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Personhood
Personhood
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Personhood is the status of having outstanding moral worth. Yet the specific criteria that qualify someone as a person are controversial. In the West, personhood tends to be defined in terms of "sophisticated cognitive capacities;" yet, in other societies, such as sub-Saharan Africa, personhood is more often understood as a relational process. Defining personhood is a controversial topic in philosophy and law and is closely tied with legal and political concepts of citizenship, equality, and liberty. According to law, only a legal person (either a natural or a juridical person) has rights, protections, privileges, responsibilities, and legal liability.[1]

Personhood continues to be a topic of international debate and has been questioned critically during the abolition of human and nonhuman slavery, in debates about abortion and in fetal rights and/or reproductive rights, in animal rights activism, in theology and ontology, in ethical theory, and in debates about corporate personhood, and the beginning of human personhood.[2] In the 21st century, corporate personhood is an existing Western concept; granting non-human entities personhood, which has also been referred to a "personhood movement", can bridge Western and Indigenous legal systems.[3]

Processes through which personhood is recognized socially and legally vary cross-culturally, demonstrating that notions of personhood might not be universal. Philosophers Nancy S. Jecker and Caesar A. Atuire have argued for a cross-border view of persons as emergent from social relational processes involving human beings. They write that a person "emerges out of a complex configuration of relationships involving human beings; we might say they become a ‘being-in-relationship.’ The emergent ‘being-in-relationship’ is a person, showing aspects, including superlative moral worth, not present before the relationships came together."[4] Anthropologist Beth Conklin has shown how personhood is tied to social relations among the Wari' people of Rondônia, Brazil.[5] Bruce Knauft's studies of the Gebusi people of Papua New Guinea depict a context in which individuals become persons incrementally, again through social relations.[6] Likewise, Jane C. Goodale has also examined the construction of personhood in Papua New Guinea.[7]

Philosophical definitions

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In philosophy, the word "person" may refer to various concepts. The concept of personhood is difficult to define in a way that is universally accepted, due to its historical and cultural variability and the controversies surrounding its use in some contexts. Capacities or attributes common to definitions of personhood can include human nature, agency, self-awareness, a notion of the past and future, and the possession of rights and duties, among others.[8]

Boethius, a philosopher of the early 6th century CE, gives the definition of "person" as "an individual substance of a rational nature" ("Naturæ rationalis individua substantia").[9]

According to the naturalist epistemological tradition, from Descartes through Locke and Hume, the term may designate any human or non-human agent who possesses continuous consciousness over time; and is therefore capable of framing representations about the world, formulating plans and acting on them.[8]

According to Charles Taylor, the problem with the naturalist view is that it depends solely on a "performance criterion" to determine what is an agent. Thus, other things (e.g. machines or animals) that exhibit "similarly complex adaptive behaviour" could not be distinguished from persons. Instead, Taylor proposes a significance-based view of personhood:

What is crucial about agents is that things matter to them. We thus cannot simply identify agents by a performance criterion, nor assimilate animals to machines... [likewise] there are matters of significance for human beings which are peculiarly human, and have no analogue with animals.

— Charles Taylor, "The Concept of a Person"[10]

Relatedly, Martin Heidegger developed his understanding of the distinctive kind of being which a person is as Dasein. The term's literal means an existence as a "being-there" or "there-being." Heidegger writes that, "Dasein itself has a special distinctiveness as compared with other entities; [...] it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it."[11] For Heidegger, the way in which Being is an issue for a person as Dasein is their future oriented caring. This distinguishes Dasein from function or performance criteria of personhood.

Others also dispute functional criteria of personhood, such as philosopher Francis J. Beckwith, who argues that it is rather the underlying personal unity of the individual:

What is crucial morally is the being of a person, not his or her functioning. A human person does not come into existence when human function arises, but rather, a human person is an entity who has the natural inherent capacity to give rise to human functions, whether or not those functions are ever attained. ...A human person who lacks the ability to think rationally (either because she is too young or she suffers from a disability) is still a human person because of her nature. Consequently, it makes sense to speak of a human being’s lack if and only if she is an actual person.

— Francis Beckwith, "Abortion, Bioethics, and Personhood: A Philosophical Reflection"[12]

This belief in the underlying unity of an individual is a metaphysical and moral[13] belief referred to as the substance view of personhood.[14]

Philosopher J. P. Moreland clarifies this point:

It is because an entity has an essence and falls within a natural kind that it can possess a unity of dispositions, capacities, parts and properties at a given time and can maintain identity through change.

— J. P Moreland, "James Rachels and the Active Euthanasia Debate"[15]

Harry Frankfurt writes that, in reference to a definition by P. F. Strawson, "What philosophers have lately come to accept as analysis of the concept of a person is not actually analysis of that concept at all." He suggests that the concept of a person is intimately connected to free will, and describes the structure of human volition according to first- and second-order desires:

Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, [humans] may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" or "desires of the first order," which are simply desires to do or not to do one thing or another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires.

— Harry G. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person"[16]

The criteria for being a person... are designed to capture those attributes which are the subject of our most humane concern with ourselves and the source of what we regard as most important and most problematical in our lives.

— Harry G. Frankfurt[17]

According to Nikolas Kompridis, there might also be an intersubjective, or interpersonal, basis to personhood:

What if personal identity is constituted in, and sustained through, our relations with others, such that were we to erase our relations with our significant others we would also erase the conditions of our self-intelligibility? As it turns out, this erasure... is precisely what is experimentally dramatized in the “science fiction” film, Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, a far more philosophically sophisticated meditation on personal identity than is found in most of the contemporary literature on the topic.

— Nikolas Kompridis, "Technology's Challenge to Democracy: What of the Human?"[18]

Mary Midgley defines a "person" as being a conscious, thinking being, which knows that it is a person (self-awareness). She also wrote that the law can create persons.[19]

Philosopher Thomas I. White argues that the criteria for a person are: is alive, is aware, feels positive and negative sensations, has emotions, has a sense of self, (controls its own behaviour, recognises other persons and treats them appropriately, and has a variety of sophisticated cognitive abilities. While many of White's criteria are somewhat anthropocentric, some animals such as dolphins would still be considered persons.[20] Some animal rights groups have also championed recognition for animals as "persons".[21]

Another approach to personhood, Paradigm Case Formulation, used in descriptive psychology and developed by Peter Ossorio, involves the four interrelated concepts of 1) The Individual Person, 2) Deliberate Action, 3) Reality and the Real World, and 4) Language or Verbal Behavior. All four concepts require full articulation for any one of them to be fully intelligible. More specifically, a Person is an individual whose history is, paradigmatically, a history of Deliberate Action in a Dramaturgical pattern. Deliberate Action is a form of behavior in which a person (a) engages in an Intentional Action, (b) is cognizant of that, and (c) has chosen to do that. A person is not always engaged in a deliberate action but has the eligibility to do so. A human being is an individual who is both a person and a specimen of Homo sapiens. Since persons are deliberate actors, they also employ hedonic, prudent, aesthetic and ethical reasons when selecting, choosing or deciding on a course of action. As part of our "social contract" we expect that the typical person can make use of all four of these motivational perspectives. Individual persons will weigh these motives in a manner that reflects their personal characteristics. That life is lived in a "dramaturgical" pattern is to say that people make sense, that their lives have patterns of significance. The paradigm case allows for nonhuman persons, potential persons, nascent persons, manufactured persons, former persons, "deficit case" persons, and "primitive" persons. By using a paradigm case methodology, different observers can point to where they agree and where they disagree about whether an entity qualifies as a person.[17][22]

Research

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As an application of social psychology and other disciplines, phenomena such as the perception and attribution of personhood have been scientifically studied.[23][24] Typical questions addressed in social psychology are the accuracy of attribution, processes of perception and the formation of bias. Various other scientific and medical disciplines address the myriad of issues in the development of personality.

Unborn

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Ireland

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In 1983, the people of Ireland added the Eighth Amendment to their constitution that "acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right." This was repealed in 2018 by the Thirty-sixth Amendment of the Constitution of Ireland.

United States

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A person is recognized by law as such, not because they are human, but because rights and duties are ascribed to them. The person is the legal subject or substance of which the rights and duties are attributes. An individual human being considered to be having such attributes is what lawyers call a "natural person".[25] According to Black's Law Dictionary,[26] a person is:

In general usage, a human being (i.e. natural person), though by statute term may include a firm, labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers.

In Federal law, the concept of legal personhood is formalized by statute (1 USC § 8) to include "every infant member of the species homo sapiens who is born alive at any stage of development." That statute also states that "Nothing in this section shall be construed to affirm, deny, expand, or contract any legal status or legal right applicable to any member of the species homo sapiens at any point prior to being 'born alive' as defined in this section."

According to the National Conference of State Legislatures,[27] many US States have their own definition of personhood which expands upon the federal definition of personhood, and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services declined to overturn the state of Missouri's law stating that

The life of each human being begins at conception ... Effective January 1, 1988, the laws of this state shall be interpreted and construed to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of development, all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citizens, and residents of this state, unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being.

The beginning of human personhood is a concept long debated by religion and philosophy. With respect to the abortion debate, personhood is the status of a human being having individual human rights. The term was used by Justice Blackmun in Roe v. Wade.[28]

Personhood protest in front of the United States Supreme Court

A political movement in the United States seeks to define the beginning of human personhood as starting from the moment of fertilization with the result being that abortion, as well as forms of birth control that act to deprive the human embryo of necessary sustenance in implantation, could become illegal.[29][30] Supporters of the movement also state that it would have some effect on the practice of in-vitro fertilization (IVF), but would not lead to the practice being outlawed.[31] Jonathan F. Will says that the personhood framework could produce significant restrictions on IVF to the extent that reproductive clinics find it impossible to provide the services.[32]

Currently, the personhood movement is led by the Personhood Alliance, a coalition of state and national personhood organizations headquartered in Washington DC. The Personhood Alliance was founded in 2014 and currently has 22 affiliated organizations.[33] A significant number of the state affiliates of the Personhood Alliance were once affiliates of National Right to Life. Organizations like Georgia Right to Life,[34] Cleveland Right to Life, and Alaska Right to Life left National Right to Life and joined the Personhood Alliance after refusing to support National Right to Life's proposed legislation that included exceptions like the rape and incest exceptions. The Personhood Alliance describes itself as "a Christ-centered, biblically informed organization dedicated to the non-violent advancement of the recognition and protection of the God-given, inalienable right to life of all human beings as legal persons, at every stage of their biological development and in every circumstance."[35]

A precursor to the Personhood Alliance was Personhood USA, a Colorado-based umbrella group with a number of state-level affiliates,[36] which describes itself as a nonprofit Christian ministry.[37] and seeks to ban abortion.[38] Personhood USA was co-founded by Cal Zastrow and Keith Mason[39] in 2008 following the Colorado for Equal Rights campaign to enact a state constitutional personhood amendment.[40]

Proponents of the movement regard personhood as an attempt to directly challenge the Roe v. Wade U.S. Supreme Court decision, thus filling a legal void left by Justice Harry Blackmun in the majority opinion when he wrote: "If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment."[28]

Some medical organizations have described the potential effects of personhood legislation as potentially harmful to patients and the practice of medicine, particularly in the cases of ectopic and molar pregnancy.[41]

Susan Bordo has suggested that the focus on the issue of personhood in abortion debates has often been a means for depriving women of their rights. She writes that "the legal double standard concerning the bodily integrity of pregnant and nonpregnant bodies, the construction of women as fetal incubators, the bestowal of 'super-subject' status to the fetus, and the emergence of a father's-rights ideology" demonstrate "that the current terms of the abortion debate – as a contest between fetal claims to personhood and women's right to choose – are limited and misleading."[42]

Others, such as Colleen Carroll Campbell, say that the personhood movement is a natural progression of society in protecting the equal rights of all members of the human species. She writes, "The basic philosophical premise behind these [personhood] amendments is eminently reasonable. And the alternative on offer – which severs humanity from personhood – is fraught with peril. If being human is not enough to entitle one to human rights, then the very concept of human rights loses meaning. And all of us – born and unborn, strong and weak, young and old – someday will find ourselves on the wrong end of that cruel measuring stick."[43]

Father Frank Pavone agrees, adding, "Nor is this a dispute about the state imposing a religious or philosophical view. After all, your life and mine are not protected because of some religious or philosophical belief that others are required to have about us. More accurately, the law protects us precisely in spite of the beliefs of others who, in their own worldview, may not value our lives. …To support Roe vs. Wade is not merely to allow a medical procedure. It is to acknowledge that the government has the power to say who is a person and who is not. Who, then, is to limit the groups to whom it is applied? This is what makes "personhood" such an important public policy issue.[44]

In March 2007 Georgia became the first state in the nation to introduce a legislative resolution to amend the state constitution to define and recognize the personhood of fetuses.[45] The Georgia Catholic Conference and National Right to Life supported the effort. The resolution failed to attract the super majority in both chambers required for it to be placed on the ballot.[46] Georgia legislators have filed a personhood resolution every session since 2007.[47][48][49] In May 2008 Georgia Right to Life hosted the first nationwide Personhood Symposium targeting anti-abortion activists.[50] This symposium was instrumental in spawning the group Personhood USA and the various state personhood efforts that followed. Voters in 46 Georgia counties approved personhood during the 2010 primary election with 75% in favor of a non-binding resolution declaring that the "right to life is vested in each human being from their earliest biological beginning until natural death".[51] During the 2012 Republican primary a similar question was placed on the ballot statewide and passed with a super-majority (66%) of the vote in 158 of 159 counties.[52]

In the summer of 2008 a citizen initiated amendment was proposed for the Colorado constitution.[53] Three attempts to enact the from-fertilization definition of personhood into U.S. state constitutions via referendums have failed.[54] Following two attempts to enact similar changes in Colorado in 2008 and 2010, a 2011 initiative to amend the state constitution by referendum in the state of Mississippi also failed to gain approval with around 58% of voters disapproving.[54][55] In an interview after the referendum, Mason ascribed the failure of the initiative to a political campaign run by Planned Parenthood.[56]

Personhood proponents in Oklahoma sought to amend the state constitution to define personhood as beginning at conception. The state Supreme Court, citing the U.S. Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, ruled in April 2012 that the proposed amendment was unconstitutional under the federal Constitution and blocked inclusion of the referendum question on the ballot.[57] In October 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal of the state Supreme Court's ruling.[58]

In 2006, a 16-year-old girl was charged in Mississippi with murder for the still-birth of her daughter on the basis that the girl had smoked cocaine while pregnant.[59] These charges were later dismissed.[60]

In February 2024, the Supreme Court of Alabama ruled that frozen embryos were "extrauterine children" subject to the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act, based on protections for unborn children in the state constitution[61][62] These protections were added in 2018 by ballot referendum, as Amendment 930 to the Alabama Constitution of 1901, and gained relevance when the 2022 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization returned full control over regulation of abortion to the states.[63] The concurring decision of Justice Tom Parker cited Christian theology to support the decision, raising complaints about separation of church and state[64]

Vatican

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The Vatican has advanced a human exceptionalist understanding of personhood. Catechism 2270 reads: "Human life must be respected and protected absolutely from the moment of conception. From the first moment of his existence, a human being must be recognized as having the rights of a person – among which is the inviolable right of every innocent being to life."[65]

Women

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In the United States, the personhood of women has important legal consequences. Although in 1920 the 19th Amendment guaranteed women in the right to vote, it was not until 1971 that the US Supreme Court ruled in Reed v. Reed[66] that the law cannot discriminate between the sexes because the 14th amendment grants equal protection to all "persons".[67][68] In 2011, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia disputed the conclusion of Reed v. Reed, arguing that women do not have equal protection under the 14th amendment as "persons"[69][70] because the Constitution's use of the gender-neutral term "Person" means that the Constitution does not require discrimination on the basis of sex, but also does not prohibit such discrimination, adding "Nobody ever thought that that's what it meant. Nobody ever voted for that."[71] Many others, including law professor Jack Balkin disagree with this assertion. Balkin states that, at a minimum "the fourteenth amendment was intended to prohibit some forms of sex discrimination – discrimination in basic civil rights against single women."[72] Many local marriage laws at the time the 14th Amendment was ratified (as well as when the original Constitution was ratified) had concepts of coverture and "head-and-master", which meant that women legally lost rights upon marriage, including rights to ownership of property and other rights of adult participation in the political economy; single women retained these rights, however, and voted in some jurisdictions.

Other commentators have noted that some of the ratifiers of the US Constitution (in 1787) also, in contemporaneous contexts, ratified state level Constitutions that saw women as Persons and required them to be treated as such, including granting women rights such as the right to vote.[73][74] Professor Jane Calvert argues that the 17th and 18th Century Quaker concept of Personhood applied to women, and the prevalence of Quakers in the population of several colonies, such as New Jersey and Pennsylvania, at the time that the original Constitution was drafted and ratified likely influenced the choice of the term "Person" for the Constitution instead of the term "Man", which was used in the Declaration of Independence and in the contemporaneously drafted French Constitution of 1791.[75]

The personhood of women also has consequences for the ethics of abortion. For example, in "A Defense of Abortion", Judith Jarvis Thomson argues that one person's right to bodily autonomy trumps another's right to life, and therefore abortion does not violate a fetus's right to life: Instead abortion should be understood as the pregnant women withdrawing her own body from use, which causes the fetus to die.[76]

Questions pertaining to the personhood of women and the personhood of fetuses have legal and ethical consequences for reproductive rights beyond abortion as well. For example, some fetal homicide laws have resulted in jail time for women suspected of drug use during a pregnancy that ended in a miscarriage, like one Alabama woman who was sentenced to ten years.[77]

Slavery

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Am I not a man emblem used during the campaign to abolish slavery

In 1772, Somersett's Case determined that slavery was unsupported by law in England and Wales, but not elsewhere in the British Empire. In 1868, under the 14th Amendment, black men in the United States became citizens. In 1870, under the 15th Amendment, black men got the right to vote.

In 1853, Sojourner Truth became famous for asking Ain't I a Woman? and after slavery was abolished, black men continued to fight for personhood by claiming, I Am A Man!.

Original peoples

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The legal definition of "person" has excluded indigenous peoples in some countries.[example needed]

Children

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The legal definition of persons may include or exclude children depending on the context. The US Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2002 provides a legal structure that those born at any gestational stage that are either breathing, have heartbeat, umbilical cord pulsation, or any voluntary muscle movement are living, individual human persons.[78]

Disabled

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Adults with cognitive disabilities are regularly denied rights generally granted to all adult persons such as the right to marry and consent to sex,[79] and the right to vote. They may also lack legal competence. Philosophical arguments have been made against the cognitively disabled being able to have moral agency.[80] In many countries, including the US, psychiatric illness can be cited to imprison an adult without due process.

Those who become disabled later in life often experience a change in how they are perceived, including others infantilizing them or assuming cognitive disability due to the existence of physical disability.[81] The concept of disability as being worse than death can be seen as a denial of disabled people's personhood, such as when medical professionals suggest euthanasia to non-suicidal disabled patients.[82]

Non-human animals

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Some philosophers and those involved in animal welfare, ethology, the rights of animals, and related subjects, consider that certain or even all animals should also be considered to be persons and thus granted legal personhood. Commonly named species in this context include the apes, cetaceans, parrots, cephalopods, corvids, elephants, bears, pigs, leporids and rodents, because of their apparent intelligence, sentience, and intricate social rules. The idea of extending personhood to all animals has the support of legal scholars such as Alan Dershowitz[83] and Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School,[84] and animal law courses are (as of 2008) taught in 92 out of 180 law schools in the United States.[85] On May 9, 2008, Columbia University Press published Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation by Professor Gary L. Francione of Rutgers University School of Law, a collection of writings that summarizes his work to date and makes the case for non-human animals as persons.

Those who oppose personhood for non-human animals are known as human exceptionalists or human supremacists, and more pejoratively speciesists.[86]

Other theorists attempt to demarcate between degrees of personhood. For example, Peter Singer's two-tiered account distinguishes between basic sentience and the higher standard of self-consciousness which constitutes personhood. His approach has been criticized for accepting the personhood of some animals, but rejecting the personhood of people with disabilities such as dementia.[87] It has also been given as an example of the limits of a capacities-based definition of personhood, in that they tend to be defined in ways that reinforce existing systems of power and privilege by preferring the capacities that are valued by those who write the definitions.[87] A squirrel would value agility and balance in defining personhood; a tree might grant personhood on the basis of height and longevity, and a long-time academic, "a human being with a fully functioning cerebral cortex who resides in a social context where the workings of this part of the brain are particularly prized", would just as predictably value the qualities that benefited his own life and overlook the ones that had little relationship to his own life.[87]

Wynn Schwartz has offered a Paradigm Case Formulation of Persons as a format allowing judges to identify qualities of personhood in different entities.[22][17][88] Julian Friedland has advanced a seven-tiered account based on cognitive capacity and linguistic mastery.[89] Amanda Stoel suggested that rights should be granted based on a scale of degrees of personhood, allowing entities currently denied any right to be recognized some rights, but not as many.[90]

In 1992, Switzerland amended its constitution to recognize animals as beings and not things.[91] A decade later, Germany guaranteed rights to animals in a 2002 amendment to its constitution, becoming the first European Union member to do so.[91][92][93] The New Zealand parliament included restrictions on the use of 'non-human hominids'[94] in research or teaching when passing the Animal Welfare Act (1999).[95] In 2007, the parliament of the Balearic Islands, an autonomous province of Spain, passed the world's first legislation granting legal rights to all great apes.[96]

In 2013, India's Ministry of Forests and Environment banned the importation or capture of cetaceans (whales and dolphins) for entertainment, exhibition, or interaction purposes, on the basis that "cetaceans in general are highly intelligent and sensitive" and that it "is morally unacceptable to keep them captive for entertainment." It noted that "various scientists" have argued they should be seen as "non-human persons" with commensurate rights, but did not take an official position on this, and indeed did not have the legal authority to do so.[97][98]

In 2014, a hybrid, zoo-born orangutan named Sandra was termed by the court in Argentina as a "non-human subject" in an unsuccessful habeas corpus case regarding the release of the orangutan from captivity at the Buenos Aires zoo. The status of the orangutan as a "non-human subject" needed to be clarified by the court. Court cases relevant to this orangutan were continuing in 2015.[99] Finally, in 2019, Sandra was granted nonhuman personhood and freed from captivity to a Florida sanctuary.[citation needed]

In 2015, for the first time, two chimpanzees, Hercules and Leo, were thought to be "legal persons", having been granted a writ of habeas corpus. This meant their detainer, Stony Brook University, had to provide a legally sufficient reason for their imprisonment.[100] This view was rejected and the writ was reversed by the officiating judge shortly thereafter.[101]

Corporations

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In statutory and corporate law, certain social constructs are legally considered persons. In many jurisdictions, some corporations and other organizations are considered juridical persons (a subtype of legal persons) with standing to own, possess, enter contracts, as well as to sue or be sued in court, or even to be indicted, in selected jurisdictions. This is known as legal or corporate personhood.

In 1819, the US Supreme Court ruled in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, that corporations have the same rights as natural persons to enforce contracts.

Environmental entities

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Since the new millennium, treating parts of nature like waterways as persons has become increasingly popular.

Bolivia

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In 2006, Bolivia passed a law recognizing the rights of nature "to not be affected by mega-infrastructure and development projects that affect the balance of ecosystems and the local inhabitant communities".[102]

Canada

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In February 2021, the Magpie River (Quebec) became the first river in Canada to be granted legal personhood, after the local municipality of Minganie and the Innu Council of Ekuanitshit passed joint resolutions.[103] The goal is to protect it long-term given its appeal for energy producers like Hydro-Quebec and Innergex Renewable Energy.[104] It has since the right to flow, maintain biodiversity, be free from pollution, and to sue.[3]

Colombia

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In 2016, the Constitutional Court of Colombia granted legal rights to the Rio Atrato; in 2018, the Supreme Court of Colombia granted the Amazon river ecosystem legal rights.[105]

Ecuador

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In 2008, Ecuador approved a constitution to recognize that nature "...has the right to exist, persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions and its processes in evolution."[106]

India

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In 2017, a court in the northern Indian state of Uttarakhand recognized the Ganges and Yamuna as legal persons. The judges cited Whanganui river in New Zealand as precedent for the action.[107]

New Zealand

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The Whanganui River of New Zealand is revered by the local Māori people as Te Awa Tupua, sometimes translated as "an integrated, living whole". Efforts to grant it special legal protection have been pursued by the Whanganui iwi since the 1870s. In 2012, an agreement to grant legal personhood to the river was signed between the New Zealand government and the Whanganui River Māori Trust. One guardian from the Crown and one from the Whanganui are responsible for protecting the river.[108]

United States

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In 2019, the Klamath River has been granted personhood by the Yurok Tribe.[109] Also in February 2019, voters in Toledo, Ohio passed the "Lake Erie Bill of Rights" (LEBOR), which granted personhood rights to Lake Erie.[110] The law was challenged in federal court on constitutional grounds by Drewes Farms Partnership, with the state government of Ohio joining as an intervenor. The law was overturned due to the vagueness of at least three portions of the law, with the court also criticizing the applicability of the law to other Lake Erie-bordering jurisdictions' laws regarding the lake.[111][112]

Modified humans

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The theoretical landscape of personhood theory has been altered recently by controversy in the bioethics community concerning an emerging community of scholars, researchers, and activists identifying with an explicitly transhumanist position, which supports morphological freedom, even if a person changed so much as to no longer be considered a member of the human species. For example, how much of a human can be artificially replaced before one loses their personhood? also in the case for cyborgs If people are considered persons because of their brains, then what if the brain's thought patterns, memories and other attributes could be transposed into a device? Would the patient still be considered a person after the operation?[according to whom?]

Religion

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In China's religious philosophy of Taoism, the Tao is a path of life and a divine field; not exhibiting personhood of itself, but "if well-nourished", is supposedly beneficial towards persons and the components of personhood.[citation needed]

Many generally non-religious Japanese people maintain a degree of Shinto spirituality (thus avoiding fully declared non-spirituality) because the kami are not as central to the Shinto religion as a monotheistic creator God, thus having an indirect impact on the formation of an individual's personality. The non-centrality of the kami allow an individual to take an ambivalent stance towards atheism or theism and deism. Religiously speaking, the degree of personhood granted to a deity (along with their universal centrality to a given religion) may be seen to have an impact on the world view and understandings of personhood by mortal individuals.[citation needed]

Christianity

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The Latin word persona is probably derived from the Etruscan word phersu, with the same meaning, and that from the Greek πρόσωπον (prosōpon). Its meaning in the latter Roman period changed to indicate a character of a theatrical performance or court of law, when it became apparent that different individuals could assume the same role and that legal attributes such as rights, powers, and duties followed the role. The same individuals as actors could play different roles, each with its own legal attributes, sometimes even in the same court appearance.

According to other sources, which also admit that the origin of the term is not completely clear, persona could be related to the Latin verb per-sonare, literally: sounding through, with an obvious link to the above-mentioned theatrical mask, which often incorporated a small megaphone. The word was transformed from its theater use into a term with strict technical theological meaning by Tertullian in his work, Adversus Praxean (Against Praxeas), in order to distinguish the three "persons" of the Trinity. Christianity is thus the first philosophical system to use the word "person" in its modern sense.[113] Subsequently, Boethius refined the word to mean "an individual substance of a rational nature." This can be re-stated as "that which possesses an intellect and a will."

The definition of Boethius as it stands can hardly be considered a satisfactory one. The words taken literally can be applied to the rational soul of man, and also the human nature of Christ. That St. Thomas accepts it is presumably due to the fact that he found it in possession, and recognized as the traditional definition. He explains it in terms that practically constitute a new definition. Individua substantia signifies, he says, substantia, completa, per se subsistens, separata ab aliia, i.e., a substance, complete, subsisting per se, existing apart from others (III, Q. xvi, a. 12, ad 2um).

If to this be added rationalis naturae, we have a definition comprising the five notes that go to make up a person: (a) substantia-- this excludes accident; (b) completa-- it must form a complete nature; that which is a part, either actually or "aptitudinally" does not satisfy the definition; (c) per se subsistens--the person exists in itself and for itself; he or she is sui juris, the ultimate possessor of his or her nature and all its acts, the ultimate subject of predication of all his or her attributes; that which exists in another is not a person; (d) separata ab aliis--this excludes the universal, substantia secunda, which has no existence apart from the individual; (e) rationalis naturae--excludes all non-intellectual supposita.

To a person therefore belongs a threefold incommunicability, expressed in notes (b), (c), and (d). The human soul belongs to the nature as a part of it, and is therefore not a person, even when existing separately.

— Catholic Encyclopedia, 1913, Person

See also

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References

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from Grokipedia
Personhood is the ethical and philosophical status attributing inherent moral worth and legal protections to entities deemed capable of bearing , most fundamentally tied to beings as a biological species rather than contingent psychological capacities like or . In classical definitions, such as those rooted in rational nature, and modern bioethical analyses, personhood distinguishes beings with duties and entitlements from mere biological organisms, though empirical continuity of human development challenges criteria that delay status until acquired traits emerge. Central debates hinge on whether personhood inheres in all members of Homo sapiens from conception—supported by genetic and organismal unity—or requires functional markers like and reasoning, which develop postnatally and could exclude fetuses, infants, or the severely cognitively impaired. This tension manifests in legal controversies, including historical denials of personhood to enslaved humans based on pseudoscientific racial hierarchies, contemporary laws questioning fetal status, and extension attempts to nonhuman animals or artificial intelligences lacking biological humanity. Granting conditional personhood risks arbitrary exclusions, as capacities admit degrees and fluctuate with age or injury, undermining universal human protections derived from species membership.

Conceptual Foundations

Philosophical Definitions

Philosophical conceptions of personhood center on intrinsic capacities for , , and , distinguishing persons from mere biological entities. defined a person as "a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it as it , the same thinking thing in different times and places." This emphasizes continuity of and rational agency as essential markers, grounded in empirical rather than external attributes. Similarly, formulated personhood as "persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia," an individual substance of rational nature, prioritizing subsistence through rational faculties over mere existence. These definitions privilege first-principles attributes like reflective intelligence, which enable moral accountability and abstract deliberation. Aristotelian further frames personhood as the realization of potential inherent in as a , where directs biological capacities toward ends like and . Humans possess a unique oriented by , distinguishing them from other animals through capacities for —discursive reason and purposeful action—evident in empirical observations of human-exclusive behaviors such as symbolic and ethical reasoning. This contrasts with non-teleological views by rooting personhood in causal developmental trajectories from conception, where emerges as the fulfillment of species-specific potentials rather than arbitrary thresholds. Modern corroborates uniqueness in personhood through the 's role in enabling abstract thought, planning, and , features absent or rudimentary in other . The , vastly expanded relative to body size, supports hierarchical processing for concepts untethered to immediate sensory input, as seen in of prefrontal activations during hypothetical reasoning. This structural distinctiveness underscores as an empirical hallmark, critiquing definitions that dilute personhood to basic , which ignores causal dependencies on advanced cortical integration for full reflective agency. Empirical data on fetal development challenge viability-based or late-sentience criteria, with electroencephalographic (EEG) patterns indicating organized neural activity as early as 24-28 weeks , including responses to stimuli and state transitions akin to wake-sleep cycles. Such markers of emerging align with Kantian views of personhood as rooted in rational , where beings capable of ends-in-themselves status possess from potential , not contingent relations. However, privileging biological humanity—encompassing all members of Homo sapiens by virtue of shared genomic and developmental —avoids subjective thresholds, as relational or performance-based definitions falter under causal scrutiny, conflating social recognition with ontological status. Debates distinguish minimal personhood (e.g., mere or viability) from full personhood (rational subsistence), with evidence favoring the latter as metaphysically robust, tying moral status to species-typical capacities rather than variable traits. Biological humanity provides a causally realist baseline, as deviations like impairments do not negate personhood in mature humans, per Lockean continuity, yet empirical uniqueness in neocortical function resists extension beyond the . Subjective definitions, often privileging relational , lack grounding in verifiable neural or rational markers, introducing bias toward cultural constructs over intrinsic essences. In , the concept of caput referred to an individual's civil status, encompassing their legal capacity relative to family (familia) and civic community (), which determined such as and while excluding slaves and aliens from full personhood. This framework influenced common law's bifurcation into natural persons—living human beings endowed with inherent legal personality—and artificial persons, such as corporations created by legislative fiction to hold property, enter contracts, and litigate independently of their human members. The U.S. Fourteenth Amendment illustrates the natural person criterion by conferring citizenship and protections on "all persons born or naturalized in the United States," thereby anchoring constitutional personhood to postnatal existence. Scientific data counters strict birth-based legal thresholds, as fertilization marks the formation of a genetically unique human organism with a distinct diploid genome, initiating individuation as a member of Homo sapiens separate from parental DNA. Legally, personhood functions instrumentally to allocate rights and impose duties, facilitating juridical actions like suing or being sued, but it diverges from ethical personhood, which asserts an intrinsic ontological status grounded in human dignity rather than conferred utility or relational capacities. Natural rights theory, as articulated by in his Second Treatise of Government (1689), grounds ethical personhood in pre-political endowments of life, liberty, and property, enforceable via against arbitrary denial. Conversely, Peter Singer's interest theory evaluates moral status by and capacity for suffering, deeming non-sentient humans (e.g., fetuses or anencephalic infants) lesser persons or non-persons, prioritizing utilitarian outcomes over inherent traits. Such ethical relativism has empirically correlated with rights violations, as status denials in stratified systems enabled enslavement or fetal commodification without causal accountability for harms. Bridging legal and ethical realism, statutes like the U.S. of 2004 recognize "a child in utero" at any developmental stage as a distinct victim of federal violent crimes, imposing penalties for injury or death separate from offenses against the mother, thus affirming causal harm to pre-birth humans without equating to full constitutional personhood. This distinction underscores legal personhood's role as a limited fiction versus ethical personhood's foundation in verifiable biological continuity, where expansions to non-humans risk diluting protections for vulnerable humans.

Historical Evolution

Pre-Modern Conceptions

In , personhood was fundamentally tied to the possession and exercise of , observable through deliberate speech, moral deliberation, and intellectual activity distinguishing humans from other animals. , in The Republic (c. 375 BCE), conceptualized the human as tripartite, comprising a rational part (logistikon) governing reason and wisdom, a spirited part (thymoeides) associated with courage and emotion, and an appetitive part (epithymetikon) driven by desires for pleasure and survival; harmony among these, with reason in command, defined the just and fully human individual capable of philosophical pursuit. This framework grounded personhood in the empirical reality of rational capacity, evident in adults' ability to contemplate forms and ethical ideals, rather than mere biological animation shared with beasts. Aristotle (384–322 BCE) refined this by defining the human as a "rational animal" (zoon logikon), emphasizing the intellective soul as the form actualizing the body's potential for discursive reasoning, ethical judgment, and political life—capacities empirically verifiable through observation of human behavior in the Politics and Nicomachean Ethics. In embryology, as detailed in On the Generation of Animals, he described soul development in successive stages: a nutritive soul for growth from conception, augmented by a sensitive soul for perception and locomotion, with the rational soul emerging later when organs for intellect form (approximately 40 days for males, 90 for females), reflecting causal progression from potentiality to actuality based on visible fetal changes. Personhood thus aligned with the realization of rationality, critiquing practices like Spartan infanticide—reported by Plutarch as state-mandated exposure of deformed newborns around 400 BCE—which Aristotle implicitly rejected through his teleological view of natural human perfection, where empirical defects did not negate inherent rational potential unless irremediably barring civic function. Medieval scholasticism, synthesizing Aristotelian biology with , located personhood in the infusion of the rational soul, marking the embryo's transition to full humanity. (1225–1274), in the Summa Theologica (c. 1274), adopted delayed hominization: vegetative and sensitive souls animate early stages, but the rational, intellective soul—subsisting independently and enabling immortality—is infused when the body is sufficiently organized (around 40–80 days), as then observed no higher functions earlier; prior to this, the lacks personal unity of rational substance. This causal realism prioritized empirical fetal development over instantaneous , yet affirmed protections for the formed under , influencing canon law's requirement for post-birth to remit , thereby recognizing baptized neonates as persons with eternal souls entitled to safeguards against exposure or neglect. Judeo-Christian traditions reinforced human dominion over nature through divine image-bearing (imago Dei), as in Genesis 1:26–28 (c. BCE), where empirical —evident in , tool-making, and moral accountability—distinguished persons from creation, paralleling some indigenous views of communal human essence versus nature but prioritizing stewardship rooted in rational intellect over relativistic tribal . This framework critiqued non-rational treatments of humans, such as ancient exposures, by insisting on observable capacities for reason as the basis for moral standing, prefiguring stricter medieval prohibitions on via Gratian's Decretum (c. 1140), which penalized harm to viable fetuses as assaults on potential persons. Enlightenment thinkers in the 17th and 18th centuries advanced theories that tied legal personhood to rational consent and capacity for self-governance. , in (1651), portrayed individuals in a as equal in vulnerability, necessitating a contractual surrender of rights to a for protection, while , in (1689), emphasized natural rights to life, liberty, and property inherent to persons defined by and , influencing subsequent legal recognitions of individual over arbitrary state power. These ideas manifested in foundational documents affirming inherent human personhood. The U.S. , adopted July 4, 1776, declared "" with inalienable to life, , and the pursuit of happiness, deriving personhood from a Creator rather than governmental conferral, though initially applied narrowly excluding slaves and women. The French Declaration of the and of the Citizen, adopted August 26, 1789, proclaimed that "men are born and remain free and equal in ," establishing , property, , and resistance to as natural foundational to political association. The 19th and early 20th centuries saw expansions and contractions in personhood recognitions amid social reforms and pseudoscientific justifications for exclusions. The 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, ratified December 6, 1865, abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, legally affirming the full personhood of approximately 4 million enslaved individuals by prohibiting their treatment as property. The 19th Amendment, ratified August 18, 1920, granted women suffrage, extending electoral personhood and countering prior legal fictions of coverture that subsumed married women's identities under their husbands. However, the Supreme Court's decision in Buck v. Bell (May 2, 1927) upheld forced sterilization of those deemed "feeble-minded" under Virginia's eugenics statute, with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. asserting "three generations of imbeciles are enough," thereby endorsing state denial of reproductive rights to over 60,000 Americans sterilized by mid-century based on flawed hereditary assumptions. Parallel developments introduced as a juridical fiction distinct from natural human personhood. In Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co. (1886), the U.S. Supreme Court treated corporations as "persons" under the 14th Amendment for equal protection purposes, enabling them to hold property, enter contracts, and access , a construct rooted in earlier charter protections like (1819) but criticized for conflating artificial entities with inherent . Post-World War II, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted December 10, 1948, centered protections on human dignity, affirming "everyone has the , liberty and security of person" without extending personhood to non-humans. In contrast, animal welfare legislation, such as the U.S. Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (1958), regulated treatment to prevent cruelty but conferred no legal personhood, maintaining a human-centric amid rising ethical concerns over exploitation.

Human Personhood

Prenatal Stages

The begins at fertilization, when a penetrates an ovum to form a possessing a unique distinct from that of either , marking the onset of a new individual with its own developmental trajectory. This genetic individuality establishes biological continuity, as the immediately initiates self-directed and differentiation toward human form, without acquiring new essential properties later in that would retroactively confer humanity. Empirical confirms this as the point of a whole, living human entity, countering claims that personhood emerges only at later arbitrary thresholds like viability, which depend on external technological support rather than intrinsic . Key developmental markers underscore this continuity: cardiac activity detectable via ultrasound by 5-6 weeks gestation, signaling organized physiological function; completion of major organogenesis by 8 weeks, with formation of the brain, heart, limbs, and sensory structures; and evidence of nociceptive responses, including stress hormone release and withdrawal reflexes to stimuli, emerging around 20 weeks per neuroscientific reviews. These milestones reflect progressive maturation of an existing human organism, not the creation of one; for instance, thalamocortical connections linked to pain processing form progressively from 12-20 weeks, with preterm infants at 21 weeks exhibiting behavioral and physiological reactions to noxious stimuli requiring analgesia in neonatal care. Viability around 24 weeks, often cited to deny earlier personhood, ignores that survival depends on maternal or artificial gestation, not a change in the fetus's inherent nature. Legal frameworks in various jurisdictions recognize prenatal human interests, treating harm to the unborn as under statutes that predate and persist post-Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization (2022), which devolved regulation to states without resolving in non- contexts. As of 2024, 39 U.S. states enact fetal laws charging assailants for killing an unborn child at any stage, as in the federal (2004) extended to certain crimes; post-Dobbs, states like have applied these to IVF embryos, affirming personhood-like protections. In , Ireland's 1983 Eighth explicitly acknowledged "the right to life of the unborn," equating it with the mother's until its 2018 repeal via referendum, though debates continue on restoring such recognitions amid varying gestational limits elsewhere. Denying personhood in prenatal stages facilitates elective terminations, with U.S. data indicating approximately 930,000 abortions in 2020, predominantly before 13 weeks when biological humanity is unequivocally present. Such practices, rationalized by viability or criteria, overlook causal continuity from fertilization—where denying status permits destruction of genetically entities—and correlate with societal metrics of devaluation, as evidenced by consistent annual rates despite technological advances affirming earlier viability. Sources like the , while providing incidence data, advocate pro-choice policies that may underemphasize these biological realities due to institutional biases. Prioritizing empirical over developmental gradients supports attributing personhood from conception to avoid arbitrary thresholds that fail first-principles scrutiny of equality.

Vulnerable Populations

Children possess full personhood from birth but require guardianship until reaching , set at 18 years in most including the and a of nations worldwide, to address vulnerabilities stemming from ongoing cognitive maturation. Neuroscientific evidence indicates that adolescents achieve adult-level cognitive capacity in certain domains by mid-teens, yet deficits persist in such as and , justifying temporary legal protections like parental authority over contracts and medical consent without implying lesser moral status. These safeguards prevent exploitation while upholding equal , countering arguments for diminished personhood based on immaturity. Persons with disabilities hold equal personhood and rights under , as affirmed by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006), which mandates states to ensure full enjoyment of without and to provide reasonable accommodations for autonomy. Empirical critiques highlight devaluations through practices like selective abortions for fetal anomalies; in , prenatal screening has resulted in nearly 100% termination rates for diagnoses, with only 1-2 births annually, reflecting eugenic pressures rather than neutral choice. Similarly, do-not-resuscitate (DNR) orders have been unlawfully imposed on individuals with learning disabilities during crises like the without family consultation, underscoring risks of utilitarian that prioritizes perceived over inherent . The elderly, facing age-related declines in capacity, often necessitate guardianship for personal and financial decisions when incapacity is demonstrated, as in cases of where empirical assessments reveal impaired judgment akin to those in severe . Advocacy for among this group, rooted in utilitarian frameworks that weigh societal costs against individual utility, risks broader devaluation of vulnerable lives, potentially eroding protections as seen in arguments linking to expanded criteria beyond . Studies on devaluing vulnerability, including philosophical examinations of justifications by utilitarians like , illustrate causal pathways to societal harms such as normalized elimination of the dependent, with exacerbating rates through perceived burdens. Guardianship thus serves as an evidence-based mechanism to preserve and prevent such erosions, prioritizing causal preservation of personhood over aggregate welfare calculations.

Historical Denials and Restorations

The transatlantic slave trade forcibly transported approximately 12.5 million Africans to the between 1526 and 1867, driven primarily by economic demands for labor in economies, particularly production , where denial of personhood to enslaved individuals enabled their treatment as property to maximize profits. In the U.S., the 1857 decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford explicitly ruled that , whether enslaved or free, were not U.S. citizens and possessed no rights under the , reinforcing legal barriers to personhood justified by economic interests in maintaining the institution of . This denial persisted despite empirical evidence challenging myths of inherent slave inefficiency; innovations in cotton picking, enforced through coercive methods, yielded high productivity levels that fueled Southern economic growth, underscoring how causal economic incentives—rather than productivity deficits—sustained the . Restoration came with the 13th Amendment in 1865 abolishing and the 14th Amendment in 1868 granting , affirming personhood through recognition of equal human dignity independent of economic utility. Under English , the doctrine of subsumed a married woman's legal identity into her husband's, stripping her of independent personhood by treating her , contracts, and even torts as extensions of his, a system rooted in patriarchal control that prioritized familial economic unity over individual agency. Inherited in early American , this framework denied women basic legal capacities until reforms like the Married Women's Property Acts in the mid-19th century began partial restorations, though full political personhood awaited the 19th Amendment's on August 18, 1920, which prohibited denial of voting on account of , establishing equality in civic participation based on inherent rather than relational status. These restorations countered historical subordinations not through outcome-based equity but via first-principles equality, recognizing women's personhood as coextensive with men's absent justifying differences in capacity. European colonial powers invoked the 1493 papal bull —issued by —to deny full personhood by deeming their non-Christian lands available for Christian dominion, facilitating conquest and dispossession under the Doctrine of Discovery, where economic motives for resource extraction intertwined with religious justifications to rationalize subjugation. In the U.S., this framework underpinned treaties and policies treating Native Americans as wards rather than sovereign persons, culminating in partial restoration via the of June 2, 1924, which granted birthright citizenship to all Native Americans without requiring relinquishment of tribal affiliations, affirming core personhood while distinguishing it from disputes. Causally, such denials stemmed from imperatives to acquire territory for settlement and agriculture, but restorations emphasized universal human equality over utilitarian claims to , decoupling personhood from environmental or cultural contingencies.

Extensions to Non-Humans

Corporate Entities

originated in the United States with the Supreme Court's 1886 decision in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., which treated corporations as persons entitled to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby enabling them to enter contracts, own , sue, and be sued as legal entities separate from their shareholders. This facilitated economic transactions by providing and perpetual existence, reducing risks for investors and promoting capital aggregation without personal exposure. Empirical evidence links such structures to broader economic efficiency, as corporate forms correlate with increased investment flows; for instance, has driven expansion, with host countries gaining productivity boosts from affiliate operations. Expansions of , particularly the 2010 Citizens United v. ruling, equated corporate political spending with protected speech under the First Amendment, permitting unlimited independent expenditures by corporations in elections without direct coordination with candidates. This decision, while defended as enhancing free expression, has empirically amplified corporate influence on policy through super PACs and dark money, with post-2010 election spending surging to record levels—over $14 billion in 2020 alone—often favoring business interests without corresponding moral or personal accountability inherent to human actors. Critics argue this treats money as equivalent to speech, distorting democratic processes by leveraging aggregated shareholder funds absent individual consent or culpability. Opposition movements, such as Move to Amend founded after Citizens United, advocate constitutional amendments to abolish corporate constitutional rights and redefine money as distinct from speech, citing over 700 local resolutions by 2023 supporting such reforms to curb . Defenses against abolition emphasize that revoking personhood would stifle by complicating contracts and liability shields, potentially deterring ; proposals to eliminate it are critiqued as overlooking how limited personhood distinguishes artificial entities from natural persons without granting full human equivalency. Corporate personhood remains bounded: entities cannot vote in elections, receive full protections like those against in some contexts, or claim privileges. Scandals like Enron's 2001 collapse, involving $74 billion in shareholder losses from fraudulent accounting, underscore human culpability—executives such as CEO and Chairman were convicted for orchestrating schemes via special purpose entities and mark-to-market manipulations—rather than inherent corporate agency, as accountability traces to individual directors and officers under duties. This causal chain highlights that while the corporate form enables scale, ethical failures stem from personnel decisions, not the fiction itself, prompting reforms like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to enforce CEO certifications without dismantling personhood.

Non-Human Animals

Claims for legal personhood for non-human animals often rest on empirical demonstrations of , such as response and basic in like and great apes, yet these fall short of the rationality and moral reciprocity required for reciprocal rights-bearing status under causal principles of social contract. Studies confirm advanced cognitive abilities in , including tool use and self-recognition in mirrors for some chimpanzees and orangutans, but lack of abstract reasoning, language-based moral deliberation, or capacity to assume duties like legal , distinguishing them fundamentally from s. This undermines personhood extensions, as without corresponding obligations lead to non-reciprocal burdens on , prioritizing animal interests over verifiable human needs like food production. In the United States, the 2022 New York Court of Appeals decision in Nonhuman Rights Project v. Breheny denied to Happy, an at the Bronx Zoo, ruling that legal personhood requires not only benefiting from rights but also bearing responsibilities, which non-humans cannot fulfill. The court emphasized that extending personhood judicially would disrupt established human-animal interactions, leaving such policy changes to legislatures. In contrast, Argentina's 2014 appellate ruling granted "non-human person" status to Sandra, an held at Buenos Aires Zoo, recognizing her basic rights against arbitrary detention based on and , though implementation was limited—she was transferred to a sanctuary in 2019 without full human-equivalent protections. European Union frameworks acknowledge animal under the 2009 (Article 13), mandating welfare considerations in policies, but explicitly reject personhood, treating animals as property with protections subordinate to human interests. Initiatives like the , advocating rights for hominids based on genetic similarity (sharing 98-99% DNA with humans), face critiques for anthropomorphic overreach, projecting human traits onto species without equivalent rational agency, potentially eroding human without empirical justification for reciprocity. While advances include the EU's 2013 full ban on testing and of animal-tested products, reflecting ethical shifts without granting personhood, broader claims risk economic disruption to global agriculture, where meat production reached 371 million tonnes in 2023, supporting security for billions. Prioritizing such scale underscores causal realism: animal protections must yield to verifiable human necessities, as failed personhood bids like Happy's illustrate the legal system's adherence to reciprocity over sentiment-driven extensions.

Natural and Environmental Features

Ecuador's 2008 constitution was the first to enshrine rights for nature, recognizing Pachamama's right to exist, persist, and regenerate, influenced by indigenous movements but yielding limited enforcement amid ongoing extractive activities like mining. New Zealand followed with the Te Urewera Act of 2014, granting legal personhood to the former national park as an entity with inherent value, and in January 2025, Mount Taranaki Maunga received similar status, allowing Māori iwi representation in guardianship but without altering land use restrictions substantially. Colombia's 2024 regional recognitions for Amazon ecosystems built on prior river cases, aiming to counter deforestation, while U.S. tribal initiatives, such as the Colorado River Indian Tribes' October 2025 proposal, seek personhood to protect water flows under tribal law, marking a third North American indigenous effort. These grants often function symbolically, enabling lawsuits like India's 2017 Uttarakhand High Court declaration of personhood for the and rivers to curb , which prompted temporary directives but faced reversal due to practical enforcement challenges and non-compliance by authorities. Empirical assessments reveal inefficacy, with 2023 analyses showing rights-of-nature frameworks rarely halt degradation metrics—such as Ecuador's persistent despite constitutional provisions—and suffer from vague enforcement mechanisms lacking clear incentives. Compliance rates remain low, as guardians face procedural hurdles and competing human economic priorities, contrasting with traditional regulatory tools that achieve measurable reductions in through fines and monitoring. Recent developments underscore symbolic limits: a Nature's Rights Bill launched on October 23, , proposes embedding nature's interests in decisions but risks bureaucratic overload without superior conservation outcomes, while Australian debates over personhood highlight advocacy for voice amid bleaching events yet question legal teeth against drivers. on conservation efficacy favors property rights regimes, where secure ownership aligns incentives for —global studies link stronger to higher efficiency and reduced , outperforming personhood's anthropomorphic abstractions that dilute focus on human accountability. Such extensions risk prioritizing abstract entities over vulnerable human needs, as causal chains from ownership to maintenance yield verifiable habitat gains absent in unenforced symbolic statuses.

Artificial Intelligence and Human Modifications

In 2017, granted citizenship to the Sophia, developed by , marking the first instance of a nation conferring such status on a non-human entity; however, this act was largely symbolic, lacking substantive legal rights or obligations typically associated with personhood. Proposals for AI legal personhood have since emerged in various jurisdictions, but empirical assessments reveal no verifiable evidence of or —subjective experiential states—in current systems like large language models (LLMs), which operate via statistical pattern-matching rather than genuine . The , proposed by in 1950 to evaluate machine intelligence through behavioral imitation, underscores these limitations: while modern AI excels at mimicking human responses, it fails to demonstrate underlying phenomenal , as the test assesses external performance without probing internal subjective experience. In response, legislative efforts have sought to preclude AI personhood; for instance, Ohio's House Bill 469, introduced in the 136th General Assembly in 2025, explicitly declares AI systems nonsentient and prohibits granting them legal personhood, rights, or recognition of . Similarly, the Law Commission's 2025 discussion paper on AI and law explores personhood reforms but concludes that existing AI lacks the advancement required for such status, emphasizing risks of anthropomorphic overreach that could undermine human-centric legal frameworks. As of February 2026, AI lacks legal personhood in all jurisdictions worldwide, precluding it from legally owning cryptocurrency wallets or blockchain addresses. While AI systems can technically control such assets, legal ownership, rights, and liabilities are attributed to human owners, developers, or legal entities like companies or DAOs, treating AI as tools or property rather than persons with independent legal personality. Human modifications, such as brain-computer interfaces, contrast with AI by preserving the biological substrate essential to personhood; Neuralink's first human implant occurred in January 2024, enabling a paralyzed patient, Noland Arbaugh, to control devices via thought, yet this augmentation integrates with an intact human consciousness rather than supplanting it. Transhumanist pursuits, including cybernetic enhancements, raise ethical concerns about diluting species-specific rights, as radical alterations could erode the causal primacy of unaltered human biology in moral and legal standing, potentially prioritizing engineered traits over innate human dignity. Emerging models propose "degrees" or gradient approaches to AI personhood, as outlined in 2025 analyses, allowing optional limited statuses based on functionality rather than ; however, these risk further eroding human centrality by equating programmable behaviors with intrinsic rights, absent empirical bridges to . Such frameworks demand caution, as granting personhood without verifiable could precipitate legal precedents that subordinate biological humans to synthetic entities optimized for efficiency over experiential reality.

Religious and Moral Frameworks

Abrahamic Traditions

In Abrahamic traditions, personhood derives from scriptural accounts of divine creation, emphasizing humanity's unique status as bearers of God's image or stewards of creation, which excludes non- entities from equivalent and prioritizes protections for prenatal and vulnerable humans such as orphans and the impoverished. This framework underscores causal distinctions between human souls and mere biological , affirming exceptional moral obligations toward fellow humans over extensions to animals or environments. Christian theology grounds personhood in the imago Dei doctrine from Genesis 1:26, where states, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness," conferring on humans alone rational, relational, and dominion capacities absent in other creatures, thus establishing human exceptionalism as foundational to dignity from conception onward. Prenatal personhood receives affirmation in Luke 1:41, where the "leaped" in Elizabeth's womb upon Mary's greeting—using the Greek brephos for both unborn and born infants—signaling spiritual awareness and continuity of personhood before birth. The , in Pope Francis's 2015 encyclical Laudato Si', critiques excessive advocacy that risks diluting human centrality, asserting in paragraph 68 that "not all living beings are on the same level" and human dignity demands priority over creation without equating it to persons. Vulnerable populations, including the unborn and destitute, are commanded as image-bearers, as in James 1:27's call to aid orphans and widows. Judaism interprets Genesis's imago Dei as vesting personhood (nefesh) at birth, when the infant draws its first breath (Genesis 2:7), though the garners protections as potential life; the (Yevamot 69b) describes the as "mere water" until the 40th day post-conception, after which it assumes partial form but remains part of the mother's body until delivery. Exodus 21:22 mandates a fine for unintentionally causing a through , indicating fetal value warranting restitution but not as for born persons, reflecting graded protections that prioritize the mother's full personhood while safeguarding from harm. Modern Orthodox authorities, adhering to halakhic precedents, oppose elective abortions, permitting them solely when the mother's physical or faces grave threat, as overrides fetal claims pre-birth; this stance aligns with broader mandates to defend vulnerable humans, such as the widowed and impoverished (Deuteronomy 24:17-21), without extending personhood to non-humans. Islamic theology views humans as khalifah (vicegerents) per Quran 2:30, granting unique spiritual accountability and dignity over creation, with ensoulment (ruh infusion) occurring at 120 days post-conception according to a Hadith narrated by Abdullah ibn Mas'ud: the angel shapes the fetus for 120 days before breathing in the soul, marking the transition to full humanity and prohibiting abortion thereafter except to save the mother's life. Prior to ensoulment, the embryo lacks equivalent status, though some fatwas enjoin respect; for IVF, scholars from bodies like the Islamic Fiqh Council prohibit discarding viable embryos casually, urging donation or implantation to honor potential life, as destruction post-fertilization risks violating prohibitions on wasting divine creation (Quran 17:31). Full legal rights accrue at birth (Quran 76:8), but prenatal stages demand care, paralleling imperatives to protect vulnerable persons like orphans (Quran 4:2-10), while rejecting personhood extensions to animals despite mercy toward them (Hadith in Sahih Bukhari 2365).

Eastern and Indigenous Views

In Hinduism, the ātman, or eternal soul, inhabits all jīvas (living entities), enabling cycles of across human, , and other forms, yet human birth confers superior status for pursuing , knowledge, and liberation (mokṣa) due to enhanced cognitive faculties and capacities, positioning humans at the apex of reincarnatory hierarchies. Animal souls, while sentient, occupy inferior rungs requiring karmic evolution toward human embodiment for ethical and spiritual progress, underscoring human-centric duties over egalitarian personhood extension. (non-violence) mandates compassion toward animals but frames them as subordinate, not co-persons entitled to equivalent moral standing, as evidenced in texts like the Manusmṛti prioritizing human varṇa-based obligations. Buddhist doctrine emphasizes (vijñāna) as the basis for rebirth across six realms, with human existence deemed uniquely precious for cultivating insight and escaping , as human faculties enable ethical discernment unavailable in animal states dominated by . While all sentient beings possess and warrant (compassion) under , animals lack the personhood-equivalent agency for practice, reinforcing human priority in soteriological hierarchies without conferring reciprocal . Traditional views align with sanctity of life from conception, rejecting as interruption of karmic continuity, though modern interpretations vary; surveys indicate strong cultural disapproval, with 80% of Indian women opposing it in 1996 despite higher procedural rates influenced by socioeconomic factors. Indigenous animistic frameworks, such as Andean reciprocity with Pachamama (Earth Mother), attribute agency to natural entities through relational ontologies where humans act as stewards via rituals like offerings and agrarian cycles, sustaining balance without equating non-human elements to human personhood. Human communities dominate these exchanges, directing moral duties and hierarchies—evident in ritual leadership by elders or shamans—that prioritize intra-human social orders over undifferentiated nature equality. Western romanticizations often idealize these as flat ecological egalitarianism, ignoring embedded tribal hierarchies and human guardianship roles that assert dominance through ceremonial authority, potentially constraining indigenous agency by projecting external narratives. Such traditions correlate with sanctity emphases, manifesting in ritual prohibitions against fetal harm in many groups, though empirical abortion data remains sparse and context-dependent.

Contemporary Controversies

Fetal and Reproductive Rights Debates

The U.S. Supreme Court's 2022 Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization decision, which overturned Roe v. Wade, prompted renewed advocacy for fetal personhood, positioning it as the anti-abortion movement's primary strategy to confer constitutional rights on fetuses from conception. This shift has led to state laws extending personhood to embryos and fetuses, potentially impacting criminal justice, taxation, and fertility treatments by treating prenatal life as equivalent to born persons. In Georgia, the 2019 Living Infants Fairness and Equality (LIFE) Act (HB 481) defines an "unborn child" as a natural person entitled to legal rights, a provision activated post-Dobbs and applied in 2025 to require life support for a brain-dead pregnant woman until fetal viability, overriding family wishes to prioritize the fetus. Alabama's 2024 Supreme Court ruling declared frozen IVF embryos "extrauterine children" under the state's wrongful death statute, prompting three major clinics to pause services amid fears of liability for embryo loss or destruction, though subsequent legislation granted IVF providers civil and criminal immunity. Project 2025, a policy blueprint from conservative groups, explicitly endorses fetal personhood by asserting life begins at conception, advocating restrictions on abortion pills and surveillance measures that could extend to IVF practices involving embryo selection or disposal. Post-Dobbs, pregnancy-related criminal prosecutions in the U.S. surged, with over 400 cases documented from 2022 to 2025 across 16 states, including charges for miscarriages or stillbirths often linked to substance use or perceived neglect, as prosecutors invoked fetal protection statutes to treat fetal harm as homicide. These cases highlight tensions between fetal protections and maternal autonomy, with empirical data showing increased investigations into natural pregnancy losses, though convictions remain low due to evidentiary challenges. In , Poland's 2020 Constitutional Tribunal ruling effectively imposed a near-total ban by deeming terminations for fetal anomalies unconstitutional, permitting exceptions only for , , or imminent or health risks, resulting in documented delays in care, maternal suffering, and thousands of women compelled to carry non-viable pregnancies to term annually. Ireland's 2018 repealed constitutional protections for the unborn, shifting to access up to 12 weeks on request, but subsequent 2023-2024 debates reflected ongoing conflicts over in broader amendments, which failed to pass amid concerns over diluting prenatal safeguards. Critics of fetal personhood argue it creates inconsistencies in IVF, where clinics routinely discard surplus embryos—estimated at hundreds of thousands annually in the U.S.—potentially criminalizing standard procedures if embryos hold full legal status equivalent to children, as evidenced by Alabama's ruling-induced halt. Pro-life advocates counter that personhood upholds causal reality of human life from fertilization, proposing IVF alternatives like single-embryo transfers to minimize destruction, while citing stable U.S. domestic rates of approximately 25,000 annually (2021-2022 data) as a viable option for unwanted pregnancies, though surveys indicate fewer than 1% of women seeking abortions opt for , with 91% choosing to parent if carried to term. These debates underscore empirical trade-offs: enhanced prenatal protections correlate with reduced abortions but elevate risks to maternal liberty and fertility access, without corresponding surges in adoption uptake.

AI and Technological Personhood Claims

In 2024 and 2025, advocates for AI personhood argued that advanced systems like large language models exhibit behaviors warranting legal recognition, drawing analogies to corporate entities with limited and duties. However, these claims faced significant pushback, as no demonstrates AI or , with expert surveys estimating only a 25% median probability of conscious AI by 2034. Proposals for partial , such as ethical duties toward AI without full personhood, emphasize status on a continuum akin to animals but reject equating AI with human-like agency, prioritizing human instead. Legislative responses in the U.S. underscored the prematurity of such bids, with states enacting or proposing bans to affirm AI as nonsentient tools. Ohio's House Bill 469, introduced in , explicitly declares AI systems nonsentient, prohibits their legal personhood, and bans human-AI marriages to safeguard societal norms and liability chains. Similarly, North Dakota's HB 1361 redefined "person" in state code to exclude AI and other nonhumans, while Utah's HB 249 barred state entities from recognizing AI personhood, reflecting concerns that premature could dilute human-centric legal frameworks. These measures maintain creator liability, avoiding complications where AI "rights" might shield developers from accountability for harms, thus fostering innovation by clarifying AI's status as programmable rather than autonomous agents. The EU AI Act, effective from 2024, reinforces this tool-based approach by classifying high-risk AI systems under without granting personhood, imposing obligations on providers for transparency and while resisting extensions of legal personality. Analogies to falter here, as corporations serve human economic purposes with duties traceable to owners, whereas AI lacks intrinsic causal or independent volition, per 2025 analyses questioning claims absent brain-like structures. discussions in 2025, including Commission explorations, similarly treat personhood extension as radical and unproven, prioritizing regulatory oversight to preserve human norms without empirical justification for AI . Granting prematurely risks eroding incentives for verifiable advancements, as tool status ensures harms revert to human designers, aligning with causal principles.

Critiques of Dilution and Prioritization

Critics of expanded personhood contend that granting such status to entities erodes established hierarchies by diffusing legal and material resources across entities lacking comparable or reciprocity. This dilution, they argue, prioritizes speculative or anthropomorphic interests over verifiable human needs, as evidenced by persistent global metrics—where 8.5% of the world population, or approximately 689 million , lived below $2.15 daily in —amid for claims that yield minimal tangible enforcement. Such expansions reject human exceptionalism, rooted in empirical distinctions like advanced and societal contribution, without sufficient counter-evidence from or behavioral studies showing equivalence. In environmental contexts, legal personhood for natural features, as in Ecuador's 2008 constitution or Bolivia's 2010 laws, has failed to curb exploitation, with critics noting these frameworks often serve as rhetorical tools rather than enforceable protections, leading to continued resource extraction without . remains negligible; for instance, Ecuador's provisions have not prevented ongoing and activities in biodiverse areas, highlighting causal disconnects where symbolic divert policy focus from human development without reciprocal benefits. New Zealand's Whanganui River designation in 2017 similarly faces implementation gaps, underscoring how such dilutions strain judicial systems without addressing root through human-centric stewardship. Corporate personhood expansions, amplified by the 2010 ruling, exemplify prioritization critiques by enabling unlimited political spending that correlates with widened inequality; U.S. Gini coefficients rose from approximately 0.38 in the early to 0.41 by post-taxes and transfers, as concentrated influenced policies favoring wealth retention over redistribution. This overreach inflates disparities, with super PACs channeling billions—over $6 billion in the cycle alone—toward outcomes that entrench elite interests, eroding democratic responsiveness to median human concerns. Empirical responses to crises reveal implicit prioritization, as during the , protocols universally favored patients based on and reciprocity potential, allocating scarce ventilators and ICU beds without legal challenges from animal or environmental advocates despite parallel welfare strains. Animal shelters adopted but secondary to healthcare demands, affirming that full personhood claims lack practical uptake in high-stakes scenarios, where causal realism dictates resources flow to entities with proven societal stakes. While limited welfare measures for animals or ecosystems—such as anti-cruelty laws or conservation funding—are defensible on utilitarian grounds without granting personhood, full legal equivalence undermines without empirical justification, as courts consistently deny non-human claims citing absent reciprocity and moral culpability. Proponents of restraint argue this preserves hierarchies enabling effective aid, avoiding misallocations like environmental litigation comprising under 1% of federal cases yet symbolizing opportunity costs against unaddressed human vulnerabilities.

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