tradition evolved from earlier Quranic schools for girls, with the oldest, the Wangjia Hutong Women's Mosque in Kaifeng, dating to 1820.[223]

Famous Muslims in China

[edit]

Explorers

[edit]

Religious

[edit]

Scholars and writers

[edit]

Officials

[edit]

Martial arts

[edit]

Arts

[edit]

See also

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Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Islam in China denotes the presence and practice of the faith among approximately 25 million adherents, comprising about 1.8% of the total population and belonging primarily to ten officially recognized Muslim ethnic groups, with the Hui forming the largest and most culturally assimilated contingent and the Uyghurs the predominant group in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Introduced during the Tang dynasty in the seventh century through Arab and Persian traders along the Silk Road, Islam gradually integrated with Chinese society, yielding distinctive architectural forms such as pagoda-style minarets and Confucian-influenced Hui communities that emphasize harmony with state authority. Under the Chinese Communist Party's governance, which adheres to state atheism, Islamic activities are subject to stringent regulation via bodies like the Islamic Association of China, mandating alignment with socialist principles and "Sinicization" reforms that curtail foreign influences and unauthorized teachings. This framework has fostered relative stability for Hui Muslims but precipitated conflicts in Xinjiang, where policies including vocational training centers emerged as responses to ethnic separatism, Islamist extremism, and terrorist attacks that claimed hundreds of lives in the 2000s and 2010s. Historical contributions, such as the maritime expeditions led by the Muslim eunuch admiral Zheng He in the early fifteenth century, underscore Islam's role in China's global outreach, while contemporary demographics reveal Hui dispersal across urban centers and Uyghur concentration in northwest oases, shaping a bifurcated experience of religious life amid ongoing state oversight.

History

Pre-Modern Introduction and Expansion

Islam first reached China during the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) through Arab and Persian traders and envoys traversing the Silk Road and maritime routes. Chinese historical records, including Tang annals, reference Arab peoples as "Dashi" and note their presence in coastal ports like Guangzhou, where foreign merchant quarters (fanfang) housed Muslim communities by the mid-7th century. A mission dispatched by Caliph Uthman in 651 CE to the Tang court is documented in official histories, marking early diplomatic contact, though legends of earlier prophetic companions like Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas lack contemporary corroboration and are considered apocryphal. The establishment of permanent Muslim settlements accelerated with trade, as Persian and Arab merchants imported goods via overland caravans and Indian Ocean voyages, settling in cities such as Chang'an (modern Xi'an), Yangzhou, and Quanzhou. Archaeological evidence, including ceramics and shipwrecks along coastal routes, confirms the scale of this exchange from the late 7th century onward. The Great Mosque of Xi'an, founded in 742 CE on the site of an earlier structure, represents one of the earliest enduring Islamic institutions, initially serving a small expatriate community before incorporating local converts through intermarriage. Expansion remained confined to urban enclaves during the Tang and subsequent Song dynasty (960–1279 CE), with Muslim populations numbering in the thousands rather than achieving widespread proselytization among Han Chinese. Communities focused on commerce, with limited assimilation until later dynasties; by the Song era, additional mosques appeared in Hangzhou and other trade hubs, but Islam functioned primarily as a faith of foreign sojourners and their descendants, who formed the proto-Hui ethnic group via endogamous practices and gradual sinicization. No evidence indicates coercive expansion or large-scale conversions prior to the Mongol invasions, as Tang cosmopolitanism tolerated but did not promote minority faiths.

Imperial Era Integration (Yuan to Qing)

During the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), Mongol rulers' religious tolerance facilitated the influx of Muslims from Central Asia and Persia, who served in key administrative roles, including directing the empire's financial administration and acting as trade commissioners in southeastern coastal cities. This period saw a significant increase in China's Muslim population, with Muslims categorized as semu (color-eyed people) alongside other non-Han groups, allowing them to maintain distinct communities while participating in governance. Official records document the emergence of Islamic clerics, laying groundwork for organized Muslim communities that began intermarrying with local populations, precursors to the Hui ethnic group. The Ming dynasty (1368–1644) marked deeper integration as Muslim communities adopted Chinese language, names, and customs amid restrictions on new foreign immigration. Prominent Muslims like Admiral Zheng He, born Ma He around 1371 in a Muslim family in Yunnan, led seven maritime expeditions from 1405 to 1433, fostering diplomatic and trade ties with Muslim-majority regions in the Indian Ocean, which reinforced Islamic networks without proselytizing. This era witnessed architectural Sinicization, with mosques incorporating Chinese pagoda-style minarets and halls, symbolizing cultural synthesis while preserving core Islamic functions. Hui communities solidified through intermarriage with Han Chinese, adopting Confucian-influenced interpretations of Islam to align with imperial orthodoxy. Under the (1644–1912), Hui Muslims, distinguished primarily by religion rather than ethnicity, achieved further socioeconomic integration, serving in military garrisons and businesses like qingzhen () enterprises. However, tensions arose, culminating in major uprisings such as the in (1856–1873) and the Dungan Revolt in the northwest (1862–1877), driven by local grievances and anti-Qing sentiments among Hui leaders, resulting in millions of deaths and forced migrations. Despite suppression, post-rebellion reconstruction saw continued , with scholars employing Chinese philosophical frameworks to interpret Islamic texts, enhancing compatibility with Han society. This period entrenched Hui identity as Chinese-speaking Muslims, balancing faith with imperial loyalty.

Republican Period and Early Communist Rule

During the Republican period (1912–1949), Chinese Muslim intellectuals, particularly among the Hui, engaged in vigorous debates over identity, questioning whether Islam constituted a distinct ethnicity separate from Han Chinese or merely a religious affiliation requiring assimilation into the national framework. Reformist leaders drew on transnational Islamic networks to advocate modernizing religious education and practices, establishing journals, schools, and associations that emphasized compatibility between Islamic tenets and Chinese patriotism, such as through Quran translations and "new method" (xinshi) madrasas blending Arabic studies with secular curricula. These efforts coincided with political fragmentation, where Hui elites in northwestern provinces leveraged military cliques to secure regional autonomy, maintaining mosques, sharia-influenced courts, and halal economies amid warlord rivalries and the Nationalist government's minority policies. In urban centers like and , Muslim organizations proliferated, fostering pan-Islamic solidarity while navigating anti-imperialist campaigns and Japanese occupation, during which some communities resisted collaboration and others sought alliances with the Nationalists. By the late , these dynamics positioned as a strategic bloc in the , with factions aligning variably with the or Communists, influencing post-1949 ethnic classifications that recognized Hui as a distinct minzu partly due to Republican-era precedents. Following the Communist victory in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party adopted an initial policy of cooptation toward Islam, enshrining religious freedom in Article 5 of the Common Program while framing Muslims as a loyal minority nationality to consolidate control over former warlord territories and court international Muslim support. The People's Liberation Army issued guidelines for respectful conduct in Muslim areas during the 1949 conquest of Xi'an, emphasizing non-interference in worship to avoid alienating populations. This pragmatic tolerance enabled the survival of thousands of mosques and clerical networks, though land reforms from 1950 onward redistributed waqf (religious endowment) properties, subordinating religious institutions to state oversight and eroding economic independence. The Chinese Islamic Association was formally established on May 11, 1953, in Beijing as the first national body to manage Islamic affairs, led by and other pro-CCP Muslim figures who promoted "patriotic religion" aligned with socialist construction. Local branches emerged in provinces, facilitating delegations (over 100 pilgrims annually by mid-1950s) and theological seminars that reinterpreted Islam to endorse for youth while preserving adult observances. However, the 1957 targeted outspoken clerics and intellectuals for "feudal" influences, marking the onset of restrictions that intensified by 1958 with closures of unregistered mosques and suppression of private teaching, though widespread destruction awaited the .

Post-1949 State Policies and Reforms

Following the establishment of the in 1949, the (CCP) recognized Islam as one of five official religions and formed the (IAC) on May 11, 1953, as the first national organization to oversee Muslim affairs under state supervision. This entity, led initially by figures like , aimed to unify Muslim communities and align religious practices with socialist principles, facilitating land reforms that redistributed properties while granting limited autonomy to ethnic minorities such as the Hui and . In 1955, was designated an autonomous region, ostensibly to accommodate its Muslim-majority population, though central policies emphasized assimilation through education and economic integration. During the from 1966 to 1976, religious expression faced systematic eradication, with destroying or repurposing thousands of mosques, burning Qurans, and persecuting imams and believers as part of the campaign against "old customs" and feudal superstition. In , this included public humiliations of religious leaders and suppression of Uyghur cultural practices tied to , contributing to a near-total halt in organized worship nationwide. Post-Mao reforms under , formalized in Document 19 of 1982, permitted a measured revival of religious activities, leading to the reconstruction of over 20,000 mosques by the and the reestablishment of the IAC to promote "patriotic" compatible with CCP ideology. This era saw increased state oversight, requiring religious leaders to endorse and restricting foreign influences, while Hui communities experienced relative stability compared to amid sporadic unrest in linked to perceived extremism. Under Xi Jinping since 2012, policies have intensified toward "Sinicization" of Islam, mandating the removal of Arabic architectural elements from mosques, standardization of sermons to align with socialist values, and closure of unlicensed religious schools. In Xinjiang, this culminated in the establishment of internment camps from 2017, detaining over one million Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in facilities officially termed "vocational education and training centers" to combat separatism and extremism, involving forced ideological reeducation and erosion of Islamic practices. Similar measures affected Hui mosques, with demolitions and restrictions on halal signage reported in provinces like Ningxia by 2018, framing these reforms as essential for national security and cultural unity.

Late 20th to Early 21st Century Developments

Following the (1966–1976), during which religious practices were severely suppressed and many mosques destroyed, 's post-Mao reforms under from 1978 permitted a revival of . Hui Muslim communities, dispersed across and linguistically integrated through Mandarin, rebuilt thousands of mosques in the 1980s and 1990s, often adopting Arabic architectural styles influenced by renewed ties to the . The government supported Sino-Arabic schools in Muslim areas, fostering Islamic education while maintaining oversight through patriotic religious associations. In Xinjiang, Uyghur Muslims experienced a parallel religious resurgence, with mosque construction surging and practices like veiling and beard-growing increasing amid post-Soviet influences from Central Asia. However, Beijing associated this revival with ethnic separatism, responding to incidents such as the 1990 Baren uprising and 1997 Ürümqi bus bombings with "Strike Hard" campaigns involving mass arrests and executions of suspected militants. The 2009 Ürümqi riots, which killed at least 197 people mostly Han Chinese, intensified securitization, leading to expanded surveillance and restrictions on religious expression. Under Xi Jinping from 2013, policies shifted toward "Sinicization" of Islam, requiring alignment with socialist values and Chinese culture, including removal of Arabic script from mosques and promotion of Xi Jinping Thought in sermons. In Xinjiang, this manifested in internment camps detaining over one million Uyghurs and other Muslims since 2017 for "vocational education" to combat extremism, per government accounts, though reports from human rights organizations document forced labor, sterilization, and cultural erasure as crimes against humanity. Chinese officials maintain these measures ensure stability and refute genocide claims, emphasizing economic development and deradicalization. Hui areas faced milder reforms, such as dome removals, but retained relative autonomy compared to Uyghur regions.

Demographics

Ethnic Groups and Composition

The Muslim population of China is predominantly composed of ten ethnic groups officially recognized by the People's Republic of China as having Islam as their primary religion: the Hui, Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Tatars, Dongxiang, Salars, Bonan, and Tajiks. These groups collectively number approximately 25 million people, representing about 20% of China's 55 recognized ethnic minorities, though exact religious adherence is not directly enumerated in national censuses, which track ethnicity rather than faith. The Hui constitute the largest Muslim ethnic group, with a population of about 11.3 million as per the 2020 census, making them roughly half of China's total Muslim demographic. Ethnically and linguistically akin to the Han majority—speaking Mandarin Chinese dialects and lacking a distinct indigenous language—the Hui are widely dispersed across provinces like Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai, and Yunnan, as well as urban centers in eastern China, reflecting centuries of intermarriage and cultural assimilation with non-Muslim populations. Their defining trait remains adherence to Islamic practices, distinguishing them from Han Chinese despite shared physical and cultural features. Uyghurs form the second-largest group, numbering around 11-12 million, predominantly concentrated in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, where they comprise about 45% of the local population. As Turkic-speaking peoples with Central Asian roots, Uyghurs maintain distinct linguistic, cultural, and physical characteristics, including Indo-European features from historical migrations, setting them apart from both Hui and Han. Smaller Turkic or Mongolic groups, such as Kazakhs (approximately 1.6 million, mainly in northern Xinjiang), Kyrgyz (around 200,000 in southwestern Xinjiang), Uzbeks (under 10,000), and Tatars (fewer than 4,000), are also largely confined to Xinjiang and neighboring border areas, often engaging in pastoral nomadism or trade influenced by their steppe heritage. The remaining groups—Dongxiang (about 620,000 in ), Salars (around 130,000 in ), Bonan (roughly 25,000 in and ), and Tajiks (approximately 41,000 in Xinjiang's )—are smaller and regionally clustered in the northwest, with Mongolic, Turkic, or Iranian linguistic affiliations. These minorities, totaling under 1 million combined, often preserve more insular communities due to geographic isolation and traditional livelihoods like herding or farming.
Ethnic GroupApproximate Population (2020 est.)Primary RegionsLinguistic Affiliation
Hui11.3 millionNationwide, esp. Ningxia, GansuSinitic (Chinese dialects)
Uyghur11-12 millionXinjiangTurkic
Kazakh1.6 millionNorthern XinjiangTurkic
Dongxiang620,000GansuMongolic
Kyrgyz200,000Southwestern XinjiangTurkic
Salar130,000QinghaiTurkic
Tajik41,000Xinjiang (Tashkurgan)Iranian (Pamiri)
Bonan25,000Gansu, QinghaiMongolic
Uzbek<10,000XinjiangTurkic
Tatar<4,000XinjiangTurkic
This table summarizes the composition based on ethnic census data, where near-total adherence to Islam is assumed for these groups, though state policies since 2017 have pressured conformity, potentially affecting self-reported practice rates among Uyghurs and others in Xinjiang.

Population Estimates and Geographic Distribution

The Muslim population in China is estimated at 23 to 25 million, representing approximately 1.6% to 1.8% of the country's total population of over 1.4 billion as of the 2020 . These figures are primarily based on enumerations of the 10 ethnic groups officially recognized as predominantly Muslim—Hui, Uyghur, Kazakh, Dongxiang, Kyrgyz, Salar, Tajik, Uzbek, Bonan, and Tatar—since does not directly census religious affiliation but tracks . Official Chinese data indicate these groups collectively exceed 25 million individuals, accounting for about 20% of the nation's 55 ethnic minorities. Independent analyses, such as those from , align closely, projecting around 26 million Muslims in 2020 by extrapolating from ethnic demographics and self-identification trends between the 2010 and 2020 censuses. Geographically, the distribution is uneven, with the majority concentrated in northwestern provinces and autonomous regions. Uyghur Autonomous Region hosts the largest share, primarily (estimated at 12 million, nearly all Sunni ) and , comprising over half of Xinjiang's 25.8 million residents as of 2020. Hui Autonomous Region follows, where Hui form about 36% of the 7.2 million , concentrated in urban and rural enclaves. Significant populations also reside in Gansu Province (Hui and Dongxiang in the ), Qinghai Province (Salar and Hui in areas like Huangnan and Hualong), and Province (Hui in the southwest). Beyond these core areas, Hui Muslims—China's largest Muslim ethnic group at around 10.5 to 11 million—are dispersed nationwide, forming urban minorities in eastern cities like Beijing (over 250,000), Shanghai, and Guangzhou, often tracing to historical migrations and trade networks. Smaller groups like Tajiks and Kyrgyz cluster near the borders in Xinjiang and along the Afghanistan-Tajikistan frontiers, while Uzbeks and Tatars are minimal and urban-based. This pattern reflects historical settlement patterns, with northwest concentrations tied to Central Asian influences and Hui diffusion linked to imperial-era assimilation and mobility. Rural Muslim villages (zang) persist in central provinces like Henan and Anhui, though assimilation pressures have reduced distinct enclaves in Han-dominated east.

Religious Practices

Core Observances and Adaptations

Chinese Muslims, primarily Hui and Uyghur communities, adhere to the five pillars of Islam—shahada (profession of faith), salat (prayer), zakat (almsgiving), sawm (fasting during Ramadan), and hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca)—as foundational observances, consistent with global Sunni practices predominant among them. The shahada is recited in Arabic, affirming faith in Allah and Muhammad as his prophet, while zakat involves charitable giving calculated as 2.5% of savings, often directed toward community mosques or the needy within ethnic enclaves. These pillars are observed amid varying degrees of state oversight, with Hui Muslims generally maintaining more consistent practices due to their cultural assimilation compared to Uyghurs. Salat, performed five times daily facing Mecca, occurs in mosques featuring architectural adaptations that blend Islamic and Chinese elements, such as the Great Mosque of Xi'an, built in 742 CE with a Chinese-style courtyard, pagoda-like minarets, and timber-framed halls alongside traditional mihrabs and Arabic calligraphy. This hybrid design, using dougong bracketing and green-tiled roofs, reflects centuries of cultural integration while preserving ritual orientation toward the qibla, diverging from conventional feng shui north-south axes. Hui-led congregations often incorporate Chinese language in supplementary teachings, though core recitations remain in Arabic, facilitating accessibility in Mandarin-speaking regions. Sawm during Ramadan entails abstaining from food and drink from dawn to sunset, with iftar meals featuring halal adaptations of Chinese cuisine, such as qingzhen (pure truth) lamb noodles or rice dishes prepared in Hui-dominated areas like Ningxia. Communities stockpile staples like dates, flour, and meats pre-Ramadan, emphasizing familial and mosque-based breaking of fasts, though Uyghur observance faces periodic restrictions in Xinjiang, including workplace mandates to eat during daylight hours. Hajj participation, limited by quotas and state approval, sees thousands of Chinese pilgrims annually via the Islamic Association of China, with adaptations including group travel and return integrations of Meccan souvenirs into local rituals. Dietary laws mandate slaughter and avoidance of pork, integral to daily life, with Hui merchants specializing in qingzhen certification for meats and products, enabling economic niches in urban markets. These practices underscore a pragmatic adaptation: Islam's rituals persist through localized expressions, such as floral motifs in decor echoing Chinese artistry, yet retain doctrinal purity to affirm communal identity amid Han-majority .

Education and Clerical Training

Islamic education in China, known as jingtang jiaoyu (mosque classroom education), has historically been conducted in mosque-attached schools or independent madrasas, emphasizing Quranic recitation, Arabic language, hadith, fiqh, and Islamic history adapted to local Chinese contexts. This system traces roots to the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368) but was disrupted during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), when religious instruction was banned. Post-1978 reforms revived these institutions, with government estimates from the early 2000s indicating 35,000 mosques providing education, supported by 45,000 Muslim teachers and enrolling 24,000 students across primary to adult levels. Contemporary clerical training occurs primarily through state-sponsored Islamic seminaries overseen by the Islamic Association of China (IAC), which standardizes curricula to include core texts like the Quran, the Five-Part Book (a Hanafi compilation), and Light of the Lamp alongside mandatory patriotic education on socialism, CCP history, and Xi Jinping Thought. Ten such colleges operate in locations including Beijing, Ningxia, and Kunming, offering four-year degree programs in Islamic theology and three-month refresher courses for practicing imams (ahong). Independent madrasas, numbering dozens since the 1990s—such as those in Yunnan, where at least 12 full-time institutions emerged between 1998 and 2008—supplement this, teaching similar subjects plus Chinese language but excluding Xinjiang due to regional restrictions. Graduates often serve as imams promoting state-aligned interpretations, with recent mandates requiring military-style patriotic training for seminary students to foster loyalty. Among Hui Muslims, who comprise the largest group, religious education remains relatively accessible through these mosque-based and seminary systems, though subject to increasing Sinicization policies since 2018, including bans on youth under 18 attending mosque classes in some areas like Ningxia. In contrast, Uyghur clerical training in Xinjiang faces severe curtailment; traditional imams have been systematically detained, with reports documenting over 100 religious figures imprisoned since 2014 and the Xinjiang Islamic Institute limited in scope under counter-extremism laws. State policies prioritize "vocational education and training centers" for deradicalization over conventional seminary instruction, replacing independent scholars with government-vetted personnel. Limited overseas linkages persist, with a few dozen students annually sent to institutions like Egypt's Al-Azhar University under IAC approval since 2001, though numbers have declined amid tightened controls. The pilgrimage to represents a central religious obligation for able-bodied Chinese Muslims, though participation is strictly regulated by the state to align with and objectives. Historically, Hui Muslims began undertaking the in significant numbers during the Republican era, with delegations forming bonds to Middle Eastern Islamic centers, but numbers dwindled under early Communist rule before resuming under controlled quotas post-1950s. In modern times, allocates an annual quota of approximately 9,000 to 12,000 slots based on its Muslim population, with 9,190 approved for 2022 and 12,800 dispatched in 2017, distributed across provincial Islamic associations. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) mandates that all pilgrimages occur through official channels managed by the Islamic Association of China (IAC), prohibiting independent or "self-organized" trips since regulations tightened in 2020 to curb unauthorized travel and potential exposure to foreign influences deemed extremist. Pilgrims must apply via registered mosques, undergo ideological training emphasizing "patriotic religion," and obtain visas exclusively from the Saudi Embassy in Beijing for group travel, a policy enforced since 2006 to prevent smuggling or unqualified participants, particularly from Xinjiang. For Uyghurs in Xinjiang, access remains severely limited amid broader counter-extremism measures, with quotas prioritized for more integrated groups like the Hui, reflecting differential treatment based on perceived loyalty and assimilation levels. Transnational links for Chinese Muslims are channeled primarily through state-sanctioned bodies like the IAC, which serves as China's official liaison to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and facilitates diplomatic exchanges with Saudi Arabia and other Muslim-majority states. These connections support hajj logistics and cultural diplomacy, such as joint seminars on "Sinicized Islam," but are leveraged by Beijing to promote narratives of religious harmony while silencing criticism of Uyghur policies, as evidenced by IAC delegations urging Arab counterparts to prioritize economic ties over human rights concerns. Independent networks, including historical Hui ties to Central Asian or Middle Eastern scholars, have been curtailed to mitigate risks of "foreign infiltration" or salafist ideologies, with the state monitoring remittances and returnees for radicalization signs. Separatist groups like the East Turkestan Islamic Movement have sought al-Qaeda affiliations, prompting heightened scrutiny of all external Islamic contacts as potential vectors for unrest.

Sectarian Diversity and Influences

The overwhelming majority of Muslims in China adhere to Sunni Islam, particularly the Hanafi school of jurisprudence, which was transmitted through Central Asian and Persian influences along the Silk Road trade routes beginning in the 8th century CE. This madhhab predominates among the Hui, China's largest Muslim ethnic group, who integrate Hanafi fiqh with localized Chinese cultural practices, such as the use of Chinese script for Arabic terms in some communities. Uyghurs in Xinjiang also follow Hanafi Sunni Islam, though their practices historically incorporate elements of Turkic nomadic traditions and shrine veneration. Sufism exerts significant influence, especially through the order, which arrived in by the 15th century and became entrenched in by the 17th century via migrations from . The Naqshbandiyya splintered into the silent dhikr-practicing Khufiyya (Old Teaching) and the vocal Jahriyya (New Teaching), founded in the 1760s by Ma Mingxin, leading to sectarian conflicts in the 18th and 19th centuries, including uprisings suppressed by Qing forces. These tariqas maintain shrines (mazar) in Xinjiang's , where pilgrims seek intercession from saints, blending Islamic with pre-Islamic local reverence for holy sites—a practice that persists despite state restrictions on "superstition." Other orders like the , introduced in the late 17th century, have smaller followings among Hui and Uyghur communities. Shia Islam represents a negligible fraction, estimated at under 1% of Chinese Muslims, primarily among Tajik communities in Xinjiang influenced by Persian traders or recent immigrants, with limited institutional presence. In contrast, Salafi and Wahhabi currents gained modest traction among some Hui in the 1980s–1990s through Saudi-funded mosques and scholarships, promoting scripturalism over Sufi traditions, but these were curtailed post-2001 as authorities associated them with extremism. State-sanctioned Islamic associations emphasize Hanafi-Sufi orthodoxy to counter foreign ideological imports, registering only approved sects while monitoring transnational links.

State Governance of Islam

The of the , in Article 36, stipulates that citizens enjoy freedom of religious belief and that the state protects "normal" religious activities while prohibiting the use of religion to disrupt public order, impair citizens' health, or interfere with the state's educational system. This provision recognizes as one of five officially sanctioned religions—alongside , , , and Catholicism—but subordinates religious practice to state oversight, forbidding foreign domination of religious affairs and requiring alignment with socialist principles. Unregistered religious activities or groups are deemed illegal, with no constitutional mechanism allowing individuals to sue the for violations of these protections. The primary regulatory instrument is the Regulations on Religious Affairs, revised in 2017 and effective from February 1, 2018, which mandate that religious groups register with the government, adhere to Chinese laws, support Communist Party leadership, and promote socialist core values. These regulations, administered initially by the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) and transferred to the United Front Work Department (UFWD) in 2018, require Islamic venues like mosques to obtain approval for construction or alteration, restrict unapproved religious education, and prohibit materials that "endanger national security" or promote extremism. Imams and other clergy must undergo state-approved training, including political education on Xi Jinping Thought, and religious publications or internet services demand government licensing. For Islam specifically, the framework emphasizes preventing foreign influences and , with the (IAC)—the sole authorized national body—tasked with guiding "patriotic" religious activities under UFWD supervision. pilgrimages are centrally organized with quotas; for instance, annual allocations limit participants to vetted groups via the IAC, ensuring ideological conformity. In regions like Uyghur Autonomous Region, supplemental rules enacted in 2024 reinforce national standards by mandating that Islamic practices "adhere to the direction of " and integrate socialist values, further restricting unapproved overseas study or clerical appointments. Violations, such as unauthorized gatherings or dissemination of "illegal" texts, can result in administrative penalties, site closures, or criminal charges under broader anti-extremism laws.

Sinicization Initiatives

Sinicization initiatives in China refer to state-directed efforts to adapt Islamic practices, institutions, and expressions to align with Chinese cultural norms, socialist values, and national unity under the Chinese Communist Party's oversight. These policies intensified following Xi Jinping's 2016 directive emphasizing the "Sinicization of religion," which requires religions to conform to China's cultural and political framework. The China Islamic Association, the state-sanctioned body overseeing Muslim affairs, issued a Five-Year Planning Outline for Persisting in the Sinification of Islam (2018-2022), outlining goals such as embedding Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era into religious teachings and promoting "Chinese-style" Islamic theology. A core component involves architectural modifications to mosques, where authorities have systematically removed domes, minarets, and Arabic inscriptions—deemed symbols of foreign influence—and replaced them with Chinese-style roofs, pavilions, and signage in Mandarin. By 2021, such alterations affected thousands of mosques nationwide, including prominent sites like the Grand Mosque of Shadian in Yunnan, which lost its domes in 2024 as part of completing the five-year campaign. These changes extend to Hui and Uyghur communities, with over 1,600 mosques in Ningxia reportedly modified by 2020 to feature pagoda-like structures. Doctrinal and educational reforms mandate the integration of patriotic content into sermons, Quranic interpretations, and clerical training, prioritizing loyalty to the state over transnational Islamic ties. Imams must undergo mandatory sessions on Xi Jinping Thought, and religious texts are revised to emphasize compatibility with Marxism-Leninism. Pilgrimage oversight has increased, with the state regulating Hajj participation to prevent "extremist" influences. These measures, enforced through local religious affairs bureaus, aim to foster a "Chinese Islam" that supports national rejuvenation, though critics argue they erode distinct religious identities.

Representative Organizations

The (IAC), established in 1953 under the leadership of , the first governor of , serves as the primary national representative body for Muslims in the . Headquartered in with branches across 24 provinces, the IAC functions as the official supervisory organ for Islamic affairs, overseeing mosque registration, imam appointments, and religious education while promoting alignment with state ideology. Its activities include collecting Islamic texts and relics, researching doctrine, and fostering "patriotic religion" that subordinates faith to directives. As a state-controlled entity, the IAC enforces government policies on religion, including the Sinicization of Islam, which mandates adaptations like using Chinese in sermons and removing Arabic architectural elements from mosques since 2018. It plays a political and security role by monitoring communities for extremism and facilitating international outreach to counter narratives on Xinjiang, such as hosting foreign Muslim delegations to endorse China's governance. All Islamic organizations must affiliate with the IAC or local equivalents, which are modeled after it and integrated into the party-state apparatus, ensuring no independent Muslim bodies operate outside official channels. Provincial and local Islamic associations, such as those in Ningxia or Gansu, handle regional administration under IAC guidance, managing over 40,000 mosques and supporting halal certification, though ultimate authority rests with religious affairs bureaus. In Xinjiang, where Uyghur Muslims predominate, representation occurs through similar state-sanctioned structures amid heightened security measures, with the IAC endorsing vocational programs as deradicalization efforts. These organizations prioritize loyalty to the state over transnational Islamic ties, reflecting China's framework where religious groups register under the State Administration for Religious Affairs and adhere to regulations prohibiting foreign influence.

Security and Counter-Extremism

History of Islamist Terrorism and Separatism

The emergence of Islamist terrorism and separatism among Uyghur militants in Xinjiang traces back to the late 1980s and early 1990s, amid grievances over cultural restrictions, economic disparities, and Han migration, which some groups framed through pan-Islamist and jihadist ideologies influenced by Afghan mujahideen returnees and Saudi Wahhabism. The Baren Township riot on April 5, 1990, marked an early flashpoint, when approximately 200-500 Uyghur militants armed with knives and spears attacked a police station and government offices in Akto County, proclaiming an "Islamic state" and killing at least 22 people, including security personnel; Chinese authorities reported suppressing the uprising, which sought to establish an independent East Turkestan. This incident reflected nascent separatist aims tied to Islamist rhetoric, though the scale remained localized. By the mid-1990s, organized groups coalesced, with the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), founded around 1997 by Hasan Mahsum, advocating violent jihad to carve out an independent Islamist state in Xinjiang, drawing inspiration from global jihadist networks. ETIM members trained in camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan, forging ties with al-Qaeda and the Taliban; the group was designated a terrorist organization by the United Nations in 2002 and by the U.S. shortly after, following reports of plots including a 1998 attempted hijacking of a Turkish Airlines flight from Bishkek and explosives smuggling in 2000. In 1997, separatist bombings targeted buses in Urumqi, killing 9 and injuring over 60, while protests in Yining (Ghulja) that February against bans on traditional Uyghur religious practices escalated into riots with Islamist undertones, resulting in at least 9 deaths per official accounts, though Uyghur exiles claim higher casualties. The 2000s saw ETIM's operational maturation, with attacks like the August 4, 2008, suicide bombing and vehicle assault on border police in , killing 16 officers using tactics learned from jihadist affiliates. The 2009 Urumqi riots, sparked by a factory brawl in , devolved into ethnic violence with separatist agitation, claiming 197 lives mostly per state figures, and highlighted Islamist mobilization via underground networks promoting "holy war" against perceived oppressors. ETIM rebranded elements as the (TIP) around 2008-2010, which claimed responsibility for subsequent assaults, including the July 2011 attack where assailants killed 18 civilians and police with knives and axes, and the October 2013 car ramming that killed 5. A wave of high-profile attacks peaked in 2014, underscoring TIP/ETIM's intent to export jihad beyond Xinjiang: the March 1 Kunming train station massacre involved 8 attackers wielding knives, killing 31 civilians and injuring 143, with TIP later claiming it as retaliation for "atrocities" against Muslims; days later, bombings at Urumqi's South Railway Station killed 3 and injured 79. Chinese authorities linked over 200 incidents from 1990-2016 to "three evil forces" of terrorism, separatism, and extremism, with nearly 5,000 deaths, prompting the 2014 "Strike Hard" campaign. TIP fighters, numbering in the hundreds, also joined Syria's conflict from 2013, gaining combat experience and broadcasting propaganda for East Turkestan liberation, though no major attacks occurred in China after 2016. Separatist ideology persists transnationally, but empirical data indicate a decline in domestic violence post-2017, attributed by Beijing to counter-measures, while critics question the proportionality of responses.

Policies in Xinjiang and Vocational Centers

The Chinese government implemented stringent counter-extremism policies in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) as part of the national "Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Terrorism," launched in May 2014 amid a surge in attacks attributed to Islamist separatists, including the April 2014 Urumqi railway station bombing that killed three civilians and injured 79 others, and the May 2014 Urumqi market attack that claimed 43 lives. These measures intensified after Chen Quanguo became XUAR Communist Party Secretary in August 2016, introducing grid-based surveillance, mass data collection, and preventive detention to preempt radicalization, framed as necessary to dismantle the "three evils" of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. Xinjiang's 2017 Regulations on the Prevention of Religious Extremism and Deradicalization authorized administrative detention for behaviors deemed indicative of extremism, such as promoting "pan-halal" practices, wearing veils, or irregular mosque attendance, without requiring criminal charges. Vocational education and training centers (VETCs), established under these regulations and the 2016 Counter-Terrorism Law, served as the core mechanism for deradicalization, targeting primarily Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz suspected of extremist sympathies based on intelligence or behavioral indicators. According to a 2019 State Council white paper, VETCs provided mandatory programs in standard education, legal awareness, de-extremification ideology (emphasizing "Chinese socialism" over Salafist interpretations), Mandarin proficiency, and vocational skills like tailoring or electronics assembly, with participants reportedly receiving stipends and family support. The government claimed these centers trained approximately 1.29 million individuals from 2014 to 2019, all of whom graduated and reintegrated into society, correlating with a complete halt in terrorist incidents in Xinjiang since early 2017—contrasting with over 200 attacks logged between 1990 and 2016, including coordinated bombings and stabbings. Official metrics highlight improved employment rates and social stability, attributing the policy's success to early intervention against ideological precursors to violence, akin to global deradicalization models but scaled preventively across communities. International observers, including the U.S. State Department and Human Rights Watch, have characterized VETCs as internment camps involving arbitrary mass detention of 800,000 to 3 million Muslims since 2017, with allegations of physical coercion, psychological indoctrination, forced labor in supply chains, and cultural erasure through bans on religious practices. These claims draw from satellite imagery of expanded facilities, leaked internal documents (e.g., the "Xinjiang Papers" analyzed by researcher Adrian Zenz), and defector testimonies, though access restrictions prevent independent verification, and Zenz's methodologies have faced criticism for extrapolating from unrepresentative samples and alignment with evangelical anti-communist networks. Empirical correlations support the policies' deterrent effect on terrorism—incidents dropped to zero post-2017 despite prior escalation linked to cross-border jihadist influences from Afghanistan and Syria—but causal attribution remains debated, with critics arguing overreach supplants genuine grievances like economic marginalization, while proponents cite it as pragmatic realism against existential threats to state unity. By 2020, China reported phasing out centralized VETCs in favor of localized community programs, though surveillance infrastructure persists.

Inter-Ethnic Tensions and Conflicts

Inter-ethnic tensions involving Muslim populations in China have predominantly manifested in Xinjiang between Uyghur Muslims and Han Chinese settlers, driven by factors including rapid Han migration, economic disparities, cultural separatism, and Islamist-influenced grievances against perceived assimilation policies. These conflicts have sporadically erupted into violence since the 1990s, with Uyghur groups often targeting Han civilians amid protests over labor disputes, religious restrictions, and autonomy demands. In contrast, Hui Muslims, more integrated linguistically and economically with Han society, have experienced far fewer inter-ethnic clashes, limited mostly to isolated local disputes rather than systemic unrest. A pivotal event occurred on April 5-7, 1990, in Baren Township near Kashgar, where Uyghur militants launched an armed uprising against local authorities, killing at least 22 people including officials and civilians before being suppressed, highlighting early separatist violence tied to Islamist rhetoric. Tensions escalated in February 1997 during protests in Yining (Gulja), where Uyghurs demonstrated against bans on religious practices and economic marginalization; clashes with security forces resulted in dozens of deaths, with Uyghur accounts claiming up to 100 killed, though official reports cited nine protester fatalities and subsequent revenge attacks on Han residents. These incidents underscored underlying frictions from Han demographic dominance in urban areas, rising from 6% in 1949 to over 40% by the 2000s, which Uyghurs viewed as diluting their cultural and resource control. The most deadly outbreak came on July 5, 2009, in Urumqi, triggered by the June factory brawl where Han workers killed two amid rumors of assaults, prompting thousands of to and then , systematically targeting Han and Hui passersby with improvised weapons and arson. Official statistics recorded 197 deaths—197 Han and 2 —plus over 1,700 injuries, with eyewitness reports describing Uyghur mobs beating and burning Han victims alive. The violence, framed by some Uyghur exiles as a spontaneous response to but by Chinese authorities as orchestrated , exposed deep-seated ethnic animosities exacerbated by online and prior unrest, leading to a and over 1,400 arrests. Post-2009, inter-ethnic friction persisted through sporadic Uyghur assaults on Han targets, such as the October 2013 Tiananmen vehicle ramming that killed five, attributed to Uyghur extremists, and revenge cycles where Han retaliated against perceived Uyghur threats. Among Hui communities, rare escalations include the October 2004 Henan province clashes between Hui and Han villagers over land and water, resulting in 148 deaths from gunfire and melee, though such events remain outliers compared to Xinjiang's pattern of recurrent, ideologically charged violence. Overall, these conflicts reflect causal dynamics of ethnic competition in resource-scarce regions, where Uyghur separatism intersects with global Islamist currents, contrasting with Hui adaptation through economic niches like halal trade, minimizing broader Han-Hui antagonism.

Cultural and Social Integration

Architectural and Artistic Heritage

Islamic architecture in China demonstrates a synthesis of Persian-Arab influences with indigenous Chinese building traditions, particularly evident in the eastern regions where Hui Muslim communities predominated. Mosques often feature timber-framed structures with courtyards, pavilions, and upturned eaves reminiscent of imperial palaces and Buddhist temples, while maintaining the qibla orientation toward Mecca in prayer halls. Minarets, when present, adopt pagoda-like forms with multiple tiers and flared roofs, diverging from the slender towers of West Asian mosques to align with local aesthetics and regulatory norms that historically favored assimilation. In contrast, mosques in Xinjiang retain more Central Asian elements, such as domes and arched portals, reflecting Uyghur cultural ties to Turkic Islamic traditions. The Great Mosque of Xi'an exemplifies this hybrid style, originally established in 742 CE during the Tang Dynasty amid Silk Road trade that facilitated Muslim settlement. Its current layout, largely reconstructed in 1384 CE under the Ming Dynasty, spans five courtyards leading to a prayer hall adorned with Arabic inscriptions yet constructed in Chinese wooden bracketing systems. Similarly, the Huaisheng Mosque in Guangzhou, dating to the 7th century and attributed to early Arab traders, incorporates stelae with bilingual inscriptions and a simple minaret integrated into urban Chinese fabric. These structures underscore pragmatic adaptations for endurance against dynastic upheavals, including reconstructions after Mongol invasions and imperial edicts. Artistic expressions within Chinese Islam emphasize calligraphy, particularly the Sini script—a fusion of Arabic letters with Chinese calligraphic fluidity—developed by Hui artisans from the Yuan Dynasty onward for Qur'ans, tombstones, and architectural epigraphy. This style, peaking in the Ming era, appears on ceramics like censers bearing Qur'anic verses in underglaze blue, blending Islamic aniconism with porcelain techniques refined in imperial kilns. Hui workshops produced such wares for ritual use, evidencing economic integration through export-oriented crafts while adhering to prohibitions on figural representation. Preservation of these artifacts, housed in collections like those in Berlin's Islamic Art Museum, highlights their role in sustaining Muslim identity amid Sinicization pressures. Under contemporary state policies, historical mosques face renovations enforcing further Chinese stylistic dominance, such as replacing domes with pavilion roofs, though core heritage sites like Xi'an's retain protected status for tourism and . This reflects ongoing tensions between architectural authenticity and national unity imperatives, with empirical records showing over 39,000 mosques nationwide as of 2018, many embodying this layered heritage.

Economic Roles and Halal Industries

Hui Muslims, comprising the largest Muslim ethnic group in China with an estimated population of over 10 million, have historically occupied niches in commerce, particularly in halal meat processing, livestock trading, and small-scale manufacturing such as fur, leather, and jade work. Their economic activities often center on urban enclaves in provinces like Ningxia, Gansu, and Qinghai, where they dominate qingzhen (halal) restaurants and butchery, leveraging religious dietary laws to serve both Muslim and non-Muslim consumers seeking certified products. This specialization stems from centuries-old trade networks, including border commerce in Yunnan during the Ming and Qing dynasties, enabling Hui merchants to build community leadership through economic success. Uyghurs in Xinjiang primarily contribute to agriculture, including cotton production and animal husbandry, which form the backbone of the region's economy, with Xinjiang's GDP reaching approximately RMB 1.38 trillion (USD 210 billion) in 2020 amid state-driven industrialization. However, Uyghur labor has increasingly been integrated into state labor transfer programs, directing workers to manufacturing sectors like textiles and electronics, often under coercive conditions documented in reports linking these practices to global supply chains. Ethnic stratification persists, with Uyghurs overrepresented in agriculture and government roles outside private enterprise, contrasting Han dominance in urban commerce. China's halal industry has expanded rapidly to meet domestic demand from its 25 million Muslims and export opportunities, with the halal food and beverage market projected to grow from USD 85.95 billion in 2025 to USD 217.10 billion by 2034 at a compound annual growth rate of 10.84%. Lacking a unified national standard, certification is managed by local branches of the China Islamic Association, which issues qingzhen labels for products like meat, dairy, and pharmaceuticals, facilitating exports valued at USD 10.4 billion to Organization of Islamic Cooperation countries in 2022, positioning China as the ninth-largest halal food exporter. Halal logistics, critical for supply chain integrity, generated USD 41.9 billion in revenue in 2024, driven by infrastructure investments in cold-chain transport and warehousing to prevent cross-contamination. These developments reflect pragmatic state support for Muslim economic niches, enhancing trade with Belt and Road Initiative partners in Muslim-majority nations, though certification inconsistencies have sparked debates on reliability among international buyers.

Hui Model of Assimilation

The Hui model of assimilation exemplifies the integration of Muslim communities into Han-dominated Chinese society through gradual Sinicization, beginning with Muslim arrivals in the Tang dynasty around 651 CE, when the first recorded Islamic mission reached China. This process involved extensive intermarriage between Muslim settlers—primarily merchants and soldiers from Central Asia and the Middle East—and local Han Chinese populations, leading to the adoption of Chinese language, surnames, clothing, and customs while preserving core Islamic prohibitions such as the avoidance of pork. By the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), Hui communities had secured formal recognition as subjects (min) equivalent to Han Chinese, fostering economic participation and reducing isolation. Genetic studies confirm this assimilation's depth, revealing that modern Hui populations derive approximately 70–85% of their ancestry from indigenous East Asians, including Han Chinese, with only about 6% West Eurasian input, indicative of male-dominated Muslim migration followed by massive incorporation of local women and communities during the Tang (7th century) and Yuan (13th–14th centuries) dynasties. Hui developed a hybrid identity—often termed "hyphenated" as Sino-Muslim or Hui-min—balancing ethnic-religious distinctiveness with loyalty to the state, as evidenced by their service in imperial roles and lack of separatist movements, unlike Turkic Muslim groups. Architecturally, this manifests in mosques featuring Chinese pagoda-style minarets and courtyards, symbolizing cultural synthesis. Economically and socially, the Hui, numbering around 10–11 million and dispersed across China with concentrations in Ningxia, have integrated into Han society by adopting Mandarin as their primary language—achieving near-universal fluency—and engaging in state-owned enterprises and trade networks linking China to Muslim-majority regions. This model contrasts sharply with less assimilated minorities like the Uyghurs, as Hui physical resemblance to Han Chinese minimizes discrimination, and their Confucian-influenced adaptation of Islamic practices promotes coexistence without territorial claims. Historically, periods of tension, such as Qing-era rebellions (1855–1873), were followed by reincorporation, reinforcing assimilation through legal equality and inter-ethnic mingling. The Chinese government has historically viewed Hui as a paradigm of compliant minority integration, granting them ethnic minority status with resource access, though recent Sinicization policies have imposed uniform restrictions on religious expression across Muslim groups.

Uyghur Cultural Dynamics

The Uyghurs, a Turkic-speaking ethnic group primarily residing in Xinjiang, have practiced Sunni Islam infused with Sufi traditions since its introduction between the 10th and 16th centuries through trade routes and missionary activities by Naqshbandi orders. Sufi sheikhs historically served as community leaders, fostering veneration at shrines and integrating mystical practices into daily life, which blended with pre-Islamic Central Asian customs to form a distinct folk Islam. This syncretism is evident in cultural expressions like the Uyghur Muqam, a UNESCO-recognized intangible heritage comprising poetry, music, and dance rooted in Sufi spiritual themes, performed in regional variants such as On Ikki Muqam. Sufi rituals, including hälqä-sohbät gatherings featuring zikr (remembrance chants) and hikmet (sung meditations on mortality attributed to saints like Khoja Ahmad Yasawi), emphasize auditory experiences to induce spiritual states like jäzba, distinguishing Uyghur Islam from more scripturalist forms. Shrines dedicated to these figures dot the landscape, serving as pilgrimage sites that reinforce communal bonds and ethnic identity, though many incorporate heterodox elements critiqued by reformist movements in the 20th century. These practices underscore Islam's role as a cornerstone of Uyghur cultural continuity, intertwining religious observance with Turkic linguistic and nomadic heritage amid historical interactions with Persian and Arab influences. In contemporary dynamics, Uyghur cultural identity remains tightly linked to Islamic practices, yet faces pressures from state policies framed as countering "three evils" of separatism, extremism, and terrorism, leading to restrictions on religious expression since 2014. Regulations tightened in 2024 further limit mosque attendance, Quranic education, and communal rituals for those under 18, while demolitions of thousands of shrines and mosques—estimated at over 16,000 sites by 2019—have eroded tangible heritage tied to Sufi lineages. Government initiatives promote "sinicization," co-opting elements like meshrep gatherings into state-approved forms stripped of religious content, while bilingual education policies since 2017 aim to assimilate youth, separating children from familial Islamic transmission. These measures, justified by Beijing as stabilizing security amid sporadic violence, have intensified perceptions of cultural erosion among Uyghurs, heightening ethnic tensions without evidence of widespread radicalization predating policy escalations.

Notable Figures and Contributions

Historical Explorers and Officials

Zheng He (1371–1433), originally named Ma He, was a prominent Hui Muslim eunuch admiral and diplomat who served the Ming dynasty. Born into a Muslim family of Mongol descent in Kunyang, Yunnan Province, his ancestors included pilgrims who had undertaken the Hajj to Mecca. Captured by Ming forces during the suppression of the Ming–Yunnan rebellions in 1381, he was castrated and entered palace service, eventually rising to command vast naval expeditions. From 1405 to 1433, Zheng He led seven major maritime voyages across the Indian Ocean, commanding fleets of up to 250 ships, including the famed treasure ships measuring over 120 meters in length, crewed by more than 27,000 men. These expeditions reached as far as East Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and India, facilitating diplomacy, tribute collection, and trade in goods such as porcelain, silk, and spices, while establishing Chinese suzerainty over regional polities. As a devout Muslim, Zheng He incorporated Islamic practices into the voyages, ensuring halal provisions, performing prayers, and constructing mosques in visited ports like those in Java and Ceylon. Another notable early figure was Du Huan (fl. 751), a Tang dynasty soldier and travel writer captured during the Battle of Talas in 751 CE against Abbasid forces. He spent over a decade in the Islamic world, traversing regions from Central Asia to North Africa and the Middle East, before returning to China around 762 CE. In his work Jingxingji (Record of Travels), Du Huan provided one of the earliest Chinese accounts of Muslim societies, describing customs, geography, and urban life in places like Baghdad and Egypt, though he himself remained a non-Muslim observer rather than a practitioner or official promoter of Islam. In the , (1211–1279), a Uyghur Muslim administrator of Persian origin, served as governor of Province from 1274 to 1279 under . Appointed to pacify and develop the region after Mongol conquests, he oversaw infrastructure projects including irrigation systems, academies, and roads, while introducing Confucian education alongside tolerance for , which facilitated Hui settlement and cultural integration in . His governance blended with Chinese administrative traditions, contributing to the enduring Hui presence in the area. These individuals exemplify how Muslim officials and explorers navigated imperial service, leveraging their faith and expertise to extend Chinese influence while preserving Islamic identity amid Sinicization pressures.

Modern Scholars and Leaders

Yang Faming, a Hui Muslim born in 1965 in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, has served as president of the China Islamic Association (IAC) since his election in November 2016. Under his leadership, the IAC—a state-sanctioned body established in 1953 to oversee mosques, train imams, and regulate Islamic activities—has prioritized "Sinicization" of Islam, adapting religious practices to align with socialist core values and Chinese laws while emphasizing patriotism and opposition to extremism. Yang has publicly advocated for Muslims to resist foreign influences and integrate Islamic teachings with national development, including promoting halal industries and managed Hajj pilgrimages amid government restrictions. In 2024, he led sessions instructing state imams to incorporate Communist Party directives, such as those from the Third Plenum, into sermons, framing them as compatible with Islamic moderation. Among modern Hui scholars, figures like Zhang Weizhen represent efforts to synthesize traditional Islamic scholarship with contemporary Chinese intellectual currents, drawing on historical precedents from scholars such as Liu Zhi while engaging in public discourse on religious adaptation. However, independent Muslim scholarship, particularly among Uyghurs, faces severe constraints; prominent intellectuals, including religious teachers and writers, have been detained or silenced since 2017 as part of campaigns against perceived separatism and extremism, limiting contributions to broader Islamic studies. State-approved Hui academics, often affiliated with institutions like the IAC or universities in Ningxia, focus on historical reinterpretations that underscore Islam's compatibility with Chinese governance, though such works prioritize political alignment over doctrinal innovation. This environment reflects a broader policy of controlling religious leadership to ensure loyalty, with the IAC serving as the primary conduit for official Islamic voices in China.

Military and Cultural Icons

Zheng He (1371–1433), originally named Ma He, was a Hui Muslim eunuch admiral who commanded the Ming dynasty's treasure fleets during seven maritime expeditions between 1405 and 1433, reaching as far as East Africa and establishing diplomatic ties with over 30 states. As a key military and exploratory figure, his voyages demonstrated China's naval supremacy, involving fleets of up to 300 ships and 27,000 personnel, while facilitating trade in porcelain, silk, and spices without conquest, reflecting a blend of Islamic heritage and Chinese imperial strategy. During the Ming conquest of Yunnan (1381–1382), Hui Muslim generals such as Mu Ying (d. 1393) played pivotal roles in subduing Mongol and local forces, integrating Muslim troops into the imperial army and securing the southwest frontier for the dynasty. In the 20th century, Bai Chongxi (1893–1966), a Hui Muslim general dubbed the "Little Zhuge" for his strategic acumen, rose to prominence in the National Revolutionary Army, participating in campaigns against warlords and Japanese forces while advocating for Muslim interests through the establishment of a national Islamic association. Culturally, figures like Ma Zhu (1647–1710), a Hui scholar, exemplified Sino-Islamic synthesis through works such as Qingzhen zhinao (The Compass of Islam), which reconciled Islamic theology with Confucian principles, influencing the Han Kitab tradition of Chinese Muslim literature. This intellectual legacy, developed by Hui elites in the Qing era, produced texts that framed as compatible with , fostering cultural adaptation without .

References

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