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Charvaka
Charvaka
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Charvaka (Sanskrit: चार्वाक; IAST: Cārvāka), also known as Lokāyata, is an ancient Indian school of materialism.[1] It is an example of the atheistic schools in the Ancient Indian philosophies, dated 900 BCE.[a][3][b][5][c] Charvaka holds direct perception, empiricism, and conditional inference as proper sources of knowledge, embraces philosophical skepticism, and rejects ritualism.[4][6][7][8][9] In other words, the Charvaka epistemology states that whenever one infers a truth from a set of observations or truths, one must acknowledge doubt; inferred knowledge is conditional.[10]

It was a well-attested belief system in ancient India.[d] Brihaspati, a philosopher, is traditionally referred to as the founder of Charvaka or Lokāyata philosophy, although some scholars dispute this.[11][12] Charvaka developed during the Hindu reformation period in the first millennium BCE[13] and is considered a philosophical predecessor to subsequent or contemporaneous heterodox philosophies such as Ajñāna, Ājīvika, Jainism, and Buddhism.[14] Its teachings have been compiled from historic secondary literature such as those found in the shastras, sutras, and Indian epic poetry.[15]

Charvaka is categorized as one of the nāstika or "heterodox" schools of Indian philosophy.[16][17]

Etymology and meaning

[edit]

The etymology of Charvaka (Sanskrit: चार्वाक) is uncertain. Bhattacharya quotes the grammarian Hemacandra, to the effect that the word cārvāka is derived from the root carv, 'to chew' : "A Cārvāka chews the self (carvatyātmānaṃ cārvākaḥ). Hemacandra refers to his own grammatical work, Uṇādisūtra 37, which runs as follows: mavāka-śyāmāka-vārtāka-jyontāka-gūvāka-bhadrākādayaḥ. Each of these words ends with the āka suffix and is formed irregularly."[18] This may also allude to the philosophy's hedonistic precepts of "eat, drink, and be merry".[19]

Others believe it to mean "agreeable speech" or pejoratively, "sweet-tongued", from Sanskrit's cāru "agreeable" and vāc "speech" (which becomes vāk in the nominative singular and in compounds). Yet another hypothesis is that it is eponymous, with the founder of the school being Charvaka, a disciple of Brihaspati.[20]

As Lokayata

[edit]

According to claims of Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, the traditional name of Charvaka is Lokayata.[21] It was called Lokayata because it was prevalent (ayatah) among the people (lokesu), and meant the world-outlook of the people. The dictionary meaning of Lokāyata (लोकायत) signifies "directed towards, aiming at the world, worldly".[19][e]

In early to mid 20th century literature, the etymology of Lokayata has been given different interpretations, in part because the primary sources are unavailable, and the meaning has been deduced from divergent secondary literature.[23] The name Lokāyata, for example, is found in Chanakya's Arthashastra, which refers to three ānvīkṣikīs (अन्वीक्षिकी, literally, examining by reason,[24] logical philosophies) – Yoga, Samkhya and Lokāyata. However, Lokāyata in the Arthashastra is not anti-Vedic, but implies Lokāyata to be a part of Vedic lore.[25] Lokāyata here refers to logic or science of debate (disputatio, "criticism").[26] Rudolf Franke translated Lokayata in German as "logisch beweisende Naturerklärung", that is "logically proving explanation of nature".[27]

In 8th century CE Jaina literature, Saddarsanasamuccaya by Haribhadra,[28] Lokayata is stated to be the Hindu school where there is "no God, no samsara (rebirth), no karma, no duty, no fruits of merit, no sin."[29]

The Buddhist Sanskrit work Divyavadana (ca. 200–350 CE) mentions Lokayata, where it is listed among subjects of study, and with the sense of "technical logical science".[30] Shantarakshita and Adi Shankara use the word lokayata to mean materialism,[31][32] with the latter using the term Lokāyata, not Charvaka.[33]

In Silāṅka's commentary on Sūtra-kṛtāṅgna, the oldest Jain Āgama Prakrt literature, he has used four terms for Cārvāka, namely, (1) Bṛhaspatya (2) Lokāyata (3) Bhūtavādin (4) Vāmamārgin.[34]

Origin

[edit]

The tenets of the Charvaka atheistic doctrines can be traced to the relatively later composed layers of the Rigveda, while substantial discussions on the Charvaka is found in post-Vedic literature.[31][35][f] The primary literature of Charvaka, such as the Brhaspati Sutra, is missing or lost.[31][35] Its theories and development has been compiled from historic secondary literature such as those found in the shastras (such as the Arthashastra), sutras and the epics (the Mahabharata and Ramayana) of Hinduism as well as from the dialogues of Gautama Buddha and Jain literature.[31][37]

In the oldest of the Upanishads, in chapter 2 of the Brhadāranyaka (ca. 900 BCE), the leading theorist Yājnavalkya states in a passage often referred to by the irreligious, "So I say, after death there is no awareness." This declaration arises in a discussion with his female philosophy interlocutor, Maitreyi, who notices that this might mean there is no afterlife – no religion: "After Yājñavalkya said this, Maitreyi exclaimed: 'Now, sir, you have totally confused me by saying 'after death there is no awareness'."[38]

Substantial discussions about the Charvaka doctrines are found in texts during the 6th century BCE because of the emergence of competing philosophies such as Buddhism and Jainism.[31][35][39] Bhattacharya posits that Charvaka may have been one of several atheistic, materialist schools that existed in ancient India during the 6th century BCE.[40] Though there is evidence of its development in Vedic era,[41] the Charvaka school of philosophy predated the Āstika schools as well as being a philosophical predecessor to subsequent or contemporaneous philosophies such as Ajñāna, Ājīvika, Jainism and Buddhism in the classical period of Indian philosophy.[14]

There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world, Nor do the actions of the four classes, orders, etc., produce any real effect.

— from the Sarvadarśanasaṅ̇graha, attributed to Brhaspati[42][43]

The earliest Charvaka scholar in India whose texts still survive is Ajita Kesakambali. Although materialist schools existed before Charvaka, it was the only school which systematised materialist philosophy by setting them down in the form of aphorisms in the 6th century BCE. There was a base text, a collection sūtras or aphorisms and several commentaries were written to explicate the aphorisms. This should be seen in the wider context of the oral tradition of Indian philosophy. It was in the 6th century BCE onwards, with the emergent popularity of Buddhism, that ancient schools started codifying and writing down the details of their philosophy.[44]

E. W. Hopkins, in his The Ethics of India (1924), claims that Charvaka philosophy predated Jainism and Buddhism, mentioning "the old Cārvāka or materialist of the 6th century BC". Rhys Davids assumes that lokāyata in ca. the 5th century BC came to mean "skepticism" in general without yet being organised as a philosophical school. This proves that it had already existed for centuries and had become a generic term by 600 BCE. Its methodology of skepticism is included in the Ramayana, Ayodhya kanda, chapter 108, where Jabāli tries to persuade Rāma to accept the kingdom by using nāstika arguments (Rāma refutes him in chapter 109):[45]

O, the highly wise! Arrive at a conclusion, therefore, that there is nothing beyond this Universe. Give precedence to that which meets the eye and turn your back on what is beyond our knowledge. (2.108.17)

There are alternate theories behind the origins of Charvaka. Bṛhaspati is sometimes referred to as the founder of Charvaka or Lokāyata philosophy, although other scholars dispute this.[11][12] Billington 1997, p. 43 states that a philosopher named Charvaka lived in or about the 6th century BCE, who developed the premises of this Indian philosophy in the form of Brhaspati Sutra. These sutras predate 150 BCE, because they are mentioned in the Mahābhāṣya (7.3.45).[45]

Arthur Llewellyn Basham, citing the Buddhist Samaññaphala Sutta, suggests six schools of heterodox, pre-Buddhist and pre-Jain, atheistic Indian traditions in 6th century BCE, that included Charvakas and Ajivikas.[46] Charvaka was a living philosophy up to the 12th century in India's historical timeline, after which this system seems to have disappeared without leaving any trace.[47]

Philosophy

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The Charvaka school of philosophy had a variety of atheistic and materialistic beliefs. They held perception and direct experiences to be the only valid and reliable source of knowledge.[48]

Epistemology

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The Charvaka epistemology holds perception as the primary and proper source of knowledge, while inference is held as prone to being either right or wrong and therefore conditional or invalid.[10][49] Perceptions are of two types, for Charvaka, external and internal. External perception is described as that arising from the interaction of five senses and worldly objects, while internal perception is described by this school as that of inner sense, the mind.[10] Inference is described as deriving a new conclusion and truth from one or more observations and previous truths. To Charvakas, inference is useful but prone to error, as inferred truths can never be without doubt.[50] Inference is good and helpful, it is the validity of inference that is suspect – sometimes in certain cases and often in others. To the Charvakas there were no reliable means by which the efficacy of inference as a means of knowledge could be established.[51]

Charvaka's epistemological argument can be explained with the example of fire and smoke. Kamal states that when there is smoke (middle term), one's tendency may be to leap to the conclusion that it must be caused by fire (major term in logic).[10] While this is often true, it need not be universally true, everywhere or all the times, stated the Charvaka scholars. Smoke can have other causes. In Charvaka epistemology, as long as the relation between two phenomena, or observation and truth, has not been proven as unconditional, it is an uncertain truth. In this Indian philosophy such a method of reasoning, that is jumping to conclusions or inference, is prone to flaw.[10][50] Charvakas further state that full knowledge is reached when we know all observations, all premises and all conditions. But the absence of conditions, state Charvakas, can not be established beyond doubt by perception, as some conditions may be hidden or escape our ability to observe.[10] They acknowledge that every person relies on inference in daily life, but to them if we act uncritically, we err. While our inferences sometimes are true and lead to successful action, it is also a fact that sometimes inference is wrong and leads to error.[40] Truth then, state Charvaka, is not an unfailing character of inference, truth is merely an accident of inference, and one that is separable. We must be skeptics, question what we know by inference, question our epistemology.[10][35]

This epistemological proposition of Charvakas was influential among various schools of Indian philosophies, by demonstrating a new way of thinking and re-evaluation of past doctrines. Hindu, Buddhist and Jain scholars extensively deployed Charvaka insights on inference in rational re-examination of their own theories.[10][52]

Comparison with other schools of Hinduism

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Charvaka epistemology represents minimalist pramāṇas (epistemological methods) in Hindu philosophy. The other schools of Hinduism developed and accepted multiple valid forms of epistemology.[53][54] To Charvakas, Pratyakṣa (perception) was the one valid way to knowledge and other means of knowledge were either always conditional or invalid. While the Charvaka school accepted just one valid means for knowledge, in other schools of Hinduism they ranged between 2 and 6.[53][54] Advaita Vedanta scholars considered six means of valid knowledge and to truths: Pratyakṣa (perception), Anumāna (inference), Upamāna (comparison and analogy), Arthāpatti (postulation), Anupalabdhi (non-perception, cognitive proof) and Śabda (word, testimony of past or present reliable experts).[53][54][55]

Metaphysics

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Since none of the means of knowing were found to be worthy to establish the invariable connection between middle term and predicate, Charvakas concluded that the inference could not be used to ascertain metaphysical truths. Thus, to Charvakas, the step which the mind takes from the knowledge of something to infer the knowledge of something else could be accounted for by its being based on a former perception or by its being in error. Cases where inference was justified by the result were seen only to be mere coincidences.[56]

Therefore, Charvakas denied metaphysical concepts like reincarnation, an extracorporeal soul, the efficacy of religious rites, other worlds (heaven and hell), fate and accumulation of merit or demerit through the performance of certain actions.[44] Charvakas also rejected the use of supernatural causes to describe natural phenomena. To them all natural phenomena was produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things.[57]

The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn;
By whom came this variety ? from their own nature was it born.[57]

Ethics

[edit]

The Charvaka school is commonly associated with egoism, emphasizing the individual's ends over others. It rejects ethical systems based on supernatural beliefs, advocating pleasure as the only intrinsic good, and promoting hedonism. It also opposes utilitarianism, which seeks collective pleasure, maintaining that individuals should prioritize their own interests and only benefit society if it serves them. Some scholars argue that the Charvaka school is nihilistic, focusing solely on rejecting concepts like "The Good" and divinity, rather than actively promoting hedonism.[58][59]

Consciousness and afterlife

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The Charvaka did not believe in karma, rebirth or an afterlife. To them, all attributes that represented a person, such as thinness, fatness, etc., resided in the body. The Sarvasiddhanta Samgraha states the Charvaka position as follows,[60]

There is no world other than this;
There is no heaven and no hell;
The realm of Shiva and like regions,
are fabricated by stupid imposters.

— Sarvasiddhanta Samgraha, Verse 8[60]

Pleasure

[edit]

Charvaka believed that there was nothing wrong with sensual pleasure. Since it is impossible to have pleasure without pain, Charvaka thought that wisdom lay in enjoying pleasure and avoiding pain as far as possible. Unlike many of the Indian philosophies of the time, Charvaka did not believe in austerities or rejecting pleasure out of fear of pain and held such reasoning to be foolish.[48]

The Sarvasiddhanta Samgraha states the Charvaka position on pleasure and hedonism as follows,[61]

The enjoyment of heaven lies in eating delicious food, keeping company of young women, using fine clothes, perfumes, garlands, sandal paste... while moksha is death which is cessation of life-breath... the wise therefore ought not to take pains on account of moksha.

A fool wears himself out by penances and fasts. Chastity and other such ordinances are laid down by clever weaklings.

— Sarvasiddhanta Samgraha, Verses 9-12[62]

The scholar Bhattacharya argues that the common belief that "all materialists are nothing but sensualists" is a misconception, as no authentic Charvaka aphorism have been cited by the movement's opponents to support this view.[63]

Religion

[edit]

Charvakas rejected many of the standard religious conceptions of Hindus, Buddhists, Jains and Ajivikas, such as an afterlife, reincarnation, samsara, karma and religious rites. They were critical of the Vedas, as well as Buddhist scriptures.[64] The Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha with commentaries by Madhavacharya describes the Charvakas as critical of the Vedas, materialists without morals and ethics. To Charvakas, the text states, the Vedas suffered from several faults – errors in transmission across generations, untruth, self-contradiction and tautology.

The Charvakas pointed out the disagreements, debates and mutual rejection by karmakanda Vedic priests and jñānakanda Vedic priests, as proof that either one of them is wrong or both are wrong, as both cannot be right.[64][65][66] Charvakas, according to Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha verses 10 and 11, declared the Vedas to be incoherent rhapsodies whose only usefulness was to provide livelihood to priests. They also held the belief that Vedas were invented by man, and had no divine authority.[57] Charvakas rejected the need for ethics or morals, and suggested that "while life remains, let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even though he runs in debt".[57]

The Jain scholar Haribhadra, in the last section of his text Saddarsanasamuccaya, includes Charvaka in his list of six darśanas of Indian traditions, along with Buddhism, Nyaya-Vaisheshika, Samkhya, Jainism and Jaiminiya.[67] Haribhadra notes that Charvakas assert that there is nothing beyond the senses, consciousness is an emergent property, and that it is foolish to seek what cannot be seen.[68] The accuracy of these views, attributed to Charvakas, has been contested by scholars.[69][70]

Public administration

[edit]

An extract from Aaine-Akbari (vol.III, tr. by H. S. Barrett, pp217–218) written by Abul Fazl, the famous historian of Akbar's court, mentions a symposium of philosophers of all faiths held in 1578 at Akbar's insistence. The account is given by the historian Vincent Smith, in his article titled "The Jain Teachers of Akbar". Some Carvaka thinkers are said to have participated in the symposium. Under the heading "Nastika" Abul Fazl has referred to the good work, judicious administration and welfare schemes that were emphasised by the Charvaka law-makers. Somadeva has also mentioned the Charvaka method of defeating the enemies of the nation.[71][72]

Mention in Mahabharata

[edit]

In the epic Mahabharata, Book 12 Chapter 39, a rakshasa who dresses up like a Brahmin and appoints himself as spokesperson for all Brahmins is named Charvaka. Charvaka criticizes Yudhishthira for killing his kinsmen, superiors, and teacher, and claims that all the Brahmins are uttering maledictions to him. Yudhishthira is ashamed of this, but the Brahmin Vaishampayana reassures him. The Brahmins, now filled with rage, destroy Charvaka with the power of their mantras.[73]

Mention in other works

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No independent works on Charvaka philosophy can be found except for a few sūtras attributed to Brihaspati. The 8th century Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa with Madhyamaka influence is a significant source of Charvaka philosophy. Shatdarshan Samuchay and Sarvadarśanasaṅ̇graha of Vidyaranya are a few other works which elucidate Charvaka thought.[74]

One of the widely studied references to the Charvaka philosophy is the Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha (etymologically all-philosophy-collection), a famous work of 14th century Advaita Vedanta philosopher Mādhava Vidyāraṇya from South India, which starts with a chapter on the Charvaka system. After invoking, in the Prologue of the book, the Hindu gods Shiva and Vishnu ("by whom the earth and rest were produced"), Vidyāraṇya asks, in the first chapter:[75]

...but how can we attribute to the Divine Being the giving of supreme felicity, when such a notion has been utterly abolished by Charvaka, the crest-gem of the atheistic school, the follower of the doctrine of Brihaspati? The efforts of Charvaka are indeed hard to be eradicated, for the majority of living beings hold by the current refrain:

While life is yours, live joyously;
None can escape Death's searching eye:
When once this frame of ours they burn,
How shall it e'er again return?[75]

Sanskrit poems and plays like the Naiṣadha-carita, Prabodha-candrodaya, Āgama-dambara, Vidvanmoda-taraṅgiṇī and Kādambarī contain representations of the Charvaka thought. However, the authors of these works were thoroughly opposed to materialism and tried to portray the Charvaka in an unfavourable light. Therefore, their works should only be accepted critically.[44]

Loss of original works

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There was no continuity in the Charvaka tradition after the 12th century. Whatever is written on Charvaka post this is based on second-hand knowledge, learned from preceptors to disciples and no independent works on Charvaka philosophy can be found.[44] Chatterjee and Datta explain that our understanding of Charvaka philosophy is fragmentary, based largely on criticism of its ideas by other schools, and that it is not a living tradition:

"Though materialism in some form or other has always been present in India, and occasional references are found in the Vedas, the Buddhistic literature, the Epics, as well as in the later philosophical works we do not find any systematic work on materialism, nor any organised school of followers as the other philosophical schools possess. But almost every work of the other schools states, for refutation, the materialistic views. Our knowledge of Indian materialism is chiefly based on these."[76]

Mughal era

[edit]

Ain-i-Akbari, a record of the Mughal Emperor Akbar's court, mentions a symposium of philosophers of all faiths held in 1578 at Akbar's insistence[77] (also see Sen 2005, pp. 288–289). In the text, the Mughal historian Abu'l-Fazl ibn Mubarak summarizes the Charvaka philosophy as "unenlightened" and characterizes their works of literature as "lasting memorials to their ignorance". He notes that Charvakas considered paradise as "the state in which man lives as he chooses, without control of another", while hell as "the state in which he lives subject to another's rule". On state craft, Charvakas believe, states Mubarak, that it is best when "knowledge of just administration and benevolent government" is practiced.[77]

Controversy on reliability of sources

[edit]

Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 10, 29–32 states that the claims against Charvaka of hedonism, lack of any morality and ethics and disregard for spirituality is from texts of competing religious philosophies (Buddhism, Jainism and Hinduism). Its primary sources, along with commentaries by Charvaka scholars, are missing or lost. This reliance on indirect sources raises the question of reliability and whether there was a bias and exaggeration in representing the views of Charvakas. Bhattacharya points out that multiple manuscripts are inconsistent, with key passages alleging hedonism and immorality missing in many manuscripts of the same text.[69]

The Skhalitapramathana Yuktihetusiddhi by Āryadevapāda, in a manuscript found in Tibet, discusses the Charvaka philosophy, but attributes a theistic claim to Charvakas - that happiness in this life, and the only life, can be attained by worshiping gods and defeating demons. Toso posits that as Charvaka philosophy's views spread and were widely discussed, non-Charvakas such as Āryadevapāda added certain points of view that may not be of the Charvakas'.[78]

Buddhists, Jains, Advaita Vedantins and Nyāya philosophers considered the Charvakas as one of their opponents and tried to refute their views. These refutations are indirect sources of Charvaka philosophy. The arguments and reasoning approaches Charvakas deployed were so significant that they continued to be referred to, even after all the authentic Charvaka/Lokāyata texts had been lost. However, the representation of the Charvaka thought in these works is not always firmly grounded in first-hand knowledge of Charvaka texts and should be viewed critically.[44]

Likewise, states Bhattacharya, the charge of hedonism against Charvaka might have been exaggerated.[69] Countering the argument that the Charvakas opposed all that was good in the Vedic tradition, Riepe 1964, p. 75 states, "It may be said from the available material that Cārvākas hold truth, integrity, consistency, and freedom of thought in the highest esteem."

Influence on Europe and China

[edit]

According to reports, the Europeans were surprised by the openness and rational doubts of the Mughal emperor Akbar and the Indians. In Pierre De Jarric's Histoire (1610), based on the Jesuit reports, the Mughal emperor is compared to an atheist himself: "Thus we see in this Prince the common fault of the atheist, who refuses to make reason subservient to faith (...)"[79]

Hannah Chapelle Wojciehowski writes this concerning the Jesuit descriptions in the paper "East-West Swerves: Cārvāka Materialism and Akbar's Religious Debates at Fatehpur Sikri" (2015):

...The information they sent back to Europe was disseminated widely in both Catholic and Protestant countries (...) A more detailed understanding of Indian philosophies, including Cārvāka, began to emerge in Jesuit missionary writings by the early to mid-seventeenth century.[80]

The Jesuit Roberto De Nobili wrote in 1613 that the "Logaidas" (Lokayatas) "hold the view that the elements themselves are god". Some decades later, Heinrich Roth, who studied Sanskrit in Agra ca. 1654–60, translated the Vedantasara by the influential Vedantic commentator Sadananda (14th). This text depicts four different schools of the Carvaka philosophies.

Wojciehowski notes: "Rather than proclaiming a Cārvāka renaissance in Akbar's court, it would be safer to suggest that the ancient school of materialism never really went away."

In Classical Indian Philosophy (2020), by Peter Adamson and Jonardon Ganeri, they mention a lecture by Henry T. Coolebrooke in 1827 on the schools of the Carvaka/Lokayata materialists.[81] Adamson and Ganeri compare the Carvakas to the "emergentism in the philosophy of mind," which is traced back to John Stuart Mill.

They write that Mill "sounds like a follower of Brhaspati, founder of the Cārvāka system, when he writes in his System of Logic that 'All organised bodies are composed of parts, similar to those composing inorganic nature (...)'"

The historian of ideas Dag Herbjørnsrud has pointed out that the Charvaka schools influenced China: "This Indian-Chinese materialist connection is documented in a little-known but groundbreaking paper by professor Huang Xinchuan, "Lokayata and Its Influence in China," published in Chinese in 1978 (English version in the quarterly journal Social Sciences in March 1981). Xinchuan, a senior researcher at the China Academy of Social Science, demonstrates how the Indian Lokāyata schools exercised an influence on ancient Chinese over the centuries. He lists 62 classical texts in China that refer to these Indian material-atheistic schools, from the Brahmajala Sutra translated by Zhi Qian (Chih Chien, 223–253), of the Kingdom of Wu, to An Explanation for Brahmajala Sutra written by Ji Guang (Chi-kuang, 1528–1588) of the Ming Dynasty. In addition, Xinchuan mentions four texts on Lokayata in Chinese by Japanese Buddhist writers."[79]

Xinchuan's paper explains how the Buddhists regarded the Lokayatikas as fellow-travellers of the Confucian and the Taoist Schools, and how they launched an attack on them because of their materialistic views. Xinchuan cites, as also Rasik Vihari Joshi noted in 1987, dozens of texts where Chinese classical works describe Lokayata either as "Shi-Jian-Xing" ("doctrine prevailing in the world"), "Wu-Hou-Shi-Lun" ("doctrine of denying after-life"), or refers to "Lu-Ka-Ye-Jin" (the "Lokāyata Sutra").[citation needed]

Commentators

[edit]

Aviddhakarṇa, Bhavivikta, Kambalasvatara, Purandara and Udbhatabhatta are the five commentators who developed the Carvaka/Lokayata system in various ways.[82][83]

Influence

[edit]
  • Dharmakirti, a 7th-century philosopher deeply influenced by Carvaka philosophy wrote in Pramanvartik.[84]
  • Pyrrho[citation needed]
  • The influence of this heterodox doctrine is seen in other spheres of Indian thought.

Organisations

[edit]
  • The Charvaka Ashram founded by Boddu Ramakrishna in 1973 has stood the test of time and continues to further the cause of the rationalist movement.[85]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Charvaka, also known as Lokayata, is an ancient Indian school of materialist that recognizes only direct as a valid means of knowledge (), rejects and verbal unless empirically confirmed, and asserts that reality consists solely of the four material elements—earth, water, fire, and air—without any or spiritual dimensions. emerges as a byproduct of the specific combination of these elements in living organisms, particularly through the body's sensory and physiological processes, denying the existence of an independent or . Ethically, it espouses , positing pleasure () derived from sensory experiences as the ultimate good, with no obligation to moral duties imposed by karma, , or divine commands, famously encapsulated in the maxim to "live joyously while lasts, even if by incurring ." Emerging around the 6th century BCE amid critiques of Vedic ritualism and Brahmanical , Charvaka represented an early form of against orthodox religious structures, viewing priestly interpretations of scriptures as mechanisms for rather than truth. Attributed to figures like Ajita Kesakambalin and possibly formalized in the lost Bṛhaspati Sūtra, its doctrines survive primarily in fragments quoted by adversaries in Buddhist, Jain, and , underscoring its classification as a nāstika (heterodox) system marginalized by spiritualist traditions. This empirical contributed to proto-scientific attitudes by prioritizing observable over unverified metaphysical claims, though its hedonistic emphasis drew accusations of promoting and from rival schools.

Terminology

Etymology of Charvaka

The term Charvaka (Sanskrit: Cārvāka, चार्वाक) derives from ancient Indian linguistic roots, though its precise remains debated among scholars. One prominent interpretation links it to the roots cāru ("agreeable" or "pleasing") and vāk ("speech"), yielding "agreeable speech" or, in a sense, "sweet-tongued," implying persuasive or hedonistic often associated with the school's emphasis on sensory enjoyment. An alternative derivation traces Cārvāka to carva, meaning "to chew" or "to grind with the teeth," suggesting "entertaining speech" that metaphorically evokes the savoring of material pleasures, aligning with the philosophy's materialist doctrines. This may reflect critics' views of the school as promoting indulgence, as noted in classical commentaries. Some traditions posit that Charvaka was the proper name of the school's founding philosopher, akin to how other Indian darśanas are named after eponymous figures, though no surviving texts confirm a historical individual by this name. The association with Lokayata ("world-based" or "materialist") further underscores the term's focus on empirical reality over metaphysical speculation, but Charvaka appears in texts like the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha ( CE) as a synonym emphasizing rhetorical or existential aspects.

Association with Lokayata

The terms Cārvāka and Lokayata are historically synonymous in denoting the ancient Indian school of , with Lokayata literally translating from as "that which is prevalent among the " (loka meaning "world" or "," and āyata meaning "based on" or "prevalent"). This nomenclature reflects the school's emphasis on empirical observation of the observable world, rejecting metaphysical speculations about the unseen or as unverifiable. Scholarly analyses treat Lokayata as the broader designation for the materialist tradition, while Cārvāka may derive from a legendary founder or eponymous sage, possibly implying "agreeable speech" or, pejoratively, "sweet-tongued" used by its proponents to critique Vedic orthodoxy. No original Lokayata texts survive, and knowledge of the school comes primarily from critiques by orthodox opponents like the Mimamsa and traditions, which often lump Cārvāka doctrines under Lokayata as a unified heterodox system denying karma, rebirth, and ritual efficacy. These accounts portray Lokayata as grounded in direct perception (pratyakṣa) as the sole valid (means of knowledge), with limited only for practical worldly affairs, aligning seamlessly with Cārvāka's rejection of for transcendent realms. The association underscores a shared core tenet: reality comprises only the four gross elements (earth, water, fire, air), from which consciousness emerges as an epiphenomenon without enduring or . While some interpretations suggest Lokayata might encompass pre-Cārvāka folk materialist currents, historical evidence indicates the terms converged by the early centuries CE, with Cārvāka often serving as the philosophical label in polemical literature. This equivalence persists in modern scholarship, which reconstructs the school as a consistent empiricist-materialist framework rather than disparate strands, cautioning against over-differentiating based on fragmentary references.

Historical Context

Origins and Earliest Attestations

The Charvaka school, alternatively termed Lokayata, originated in ancient amid the sramana movement of wandering ascetics, paralleling the rise of around the 6th century BCE. This materialist tradition rejected Vedic authority and supernatural entities, emphasizing empirical perception and worldly existence, though its precise inception remains inferred from later references rather than direct foundational documents. Scholarly analysis places its formative development in the post-Vedic intellectual ferment, where anti-ritualistic and this-worldly views challenged Brahmanical orthodoxy. Earliest attestations of Lokayata doctrines appear in Buddhist literature circa 500 BCE, where the term denoted prevalent folk philosophies and ascetic outlooks focused on the tangible world, distinct from transcendental pursuits. In the Pali Canon's , specifically the (discourse on the fruits of the contemplative life), the philosopher Ajita Kesakambalin—regarded as a pioneering materialist—articulates core tenets to King Ajātasattu, denying agency in karma, rebirth, or afterlife, and attributing all phenomena to the four elements (earth, water, fire, air). This text, rooted in oral traditions from the 5th century BCE and committed to writing by the 3rd century BCE, represents the oldest preserved exposition of such views, portraying Ajita as a contemporary of (c. 563–483 BCE). Parallel references emerge in early Jain scriptures, including the Sūtrakṛtāṅga and Bhagavatī Sūtra, which critique Lokayata-like as one of several heterodox positions lacking scriptural validity or metaphysical depth. These texts, compiled between the 4th and 3rd centuries BCE, highlight Lokayata's association with denial of unseen realities and reliance on direct (pratyakṣa), positioning it as a foil to Jain emphasis on multiple viewpoints (anekāntavāda). No primary Lokayata compositions survive, with knowledge derived exclusively from adversarial accounts in sramana and later Brahmanical sources, underscoring the school's marginalization by dominant traditions. Attributions to a mythical founder, Bṛhaspati, and the eponymous Cārvāka appear in retrospective Epic-period texts like the Mahābhārata (c. 400 BCE–400 CE), linking the school to pre-sramanic skepticism in the Vedic era (c. 1500–500 BCE), but such claims lack empirical corroboration beyond poetic or polemical contexts. Vedic hymns occasionally evince rudimentary materialistic undertones, such as queries on cosmic origins without divine intervention (Ṛgveda 10.129), yet these predate formalized Lokayata by centuries and do not constitute direct attestation. The absence of indigenous artifacts or inscriptions further limits reconstruction to textual critiques, revealing Charvaka's influence as pervasive yet systematically suppressed in surviving records.

Key Proponents and Chronological Development

The Charvaka school, synonymous with Lokayata, traces its materialist roots to the (c. 1500–300 BCE), where early skeptical ideas against Vedic ritualism and moral causation are attributed to Bṛhaspati, traditionally regarded as the foundational figure and purported author of the lost Bṛhaspati Sūtra. This attribution, however, rests on fragmentary quotations preserved in later orthodox texts rather than direct evidence, highlighting the challenges in verifying proponent identities amid the absence of primary sources. Around 600–500 BCE, during the of , emerged as a prominent early advocate of , rejecting notions of , karma, and in favor of empirical observation of the physical world composed of four elements (, , , air). His views, documented in Buddhist texts like the Samaññaphala Sutta, align closely with core Charvaka tenets and mark the school's transition from latent skepticism to a more articulated heterodox system contemporaneous with . In the subsequent Epic period (c. 200 BCE–200 CE), Charvaka doctrines formalized further, integrating conditional inference alongside direct perception as epistemological tools while critiquing unseen entities like gods or rebirth; this evolution is inferred from embedded critiques in epics such as the and early texts. The school, often unnamed proponents beyond foundational figures, emphasized hedonistic grounded in sensory experience, but its and lack of institutional support left it vulnerable to misrepresentation in adversarial Brahmanical literature. By the early medieval era, references persist in Jain works like Haribhadra's Saddarsanasamuccaya (c. CE), portraying Lokayata as denying and samsara, yet the school showed signs of decline amid rising Vedantic dominance and Islamic incursions. Last substantive mentions occur in Madhava's Sarvadarshanasangraha (c. CE), after which Charvaka effectively vanished from active discourse, surviving regionally in southern until around the 14th century but without identifiable later thinkers or textual revivals. The paucity of endogenous records, reliance on opponents' accounts, and cultural pressures favoring theistic schools likely contributed to its .

Philosophical Foundations

Epistemology: Pratyaksha and Limited Inference

Charvaka epistemology centers on pratyaksha (direct perception via the senses) as the sole independent and authoritative pramana (means of valid knowledge), asserting that all cognition must derive from empirical sensory data without mediation by abstract reasoning or authority. Proponents maintained that perception provides immediate, unerring access to material reality, encompassing the four elements—earth, water, fire, and air—while dismissing any knowledge claims not grounded in observable phenomena. This empiricist stance precluded acceptance of transcendental or unseen entities, as verification required tangible sensory encounter. Inference (anumana) receives limited endorsement, functioning only as a derivative tool when direct perception is infeasible, provided it rests on repeated perceptual observations establishing a conditional linkage between sign (linga) and signified (lingin). The paradigmatic case involves deducing fire's presence from smoke, justified by consistent empirical conjunctions where smoke has invariably accompanied visible fire, yet this holds no warrant for extrapolating to imperceptible instances or universal laws absent exhaustive sensory confirmation. Charvakas rejected standalone inference as prone to fallacy, arguing that establishing vyapti (invariable concomitance) presupposes the very inferential process it seeks to validate, engendering circularity or regress. This delimited role for underscores Charvaka's toward orthodox schools' expansive use of anumana to affirm metaphysical postulates like karma or , which lack perceptual backing and thus devolve into . By subordinating to , the system prioritizes causal explanations rooted in observable interactions among elements, eschewing hypotheticals that transcend sensory bounds. Critics from and other traditions countered that such restriction undermines practical cognition, but Charvakas upheld it as safeguarding against illusory knowledge derived from unverified analogies.

Metaphysics: Elemental Materialism and Denial of the Unseen

Charvaka metaphysics posits that the universe consists solely of four gross elements— (pṛthvī), (ap), fire (tejas), and air (vāyu)—which combine in various proportions to form all observable phenomena, without invoking any subtle or transcendent principles. These elements are directly perceptible through the senses, serving as the foundational building blocks of reality, and their interactions account for the diversity of material forms, from inanimate objects to living organisms. Unlike Vedic traditions that include a fifth element, (ākāśa), Charvakas reject it as imperceptible and thus unreal, emphasizing that only empirically verifiable constituents constitute existence. This elemental framework extends to biological processes, where the body's vital functions arise from the specific admixture of these elements, precluding any non-material agency. Central to this materialism is the view that consciousness (caitanya) emerges as a byproduct of the combination of the four elements within the physical body, analogous to how intoxication arises from the fermentation of ingredients like molasses, water, and yeast, none of which individually possess the emergent property. Consciousness is not an independent, eternal substance but a contingent state tied to the body's integrity; it dissipates upon the body's decomposition, as the elemental combination dissolves. This emergentist account denies dualistic notions of mind or soul separate from matter, reducing mental phenomena to physiological processes observable through direct perception (pratyakṣa). Critics from orthodox schools, such as Nyaya, later challenged this by arguing that elemental combinations alone cannot explain qualia or self-awareness without invoking unseen causes, but Charvakas countered that postulating such entities violates empirical constraints. The denial of the adṛśya (unseen or imperceptible) forms the cornerstone of Charvaka's rejection of supernaturalism, encompassing entities like the soul (ātman), deities (iśvara), afterlife realms (svarga or naraka), and the transmigratory effects of karma, all of which lack sensory verification. Charvakas argue that claims about these rely on inference (anumāna) extrapolated beyond perceptible correlates, which is inherently fallible—fire may invariably accompany smoke in observed cases, but unseen cosmic fires cannot be confirmed similarly. Consequently, Vedic hymns and rituals promising otherworldly rewards are dismissed as priestly fabrications designed for material gain, with no causal efficacy beyond psychological or social effects. This stance prioritizes causal explanations grounded in observable interactions of elements, eschewing teleological or divine interventions as unverifiable hypotheses that complicate rather than clarify reality. While some interpretations attribute a qualified acceptance of inference for practical predictions (e.g., inferring unseen but elemental processes like digestion), it is strictly limited to domains with perceptual analogs, barring metaphysical extrapolations.

Ethics: Sensory Pleasure as the Highest Good

In philosophy, the ethical framework centers on the pursuit of sensory (kāma) as the sole intrinsic good and ultimate goal of human existence, dismissing traditional Vedic aims like (dharma), wealth (artha) for its own sake, or liberation (mokṣa). This hedonistic stance derives from the school's materialist metaphysics, which denies any postmortem existence or rewards, rendering transcendental pursuits meaningless since ceases with bodily . Adherents argued that ethical actions should maximize immediate sensory gratification, as evidenced by the maxim: "While life remains, let a man live happily; let him feed on even though he runs in debt; when once the body becomes ashes, how can it return again?"—a verse preserved in later critiques but attributed to Charvaka doctrine. This view rejects and obligations, viewing them as impediments to enjoyment imposed by unverifiable religious claims. Wealth () holds value only instrumentally, as a means to facilitate through resources like , , and sensual experiences, rather than as an end in itself or tied to moral duty. Charvakas emphasized empirical discernment in pleasure-seeking: short-term indulgences yielding long-term pain (e.g., overindulgence leading to illness) should be avoided, favoring calculated that sustains vitality for ongoing sensory fulfillment. Critics from orthodox schools, such as Mimamsa and , later portrayed this as crude , but Charvaka texts, as reconstructed from fragments, framed it as rational realism grounded in observable human drives. The school's thus promoted a this-worldly , encouraging individuals to exploit material conditions for without deference to divine or karmic consequences. This positioned Charvaka in opposition to Brahmanical ideals of self-restraint, advocating instead for unencumbered pursuit of tastes, sounds, touches, forms, and scents as the pinnacles of value. Historical attestations in texts like the Sarva-Darśana-Saṃgraha () confirm this focus, attributing to Lokayata (synonymous with Charvaka) the that " is the highest good" amid a finite lifespan.

Specific Doctrines

Consciousness and Rejection of Soul or Afterlife

Charvaka doctrine posited that consciousness (caitanya) arises solely from the material aggregation of the body's four elements—earth, water, fire, and air—without requiring an immaterial soul (atman). This emergent property manifests when these elements combine in specific configurations, enabling sensory perception and cognition, much as the intoxicating quality of liquor emerges from the non-intoxicating fermentation of ingredients like jaggery, water, and husk. Proponents rejected Vedic claims of a transcendent self surviving bodily death, arguing that no empirical evidence supports an independent soul, as all observed mental states correlate directly with physiological processes perceivable through direct sense experience (pratyaksha). The absence of a implied the finality of as complete of , denying , karma's transmigratory effects, or any posthumous . Charvakas dismissed inferences (anumana) about unseen entities like heavens or hells as speculative, insisting that only tangible, perceptible realities warrant acceptance; thus, ethical conduct need not anticipate otherworldly rewards or punishments. This stance contrasted sharply with orthodox schools like and , which posited an eternal atman as the substratum of , but Charvakas countered that such views rely on unverified scriptural testimony (sabda), which they invalidated as a . Reconstructed Charvaka sutras, preserved fragmentarily in critics' works such as Madhava's Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha (c. CE), encapsulate this : "The is nothing but the body characterized by ," emphasizing epiphenomenal over dualistic . Empirical analogies underscored their causal realism, as dissipates with bodily decomposition, akin to intoxication vanishing once ingredients separate, rendering doctrines causally implausible absent direct .

Critique of Vedic Rituals and Religious Authority

Charvakas rejected the authority of the Vedas, asserting that these texts were human inventions composed by poets and priests for personal gain rather than divine revelation. They argued that the Vedas' claims of ritual efficacy, such as sacrifices ensuring heavenly rewards or averting misfortune, lacked empirical verification through direct perception (pratyakṣa), the sole valid pramāṇa they accepted. Attributed verses in the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha of Mādhava (14th century) encapsulate this view: "The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetics in the stage of the vānaprastha, drinking [the soma juice], and sacrifices, these are but the inventions of the Brāhmaṇa priests for the sake of their own livelihood." This critique portrayed Vedic rituals as a mechanism for economic exploitation, where priests extracted offerings under false promises of supernatural outcomes unobservable in this world. Further, Charvakas highlighted internal inconsistencies in Vedic texts to undermine their , noting contradictions in prescriptions and mythological accounts that suggested composition by fallible humans rather than an eternal, omniscient source. A quoted verse attributes to them: "The three authors of the were buffoons, knaves, and demons. All the rest were knaves who made a living by cheating the people with the help of the ." They mocked specific practices like animal sacrifices, questioning: if a beast slain in yajña attains , why not slaughter one's own parents to expedite their , thereby exposing the of inferring unseen benefits from visible acts. Such arguments emphasized causal realism, insisting that only perceivable material processes govern outcomes, not ritualistic invocations. This dismissal extended to religious authority figures, including priests and gurus, whom Charvakas accused of perpetuating to maintain social dominance and material benefits. They contended that derived from Vedic injunctions was illusory, serving only to enforce obedience without tangible proof of moral or cosmic efficacy. Accounts preserved in opponent texts like the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha—written from an perspective—thus transmit these critiques, though potentially amplified for refutation; nonetheless, the consistency across multiple orthodox sources, including Buddhist and Jain polemics, suggests core elements reflect genuine Lokayata positions. By privileging sensory evidence over scriptural testimony, Charvakas advocated empirical scrutiny of religious claims, anticipating modern toward unverified assertions.

Implications for Governance and Society

Charvaka's rejection of supernatural foundations for and metaphysics extended to , prioritizing material prosperity and sensory enjoyment over ritualistic or caste-based hierarchies. By denying the authority of the and concepts like dharma rooted in unseen realms, adherents advocated a pragmatic social framework where norms derived from observable human needs rather than divine mandates, potentially fostering and empirical evaluation of communal practices. This outlook critiqued priestly influence and ascetic ideals, promoting material well-being as a collective good achievable through rational pursuit of artha (wealth) and kāma (pleasure), though primarily justified by rather than inherent social duty. Reconstructions from opponent texts suggest Charvaka opposed divisions, arguing against their divine origins and emphasizing the equal elemental composition of all humans, which implied egalitarian leanings in social roles and anti-discrimination stances, including against . Such views challenged hierarchical structures tied to religious , potentially influencing marginalized groups by validating empirical critiques of over scriptural justifications for inequality. However, these interpretations rely on fragmentary references in adversarial sources, as original texts are lost, introducing interpretive risks from biased portrayals. Social cooperation, in this schema, emerged not from karmic obligations but from mutual benefits, with individuals contributing to society only insofar as it enhanced personal security and enjoyment. In , Charvaka positioned the earthly as the supreme arbiter of right and wrong, supplanting any notion of a divine and grounding political in worldly rather than Vedic sanction. The state served instrumental purposes, such as protecting and enabling pleasurable living, aligning with as a valid pursuit unencumbered by or ritual expenditures. This pragmatic realism, echoed in attributions like viewing Vedic lore as a "" for practical worldly strategies, implied support for monarchical or authoritative rule focused on empirical outcomes like stability and , without moral imperatives from unseen forces. Critics later portrayed this as egoistic, potentially undermining broader welfare, yet it underscored a secular, utility-based resistant to theocratic elements.

Criticisms from Orthodox Schools

Challenges to Epistemological Validity

Orthodox Indian philosophical schools, particularly and , challenged the Cārvāka restriction of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) to direct perception (pratyakṣa) alone, arguing that it fails to account for reliable of unperceived entities essential to empirical and theoretical understanding. epistemologists contended that perception is inherently limited to immediate sensory contact with particulars, rendering it insufficient for grasping universals, causal relations, or predictive inferences, such as deducing the presence of from when the fire itself is not directly observed. This limitation, they asserted, undermines practical reasoning and scientific inquiry, as everyday activities like or rely on inferential links between observed signs and unseen effects, which Cārvāka cannot validate without ad hoc exceptions. Critics further highlighted the internal inconsistency in Cārvāka's qualified acceptance of "limited " (anumāna) grounded solely in repeated perceptual correlations, pointing out that establishing invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between a middle term (e.g., ) and major term (e.g., ) requires inductive beyond finite perceptions, which itself presupposes inferential validity—a concession that erodes the school's foundational rejection of anumāna as an independent pramāṇa. Mīmāṃsā thinkers, emphasizing Vedic (śabda), argued that perception's subjectivity and proneness to (e.g., mirages or optical errors) demands corroboration from and authoritative verbal sources to achieve epistemic , without which Cārvāka reduces to solipsistic immediacy incapable of refuting rival metaphysical claims or sustaining ethical norms. These epistemological critiques extended to broader implications for materialist , as the of non-perceptual pramāṇas precludes for unseen entities like atoms or karma posited by Vaiśeṣika and , forcing Cārvāka into skepticism about causal explanations beyond momentary sense data, which orthodox schools viewed as empirically inadequate given patterns of regularity in nature. Despite Cārvāka's emphasis on empirical directness to avoid speculative error, detractors maintained that such sacrifices , as demonstrated by 's formalized syllogisms (anumāna), which integrate with logical structure to yield verifiable predictions unattainable through alone.

Rebuttals on Metaphysical and Ethical Grounds

Orthodox schools such as and rebutted Cārvāka's metaphysical denial of the , , and supernatural causation by upholding anumāna () as a valid for establishing unseen entities, arguing that observable effects like persistent suffering across apparent life continuities imply underlying causation (karma) and an enduring beyond physical elements. philosophers, including Udayana in the Nyāyakusumāñjali, countered Cārvāka's reliance on nonapprehension to prove absence by demonstrating that simple lack of perception does not negate existence, as from effects (e.g., implying ) extends reliably to unperceived causes like the ātman, without which explanations for or ethical disparities remain inadequate. thinkers like defended the eternality and apauruṣeya (authorless) nature of the as śabda-pramāṇa, refuting materialist reduction of reality to four elements by positing Vedic testimony's intrinsic validity for unseen ritual potencies (apūrva), which produce effects beyond sensory verification. Advaita Vedānta, as articulated in Madhava's Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha (c. ), positioned Cārvāka at the base of philosophical ascent, critiquing its elemental as illusory ignorance (avidyā) that obscures the non-dual , with empirical perception limited to māyā-bound phenomena rather than . These rebuttals emphasized causal realism, where denying unseen agencies fails to account for ordered cosmic processes or individual moral outcomes, contrasting Cārvāka's perceptual with broader pramāṇas validated through logical consistency and scriptural coherence. On ethical grounds, orthodox critiques targeted Cārvāka's —positing sensory pleasure (kāma) as the —as shortsighted and self-defeating, arguing it disregards long-term pains from unchecked desires and ignores dharma's unseen rewards, which sustain societal order and personal welfare beyond immediate gratification. responded by invoking Vedic rituals' apūrva as causal mechanisms yielding deferred benefits, superior to transient pleasures, while Nyāya highlighted ethical inconsistencies in materialist denial of karma, where observed inequalities in fortune necessitate retributive principles for . Vedānta Deśika in Viśiṣṭādvaita works further exposed practical disloyalty in Cārvāka adherents, who pursue actions implying unseen ends despite doctrinal rejection, underscoring hedonism's inadequacy for coherent . These arguments prioritized rooted in scriptural and inferential realism over perceptual , viewing Cārvāka's framework as undermining social cohesion and ultimate liberation (mokṣa).

Textual References and Preservation

Mentions in Epics and Puranas

In the Mahabharata's Shanti Parva (Book 12, Chapter 39), a rakshasa named Charvaka disguises himself as a Brahmin to approach Yudhishthira shortly after the Kurukshetra War, during the Pandavas' return to Hastinapura. Posing as a representative of ascetics, he accuses Yudhishthira of adharma for slaying kinsmen, questioning the efficacy of Vedic rituals and the afterlife, and advocating a hedonistic focus on sensory pleasures in this world alone—views aligned with Lokayata materialism. Krishna recognizes the impostor and invokes Agni, incinerating Charvaka with a divine flame, after which the assembly reaffirms orthodox dharma. This episode portrays Charvaka philosophy not as a human sage but as demonic deception, underscoring early textual hostility toward materialist skepticism. The reflects Lokayata-like ideas through the advisor in the Kanda (Sarga 66-109), who urges to renounce exile by arguing that Vedic injunctions yield no verifiable fruits, that the world is self-existent without causation, and that rational pursuit of kingship and trumps ritualistic . counters by condemning such "Charvaka" doctrines as deviations from truth, insisting on fidelity to paternal vows and Vedic authority for cosmic order. Later in Sarga 109, explicitly denounces proponents of Charvaka as infidels who stray from righteous paths, equating their rejection of and scripture with ethical peril. These passages embed materialist critiques within conflicts, resolved in favor of , without naming a foundational Charvaka figure. Puranic references to Lokayata or Charvaka are sporadic and polemical, often linking the school to as its purported sutrakara while decrying its denial of transcendent realities. The alludes to Barhaspatya (Brihaspati's) teachings as worldly materialism, contrasting it with devotional paths. Similarly, the mentions Lokayata amid enumerations of philosophical views, portraying it as a transient, sense-bound error eclipsed by Vishnu's grace. These texts, compiled between the 3rd and 10th centuries CE, preserve no systematic Charvaka doctrines but use the label to warn against , reflecting the school's marginalization in post-epic literature.

Accounts in Opposing Philosophical Works

The surviving descriptions of Charvaka doctrines derive predominantly from refutations in opposing philosophical traditions, including the astika schools of , Mimamsa, and , as well as nastika systems like , which preserved fragments amid critiques of their perceived epistemological narrowness and metaphysical denialism. These accounts portray Charvaka (or Lokayata) as restricting valid knowledge () to direct (pratyaksha) alone, rejecting (anumana) unless invariably linked to observed concomitance and verbal testimony () as unreliable due to potential or human fabrication. Opponents argue this stance undermines practical reasoning, as Charvakas implicitly rely on in everyday judgments, such as predicting fire's from , exposing an inconsistency between theory and application. In the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha (c. CE), attributed to the Advaita Vedantin Madhava, the initial chapter on Charvaka encapsulates their ontology as composed of four tangible elements—, , , and air—excluding ether () as imperceptible, with arising transiently from their conjunction, akin to giddiness from fermented ingredients or a red hue from mixing leaf, lime, and . The text attributes to them the rejection of an independent soul (atman), , or karma, positing that death extinguishes awareness like a lamp's , and dismisses Vedic rituals as priestly inventions for profit, advocating instead the pursuit of sensory pleasures while endures. This summary, though framed adversarially to highlight absurdities like unverifiable ethical norms without transcendence, aligns with recurrent motifs in earlier critiques. Nyaya texts, commencing with Gautama's Nyaya Sutras (c. BCE), systematically refute Charvaka materialism by defending inference's autonomy; for instance, they challenge the claim that is merely a bodily epiphenomenon by noting its persistence or alteration in states like fainting or dreamless sleep, where physical composition remains unchanged yet awareness varies, implying a non-material substrate. Vatsyayana's commentary (c. 4th century CE) extends this to argue that denying unseen causes, such as or divine order, commits the of arguing from ignorance—"the soul is unperceived" does not entail "the soul does not exist"—and renders moral accountability incoherent without continuity beyond the body. Mimamsa authors, notably Kumarila Bhatta in his Shlokavarttika (c. CE), assail the dismissal of by upholding Vedic testimony as an independent for apprehending ritual outcomes and , which transcend sensory grasp; they contend Charvaka's perception-only criterion fails to justify social obligations or cosmic efficacy, reducing ethics to transient gratification. Vedanta critiques, as in Shankara's Brahma Sutra Bhashya (c. 8th century CE), integrate these by subordinating to non-dual , portraying Lokayata as myopic for conflating empirical aggregates with . Buddhist epistemologists like Dignaga (c. 5th century CE) and Dharmakirti (c. 7th century CE) counter Lokayata's elemental eternalism with doctrine of momentariness, refuting stable materialism via inference from impermanence in perceived changes, while deeming their hedonism incompatible with dukkha's universality. Jain works, such as those by Hemacandra (c. 12th century CE), depict Charvakas as neglecting jiva (soul) and karma's binding, leading to a worldview devoid of ethical causation and liberation, often citing their views to affirm multi-pramana validity including inference for unobservable entities. These representations, while biased toward orthodoxy, provide coherent doctrinal outlines corroborated across traditions, underscoring Charvaka's emphasis on empirical verifiability over speculative metaphysics.

Decline and Reconstruction

Loss of Original Texts

No complete primary texts of the Charvaka (Lokayata) school survive, with the foundational Brhaspati Sutra—attributed to the sage Brhaspati and regarded as the core doctrinal work—having been lost by at least the early medieval period. This absence extends to other purported Charvaka compositions, leaving the philosophy reliant on indirect evidence from adversarial sources. The loss likely stems from the school's marginalization amid the dominance of Vedic-orthodox traditions, which lacked institutional mechanisms like lineages or monastic copying to sustain heterodox manuscripts, unlike the preserved sutras of or Mimamsa. Fragmentary quotations preserved in refutative works by Buddhist, Jain, and Brahmanical authors provide the primary basis for reconstruction, numbering around 50-60 verses and prose passages scattered across texts like Madhava's Sarvadarshanasangraha ( CE) and Haribhadra's Sad-darshana-samuccaya ( CE). These excerpts, often polemically framed, emphasize (pratyaksha) as the sole and reject or scriptural authority, but their authenticity is debated due to potential distortions by critics aiming to . Scholarly compilations, such as those by D.R. Shastri in the and later expanded by Ramkrishna Bhattacharya, have cataloged these survivals, identifying verse fragments like "The is but the body organized / The fivefold senses are its instruments" from anonymous Charvaka attributions. The scarcity of originals hampers definitive interpretation, as secondary accounts may conflate Charvaka with folk or exaggerate hedonistic elements to discredit it, underscoring the challenge of verifying doctrines without unmediated access. Efforts at philological recovery continue, but the textual void reflects broader historical patterns where non-conformist Indian philosophies faded without , contrasting with the archival endurance of elite-sanctioned systems.

Debates on Source Reliability

The absence of surviving primary texts from the Charvaka school renders its doctrines known almost exclusively through summaries and critiques in works by opposing philosophical traditions, including Brahmanical texts like Madhava's Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha (c. CE) and Buddhist or Jain polemics. These secondary accounts, compiled by adversaries committed to Vedic , , and metaphysical realism, systematically portray Charvaka as crudely hedonistic and epistemologically naive, potentially exaggerating elements like unqualified rejection of to facilitate refutation. Scholars note that such representations exhibit a consistent , as orthodox authors had institutional incentives to discredit materialist that undermined efficacy and priestly , leading to debates over whether core tenets—such as perceptual and denial of —reflect authentic positions or caricatures designed for rhetorical dismissal. Reconstruction efforts, exemplified by Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya's Lokayata: A Study in Ancient Indian (1959), aggregate references from Vedic, Buddhist, and Jain sources to posit a coherent materialist framework, arguing that cross-traditional consistencies (e.g., critiques of unseen entities like karma) indicate underlying fidelity despite polemical framing. However, critics of this approach highlight Chattopadhyaya's reliance on , which may impose anachronistic economic interpretations on sparse fragments, potentially overlooking textual distortions. Ramkrishna Bhattacharya, in Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata (2011), addresses these issues by scrutinizing commentator fragments on the lost Carvakasutra, cautioning against uncritical acceptance of later summaries derived from earlier non-orthodox critiques, and advocating philological cross-verification to distinguish doctrinal kernels from accreted biases. Bhattacharya contends that while outright fabrication is unlikely given doctrinal uniformity across foes, orthodox summaries often amplify ethical critiques (e.g., equating with ) to align with dharma-centric worldviews. Contemporary historiography debates the extent of reliability, with some arguing that the very scarcity of pro-Charvaka defenses—attributable to cultural suppression of —necessitates cautious from opponent texts, treating them as adversarial mirrors rather than verbatim records. Peer-reviewed analyses emphasize that Jain and Buddhist sources, less invested in Vedic ritualism, occasionally preserve nuanced epistemological arguments (e.g., conditional acceptance of limited for practical ends), suggesting partial accuracy amid overall hostility. Yet, systemic underrepresentation in preserved literature implies that Charvaka's full sophistication, including potential advancements in sensory , remains irrecoverable, prompting calls for in attributions.

Later Historical Engagements

Encounters in the Mughal Period

During the reign of Mughal Emperor (r. 1556–1605), Charvaka (also known as Lokayata) philosophy experienced notable encounters through organized religious and philosophical debates at his court in . Akbar, seeking to explore diverse doctrines for administrative and intellectual purposes, established the Ibadatkhana (House of Worship) around 1575, where scholars from , , , , , and other traditions convened regularly. Adherents of Charvaka participated in these discussions, representing a rare documented resurgence of the school after centuries of marginalization by orthodox Hindu traditions. A key event occurred in 1578, when Akbar convened a of philosophers from various faiths, explicitly including Charvakas, to debate metaphysical and ethical questions such as the , the , and an . Court chronicler , in his (completed 1602), records Charvakas as atheists who denied immaterial substances, divine creation, and scriptural , emphasizing empirical and worldly instead. These participants challenged orthodox views on cosmology and karma, arguing from materialist premises that observable phenomena alone suffice for , though they did not prevail in the debates dominated by theistic schools. Abul Fazl's (c. 1590s), a detailed administrative , further references Charvakas among the empire's philosophical currents, portraying their literature as promoting and toward Vedic rituals, while deeming their worldview "unenlightened" in contrast to Akbar's syncretic Din-i-Ilahi. Jesuit observers at the court, such as those reporting in the 1580s, noted the presence of these materialists, whose ideas paralleled European and later influenced transmitted accounts to the West via missionary writings. Such engagements highlight Charvaka's persistence as a in Mughal intellectual discourse, though court records reflect a toward integrating rather than endorsing its rejection of . Later 17th-century texts like the Dabistan-i Mazahib (c. 1660) corroborate ongoing awareness of Charvaka ideas among Mughal-era thinkers, describing their non-dogmatic in encounters with Persian and Indian scholars.

European and Global Awareness

The earliest documented European references to Charvaka (also known as Lokayata) emerged in the 17th century through accounts by travelers interacting with Mughal intellectuals. French physician and philosopher , who resided in from 1656 to 1668, described the "Charvacs" as a rejecting the , the soul's , and divine origins of the world, portraying them as materialists who affirmed sensory perception as the sole valid knowledge source. Bernier's observations, derived from Persian and sources via court scholars, represented indirect transmission rather than direct textual analysis, reflecting limited primary access for Europeans at the time. Systematic European engagement intensified in the early amid British orientalist scholarship. , a prominent Indologist and president of of , delivered a lecture in 1827 detailing the materialist doctrines of the Carvaka/Lokayata school, including their rejection of , entities, and Vedic in favor of empirical alone. 's 1837 essay further elaborated on Hindu , drawing from secondary Indian philosophical critiques to outline Charvaka and [ethics](/page/E Ethics), though he noted the scarcity of original texts and reliance on orthodox opponents' accounts. These works marked the first scholarly framing of Charvaka as a distinct atheistic tradition comparable to , influencing subsequent Indological studies despite interpretive challenges from fragmented sources. Global awareness expanded in the through comparative and . Indian scholar Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya's 1959 monograph Lokayata: A Study in Ancient Indian synthesized available fragments into a comprehensive reconstruction, emphasizing Charvaka's and while critiquing idealist biases in prior Indian scholarship; this text gained international traction via translations and citations in Western academia. Post-independence Indian debates and global interest in non-Western atheism further disseminated Charvaka ideas, with parallels drawn to and modern in philosophical journals, though limitations persisted, confining analysis to doxographical evidence from and . By the late , Charvaka featured in broader discussions of ancient , as in Ramkrishna Bhattacharya's compilations of fragments, underscoring its role as an early rejection of metaphysical dualism.

Modern Interpretations and Legacy

Revival in 20th-Century Scholarship

The scholarly revival of , also known as Lokayata, in the centered on reconstructive efforts by Indian philosophers and historians drawing from fragmentary references in ancient orthodox texts, as no primary Lokayata works survive intact. This period saw a shift from incidental mentions in colonial-era toward systematic analyses emphasizing its materialist epistemology, which privileged direct perception (pratyakṣa) over inference, scripture, or supernatural testimony. A pivotal contribution came from (1918–1993), whose Lokayata: A Study in Ancient Indian was first published in 1959 by People's Publishing House. Chattopadhyaya, approaching the tradition through a Marxist lens, portrayed Charvaka as an early expression of rooted in empirical observation of the four elements (earth, water, fire, air) and rejecting metaphysical entities like the soul or , thereby framing it as a progressive counter to Vedic . His work, expanded from a doctoral , compiled over 400 quotations from sources such as the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha and , arguing for Lokayata's influence on later Indian skepticism despite priestly distortions in transmission. However, this interpretation has been critiqued for retrojecting 19th-century European onto sparse ancient evidence, potentially overstating continuities with modern amid ideological commitments to class-based historical analysis prevalent in post-independence Indian academia. Building on such foundations, Ramkrishna Bhattacharya advanced philological rigor starting in the mid-1990s, with essays challenging anachronistic views of Charvaka as mere or proto-utilitarianism. Bhattacharya's analyses, culminating in collections like Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata (2011 but drawing from 1990s research), identified pre-Carvaka materialist strands in texts like the Ṛgveda and Sāṃkhyakārikā, while documenting 18 core fragments on topics from as an emergent property of to . He emphasized the school's conditional acceptance of only when perceptionally verifiable, cautioning against overreliance on adversarial accounts from Brahmanical authors who caricatured Lokayata as indulgent (yāvat jīvet sukhaṃ jīvet). These efforts, grounded in rather than ideological reconstruction, spurred comparative studies linking Charvaka to global ancient materialisms, though debates persist on the extent of its doctrinal coherence given source polemics.

Influence on Contemporary Materialism and Skepticism

The materialist ontology of Cārvāka, which posits that reality consists solely of the four perceptible elements—earth, water, fire, and air—and denies the existence of immaterial entities such as souls or deities, exhibits parallels with contemporary physicalism in philosophy of mind, where mental states are viewed as emergent properties of physical processes without supernatural causation. Scholars like Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, in his 1959 analysis, interpreted Cārvāka's rejection of Vedic metaphysics as an embryonic form of scientific materialism, arguing that its emphasis on observable phenomena prefigures a naturalistic worldview aligned with empirical science over scriptural authority, though this reading reflects Chattopadhyaya's Marxist framework prioritizing dialectical historical materialism. Ramkrishna Bhattacharya further reconstructed Cārvāka's tenets from fragmented sources, underscoring its strict perceptual epistemology—which accepts only direct sense data as pramāṇa (valid knowledge) and dismisses inference unless corroborated by perception—as akin to modern empiricist skepticism toward untestable hypotheses. Cārvāka's hedonistic , advocating derived from sensory as the highest good while critiquing ritualistic expenditures as exploitative, resonates with secular utilitarian traditions that prioritize verifiable welfare over eschatological promises. This stance anticipates contemporary critiques of as mechanisms for , with Cārvāka's dismissal of karma and rebirth as unverifiable aligning with evidentialist arguments in against claims. Bhattacharya's textual studies, compiling over 500 fragments, reveal Cārvāka's systematic denial of inductive overreach, paralleling David Hume's and modern Bayesian , where probabilistic inferences are scrutinized absent empirical anchoring. In , Cārvāka has been invoked by rationalist movements as an indigenous antecedent to freethinking, with organizations tracing their advocacy for evidence-based inquiry and opposition to back to Lokāyata's materialist against Brahmanical . For instance, post-independence rationalists have cited Cārvāka to counter narratives of as inherently spiritual, positioning its as a native to pseudoscientific practices, though direct causal transmission remains limited due to textual losses. Globally, these doctrines inform discussions in comparative philosophy, where Cārvāka's atomistic proto-chemistry—positing from elemental combinations—is compared to , yet critiqued for lacking quantitative mechanisms absent in ancient contexts. Such evaluations highlight Cārvāka's enduring provocation to , challenging idealist hegemonies in both historical Indian thought and modern debates on .

Evaluations of Strengths and Limitations

Charvaka's epistemological commitment to pratyakṣa (direct perception) as the sole valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) underscores its strength in privileging over speculative or scriptural authority, thereby challenging dogmatic assertions in Vedic ritualism and promoting a grounded approach to observable through the senses. This anticipates modern by demanding demonstrable proof, rejecting unverifiable claims like karma or that lack sensory corroboration, and religious practices as distractions from tangible human welfare. Scholars note that this framework encouraged dissent against prevailing orthodoxies, positioning Charvaka as an early proponent of rational in ancient Indian thought. The philosophy's materialist , positing that arises from the combination of four elements (earth, water, fire, air) akin to intoxication from fermented ingredients, offers a causal explanation for mental phenomena without invoking entities, aligning with observable natural processes and avoiding dualistic metaphysics. This facilitates a focus on worldly , advocating enjoyment of life through ethical —pursuing refined pleasures while minimizing pain—over ascetic denial, which Charvakas viewed as counterproductive to human flourishing. Despite these merits, Charvaka's strict rejection of anumāna () severely limits its explanatory scope, as it cannot reliably account for non-immediate phenomena like fire's before contact or the continuity of memory, rendering the system inconsistent for predictive or essential to causal understanding. Critics from and other schools argued this solipsistic leads to absurdities, such as denying unseen causes in everyday correlations (e.g., implying ), which hampers broader scientific progress reliant on patterned . The hedonistic ethics, while pragmatic in rejecting otherworldly pursuits, promotes short-term sensory gratification without robust mechanisms for or deferred rewards, potentially fostering and social discord by equating virtue solely with pleasure maximization, absent considerations of or collective . Materialism's inability to fully explain emergent properties like or from elemental aggregates leaves unresolved tensions in accounting for subjective experience, inviting critiques of incompleteness against holistic realist frameworks.

References

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