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Cartesian doubt
Cartesian doubt
Cartesian doubt
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Cartesian doubt is a form of methodological skepticism associated with the writings and methodology of René Descartes (March 31, 1596–February 11, 1650).[1][2]: 88  Cartesian doubt is also known as Cartesian skepticism, methodic doubt, methodological skepticism, universal doubt, systematic doubt, or hyperbolic doubt.

Cartesian doubt is a systematic process of being skeptical about (or doubting) the truth of one's beliefs, which has become a characteristic method in philosophy.[3]: 403  Additionally, Descartes' method has been seen by many as the root of the modern scientific method. This method of doubt was largely popularized in Western philosophy by René Descartes, who sought to doubt the truth of all beliefs in order to determine which he could be certain were true. It is the basis for Descartes' statement, "Cogito ergo sum" (I think, therefore I am). A fuller version of his phrase: "dubito ergo cogito, cogito ergo sum" translates to "I doubt therefore I think, I think therefore I exist." Sum translated as "I exist" (per various Latin to English dictionaries) presents a much larger and clearer meaning to the phrase.

Methodological skepticism is distinguished from philosophical skepticism in that methodological skepticism is an approach that subjects all knowledge claims to scrutiny with the goal of sorting out true from false claims, whereas philosophical skepticism is an approach that questions the possibility of certain knowledge.[4]: 354 

Characteristics

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Cartesian doubt is methodological. It uses doubt as a route to certain knowledge by identifying what can't be doubted. The fallibility of sense data in particular is a subject of Cartesian doubt.

There are several interpretations as to the objective of Descartes' skepticism. Prominent among these is a foundationalist account, which claims that Descartes' skepticism aims to eliminate all belief that it is possible to doubt, thus leaving only basic beliefs (also known as foundational beliefs).[5]: 64–65  From these indubitable basic beliefs, Descartes then attempts to derive further knowledge. It's an archetypal and significant example that epitomizes the Continental Rational schools of philosophy.[6]: 6 

Mario Bunge argues that methodological skepticism presupposes that scientific theories and methods satisfy certain philosophical requirements: idealism, materialism, realism, rationalism, empiricism, and systemics, that the data and hypotheses of science constitute a system.[7]

Technique

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Descartes' method of hyperbolic doubt included:[8]: 67–70 

  • Accepting only information you know is true
  • Breaking down these truths into smaller units
  • Solving the simple problems first
  • Making complete lists of further problems

Hyperbolic doubt means having the tendency to doubt, since it is an extreme or exaggerated form of doubt.[9]: 115  Knowledge in the Cartesian sense means to know something beyond not merely all reasonable doubt, but all possible doubt. In his Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), Descartes resolved to systematically doubt that any of his beliefs were true, in order to build, from the ground up, a belief system consisting of only certainly true beliefs; his end goal—or at least a major one—was to find an undoubtable basis for the sciences. Consider Descartes' opening lines of the Meditations:

Several years have now elapsed since I first became aware that I had accepted, even from my youth, many false opinions for true, and that consequently what I afterward based on such principles was highly doubtful; and from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions I had adopted, and of commencing anew the work of building from the foundation...—Descartes, Meditation I, 1641

Descartes' method

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René Descartes, the originator of Cartesian doubt, put all beliefs, ideas, thoughts, and matter in doubt. He showed that his grounds, or reasoning, for any knowledge could just as well be false. Sensory experience, the primary mode of knowledge, is often erroneous and therefore must be doubted. For instance, what one is seeing may very well be a hallucination. There is nothing that proves it cannot be. In short, if there is any way a belief can be disproved, then its grounds are insufficient. From this, Descartes proposed two arguments, the dream and the demon.[10]: 33–36 

The dream argument

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See also: Dream argument

Descartes, knowing that the context of our dreams, while possibly unbelievable, are often lifelike, hypothesized that humans can only believe that they are awake.[11]: 353–368  There are no sufficient grounds to distinguish a dream experience from a waking experience. For instance, Subject A sits at the computer, typing this article. Just as much evidence exists to indicate that the act of composing this article is reality as there is evidence to demonstrate the opposite. Descartes conceded that we live in a world that can create such ideas as dreams. However, by the end of The Meditations, he concludes that we can distinguish dream from reality at least in retrospect:[12]: 538 

"But when I distinctly see where things come from and where and when they come to me, and when I can connect my perceptions of them with the whole of the rest of my life without a break, then I am quite certain that when I encounter these things I am not asleep but awake."—Descartes: Selected Philosophical Writings[13]: 122 

The Evil Demon

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Main article: Evil demon

Descartes reasoned that our very own experience may very well be controlled by an evil demon of sorts.[14] This demon is as clever and deceitful as he is powerful. He could have created a superficial world that we may think we live in.[1] As a result of this doubt, sometimes termed the Malicious Demon Hypothesis, Descartes found that he was unable to trust even the simplest of his perceptions.[15]: 66 

In Meditation I, Descartes stated that if one were mad, even briefly, the insanity might have driven man into believing that what we thought was true could be merely our minds deceiving us. He also stated that there could be 'some malicious, powerful, cunning demon' that had deceived us, preventing us from judging correctly.[16]: 308 

Descartes argued that all his senses were lying, and since your senses can easily fool you, his idea of an infinitely powerful being must be true—since that idea could have only been put there by an infinitely powerful being who would have no reason for deceit.[17]: 16 

I think, therefore I am

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While methodic doubt has a nature, one need not hold that knowledge is impossible to apply the method of doubt.[18]: 83  Indeed, Descartes' attempt to apply the method of doubt to the existence of himself spawned the proof of his famous saying, "Cogito, ergo sum" (I think, therefore I am). That is, Descartes tried to doubt his own existence, but found that even his doubting showed that he existed, since he could not doubt if he did not exist.[19]: 56 

See also

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References

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Further reading

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Cartesian doubt

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Cartesian doubt, also known as the method of doubt or methodological skepticism, is a philosophical technique developed by in his 1641 work , in which one systematically questions the truth of all previously held beliefs—beginning with those derived from the senses—to identify foundations of knowledge that are absolutely certain and indubitable. This approach treats doubt not as an end but as a provisional tool for intellectual reconstruction, aiming to demolish unstable epistemic structures and rebuild on unshakeable grounds. The method unfolds in escalating stages of . Initially, Descartes doubts the reliability of sensory perceptions, noting that the senses can deceive, as in cases of optical illusions or mirages, making it prudent to withhold assent from anything once proven fallible. He then extends to the distinction between and dreams, arguing that since dream experiences can mimic so convincingly, there may be no reliable criterion to differentiate them, thus undermining confidence in the external world. At its most radical, the process invokes the hypothesis of a powerful deceiver—often termed the "evil genius" or "malicious "—who might systematically mislead even about evident truths like mathematical propositions, such as 2 + 3 = 5, to ensure no assumption escapes scrutiny. This hyperbolic serves to clear away prejudices and provisional opinions accumulated from childhood, allowing for a fresh start in . From this universal doubt emerges the foundational certainty of the cogito ergo sum ("I think, therefore I am"), articulated in the second meditation: even if deceived about everything else, the act of doubting affirms the existence of a thinking self, as deception requires a mind to be deceived. This self-evident truth—that the mind is a "thing that thinks," encompassing doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, willing, and sensing—provides the bedrock for further demonstrations, including the as a non-deceiver and the reliability of clear and distinct ideas. Cartesian doubt thus not only critiques but establishes rationalism's emphasis on innate ideas and deductive certainty, influencing by prioritizing hyperbolic as a pathway to absolute knowledge.

Overview and Background

Definition and Purpose

Cartesian doubt, also known as the method of , constitutes a radical form of methodological introduced by in his pursuit of foundational . It entails the systematic and provisional rejection of all susceptible to even the slightest , regardless of their apparent certainty, with the objective of identifying only those indubitable propositions that can serve as an unassailable basis for all further . This approach demands a comprehensive scrutiny of one's entire system, withholding assent until absolute certainty is attained, thereby aiming to establish a secure epistemological foundation impervious to . The purpose of Cartesian doubt is to eradicate any elements of uncertainty or falsehood from the edifice of human , allowing for its reconstruction upon indubitable truths. Descartes employed this method to achieve a level of comparable to that in , motivated by his aspiration for that is entirely stable and enduring amid the intellectual challenges posed by contemporary scientific advancements and religious controversies. By demolishing provisional beliefs, the method seeks to reveal self-evident principles from which a reliable of and can be rebuilt. In distinction from ordinary , which typically involves casual or localized questioning in daily affairs without a structured aim, Cartesian doubt is deliberately hyperbolic and exhaustive, applying to the senses, the , and received traditions to probe the deepest limits of . It functions not as aimless incredulity but as a rigorous, temporary designed to yield foundational certainties, such as the recognition of one's own thinking existence.

Historical and Philosophical Context

René Descartes developed the foundations of his method of systematic doubt during an intellectual crisis in 1619–1620, a period marked by his travels in and a profound reevaluation of established knowledge traditions. This crisis prompted him to seek a secure epistemological basis amid the uncertainties of his early scientific pursuits, including and , leading to the initial formulation of a doubting approach to clear away unreliable beliefs. Descartes first outlined elements of this method in his 1637 , where he described resolving to reject all doubtful opinions to rebuild on certain foundations, emphasizing the provisional nature of prior acceptances. The method received its full elaboration in the 1641 , presented as a series of meditative exercises aimed at establishing indubitable truths through rigorous . Philosophically, Cartesian doubt drew from ancient skeptical traditions, particularly as transmitted by in works like Outlines of Pyrrhonism, which emphasized suspending judgment on non-evident matters to achieve tranquility—a theme echoed in Descartes' hyperbolic doubt despite his ultimate rejection of . Renaissance skepticism further shaped this approach, with figures like Francisco Sanches influencing Descartes' critique of dogmatic certainty in through appeals to undecidable phenomena. Additionally, the 1633 trial and condemnation of Galileo by the for deeply affected Descartes, prompting him to withhold publication of his mechanistic treatise The World out of caution and reinforcing his turn toward metaphysical doubt as a safer path to foundational certainty. The broader 17th-century intellectual climate, characterized by a transition from medieval —reliant on Aristotelian and authority—to a mechanistic inspired by figures like Galileo and , underscored the need for indubitable epistemological foundations that Descartes sought to provide. This shift was compounded by Protestant-Catholic tensions, including debates over , where Descartes positioned his philosophy to align with Catholic against Protestant critiques, using to defend doctrines like the real presence in the .

The Method of Systematic Doubt

Core Characteristics

Cartesian doubt, as articulated by , is characterized by its hyperbolic nature, wherein doubt is extended to an extreme degree, encompassing even those beliefs that appear most evident, in order to rigorously test their resilience against deception. This approach involves questioning fundamental truths, such as the reliability of arithmetic—for instance, doubting that 2 + 3 = 5 if the foundations of prove unreliable—pushing beyond ordinary limits to uncover any potential vulnerabilities. A key feature of this method is the provisional suspension of beliefs, whereby all previously held opinions are set aside temporarily rather than permanently rejected, applying universally to every source of , including the senses, reason, and . Descartes emphasizes that this suspension functions as a deliberate withholding of assent, treating doubtful propositions as if they were false to counteract habitual acceptance, without committing to their outright falsity. This temporary allows for a systematic examination without immediate dismissal, ensuring that the process serves rather than . At its core, Cartesian doubt pursues a foundational aim: to identify indubitable bedrock truths that withstand all forms of , thereby providing a secure basis for rebuilding . Unlike partial or local , which targets specific domains, this method seeks absolute by demolishing unstable foundations and reconstructing upon unassailable principles, contrasting sharply with more limited skeptical traditions that do not aspire to such comprehensive .

Step-by-Step Technique

The method of systematic doubt, as outlined by in his , unfolds through a deliberate sequence designed to dismantle all previously held beliefs, relying on the universality of doubt to apply comprehensively across all domains of knowledge. This process begins with an initial step of withholding assent from sensory perceptions, recognizing their inherent fallibility due to instances of deception such as optical illusions or hallucinations, where external objects appear other than they are. Descartes emphasizes that even a single instance of sensory error justifies suspending belief in all sense-based judgments to avoid rash confidence. The doubt then escalates to challenge even the most seemingly indubitable truths, such as those in and , which appear clear and distinct to the . To further extend the , radical skeptical hypotheses are invoked that challenge even seemingly indubitable intellectual truths, such as those in and . Under such scenarios, arithmetic certainties like 2 + 3 = 5 might also be called into question. This step ensures that no proposition escapes scrutiny merely because it lacks the overt deceptiveness of sensory data. Culminating in a radical application, the method employs hyperbolic hypotheses—extreme, conceivable scenarios of total —to everything that can possibly be called into question, thereby achieving a comprehensive that leaves no belief unscathed. These suppositions push to its hyperbolic limits, treating all knowledge as provisional until proven impervious to such challenges. In the subsequent rebuilding phase, the process transitions to reconstruction by provisionally accepting only those propositions that withstand every level of , forming the unshakeable foundation for further . This selective affirmation prioritizes absolute , ensuring that the edifice of is erected solely on indubitable grounds.

Key Skeptical Arguments

The Dream Argument

The dream argument, articulated by in the First Meditation of his , serves as a pivotal skeptical device to challenge the reliability of sensory perceptions. Descartes observes that in dreams, individuals experience vivid and coherent scenarios—such as seeing books, hearing sounds, or feeling warmth—that appear entirely real at the time, yet upon waking are revealed as fabrications without external correspondence. He contends that these dream experiences mimic waking sensations so closely that there exists no definitive criterion to distinguish one from the other, thereby introducing the possibility that one's current perceptions might similarly be illusory. Central to the argument's structure is the premise that sensory data, often taken as the foundation of about the external world, can deceive without apparent markers of falsehood. For instance, Descartes reflects: "I often have perceptions very much like the ones I usually have in sensation while I am ," noting how past certainties about being dissolved upon awakening. This leads to the conclusion that beliefs formed solely through the senses—such as the existence of one's body or surroundings—cannot be deemed certain, as they may stem from internal mental processes rather than veridical external inputs. As part of Descartes' broader method of systematic doubt, this argument systematically erodes confidence in , compelling a search for indubitable foundations beyond sensory testimony. Philosophically, the dream argument profoundly impacts by demonstrating that senses alone cannot guarantee truth, shifting emphasis toward rational introspection as a more secure epistemic avenue. It underscores the fallibility of , influencing subsequent skeptical traditions and highlighting how everyday assumptions about rest on unexamined trust in . However, the argument has inherent limitations: it does not assert perpetual dreaming or deny the occasional ability to wake, but merely posits the epistemic uncertainty of any given moment being a dream, thus targeting the trustworthiness of sensory reports without extending to all forms of .

The Evil Demon Hypothesis

In ' Meditations on First Philosophy, the evil demon hypothesis, also known as the malicious demon or evil genius, serves as the pinnacle of his method of systematic , positing the of a supremely powerful and deceptive entity capable of manipulating all human perceptions and thoughts to render truth indiscernible. Descartes introduces this scenario in the First Meditation, where he imagines "not that who is supremely good and the source of truth, but rather some malicious of the utmost power and cunning has employed all his energies in order to deceive me." This hypothesis extends beyond everyday errors or natural deceptions, such as those arising from the senses, by invoking a deceiver whose influence eliminates any possibility of reliable . The functions as a tool for hyperbolic doubt, a form of exaggerated designed to withhold assent from any , no matter how seemingly certain, if there exists even the slightest ground for uncertainty. Descartes employs it to undermine not only external realities but also the foundations of , supposing that this deceiver could fabricate illusions of the , , colors, shapes, and sounds as mere traps for . By attributing all experiences to the demon's machinations, Descartes achieves a total suspension of , ensuring that no escapes scrutiny. The scope of the hypothesis is universal, encompassing sensory perceptions, rational faculties, and even innate ideas, thereby instituting a comprehensive form of skepticism. It builds upon prior doubts about sensory reliability by proposing that the deceiver could also falsify mathematical truths and self-evident axioms, such as 2 + 3 = 5, if they are part of the deceived mind's operations. In this way, the hypothesis dismantles the entire edifice of , leaving the meditator in a state of radical uncertainty where distinguishing from becomes impossible.

Attaining Certainty: The Cogito

Formulation of "I Think, Therefore I Am"

The formulation of Descartes' foundational principle, known as the cogito, first appears in his Discourse on the Method (1637), where it is expressed in French as "je pense, donc je suis," meaning "I think, therefore I am." In the same work, Descartes provides a Latin equivalent in parentheses: "Cogito, ergo sum." This Latin phrasing later gained prominence in his Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), though the core idea originates from the Discourse. The English translation, "I think, therefore I am," captures the essence of this intuitive assertion of self-existence through the act of thought. The logical derivation of the cogito arises directly from the process of hyperbolic doubt, where Descartes systematically questions the reliability of all beliefs, including the possibility of by an "" that might render all perceptions and realities illusory. Even under this extreme , the very act of doubting presupposes the of a thinking : if I am doubting everything, including my own , then I must be thinking, and thus I must exist as a thinking thing. As Descartes writes, "whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat." This derivation is not a dependent on prior premises but an immediate recognition that the process of thought itself cannot be doubted without affirming the thinker's presence. The cogito possesses a self-evident , deriving its from rather than deductive proof, making it impervious to the hyperbolic that undermines other propositions. Descartes describes it as "so certain and of such evidence that no ground of , however extravagant, could be alleged by the sceptics capable of shaking it," establishing it as an indubitable foundation. This intuitive clarity ensures that the affirmation of the thinking self resists even the most radical skeptical scenarios, serving as the bedrock for further philosophical inquiry.

Role in Overcoming Doubt

The cogito argument functions as an in Descartes' philosophy, providing an unshakeable foundation amid systematic doubt by establishing the of the thinking self, or res cogitans, as the sole indubitable truth. In the Second Meditation, Descartes asserts that even if an evil deceiver attempts to undermine all , the act of doubting itself affirms the thinker's , as "I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever I state it or conceive it in my mind." This self-evident certainty of the thinking thing—defined as "a thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions"—allows Descartes to halt the regress of doubt and begin reconstructing from this secure base. Building on this foundation, the cogito enables the progression in the toward broader certainties, particularly through the criterion of clear and distinct ideas derived from the indubitability of the thinking self. In the Third Meditation, Descartes examines innate ideas, including the concept of a perfect , which he perceives clearly and distinctly; since such ideas must originate from a non-deceiving source, God's existence is proven, guaranteeing the truth of all clear and distinct perceptions. This divine guarantee extends in the Sixth Meditation to affirm the reliability of the external world, as sensory deceptions are reconciled with God's benevolence, allowing Descartes to conclude that bodies and the material realm exist in a manner consistent with mathematical and clear ideas. However, the cogito's role is limited to securing only the existence of the thinking self, requiring subsequent arguments to validate other domains of knowledge. While it provides certainty about res cogitans, doubts concerning the body, senses, and external objects persist until resolved through proofs of God's existence and the trustworthiness of clear perceptions, underscoring that the cogito alone does not immediately encompass the full edifice of knowledge.

Implications and Criticisms

Epistemological Consequences

Cartesian doubt, as employed by in his , establishes a foundational framework for by emphasizing the primacy of innate ideas and over empirical observation. Through systematic doubt, Descartes identifies innate intellectual concepts—such as the truths of and the idea of —as indubitable foundations for , independent of potentially deceptive sensory input. This approach prioritizes deduction, modeled after geometric proofs, where conclusions follow necessarily from clear premises, thereby sidelining empiricism's reliance on induction from . A key criterion emerging from this method is the rule of clear and distinct perception, whereby ideas grasped with utmost clarity and distinctness by the mind's "natural light" guarantee truth, provided they are not obscured by doubt. The method also precipitates the emergence of substance dualism, sharply distinguishing the mind as a thinking, non-extended substance from the body as an extended, non-thinking substance. In the wake of doubting all external realities, including the body's , Descartes concludes that the mind's through thought (cogito) reveals its essential nature as res cogitans, separate from the res extensa of material bodies. This epistemological separation forms the bedrock of Cartesian metaphysics, asserting that the mind can be known with greater than the body, whose depends on rather than direct sensory . Furthermore, Cartesian doubt fosters a mechanistic in the sciences by undermining the certainties of Aristotelian , particularly its dependence on sensory qualities and teleological explanations. By questioning the reliability of sense perceptions—such as colors, tastes, and sounds—Descartes clears the ground for understanding the physical world through intelligible, mathematical principles of motion and extension alone. This shift enables a corpuscular-mechanical model of nature, where bodies interact via contact and shape, free from Aristotelian substantial forms and final causes, thus paving the way for modern scientific inquiry grounded in rational deduction.

Major Critiques and Responses

One prominent critique of Cartesian doubt and the cogito argument centers on the charge of , often termed the "." This objection posits that Descartes relies on the reliability of clear and distinct perceptions to prove God's existence, yet invokes God's non-deceptive nature to guarantee the truth of those same perceptions, creating a . The critique was first raised by Descartes' contemporary in the Fourth Set of Objections to the , where he argued that this undermines the foundation for certain knowledge. In response, Descartes maintained in his Replies that the circle is illusory, as the initial perception of God's existence arises from an innate idea that is self-evident upon clear and distinct apprehension, independent of prior guarantees against deception. He further clarified that while God's veracity ensures the enduring reliability of and past clear perceptions, the cogito itself is an immediate grasped in the present moment, requiring no such external validation. Later defenders, such as those emphasizing Descartes' of innate ideas, have argued that the cogito's stems from God-given faculties that render the knowledge non-circular, as these ideas are hardwired and not derived from sensory . Another key objection challenges the cogito's assumption that "thinking" presupposes a unified "I" or that exists. The physicist and philosopher famously remarked that Descartes should conclude only "it thinks" rather than "I think, therefore I am," likening it to saying "it lightens" during a storm, thereby avoiding the unwarranted inference of a substantial thinker. Similarly, critiqued the formulation in as question-begging, asserting that the "I" in "I think" already smuggles in the existence of a subject, rendering the argument tautological and presupposing what it seeks to prove. Descartes anticipated such concerns by framing the cogito not as a syllogistic but as an indubitable where the act of doubting one's affirms the thinker's presence, with the "I" emerging directly from the reflective itself. Modern analytic philosophers have defended this by interpreting the cogito as a —its truth lies in the very act of assertion—thus evading Lichtenberg's impersonal reformulation, though critics like Nietzsche persist in viewing it as linguistically laden and non-foundational. Analytic critiques further contend that the cogito begs the question by embedding linguistic assumptions within the process, as the use of first-person language ("I ") implicitly affirms a coherent before the conclusion is reached. This objection highlights how Cartesian , while methodical, cannot fully escape ordinary conceptual frameworks, potentially undermining its . From a feminist perspective, Geneviève Lloyd in The Man of Reason: "Male" and "Female" in (1984) argues that Cartesian promotes a disembodied, abstract rationality that aligns reason with masculine ideals, marginalizing embodied, relational experiences traditionally associated with the feminine and ignoring the gendered context of knowledge production. Descartes' emphasis on a mind severed from the body thus reinforces dualistic hierarchies that devalue embodiment, a echoed in subsequent for perpetuating exclusions in philosophical foundations.

References

  1. https://people.bu.edu/wwildman/courses/wphil/readings/wphil_rdg21_meditations_entire.htm
  2. https://philife.nd.edu/assets/462142/descartes_meditations_doubt_everything.pdf
  3. https://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/Phil100/descartes.html
  4. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-epistemology/
  5. https://web.ics.purdue.edu/~drkelly/DescartesMeditationsPSPPEdit1641.pdf
  6. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-method/
  7. https://www.academia.edu/124451966/The_Origins_of_Descartes_Concept_of_Mind_in_the_Regulae_ad_directionem_ingenii
  8. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/59/59-h/59-h.htm
  9. https://personal.lse.ac.uk/ROBERT49/teaching/ph103/pdf/Descartes_1641Meditations.pdf
  10. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10848770.2024.2316405
  11. https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789004177840/Bej.9789004177840.i-390_016.xml
  12. https://fundacionorotava.org/media/web/files/page145__cap_04_02_Finocchiaro.pdf
  13. https://academic.oup.com/book/34772/chapter/297167982
  14. https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/bitstreams/61de3286-1f13-4167-9d7a-ba23fd17bb7d/download
  15. https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil201/Meditations.pdf
  16. https://diametros.uj.edu.pl/diametros/article/download/393/400/792
  17. https://journals.ezenwaohaetorc.org/index.php/NAJP/article/download/12-1-2020-008/1683
  18. https://philarchive.org/archive/SACDAS-2
  19. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/descartes/1639/meditations.htm
  20. https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/descartes1641.pdf
  21. https://iep.utm.edu/dreaming-philosophy/
  22. https://iep.utm.edu/rene-descartes/
  23. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes/
  24. https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/descartes1642.pdf
  25. https://www.iep.utm.edu/rene-descartes/
  26. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-femhist/
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