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20 July plot
20 July plot
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20 July plot
Part of the Assassination attempts on Adolf Hitler and German resistance to Nazism
Martin Bormann, Hermann Göring, and Bruno Loerzer surveying the damaged conference room
TypeCoup d'état
Locations
Several, including Wolf's Lair, East Prussia

54°04′50″N 21°29′47″E / 54.08056°N 21.49639°E / 54.08056; 21.49639
and Berlin
Objective
Date20 July 1944; 81 years ago (1944-07-20)
Executed by
Outcome
  • Hitler survives with minor injuries
  • Military coup fails within 5 hours
  • 7,000 arrested; 4,980 executed, including 200 conspirators
  • Traditional military salute fully replaced by Nazi salute
Casualties4 killed, 20 injured
Wolf's Lair is located in Germany
Wolf's Lair
Wolf's Lair
The location of the assassination attempt on Hitler

The 20 July plot, sometimes referred to as Operation Valkyrie, was a failed attempt to assassinate Adolf Hitler, the chancellor of Germany, and overthrow the Nazi regime on 20 July 1944. The plotters were part of the German resistance, mainly composed of Wehrmacht officers.[1][2] The leader of the conspiracy, Claus von Stauffenberg, tried to kill Hitler by detonating an explosive hidden in a briefcase. However, due to the location of the bomb at the time of detonation, the blast only dealt Hitler minor injuries. The planners' subsequent coup attempt also failed and resulted in a purge of the Wehrmacht.

As early as 1938, German military officers had plotted to overthrow Hitler, but indecisive leadership and the pace of global events stymied action. Plotters gained a sense of urgency in 1943 after Germany lost the Battle of Stalingrad and Soviet forces began to push towards Germany. Under the leadership of Stauffenberg, plotters tried to assassinate Hitler at least five times in 1943 and 1944. With the Nazi secret police, the Gestapo, closing in on the plotters, a final attempt was organised in July 1944. Stauffenberg personally took a briefcase containing a block of plastic explosive to a conference in the Wolf's Lair. The explosives were armed and placed next to Hitler, but it appears they were moved unwittingly at the last moment behind a table leg by Heinz Brandt, inadvertently saving Hitler's life. When the bomb detonated, it killed Brandt and two others, while the rest of the room's occupants were injured, one of whom, Rudolf Schmundt, later died from his injuries. Hitler's trousers were singed by the blast, and he suffered a perforated eardrum and conjunctivitis, but was otherwise unharmed.

The plotters, unaware of their failure, then attempted a coup d'état. A few hours after the blast, the conspiracy used Wehrmacht units to take control of several cities, including Berlin, right after giving them disinformation on the intention of the orders they were given. This part of the coup d'état attempt is referred to by the name "Operation Valkyrie", which also has become associated with the entire event.[3][4] Within hours, the Nazi regime had reasserted its control of Germany. A few members of the conspiracy, including Stauffenberg, were executed by firing squad the same night. In the months after the coup d'état attempt, the Gestapo arrested more than 7,000 people, 4,980 of whom were executed. Roughly 200 conspirators were executed.[5]

The apparent aim of the coup d'état attempt was to wrest political control of Germany and its armed forces from the Nazi Party (including the Schutzstaffel) and to make peace with the Western Allies as soon as possible. The details of the conspirators' peace initiatives remain unknown,[6][7][8] but they would have included unrealistic demands for the confirmation of Germany's extensive annexations of European territory.[9][10]

Background

[edit]
Battle fronts in Europe as of 15 July 1944

Since 1938 there had been groups plotting an overthrow of some kind within the German Army and in the German Military Intelligence Organization.[11] Early leaders of these plots included Major General Hans Oster, the deputy head of the Military Intelligence Office; Colonel General Ludwig Beck, a former Chief of Staff of the German Army High Command (OKH); and Field Marshal Erwin von Witzleben, a former commander of the German 1st Army and the former Commander-in-Chief of the German Army Command in the West. They soon established contacts with several prominent civilians, including Carl Goerdeler,[12] the former mayor of Leipzig, and Helmuth James von Moltke,[13] the great-grandnephew of Moltke the Elder, hero of the Franco-Prussian War.

Groups of military plotters exchanged ideas with civilian, political, and intellectual resistance groups in the Kreisauer Kreis (which met at the von Moltke estate in Kreisau) and in other secret circles. Moltke was against killing Hitler; instead, he wanted him placed on trial. Moltke said, "we are all amateurs and would only bungle it". Moltke also believed killing Hitler would be hypocritical: Hitler and National Socialism had turned wrongdoing into a system, something which the resistance should avoid.[14]

Plans to stage an overthrow and prevent Hitler from launching a new world war were developed in 1938 and 1939, but were aborted because of the indecision of Army General Franz Halder and Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch, and the failure of the Western powers to oppose Hitler's aggression until 1939.[15]

In 1942 a new conspiratorial group formed, led by Colonel Henning von Tresckow, a member of Field Marshal Fedor von Bock's staff, who commanded Army Group Centre in Operation Barbarossa. Tresckow systematically recruited oppositionists into the Group's staff, making it the nerve centre of the army resistance. Little could be done against Hitler as he was heavily guarded, and none of the plotters could get near enough to him.[16]

During 1942, Oster and Tresckow nevertheless succeeded in rebuilding an effective resistance network. Their most important recruit was General Friedrich Olbricht, head of the General Army Office headquarters at the Bendlerblock in central Berlin, who controlled an independent system of communications to reserve units throughout Germany. Linking this asset to Tresckow's resistance group in Army Group Centre created a viable coup apparatus.[17]

In late 1942 Tresckow and Olbricht formulated a plan to assassinate Hitler and stage an overthrow during Hitler's visit to the headquarters of Army Group Centre at Smolensk in March 1943, by placing a bomb on his plane (Operation Spark). The bomb failed to detonate, and a second attempt a week later with Hitler at an exhibition of captured Soviet weaponry in Berlin also failed.[18] These failures demoralised the conspirators. During 1943 Tresckow tried without success to recruit senior army field commanders such as Field Marshal Erich von Manstein and Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, to support a seizure of power. Tresckow, in particular, worked on his Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Centre, Field Marshal Günther von Kluge, to persuade him to move against Hitler and at times succeeded in gaining his consent, only to find him indecisive at the last minute.[19] However, despite their refusals, none of the Field Marshals reported their treasonous activities to the Gestapo or Hitler.[citation needed]

Motivation and goals

[edit]

Opposition to Hitler and to Nazi policies

[edit]

While the primary goal of the plotters was to remove Hitler from power, they did so for various reasons. The majority of the group behind the 20 July plot were conservative nationalists—idealists, but not necessarily of a democratic stripe.[20][21] Martin Borschat portrays their motivations as a matter of aristocratic resentment, writing that the plot was mainly carried out by conservative elites who were initially integrated by the Nazi government but during the war lost their influence and were concerned about regaining it.[22] However, at least in Stauffenberg's case, the conviction that Nazi Germany's atrocities against civilians and prisoners of war were a dishonour to the nation and its military was likely a major motivating factor.[23] Historian Judith Michel assesses the circle around the 20 July Group as a diverse and heterogeneous group that included liberal democrats, conservatives, social democrats, authoritarian aristocrats, and even communists. The common goal was to overthrow Hitler's regime and bring the war to a swift end.[24] There is evidence of the plot encompassing a broad spectrum of plotters which included communists. That April, before the attempted coup, Stauffenberg agreed to cooperate with the Operational Leadership of the KPD (Communist Party of Germany) remaining in Germany. Contacts were established through the Social Democrats Adolf Reichwein and Julius Leber.[25]

Territorial demands

[edit]

Among demands initially countenanced by the plotters for issue towards the Allies were such points as re-establishment of Germany's 1914 boundaries with Belgium, France and Poland and no reparations. Like most of the rest of German resistance, the 20 July plotters believed in the idea of Greater Germany and as a condition for peace demanded that the western allies recognise as a minimum the incorporation of Austria, Alsace-Lorraine, Sudetenland, and the annexation of Polish-inhabited territories that Germany ceded to Poland after 1918, with the restoration of some of the overseas colonies. They believed that Europe should be controlled under German hegemony.[26]

The overall goals towards Poland were mixed within the plotters. Most of the plotters found it desirable to restore the old German borders of 1914, while others pointed out that the demands were unrealistic, and amendments had to be made.[27] Some like Friedrich-Werner Graf von der Schulenburg even wanted all of Poland annexed to Germany.[28]

To Poland, which was fighting against Nazi Germany with both its army and government in exile, the territorial demands and traditional nationalistic visions of resistance were not much different from the racist policies of Hitler.[29] Stauffenberg, as one of the leaders of the plot, stated five years before the coup in 1939 during the Poland campaign: "It is essential that we begin a systemic colonisation in Poland. But I have no fear that this will not occur."[30][31]

Political vision of post-Hitler Germany

[edit]

Many members of the plot had helped the Nazis to gain power and shared revisionist foreign policy goals pursued by Hitler, and even at the time of the plot were anti-democratic, hoping to replace Hitler with a conservative-authoritarian government involving aristocratic rule. They opposed popular legitimation or mass participation in governance of the state.[32]

Political program

[edit]

The political program of the planned government was outlined in a draft for a government policy statement, consisting of twelve points:

  1. Restoration of the rule of law, independence of the courts, protection of personal and property security, dissolution of concentration camps, prevention of lynch law,
  2. Combating corruption, restitution of looted works of art, ending the persecution of Jews, punishment of war crimes,
  3. Dissolution of the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda and an end to propaganda reporting on the course of the war,
  4. Separation of church and state, a Christian mindset as the basis for policies, freedom of the press,
  5. Restoration of Christian education by parents
  6. Reduction of bureaucracy, examination and possible punishment, dismissal or transfer of all officials appointed and promoted from 1 January 1933, especially Nazi party members
  7. Transformation of the provinces of Prussia and states into Reichsgaue, local self-government for the Reichsgaue, districts and municipalities under the supervision of Reichsstatthalter,
  8. Restoration of full economic freedom after the war, protection of private property, planned economic measures only under conditions of war-related shortages,
  9. Responsible and conscientious social policy in the hands of Reichsgaue and trade unions
  10. Ending national debt through tax increases and austerity policies, international agreement on debt repayment
  11. Continuation of the war for defence purposes only,
  12. Commencement of peace negotiations with the Western Allies, punishment of those Germans responsible for the Second World War.[33]

Planning a coup

[edit]

Von Stauffenberg joins

[edit]
Stauffenberg with Albrecht Mertz von Quirnheim in June 1944

By mid-1943 the tide of war was turning decisively against Germany. The army plotters and their civilian allies became convinced that Hitler should be assassinated, so that a government acceptable to the western Allies could be formed, and a separate peace negotiated in time to prevent a Soviet invasion of Germany. In August 1943 Tresckow met, for the first time, a young staff officer named Lieutenant Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg. Severely wounded in North Africa, Stauffenberg was a political conservative and zealous German nationalist.[3]

From early 1942, he had come to share two basic convictions with many military officers: that Germany was being led to disaster and that Hitler's removal from power was necessary. After the Battle of Stalingrad in December 1942, despite his religious scruples, he concluded that the Führer's assassination was a lesser moral evil than Hitler's remaining in power.[34] Stauffenberg brought a new tone of decisiveness to the ranks of the resistance movement. When Tresckow was assigned to the Eastern Front, Stauffenberg took charge of planning and executing the assassination attempt.

New plan

[edit]

Olbricht now put forward a new strategy for staging a coup against Hitler. The Replacement Army (Ersatzheer) had an operational plan called Operation Valkyrie, which was to be used in the event that the disruption caused by the Allied bombing of German cities would cause a breakdown in law and order, or an uprising by the millions of forced labourers from occupied countries now being used in German factories. Olbricht suggested that this plan could be used to mobilise the Reserve Army for the purpose of the coup.[35]

In August and September 1943, Tresckow drafted the "revised" Valkyrie plan and new supplementary orders. A secret declaration began with these words: "The Führer Adolf Hitler is dead! A treacherous group of party leaders has attempted to exploit the situation by attacking our embattled soldiers from the rear in order to seize power for themselves."[36] Detailed instructions were written for occupation of government ministries in Berlin, Heinrich Himmler's headquarters in East Prussia, radio stations and telephone offices, and other Nazi apparatus through military districts, and concentration camps.[37]

Previously, it was believed that Stauffenberg was mainly responsible for the Valkyrie plan, but documents recovered by the Soviet Union after the war and released in 2007 suggest that the plan was developed by Tresckow by late 1943.[38] All written information was handled by Tresckow's wife, Erika, and by Margarethe von Oven, his secretary. Both women wore gloves to avoid leaving fingerprints.[39] On at least two other occasions Tresckow had tried to assassinate the Führer. The first plan was to shoot him during dinner at the army base camp, but this plan was aborted because it was widely believed that Hitler wore a bullet-proof vest. The conspirators also considered poisoning him, but this was not possible because his food was specially prepared and tasted. They concluded that a time bomb was the only option.[40]

Operation Valkyrie could only be put into effect by Hitler himself, or by General Friedrich Fromm, commander of the Reserve Army, so the latter had to be either won over to the conspiracy or in some way neutralised if the plan was to succeed.[35]

Previous failed attempts

[edit]

During 1943 and early 1944 von Tresckow and von Stauffenberg organised at least five attempts to get one of the military conspirators near enough to Hitler, for long enough to kill him with hand grenades, bombs, or a revolver:

As the war situation deteriorated, Hitler no longer appeared in public and rarely visited Berlin. He spent most of his time at his headquarters at the Wolfsschanze near Rastenburg in East Prussia, with occasional breaks at his Bavarian mountain retreat Obersalzberg near Berchtesgaden. In both places, he was heavily guarded and rarely saw people he did not know or trust. Himmler and the Gestapo were increasingly suspicious of plots against Hitler and rightly suspected the officers of the General Staff, which was indeed the source of many conspiracies against him.

Preparations

[edit]

By mid-1944 the Gestapo was closing in on the conspirators. When Stauffenberg sent Tresckow a message through Lieutenant Heinrich Graf von Lehndorff-Steinort asking whether there was any reason for trying to assassinate Hitler given that no political purpose would be served, Tresckow's response was: "The assassination must be attempted, coûte que coûte [whatever the cost]. Even if it fails, we must take action in Berlin ⁠,⁠ ⁠for the practical purpose no longer matters; what matters now is that the German resistance movement must take the plunge before the eyes of the world and of history. Compared to that, nothing else matters."[43]

Himmler had at least one conversation with a known oppositionist when, in August 1943, the Prussian Finance Minister Johannes Popitz, who was involved in Goerdeler's network, came to see him and offered him the support of the opposition if he would make a move to displace Hitler and secure a negotiated end to the war.[44] Himmler himself tried in April 1945 to form a separate peace with the allies in order to remain in some sort of power, but it was rejected as the allies continued to demand unconditional surrender.

Popitz was not alone in seeing Himmler as a potential ally. General von Bock advised Tresckow to seek his support, but there is no evidence that he did so. Goerdeler was apparently also in indirect contact with Himmler via a mutual acquaintance, Carl Langbehn. Wilhelm Canaris's biographer Heinz Höhne suggests that Canaris and Himmler were working together to bring about a change of regime, but this remains speculation.[45]

Countdown to Stauffenberg's attempt

[edit]
Hitler shaking hands with General Karl Bodenschatz, accompanied by Stauffenberg (left) and Keitel (right). Bodenschatz was seriously wounded five days later by Stauffenberg's bomb. Rastenburg, 15 July 1944.

First week of July

[edit]

On Saturday 1 July 1944 Stauffenberg was appointed Chief of Staff to General Friedrich Fromm at the Reserve Army headquarters on Bendlerstraße in central Berlin. This position enabled Stauffenberg to attend Hitler's military conferences, either at the Wolfsschanze in East Prussia or at Berchtesgaden, and would thus give him an opportunity, perhaps the last that would present itself, to kill Hitler with a bomb or a pistol. Meanwhile, new key allies had been gained. These included General Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, the German military commander in France, who would take control in Paris when Hitler was killed, and it was hoped, negotiate an immediate armistice with the invading Allied armies.[citation needed]

Aborted attempts

[edit]

The plot was now fully prepared. On 7 July 1944 General Helmuth Stieff was to kill Hitler at a display of new uniforms at Klessheim castle near Salzburg. However, Stieff felt unable to kill Hitler. Stauffenberg now decided to do both, assassinate Hitler and to manage the plot in Berlin.[citation needed]

On 14 July Stauffenberg attended Hitler's conferences carrying a bomb in his briefcase, but because the conspirators had decided that Himmler and Hermann Göring should be killed simultaneously if the planned mobilisation of Operation Valkyrie was to have a chance to succeed, he held back at the last minute because Himmler was not present. In fact, it was unusual for Himmler to attend military conferences.[16]

By 15 July, when Stauffenberg again flew to the Wolfsschanze, this condition had been dropped. The plan was for Stauffenberg to plant the briefcase with the bomb in Hitler's conference room with a timer running, excuse himself from the meeting, wait for the explosion, then fly back to Berlin and join the other plotters at the Bendlerblock. Operation Valkyrie would be mobilised, the Reserve Army would take control of Germany and the other Nazi leaders would be arrested. Beck would be appointed provisional head of state, Goerdeler would be chancellor, and Witzleben would be commander-in-chief of the armed forces.[citation needed]

Again on 15 July, the attempt was called off at the last minute. Himmler and Göring were present, but Hitler was called out of the room at the last moment. Stauffenberg was able to intercept the bomb and prevent its discovery.[16]

20 July 1944

[edit]

Operation Valkyrie

[edit]
Approximate positions of the attendees at the meeting in relation to the briefcase bomb when it exploded:
  1.   Heinz Waizenegger
  2.   Heinrich Berger
  3.   Heinz Buchholz
Bomb damage to the conference room

On 18 July rumours reached Stauffenberg that the Gestapo had knowledge of the conspiracy and that he might be arrested at any time—this was apparently not true, but there was a sense that the net was closing in and that the next opportunity to kill Hitler must be taken because there might not be another. On the morning of Thursday 20 July Stauffenberg flew back to the Wolfsschanze for another military conference at which Hitler would be present, once again with a bomb in his briefcase.[3]

At around 12:30 pm as the conference began, Stauffenberg asked to use a washroom in Wilhelm Keitel's office, saying that he had to change his shirt, which indeed was soaked through with sweat, it being a very hot day. There, assisted by von Haeften, he used pliers to crush the end of a pencil detonator inserted into a 1 kilogram (2.2 lb) block of plastic explosive wrapped in brown paper, that was prepared by Wessel von Freytag-Loringhoven.[46] The pencil detonator consisted of a thin copper tube containing cupric chloride that would take about ten minutes to silently eat through wire holding back the firing pin from the percussion cap. It was slow going due to war wounds that had cost Stauffenberg an eye, his right hand, and two fingers on his left hand. Interrupted by a guard knocking on the door advising him that the meeting was about to begin, he was not able to prime the second bomb, which he gave to his aide-de-camp, Werner von Haeften.[3]

Stauffenberg placed the single primed bomb inside his briefcase and, with the unwitting assistance of Major Ernst John von Freyend, entered the conference room containing Hitler and 20 officers, positioning the briefcase under the table near Hitler.[47][page needed][48][page needed] After a few minutes, Stauffenberg received a planned telephone call and left the room. It is presumed that Colonel Heinz Brandt, who was standing next to Hitler, used his foot to move the briefcase aside by pushing it behind the leg of the conference table,[49] thus unintentionally deflecting the blast from Hitler but causing the loss of one of his legs and his own demise when the bomb detonated.[3]

At 12:42[49] the bomb detonated, demolishing the conference room and killing a stenographer instantly. More than 20 people in the room were injured with three officers later dying. Hitler survived, as did everyone else who was shielded from the blast by the conference table leg. His trousers were singed and tattered, and he suffered from a perforated eardrum (as did most of the other 24 people in the room),[49] as well as from conjunctivitis in his right eye. Hitler's personal physician, Theodor Morell, administered penicillin which had been taken from captured Allied soldiers for treatment; Morell had previously observed the death of Reinhard Heydrich from sepsis in an assassination two years earlier.[50]

Escape from the Wolf's Lair and flight to Berlin

[edit]

Stauffenberg was seen leaving the conference building by Kurt Salterberg, a soldier on guard duty who did not consider this out of the ordinary as attendees sometimes left to collect documents. He then saw a "massive" cloud of smoke, wood splinters and paper and men being hurled through a window and door.[51] Stauffenberg, upon witnessing the explosion and smoke, assumed that Hitler was dead. He then climbed into a staff car with his aide Werner von Haeften and managed to bluff his way past three checkpoints to exit the Wolfsschanze complex. Haeften then tossed the second (unprimed) bomb into the forest as they made a dash for Rastenburg airfield, reaching it before it could be realised that Stauffenberg could be responsible for the explosion. At first it was thought that the explosion had been the result of an aerial bombing, but when it was confirmed that no warplanes had flown over and Stauffenberg was absent, the theory of an assassination attempt gained strength. By 13:00 he was airborne in a Heinkel He 111[52][page needed][53][page needed] arranged by General Eduard Wagner.

Hitler's tattered trousers[54]

By the time Stauffenberg's aircraft reached Berlin about 16:00,[55] General Erich Fellgiebel, an officer at the Wolfsschanze who was in on the plot, had phoned the Bendlerblock and told the plotters that Hitler had survived the explosion. As a result, the plot to mobilise Operation Valkyrie would have no chance of succeeding once the officers of the Reserve Army knew that Hitler was alive. There was more confusion when Stauffenberg's aircraft landed and he phoned from the airport to say that Hitler was in fact dead.[56] The Bendlerblock plotters did not know whom to believe.

Finally, at 16:00 Olbricht issued the orders for Operation Valkyrie to be mobilised. The vacillating General Fromm, however, phoned Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel at the Wolf's Lair and was assured that Hitler was alive. Keitel demanded to know Stauffenberg's whereabouts. This told Fromm that the plot had been traced to his headquarters and that he was in mortal danger. Fromm replied that he thought Stauffenberg was with Hitler.[57]

Meanwhile, General Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, military governor of occupied France, managed to disarm the SD and SS and captured most of their leadership. He travelled to Field Marshal Günther von Kluge's headquarters and asked him to contact the Allies, only to be informed that Hitler was alive.[56] At 16:40 Stauffenberg and Haeften arrived at the Bendlerblock. Fromm, presumably to protect himself, changed sides and attempted to have Stauffenberg arrested. Olbricht and Stauffenberg restrained him at gunpoint and Olbricht then appointed General Erich Hoepner to take over his duties.

By this time Himmler had taken charge of the situation and had issued orders countermanding Olbricht's mobilisation of Operation Valkyrie. In many places the coup was going ahead, led by officers who believed that Hitler was dead. City Commandant, and conspirator, Lieutenant General Paul von Hase ordered the Wachbataillon Großdeutschland, under the command of Major Otto Ernst Remer, to secure the Wilhelmstraße and arrest Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels.[58] In Vienna, Prague, and many other places troops occupied Nazi Party offices and arrested Gauleiters and SS officers.

Failure of the coup

[edit]

At around 18:10, the commander of Military District III (Berlin), General Joachim von Kortzfleisch, was summoned to the Bendlerblock; he angrily refused Olbricht's orders, kept shouting "the Führer is alive",[59] was arrested, and held under guard. General Karl Freiherr von Thüngen was appointed in his place but proved to be of almost no help. General Fritz Lindemann, who was supposed to make a proclamation to the German people over the radio, failed to appear and as he held the only copy, Beck had to work on a new one.[60]

Soldiers and Waffen SS men at the Bendlerblock, July 1944

At 19:00 Hitler was sufficiently recovered to make phone calls. He called Goebbels at the Propaganda Ministry. Goebbels arranged for Hitler to speak to Major Otto Ernst Remer, commander of the troops surrounding the Ministry. After assuring him that he was still alive, Hitler ordered Remer to regain control of the situation in Berlin and capture the conspirators alive. Major Remer ordered his troops to surround and seal off the Bendlerblock, but not to enter the buildings.[58] At 20:00 a furious Witzleben arrived at the Bendlerblock and had a bitter argument with Stauffenberg, who was still insisting that the coup could go ahead. Witzleben left shortly afterwards. At around this time the planned seizure of power in Paris was aborted when Field Marshal Günther von Kluge, who had recently been appointed commander-in-chief in the West, learnt that Hitler was alive.

As Remer regained control of the city and word spread that Hitler was still alive, the less resolute members of the conspiracy in Berlin began to change sides. Fromm was freed from his room and fighting broke out in the Bendlerblock between officers supporting and opposing the coup; Stauffenberg was wounded after a shootout. As the fighting was still ongoing, Remer and his forces arrived at the Bendlerblock and the conspirators were overwhelmed and arrested; by 23:00 Fromm and Remer had regained control of the building.

Perhaps hoping that a show of zealous loyalty would save him, Fromm convened an impromptu court martial consisting of himself, and sentenced Olbricht, Stauffenberg, Haeften and another officer, Colonel Albrecht Mertz von Quirnheim, to death, while putting Beck under arrest; Beck, realising the situation was hopeless, asked for a pistol and shot himself—the first of many attempted suicides in the coming days. At first Beck only seriously wounded himself—he was then shot in the neck and killed by soldiers.[61] Despite protests from Remer (who had been ordered by Hitler to arrest the conspirators), at 00:10 on 21 July the four officers were executed in the courtyard outside, possibly to prevent them from revealing Fromm's involvement.[56] Others would have been executed as well, but at 00:30 Waffen-SS personnel led by SS-Obersturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny arrived and further executions were forbidden.

Aftermath

[edit]
Admiral Karl Donitz giving a radio speech after the attempt on Hitler's life. 21 July 1944

Over the following weeks, Himmler's Gestapo, driven by a furious Hitler, rounded up nearly everyone who had the remotest connection with the plot. The discovery of letters and diaries in the homes and offices of those arrested revealed the plots of 1938, 1939, and 1943, and this led to further rounds of arrests, including that of Colonel General Franz Halder, who finished the war in a concentration camp. Under Himmler's new Sippenhaft (blood guilt) laws, many relatives of the principal plotters were also arrested in the immediate aftermath of the failed plot.[62]

Sippenhaft was proposed and introduced by Himmler and remained in effect until the end of the war. Its distribution was aimed at creating fears among Wehrmacht members for their families in the event of an attempted betrayal. At first, the practice was not regulated and was carried out chaotically, which was due to Himmler’s refusal to “establish specific rules regarding clan guardianship”, however, on 5 February 1945 Keitel’s order was issued, according to which the family of a serviceman who committed high treason was subjected to repression up to and including the death penalty. Presumably, the Sippenhaft regulation was introduced to tighten control over the military and keep them in the army during the final period of the war.[63]

Courtyard at the Bendlerblock, where Stauffenberg, Olbricht, and others were executed
Hitler visits Karl-Jesko von Puttkamer in the Carlshof hospital.
Funeral of General Günther Korten at the Tannenberg Memorial

Particularly noteworthy in considering this issue is the scientific publication of Robert Loeffel. In his study, Loeffel came to the conclusion that Sippenhaft, as part of state terror at the end of the war, was a means of intimidation within Nazi Germany, when in reality this practice was not always applied, and most of the terror was adopted only after 20 July. This was due to its duality: terror was implemented only in quantities necessary to maintain a level of fear among the population that would not lead them to go over to the side of resistance.[64]

More than 7,000 people were arrested[65] and 4,980 were executed.[66] Not all of them were connected with the plot, since the Gestapo used the occasion to settle scores with many other people suspected of opposition sympathies. Alfons Heck, a former Hitler Youth member and later a historian, describes the reaction many Germans felt to the punishments of the conspirators:

When I heard that German officers had tried to kill Adolf Hitler ... I was enraged. I fully concurred with the sentences imposed on them, strangling I felt was too good for them; this was the time, precisely, when we were at a very ... precarious military situation. And the only man who could possibly stave off disaster ... was Adolf Hitler. That opinion was shared by many Germans, Germans who did not adore Hitler, who did not belong to the [Nazi] Party.

Allied radio stations also speculated on who the possible remaining suspects could be, many of whom were eventually implicated in the plot.[67]

Very few of the plotters tried to escape or to deny their guilt when arrested. Those who survived interrogation were given perfunctory trials before the People's Court, a kangaroo court that always decided in favour of the prosecution. The court's president, Roland Freisler, was a fanatical Nazi seen shouting furiously and insulting the accused in the trial, which was filmed for propaganda purposes. The plotters were stripped of their uniforms and given old, shabby clothing to humiliate them for the cameras.[68] The officers involved in the plot were "tried" before the Court of Military Honour, a drumhead court-martial that merely considered the evidence furnished to it by the Gestapo before expelling the accused from the Army in disgrace and handing them over to the People's Court.[69][page needed]

The first trials were held on 7 and 8 August 1944. Hitler had ordered that those found guilty should be "hanged like cattle".[68] Many people took their own lives prior to either their trial or their execution, including Kluge, who was accused of having knowledge of the plot beforehand and not revealing it to Hitler. Stülpnagel tried to commit suicide, but survived and was hanged.

Hitler's bust in the Storting is decorated with flowers following the assassination attempt on 20 July 1944.

Tresckow killed himself the day after the failed plot by use of a hand grenade in no man's land between Soviet and German lines. Adjutant General Fabian von Schlabrendorff recalled Tresckow saying the following before his death:

The whole world will vilify us now, but I am still totally convinced that we did the right thing. Hitler is the archenemy not only of Germany but of the world. When, in few hours' time, I go before God to account for what I have done and left undone, I know I will be able to justify what I did in the struggle against Hitler. None of us can bewail his own death; those who consented to join our circle put on the robe of Nessus. A human being's moral integrity begins when he is prepared to sacrifice his life for his convictions.[70]

Fromm's attempt to win favour by executing Stauffenberg and others on the night of 20 July had merely exposed his own previous lack of action and apparent failure to report the plot. Having been arrested on 21 July, Fromm was later convicted and sentenced to death by the People's Court. Despite his knowledge of the conspiracy, his formal sentence charged him with poor performance in his duties. He was executed in Brandenburg an der Havel. Hitler personally commuted his death sentence from hanging to the "more honourable" firing squad. Erwin Planck, the son of the physicist Max Planck, was executed for his involvement.[71][72]

A report of SS-Obergruppenführer Ernst Kaltenbrunner to Hitler dated 29 November 1944 on the background of the plot states that the Pope was somehow a conspirator, specifically naming Eugenio Pacelli, Pope Pius XII, as being a party in the attempt.[73] Evidence indicates that the 20 July plotters Colonel Wessel von Freytag-Loringhoven, Colonel Erwin von Lahousen, and Admiral Wilhelm Canaris were involved in the foiling of Hitler's alleged plot to kidnap or murder Pope Pius XII in 1943, when Canaris reported the plot to Italian counterintelligence officer General Cesare Amè, who passed on the information.[74][75]

A member of the SA convicted of participating in the plot was SA-Obergruppenführer Wolf-Heinrich Graf von Helldorf, who was the Orpo Police Chief of Berlin and had been in contact with members of the resistance since before the war. Collaborating closely with SS-Gruppenführer Arthur Nebe, he was supposed to direct all police forces in Berlin to stand down and not interfere in the military actions to seize the government. However, his actions on 20 July had minimal influence on the events. For his involvement in the conspiracy, he was later arrested, convicted of treason and executed.[76]

After 3 February 1945, when Freisler was killed in an American air raid, there were no more formal trials, but as late as April, with the war weeks away from its end, Canaris' diary was found, and many more people were implicated. Hans Von Dohnanyi was accused of being the "spiritual leader" of the conspiracy to assassinate Hitler, and executed on 6 April 1945. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, whom Von Dohnanyi had recruited into the Abwehr, was executed 9 April 1945 along with Canaris, Oster, and four others. Executions continued and ramped up into the last days of the war, as the Nazis were determined to take down as many of their enemies with them as they possibly could.

Hitler took his survival to be a "divine moment in history",[citation needed] and commissioned a special decoration to be made for each person wounded or killed in the blast. The result was the Wound Badge of 20 July 1944. The badges were struck in three values: gold, silver, and black. (The colours denoted the severity of the wounds received by each recipient.) A total of 100 badges were manufactured,[77] and 47 are believed to have actually been awarded. Each badge was accompanied by an ornate award document personally signed by Hitler. The badges themselves bore a facsimile of his signature, making them among the rarest decorations to have been awarded by Nazi Germany.[78]

For his role in stopping the coup Major Remer was promoted to colonel and ended the war as a Major General. After the war he co-founded the Socialist Reich Party and remained a prominent neo-Nazi and advocate of Holocaust denial until his death in 1997.[79]

Major Philipp von Boeselager, the German officer who provided the plastic explosives used in the bomb, escaped detection and survived the war. He was the second-to-last survivor of those involved in the plot and died on 1 May 2008, aged 90.[80] The last survivor of the 20 July Plot was Oberleutnant Ewald-Heinrich von Kleist-Schmenzin, the thwarted plotter of just a few months before. He died on 8 March 2013, aged 90.[81]

As a result of the failed coup, every member of the Wehrmacht was required to reswear his loyalty oath, by name, to Hitler and on 24 July 1944 the military salute was replaced throughout the armed forces with the Hitler Salute in which the arm was outstretched and the salutation Heil Hitler was given.[82]

Planned government

[edit]

The conspirators had earlier designated positions in secret to form a government that would take office after the assassination of Hitler were it to prove successful. Because of the plot's failure, such a government never rose to power and most of its members were executed.

The following were intended for these roles as at July 1944:[83]

It was planned to include one Austrian politician (probably Heinrich Gleißner or Karl Seitz) as minister without portfolio to keep Austria in the Reich.

Albert Speer was listed in several notes of the conspirators as a possible Minister of Armaments; however, most of these notes stated Speer should not be approached until after Hitler was dead and one conjectural government chart had a question mark beside Speer's name. This (in addition to Speer being one of Hitler's closest and most trusted friends) most likely saved Speer from arrest by the SS.[84]

Wilhelm, Crown Prince of Germany, was also under suspicion as he was touted to be head of state after Hitler. He was placed under the supervision of the Gestapo and his home in the Cecilienhof at Potsdam watched.[85]: 11–15 

Erwin Rommel's involvement

[edit]

The extent of Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel's involvement in the military's resistance against Hitler or the 20 July plot is difficult to ascertain, as most of the leaders who were directly involved did not survive and limited documentation on the conspirators' plans and preparations exists. Historians' opinions on this matter vary greatly. According to Peter Hoffmann, he had turned into Hitler's resolute opponent and in the end supported the coup (though not the assassination itself). He was even the natural leader of the opposition in France to some extent, considering the fact he had drawn many military and political personnel into his orbit in preparation of a "Western solution".[86] Ralf Georg Reuth thinks that the conspirators perhaps mistook Rommel's ambiguous attitude for approval of the assassination. In this regard, it should be remembered that the conspirators normally did not explicitly mention the assassination. Rommel for his part was in fact both very naive and very attached to Hitler (who was the personification of National Socialism, which had provided Rommel with a great career). Thus even if Caesar von Hofacker—personal advisor to Stülpnagel— had mentioned a violent upheaval in Berlin, Rommel would perhaps not have interpreted it as an assassination.[87] Thus, Rommel's participation remains ambiguous and the perception of it largely has its source in the subsequent events (especially Rommel's forced suicide) and the accounts by surviving participants.[88]

According to a post-war account by Karl Strölin, the Oberbürgermeister of Stuttgart at that time, he and two other conspirators, Alexander von Falkenhausen and Carl Heinrich von Stülpnagel began efforts to bring Rommel into the anti-Hitler conspiracy in early 1944.[89] On 15 April 1944 Rommel's new chief of staff, Hans Speidel, arrived in Normandy and reintroduced Rommel to Stülpnagel.[90] Speidel had previously been connected to Carl Goerdeler, the civilian leader of the resistance, but not to the plotters led by Stauffenberg, and only came to the attention of Stauffenberg due to his appointment to Rommel's headquarters. The conspirators felt they needed the support of a field marshal on active duty. Witzleben was a field marshal, but had not been on active duty since 1942. The conspirators gave instructions to Speidel to bring Rommel into their circle.[91]

Speidel met with the former foreign minister Konstantin von Neurath and Strölin on 27 May in Germany, ostensibly at Rommel's request, although the latter was not present. Neurath and Strölin suggested opening immediate surrender negotiations in the West, and, according to Speidel, Rommel agreed to further discussions and preparations.[92] Around the same timeframe, however, the plotters in Berlin were not aware that Rommel had reportedly decided to take part in the conspiracy. On 16 May, they informed Allen Dulles, through whom they hoped to negotiate with the Western Allies, that Rommel could not be counted on for support.[93] Three days before the assassination attempt, on 17 July, Rommel's staff car was strafed by an Allied aircraft in France; he was hospitalised with major injuries and incapacitated on 20 July.

Rommel opposed assassinating Hitler. After the war, his widow maintained that he believed an assassination attempt would spark a civil war.[94] According to the journalist and author William L. Shirer, Rommel knew about the conspiracy and advocated that Hitler be arrested and placed on trial. The historian Ian Becket argues that "there is no credible evidence that Rommel had more than limited and superficial knowledge of the plot" and concludes that he would not have acted to aid the plotters in the aftermath of the attempt on 20 July,[88] while the historian Ralf Georg Reuth contends that "there was no indication of any active participation of Rommel in the conspiracy."[95] The historian Richard J. Evans concluded that he knew of a plot, but was not involved.[96]

What is not debated are the results of the failed bomb plot of 20 July. Many conspirators were arrested and the dragnet expanded to thousands.[97] Consequently, it did not take long for Rommel to come under suspicion. He was primarily implicated through his connection to Kluge.[88] Rommel's name also came up in confessions made under torture by Stülpnagel and Hofacker, and was included in Goerdeler's papers on a list of potential supporters.[98][99] Hofacker confessed that Rommel had agreed to demand for Hitler to step down, and if he refused, Rommel would join the other conspirators in deposing Hitler. Rommel was also planned to become a member of the post-Hitler government in papers drawn up by Goerdeler.[100]

Hitler knew it would cause a major scandal on the home front to have the popular Rommel publicly branded as a traitor. With this in mind, he opted to give Rommel the option of suicide via cyanide or a public trial by Freisler's People's Court. Rommel was well aware that being hauled before the People's Court was tantamount to a death sentence. He also knew that if he chose to stand trial, his family would have been severely punished even before the all-but-certain conviction and execution. With this in mind, he committed suicide on 14 October 1944. He was buried with full military honours and his family was spared from persecution; his cause of death did not come to light until after the war.[96]

Criticism

[edit]

Involvement in war crimes and atrocities

[edit]
General Erich Hoepner at the Volksgerichtshof. In 1941, Hoepner called for an extermination war against the Slavs in the Soviet Union.[101]

Involvement of the plotters in war crimes and atrocities has been studied by historians such as Christian Gerlach.[102] Gerlach proved that plotters such as Tresckow and Gersdorff were aware of mass murder happening in the East from at least 1941. He writes: "Especially with reference to the murder of the Jews, [it is said that] 'the SS' had deceived the officers by killing in secret, filing incomplete reports or none at all; if general staff officers protested, the SS threatened them." Gerlach concludes: "This is, of course, nonsense."[citation needed]

Tresckow also "signed orders for the deportation of thousands of orphaned children for forced labor in the Reich"—the so-called Heu-Aktion. Such actions led historians to question the motives of the plotters, which seemed more concerned with the military situation than with Nazi atrocities and German war crimes.[citation needed] However some others assert that, in such actions, Tresckow had to act out of principle to continue with his coup plans.[103]

Gerlach pointed out that the plotters had "selective moral criteria" and while they were concerned about Jews being exterminated in the Holocaust, they were far less disturbed about mass murder of civilians in the East.[104] To Gerlach, the primary motivation of the plotters was to ensure German victory in the war or at least prevent defeat.[104] Gerlach's arguments were later supported by the historian Hans Mommsen, who stated that the plotters were interested above all in military victory.[105][106] However, Gerlach's arguments were also criticised by some scholars, among them Peter Hoffmann from McGill University and Klaus Jochen Arnold [de] from the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. While acknowledging that Tresckow and other 20 July conspirators had been involved in war crimes, Arnold writes that Gerlach's argument is oversimplified.[107] In 2011 Danny Orbach, a Harvard University-based historian, wrote that Gerlach's reading of the sources is highly skewed, and, at times, diametrically opposed to what they actually say. In one case, according to Orbach, Gerlach had falsely paraphrased the memoir of the resistance fighter Colonel Rudolf Christoph Freiherr von Gersdorff, and in another case, quoted misleadingly from an SS document.[108]

Commemoration and collective memory

[edit]

A 1951 survey by the Allensbach Institute revealed that "Only a third of respondents had a positive opinion about the men and women who had tried unsuccessfully to overthrow the Nazi regime."[109]

The "first official memorial service for the resistance fighters of 20 July" was held on the tenth anniversary in 1954. In his speech at the event, Theodor Heuss, the first President of the Federal Republic of Germany, said that "harsh words" were necessary, and that "There have been cases of refusal to carry out orders that have achieved historic greatness."[109] After this speech, public opinion in Germany began to shift.

Nonetheless, a 1956 proposal to name a school after Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg was opposed by a majority of citizens, and, according to Deutsche Welle (in 2014):

East Germany's communist leadership had ignored the assassination attempt for decades, mainly because the conservative and aristocratic conspirators around Stauffenberg did not match the socialist ideal.[109]

The first all-German commemoration of the event did not take place until 1990. In 2013 the last surviving member of the plot, Ewald-Heinrich von Kleist-Schmenzin, died in Munich.[110] As of 2014, the resistance fighters are generally considered heroes in Germany, according to Deutsche Welle.[109]

See also

[edit]

Citations

[edit]
  1. ^ Kahn, Arthur D. (2003). "2 We do Not Call Upon the Germans to Revolt fall 1944". Experiment in Occupation. Penn State University Press. pp. 13–20. doi:10.1515/9780271022758-005. ISBN 978-0-271-02275-8.
  2. ^ Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality (1948). Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Supplement B. United States Government Printing Office. p. 1688.
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  4. ^ "July Plot". Britannica. Archived from the original on 15 March 2023. Retrieved 7 March 2021.
  5. ^ According to Shirer, Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1960, p. 1393.
  6. ^ Hans Helmut Kirst "20th of July"
  7. ^ Winston Churchill, war annual books, "1944"
  8. ^ William L. Shirer The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, part IV, chapter "20th July"
  9. ^ Klemens von Klemperer, German Resistance against Hitler: The Search for Allies Abroad 1938–1945
  10. ^ Hoffmann 1996, pp. 608–609.
  11. ^ Hans Magnus Enzensberger: Hammerstein oder Der Eigensinn. Eine deutsche Geschichte. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp 2008, ISBN 978-3-518-41960-1
  12. ^ "Carl Goerdeler". Britannica. Archived from the original on 25 November 2020. Retrieved 7 March 2021.
  13. ^ "Helmuth James Graf von Moltke". Gedenkstatte Deutscher Widerstand. Archived from the original on 2 July 2024. Retrieved 7 March 2021.
  14. ^ Kurtz 1946, p. 224.
  15. ^ Wheeler-Bennett 1967, p. 471
  16. ^ a b c Kurtz 1946, p. 226.
  17. ^ Fest 1997, p. 188.
  18. ^ "Another Plot to Kill Hitler Foiled". History.com. Archived from the original on 21 March 2021. Retrieved 7 March 2021.
  19. ^ von Schlabrendorff, Fabian, They Almost Killed Hitler, p. 39.
  20. ^ Encyclopedia of Contemporary German Culture, "The heroes of West German accounts at this time were the men involved in the largely conservative, nationalist resistance of the July Plot of 1944. It was not until much later that a new generation of left-liberal historians pointed out how little many involved in the July Plot actually sympathized with or understood democratic ideas. John Sandford. 2013.
  21. ^ Faith and Democracy: Political Transformations at the German Protestant Kirchentag, 1949–1969 Benjamin Carl Pearson 2007 Similarly, one could argue that the conservative, nationalist resistance circles that grew up during the war years, whose activity culminated in the July 1944 Officers Plot
  22. ^ Evans 2015, p. 198.
  23. ^ Evans 2009b.
  24. ^ "Der 20. Juli 1944 – Attentat auf Adolf Hitler". 26 June 2014. Archived from the original on 20 July 2021. Retrieved 22 July 2021.
  25. ^ Hans Coppi Jr.; 'Der vergessene Widerstand der Arbeiter: Gewerkschafter, Kommunisten, Sozialdemokraten, Trotzkisten, Anarchisten und Zwangsarbeiter'; pp. 154–157
  26. ^ Evans 2015, pp. 198–199.
  27. ^ German Foreign Policy. Klaus Hilderbrand. pp. 185–188
  28. ^ Alternatives to Hitler: German Resistance Under the Third Reich. Hans Mommsen. p. 161
  29. ^ German Foreign Policy Klaus Hilderbrand, page 188
  30. ^ Peter Hoffman Stauffenberg: A Family History, 1905–1944; p. 116; 2003 McGill-Queen's Press
  31. ^ War of extermination p. 137.
  32. ^ A Concise History of Germany. p. 200. Mary Fulbrook
  33. ^ Goerdeler, Carl; Beck, Ludwig (1944). "Draft for a government policy statement" (PDF). German Resistance Memorial Center (in German).
  34. ^ Kaminski, Joseph. "The Plots to Kill Hitler". Archived from the original on 7 April 2015.
  35. ^ a b "Operation Valkyrie 1944". University of Cambridge. 27 April 2015. Archived from the original on 3 February 2021. Retrieved 7 March 2021.
  36. ^ Jones, Nigel (2009). Countdown to Valkyrie: The July Plot to Assassinate Hitler. Pen & Sword Books. ISBN 978-1783461455. Archived from the original on 11 April 2023. Retrieved 7 March 2021.
  37. ^ Fest 1997, p. 219.
  38. ^ Hoffmann, Peter (2007). "Oberst i.G. Henning von Tresckow und die Staatsstreichspläne im Jahr 1943". Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte. 55 (2): 331–364. doi:10.1524/VfZg.2007.55.2.331. S2CID 143574023.
  39. ^ Fest 1997, p. 220.
  40. ^ Moorhouse 2007, p. 241.
  41. ^ a b Andrews, Evan (29 April 2015). "6 Assassination Attempts on Adolf Hitler". History.com. Archived from the original on 7 March 2021. Retrieved 7 March 2021.
  42. ^ a b c "Killing Hitler: The Many Assassination Attempts on Adolf Hitler". History.uk. Archived from the original on 26 February 2021. Retrieved 7 March 2021.
  43. ^ Fest 1997, p. 236.
  44. ^ Fest 1997, p. 228.
  45. ^ Himmler's contacts with the opposition and his possible motives are discussed by Padfield, Himmler, pp. 419–424.
  46. ^ "6 assassination attempts on Hitler". Geopol Intelligence. 28 August 2015. Archived from the original on 13 November 2016. Retrieved 23 June 2018.
  47. ^ Hoffman, Peter (1996). The History of the German Resistance, 1933–1945. McGill-Queen's Press. ISBN 0773515313.
  48. ^ Thomsett, Michael C. (1997). The German Opposition to Hitler: The Resistance, the Underground, and Assassination Plots, 1938–1945. McFarland. ISBN 0786403721.
  49. ^ a b c "20. Juli 1944, 12 Uhr: Der Anschlag". Der Spiegel. 20 July 2004. Archived from the original on 16 June 2012. Retrieved 17 November 2019 – via Spiegel Online.
  50. ^ Johnson, Steven (2021). Extra Life (1st ed.). Riverhead Books. pp. 166–167. ISBN 978-0-525-53885-1.
  51. ^ Germany remembers the plot to kill hitler at dw Archived 22 July 2023 at the Wayback Machine. Retrieved 22 July 2015
  52. ^ Gitta Sereny (1996). Albert Speer His Battle with the Truth. Picador. ISBN 0330346970.
  53. ^ Martin A. Allen (2005). Himmler's Secret War: The Covert Peace Negotiations of Heinrich Himmler. Robson Books. ISBN 1861058896.
  54. ^ Galante & Silianoff 1981, photo insert section.
  55. ^ German radio broadcast 10 July 2010 Archived 5 June 2011 at the Wayback Machine on Bayern1 (written version; in German)
  56. ^ a b c Kurtz 1946, p. 227.
  57. ^ Galante & Silianoff 1981, pp. 11–12.
  58. ^ a b Galante & Silianoff 1981, p. 209.
  59. ^ Hoffmann 1996, p. 426.
  60. ^ Fest 1997, pp. 270–272.
  61. ^ "July Plot". History.com. 9 November 2009. Archived from the original on 4 February 2021. Retrieved 7 March 2021.
  62. ^ Loeffel, Robert (2012). Family Punishment in Nazi Germany: Sippenhaft, Terror and Myth. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0230343054.[permanent dead link]
  63. ^ Terentiev V.O. Consequences of the assassination attempt on Hitler on July 20, 1944 for the internal politics of the Third Reich Archived 19 June 2024 at the Wayback Machine // Klio. №5 (209). 2024. P. 59
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  65. ^ The Gestapo claimed 7,000 arrests. This can be found in William L. Shirer's Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, ch. 29.
  66. ^ Kershaw, Ian. Hitler 1936–1945: Nemesis, p. 693.
  67. ^ Metternich, Tatiana (1976). Purgatory of Fools. Quadrangle. p. 202. ISBN 0812906918.
  68. ^ a b See Shirer 1070–1071.
  69. ^ William Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (Touchstone Edition) (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990)
  70. ^ Fest 1997, pp. 289–290.
  71. ^ "Alleged July Plot Conspirators Executed in Plötzensee Prison". Archived from the original on 9 May 2008. Retrieved 19 April 2009.
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  82. ^ Büchner 1991.
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  84. ^ Speer, Albert. Inside the Third Reich.
  85. ^ Müller, Heike; Berndt, Harald (2006). Schloss Cecilienhof und die Konferenz von Potsdam 1945 (German). Stiftung Preussische Schlösser und Gärten. ISBN 3-910068-16-2.
  86. ^ Hoffmann 1996, pp. 351–354.
  87. ^ Reuth 2005, pp. 177–178.
  88. ^ a b c Beckett 2014, p. 6.
  89. ^ Shirer 2011, pp. 1031, 1177.
  90. ^ Hart 2014, pp. 142–150.
  91. ^ Hart 2014, pp. 139–142.
  92. ^ Hart 2014, p. 146.
  93. ^ Hart 2014, pp. 145–146.
  94. ^ Hart 2014, p. 140.
  95. ^ Reuth 2005, p. tbd.
  96. ^ a b Evans 2009, p. 642.
  97. ^ Hart 2014, p. 152.
  98. ^ Hart 2014, pp. 141, 152.
  99. ^ Reuth 2005, p. 183.
  100. ^ Jones, Nigel H. (2008). Countdown to Valkyrie: The July Plot to Assassinate Hitler. Philadelphia: Casemate. p. 261. ISBN 978-1848325081.
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Bibliography

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from Grokipedia
The 20 July plot was a failed assassination attempt against orchestrated by senior German military officers on 20 July 1944 at his headquarters in Rastenburg, (now , ). Colonel Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg, who had initially supported the Nazi regime but grew disillusioned amid mounting military defeats, placed a in a during a briefing; the explosion killed four others but only wounded Hitler due to a shifted table and sturdy construction of the room. Codename , the plot repurposed an existing emergency plan for mobilizing the Reserve Army to secure government functions, with the aim of arresting Nazi leaders like and , installing a new administration under figures such as as chancellor and General as head of state, and negotiating an armistice with the Western Allies to avert total defeat and . The conspirators, drawn from conservative nationalist circles within the and civil service rather than broad ideological opposition, sought to preserve core German territorial gains from earlier wars while ending the conflict that had turned disastrous after Stalingrad and ; their motivations stemmed primarily from pragmatic recognition of inevitable loss under Hitler's absolute control, not uniform moral revulsion against Nazi crimes, though some like cited ethical qualms in private. Hitler's survival, confirmed via radio to co-conspirators in who hesitated to launch the coup, triggered immediate purges: and key allies were shot that evening, while the executed over 7,000 suspects in show trials and torture-extracted confessions, decimating internal dissent but failing to alter the war's trajectory toward Germany's collapse ten months later. , the plotters were rehabilitated in as symbols of moral resistance, though historical scrutiny reveals their earlier complicity in the regime's conquests and limited focus on racial policies, reflecting a selective that overlooks the broader elite's initial alignment with Hitler's . The event underscored the regime's and control, yet highlighted fractures in loyalty driven by strategic desperation rather than principled overthrow from inception.

Historical Context

Development of German Military Resistance

The opposition within the German military to Adolf Hitler's leadership emerged primarily among senior conservative officers rooted in the Prussian military tradition, who initially tolerated the Nazi regime's rearmament efforts but grew alarmed by its reckless expansionism and subordination of the armed forces to political control. In 1937, General , Chief of the Army General Staff since 1935, resisted Hitler's directives for invading , deeming the timing premature and strategically unwise. This tension escalated in 1938 amid preparations for the invasion of ; Beck warned that such aggression risked a could not sustain, authoring memoranda to high command leaders and urging a collective resignation of generals to force Hitler to reconsider, an effort that failed due to lack of unified support. Beck formally resigned on August 1, 1938, becoming the symbolic leader of nascent military resistance, forging links with civilian conservatives like Carl Goerdeler and participating in early coup planning, including a aborted 1938 scheme by officer to arrest Hitler during the Sudeten crisis. Parallel networks formed within the , Germany's military intelligence agency, where Oster, appointed deputy chief in 1937 under , leveraged the organization's autonomy to shield opponents, leak information to Allies, and facilitate early plots; Oster's anti-Nazi stance solidified after the 1934 , viewing the regime as a threat to military professionalism and ethical conduct. Concurrently, commanders like , Beck's ally and predecessor as , faced via fabricated homosexuality charges in 1938, further eroding trust in Hitler's reliability and highlighting the regime's use of blackmail against disloyal officers. These pre-war stirrings reflected not outright ideological rejection of —many officers shared nationalist aims—but pragmatic concerns over Hitler's amateurish strategy and the erosion of Kadavergehorsam (blind obedience) in favor of personal loyalty to the . The invasion of the on June 22, 1941, marked a turning point, as mounting defeats exposed Hitler's strategic errors, galvanizing field commanders into active subversion. Henning von Tresckow, chief of staff to Army Group Center under Fedor von Bock, emerged as the pivotal organizer on the Eastern Front from late 1941, recruiting officers disillusioned by atrocities and logistical failures while coordinating with Beck and Oster for bomb plots, including a failed March 13, 1943, attempt to destroy Hitler's plane using smuggled British explosives procured via channels. Tresckow's network emphasized pragmatic motives—averting national catastrophe—over moral outrage at , though some members aided covertly; by 1943, as Stalingrad's surrender in February signaled irreversible decline, he consolidated ties between Eastern Front resisters and plotters, advocating tyrannicide as a duty to preserve Germany's honor. The 's protective role waned after Canaris's dismissal in February 1944, but military dissent had evolved into a loose coalition, culminating in the adaptation of contingency plans like for regime overthrow, driven by the Allies' refusal to negotiate and the Wehrmacht's collapse on multiple fronts.

Strategic Situation on the Eastern and Western Fronts in 1944

On the Eastern Front, the Wehrmacht confronted escalating Soviet offensives that shattered its defensive posture in mid-1944. Following earlier setbacks at Stalingrad and Kursk, the Red Army initiated Operation Bagration on June 22, 1944, a massive assault involving over 1.6 million Soviet troops, 5,800 tanks, and 5,300 aircraft against German Army Group Center. This operation, executed across Belarus, inflicted approximately 390,000 German casualties—including killed, wounded, and captured—within nine weeks, effectively annihilating 28 of 34 divisions in Army Group Center and enabling Soviet advances of up to 350 miles. By late July 1944, Soviet forces had overrun Minsk on July 3 and pushed toward the Polish border, forcing the remnants of German forces to retreat to the borders of East Prussia and the Reich itself, with reserves critically depleted and unable to reconstitute coherent defenses. The scale of these losses—surpassing those at Stalingrad—stemmed from intelligence failures, Hitler's prohibition on tactical withdrawals, and the Soviet exploitation of numerical superiority in manpower and armor, which overwhelmed German positions through deep penetrations and encirclements. German morale plummeted as divisions were reduced to strength, supply lines stretched beyond capacity, and the prospect of a Soviet into the industrial heartland loomed, compelling field commanders to question the feasibility of prolonged resistance without political capitulation. On the Western Front, the Allied invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944—codenamed —involved 156,000 troops landing across five beaches, rapidly expanding into a lodgment despite German counterattacks led by Field Marshal . By July 20, 1944, the front had stabilized into grueling hedgerow combat in the region, where American, British, and Canadian forces numbered over 1 million supported by air supremacy, while German defenders under Rommel (wounded June 17) and successor committed 38 divisions but suffered from divided command and inadequate reinforcements diverted from the East. Allied forces had captured harbor by late June and partially secured , inflicting mounting attrition on German units, with total casualties in reaching toward 290,000 by campaign's end, including over 200,000 captured. Hitler's directive to hold fixed positions, coupled with V-1 and V-2 reprisals failing to disrupt Allied logistics, strained German resources as panzer divisions were mauled in futile counteroffensives like the one at , foreshadowing the breakout on July 25 that would liberate much of . This convergence of Allied momentum—bolstered by 12,000 aircraft and overwhelming —exposed the Reich's vulnerability to invasion from the west, mirroring Eastern collapses and amplifying perceptions among senior officers of an imminent total defeat absent leadership change.

Key Participants and Motivations

Central Figures and Their Backgrounds

Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg, the officer who carried out the assassination attempt on 20 July 1944, was born on 15 November 1907 into a Catholic noble family in Jettingen, Bavaria. He entered the Reichswehr as a lieutenant in 1926 after training at cadet schools in Schliechersee and Bamberg, and advanced through staff positions, including service in the 17th Cavalry Regiment. Stauffenberg saw combat in the 1939 invasion of Poland with the 6th Panzer Division and in the 1940 Western campaign, where he received the Iron Cross First Class on 31 May 1940 for his role in operations against French forces. Transferred to North Africa in 1942 as operations officer for the 10th Panzer Division under Rommel, he was severely wounded on 7 April 1943 by Allied aircraft, losing his left eye, right hand, and two fingers on his left hand, which ended his frontline duties but did not halt his career ascent. By June 1944, he served as chief of staff to the Replacement Army commander, General Friedrich Fromm, granting him access to Hitler and positioning him centrally in resistance planning. Ludwig Beck, designated as the interim head of state in the plotters' post-assassination government, was born on 29 June 1880 in Riesadorf, , and began his military service as a cadet in the in March 1888. A career staff officer, he commanded infantry regiments during and rose in the , becoming Chief of the Army General Staff on 1 September 1935. Beck resigned on 18 August 1938 in protest against Hitler's aggressive foreign policy, particularly the planned invasion of , viewing it as risking a premature could not win. Post-resignation, he coordinated civilian-military opposition networks, authoring memoranda warning of Nazi overreach and maintaining contacts with foreign diplomats to advocate for a negotiated peace. Henning von Tresckow, a chief architect of earlier assassination schemes that informed the July plot, was born on 11 October 1901 into a Prussian family and commissioned as a lieutenant in the infantry in 1924. He served on the Eastern Front from 1941 as operations officer for Army Group Center under , organizing multiple failed attempts on Hitler's life, including a March 1943 bomb plot disguised as liquor bottles. Tresckow's influence extended to recruiting and adapting for a coup, leveraging his staff expertise to build a network among officers disillusioned by defeats at Stalingrad and . Transferred to counter-espionage duties after suspicions arose, he committed on 21 July 1944 near to evade capture. Field Marshal , slated to command the post-coup, was born on 4 December 1881 in Breslau and joined the as a in the 7th Grenadier Regiment on 23 March 1901. A veteran who commanded a regiment by 1918, he retained his commission in the reduced , advancing to command I Military District in 1930 and the 2nd Infantry Division. Promoted to field marshal on 19 July 1940 after leading Army Group D's occupation forces in , Witzleben grew antagonistic toward Hitler over strategic blunders and the Night of the Long Knives, joining the resistance by 1938 and coordinating with . Retired in 1942 but recalled for plot logistics, he was arrested after the failure. Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, a civilian counterpart envisioned as chancellor, was born on 31 July 1884 in Neidenburg, , and pursued a career, becoming of in 1920 and in 1930. Appointed Reich Price Commissioner in 1931 under Chancellor , he continued under the Nazis until resigning in 1935 over economic policy disputes and opposition to rearmament's inflationary risks. Goerdeler traveled abroad from 1937, leaking intelligence on Nazi intentions to British and American contacts while drafting post-Hitler constitutional plans emphasizing and anti-totalitarianism, though his conservative monarchist views clashed with some military plotters.

Ideological and Personal Drivers

The conspirators in the 20 July plot were driven by a combination of ideological opposition to Nazi totalitarianism and personal experiences of the regime's failures and moral depravities. Many, including Claus von Stauffenberg and Ludwig Beck, initially aligned with Hitler's early nationalist and anti-Versailles policies but grew disillusioned by the regime's unchecked power, corruption, and deviation from traditional German conservative values such as the rule of law, military honor, and Christian ethics. Their resistance emphasized restoring a post-Hitler order that prioritized national survival over ideological purity, often envisioning an authoritarian but non-totalitarian government—potentially under a restored monarchy or military dictatorship—rather than liberal democracy. This stance reflected a patriotic imperative to avert Germany's complete destruction, influenced by strategic realism amid mounting defeats on the Eastern Front after Stalingrad in February 1943 and the Allied invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944. Ideologically, figures like Carl Goerdeler opposed the Nazis' racial extremism and anti-Semitic policies, viewing them as antithetical to civilized governance and economically ruinous, though their primary focus was salvaging German sovereignty through honorable negotiations with the Western Allies while continuing resistance against the . , who resigned as on 18 1938 over Hitler's aggressive plans for , saw the Führer's leadership as a path to national suicide, prioritizing professional military judgment and constitutional principles over absolutism. Christian influences were prominent, particularly among Catholic and Protestant circles; Stauffenberg's exposure to the Kreisau Circle's ethical discussions reinforced a duty to act against the regime's program (, initiated in 1939) and SS atrocities, framing resistance as rooted in rather than . On a personal level, Stauffenberg's transformation was catalyzed by his severe wounding in on 7 April 1943—losing his left eye, right hand, and two fingers on his left hand—which deepened his contempt for Hitler's strategic incompetence and the Wehrmacht's subjugation to party ideologues. Influenced by his brothers and wife Nina, who shared anti-Nazi sentiments, he rejected the regime after witnessing Eastern Front brutalities and internal purges, declaring in that "the system as a whole must be destroyed" to rebuild ethically. Beck's personal driver stemmed from principled isolation after resignation, collaborating with Goerdeler to network conservative elites disillusioned by the Night of the Long Knives in June 1934 and the SS's rise, viewing inaction as complicity in catastrophe. Goerdeler's global travels as price commissioner exposed him to the regime's economic mismanagement and diplomatic isolation, fueling a personal crusade against Hitler's "criminal folly" by 1941. These drivers converged in a resolve for , justified not by abstract but by causal necessity: removing Hitler to enable a coup that could activate and sue for peace before became inevitable.

Planning and Preparation

Adaptation of Operation Valkyrie

, originally designated Unternehmen Walküre, was a developed by the High Command to enable the Reserve Army to suppress internal disturbances, such as potential uprisings by foreign forced laborers or breakdowns in civil order resulting from Allied bombing campaigns; had personally approved the plan to ensure functions during such crises. Conspirators within the German military resistance, recognizing the plan's potential for rapid mobilization of forces under army control, began modifying it in 1943 to serve as the framework for a following Hitler's assassination. General , deputy commander of the Reserve Army, initiated revisions to expand the plan's scope, which Colonel further developed in August and September 1943 by drafting supplementary orders that authorized the army to disarm SS and police units, occupy key government buildings, and neutralize officials under the pretext of quelling a fabricated SS-led insurrection. By mid-1944, Colonel , appointed Chief of Staff of the Reserve Army on July 1, refined these adaptations to address evolving wartime conditions, including the Allied invasion of Normandy, ensuring the orders could be issued swiftly from the in to activate Reserve Army districts across . The modified directives instructed commanders to seize telecommunications centers, radio stations, and administrative hubs in major cities; arrest high-ranking SS leaders like and Heinrich Müller, as well as propaganda minister ; and proclaim a new led by Carl Goerdeler as Chancellor and as head of state, with the aim of negotiating an end to the war. These alterations transformed from a defensive measure into an offensive instrument for , bypassing the to Hitler by framing the post-assassination actions as a response to "terrorist" elements within the SS and Party, thereby legitimizing army intervention without immediate declaration of Hitler's death until control was secured. The final version included coded signals—""—to initiate operations, with and Olbricht prepared to issue them upon confirmation of the on , 1944.

Coordination Among Conspirators

The core coordination among the 20 July plot's conspirators centered on a small group of high-ranking officers who leveraged their official positions for covert collaboration, primarily through face-to-face meetings in Berlin's headquarters of the Reserve Army. Colonel , appointed of the Reserve Army on 1 July 1944, collaborated directly with General , his superior at the General Army Office since Stauffenberg's transfer there in September 1943, and Olbricht's chief of staff, Colonel , to modify —a pre-existing for quelling internal unrest—into a mechanism for seizing key government sites and disarming SS units following Hitler's assassination. Major General , serving with Army Group Center on the Eastern Front, served as an early architect and coordinator, working with Olbricht to refine elements as far back as 1943 and dispatching trusted aides to to align 's operational role with broader resistance efforts; in mid-July , Tresckow personally reinforced Stauffenberg's commitment via intermediaries, emphasizing the moral imperative to act amid Germany's collapsing fronts. Retired General , the plot's intended head of state, participated in strategic discussions with this military nucleus, providing non-operational guidance drawn from his pre-war General Staff experience, though his influence waned as Stauffenberg assumed tactical leadership. To minimize detection by the , communication avoided written records, relying instead on verbal agreements during Stauffenberg's frequent visits, coded references in official military correspondence, and select couriers for frontline-to-capital relays; this approach enabled aborted attempts on 15 July and earlier dates but exposed vulnerabilities, as prior failures stemmed from incomplete synchronization, such as unconfirmed Hitler sightings or hesitancy among peripheral allies. Efforts to expand coordination involved approaching commanders of the 17 Wehrkreise (military districts) for implementation, with Olbricht and Mertz von Quirnheim dispatching preparatory orders under guises of routine exercises, though many district leaders—wary of unverified Hitler death reports—required direct phone confirmation from , revealing the plot's dependence on rapid post-assassination verification via severed Eastern Front communications. The inner circle's trust-based model, forged through shared frontline disillusionment and anti-Nazi convictions, facilitated 's adaptation but faltered under time pressures, as 's dual roles in Rastenburg briefings and command necessitated last-minute adjustments without full network rehearsal.

Execution of the Assassination Attempt

Events at the Wolf's Lair on 20 July 1944

On 20 July 1944, Colonel , chief of staff to General , commander of the Reserve Army, arrived at the (Wolfsschanze), Adolf Hitler's forward headquarters near Rastenburg in , accompanied by his aide Lieutenant . The Führerhauptquartier Wolfsschanze employed multi-layered preventive security to counter internal disturbances, centered on three restricted zones (Sperrkreis III outer, Sperrkreis II middle, Sperrkreis I inner containing Hitler's quarters). Access required special permits, personal searches, and escorts; weapons were banned in inner zones. Security was managed by the Reichssicherheitsdienst (RSD), SS guards, and Führerbegleitbataillon, with the system focused on prevention via strict access control, surveillance, and loyalty checks rather than specific pre-defined protocols for responding to internal threats. They had flown from earlier that morning, with Stauffenberg carrying a containing a timed composed of two 1-kilogram blocks of and a British . Due to time constraints during the flight preparations, only one was fully armed in a nearby washroom shortly before the 12:30 p.m. briefing, as a guard interrupted the process of arming the second. The daily military briefing, attended by Hitler and about 20-24 officers including Field Marshal , General , and others, began approximately 30 minutes early at around 12:40 p.m. in the wooden conference barrack, prompted by the summer heat with windows left open for ventilation. entered the room, placed the briefcase on the floor under the heavy oak conference table near Hitler while pretending to adjust maps, positioning it as close as possible to the Führer amid the crowded space. Moments later, citing a need to answer a phone call, excused himself and left the barrack with Haeften, who carried the disarmed second bomb. The bomb detonated at precisely 12:42 p.m., creating a massive blast that demolished much of the conference room, shattered windows, and ignited fires, killing four men outright—General (Hitler's chief adjutant), (who had unwittingly moved the briefcase slightly farther from Hitler to make room for another attendee, placing it against a thick table leg), General Walter Scherff (Hitler's military chronicler), and the stenographer Heinz Berger—and severely injuring several others, including and . Hitler survived with minor injuries, including perforated eardrums, burns, and shredded trousers, largely because the solid support of the conference table absorbed and deflected the bulk of the explosion's force away from him, while the open windows dissipated the blast pressure that might otherwise have confined and intensified the shockwave in a sealed room. The wooden construction of the barrack, though splintering lethally in some directions, contributed to the uneven distribution of the blast compared to a . In the immediate aftermath, chaos ensued as guards and staff rushed to the scene; Hitler emerged from the shaken but alive, reportedly exclaiming about divine and crediting architectural features for his . and Haeften, having retrieved a under the pretext of the "attack," witnessed the explosion's smoke plume from afar and departed the compound by plane around 1:00 p.m., heading back to under the assumption—based on initial reports of total destruction—that Hitler had been killed. Confirmation of Hitler's reached the plotters only after their return, as security tightened at the Lair but initial communications delays hindered rapid dissemination.

Simultaneous Actions in Berlin and Elsewhere

As Colonel departed the following the 12:42 p.m. explosion on 20 July 1944, co-conspirators in prematurely initiated around 4:00 p.m. under Generals and at the headquarters of the Reserve Army. arrived shortly thereafter via Rangsdorf airfield, joining efforts to issue teletype orders mobilizing Reserve Army units to secure the government quarter, communication centers, and transportation hubs while arresting key Nazi figures such as and . , the military district commander, directed troops to advance on central , but implementation faltered due to conflicting signals, hesitation among subordinate officers loyal to the Nazis, and failure to seize radio stations for propaganda control. Simultaneously, parallel measures unfolded in occupied territories to neutralize and elements. In , Military Governor Karl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel exploited orders to direct the arrest of approximately 1,200 and SD personnel between 9:30 and 10:30 p.m., targeting sites like and Boulevard Lannes, temporarily disempowering these forces for several hours. In , , and , local commanders initially complied with directives in the early evening, arresting and functionaries to consolidate military authority, though these actions dissolved amid confusion from dueling telexes confirming Hitler's survival. The decentralized rollout relied on pre-distributed Valkyrie protocols adapted for coup purposes, aiming to portray the moves as responses to fictitious unrest while sidelining Nazi loyalists. However, delays in —exacerbated by General Friedrich Fromm's vacillation and the plotters' inability to suppress news of Hitler's survival via a 6:28 p.m. radio broadcast—cascaded failures outward, prompting reversals and releases by late evening as loyalty to the regime reasserted itself. In , for instance, detainees were freed upon verification of the Führer's condition, underscoring the plot's dependence on rapid, unified execution across disparate commands.

Failure and Immediate Aftermath

Reasons for the Plot's Collapse

The failure of the assassination attempt initiated the plot's collapse. At 12:42 p.m. on 20 July 1944, the single detonated bomb exploded in the briefing room, killing four others but inflicting only minor injuries on , including shredded trousers, a perforated eardrum, and superficial burns. The briefcase had been repositioned by Colonel away from Hitler to accommodate a large , placing it behind a thick oak table leg that absorbed much of the blast's force. The room's wooden walls and open windows further dissipated the explosion's energy upward and outward, reducing its confined lethality. Stauffenberg had armed only one of two planned bombs due to time constraints from an interrupting phone call to . Stauffenberg's hasty departure compounded the issue. Having exited the room minutes earlier for the call, he witnessed the explosion's smoke from outside and inferred Hitler's death without inspection. He bluffed past three security checkpoints at the en route to an airfield, then flew approximately miles to 's Bendlerblock headquarters to activate . This assumption-driven exit precluded on-site confirmation and allowed Hitler's aides to stabilize him and initiate contact with Berlin. In , operational delays and indecision stalled the coup. Conspirators, including General , partially mobilized the Reserve Army for arrests of Nazi officials but withheld full implementation pending assassination verification. Communication lags—exacerbated by reliance on couriers and uncertain phone lines—fueled hesitation amid unconfirmed reports. Hitler telephoned Propaganda Minister around 4:00 p.m., and a radio address by Hitler's voice at approximately 6:30 p.m. broadcast his survival, prompting immediate defections. General , peripherally aware but uncommitted, ordered the arrest of Stauffenberg, Olbricht, and others upon hearing the broadcast, executing Stauffenberg by firing squad that evening to distance himself. Residual military loyalty and incomplete coordination sealed the failure. Many commanders disregarded Valkyrie orders due to allegiance to Hitler or skepticism of the plot, while the rapid purge of suspected resisters—totaling nearly 200 executions in ensuing weeks—prevented resurgence. The absence of broader high-level buy-in, such as from field marshals, limited the coup's geographic reach beyond .

Hitler's Response and Initial Countermeasures

The immediate response to the explosion was ad hoc, lacking pre-defined protocols for internal disturbances such as assassination attempts; it included site lockdown, medical aid to the injured, phone monitoring, troop mobilization, and arrests of suspects. Following the explosion at 12:42 p.m. on 20 July 1944, Adolf Hitler emerged from the briefing room at the Wolf's Lair with minor injuries, including perforated eardrums, burns to his legs, and bruising to his right arm, but he wasted no time in demonstrating his survival and issuing directives. Despite the blast's severity—which killed four men and injured others—Hitler proceeded with his afternoon schedule, personally escorting Italian leader Benito Mussolini through the damaged conference room later that day to underscore his unscathed leadership and the plot's failure. This meeting, originally planned, served as an immediate propaganda countermeasure, projecting resilience amid the chaos. Hitler promptly communicated his survival via secure channels to , confirming it directly around 3:30 p.m. to halt any coup activities, as news of his death had initially spurred partial activation of by conspirators. He instructed Propaganda Minister to manage public messaging and mobilized the under to launch an urgent investigation into the bombing, directing them to identify and detain suspects without delay. This triggered immediate arrests at the , including scrutiny of officers like , who had unknowingly carried the bomb-laden briefcase, and extended to by evening, where SS forces secured key sites and apprehended early plotters such as Claus von Stauffenberg's associates. On 21 July 1944, at 1:00 a.m., Hitler broadcast a national radio address from the , declaring, "I am unhurt," attributing his escape to "the grace of Providence," and vowing merciless retribution against the "small clique of ambitious, conscienceless, and criminal elements" responsible. In the address, he announced structural reforms, including Himmler's appointment as of the (Ersatzheer), a role designed to purge disloyal elements from reserves and prevent future insurrections by centralizing SS oversight of military replacements. These steps, combined with heightened security protocols at —such as expanded SS guards and loyalty oaths—aimed to reassert control and deter further resistance in the plot's chaotic aftermath.

Repressions and Consequences

Arrests, Interrogations, and Executions

Following the failure of the plot, Colonel , General , Lieutenant , and General were arrested at the in on the evening of 20 July 1944 after loyalist forces reasserted control. General , who had attempted twice with his pistol, was shot by an officer to end his suffering. Stauffenberg and the others were executed by firing squad in the Bendlerblock courtyard shortly after midnight on 21 July. The , under Heinrich Himmler's direction, initiated widespread arrests beginning immediately after confirmation of the plot's collapse, targeting known conspirators, their associates, and even individuals suspected on minimal evidence. Over 7,000 people were detained in the ensuing months, including military officers, civilians, and family members, with arrests extending beyond direct participants to settle old scores or suppress potential dissent. Interrogations were brutal, often involving to extract confessions and implicate others, as documented in Gestapo records that revealed coerced admissions used to expand the investigation. Executions followed rapidly, with approximately 200 core conspirators put to death in the initial wave, though total reprisal killings reached around 4,980, many on flimsy pretexts. Prominent figures faced show trials in presided over by , after which dozens were hanged using piano wire from meat hooks in , with proceedings filmed for Adolf Hitler's private viewing to maximize humiliation. Field Marshal , implicated indirectly through associations, was forced to commit suicide on 14 October 1944 to avoid broader family persecution.

Broader Purges and Impact on German Society

Following the failure of the 20 July plot, the and SS expanded reprisals beyond the approximately 200 core conspirators to encompass thousands suspected of indirect involvement, sympathy, or mere association, resulting in over 7,000 arrests across . These purges, ordered by Hitler and coordinated by , targeted military officers, civilians, and even peripheral figures in the and civilian administration, with investigations lasting months and often relying on minimal or fabricated evidence. In total, nearly 5,000 individuals were executed, many via public hangings in Plötzensee Prison or other sites, designed to deter opposition through spectacle and filmed documentation sent to Hitler. A key element of these broader measures was the intensified application of , or kin liability, formalized in directives issued on 2 August 1944, which held families collectively responsible for perceived treason. Under this policy, enforced by the SS, local Gauleiters, and courts, hundreds of relatives—including spouses, children, and extended kin of plotters—were arrested without individual charges; for instance, Clarita von Trott, wife of conspirator , was detained on 17 August 1944, and similar actions struck the von Stauffenberg and von Hofacker families. While executions of family members were rare, detentions in concentration camps like Ravensbrück led to harsh conditions, property confiscations, and social ostracism, amplifying the policy's deterrent effect despite its inconsistent enforcement across regions. These purges profoundly eroded trust within the German military, as investigations implicated high-ranking officers like , who was forced to commit on 14 October 1944 despite limited evidence of direct involvement, fostering paranoia and self-censorship among commanders. In society at large, the threat of and mass arrests cultivated pervasive fear, stifling potential dissent and reinforcing Nazi control amid mounting wartime defeats, as Himmler's 21 July 1944 speeches emphasized to prevent future resistance. The removal of experienced officers and the elevation of ideologically rigid loyalists further hampered operational effectiveness, contributing to declining morale and cohesion in the as the Eastern and Western Fronts collapsed.

Controversies and Historical Debates

Assessments of the Plotters' Complicity in Nazi Atrocities

The plotters of the 20 July 1944 assassination attempt against , primarily drawn from the German military officer corps and conservative civilian elites, have been subject to historical scrutiny regarding their roles in the Nazi regime's atrocities, including and war crimes on the Eastern Front. While none of the core conspirators were SS members directly implementing extermination policies, many served in units that facilitated or participated in invasions enabling mass killings, such as the 1939 Polish campaign and in 1941, where German forces executed tens of thousands of civilians and POWs under the and other directives. Historians like have documented the 's systematic involvement in atrocities, arguing that officers like those in the plot bore indirect responsibility through command structures that tolerated or ordered reprisals against partisans and , with over 500,000 Soviet POWs dying in German custody by 1942 due to deliberate neglect. Claus von Stauffenberg, the plot's operational leader, exemplified this ambiguity: as a staff officer in the 6th Panzer Division, he participated in the 1939 invasion of Poland, which triggered widespread executions and ghettoizations, and later served on the Eastern Front in 1940–1941, witnessing but not documented as intervening against early massacres. His brother Berthold and other aristocrats in the circle shared a conservative nationalist worldview that included anti-Semitic prejudices common in pre-Nazi German elites, though they rejected the regime's racial fanaticism and total war by 1942–1943, motivated partly by reports of Einsatzgruppen killings. Henning von Tresckow, a key ideological driver, commanded intelligence in Army Group Center during Barbarossa, where his units conducted anti-partisan operations resulting in civilian deaths exceeding military targets, as verified in post-war trials; he later expressed remorse but had not resigned his post earlier. Critics, including leftist historians, contend the plotters' complicity stemmed from prolonged loyalty to the regime's expansionist goals, only shifting to action after Stalingrad (1943) exposed strategic failure, allowing post-war narratives in to portray them as untainted patriots absolving broader German society of collective guilt—exemplified by Chancellor Helmut Kohl's speech framing their resistance as proof Hitler failed to corrupt the nation entirely. Defenders, such as Peter Hoffmann, highlight personal ethical turning points, like Stauffenberg's outrage at Allied bombings and Eastern Front horrors, positioning the group as causal realists who prioritized to halt further crimes, despite their authoritarian leanings and intent to negotiate with the Western Allies while continuing anti-Soviet fighting. from declassified records and survivor testimonies underscores that while the plotters avoided direct genocidal roles, their military service sustained the system perpetrating 6 million Jewish murders and millions more civilian deaths, complicating hagiographic commemorations.

Debates on Timing, Motives, and Potential Outcomes

Historians have debated the timing of the 20 July plot, noting that earlier attempts by the same resistance networks occurred as far back as , with intensified efforts from onward, yet decisive action only crystallized in mid-1944 after the Allied on 6 June exposed Germany's impending collapse on multiple fronts. Critics, including some analyses of military correspondence, argue that the delay stemmed from plotters' initial hope for a reversal of fortunes on the Eastern Front or in the West, reflecting a reluctance to act until overrode ideological qualms, rather than a consistent against Nazi excesses witnessed since 1941. Proponents of the resisters counter that pervasive surveillance and the need for broad military buy-in necessitated waiting for a moment of operational feasibility, such as Stauffenberg's access to Hitler via his Chief of Staff role in the , achieved only after his 1943 wounding in . The motives of key figures like remain contested, with evidence from personal letters and interrogations indicating a evolution from early sympathy for Nazi expansionism—Stauffenberg praised the regime's anti-communist stance in 1939—to disillusionment after observing atrocities in the and Hitler's strategic blunders, such as the 1943 Stalingrad defeat. However, assessments emphasize that for many officers, including those implicated in war crimes like Karl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, the primary driver was pragmatic: averting national catastrophe amid Allied advances, rather than atonement for complicity in or programs, which some had tolerated or enabled earlier. This view aligns with post-war analyses questioning the plotters' selective outrage, as conservative nationalists like Carl Goerdeler prioritized restoring a pre-Nazi order over dismantling the regime's racial policies outright. Potential outcomes of a successful plot are speculative but hinge on the plotters' plan to activate emergency military controls, arrest SS leaders, and form a under as and Goerdeler as , aiming for separate peace negotiations with the Western Allies while possibly continuing resistance against the . Historians argue this overlooked the Allies' January 1943 demand for , rendering armistice overtures futile and likely provoking internal civil war, as loyalist Wehrmacht elements under or SS forces under could rally to sustain the fight, potentially installing and prolonging the conflict into 1945 with similar devastation. Even if the coup consolidated power swiftly—doubtful given Otto Ernst Remer's rapid suppression of operations—Germany's depleted resources and fanatical rear-guard resistance would have precluded a swift end, saving few lives overall while complicating post-war divisions.

Long-Term Impact and Legacy

Influence on the End of World War II

The failure of the 20 July 1944 assassination attempt on ensured his continued personal direction of the German war effort, which historians attribute to strategic irrationality that extended the conflict's duration beyond what a post-Hitler junta might have negotiated, though demands by the Allies—formalized at the on 14–24 January 1943—limited realistic prospects for regardless. The plotters, including , envisioned as a means to seize control, arrest SS leaders, and seek terms primarily with Western Allies while resisting Soviet advances, but their conservative military orientation and lack of broad support precluded swift capitulation even in success. Empirical assessments of German military performance post-July indicate no abrupt decline attributable to the plot; offensives like the Vistula–Oder in early 1945 and the Rhine crossings proceeded amid prior losses from (22 June–19 August 1944), which obliterated , underscoring that Allied logistical dominance—evidenced by 2.5 million Soviet troops committed in Bagration versus Germany's depleted reserves—drove the timeline to VE Day on 8 May 1945. Subsequent Gestapo repressions, involving over 7,000 arrests and approximately 4,980 executions or suicides by late 1944, targeted suspected sympathizers across the , civilian bureaucracy, and nobility, removing mid-level officers and administrators who might have facilitated earlier de-escalation but whose absence did not measurably impair frontline cohesion given Hitler's pre-existing micromanagement and SS infiltration of commands. These purges intensified internal paranoia, as Hitler invoked "providential" survival in broadcasts on 20 July 1944 to rally loyalty, yet causal analysis reveals negligible impact on operational effectiveness; for example, the failed Counteroffensive (16 December 1944–25 January 1945) faltered due to fuel shortages and air inferiority rather than leadership vacuums from executions. Allied , aware of the plot via decrypted communications, viewed it as an internal German affair without altering strategic bombing or ground campaigns, confirming that the war's end hinged on material attrition—Germany produced 40,000 in 1944 against Allied 130,000—over political intrigue. Debates among historians, such as those in analyses of resistance dynamics, posit that the plot's collapse reinforced Nazi , delaying potential fractures in elite cohesion that could have accelerated collapse in spring 1945, but primary evidence from war diaries and surrender records attributes prolongation to Hitler's no-retreat orders, as in the defense of the (16–19 April 1945), independent of July purges. Overall, the event's influence remained secondary to the inexorable Allied convergence on , with Germany's defeat sealed by multi-front exhaustion rather than the absence of a successful coup.

Post-War Commemoration and Interpretations

In the , commemoration of the 20 July plot began shortly after the war's end, with a memorial plaque installed at the execution site in 1952 and a monument unveiled there on 20 July 1953 by Mayor to honor and fellow conspirators shot that night. The , established at the complex—a former military headquarters central to the plot's planning—documents opposition to the Nazi regime, emphasizing the 1944 coup attempt as a pivotal act of defiance, with exhibits opened to the public from the onward. Federal observances include an annual solemn ceremony on 20 July, organized by the government since the 1950s and formalized with nationwide flag displays at public buildings; these events rotate between the and Plötzensee Memorial Center, where over 2,800 regime opponents were executed between and , to evoke remembrance of resistance and reconciliation with 's past. In unified , such commemorations portray the plotters as exemplars of moral courage, with figures like Olaf Scholz in 2024 describing the attempt as proof that "a better " remained possible amid , framing it as a cornerstone of democratic self-understanding. Post-war interpretations have emphasized the plot's role in demonstrating internal German opposition to Hitler, countering narratives of universal complicity, though debates persist over the conspirators' motives and character. Many, including Stauffenberg, had sworn loyalty oaths to Hitler and participated in the regime's early military expansions, with shifts toward resistance accelerating after Stalingrad in 1943 due to perceptions of strategic folly, ideological disillusionment, and fears of national annihilation rather than early principled rejection of Nazi racial policies or totalitarianism. Proposed successors like Carl Friedrich Goerdeler envisioned a conservative-authoritarian state prioritizing anti-communism, potential armistice with the West, and continuity of anti-Bolshevik warfare, raising questions about compatibility with full democratization or unconditional surrender demands. While West German accounts from the 1950s onward mythologized the plotters as proto-democratic patriots restoring honor to the Wehrmacht, subsequent scholarship highlights their aristocratic, Prussian-conservative worldview and limited broader societal support, attributing the coup's isolation to widespread war-weariness and regime entrenchment.

References

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