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Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva
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Key Information

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva[a] (born Luiz Inácio da Silva; 27 October 1945), known mononymously as Lula, is a Brazilian politician, trade unionist and former metalworker who has served as the 39th president of Brazil since 2023. A member of the Workers' Party, Lula was also the 35th president from 2003 to 2011.

Born in Pernambuco, Lula quit school after second grade to work, and did not learn to read until he was ten years old. As a teenager, he worked as a metalworker and became a trade unionist. Between 1978 and 1980, he led the ABC workers' strikes during Brazil's military dictatorship, and in 1980, he helped start the Workers' Party during Brazil's redemocratization. Lula was one of the leaders of the 1984 Diretas Já movement, which demanded direct elections. In 1986, he was elected a federal deputy in the state of São Paulo. He ran for president in 1989, but lost in the second round. He also lost presidential elections in 1994 and 1998. He finally became president in 2002, in a runoff. In 2006, he was successfully re-elected in the second round.

Described as left-wing, his first presidency coincided with South America's first pink tide. During his first two consecutive terms in office, he continued fiscal policies and promoted social welfare programs such as Bolsa Família that eventually led to GDP growth, reduction in external debt and inflation, and helping millions of Brazilians escape poverty. He also played a role in foreign policy, both on a regional level and as part of global trade and environment negotiations.[1] During those terms, Lula was considered one of the most popular politicians in Brazil's history and left office with 80% approval rating.[2][3][4] His first term was also marked by notable corruption scandals, including the Mensalão vote-buying scandal. After the 2010 Brazilian general election, he was succeeded by his former chief of staff, Dilma Rousseff, and remained active in politics and gave lectures.

In July 2017, Lula was convicted on charges of money laundering and corruption in the Operation Car Wash context, after which he spent a total of 580 days in prison. He attempted to run in the 2018 Brazilian presidential election, but was disqualified under Brazil's Ficha Limpa law. He was convicted again in February 2019, and was released from prison the following November. His two convictions were nullified in 2021 by the Supreme Federal Court, in a ruling which also found serious biases in the first case against him, also annulling all other pending cases. Once legally allowed to make another run for the presidency, Lula did so in the 2022 election and ultimately defeated the incumbent Jair Bolsonaro in a runoff. Sworn in on 1 January 2023 at the age of 77, he became the oldest Brazilian president at time of inauguration, as well as the first-ever Brazilian individual to have defeated an incumbent president and to be elected to a third term.

Early life

[edit]

Luiz Inácio da Silva was born on 27 October 1945[5] (registered with a date of birth of 6 October 1945) in Caetés (then a district of Garanhuns), 250 km (160 mi) from Recife, capital of Pernambuco, a state in the Northeast of Brazil. He was the seventh of eight children of Aristides Inácio da Silva and Eurídice Ferreira de Melo, farmers who had experienced famine in one of the poorest parts of the agreste.[6] He was raised Catholic.[7] Lula's mother was of Portuguese and partial Italian descent.[8] Two weeks after Lula's birth, his father moved to Santos, São Paulo, with – though Eurídice was not aware of it – her younger cousin Valdomira Ferreira de Góis.[9]

In December 1952, when Lula was seven years old, his mother moved the family to São Paulo to rejoin her husband. After a journey of 13 days in a pau-de-arara (open truck bed), they arrived in Guarujá and discovered that Aristides had formed a second family with Valdomira, with whom he had 10 more children.[10] Aristides's two families lived in the same house for some time, but they did not get along very well, and four years later, his mother moved with him and his siblings to a small room behind a bar in São Paulo. After that, Lula rarely saw his father, who died illiterate and an alcoholic in 1978.[11][12] In 1982, he added the nickname Lula to his legal name.[13][14]

Personal life

[edit]

Twice a widower, Lula has been married three times, and has a daughter from a fourth relationship. In 1969, he married Maria de Lourdes Ribeiro.[15] She died of hepatitis in 1971 while pregnant with a child, who also died.[16]

In March 1974, Lula had a daughter, Lurian, with his then-girlfriend, Miriam Cordeiro.[15] The two never married. Lula only began participating in his daughter's life when she was already a young adult.[17]

Two months later, in May 1974, Lula married Marisa Letícia Rocco Casa, a 24-year-old widow whom he had met the prior year. He had three sons with her, and adopted her son from her first marriage.[15] The two remained married for 43 years, until her death on 2 February 2017, after a stroke.[18]

Later that same year, he met and started a relationship with Rosângela da Silva, known as Janja. The relationship only became public in 2019 while he was serving time in jail in Curitiba, Paraná, on corruption charges.[19] Lula and Janja married on 18 May 2022.[20]

Lula is Catholic.[21]

Education and work

[edit]
Lula had his left little finger amputated after a work-related accident when he was a metalworker in 1974.

Lula had little formal education. He did not learn to read until he was ten years old.[22] He quit school after the second grade to work. His first job at age eight was as a street vendor.[23] When he was 12, he also worked as a shoeshiner. In 1960, when he was 14, he got his first formal job, in a warehouse.[24]

In 1961, he started working as an apprentice of a press operator in a metallurgical company that produced screws, while studying in a vocational course. There, Lula had his first contact with strike movements.[25] After the movement failed in its negotiations, Lula left the company for another metallurgical company. From 1966 to 1980, he worked at Villares Metals S.A [pt], a new metalworking firm.[15]

There, in 1974, he lost his left pinky finger in a machinery accident, while working as a press operator in the factory.[22] After the accident, he had to run to several hospitals before he received medical attention. This experience increased his interest in participating in the Workers' Union. Around that time, he became involved in union activities and held several union posts.[24][26]

Union career

[edit]

Inspired by his brother Frei Chico, a member of the Brazilian Communist Party, Lula joined the labour movement when he worked at Villares Metals, rising through the ranks.[27] He was elected in 1975, and re-elected in 1978, as president of the Steel Workers' Union of São Bernardo do Campo and Diadema. Both cities are located in the ABCD Region, home to most of Brazil's automobile manufacturing facilities, including Ford, Volkswagen, Toyota, and Mercedes-Benz.

In the late 1970s, when Brazil was under military rule, Lula helped organize union activities, including major strikes. Labour courts found the strikes illegal, and in 1980, Lula was jailed for a month. Due to this, and like other people imprisoned for political activities under the military government, Lula was awarded a lifetime pension after the fall of the military regime.[12]

Political career

[edit]
Lula speaking at the plenary of the Chamber of Deputies, 1989

On 10 February 1980, a group of academics and union leaders, including Lula, founded the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) or Workers' Party, a left-wing party with progressive ideas.[28][29][30][31] In 1983, he helped found the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT) trade union association.[32]

Elections

[edit]
Lula climbs ramp leading to the Palácio do Planalto with Vice President José Alencar for the official ceremony marking the beginning of their second term, 2007

Lula first ran for office in 1982 for the state government of São Paulo, but lost with 11% of the vote. Cuban president Fidel Castro urged him to continue on as a politician, during a trip by Lula to Cuba.[33][34] In the 1986 election, Lula won a seat in the National Congress with the most votes nationwide.[35]

In 1989, Lula ran for president as the PT candidate. Lula advocated immediate land reform and that Brazil default on its external debt. A minor candidate, Fernando Collor de Mello, quickly amassed support with a more business-friendly agenda and by taking emphatic anti-corruption positions. He beat Lula in the second round of the 1989 elections. Lula decided not to run for re-election as a Congressman in 1990.[36]

Lula ran again for president, and lost again, in the next two Brazilian elections. Former PSDB Minister of Finance Fernando Henrique Cardoso defeated Lula who received only 27% of the vote in the presidential elections in 1994, and again, by a somewhat smaller margin, as Lula garnered only 32% of the vote in 1998.

An article in The Washington Post said that before 2002, Lula had been a "strident union organizer known for his bushy beard and Che Guevara T-shirts".[37] In the 2002 campaign, Lula abandoned both his informal clothing style and his platform plank that Brazil should not pay its foreign debt unless it links the payment to a prior thorough audit. This last point had worried economists, businessmen, and banks, who feared that even a partial Brazilian default would have a massive ripple effect through the world economy. Lula in the 2002 election, defeated PSDB candidate José Serra in a runoff, to become the country's first leftist president following the fall of the military dictatorship in Brazil.[38] In the 2006 election, Lula won a run-off over the PSDB's Geraldo Alckmin.[39]

In September 2018, Brazil's top electoral court banned Lula from running for president in 2018 due to his corruption conviction, in accordance with Brazil's Lei da Ficha Limpa law.[40] Instead, Fernando Haddad ran for president on the Workers Party ticket, and was defeated by Jair Bolsonaro.[41]

Electoral history

[edit]
Year Election Party Office Coalition Partners Party Votes Percent Result
1982 State Elections of São Paulo PT Governor Hélio Bicudo PT 1,144,648 10.77% Not elected
1986 State Elections of São Paulo Federal Deputy 651,763 4.22% Elected
1989 Presidential election President Popular Brazil Front
(PT, PSB, PCdoB)
José Paulo Bisol PSB 11,622,321 17.49% Runoff
31,075,803 46.97% Not elected
1994 Presidential election Brazilian Popular Front for Citizenship
(PT, PSB, PPS, PV, PCdoB, PCB, PSTU)
Aloizio Mercadante PT 17,122,127 27.04% Not elected
1998 Presidential election Union of the People Change Brazil
(PT, PDT, PSB, PCdoB, PCB)
Leonel Brizola PDT 21,475,211 31.71% Not elected
2002 Presidential election Lula President
(PT, PL, PCdoB, PMN, PCB)
José Alencar PL 39,455,233 46.44% Runoff
52,793,364 61.27% Elected
2006 Presidential election The Strength of the People
(PT, PRB, PCdoB)
José Alencar Republicanos 46,662,365 48.60% Runoff
58,295,042 60.83% Elected
2022 Presidential election Brazil of Hope
(PT, PCdoB, PV, PSOL, REDE, PSB, Solidariedade, Avante, Agir, PROS)
Geraldo Alckmin PSB 57,259,504 48.43% Runoff
60,345,999 50.90% Elected

First presidency (2003–2011)

[edit]
Lula at the beginning of his first (left) and second (right) terms

Lula, described as left-wing, served two terms as president from 2003 through 2010.[42][43] During his farewell speech, he said he felt a burden to prove that he could handle the presidency despite his humble beginnings. "If I failed, it would be the workers' class which would be failing; it would be this country's poor who would be proving they did not have what it takes to rule".[44][45]

Political orientation

[edit]

Very few of the reforms that Lula proposed were actually implemented during Lula's terms of office. Some wings of the Worker's Party disagreed with the increasing moderation in focus since the late eighties, and left the party to form other parties, such as during Lula's presidency, the Socialism and Liberty Party. Alliances with old, traditional oligarch politicians, like former presidents José Sarney and Fernando Collor, have been a cause of disappointment for some.[46]

Education

[edit]

A number of educational initiatives were launched during Lula's first presidency. A free school meals programme was extended to 37 million pupils while a programme was launched which aimed to provide "whole or partial remission of student fees for low-income students".[12] In 2006, primary education was extended from 8 to 9 years. A Fund for the Maintenance and Development of Basic Education was set up to improve the quality of education. The PED (an education development plan) conditioned the disbursement of public funds to state schools on the schools' performance.[47]

Still in 2006, many Brazilians and commentators felt that Lula had not done enough to improve the quality of public education.[48][49][50] And in 2010, while education was compulsory for all children in Brazil aged 7 to 14, in practice that requirement was only loosely enforced; 90% of children in rural areas attended school for less than four years, and only 25% of children living in favelas attended school.[51]

Social programs

[edit]

Lula's top social programme sought to eradicate hunger. It was financed by an increase in tax revenues, coupled with a decrease in government expenditures on both wages and on benefits paid to public employees, as well as a decrease in government expenditures on infrastructure.[52] The programme followed the lead of a project that had already been put into practice in 1995 by the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration, which was named Bolsa Escola (School Stipend).[53] It expanded that initiative with the new Fome Zero ("Zero Hunger") programme, which was part of the Bolsa Família (Family Allowance) plan.[54][55]

Five months after Lula took office, however, the budget for Fome Zero was cut down a third from its original amount, and one year later, about $800 million was budgeted toward the programme, but only $130 million of that was actually disbursed.[56] Lula's programme was accused of having become more bark than bite, inasmuch as of May 2005, two years after the effort began, the programme had fallen far short of expectations.[57]

Lula speech in Diadema launching subsidized housing and Bolsa Família credits, 2005

During Lula's first term, child malnutrition in Brazil decreased by 46%. In May 2010, the UN World Food Programme (WFP) awarded Lula the title of "World Champion in the Fight against Hunger".[58] A number of other social projects were introduced during Lula's first presidency.[59]

Lula launched a housing aid programme that was larger in scope to the policies developed until then. More than 15 billion euros were invested in water purification and the urbanization of favelas, and more than 40 billion in housing. The government proposed to relocate the poor populations that occupied the "risk zones", prone to floods or landslides; at the end of the day, however, at least 212 people died and at least 15,000 people were made homeless by the April 2010 Rio de Janeiro floods and mudslides alone. It proposed to then extend the electricity network, to relocate the streets and to improve the precarious housing. The government undertook to democratize access to real estate credit.[60]

Economy

[edit]

Lula's first two terms coincided with a strong boom in commodities prices.[61][62][63] This fueled an economic boom in Brazil, which in turn allowed Lula to spend heavily on social programmes and pay off a $15 billion IMF loan a year early.[61][62][63]

In the run-up to the 2002 elections, the fear of Lula taking drastic measures, and comparisons of him with Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, increased internal market speculation. This led to a drop in the value of the Brazilian real, and a downgrade of Brazil's credit rating.[64] Lula chose Henrique Meirelles of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), a market-oriented economist, as head of the Brazilian Central Bank. As a former CEO of BankBoston he was well known to the market.[65]

Lula and his cabinet followed, to an extent, the lead of the previous government in economics.[66] It renewed all agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which were signed by the time Argentina defaulted on its own deals in 2001. His government achieved a satisfactory primary budget surplus in the first two years, as required by the IMF agreement, exceeding the target for the third year. In late 2005, the government paid off its debt to the IMF in full, two years ahead of schedule.[67] The Brazilian economy was generally not affected by the 2005 Mensalão scandal, which related to vote buying in the Brazilian Congress.[68]

Chief of staff José Dirceu, Lula, and finance minister Antonio Palocci, 2003

In June 2005, economist and attorney José Dirceu, Lula's chief-of-staff since 2003, resigned after he was caught up in a massive corruption scheme in the legislature, the Mensalão corruption scandal.[69][70][71][72] In March 2006, Lula's finance minister Antonio Palocci, who had continued the anti-inflation and pro-market policies of the previous centrist government, resigned due to his involvement in a corruption and abuse of power scandal.[73][74][75] Lula then appointed Guido Mantega, a PT economist, as finance minister.

Not long after the start of his second term, in 2007 Lula's government announced the Growth Acceleration Programme (Programa de Aceleração de Crescimento, PAC), an investment programme which sought to solve many of the problems that prevented the Brazilian economy from expanding more rapidly. The measures included investment in the creation and repair of roads and railways, simplification and reduction of taxation, and modernization of the country's energy production to avoid further shortages. The money pledged to be spent on this programme was to be around R$ 500 billion (US $260 billion) over four years. However, by 2010 many projects remained mired in bureaucracy, and only 11% of the projects outlined in the plan had been completed, while just over half had not even been launched.[76]

Prior to taking office, Lula had been a critic of privatization.[77] His administration created public-private partnership concessions for seven federal roadways.[78] After decades with the largest foreign debt among emerging economies, Brazil became a net creditor for the first time in January 2008.[79] By mid-2008, both Fitch Ratings and Standard & Poor's had elevated the classification of Brazilian debt from speculative to investment grade. Banks made record profits under Lula's government.[80]

Lula and his wife Marisa Letícia review troops during the 2007 Independence Day military parade

The 2008 financial crisis might have been a tsunami in the US and Europe, Lula declared, but in Brazil it would be no more than a little 'ripple' ("uma marolinha"). The phrase was seized on by the Brazilian press as proof of Lula's reckless economic ignorance and irresponsibility.[81] In 2008, Brazil enjoyed economic good health to mitigate the 2008 financial crisis with a large economic stimulus lasting, at least, until 2014.[82] According to The Washington Post: "Under Lula, Brazil became the world's eighth-largest economy, [and] more than 20 million people rose out of acute poverty ..."[37]

At the same time, in 2010 The Wall Street Journal noted that: "[Brazil's] public sector is bloated and riddled with corruption. Crime is rampant. Its infrastructure is badly in need of repair and expansion. The business environment is restrictive, with a labour code ripped from the pages of Benito Mussolini's economic playbook. Brazil also risks patting itself on the back so much that it fails to see the colossal work that remains to be done."[76]

Environment

[edit]
Brazil's deforestation rate declined during Lula's time in office, and reversed under Bolsonaro[83][84]

Initially, Lula's administration pushed for progressive policies that significantly curbed deforestation in the Amazon. Despite this, he did not support legislation that would have required the country to phase out its fossil fuels.

In May 2008, environmental minister Marina Silva resigned, blamed "stagnation" in the government, after she lost disagreements with Lula when she opposed approval of new hydroelectric dams in the Amazon and criticized Lula's biofuels programme.[85] Dr. Daniel Nepstad of the Woods Hole Research Centre said the growing demand for biofuels may ultimately result in more Amazon deforestation.[86] In particular, environmentalists warn that while biofuels reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, they may well also trigger a significant expansion of the biofuel crops; that, in turn, may push agriculture deeper into forests, destroying habitat and biodiversity.[87]

The creation of conservation areas and indigenous reserves led to a decrease of around 75% in deforestation starting in 2004.[88] In Lula's first year in office, in 2003–04, 25,000 square kilometers of Brazilian forest were destroyed, the second-worst devastation since 1977.[89] In late 2006, the Instituto Soicioambiental environmental group said that deforestation in Lula's first four years had been worse than in any four-year period since 1988.[90][89][91] By 2009, Brazil's Amazon destruction—though lower—was still about 7,000 square kilometers a year, larger than the US state of Delaware.[92] Critics said, however, that Brazil's lowest rate of deforestation in 2009 was a function of the 2008 financial crisis.[93] Paulo Adario of Greenpeace said that it was a function not of efforts to protect the climate, but of the fact that the "demand for beef, soya and wood ha[d] dramatically fallen".[93]

In 2009, Lula gave a speech in which he said that "gringos" should pay Amazon nations to prevent deforestation.[92]

In February 2010, Lula's government approved the construction of a controversial hydroelectric mega Belo Monte Dam in the middle of the Amazon rain forest in the Brazilian state of Pará.[93] It was to be the third-largest hydroelectric dam in the world.[93] Environmental activists protested the building of the dam.[93] It was expected to cause a significant decline in the water table, resulting in significant losses of aquatic and terrestrial fauna, and adversely impact aquatic mammals.[94] Approximately 20,000-40,000 indigenous people were to be resettled with little or no compensation, and 516 square kilometers (199 square miles) of rain forest were to be flooded for the dam's construction.[93][94]

Foreign policy

[edit]
U.S. President Barack Obama greets Lula in the Oval Office, 2009
Lula with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan negotiated a failed 2010 Iran nuclear fuel swap deal
Lula with leaders from Russia, China, and India at the 2nd BRIC summit

In 1979, Lula was asked in an interview which historical figures he admired most. He answered: Gandhi, Che Guevara, and Mao Zedong.[95] Upon being asked to give additional examples, he added Fidel Castro, Ruhollah Khomeini and Adolf Hitler and saying about the latter: "I admire in a man the fire to want to do something, and then his going out to try to do it."[96][95]

Leading a large agricultural state, Lula generally opposed and criticized farm subsidies, and this position has been seen as one of the reasons for the walkout of developing nations and subsequent collapse of the Cancún World Trade Organization talks in 2003 over G8 agricultural subsidies.[97] Brazil played a role in negotiations regarding internal conflicts in Venezuela and Colombia, and made efforts to strengthen Mercosur.[98] During the Lula administration, Brazilian foreign trade increased dramatically, changing from deficits to several surpluses after 2003. In 2004, the surplus was US$29 billion, due to a substantial increase in global demand for commodities. Brazil also provided UN peacekeeping troops and led a peacekeeping mission in Haiti.[99]

According to The Economist of 2 March 2006, Lula had a pragmatic foreign policy, seeing himself as a negotiator, not an ideologue, a leader adept at reconciling opposites. As a result, he befriended both Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez and U.S. President George W. Bush.[100] Former Finance Minister, and current advisor, Delfim Netto, said: "Lula is the ultimate pragmatist".[101]

He travelled to more than 80 countries during his presidency.[102] A goal of Lula's foreign policy was for the country to gain a seat as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. In this he was unsuccessful.[102]

China

[edit]

From 2003 to 2010, Lula embraced China as central to reforming what he considered an unjust global order.[103] He intertwined the Chinese and Brazilian economies.[104][105][103] Lula stated Brazil's commitment to the One China principle that is the position held by the People's Republic of China and the ruling Chinese Communist Party, saying that the government of the People's Republic of China was the sole legal government representing the whole of China, including Taiwan—as part of China.[106]

Cuba

[edit]
Lula and Cuban leader Fidel Castro, 2003

Lula and Cuban president Fidel Castro were longtime friends.[107][108] Under Lula, Brazil provided money and corporate support to Cuba.[109][110] The state-controlled Brazilian oil company Petrobras studied the possibility of drilling for oil off of Cuba, while the Odebrecht construction firm headed a revamp of the Cuban port of Mariel into the island's main commercial port.[110][111] Brazil's state-run Brazilian Development Bank gave $300 million to Odebrecht to build new roads, rail lines, wharves, and warehouses at Mariel.[110] Brazil also offered Cuba up to $1 billion in credit lines to pay for Brazilian goods and services.[111]

Iran

[edit]
Lula with Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei, 2010

The conviction by an Iranian court of Iranian Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani for the crime of adultery, with a sentence in 2006 of execution by stoning, led to calls for Lula to intercede on her behalf. In July 2010, Lula said "I need to respect the laws of a [foreign] country. If my friendship with the president of Iran and the respect that I have for him is worth something, if this woman has become a nuisance, we will receive her in Brazil". The Iranian government declined his offer.[112][113] Mina Ahadi, an Iranian Communist politician, welcomed Lula's offer, but reiterated a call for an end to stoning altogether and requested a cessation of recognition and support for the Iranian government.[114][115][116][117] Jackson Diehl, deputy editorial page editor of The Washington Post, called Lula the "best friend of tyrants in the democratic world," and criticised his actions.[112] Shirin Ebadi, Iranian human rights activist and Nobel Peace Prize laureate called Lula's comments a "powerful message to the Islamic Republic".[118]

In 2009, Lula warmly hosted Iranian president Ahmadinejad, who made a controversial visit to Brazil.[119][120] Some demonstrators expressed displeasure over Ahmadinejad's positions on human rights and his denial of the Holocaust.[121]

In May 2010, Lula and Turkey's prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan negotiated a preliminary fuel swap agreement with the Iranian government on uranium enrichment, that ultimately failed.[122] The preliminary agreement that they presented to the United Nations was at odds with what the International Atomic Energy Agency and other countries viewed as necessary actions to stop Iran from obtaining weapons grade materials.[122] Within hours of signing the agreement, Iran did an about-face and announced that it would continue to enrich some uranium.[123] U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said Brazil was being "used" by Tehran.[123] The UN Security Council ultimately rejected it when permanent member country representatives argued that "the swap proposal negotiated by Brazil and Turkey would leave Iran with enough material to make a nuclear weapon," and that "Iran intends to continue a new programme of enriching uranium to a higher level."[122][102] Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Thomas Friedman wrote: "Is there anything uglier than watching democrats sell out other democrats to a Holocaust-denying, vote-stealing Iranian thug just to tweak the U.S. and show that they, too, can play at the big power table?"[124] Moisés Naím, editor in chief of Foreign Policy magazine and former Minister of Trade in Venezuela, said "Lula is a political giant, but morally he has been a deep disappointment."[124] In 2010, in addition, Brazilians largely disagreed with Lula as to how to handle Iran and Iran's nuclear weapons programme.[125] While Lula opposed additional international economic sanctions against Iran, of the 85% of Brazilians who opposed Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, two-thirds approved of tighter international sanctions on Iran to try to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons.[125]

Iraq

[edit]
Lula with U.S. President George W. Bush in November 2008

In 2003, Lula condemned the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, saying that the United States had no right "to decide unilaterally what is good and what is bad for the world".[126] He said that "the behaviour of the United States in relation to Iraq has weakened the United Nations".[127]

Libya

[edit]

Brazil, as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, abstained from the vote authorising "all necessary measures" against Libya's Muammar Gaddafi.[128] It opposed the bombing in Libya to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973.[128] Lula said: "These invasions only happen because the United Nations is weak."[128]

Venezuela

[edit]

Lula was close with Venezuela's president Hugo Chávez, a close ally of Communist Cuba and an antagonist of the United States.[129][130] In November 2007, Lula defended Chávez as the democratic choice of his people.[130] He said: "There is no risk with Chávez."[130] Expressing his admiration for Chávez, he said "Only thanks to Chávez's leadership, the people [of Venezuela] have had extraordinary achievements," and that in 2008 that Chávez was "the best president the country has had in 100 years."[131] However, in 2010 Brazilians largely had a different view than Lula, as only 13% had at least some confidence in Chávez, while 70% had little or no confidence in him.[125]

Freedom of the press

[edit]

After Lula was infuriated by a 9 May 2004, New York Times article that claimed he had a drinking problem, Brazil ordered the New York Times reporter, Larry Rohter, to leave the country and revoked his visa because he had written a story "offensive to the honour of the president."[132][133] Lula said: "Certainly its author ... must be more worried than I am ... it deserves action."[133] Brazil's presidential palace threatened to take legal action against the New York Times, which stood by the story and said that the expulsion raised serious questions about freedom of expression and freedom of the press in Brazil.[133] No journalist had been expelled from Brazil since its military dictatorship ended in the mid-1980s.[133] Brazilian opposition senator Tasso Jereissati said: "This is ridiculous. It's more like the immature act of a dictator of a third-rate republic..."[133] Brazil's second largest union, Força Sindical, issued a statement expressing concern that: "it is a reaction typical of authoritarian governments that don't like contrary voices."[133] Despite criticism, on 13 May 2004, Lula said "he would not consider revoking the action."[133] The government subsequently changed its position, and allowed the reporter to remain.[134]

Three months later, Lula introduced legislation to create a Brazil National Journalists' Council that would have the power to "orient, discipline and monitor" journalists and their work.[134][135] Critics called the draft law the worst affront to press freedom since censorship under the military dictatorship.[134][135] The government also proposed the establishment of a National Cinema and Audiovisual Agency that would have the power to conduct prior reviews of programming and to veto certain programmes if they believed that they did not to meet standards of "editorial responsibility."[134]

Corruption scandals and controversy

[edit]

Lula's administration was plagued by numerous corruption scandals, notably the Mensalão $50 million vote-buying scandal and Escândalo dos sanguessugas [pt] during Lula's first term.[136][137][138]

Mensalão vote-buying scandal

[edit]

In the 2005 Mensalão $50 million vote-buying scandal, Brazilian attorney general Álvaro Augusto Ribeiro Costa presented charges against 40 politicians and officials involved in the Mensalão affair, including several charges against Lula himself. Lula said that he knew nothing about the scandals.[139]

Among those convicted were Jose Dirceu (who was Lula's chief of staff and right-hand man from 2003 to 2005; he was sentenced to over 10 years in jail), and both the former head of Lula's Workers Party, Jose Genoino, and its treasurer, Delubio Soares.[71][140] Dirceu and officials Luiz Gushiken and Humberto Costa said that Lula was not involved. Roberto Jefferson said that if Lula didn't "commit a crime by action, he committed it by omission."[141] But one of Lula's own party members, Arlindo Chinaglia, alleged that Lula had been warned about the matter, and businessman Marcos Valério, who was sentenced to more than 40 years in prison for his involvement in the scandal, alleged in testimony after he was convicted that Lula had authorized loans for the scheme and used some of the money to pay for his personal expenses.[142][143]

Politicking

[edit]

His administration was criticized for relying on local, right-of-centre political barons, like José Sarney, Jader Barbalho, Renan Calheiros and Fernando Collor to ensure a majority in Congress. Another frequent reproach was his ambiguous treatment of the left wing of the PT. Analysts felt that he would occasionally give in to left-wing calls for tighter government control on media and increased state intervention: in 2004, he pushed for the creation of a "Federal Council of Journalists" (CFJ) and a "National Cinema Agency" (Ancinav), the latter designed to overhaul funding for electronic communications. Both proposals ultimately failed amid concerns over the effect of state control on free speech.[144][145]

Great Recession caused by white people with blue eyes

[edit]

Before a G-20 summit in London in March 2009, Lula caused an uproar by declaring that the economic crisis was caused by "the irrational behavior of white people with blue eyes, who before seemed to know everything, and now have shown they don't know anything".[146] He added: "I don't know any black or indigenous bankers."[147] He repeated the accusation the following month.[147]

Terrorist Cesare Battisti

[edit]

When Italian far-left terrorist Cesare Battisti of the Armed Proletarians for Communism, wanted for four murders, was arrested in Rio de Janeiro in March 2007 by Brazilian and French police officers, Brazilian Minister of Justice Tarso Genro granted him status as a political refugee. It was a controversial decision, which divided Italy and the Brazilian and international press. In February 2009, the European Parliament adopted a resolution in support of Italy, and held a minute's silence in memory of Battisti's victims. In November 2009, the Brazilian Supreme Court declared the grant of refugee status illegal and allowed Battisti's extradition, but also stated that the Brazilian constitution gave the president the personal power to deny the extradition if he chose to, effectively putting the final decision in the hands of Lula.[148]

Lula barred Battisti's extradition.[149] On 31 December 2010, Lula's last day in office, his decision not to allow Battisti's extradition was officially announced. Battisti was released on 9 June 2011 from prison, after the Brazilian Constitutional Court denied Italy's request to extradite him. Italy planned to appeal to the International Court of Justice in the Hague, saying Brazil had breached an extradition treaty.[150] President Michel Temer revoked his status as a permanent resident in December, 2018 and an arrest warrant was issued; Battisti then entered Bolivia illegally, and was arrested and extradited from Bolivia in January 2019.[151]

Operation Zelotes

[edit]

In 2015, Lula, along with his former chief of staff Gilberto Carvalho [pt] and five others, was indicted in a corruption probe as part of Operation Zelotes [pt], regarding payment of R$6 million in bribes (US $1.5 million). Prosecutors alleged they helped pass Provisional Measure 471 (which was later converted into Law 12,218/2010) in 2009 in order to benefit the automotive companies Grupo Caoa and MMC.[152] On 21 June 2021, Judge Frederico Botelho de Barros Viana of the 10th Federal Court of Brasilia acquitted all the accused, saying that the prosecution did not convincingly demonstrate that the defendants were involved in a criminal conspiracy.[153]

Operation Car Wash: corruption investigation and prosecution

[edit]
Protests related to 2016 Lula's testimony
Demonstrators gather in front of the Palácio do Planalto, the presidential palace, to protest against Lula's appointment as Chief of Staff of the Presidency, 16 March 2016
Lula is sworn in as Chief of Staff by President Dilma Rousseff on 17 March 2016.

In 2014, Brazil began Operação Lava Jato (English: Operation Car Wash), resulting in multiple arrests and convictions, including nine suits against Lula.

In April 2015, the Public Ministry of Brazil opened an investigation into allegations of influence peddling by Lula, which alleged that between 2011 and 2014 he had lobbied for government contracts in foreign countries for the Odebrecht company and had also persuaded the Brazilian Development Bank to finance the projects in Ghana, Angola, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic.[154] In June 2015, Marcelo Odebrecht, president of Odebrecht, was arrested on charges that he had paid politicians $230 million in bribes.[155] Three other company executives were also arrested, as well as the chief executive of Andrade Gutierrez, another construction conglomerate.[156]

On 4 March 2016, as part of "Operation Car Wash", Brazilian authorities raided Lula's home.[157][158] After the raid, the police detained Lula for questioning.[159][160] A police statement alleged that Lula had collaborated in illegal bribes from the oil company Petrobras to benefit his political party and presidential campaign.[159] Prosecutor Carlos Fernando said, "The favours to Lula from big construction companies involved in the fraud at Petrobras were many and hard to quantify".[161] Lula said that he and his party were being politically persecuted.[162][163][164]

On 16 March 2016, Rousseff appointed Lula as her chief of staff, a position comparable to that of prime minister. This would have shielded him from arrest due to the immunity that went with the position.[165] Cabinet ministers in Brazil are among close to seven hundred senior government officials enjoying special judicial standing, which means they can only be tried by Brazil's Supreme Federal Court. Supreme Court Judge Gilmar Mendes suspended Lula's appointment on the grounds that Rousseff was trying to help Lula circumvent prosecution.[166][167][168][169]

On 28 July 2016, Lula filed a petition with the United Nations Human Rights Committee, a panel of experts, requesting that it provide a view on his accusation that Moro had violated his rights. [170] The Committee ultimately accepted the case. The Brazilian ambassador to the UK wrote: "The (Brazilian) judiciary is fully independent and due process of law is faithfully observed. All defendants facing criminal prosecution fully enjoy the guarantee of a fair trial and the right to appeal."[171]

On 14 September 2016, prosecutors filed corruption charges against Lula, accusing him of being the mastermind or 'maximum commander of the scheme'.[172] On 19 September 2016, 13th Circuit (Paraná) federal judge Sergio Moro, who was leading the corruption probe, accepted an indictment for money laundering against Lula and his wife Marisa Letícia Lula da Silva. On 11 May 2017, Lula answered a summons by appearing in Curitiba and was questioned by Moro. The closed-court hearing lasted five hours. Thousands of Lula supporters went to Curitiba, together with Dilma Rousseff. After the hearing, Lula and Rousseff gave speeches to his supporters; Lula attacked what he called bias in the Brazilian media.[173]

Guilty verdict and sentencing

[edit]

Lula was found guilty by the lower court of accepting R$3.7 million in bribes ($940,000 US) in the form of improvements to his beachfront house, made by construction company Grupo Metha [pt], which in turn received lucrative contracts from the state-owned oil company Petrobras.[174] Lula also faced other charges, including money laundering, influence peddling and obstruction of justice.[175][174] On 12 July 2017, Sergio Moro sentenced Lula to nine and a half years in prison.[176] Lula remained free pending his appeal.[177] Lula's lawyer accused the judge of bias and the judge replied that nobody, not even the former president, should be above the rule of law.[177]

On 25 January 2018, the Appeal Court of Porto Alegre found Lula guilty of corruption and money laundering and increased his sentence to 12 years of prison[178] for one of the nine charges, while the other eight were still pending. On 26 March 2018, that same court upheld its own sentence, thus ending the case in that court.[179]

Prison

[edit]

On 5 April 2018, Brazil's Supreme Federal Court (STF) voted 6–5 to deny Lula's habeas corpus petition.[180] The court ruled that Lula must begin serving his sentence relating to his 12 July 2017 graft conviction for taking bribes from an engineering firm in return for help to land contracts with state-run oil company Petroleo Brasileiro SA, despite him not having exhausted all of his appeals, but rather only one appeal, at which the appellate court had unanimously upheld his sentence.[181][182][183] Brazilian financial markets rallied, as the decision increased the chances a market-friendly candidate winning the election.[183] Lula and his party vowed to continue his campaign from prison following the court's decision that he must surrender himself by 6 April.[184] The head of Brazil's army, General Eduardo Villas Boas, called for Lula to be placed behind bars.[185] Following Judge Moro's issuance of an arrest warrant for Lula on 6 April 2018, Lula appealed to the UN Human Rights Committee to – in addition to his primary case – take emergency action by asking the government of Brazil to prevent his arrest until he had exhausted all appeals, arguing that the Brazilian Supreme Court had narrowly adopted its ruling with only six votes against five, which "shows the need for an independent court"; the Committee ultimately denied Lula's request.[186][187] In June 2018, the Committee denied Lula's request.[188]

Lula failed to turn himself in at the scheduled time,[189] but he did so on the following day on 7 April 2018.[190] After Lula was imprisoned, protesters took to the streets in cities across Brazil.[191] Lula's imprisonment led to the formation of the Free Lula Movement.

On 28 May 2018, the UN Human Rights Committee initiated an investigation into Lula's case.[192] In August, the Committee "requested Brazil to take all necessary measures to ensure that Lula can enjoy and exercise his political rights while in prison, as candidate in the 2018 presidential elections"; Brazil's foreign ministry noted that the recommendation had no legal significance.[193][194]

On 8 July 2018, on-call weekend duty federal judge for the 4th region Rogério Favreto ordered Lula's release.[195] Moro said that Favreto did not have the authority to release Lula, and Favreto's ruling was overturned the same day by the Judge Pedro Gebran Neto, president of the 4th regional court.[196]

On 2 August 2018, Pope Francis received three former allies of Lula in Rome: Celso Amorim, Alberto Fernández and Carlos Ominami.[197] Later, the pope addressed a handwritten note to Lula (posted on his Twitter account) with the following text: "To Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva with my blessing, asking him to pray for me, Francisco".[198]

On 9 June 2019, The Intercept published leaked Telegram messages between the judge in Lula's case, Sergio Moro, and the Operation Car Wash lead prosecutor, Deltan Dallagnol, in which they allegedly conspired to convict Lula to prevent his candidacy for the 2018 presidential election.[199][200][201][202][203][204][205] Moro was accused of lacking impartiality in Lula's trial.[206] Following the disclosures, the resumption of legal proceedings was determined by the Supreme Court.[207] Moro denied any wrongdoing or judicial misconduct during the course of Operation Car Wash and his investigation of Lula, claiming that the conversations leaked by The Intercept were misrepresented by the press and that conversations between prosecutors and judges are normal.[208] Moro became Minister of Justice and Public Security after the election of president Jair Bolsonaro.

The information published by The Intercept prompted reactions both in Brazil and overseas. A group of 17 lawyers, ministers of Justice, and high court members from eight countries reacted to the leaks by describing former president Lula as a political prisoner and calling for his release.[209] United States Senator Bernie Sanders said Lula should be released and his conviction annulled. American Congressman Ro Khanna asked the Trump administration to investigate Lula's case, saying that "Moro was a bad actor and part of a larger conspiracy to send Lula to jail".[210] A number of international intellectuals, activists and political leaders, including professor Noam Chomsky and 12 US Congressmen, complained that the legal proceedings appeared to be designed to prevent Lula from running for president in 2018.[211][212][better source needed] American talk show host Michael Brooks, a vocal advocate for Lula, opined that Lula's imprisonment and Moro's alleged political motives had rendered the results of the 2018 election "fundamentally illegitimate".[213]

Release

[edit]

On 8 November 2019, Lula was released from prison after 580 days when the Brazilian Supreme Court ended mandatory imprisonment of convicted criminals after their first appeal failed.[214][215][216][217][218][219] His release allowed him to remain out of prison until all of his appeals of his corruption and money laundering convictions were exhausted.[220]

On 27 November, the Federal Regional Tribunal of Region 4 [pt] in Porto Alegre increased Lula's sentence to 17 years.[221]

On 8 March 2021, Judge Edson Fachin of the Supreme Federal Court annulled all convictions against Lula, ruling that the court in Curitiba, in Paraná state, which convicted him lacked jurisdiction to do so because the crimes he was accused of did not take place in that state, as at the time Lula resided in the capital, Brasilia.[222] Justice Fachin said the cases against him should therefore be retried by a court in that city.[223] The judge did not rule as to whether Lula was guilty or not of the corruption charges.[222] On 15 April, a full Supreme Court upheld the ruling in an 8–3 decision.[224]

On 23 March 2021, the Supreme Federal Court ruled by a 3–2 decision that Moro, who had overseen Lula's trial in a case, was biased against him.[225] On 23 June it upheld the ruling in a 7–4 decision.[226] On 24 June, Judge Gilmar Mendes of the Supreme Federal Court annulled the two other cases Moro had brought against Lula, reasoning that there was a link between them and the case in which Moro was declared biased. This meant that all evidence Moro had collected against Lula was inadmissible in court, and that fresh trials would be needed.[227]

Between terms (2011–2023)

[edit]

Health

[edit]

On 29 October 2011, it was announced that Lula, a former smoker, had a malignant tumor in his larynx,[228] which was detected after his voice became unusually hoarse.[229] He had chemotherapy to treat the tumor,[230] and was later treated with radiation therapy; his laryngeal cancer went into remission. Lula announced his recovery in March 2012.[231]

On 21 January 2021, Lula tested positive for COVID-19 while participating in the filming of an Oliver Stone documentary in Cuba, five days after arriving on the island. He recovered without needing to be admitted to hospital.[232] On 13 March 2021, Lula received his first dose of the CoronaVac vaccine.[233]

In October 2023, Lula had hip joint replacement surgery for a hip prosthesis, replacing the top of his right femur with an implant to treat his arthrosis.[234][235] [236] He also had a blepharoplasty, a cosmetic plastic surgery to remove excess skin from both of his eyelids.[234][237][235]

2018 presidential campaign

[edit]
Lula in 2016
Lula with Brazilian politicians Manuela d'Ávila and Marcelo Freixo, 2018

In 2017, Lula announced he would stand as the Workers' Party candidate for president again in the 2018 election. In September, he led a caravan of supporters which travelled through the states of Brazil, starting with Minas Gerais, whose governor was Lula's political ally Fernando Pimentel.[238] While traveling through the South of Brazil, the caravan became the target of protests. In Paraná, a campaign bus was shot at, and in Rio Grande do Sul, rocks were thrown at pro-Lula militants.[239]

Despite Lula's imprisonment in April 2018, the Workers' Party kept Lula as the party's presidential candidate. In a poll conducted by Ibope in June 2018, Lula led with 33% of vote intentions, with the PSL candidate Jair Bolsonaro polling second with 15%.[240] Lula negotiated a national coalition with the PCdoB and regional alliances with the Socialist Party.[241]

The Workers' Party officially nominated Lula as its candidate on 5 August 2018, in São Paulo. Actor Sérgio Mamberti read a letter written by Lula, who was unable to attend because of his prison sentence. Former São Paulo mayor Fernando Haddad was named as Lula's running mate and intended to represent Lula in events and debates. If Lula was declared ineligible, Haddad would replace Lula as candidate, with Manuela d'Ávila replacing Haddad as the vice-presidential candidate.[242]

In response to a petition from Lula, the UN Human Rights Committee on 17 August 2018 suggested to the Brazilian government that it allow Lula to exercise his political rights.[243]

In a 26 August poll, Lula had 39 percent of vote intentions within one month of the first round. The same opinion polling put Lula ahead of all his challengers in a second round run-off, including the nearest one, PSL candidate Jair Bolsonaro, by 52 to 32.[244]

Lula's candidacy was denied by the Superior Electoral Court on 31 August 2018 by a majority vote of the seven-judge panel.[245] On 11 September 2018, Lula officially withdrew and was replaced by Fernando Haddad, whom Lula endorsed.[246]

Second presidency (2023–present)

[edit]

2022 election

[edit]
Lula with President of Argentina Alberto Fernández, 2022

In May 2021, Lula said that he would run for a third term in the October 2022 general election, against the incumbent President Jair Bolsonaro.[247][248][249] He was 17% ahead of Bolsonaro in a poll in January 2022.[250] In April 2022, Lula announced that his running mate would be Geraldo Alckmin, a three-term governor of São Paulo state who had run against Lula in the 2006 presidential elections.[251]

On 2 October, in the first round vote, Lula was in first place with 48% of the electorate, qualifying for the second round with Bolsonaro, who received 43% of the votes. Lula was elected in the second round on 30 October with 50.89% of the vote, the smallest margin in the history of Brazil's presidential elections,[252][253] three days after his 77th birthday. He became the first president of Brazil elected to three terms, the first since Getúlio Vargas to serve in non-consecutive terms, and the first to unseat an incumbent president. He was sworn in on 1 January 2023.[254][255] At age 77, he was the oldest Brazilian president at the time of inauguration.[256][257][258]

Tenure

[edit]

Lula said that his main commitments were: the reconstruction of the country in the face of the economic crisis; democracy, sovereignty and peace; economic development and stability; fighting poverty; education; implementation of a National System of Culture and the expansion of housing programmes.[259] He held the presidency of the G20 from 2023 (succeeding India) until the 2024 Brazilian G20 Summit, where after this the presidency was handed over to South Africa.[260][261]

Lula's popularity declined; in September 2023, 38% of those polled considered him to be good or excellent, while 30% considered him to be average, and 31% viewed him as bad or terrible.[2]

On 23 October 2025, Lula announced that he would run for reelection as president in the 2026 Brazilian general election.[262]

Foreign policy

[edit]
China
[edit]
Lula and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, April 2023

In March 2023, Lula met in China with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, and signed 15 memoranda of understanding and 20 agreements on a wide range of issues.[263] Lula gave a speech in which he said that no one would keep Brazil from improving its relationship with China—which was taken as a reference to the United States.[264][265] In January 2024, Lula reaffirmed to Director of the Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission Wang Yi his recognition of China's policy of "one China", under which China claims Taiwan.[266] Human Rights Watch, in the meantime, cautioned Lula against cozying up to China, while remaining silent about China's human rights abuses.[103][267][268]

Cuba
[edit]

In September 2023, Lula called Cuba a "victim" of an "illegal" United States embargo against Cuba.[269][268] He also denounced the inclusion of Cuba on the US list of state sponsors of terrorism.[269][270]

Iran
[edit]

In March 2023, Lula's administration allowed two Iranian Navy warships, forward base ship IRIS Makran and frigate IRIS Dena, to dock in Rio de Janeiro.[271][272][273] U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Elizabeth Bagley said that in the past the warships had facilitated terrorist activities, and US Senator Ted Cruz said that "the docking of Iranian warships in Brazil is a dangerous development and a direct threat to the safety and security of Americans."[273]

Lula endorsed admitting Iran into the BRICS organization, and in August 2023 met with Iranian president Ebrahim Raeisi.[274][275] Lula stopped short of condemning Iran's rights abuses.[275]

Nicaragua
[edit]

In June 2023, at an Organization of American States (OAS) summit, Lula tried to soften OAS criticism of Nicaragua's government, which was accused of repression and of violations of human rights and property rights.[276][277][278][279] Nicaragua's former ambassador to the OAS, Arturo McFields, said that the proposed softening was "shameful," and that "President Lula is lying and telling another story that never existed in Nicaragua."[279]

Russia
[edit]
Lula with Russian President Vladimir Putin during the Victory Day celebrations in Moscow on 9 May 2025

In May 2023, he declined an invitation to the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum, saying that he "can't visit Russia at the moment", while confirming that he had spoken to Putin.[280] In December 2023, Lula said he would invite Vladimir Putin to the BRICS and G20 summits in Brazil. Due to Brazil being a signatory of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Putin could be placed under arrest by the Brazilian authorities if he sets foot on Brazil's territory. Lula said Putin could be arrested in Brazil, but that would be the decision of Brazil's independent courts, not his government.[281] In February 2024, he was visited by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.[282] In May 2025, he attended the Victory Day parade in Moscow.[283]

Russian invasion of Ukraine
[edit]

Lula has commented often on the Russo-Ukrainian War. He condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine,[284] but Ukraine called some of his comments as "Russian attempts to distort the truth".[285][286]

In May 2022, Lula blamed both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy for Russia's invasion of Ukraine, saying that Zelenskyy "is as responsible as Putin for the war".[287] Lula also repeatedly criticized NATO and the European Union for being partially responsible for the war. He accused NATO of "claiming for itself the right to install military bases in the vicinity of another country".[288] In April 2023, Lula declared after a state visit to China that "the United States needs to stop encouraging war and start talking about peace". U.S. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby responded by accusing Lula of "parroting Russian and Chinese propaganda", describing his comments as "simply misguided" and "suggesting the United States and Europe are somehow not interested in peace, or that we share responsibility for the war".[289]

Lula with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 20 September 2023

In April 2023, Lula initially condemned Russia's violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity and said Russia should withdraw from Ukrainian territory it has occupied since February 2022.[284] Later, however, that same month, he suggested that Ukraine should "give up Crimea" to Russia in exchange for peace and Russia's withdrawal from Ukrainian territory it occupied after February 2022, saying Zelenskyy "cannot want everything".[290][291]

After Germany appealed to Lula to provide military aid to Ukraine by selling it arms, Lula refused.[292] On 26 April, in a joint press conference, Spanish prime minister Pedro Sánchez questioned Lula's position, stressing that as the victimized country Ukraine needed to be supported.[293][better source needed] Lula said that he is seeking peace in accordance with a binding foreign policy principle in the pacifist Brazilian Constitution of 1988.[294] He said that the countries of the Global South, including Brazil, India, Indonesia and China "want peace", but both Putin and Zelenskyy "are convinced that they are going to win the war" and do not want to talk about peace.[295] He noted the human cost of the war, as well as the war's impact on food security, energy costs, and global supply chains.[296][297]

Saudi Arabia
[edit]
Lula and Saudi Head of State in Saudi Arabia, 2023

In November 2023, Lula met in Riyadh with the prime minister and crown prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman.[298][299][300] They discussed strengthening bilateral relations, and investments in both countries.[299][300] Salman said that a more robust strategic partnership between the two countries would benefit both sides.[299] The $10 billion that the sovereign wealth fund of Saudi Arabia pledged to invest in Brazil was one topic of conversation.[299][300] Lula mentioned Brazil's rapprochement with Arab countries.[299] Salman also discussed Saudi Arabia's entry into BRICS in January 2024.[299] Lula invited Salman to visit Brazil in 2024.[299][301][300]

In February 2024, Saudi Ambassador to Brazil Faisal Ghulam participated in a reception held by the ambassadors of Arab and Islamic countries in honour of Lula, and on behalf of the ambassadors of the Arab and Islamic countries, Ghulam delivered a speech in which he reviewed the developing relations between the Arab and Islamic countries and Brazil.[302]

Israel–Palestine war
[edit]

Lula condemned the Hamas attack on Israel carried out on 7 October 2023.[303] On 11 October 2023, he called for a ceasefire in the Israel–Gaza war, stating, it was "urgently needed in defence of Israeli and Palestinian children".[304] Lula urged Hamas to release kidnapped Israeli children and Israel to stop bombing the Gaza Strip and allow Palestinian children and their mothers to leave the war zone.[305] On 25 October 2023, Lula stated, "It's not a war, it's a genocide".[306] On 18 February 2024, he drew comparisons to the Nazi Holocaust.[307] That same day, he was accused of "blatant antisemitism" by Dani Dayan, the Chairman of Yad Vashem, the World Holocaust Remembrance Centre, for comparing Israel's actions to Adolf Hitler.[308] Brazil's ambassador to Israel Frederico Meyer was recalled after these comments, and President Lula was designated a persona non grata in the State of Israel.[309][310] Lula subsequently declined to apologise and despite having invoked a comparison with Adolf Hitler, he stated "I did not say the word Holocaust, that was the interpretation of the prime minister of Israel, it was not mine."[311]

United States
[edit]
Lula and US President Joe Biden at the White House on 10 February 2023

In April 2023, alluding to the support of the United States for Ukraine in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Lula said that the US needs to "stop encouraging war."[312] In May 2023, he said that US economic sanctions on Venezuela were "worse than a war" and "kill" women and children.[313] In February 2024, University of São Paulo foreign policy expert Feliciano de Sa Guimaraes said Lula only listens to one side in his government, "the left-wing, anti-American voices who very aggressively speak of a radical change in the global order."[314]

Venezuela
[edit]
Lula meeting with Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, May 2023

Lula restored diplomatic ties that Brazil had cut off with Venezuela's Nicolas Maduro government after 2018 elections that had been condemned by critics as a sham. In March 2023, Lula refused to join 54 other nations and sign a United Nations declaration criticizing Venezuela's human rights abuses.[315] In May 2023 Lula met with Maduro in Brazil.[316]

In May 2023, Lula warmly embraced and fully supported Venezuela's authoritarian leftist President Nicolás Maduro.[317] Lula dismissed charges against Maduro of human rights and civil rights abuses as a political "constructed narrative."[129] Lula was criticized by Uruguay's President Luis Lacalle Pou, who said that the "worst thing we can do" is pretend there are no significant human rights problems in Venezuela, and by Chile's President Gabriel Boric, who said that Lula was making light of human rights violations in Venezuela.[317] Lula also criticized as "unjustified" U.S. sanctions on Venezuela for its alleged human rights abuses, and criticized the United States for denying the legitimacy of Maduro, who the U.S. said had not allowed free elections.[318][319][320]

In August 2024, amid Venezuelan protests against Maduro, Lula described Maduro's government as "a very unpleasant regime" with an "authoritarian slant", but not a dictatorship.[321] Regarding Maduro's victory in the 2024 Venezuelan presidential election, which UN election experts said lacked "basic transparency and integrity", Lula said that Maduro should either hold new elections or form a coalition government. Both Maduro and the opposition rejected these suggestions.[321]

Economy

[edit]
Lula and other BRICS leaders at the 15th BRICS Summit, August 2023, in Johannesburg

In March 2023, Lula reinforced the Bolsa Família program. The programme was created during the first term of Lula and then significantly cut by Jair Bolsonaro, with its goal being help to around 60 million Brazilians suffering from poverty.[322] According to the World Bank estimates, the reinforced programme would reduce the poverty rate in Brazil to 24.3% – the level before the COVID-19 pandemic.[323][324]

In August 2023, Lula announced a vast infrastructure investment programme of over $350 billion over four years. Part of this sum is earmarked to finance the "My home, my life" social housing project. It also includes 100 billion for energy and 65 billion for transport and roads. Education and health are also concerned, with the construction of schools and hospitals. The project also aims to boost economic growth and develop clean energy.[325][326]

At the beginning of September 2023, he presented a major plan to eradicate hunger, as 33 million Brazilians do not have enough to eat, and more than half the country is affected to varying degrees by some form of food insecurity. To this end, he set up a national network of food banks to prevent waste, increased the budget allocated to school meals, and increased the purchase of food from family farms to supply public canteens. These measures are part of a broader policy to build social housing and raise the minimum wage and other social benefits. The fight against world hunger is also high on the Brazilian president's international agenda.[327][328]

In the first quarter of 2023, Brazilian economy grew by 1.9%. In the second quarter, by 0.9%, 3 times more than expected, while many of the neighbors of Brazil saw a shrinkage in their economy. The possible reasons of this phenomenon included reduced inflation, a good harvest, and an improved credit rating. The economic policy of Lula regarding taxation, spending, public ownership of some companies probably played a major role in this.[citation needed] Explaining his economic philosophy Lula once said: ""[Brazilians] need to understand that the money that exists in this country needs to circulate in the hands of many people," "We do not want the concentration of wealth. We want more people to have access to credit to make the wheel of the economy turn. The growing economy needs to be distributed."[329]

In 2025, Lula became the first Brazilian president since 1992 to have one of his decrees overturned by Congress following its rejection of a proposal to raise a financial transactions tax.[330]

Environment

[edit]
Launch of the Global Biofuel Alliance at the 2023 G20 New Delhi summit

During his campaign, Lula pledged to end illegal logging.[331] In 2004, Lula had presented a road map for curbing deforestation. It was part of "The Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon", which sought to decrease deforestation in the Amazon by 80% by 2020.[332] This plan was largely responsible for the 83% decrease in the Amazon deforestation rate in the years 2004 through 2012, but it was suspended during Bolsonaro's presidency. Lula re-affirmed the plan's goals in his third term, with a new target of zero illegal deforestation by the year 2030.[333] The plan includes different measures for creating a sustainable economy in the Amazon region, like bioeconomy, rural credits and managed fishing.[334]

The Amazon rainforest near Manaus, Brazil

According to Amazon Conservation's MAAP forest monitoring programme, the deforestation rate in the Brazilian Amazon from the 1 January to the 8 November 2023 decreased by 59% in comparison to the same period in 2022.[335][336][337] In July 2023 the deforestation rate was 66% lower than in July 2022. In the beginning of August Lula participated in the Belem summit, 8 Amazonian nations renewed the Amazon cooperation treaty.[338][needs update][339]

However, there are concerns that illegal loggers have partly moved their action from the Amazon rainforest to Cerrado, where the environmental destruction has increased.[340]

As a whole, the rate of primary forest loss declined in Brazil by 36% in 2023.[341]

Bolsonaro had strongly cut spending for security in the Brazilian Amazon, and in 2022, 34 environmental defenders were murdered in this region. When Lula re-assumed office, he sent troops to restore law enforcement in the region. In October 2023, there were still "reports of violence, threats, torture, intimidation, attempts at criminalization and other non-lethal violations".[342]

In April, Biden pledged to give $500 million to the Amazon Fund which was frozen during the rule of Bolsonaro and reactivated when Lula returned to power, to deal with climate change".[343] According to John Kerry, the overall financial help from US to Brazil for stopping deforestation through different channels will be around 2 billion US dollars.[344]

Lula and French president Emmanuel Macron agreed about cooperation between Brazil and France on different environmental issues, including the transmission of 1.1 billion dollars for preserving the Amazon rainforest.[345]

Lula visits the Yanomami people in the Brazilian state of Roraima during the Yanomami humanitarian crisis in January 2023

Lula pledged to recognize 14 new indigenous reserves. Six were recognized as of May 2023.[346] Lula and American president Joe Biden committed to work together on the issue.[347]

Several hours after Lula talked about leaving fossil fuels at the 2023 United Nations Climate Change Conference (also known as COP28), his government held an auction in which it offered 603 territorial blocks for oil extraction. The territories cover 2% of the territory of Brazil, overlap with many protected areas or areas belonging to indigenous people and can result in a release of 1 gigaton of CO2.[348]

Lula has expressed support for the paving of BR-319, a project initiated by the Bolsonaro government. Although he argues that the project can be done sustainably, one study found that the road could enable deforestation on a scale of territory the size of Florida by 2030. A court blocked the project in July 2024, saying that the government lacked a plan to combat the deforestation that would follow the implementation of the project.[349]

Freedom of the press

[edit]

In March 2023, the Lula government launched a campaign to fight "misinformation".[350][351] The initiative was viewed by many as a tool for Lula's administration to delegitimize criticism it faces—under the guise of "fact-checking", and raised serious concerns about freedom of expression.[352][350] In response, the senior programme director of the International Centre for Journalists, Christina Tardáliga, tweeted "There is no such thing as government fact-checking. This appropriation of the term is misguided and offensive. What the government does is propaganda."[350]

Health problems

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In late October 2024, Lula suffered a fall in the official residence, which resulted in trauma to the back of his head and a small brain hemorrhage in the temporal-frontal region, prompting him to cancel, under advice from his doctors, a planned trip to a BRICS summit in Russia.[353][354] In December of the same year, he was admitted to hospital after complaining of a headache. A brain haemorrhage was discovered after an MRI scan, and an emergency craniotomy was performed. The intracranial haemorrhage was attributed to his fall in October. After the operation he was reported to be recovering in intensive care.[355]

In May 2025, Lula was diagnosed with labyrinthitis after suffering from vertigo.[356]

Political positions and philosophy

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Lula has advocated "socialism of the 21st century", but Lulism is considered to be substantially similar to social liberalism.[357][358][359] Although he showed a moderate centre-left liberal tendency economically, he highlighted his closeness with the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and negatively evaluated Juan Guaidó during the Venezuelan crisis.[360] He is "personally against" abortion, but maintains that it should be treated as a public health issue.[361][362]

Palestine

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Lula criticized the decisions by Western countries to cut funding to UNRWA and in response pledged to the Palestinian government that Brazil would increase its funding to UNRWA. Lula has called for a two-state solution with Palestine "definitively recognised as a full and sovereign state".[363]

On 18 February 2024, Lula told reporters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia while attending the African Union Summit, "What's happening in the Gaza Strip isn't a war, it's a genocide. ... It's not a war of soldiers against soldiers. It's a war between a highly prepared army and women and children. ... What's happening in the Gaza Strip with the Palestinian people hasn't happened at any other moment in history. Actually, it has happened: when Hitler decided to kill the Jews".[363]

Honours and awards

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The list of Lula's awards since 2003:

National honours

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Ribbon bar Honour Date & Comment Ref.
Grand Cross of the Order of the Southern Cross 2003 – automatic upon taking presidential office [365]
Grand Cross of the Order of Rio Branco 2003 – automatic upon taking presidential office [366]
Grand Cross of the Order of Military Merit 2003 – automatic upon taking presidential office [367]
Grand Cross of the Order of Naval Merit 2003 – automatic upon taking presidential office
Grand Cross of the Order of Aeronautical Merit 2003 – automatic upon taking presidential office
Grand Cross of the Order of Military Judicial Merit 2003 – automatic upon taking presidential office
Grand Cross of the National Order of Merit 2013 [368]

State honours

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Ribbon bar Honour Date & Comment Ref.
Grand Cross of the Aperipê Order of Merit 2008 – Given by Governor of Sergipe [369]
Grand Necklace of the Inconfidence Medal 2008 – Given by Governor of Minas Gerais

Foreign honours

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Ribbon bar Country Honour Date Ref.
Algeria Grand Cross of the National Order of Merit 7 February 2006 [370]
Benin Grand Cross of the National Order of Benin 17 March 2013 [371]
Bolivia Collar of the Order of the Condor of the Andes 17 December 2007 [372]
Cape Verde Grand Cross of Amílcar Cabral Order 29 July 2004 [373]
Colombia Grand Collar of the Order of Boyacá 14 December 2005 [374]
Cuba Grand Cross of the Order of Carlos Manuel de Céspedes 20 December 2019 [375]
Denmark Knight of the Order of the Elephant 12 September 2007 [376]
Ecuador Grand Collar of the National Order of San Lorenzo 6 June 2013 [377]
Gabon Grand Cross of the Order of the Equatorial Star 28 July 2004 [378]
Ghana Companion of the Order of the Star of Ghana 13 April 2005 [379]
Medalha Amílcar Cabral Guinea-Bissau Member of the Order of Amílcar Cabral 25 August 2010 [380]
Guyana Member of the Order of Excellence of Guyana 25 November 2010 [381]
Japan Grand Cordon of the Supreme Order of the Chrysanthemum 18 March 2025 [382]
Mexico Collar of the Order of the Aztec Eagle 3 August 2007 [383]
Norway Grand Cross of the Order of St. Olav 7 October 2003
Norway Grand Cross of the Royal Norwegian Order of Merit 13 September 2007
Palestine Grand Collar of the State of Palestine 2010
Panama Grand Cross of the Order of Omar Torrijos Herrera 10 August 2007 [384]
Paraguay Grand Collar of the Order of Marshal Francisco Solano López 2007
Peru Grand Cross with Diamonds of the Order of the Sun 25 August 2003 [385]
Portugal Grand Cross of the Order of the Tower and Sword 5 March 2008 [386]
Portugal Grand Collar of the Order of Liberty 23 July 2003 [386]
Portugal Grand Collar of the Order of Camões 22 April 2023 [386]
Spain Knight of the Collar of the Order of Isabella the Catholic 11 July 2003 [387]
Saudi Arabia Chain of the Order of Abdulaziz Al Saud 16 May 2009
South Africa Member of the Order of the Companions of O. R. Tambo 27 April 2011
Sweden Knight of the Royal Order of the Seraphim 11 September 2007 [388]
Syria Member First Class of the Order of the Umayyads 2010
Ukraine Member First Class of the Order of Prince Yaroslav the Wise 2003 [389]
Ukraine Member of the Order of Liberty 2009 [390]
United Kingdom Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath 7 March 2006 [391]
Zambia Grand Commander of the Order of the Eagle of Zambia 2010 [392]

Foreign awards

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Country Award Date Ref.
Spain Princess of Asturias Award for International Cooperation October 2003 [393]
Portugal Honoris Causa Doctor in Economics, University of Coimbra March 2011 [394]
France Doctor Honoris Causa, Sciences Po Paris September 2011 [395][396]
Poland Lech Wałęsa Prize September 2011 [397][398]
United Kingdom Honorary President of Young Labour (UK) October 2018 [399]
France Honorary citizen of Paris March 2020 [400][401]
Argentina Doctor Honoris Causa, Universidad Nacional de Rosario May 2020 [402][403]
Uruguay Más Verde Prize January 2023 [404]
Bolivia Key to the City of Santa Cruz de la Sierra July 2024 [405]
United States Global Goalkeeper Award September 2024 [406]
France Doctor Honoris Causa, Paris 8 University June 2025 [407][408]
France Académie Française Award June 2025 [407][408]
[edit]

Academy Award-nominated Brazilian director Fábio Barreto directed the 2009 Brazilian biographical film Lula, Son of Brazil that depicts the life of Lula up to 35 years of age.[409] Upon its release, it was the most expensive Brazilian film ever.[410] The film was a commercial and critical failure.[411][412] Critics charged that it was election propaganda, fostering a cult of personality.[413][414][415]

The Netflix Brazilian series The Mechanism deals with Operation Car Wash, and has a character inspired by Lula, who is referred to as João Higino in the series.[416][417]

The 2019 Brazilian documentary, The Edge of Democracy, written and directed by Petra Costa, chronicled the rise and fall of Lula and Dilma Rousseff, and the socio-political upheaval in Brazil during the period.[418] Lula is also featured in the director's 2024 documentary Apocalypse in the Tropics.[419]

Notes

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References

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Further reading

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (born 27 October 1945) is a Brazilian politician and former trade unionist who has served as the 39th and 43rd president of Brazil, holding office from 2003 to 2010 and again since 2023. Rising from a impoverished rural background in Pernambuco state, he migrated to São Paulo as a child, worked as a metalworker, and became a prominent labor leader in the late 1970s, heading major strikes against the military dictatorship. In 1980, he co-founded the leftist Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT), which combined union activists, intellectuals, and social movements to challenge Brazil's political establishment.
After multiple unsuccessful presidential bids in 1989, 1994, and 1998, Lula won the 2002 election by moderating his platform to assure markets of fiscal prudence, then governed through a commodity-fueled economic expansion that averaged over 4% annual GDP growth from 2004 to 2010, enabling social welfare expansions like the Bolsa Família program that lifted millions from extreme poverty. His administrations advanced Brazil's global influence via BRICS diplomacy and South-South ties, yet were overshadowed by corruption schemes including the 2005 Mensalão vote-buying scandal and Petrobras graft exposed by Operation Car Wash (Lava Jato), which implicated PT allies in billions of dollars in kickbacks. Convicted in 2017 of corruption and money laundering for receiving undue benefits from construction firms—a verdict upheld in multiple judicial instances—Lula was imprisoned for 580 days from 2018 to 2019, barring his 2018 candidacy; Brazil's Supreme Federal Court annulled the convictions in 2021 on grounds that the Curitiba court lacked jurisdiction over the cases, and in a subsequent ruling found Judge Sergio Moro biased, transferring them for potential retrial without declaring innocence or invalidating the substantive evidence reviewed across proceedings. Cleared to run again, he narrowly defeated incumbent Jair Bolsonaro in the disputed 2022 election amid polarized claims of electoral irregularities, returning to power with a slim mandate to revive PT-era policies amid ongoing economic challenges and institutional tensions.

Early life and background

Childhood and family origins

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was born on October 27, 1945, in Garanhuns, Pernambuco, in Brazil's rural Northeast region. He was the seventh of eight children born to Aristides Inácio da Silva, an illiterate agricultural laborer, and Eurídice Ferreira de Mello, known as Dona Lindu, who managed the household amid chronic hardship. The family subsisted on sharecropping and small-scale farming in an area marked by aridity, land inequality, and persistent underdevelopment, conditions that exacerbated food insecurity and limited access to basic services for rural households. Aristides da Silva's occupation involved itinerant work on farms owned by larger landowners, a common pattern in Pernambuco's agrarian economy where tenant families like Lula's yielded portions of harvests in exchange for plots, often insufficient to sustain large broods. Dona Lindu, also lacking formal education, bore primary responsibility for child-rearing and domestic survival, drawing on extended kin networks typical of Northeast peasant communities to mitigate scarcity. By Lula's early years, the household had already experienced instability, with Aristides departing for industrial work in Santos, São Paulo, around 1950, leaving Eurídice to support the children through intensified labor and temporary separations. These origins reflected broader structural poverty in the Northeast, where over 50% of the population in the 1940s lived in extreme deprivation, reliant on seasonal agriculture vulnerable to droughts.

Migration to São Paulo and early hardships

In December 1952, at the age of seven, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva migrated with his mother, Eurídice Ferreira de Melo (known as Dona Lindu), and his seven siblings from their rural home in Caetés, Pernambuco, to São Paulo state, fleeing severe drought and hunger in Brazil's impoverished Northeast. The family's father, Aristides Inácio da Silva, had already relocated to São Paulo earlier in search of work, leaving the mother to lead the arduous overland journey. The migration entailed a grueling 13-day trip aboard a pau de arara, an informal open-bed truck commonly used for transporting rural migrants southward, under cramped and hazardous conditions that exposed passengers to weather, poor roads, and physical strain. Upon arrival, the family initially settled in the working-class Brás neighborhood of São Paulo before moving to the coastal suburb of Vicente de Carvalho near Guarujá, where they endured ongoing poverty in rudimentary housing amid the challenges of urban adaptation for Northeastern migrants. Early hardships in São Paulo included acute economic deprivation, with the family relying on low-wage informal labor and facing the instability typical of mid-20th-century internal migration waves driven by industrialization and rural collapse; by 1956, they relocated again to a single-room dwelling behind a bar in the Ipiranga district of the city proper, underscoring persistent substandard living conditions. These experiences of familial separation, perilous travel, and urban squalor shaped the backdrop of Lula's formative years in a context of mass Northeastern exodus, where millions sought survival in São Paulo's factories but often confronted exploitation and marginalization.

Personal life

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has been married three times. His first wife, Maria de Lourdes Ribeiro, died in 1971 from hepatitis complications during her eighth month of pregnancy; they had one son, Fábio Luís Lula da Silva, who survived. He married Marisa Letícia Casa in 1974; she was the mother of four of his children and died in 2017 from a brain aneurysm. In 2022, he married Rosângela da Silva, known as Janja. Lula was raised in a Catholic family.

Education and early employment

Limited formal education

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's formal education was constrained by economic hardship and familial obligations, typical of many rural migrants in mid-20th-century Brazil. Born on October 27, 1945, in Caetés, Pernambuco, he relocated to São Paulo with his family in April 1952 at age seven, amid severe poverty that necessitated child labor. He enrolled in primary school irregularly, often prioritizing work such as shining shoes or odd jobs, and remained illiterate until age ten, when he began learning to read. Accounts of his schooling completion vary slightly, with multiple sources indicating he attended up to the fourth grade before dropping out around age 11 or 12 to support his family full-time, while others specify the fifth grade. In the Brazilian educational system of the era, primary schooling emphasized basic literacy and arithmetic, but Lula's fragmented attendance limited his proficiency; he later described himself as having "only a primary school education" without advancing to secondary levels. Lula never obtained a secondary school diploma or pursued higher academic education, becoming the first Brazilian president without a university degree. His initial formal qualification came later through vocational training: in 1967, at age 21, he completed a course in lathe operation (torneiro mecânico) at the Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Industrial (SENAI), a government-backed industrial training institute, which provided practical skills rather than academic credentials. This training, rather than traditional schooling, facilitated his entry into metalworking, underscoring the primacy of on-the-job learning in his early career amid Brazil's rapid industrialization.

Entry into industrial workforce as metalworker

In January 1966, at the age of 21, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was hired as a machinist by Indústrias Villares, a prominent metallurgical firm in São Bernardo do Campo, marking his entry into Brazil's industrial workforce as a metalworker. This position involved operating lathes in the production of metal components, amid the ABC Paulista region's rapid industrialization driven by the country's "economic miracle" under military rule, though tempered by post-1964 coup recession and labor controls. Prior to this role, Lula had acquired vocational skills through training at the Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Industrial (SENAI), a federal apprenticeship program focused on industrial trades, where he specialized in lathe operation after completing only four years of primary schooling. His earlier employment from age 12 included informal jobs such as shoeshine boy, street vendor, office messenger, and warehouse assistant at firms like Armazéns Gerais Columbia, reflecting the precarious conditions faced by Northeastern migrants in São Paulo's urban economy. The Villares job provided Lula with stable wages and exposure to factory discipline, contrasting his prior instability, and positioned him within a sector employing thousands in auto parts and machinery manufacturing; he advanced from machinist tasks to more skilled operations over time. This entry facilitated his initial contacts with organized labor, influenced by his brother Frei Chico, a union activist, though active involvement came later.

Union activism and leadership

Rise in metalworkers' union

Lula da Silva entered the industrial workforce as a machinist in the São Paulo metropolitan area during the mid-1960s, initially at companies like Indústrias Villares and later at other metalworking firms in the ABC region (Santo André, São Bernardo do Campo, and São Caetano do Sul). Influenced by his older brother, José Ferreira da Silva (known as Frei Chico), a union organizer, Lula joined the Sindicato dos Metalúrgicos de São Bernardo do Campo e Diadema around 1969, amid Brazil's military dictatorship that imposed strict controls on labor organizations through interventionist laws like the 1943 Consolidated Labor Laws (CLT). His early union involvement focused on shop-floor grievances, such as wage disputes and poor working conditions, during a period of rapid industrialization under the dictatorship's economic miracle, which expanded the metalworking sector but suppressed independent unionism. By 1972, Lula transitioned from factory employment to a paid position as a union official, handling membership drives and negotiations, which positioned him within the union's leadership cadre despite lacking formal political experience. This move coincided with growing worker discontent over inflation eroding real wages—averaging 20-30% annually in the early 1970s—and the regime's peleguismo system, where government-aligned unions (pelegos) prioritized collaboration over militancy. Lula's pragmatic approach, emphasizing direct worker mobilization over ideological dogma, gained traction among rank-and-file metalworkers facing job insecurity from the sector's 1970s expansion, which employed over 100,000 in the ABC region by the mid-decade. On April 19, 1975, Lula was elected president of the Sindicato dos Metalúrgicos do ABC, securing 92% of the vote in a direct election involving approximately 100,000 workers, marking a shift toward more autonomous union governance amid the dictatorship's gradual abertura (opening). His victory reflected dissatisfaction with prior interventionist leadership, as he campaigned on reforming union practices to prioritize worker interests over state compliance, including ending mandatory union dues (imposto sindical) collection that funded regime-friendly activities. Under his presidency, the union's membership dues-funded budget grew, enabling expanded legal aid and strike funds, though these innovations tested the limits of tolerated dissent under Lei de Segurança Nacional restrictions. This rapid ascent from novice activist to leader underscored Lula's ability to navigate internal union factions—balancing communists, Catholics, and independents—while building a base through personal charisma and tangible gains like negotiated productivity bonuses at firms such as Volkswagen and Mercedes-Benz.

Organization of strikes and formation of labor federations

In 1975, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was elected president of the Metalworkers' Union of São Bernardo do Campo and Diadema, a position that positioned him as a leader in Brazil's industrial ABC region amid the military dictatorship's economic "miracle" and wage suppression policies. Under his direction, the union pursued a strategy of direct worker mobilization, rejecting collaboration with state-controlled labor structures and emphasizing rank-and-file democracy over bureaucratic negotiation. This approach crystallized in the "new unionism" model, which prioritized strikes as tools for reclaiming bargaining power eroded by inflation outpacing official wage adjustments. The strikes Lula organized began with a spontaneous wildcat action in May 1978, when approximately 3,000 metalworkers at Volkswagen's plant walked out demanding a 34.1% salary increase to offset rising living costs, bypassing legal strike procedures outlawed under the dictatorship. The stoppage expanded rapidly, involving tens of thousands across auto and machinery factories, but ended after 12 days due to police intervention and court injunctions, with no immediate wage gains yet establishing Lula's reputation for defiance. Escalation followed in 1979: on March 13, Lula launched a coordinated strike wave mobilizing 170,000 metallurgists, paralyzing the ABC industrial belt for over 40 days through factory occupations and mass assemblies that evaded union headquarters to sustain momentum. Government forces responded with arrests, including Lula's detention in April 1979 on charges of inciting unrest, and military occupation of plants, ultimately forcing a return to work without full concessions but weakening regime control over labor. A third wave in 1980 repeated the pattern, with strikes lasting into July and involving over 140,000 workers, further eroding the dictatorship's aura of invincibility despite economic setbacks for participants like lost wages and blacklisting. These actions exposed the limitations of the dictatorship-era Command of Workers' Currencies (CGT), a state-aligned federation that enforced wage freezes and suppressed dissent, prompting Lula and allies to advocate for autonomous labor coordination. By 1981, inter-union forums like the São Bernardo Coordinating Committee began aggregating experiences from the strikes, laying groundwork for national independence from peleguista (collaborationist) structures. This culminated in the formation of the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT) on August 28, 1983, during the First National Congress of the Working Class in São Bernardo do Campo, where over 3,000 delegates from 1,800 unions endorsed a charter for class-based, democratic federation free of government tutelage. Lula, as a principal architect and inaugural coordinator, steered CUT toward political engagement, including support for direct presidential elections, distinguishing it from reformist rivals and enabling broader worker mobilization in the transition to democracy. The federation grew to represent millions by the mid-1980s, though internal debates over radicalism versus pragmatism reflected tensions in Lula's leadership between confrontational tactics and institutional gains.

Entry into politics

Founding of the Workers' Party (PT)

The Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) was founded on February 10, 1980, amid a surge in labor militancy following the 1978–1980 strikes in São Paulo's ABC industrial region, where metalworkers numbering in the tens of thousands defied military dictatorship controls on wages and unions. These actions, coordinated under Lula's leadership as president of the Metalworkers' Union of São Bernardo do Campo and Diadema since 1975, exposed the regime's weakening grip after years of repression peaking in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and highlighted demands for autonomy from state-aligned labor structures like the Brazilian Labor Confederation (CTB). Lula played a pivotal organizational role, convening trade unionists from the "new unionism" movement with progressive intellectuals, liberation theology adherents from the Catholic Church, Trotskyist militants, and other left-wing groups alienated by the dictatorship's two-party system of the National Renewal Alliance (ARENA) and Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB). The founding assembly, held in São Paulo, sought to create a class-based party independent of bourgeois influences, drawing on the strike wave's momentum to prioritize workers' direct representation over electoral opportunism. The PT's inaugural program, adopted at the founding congress, called for immediate direct elections for president and governors, land expropriation for agrarian reform without compensation to large landowners, nationalization of foreign-owned banks and utilities, and worker-management councils in factories, framing these as steps toward socialism via mass mobilization rather than vanguardism. Internal divisions surfaced early, pitting radical factions advocating revolutionary rupture against Lula's pragmatists favoring broad anti-dictatorship alliances, yet the party's structure emphasized horizontal democracy through neighborhood and workplace nuclei to sustain rank-and-file control. This approach positioned the PT as Brazil's first major autonomous labor party since the 1920s, contrasting with co-opted predecessors and enabling rapid growth to over 1.5 million members by the mid-1980s through affiliation drives tied to union bases.

Early presidential campaigns and ideological evolution (1989–1998)

In the 1989 Brazilian presidential election, the first direct vote for the office since the 1964 military coup, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva ran as the candidate of the Workers' Party (PT), securing 11,622,673 votes (16.08%) in the first round on November 15. He advanced to a runoff against Fernando Collor de Mello of the National Reconstruction Party (PRN), but lost on December 17 with 47% of the vote to Collor's 53%, amid a campaign marked by Collor's attacks on Lula's working-class background and accusations of radicalism. The PT's platform emphasized socialist-oriented policies, including extensive land reform via expropriation, nationalization of foreign-owned utilities and banks, worker management in enterprises, and opposition to neoliberal privatization, positioning Lula as a champion of the disenfranchised against elite interests. Following the narrow defeat, which Lula attributed partly to biased media coverage favoring Collor, the PT conducted internal reflections but largely preserved its ideological core, viewing the loss as a mobilization of conservative forces rather than a rejection of its program. This stance reflected the party's origins in 1980 as a broad coalition of unions, social movements, and left-wing intellectuals committed to democratic socialism and anti-capitalist transformation, with Lula as its enduring figurehead. However, the electoral setback prompted early pragmatic adjustments, such as increased emphasis on electoral organization and alliances with non-radical groups to broaden appeal beyond the industrial working class. By the 1994 election, held on October 3 amid hyperinflation's resolution through Fernando Henrique Cardoso's Real Plan, Lula's campaign focused on persistent inequality and corruption critiques, but he garnered only 17 million votes (27%) against Cardoso's 54.3% in a first-round victory for the latter. The PT platform retained calls for redistributive measures like progressive taxation and public investment in health and education, yet showed nascent moderation by acknowledging fiscal discipline's role in stabilizing the economy, diverging from pure anti-market rhetoric. This shift stemmed from the party's growing recognition that economic chaos under prior governments had eroded support for radical change, forcing adaptation to voter priorities for stability. The 1998 election on October 4 saw further defeats, with Lula receiving 21.5 million votes (31.7%) as Cardoso secured re-election with 53.1% on the first ballot, buoyed by sustained growth and low inflation. Throughout the 1990s, repeated losses—coupled with the PT's expansion in congressional seats from 3% in 1986 to 10% by 1998—drove ideological evolution under Lula's leadership: from overt socialist aspirations toward pragmatic social democracy, including reduced emphasis on nationalizations, greater openness to regulated markets, and strategic pacts with centrist parties to counter the PSDB's dominance. This moderation was electoral calculus rather than doctrinal overhaul, as internal radicals resisted but yielded to Lula's argument that uncompromised ideology yielded isolation; core tenets like combating poverty endured, but framed increasingly within capitalist frameworks to attract middle-class voters wary of instability.

Path to first presidency

2002 election strategy and victory

In the lead-up to the 2002 presidential election, Lula da Silva, after three unsuccessful bids in 1989, 1994, and 1998—during which he embraced radical left-wing positions influenced by the Workers' Party (PT)'s Marxist-oriented factions, advocating debt moratoriums, aggressive land reforms, and class-struggle framing—adopted a strategy of ideological moderation to broaden his appeal beyond the Workers' Party (PT) base and assuage concerns among business elites, investors, and centrists about potential radical policies. His campaign emphasized fiscal responsibility, respect for existing contracts, and continuity in macroeconomic management, marking a departure from the more confrontational rhetoric of prior runs that had portrayed him as a threat to market stability. This shift was necessitated by early polling leads that triggered financial market turmoil, including a sharp decline in the Bovespa stock index and depreciation of the Brazilian real, prompting Lula to signal pragmatism to prevent capital flight. A pivotal element was the June 22 "Carta ao Povo Brasileiro" (Letter to the Brazilian People), a manifesto in which Lula committed to upholding inflation targets, central bank autonomy, primary fiscal surpluses, and international trade obligations, while prioritizing social inclusion without upending the neoliberal framework established under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. To further balance the ticket and counter perceptions of anti-business bias, Lula selected José Alencar, a wealthy textile industrialist from the centrist Liberal Party (PL), as his vice-presidential running mate, forging an alliance that extended PT's reach into conservative and entrepreneurial circles. These moves coalesced support from diverse voters disillusioned with Cardoso's economic stagnation and corruption scandals, positioning Lula as a viable agent of change without revolutionary upheaval. In the first round on October 6, Lula secured 46% of the valid votes, far outpacing José Serra of the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB), who received 23%, necessitating a runoff against the government-backed candidate. The PT's expanded coalition, including the PL and smaller parties, bolstered congressional gains, enhancing governability prospects. On October 27, in the runoff, Lula won decisively with 61.2% of the votes (approximately 52 million) to Serra's 38.8%, achieving the largest margin in Brazilian presidential history and marking the first PT victory in a direct election. This outcome reflected voter fatigue with the PSDB's incumbency amid inequality and debt burdens, though Lula's moderated platform mitigated fears of policy rupture, stabilizing markets post-election.

Electoral history overview

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva entered elective office by winning a seat in Brazil's federal Chamber of Deputies in the 1986 parliamentary elections, securing the highest vote total in São Paulo state as a Workers' Party (PT) candidate. His subsequent presidential campaigns marked a progression from consistent second-place finishes to eventual victories after ideological moderation and economic shifts favoring his platform. In the 1989 direct presidential election—the first since 1961—Lula reached the runoff against Fernando Collor de Mello but lost amid allegations of media bias and fragmented opposition. Lula placed second in the 1994 presidential election with 27.04% of the valid votes (17,112,127 votes), behind Fernando Henrique Cardoso's 54.27%, in a contest dominated by Cardoso's anti-inflation Real Plan. He improved to 31.71% (21,475,218 votes) in 1998 against Cardoso's reelection bid, again failing to force a competitive runoff. By 2002, after adopting a more market-friendly "Letter to the Brazilian People" to reassure investors, Lula won the first round with 46.44% and the runoff with 61.3% against José Serra. Re-elected in 2006 amid a commodities boom, he took 48.6% in the first round and 60.8% in the runoff versus Geraldo Alckmin. After legal disqualifications from 2018 to 2022 due to corruption convictions later annulled, Lula returned to win the 2022 election narrowly, securing 48.43% in the first round and 50.90% (60,345,999 votes) in the runoff against incumbent Jair Bolsonaro's 49.10%. His victories reflected strong support in Brazil's Northeast but weaker performance in the South and agrarian interior, highlighting persistent regional polarization.
YearElection RoundLula's Vote Share (%)Opponent's Vote Share (%)Result
1989Runoff47.5Collor (53.5)Loss
1994First27.0Cardoso (54.3)Loss
1998First31.7Cardoso (53.1)Loss
2002First46.4Serra (23.2)Advance
2002Runoff61.3Serra (38.7)Win
2006First48.6Alckmin (41.6)Advance
2006Runoff60.8Alckmin (39.2)Win
2022First48.4Bolsonaro (43.2)Advance
2022Runoff50.9Bolsonaro (49.1)Win
Note: Percentages are of valid votes; data derived from official tallies reported by electoral authorities and contemporaneous analyses, with minor variations due to rounding.

First presidency (2003–2011)

Economic management and commodity boom reliance

During Lula da Silva's first presidency from 2003 to 2010, Brazil's economy expanded at an average annual GDP growth rate of 4.06%, marking the highest such average in two decades and totaling 32.62% cumulative growth. Per capita GDP rose by 23.05% over the period, outpacing prior decades and contributing to reduced poverty rates, with the share of the population below the poverty line falling significantly amid rising employment and real wages. This performance built on the fiscal framework established by the 2000 Fiscal Responsibility Law under the prior administration, which Lula's government adhered to by maintaining primary budget surpluses averaging around 3-4% of GDP annually, thereby stabilizing public debt at approximately 60% of GDP. The expansion was predominantly fueled by a global commodity supercycle, with Brazil's export revenues surging from $118 billion in 2005 to $256 billion by 2011, driven by heightened demand from China's industrialization. Primary commodities such as soybeans, iron ore, and oil accounted for over 60% of export value, with shipments to China alone reaching $44.3 billion in 2011—a 43% increase from 2010—and overtaking the United States as Brazil's top trading partner by 2009. This external windfall masked underlying structural weaknesses, including low productivity growth (averaging under 1% annually) and insufficient investment in manufacturing or infrastructure, as commodity rents financed social transfers like Bolsa Família without corresponding reforms to enhance competitiveness. Critics, including economists analyzing post-boom outcomes, argue that Lula's management prioritized short-term redistribution over diversification, fostering dependency on volatile raw material prices rather than fostering export sophistication or regulatory streamlining; for instance, manufacturing's share of GDP declined from 20% in 2003 to 16% by 2010 amid rising import competition from China. While the administration expanded credit through state banks like BNDES and implemented minimum wage hikes tied to inflation plus GDP growth—lifting real minimum wages by about 70%—these measures amplified demand without addressing supply-side bottlenecks, rendering the model vulnerable to the commodity price collapse post-2011. This reliance on exogenous factors, rather than endogenous policy innovations, explains why growth averaged only 2.5% per capita annually through 2014 before contracting sharply, highlighting the limits of commodity-led expansion absent deeper institutional reforms.

Social welfare programs: Implementation and short-term impacts

Upon assuming office in January 2003, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva prioritized combating hunger through the Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) initiative, a multi-pillar strategy encompassing food access via subsidies and distributions, agricultural support for small farmers, income generation programs, and social mobilization efforts. This program initially distributed food cards and promoted cisterns in drought-prone areas, but faced implementation challenges including bureaucratic overlaps and uneven municipal participation. By mid-2003, Fome Zero evolved into the more streamlined Bolsa Família program, launched in October 2003, which consolidated prior conditional cash transfer schemes such as Bolsa Escola (for school attendance) and Bolsa Alimentação (for nutrition). Bolsa Família provided monthly cash payments to families with per capita income below R$100 (later adjusted to R$120), targeting approximately 11 million households by 2006, conditional on children attending school at least 85% of the time, receiving vaccinations, and undergoing health check-ups. Funding came from reallocating existing social budgets and new revenues from economic growth, costing about 0.5% of GDP initially, with payments varying from R$50 for basic benefits to R$95 for larger families with school-aged children. Rollout emphasized targeting the extreme poor via unified registries, though early audits revealed some leakages to ineligible recipients due to self-reported income data. In the short term (2003–2006), Bolsa Família contributed to measurable reductions in extreme poverty, with national surveys indicating a 4.5% drop in both poverty and extreme poverty rates, alongside increased household consumption among beneficiaries. Hunger indicators improved, as the program's conditions encouraged health compliance, reducing child malnutrition rates in participating families by promoting regular medical visits and vaccinations. School enrollment and attendance rose, particularly for girls and in rural areas, breaking immediate intergenerational poverty cycles through better access to basic services. The Gini coefficient, a measure of income inequality, declined from 0.594 in 2001 to approximately 0.56 by 2006, reflecting partial redistribution effects from transfers that boosted the bottom income quintiles. However, these gains were amplified by concurrent economic expansion driven by commodity exports, which increased formal employment and wages, suggesting the programs' impacts were not solely causal but synergistic with broader growth. Critics, including economists analyzing fiscal sustainability, noted risks of dependency, as short-term evaluations showed limited immediate boosts to labor force participation among adult beneficiaries, with some households relying on transfers without transitioning to self-sufficiency. Early fiscal analyses highlighted that while costs remained contained, expansion without structural reforms like labor market deregulation could strain public finances if growth faltered. Empirical studies attributed about 20–30% of poverty declines directly to the transfers, underscoring their role in immediate relief but emphasizing the need for complementary investments in education and jobs for lasting effects.

Foreign policy: Alignments with non-democratic regimes

During Lula's first presidency, Brazil pursued deepened ties with Cuba, highlighted by Cuban leader Fidel Castro's attendance at Lula's inauguration on January 1, 2003, alongside Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez. Following the ceremony, Lula dined with Castro, underscoring an immediate warming of relations after years of cooler ties under prior administrations. Brazil's government abstained from supporting United Nations Human Rights Commission resolutions condemning Cuba's human rights situation, such as in 2003, prioritizing bilateral cooperation including medical personnel exchanges over public criticism of the communist regime's political repression. Lula maintained a close ideological and diplomatic alliance with Venezuela's Chávez, expressing full support for his government shortly after taking office in January 2003 and refusing to openly criticize Chávez's authoritarian tendencies throughout the term. In November 2007, ahead of a referendum on constitutional reforms that would expand Chávez's powers, Lula defended him as the democratic choice of Venezuelans, emphasizing regional solidarity amid Chávez's confrontations with the United States. This partnership facilitated energy agreements and joint initiatives like proposals for a Latin American OPEC, though it drew accusations of enabling Chávez's erosion of democratic institutions. In dealings with Iran, Lula's administration opposed Western-led sanctions and mediated a nuclear fuel swap deal with Turkey on May 17, 2010, under which Iran would export 1,200 kilograms of its low-enriched uranium stockpile to Turkey in exchange for fuel rods, aiming to avert escalation over Tehran's nuclear program. Lula visited Tehran on May 15, 2010, to negotiate directly with Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, as part of this effort, which the United States rejected as insufficient to curb Iran's enrichment activities. In March 2010, Lula publicly resisted U.S. pressure for UN sanctions, arguing for diplomacy with the theocratic regime despite its documented support for terrorism and human rights abuses. These alignments reflected Lula's broader strategy of South-South cooperation and multipolarity, often sidelining concerns over partner regimes' lack of democratic accountability. Deforestation rates in the Brazilian Amazon remained elevated at the outset of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's first presidency, with 25,396 km² cleared in the 2002-2003 monitoring period and peaking at 27,772 km² in 2004. This surge occurred amid expanding agricultural frontiers, particularly soy cultivation, which benefited from global commodity booms during Lula's early term. In response, the administration launched the Action Plan for Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAm) in May 2004, coordinating federal agencies to enhance satellite monitoring through the DETER alert system, impose financial restrictions on illegal deforesters, and bolster enforcement operations. These measures contributed to a sharp decline, with annual losses falling to 18,793 km² in 2005, 14,286 km² in 2006, and further to 7,000-12,000 km² range by 2009-2010, culminating at 6,451 km² in 2010—a reduction of over 75% from the 2004 peak. Lula's rhetoric emphasized Brazil's commitment to environmental stewardship, framing deforestation reductions as proof of sustainable development compatible with poverty alleviation and economic growth, often citing biofuels expansion and international climate pledges. He positioned the Amazon as a global asset under responsible national management, advocating for technology transfers from developed nations while resisting external interference. However, analyses indicate that alongside policy enforcement, a temporary dip in global prices for deforestation drivers like soy and cattle reduced economic incentives for clearing, accounting for roughly half the avoided losses between 2004 and 2009. Despite successes, cumulative clearing during 2003-2010 exceeded 100,000 km², reflecting ongoing tensions between agribusiness expansion—supported by Lula's rural caucus alliances—and conservation goals.

Media relations and press freedom concerns

During Lula's first presidency, the administration maintained a contentious relationship with Brazil's private media sector, dominated by conglomerates such as Globo and Folha de S.Paulo, which Lula and Workers' Party (PT) officials repeatedly characterized as elitist and ideologically opposed to progressive policies. Lula frequently publicly denounced these outlets for alleged distortions in coverage, particularly during the 2005 Mensalão vote-buying scandal, asserting that they exaggerated corruption allegations to undermine his government rather than report objectively. A notable incident occurred in August 2005, when the Brazilian foreign ministry moved to revoke the work visa of New York Times correspondent Larry Rohter following his article alleging Lula's struggles with alcoholism and questioning his fitness for office; the measure, justified by the government as a response to "defamatory" reporting, was rescinded after widespread backlash from Brazilian journalists, international press groups, and diplomatic pressure, highlighting perceived intolerance for critical foreign coverage. PT allies, including lawmakers, also pursued legal actions against domestic reporters and outlets for "slander" amid scandal coverage, contributing to an atmosphere of intimidation despite no formal censorship decrees. Regulatory efforts further fueled concerns. In 2009, Lula's administration organized the National Conference on Communication, a forum involving civil society and government that proposed measures to limit media cross-ownership, mandate diverse content quotas, and expand state-funded outlets, which critics including Reporters Without Borders viewed as veiled attempts to impose ideological controls under the guise of "democratization." Lula endorsed the conference's outcomes, stating in 2010 that traditional media failed to reflect societal realities and required structural reforms to break private monopolies, though many proposals stalled in Congress. Separately, the administration's allocation of state advertising disproportionately favored allied or less critical outlets, a practice documented by media watchdogs as a tool for subtle influence over independent journalism. Press freedom indicators reflected moderate risks, with Brazil ranking between 58th and 87th in Reporters Without Borders' annual indices from 2003 to 2011, amid ongoing violence against journalists—primarily in rural conflict zones rather than direct state action—but exacerbated by political polarization. While Lula vetoed a 2009 bill mandating journalism diplomas (later struck down by the Supreme Federal Court as unconstitutional), the pattern of executive rhetoric and policy pushes drew warnings from organizations like the Inter American Press Association about erosion of pluralism, attributing tensions to media concentration yet cautioning against state overreach as a causal risk to independent reporting.

Corruption scandals in first term

Mensalão scheme: Vote-buying mechanics and convictions

The Mensalão scheme, operational from 2003 to 2005, constituted a systematic vote-buying operation orchestrated by the Workers' Party (PT) to secure legislative support in Brazil's Congress for President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's administration. Monthly payments, termed "mensalão" or "big monthly," were disbursed to lawmakers from allied and smaller coalition parties, typically amounting to 30,000 reais (approximately US$12,000 at the time) per deputy, in exchange for voting in favor of government priorities such as pension and tax reforms. These illicit transfers, totaling around 100 million reais (about US$50 million), bypassed formal coalition agreements and relied on cash distributions to evade traceability. Mechanically, funds were laundered through advertising agencies and public banks, with Marcos Valério de Souza, a Belo Horizonte-based marketer, serving as the primary intermediary. Valério's firm received inflated loans from institutions like Banco do Brasil and state-owned entities, ostensibly for publicity contracts, which were then redirected as bribes to politicians via checks, wire transfers, and direct cash handovers coordinated by PT operatives. PT treasurer Delúbio Soares and aide Silvio Vaccari facilitated internal party logistics, while José Dirceu, Lula's chief of staff, was accused of masterminding the scheme's political coordination to maintain a fragile congressional majority amid PT's limited seat holdings. The plot unraveled in June 2005 when Roberto Jefferson, PTB party leader, publicly alleged the payments in a Veja magazine interview, triggering Federal Police probes and congressional inquiries. The ensuing Supreme Federal Court trial, known as Action Penal 470 and spanning 2007 to 2013, prosecuted 40 defendants for crimes including corruption, money laundering, and conspiracy. Of these, 25 were convicted, marking a rare instance of high-level accountability in Brazilian politics. While senior PT officials were convicted, Lula was never formally accused or indicted by the Procuradoria-Geral da República (PGR), headed at the time by Antonio Fernando de Souza, whom Lula had appointed. José Dirceu received a 10-year, 10-month sentence for active and passive corruption, later upheld but adjusted downward on appeals; he began serving time in November 2013 before partial remission. Delúbio Soares, PT treasurer, was sentenced to 8 years and 11 months for corruption and conspiracy. Marcos Valério drew a 37-year term for banking the funds and laundering, encompassing multiple counts. Other convictions included José Genoino (former PT president, 6 years 11 months for corruption) and João Paulo Cunha (former Chamber president, 9 years 4 months for bribery). Despite this, Lula made multiple and sometimes contradictory public statements: initially denying knowledge, then acknowledging warnings or “errors,” and framing the scandal as internal party misconduct or campaign financing irregularities, downplaying personal involvement. This combination of statements and absence of formal charges continues to fuel debate over what Lula knew and when. Several sentences were reduced or racketeering charges overturned in 2014 reviews, yet the trial affirmed the scheme's existence and mechanics through witness testimonies, bank records, and forensic accounting.

Other contemporaneous graft allegations

In February 2004, a video recording emerged implicating Waldomiro Diniz, an advisor in the Special Secretariat for Social Communication and a key PT operative appointed to the presidential staff, in soliciting bribes from businessman Carlinhos Cachoeira, owner of a bingo operation, to fund PT electoral campaigns. The footage, captured in 2002 but released publicly during Lula's administration, showed Diniz discussing monthly payments of up to R$5 million in exchange for favorable regulatory treatment of bingo parlors, which were under scrutiny for money laundering. Diniz was dismissed from his post, and the incident prompted investigations by federal police into potential misuse of influence, though no direct charges against Lula materialized; critics attributed it to lax oversight in PT's coalition fundraising practices. The Sanguessugas scandal, uncovered in mid-2006 amid Lula's re-election campaign, involved an alleged scheme where federal lawmakers from allied parties, including PT members, directed municipal governments to purchase overpriced ambulances using congressionally earmarked funds, pocketing kickbacks estimated at R$110 million across 1,000 municipalities. Federal police raids implicated 85 deputies and senators from at least 11 parties in the coalition, with suppliers inflating prices by up to 1,000% through fraudulent bidding processes coordinated via a network in Mato Grosso state. While the fraud predated Lula's term in some contracts, the bulk occurred under his government, leading to the resignation of Health Minister Saraiva Felipe and congressional probes; prosecutors charged over 50 individuals, highlighting vulnerabilities in decentralized health fund allocations but sparing Lula direct involvement. Allegations also surfaced regarding irregularities in Alstom contracts for metro and power projects, with Brazilian authorities launching probes in 2006 into suspected bribes totaling millions of dollars paid by the French firm to secure deals worth over $1 billion, some awarded during Lula's early term. Testimonies and documents revealed shell companies funneling payments to politicians and officials, though the scheme's origins traced to the 1990s; the investigations, pursued by the federal prosecutor's office, resulted in asset freezes and international cooperation but yielded few convictions by 2011, amid claims of insufficient evidence tying senior PT figures. These cases, while not centrally implicating Lula, underscored patterns of procurement graft in infrastructure reliant on political alliances, contributing to public disillusionment despite economic growth.

Inter-presidency period (2011–2019)

Support for Dilma Rousseff and economic contraction

Following the end of his second term in 2010, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva actively supported Dilma Rousseff, his hand-picked successor and former chief of staff, during her presidency from 2011 to 2016. Rousseff's administration initially benefited from the commodity boom's tailwinds but soon faced mounting economic challenges, including a sharp recession exacerbated by fiscal mismanagement and declining global demand for Brazilian exports. Brazil's gross domestic product (GDP) contracted by 3.8% in 2015, marking one of the worst performances among major economies that year. The downturn continued into 2016 with a further GDP decline of over 3%, driven by factors such as insufficient private investment, high interest rates, and creative accounting practices known as "fiscal pedaling," which masked budget deficits to comply with fiscal rules. Lula defended Rousseff's economic policies publicly, attributing the contraction partly to external factors like falling commodity prices while downplaying internal policy shortcomings. Despite the recession's severity—characterized by seven consecutive quarters of negative growth starting in early 2014—Lula campaigned vigorously for Rousseff's re-election in 2014, portraying her leadership as a continuation of his successful tenure. His endorsement helped secure her narrow victory, but the economy deteriorated further, with inflation surging and unemployment rising amid corruption scandals eroding investor confidence. As Rousseff's approval ratings plummeted amid the crisis and impeachment proceedings in 2016, Lula accepted an appointment as her chief of staff on March 16, 2016, a move interpreted as an effort to stabilize her government and shield himself from ongoing corruption investigations via jurisdictional protections. The appointment, conducted in a private ceremony, intensified political turmoil and sparked widespread protests, as critics viewed it as an evasion tactic rather than a substantive response to the economic woes. Rousseff defended the decision as necessary to confront the "coup plotting" and economic crisis, but it ultimately failed to avert her impeachment later that year for fiscal irregularities. Lula's role underscored his unwavering loyalty to Rousseff, even as her policies contributed to Brazil's deepest recession in decades.

Operation Car Wash (Lava Jato): Probe scope and Lula's involvement

Operation Car Wash (Lava Jato) commenced in March 2014 as a money laundering inquiry originating from suspicious transactions at a Curitiba car wash, rapidly evolving into a probe of systemic corruption at Petrobras, Brazil's state-controlled oil giant. Authorities uncovered a cartel of engineering firms, including Odebrecht and OAS, that secured Petrobras contracts through bid-rigging and overpricing, remitting kickbacks equivalent to 1–3% of contract values—aggregating over $2 billion in illicit payments—to party officials and politicians for influence and campaign financing, predominantly benefiting the Workers' Party (PT) coalition. The investigation, led by federal prosecutors and Judge Sérgio Moro, leveraged wiretaps, document seizures, and over 100 plea bargains from executives, yielding more than 200 indictments by 2017 and nearly 280 convictions by 2021, encompassing executives, lawmakers, and former ministers. These efforts repatriated about $800 million to public coffers and spurred global fines surpassing $10 billion, while Petrobras incurred market value losses exceeding $250 billion amid revelations of falsified accounts and executive complicity. Prosecutors implicated former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, alleging he orchestrated benefits from the scheme as PT leader and Petrobras overseer from 2003 to 2010, receiving undisclosed advantages from favored contractors in exchange for directing contracts their way. In the Guarujá triplex case, OAS admitted via executive testimony to expending roughly 1.1 million reais on apartment renovations and furnishings for Lula's family use, supported by records of their occupancy, furniture storage, and discussions reserving the unit exclusively for him, without a registered deed transfer. This led to Lula's July 2017 conviction by Moro for passive corruption and money laundering, with an initial 9-year-6-month sentence later extended to 12 years on appeal. A parallel Atibaia case charged Lula with accepting over 1 million reais in uncompensated upgrades to a rural estate from Odebrecht and OAS, including expansions and pools, tied to Petrobras favors, evidenced by contractor invoices, site visits, and aligned executive accounts under plea deals. Conviction followed in February 2019, imposing a nearly 13-year term for similar offenses. Both rulings hinged on interlocking delações premiadas (leniency testimonies) corroborated by financial trails, though Lula contested them as uncorroborated by direct ownership proofs or payments, framing the probe as targeted persecution.

Criminal convictions, imprisonment, and judicial processes

In March 2016, amid Operation Car Wash investigations, President Dilma Rousseff appointed Lula as Chief of Staff (Ministro-chefe da Casa Civil), a move that would grant him privileged jurisdiction and transfer ongoing cases from first-instance courts, including those under Judge Sergio Moro in Curitiba, to the Supreme Federal Court (STF). The government described the appointment as aiding political coordination during the impeachment crisis, but federal prosecutors and opposition viewed it as an attempt to shield Lula from imminent measures. Hours after the ceremony, STF Justice Gilmar Mendes issued a preliminary injunction suspending the swearing-in, citing "deviation of purpose" informed by court-authorized wiretaps released by Moro, including a call where Rousseff referenced sending the decree "in case of need." The full STF upheld the injunction in April 2016, maintaining the Guarujá triplex case and other proceedings under Moro's jurisdiction in Curitiba. In July 2017, Federal Judge Sergio Moro convicted Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of passive corruption and money laundering in connection with an apartment in Guarujá, alleging that he received undue benefits from the construction firm OAS as bribes for favoring the company in Petrobras contracts during his presidency. Moro sentenced Lula to nine years and six months in prison, citing evidence including testimony from executives under plea bargains, documents of apartment renovations valued at over R$1 million (approximately $500,000 at the time), and Lula's failure to declare the asset. Lula denied ownership of the triplex, claiming it was never transferred to him, and his defense argued the conviction relied on insufficient direct proof of intent or quid pro quo. On appeal, the Fourth Regional Federal Court (TRF-4) upheld the conviction in January 2018 but increased the sentence to 12 years and one month, with three judges unanimously affirming the evidence of corruption based on the pattern of favors to OAS and Lula's influence over Petrobras appointments. In 2019, the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) upheld the conviction while reducing the sentence to eight years and ten months. Moro ordered Lula to begin serving the term on April 5, 2018; Lula surrendered the next day at the Federal Police headquarters in Curitiba, where he was imprisoned for 580 days amid protests from supporters decrying political persecution and from opponents demanding accountability for systemic graft uncovered by Operation Car Wash. Lula was released on November 8, 2019, following a Supreme Federal Court (STF) ruling two days prior that prohibited imprisonment for convictions not yet finalized after all appeals, overturning a prior policy mandating custody post-second-instance affirmation to prevent elite impunity but now deemed to violate presumption of innocence under Brazil's constitution. This procedural change applied retroactively, though Lula's appeals continued; separate convictions, such as one for a country estate in Atibaia involving bribes from Odebrecht and OAS, added concurrent sentences totaling over 25 years before annulments. In March 2021, STF Justice Edson Fachin annulled the triplex and related convictions, ruling that the Curitiba court lacked jurisdiction as the alleged crimes did not directly connect to Petrobras' federal operations there, requiring transfer to the Federal Court in Brasília. Later that month, the STF's First Turma panel ruled Moro had been biased, citing leaked messages from Operation Vaza Jato (published by The Intercept) showing Moro's improper coordination with prosecutors, including suggestions on evidence and witness questioning, which violated impartiality standards. The full STF confirmed this in June 2021, nullifying proceedings without addressing the merits of the evidence, such as plea-bargain testimonies or financial records, which critics argued undermined Lava Jato's recoveries of over R$6 billion ($1.2 billion) in assets despite procedural flaws. In April 2022, a UN Human Rights Committee panel found the process violated due process through untimely remedies and bias, though Brazil disputed the findings as non-binding. Lula has consistently proclaimed innocence, attributing the cases to lawfare, while no retrials have resulted in new convictions as of 2025, as the annulments resulted in the prescription of the crimes due to expired statutes of limitations, preventing new trials and restoring judicial presumption of innocence, though the evidence collected (including plea-bargain testimonies and financial records) and billions recovered from confessed defendants remain as undisputed historical facts.

Release and political resurgence (2019–2022)

Supreme Court annulments and eligibility restoration

On November 8, 2019, Brazil's Supreme Federal Court (STF) ruled 6-5 in a habeas corpus petition that criminal defendants could not be imprisoned immediately after a second-instance conviction but only after exhausting all appeals, overturning a 2016 precedent. This decision led to Lula's release from Curitiba's federal prison after 580 days of incarceration for his 2017 conviction in the Operation Car Wash probe, though his political ineligibility under the Clean Slate Law (Lei da Ficha Limpa) remained due to the upheld sentence at that stage. The pivotal annulments occurred on March 8, 2021, when STF Justice Edson Fachin ruled that the 13th Federal Court in Curitiba lacked jurisdiction over Lula's cases, as the alleged offenses—primarily related to a triplex apartment and a country estate—did not directly connect to the Petrobras corruption scheme centered there but should have been tried in Brasília's federal courts. Fachin's decision nullified Lula's two convictions (the triplex case with a 12-year sentence upheld on appeal, and the related site-country estate case), restoring his political rights and eligibility to run for office, including in the 2022 presidential election. The ruling emphasized procedural irregularities rather than substantive innocence, allowing potential retrials in the proper venue, though none materialized before the election. The full STF confirmed Fachin's annulment on April 15, 2021, by a majority vote, solidifying the jurisdictional shift. Subsequently, on June 23, 2021, the STF's First Panel ruled 3-2 that former Judge Sérgio Moro exhibited bias against Lula, including partiality in evidence handling and coordination with prosecutors revealed in leaked messages, further validating the nullifications without addressing the merits of the corruption allegations. These decisions effectively cleared Lula's legal barriers under the Clean Slate Law, which bars candidates with final convictions, positioning him as a viable contender against incumbent Jair Bolsonaro despite ongoing investigations in other jurisdictions. In September 2023, the STF described Lula's prior imprisonment as a "historical mistake" and annulled broader Operation Car Wash evidence due to illegalities, but this postdated his eligibility restoration.

2018 disqualification and 2022 campaign against Bolsonaro

In September 2018, Brazil's Superior Electoral Court (TSE) unanimously barred Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva from running in the October presidential election, citing his 2017 conviction for corruption and money laundering in the Operation Car Wash probe, which had been upheld on appeal. The decision invoked the Clean Slate Law (Lei da Ficha Limpa), enacted in 2010, which prohibits candidates with final convictions for administrative improbity or crimes against public administration from holding office until eight years after sentence completion. Lula, imprisoned since April 2018 on a 12-year sentence for receiving undue benefits from a construction firm in exchange for influencing government contracts, remained the Workers' Party (PT) frontrunner in polls, leading to his symbolic nomination despite the ineligibility. Appeals to the Supreme Federal Court failed to overturn the ruling by the registration deadline, forcing the PT to substitute Fernando Haddad as candidate, who lost in the runoff to Jair Bolsonaro. Lula's release from prison in November 2019, following a Supreme Court decision limiting second-instance imprisonment, did not immediately restore eligibility, as the convictions persisted. However, on March 8, 2021, Supreme Court Justice Edson Fachin annulled the convictions, ruling that the Curitiba federal court lacked jurisdiction over the cases, which involved Petrobras contracts better suited to Brasília's venue; this procedural nullification erased the legal basis for disqualification without addressing guilt on merits. The full Supreme Court upheld the annulment on April 15, 2021, by a 8-3 vote, reinstating Lula's political rights and enabling his 2022 candidacy, though prosecutors could refile charges—none succeeded before the election. Lula officially launched his 2022 campaign on May 7, framing it as a fight against Bolsonaro's "authoritarian" governance, economic mismanagement amid inflation exceeding 12% in 2021, and handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, which claimed over 680,000 lives. He allied with center-left figures, including Geraldo Alckmin as running mate, to broaden appeal beyond PT's base, emphasizing poverty reduction via revived social programs like Bolsa Família and criticizing Bolsonaro's environmental deregulation, which correlated with a 22% deforestation spike in the Amazon from 2019 to 2021. Bolsonaro countered by portraying Lula as emblematic of systemic corruption, referencing Lava Jato's exposure of graft under PT administrations, and highlighting economic recovery indicators like 4.6% GDP growth in 2021. The campaign featured heated televised debates, including one on August 25 where Lula accused Bolsonaro of spreading misinformation on vaccines and election integrity, while Bolsonaro's campaign referenced Lula's own 2020 statements criticized for downplaying the virus's severity, exemplified by his remark that the coronavirus, as a "monster" created by nature against humanity's will, had revealed the necessity of state intervention. In the first round on October 2, 2022, Lula secured 48.4% of valid votes to Bolsonaro's 43.2%, advancing to a runoff with outsider Simone Tebet third at 8%. On October 30, Lula won the runoff with 50.90% (60.3 million votes) against Bolsonaro's 49.10% (58.2 million), the closest margin in Brazilian democratic history, certified by the TSE amid Bolsonaro's unsubstantiated fraud allegations targeting electronic voting machines, which courts including the Supreme Court rejected for lack of evidence. Post-election unrest included Bolsonaro supporters' road blockades and a January 8, 2023, riot in Brasília, but Lula's victory marked his political rehabilitation, buoyed by urban and northeastern support despite rural and evangelical strongholds favoring Bolsonaro.

Second presidency (2023–present)

2022 election: Results, disputes, and transition

The 2022 Brazilian presidential election proceeded in two rounds, with the first held on October 2, yielding no majority winner and advancing incumbent President Jair Bolsonaro and challenger Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to a runoff on October 30. In the runoff, Lula secured 50.9% of valid votes (60,345,999), narrowly defeating Bolsonaro's 49.1% (58,206,354), a margin of approximately 2.1 million votes amid high turnout of over 79% of eligible voters. Brazil's Superior Electoral Court (TSE) certified the results on October 30, declaring Lula president-elect, with international observers from the OAS and Carter Center reporting no irregularities compromising the process's integrity. Bolsonaro initially withheld concession, echoing prior unsubstantiated assertions of vulnerabilities in Brazil's electronic voting system, which he had questioned for over a year without producing verifiable evidence of fraud in the 2022 contest. His campaign filed a post-election challenge alleging machine malfunctions and seeking to annul votes from about two-thirds of electronic polling stations, but the TSE rejected it on November 23, imposing multimillion-real fines on allied parties for bad-faith litigation absent proof. Separate military audits and TSE audits found no systemic discrepancies, and federal courts upheld the vote tallies, though Bolsonaro's base sustained fraud narratives via social media, fueling protests and trucker blockades that disrupted highways into November. Transition proceedings commenced belatedly on November 3, when Bolsonaro met briefly with Lula's designated coordinator for a formal power transfer protocol, amid ongoing public demonstrations by Bolsonaro supporters rejecting the outcome. Bolsonaro departed Brazil for Florida on December 30, 2022, skipping Lula's January 1, 2023, inauguration in Brasília, where Vice President-elect Geraldo Alckmin and congressional leaders attended but Bolsonaro's absence underscored lingering polarization. The handover proceeded without incident, with Lula assuming office as planned, marking his third non-consecutive term despite the disputes.

Economic policies: Growth, inflation, and fiscal constraints

Upon assuming office in January 2023, Lula da Silva's administration introduced a new fiscal framework to replace the 2016 spending cap, aiming for a primary deficit of 0.25-0.75% of GDP in 2023, zero deficit in 2024, and surpluses of 0.5% in 2025 and 1% in 2026, with expenditure growth limited to 70% of revenue growth to address fiscal rigidities and enable social spending increases. However, the framework faced progressive weakening through congressional exemptions and executive maneuvers, allowing higher deficits to fund populist measures, which critics attribute to Lula's statist approach prioritizing state intervention over market discipline. Brazil's GDP expanded by 2.9% in 2023, surpassing initial forecasts and driven by robust household consumption and agricultural output amid favorable commodity prices. Growth accelerated to 3.4% in 2024, the strongest annual rate since the post-pandemic rebound, fueled by services (up 3.7%) and industry, with quarterly gains of 1.4% in Q2 supported by domestic demand despite global headwinds. Projections for 2025 indicate a slowdown to around 2.4%, reflecting tighter monetary policy and fiscal uncertainties, with long-term forecasts averaging 2% annually through 2028 due to policy-induced distortions in investment and productivity. Inflation, measured by the IPCA index, moderated from 4.59% in 2023 to 4.37% in 2024, remaining above the Central Bank's 3% target (±1.5% tolerance band) amid pressures from food prices and public spending. By September 2025, annual inflation edged up to 5.17%, prompting renewed rate hikes after cuts from mid-2023 to mid-2024, as analysts' expectations drifted to 4.6% for the year, eroding purchasing power and complicating growth sustainability. Lula's administration defended expansionary fiscal moves as necessary for recovery, but fiscal-monetary tensions exacerbated inflationary risks, with the Central Bank citing unchecked deficits as a key driver. Fiscal constraints intensified as the primary deficit narrowed to 0.3% of GDP in 2024 from 2.3% in 2023, aided by revenue windfalls, yet the nominal deficit reached 8.45% amid rising interest payments, pushing public debt to 76.1% of GDP. Lula's policies, including payroll tax exemptions and minimum wage hikes, strained the framework's credibility, leading to currency depreciation and higher borrowing costs, with markets viewing the approach as echoing past cycles of spending-led booms followed by austerity reversals. Despite official targets for surpluses, structural rigidities—such as mandatory social entitlements consuming over 90% of revenues—limited maneuverability, fostering skepticism about long-term debt stabilization without deeper reforms.

Social programs revival: Continuity and dependency critiques

Upon taking office in January 2023, Lula da Silva emphasized the revival of social welfare initiatives from his prior presidencies, particularly the Bolsa Família conditional cash transfer program originally launched in 2003. In March 2023, he signed a provisional measure restoring the program's original name—previously rebranded as Auxílio Brasil under the prior administration—and maintaining a minimum monthly benefit of R$600 (approximately USD 119) per family, reaching around 21 million low-income households with requirements for school attendance and health checkups. This relaunch built on the program's historical role in poverty alleviation, which government data attributes to lifting 3 million Brazilians out of poverty in 2023 alone, contributing to a drop in extreme poverty from 12.6 million people in 2022 to 9.5 million in 2023 and an overall poverty rate of 27.4%. The policy's continuity reflects Lula's long-standing approach of direct income support to address inequality, with expansions including additional benefits for pregnant women and nutrition stipends, financed partly through tax reforms targeting higher earners. Empirical assessments, including from the World Bank, affirm Bolsa Família's progressive impact on reducing inequality and extreme poverty through targeted transfers, though outcomes depend on complementary employment growth, which saw 3.7 million formal jobs created since early 2023. Social assistance overall became Brazil's second-largest federal expenditure category in 2024, totaling R$285 billion or 13.29% of total outlays, underscoring the scale of revival efforts amid rising demands from post-pandemic vulnerabilities. Critics, including fiscal conservatives and opposition figures, argue that such programs perpetuate dependency by providing ongoing cash incentives without sufficient emphasis on labor market integration or skill-building, potentially trapping beneficiaries in a cycle of state reliance rather than promoting sustainable self-sufficiency. This view gained traction as program costs strained budgets, prompting Lula in July 2024 to authorize a review of benefits to align with fiscal targets under the 2023 framework, which caps spending growth to curb deficits that reached 2% of GDP in 2023. While short-term data shows poverty metrics improving alongside low unemployment at historic levels around 6-7%, detractors highlight risks of fiscal fragility—evident in 2025 spending cuts of R$330 billion (USD 55 billion)—contending that expansive transfers prioritize political popularity over structural reforms for long-term economic independence. Government responses emphasize conditionalities' role in encouraging human capital investment, yet ongoing debates underscore tensions between immediate relief and incentives for productive work.

Foreign policy: BRICS expansion, Venezuela ties, and U.S. tensions

Upon assuming office in January 2023, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva prioritized strengthening Brazil's role in the BRICS bloc, advocating for its expansion to enhance representation of emerging economies and challenge Western-dominated institutions. At the 15th BRICS summit in Johannesburg on August 22–24, 2023, the group announced the invitation of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates to join as full members effective January 1, 2024, with Saudi Arabia confirming participation shortly after, bringing total membership to nine nations. This move, supported by Lula, aimed to amplify the bloc's economic weight—representing over 45% of the global population and 28% of world GDP—but faced internal hurdles, including stalled discussions on a common currency due to reservations from China and India. Brazil assumed the rotating BRICS presidency on January 1, 2025, under Lula's direction, focusing on themes like global governance reform, sustainable development, and de-escalation of conflicts such as Ukraine. The 17th summit, hosted in Rio de Janeiro in 2025, adopted 126 commitments across finance, AI, climate, and security, while exploring further expansion and partnerships amid geopolitical shifts. Lula framed BRICS as a platform for "active non-alignment," prioritizing South-South cooperation over alignment with either the US or China, though critics argue this dilutes focus and invites divisions on issues like Russia's Ukraine invasion. Lula swiftly restored ties with Venezuela, hosting President Nicolás Maduro in Brasília on May 29, 2023—the Venezuelan leader's first such visit in years—announcing resumed cooperation in energy, agriculture, environment, and industry after relations had been severed under predecessor Jair Bolsonaro. This alignment with Maduro, a ideological ally from Lula's prior ties to Hugo Chávez, extended to Brazil guaranteeing Venezuela's July 2024 elections and defending the results' legitimacy despite international disputes over irregularities and opposition claims of fraud. In January 2025, Brazilian social movements urged Lula to recognize Maduro's inauguration, reflecting domestic left-wing support, though Lula expressed shock at Maduro's pre-election threats of a "bloodbath" if defeated. These Venezuela overtures exacerbated tensions with the United States, where Lula's refusal to fully condemn Maduro clashed with US sanctions and recognition of opposition figures like Edmundo González as the legitimate winner. Early 2023 meetings between Lula and President Joe Biden emphasized shared goals on climate and democracy, including UN Security Council reform, but diverged sharply on Ukraine—Lula's calls for negotiations without labeling Russia the aggressor drew US rebukes—and BRICS moves perceived as eroding dollar dominance. In September 2025, amid US naval deployments in the Caribbean interpreted as pressure on Maduro, Lula publicly decried them as a "source of tension" risking regional instability. Post-2024 US election, Lula engaged incoming President Donald Trump on October 8, 2025, amid escalated US rhetoric against Venezuela, signaling pragmatic diplomacy but underscoring persistent friction over hemispheric security and alliances. On January 3, 2026, following U.S. military strikes that captured Nicolás Maduro, Lula defended Maduro on X, condemning the action as crossing an unacceptable line and violating principles against the use of force in international relations.

Environmental agenda: Deforestation reductions vs. fossil fuel investments

Upon assuming office in January 2023, President Lula da Silva prioritized reversing deforestation trends from the prior administration, reinstating the Amazon Fund and bolstering enforcement agencies like IBAMA. Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon declined by 50% in 2023 compared to 2022. For the monitoring period from August 2023 to July 2024, rates fell an additional 30.6% to 6,288 square kilometers, marking the lowest level in nine years according to INPE data. Monthly figures reinforced this trajectory, with August 2024 recording the lowest deforestation in six years and a 24% cumulative drop from January to August versus the prior year. Lula pledged to achieve zero illegal deforestation across Brazilian biomes by 2030, a commitment echoed in the revived PPCDAm action plan and integrated into Brazil's updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement. However, the NDC permits ongoing legal deforestation for agricultural expansion, which environmental analysts note could sustain habitat loss even as illegal clearing diminishes. Concurrent with these forest protection measures, the Lula administration has advanced fossil fuel development, prioritizing energy security and economic revenues. Petrobras, the state-controlled oil company, received regulatory approval in October 2025 for exploratory drilling in the Foz do Amazonas basin near the Amazon River's mouth, following a 2023 denial over spill risk assessments. This offshore block, in an ecologically vulnerable delta region, drew criticism from indigenous groups and scientists for potential biodiversity threats and oil spill hazards, especially as Brazil prepares to host COP30 in Belém. The government's 2024-2028 Petrobras strategic plan allocates over 70% of investments to oil and gas, focusing on pre-salt fields to boost production capacity amid global demand. This expansion, including planned oil and gas auctions, contrasts with deforestation gains by increasing Brazil's long-term carbon emissions footprint, as fossil fuel extraction and combustion contribute substantially to national greenhouse gases despite renewable energy strengths in hydropower and biofuels. Proponents cite fiscal necessities for social spending, while detractors, including international observers, highlight inconsistencies in positioning Brazil as a climate leader.

Indigenous land policies: Titling progress and implementation gaps

Upon assuming office in January 2023, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva pledged to expedite the demarcation of 14 Indigenous lands within his first 100 days, aiming to reverse the stagnation under the prior administration and fulfill constitutional obligations under Article 231 for recognizing ancestral territories. In April 2023, FUNAI (National Indian Foundation) advanced six demarcations, including Arara do Rio Amônia, Kariri-Xocó Porto Real, and Rio dos Indios, covering approximately 6,217 square kilometers and providing enhanced protection against encroachment in the Amazon and Atlantic regions. By April 2024, the government reported 10 lands regularized, with two additional territories—potentially including areas in Santa Catarina and Paraíba—formalized, bringing the cumulative new demarcations to 10 amid ongoing processes for over 240 lands at various stages. Further advancements occurred in late 2024, with Lula approving 13 territories overall since 2023, including three more in December such as Aldeia Velha in Bahia and Cacique Fontoura in Mato Grosso, though these fell short of the initial timeline and addressed only a fraction of the 300+ mapped but pending claims identified by Indigenous leaders. To accelerate homologations, Lula established a federal task force in April 2024, targeting resolutions in states like Alagoas within weeks, and revoked prior decrees permitting mining on Indigenous lands, signaling institutional recommitment via FUNAI reforms. As of November 2023, FUNAI registered 736 Indigenous lands nationwide, comprising about 13% of Brazil's territory, with recent titling contributing to reduced vegetation loss—demarcated areas lost only 1% of native cover from 1990 to 2020. Despite these steps, implementation gaps persist, as the 14 promised demarcations extended beyond the first year, with only partial fulfillment by mid-2024, drawing criticism from Indigenous organizations for bureaucratic delays and insufficient coordination among ministries. Indigenous leaders, including those from APIB (Articulation of the Indigenous Peoples of Brazil), have highlighted unaddressed threats like illegal logging, mining, and invasions on newly titled lands, exacerbated by congressional resistance and underfunding—FUNAI's budget remains strained despite Lula's pledges. Over 240 ongoing processes face judicial and agro-business opposition, with reports indicating that while titling reduces deforestation empirically, enforcement lags, allowing continued encroachments in vulnerable Amazonian territories. These shortfalls reflect systemic challenges, including historical policy inertia predating Lula's tenure, though his administration's slower pace relative to campaign commitments has fueled perceptions of faltering execution amid competing fiscal priorities.

Recent developments: Health issues, scandals, and 2026 re-election bid

In December 2024, President Lula da Silva suffered an intracranial hemorrhage following a fall, prompting emergency surgery on December 10 to drain the bleed; he remained in intensive care but was reported stable. A second procedure on December 12 involved embolization of the middle meningeal artery to reduce recurrence risk, after which he was discharged from a São Paulo hospital on December 15, marking his first public appearance since the incidents. This episode stemmed from a prior 2024 bathroom fall at his residence that caused a concussion, stitches, and initial hemorrhage. In May 2025, Lula experienced vertigo attributed to inner ear inflammation, leading to brief hospitalization and subsequent release after treatment. A major pension fraud scandal erupted in early 2025, implicating officials in Lula's social security ministry in a scheme that diverted approximately 6.3 billion reais (over $1.1 billion) through unauthorized deductions from beneficiaries between 2019 and 2024. Federal police suspended officials and seized assets amid the probe, prompting Lula to dismiss the social security head and the resignation of the minister on May 2. The affair fueled public concerns over corruption, with polls in May and June 2025 showing Lula's disapproval rating climbing to 57%, the highest of his term, as graft became voters' primary worry. Critics, including opposition voices, linked the scandal to entrenched issues in state pension systems, though investigations predated Lula's 2023 return to office. On October 23, 2025, during a state visit to Indonesia, Lula confirmed his candidacy for a fourth nonconsecutive presidential term in the October 2026 election, stating at age 80 he retained "the same energy as when I was 30." This bid follows earlier hints in July 2025 and aligns with Brazil's constitutional allowance for non-consecutive reelection, despite trailing in early polls amid economic discontent and scandals. Supporters frame it as continuity for social programs, while detractors cite his age, health episodes, and governance record as liabilities.

Political ideology and positions

Economic populism and state interventionism

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's economic positions reflect a blend of left-wing populism, characterized by redistributionist measures appealing to lower-income voters, and state interventionism favoring government direction of investment and industrial policy over market liberalization. Rooted in his trade union background, Lula has consistently prioritized worker protections, expansive social transfers, and credit subsidies through institutions like the National Development Bank (BNDES), arguing that the state must counteract inequalities perpetuated by private capital. During his first presidency (2003–2010), Lula maintained macroeconomic orthodoxy with inflation targeting and primary fiscal surpluses while expanding interventionist tools, such as BNDES loans totaling over 300 billion reais by 2010 to favored sectors like agribusiness and manufacturing, often at subsidized rates below market levels. These policies, including annual real minimum wage increases averaging 7.5% from 2003 to 2010, contributed to poverty reduction from 35% to 21% of the population, though critics attribute much of the outcome to a global commodity boom rather than structural reforms. In his ideological framework, populism manifests in anti-elite rhetoric framing economic elites as barriers to inclusion, with proposals like a "national food reserves policy" to buffer prices and support small farmers through state purchases, as outlined in Workers' Party platforms. State interventionism is evident in opposition to privatizations of strategic assets, such as advocating greater government control over Petrobras amid past scandals, and promoting protectionist tariffs to shield domestic industry from imports. Lula's second term has intensified these tendencies via the "Nova Indústria Brasil" plan launched on January 26, 2024, allocating up to 300 billion reais in public and private funds for reindustrialization, emphasizing green energy and technology sectors under state guidance to achieve 3–4% annual GDP growth. This approach signals a return to developmental state models, with increased regulation of private firms and fiscal maneuvers to bypass spending caps, raising concerns over long-term debt sustainability given Brazil's public debt exceeding 75% of GDP in 2023. Empirical assessments highlight trade-offs: while interventionist credit fueled investment booms, it also distorted markets, contributing to non-performing loans at BNDES peaking at 4.5% in 2015 under successor Dilma Rousseff's extensions of Lula-era policies. Lula defends such measures as essential for sovereignty, rejecting neoliberal prescriptions that he claims exacerbate inequality, though data show Gini coefficient reductions during his tenure were modest at best, from 0.59 in 2001 to 0.53 in 2014, partly reversed post-2014 amid fiscal strain.

Social and cultural stances

Lula has maintained a pragmatic approach to social issues, often balancing personal convictions rooted in his Catholic upbringing with appeals to Brazil's diverse electorate, including evangelical Christians who constitute a growing political force. In a 2022 open letter to evangelicals, he affirmed his personal opposition to abortion and emphasized respect for religious freedoms, stating that such matters should be decided by Congress rather than the executive. He has courted evangelical support through public prayers with pastors and vows to protect religious liberty, despite criticisms from conservative factions for perceived inconsistencies with progressive policies. On abortion, Lula has repeatedly described himself as personally opposed, noting in 2022 that "all the women I've married are against abortion" and that the issue is broadly unpopular in Brazil. However, he frames the practice as a public health reality requiring treatment rather than punishment, criticizing a 2024 congressional bill equating late-term abortions with homicide as "insane" and defending existing laws that allow exceptions for rape, fetal anencephaly, or maternal risk. During his first presidency (2003–2010), a 2005 commission he established to review abortion laws proposed reforms but faced opposition from social committees, resulting in no legislative changes. Lula has supported recognition of same-sex unions, stating in 2008 that gay couples "exist and we must give them legal recognition." However, Lula has faced criticism for past uses of derogatory language toward homosexuals, such as referring to the city of Pelotas as a 'pólo exportador de veados' in 2000. Under his administrations, Brazil advanced toward nationwide same-sex marriage through judicial rulings in 2011 and 2013, which aligned with his government's progressive leanings on social movements. In 2023, he reiterated commitment to LGBTQ rights alongside U.S. President Biden, emphasizing intersex protections. Regarding drug policy, Lula's first term saw partial decriminalization of personal possession in 2006 via Supreme Federal Court interpretation, which critics argue contributed to mass incarceration by blurring lines between users and traffickers, exacerbating prison overcrowding from 360,000 inmates in 2006 to over 800,000 by 2023. In his third term, Justice Minister Flávio Dino advocated decriminalization to reduce prisoner numbers, reflecting Lula's personal sympathy amid public polls showing 72% opposition to liberalization. The Supreme Court, with appointees from his administrations, voted in 2024 to decriminalize up to 40 grams of marijuana for personal use, signaling a cautious shift despite Lula's campaign avoidance of the topic. Lula has promoted women's rights through targeted policies, including 2023 initiatives on International Women's Day to combat violence, ensure equal pay, and expand social protections, reversing some Bolsonaro-era restrictions like mandatory abortion reporting by health professionals. However, he has faced criticism for past uses of derogatory or sexist language toward women on multiple occasions, such as referring to female PT feminists as "mulheres de grelo duro" in a 2016 intercepted conversation. He prioritizes gender equity in poverty alleviation, recognizing disproportionate impacts on women, though his agenda emphasizes economic inclusion over expansive feminist reforms. Culturally, he advocates broader access to arts, sports, and leisure as tools for social inclusion, integrating these into welfare frameworks without imposing ideological mandates.

Foreign affairs: Anti-imperialism, Palestine support, and authoritarian sympathies

Lula da Silva has consistently articulated an anti-imperialist foreign policy framework, emphasizing opposition to perceived U.S. hegemony and advocating for a multipolar world order. During his presidencies, he has criticized U.S. interventions and sanctions as tools of dominance, particularly in Latin America, framing them as impediments to sovereign development. For instance, in March 2024, Lula stated that the United States can kidnap heads of state because those countries lack nuclear weapons. In May 2023, Lula hosted Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and rejected claims of authoritarianism in Venezuela as a "constructed narrative," while condemning U.S. sanctions that he argued exacerbated humanitarian crises without addressing root causes. This stance aligns with Lula's broader promotion of autonomy for Global South nations, often prioritizing alliances with non-Western powers over alignment with Washington-led initiatives. On Palestine, Lula has positioned Brazil as a vocal supporter, building on the 2010 recognition of Palestinian statehood with pre-1967 borders under his prior administration. In his third term, he escalated criticism of Israel following the October 2023 Hamas attacks and subsequent Gaza conflict, labeling Israel's response a "genocide" in February 2024 and calling for Palestine's full UN membership as a sovereign state. Brazil under Lula expelled Israel's ambassador in February 2024 amid heightened tensions and has reaffirmed solidarity on occasions like the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People. These positions reflect Lula's adherence to a two-state solution while prioritizing criticism of Israeli actions over Hamas's role, consistent with his anti-imperialist lens viewing the conflict through U.S.-backed asymmetry. Lula's foreign engagements reveal sympathies toward authoritarian regimes, evidenced by sustained diplomatic and rhetorical support despite documented human rights concerns. He has defended Cuba's government against external pressures, welcoming Cuban delegations and framing U.S. policies as unjust blockades rather than responses to repression. Ties with Iran include permitting Iranian warships to dock in Rio de Janeiro in March 2023—despite U.S. objections—and aligning Brazil with Tehran against Israeli strikes, condemning them as violations of sovereignty. Regarding Venezuela, while Lula acknowledged an "authoritarian bias" in Maduro's regime in August 2024 amid disputed elections, his earlier embrace and refusal to fully endorse opposition claims indicate a pattern of ideological affinity over democratic conditionalities. These relationships prioritize anti-Western solidarity, often downplaying internal authoritarian practices in favor of countering perceived imperialism.

Legacy and evaluations

Claimed achievements: Poverty metrics and global standing

During Lula's first presidency from 2003 to 2010, Brazil experienced a notable decline in extreme poverty, defined by the World Bank as living on less than $1.90 per day (2011 PPP), dropping from around 8.4% of the population in 2001 to approximately 4.2% by 2012, with much of the reduction occurring during his tenure. This progress was largely attributed to the Bolsa Família program, launched in 2003 as a conditional cash transfer initiative targeting low-income families conditioned on school attendance and health checkups, which expanded to cover over 11 million families by 2010 and is credited with lifting an estimated 36 million people above the extreme poverty line through direct income support averaging R$100-150 monthly per family. Independent evaluations, including those from the World Bank, link the program's design to sustained reductions in hunger and inequality, with the Gini coefficient falling from 0.58 in 2001 to 0.52 by 2010, though critics note that a significant portion of the poverty drop—up to 20-30%—stemmed from favorable global commodity prices boosting export revenues rather than solely domestic policy innovations. The program's impact extended to multidimensional poverty indicators, such as reduced child labor and improved access to sanitation, with studies showing a 15-20% decrease in household vulnerability to shocks for beneficiaries, though long-term sustainability has been questioned due to reliance on transfers without commensurate job creation, leading to reversals post-2014 amid economic downturns. In his third term starting 2023, Lula revived and expanded Bolsa Família (rebranded as Auxílio Brasil successor), increasing benefits to R$600 monthly and covering 21 million families by 2024, correlating with a reported drop in extreme poverty to 5.8% in 2023 from 6.5% in 2022, per national surveys, amid post-pandemic recovery. However, these gains are provisional, with dependency ratios remaining high—transfers constituting up to 30% of income for recipient households—and fiscal strains evident as public debt rose to 78% of GDP by mid-2024. On global standing, Lula's administrations positioned Brazil as an emerging power, with nominal GDP growing at an average annual rate of 4.1% from 2003 to 2010, elevating the country from the world's 10th-largest economy in 2003 to 5th by purchasing power parity by 2010, fueled by agricultural and mineral exports amid China's demand surge. Diplomatic initiatives, including co-founding the BRIC group in 2009 (expanded to BRICS), enhanced Brazil's multilateral influence, securing G20 prominence and investment inflows exceeding $50 billion annually by 2010, while Lula's advocacy for South-South cooperation—evident in 150 new overseas postings and deals with Africa and Asia—boosted trade volumes by 300% over the decade. These efforts were hailed by supporters as democratizing global governance, though empirical assessments indicate limited structural reforms, with Brazil's per capita income ranking stagnating at around 80th globally, underscoring reliance on cyclical booms over enduring competitiveness. In the 2023-2025 period, Lula's push for BRICS expansion to include new members like Saudi Arabia and Iran aimed to counter Western dominance, yet yielded mixed results, with Brazil's IMF quota share unchanged and foreign direct investment dipping amid policy uncertainty.

Criticisms: Institutional erosion, corruption normalization, and policy failures

Critics contend that Lula's Workers' Party (PT) governments eroded Brazilian institutions through reliance on clientelistic practices and informal vote-buying to secure legislative support, undermining the independence of Congress and normalizing extralegal governance mechanisms. The 2005 Mensalão scandal exemplified this, involving monthly payments of approximately R$30,000 to around 75 federal deputies from allied parties to ensure backing for PT initiatives, orchestrated by Lula's chief of staff José Dirceu, who was convicted in 2012 for leading the scheme. Despite Lula denying direct knowledge, the scandal implicated high-level PT operatives and highlighted a pattern of executive overreach to bypass institutional checks, with 25 convictions including Dirceu, weakening public trust in democratic processes. Corruption became normalized under Lula's tenure as scandals proliferated without derailing PT's electoral dominance, fostering a culture where graft was tolerated for political continuity. The Mensalão exposed systematic bribery using public funds via state banks like Banco do Brasil, yet Lula completed his terms with high approval ratings above 80% and facilitated Dilma Rousseff's 2010 victory. Subsequent Lava Jato investigations (2014 onward) uncovered Petrobras overpricing schemes yielding billions in kickbacks, with Lula convicted in 2017 for receiving a R$3.7 million triplex apartment as bribe, sentenced to 12 years, though annulled in 2021 on jurisdictional grounds by Supreme Court Justice Edson Fachin. Critics, including anti-corruption advocates, argue the annulment and subsequent discrediting of Operation Lava Jato—praised internationally for recovering over $3 billion—reflected institutional capture favoring political elites, allowing Lula's 2022 return despite evidence of PT-embedded graft. Lula's economic policies, while delivering short-term gains from 2003-2010, failed to implement structural reforms, leaving Brazil vulnerable to commodity busts and fiscal imbalances. GDP growth averaged 4.05% annually during this period, buoyed by soaring exports to China and social transfers like Bolsa Família, reducing extreme poverty from 9.5% to 4.8%, but unemployment lingered around 8-10% and lacked diversification from agriculture and mining. This model sowed dependency, contributing to the 2014-2016 recession with GDP contracting 7% cumulatively under Rousseff, as unreformed state interventionism inflated public spending to 18% of GDP without productivity gains. In his 2023 term, growth reached 2.9% amid fiscal loosening, but inflation hovered at 6%, public debt exceeded 78% of GDP, and critics highlight renewed statism—such as subsidies and industrial policy—exacerbating deficits without addressing chronic issues like low investment (16% of GDP) and inequality persistence. Critics have also pointed to controversial statements from Lula's early career reflecting admiration for authoritarian figures. In a July 1979 interview with Playboy magazine, when asked about historical figures he admired, Lula cited Adolf Hitler for his personal traits, stating: "Por exemplo… O Hitler, mesmo errado, tinha aquilo que eu admiro num homem, o fogo de se propor a fazer alguma coisa e tentar fazer. Quer dizer que você admira o Adolfo? Não, não. O que eu admiro é a disposição, a força, a dedicação. É diferente de admirar as ideias dele, a ideologia dele." (Translation: "For example… Hitler, even though wrong, had that which I admire in a man: the fire to propose doing something and trying to do it. Does that mean you admire Adolf? No, no. What I admire is the disposition, the strength, the dedication. It's different from admiring his ideas, his ideology.") He framed these comments as appreciation for dedication rather than endorsement of ideologies or actions, and similarly mentioned figures like Che Guevara, Fidel Castro, Mao Zedong, and Ayatollah Khomeini.

Long-term impacts on Brazilian democracy and economy

Lula's presidencies have been associated with systemic corruption scandals that undermined public trust in democratic institutions. The Mensalão scandal, uncovered in 2005 during his first term, involved a vote-buying scheme by the Workers' Party (PT) to secure congressional support, resulting in convictions of high-level officials and exposing practices of clientelism that distorted legislative processes. Operation Lava Jato, initiated in 2014 but revealing graft from PT-led governments including Petrobras embezzlement totaling billions, led to over 200 convictions and economic disruptions from reduced investment, yet fostered a temporary strengthening of judicial independence before facing backlash. These events contributed to a long-term erosion of institutional checks, as subsequent PT efforts, including judicial appointments and legal challenges, annulled key Lava Jato outcomes, signaling a normalization of impunity and politicization of the judiciary that persists into Lula's third term. Perceptions of corruption have deteriorated over PT governance periods, with Brazil's score on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index declining from a peak of 43 in 2010 to 34 in 2023, reflecting entrenched patronage networks that prioritize loyalty over accountability. This has fueled political polarization and weakened democratic norms, as evidenced by public support for non-democratic alternatives rising amid disillusionment, though Lula's return elicited mixed views with only about one-third of Brazilians seeing it as enhancing democracy. Long-term, these dynamics have entrenched coalitional presidentialism reliant on corrupt bargains, hindering reforms and institutional stability, as PT's extended rule fostered a culture where executive influence overrides judicial and legislative independence. Economically, Lula's policies emphasized expansionary spending and social transfers like Bolsa Família, which reduced extreme poverty from 9.7% in 2003 to 4.8% by 2010 amid a commodity boom, but created dependency and fiscal vulnerabilities without structural productivity gains. Public debt-to-GDP fell to 62% by the end of his second term through primary surpluses, yet successor Dilma Rousseff's continuation of interventionist measures abandoned fiscal discipline, precipitating the 2014-2016 recession with GDP contracting over 7% cumulatively. In his third term, renewed spending has driven short-term growth to around 3% in 2023-2024 with low unemployment below 8%, but projections show debt rising to 84.3% of GDP by 2028, straining sustainability amid high interest burdens and limited private investment. Inequality metrics improved temporarily, with the Gini coefficient dropping from 0.59 in 2001 to 0.52 by 2014 due to transfers, but rebounded post-recession and remains above pre-Lula levels in effective terms when accounting for fiscal drag. Long-term, state-heavy interventionism has perpetuated low growth potential, averaging under 2% annually since 2011, by crowding out private sector dynamism and exposing the economy to external shocks without diversification from commodities. This model, prioritizing redistribution over efficiency, has locked Brazil into a cycle of boom-bust volatility, with current fiscal rules like the 2023 framework attempting restraints but undermined by political pressures for spending, forecasting persistent deficits and reduced global competitiveness.

References

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