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Our Homeland Movement
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Our Homeland Movement (Hungarian: Mi Hazánk Mozgalom, pronounced [ˈmi ˈhɒzaːŋk ˈmozɡɒlom], Mi Hazánk, MHM, MH) is a Hungarian far-right political party. It was founded by Ásotthalom mayor and former Jobbik Vice-President, László Toroczkai, along with other Jobbik dissidents who left the organization after the party's leadership moved away from its radical beginnings. The party ran in the 2019 European Parliament elections for the first time, but it did not win a seat. However, in the 2022 parliamentary election, it became the third-largest party in the country with a result of nearly 6%, far surpassing public opinion polls. In the 2024 European Parliament elections, the party continued to increase its support, reaching nearly 7%.

Key Information

History

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On April 8, 2018, after the lost elections, the president of Jobbik, Gábor Vona, resigned, true to his promise, and therefore a reform congress was announced in the party. László Toroczkai was the first to indicate his intention to run for the position of president, which was followed by the presidential application of Tamás Sneider, nominated by the acting presidency. Almost half of the congress delegates (46%) voted for the pair of László Toroczkai (president) and Dóra Dúro (deputy president). László Toroczkai announced that he is forming a platform within the party called Mi Magunk.[21] The presidency announced that it will not accept Toroczkai's platform because it considers it against the constitution, although there is no such decision in the constitution. Proceedings were initiated against Toroczkai and Dóra Dúró, Dóra Dúró was expelled from the faction, and Toroczkai from the party. After that, Dóra Dúró[22] and her husband Előd Novák left the party, so the Mi Magunk platform became an independent movement. Due to the failure of the platform creation, the new movement under the name Mi Hazánk Mozgalom will raise its flag on June 23, 2018 in Ásottthalom. As a result of Toroczkai's expulsion and the proceedings against Dóra Dúró, many Jobbik members and grassroots organizations indicated their withdrawal from the party or their dissolution. Some of them joined the new movement.[23] On August 20, 2018, they announced their Founding Declaration at their celebratory event in Budapest's Városliget, and the next day, on August 21, 2018, Deputy President Dóra Dúró announced that the court registration of Mi Hazánk Mozgalom as a political party was legally binding.[24]

In early 2019, the party made an alliance with the right-wing Hungarian Justice and Life Party and the agrarian Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers and Civic Party.[25]

In 2019 local elections, the party won 8 seats in counties' assemblies.

In the 2022 parliamentary election, the party surpassed the 5% threshold to enter parliament, winning 6 seats and forming the second largest faction in the Hungarian Parliament.

In 2022, the party hosted representatives of Alternative for Sweden (AfS), Alternative for Germany (AfD), the Dutch Forum for Democracy (FvD) and the Bulgarian Revival party at the Hungarian-Serbian border, describing them as "allies".[26] Our Homeland Movement party leader László Toroczkai, as well as AfD's Stefan Korte, both held individual speeches at AfS's election campaign meeting held in Rålambshovsparken in Stockholm on 6 August 2022.[27]

In August 2023, the party organized a joint "Declaration for a free Europe of Nations" with the AfS, FvD, Revival, the Czech Republic's Freedom and Direct Democracy and the Swiss Mass-Voll party, with a view towards forming a future new group in the European Parliament.[28]

Ideology

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Although the party identifies itself as "third way", opposing the policies of both the left-wing opposition and the governing right-wing party Fidesz, the mass-media has variously described Our Homeland Movement and its ideology as nationalist,[29] right-wing populist,[5] far-right,[10][11] radical right,[18] extremist[30] and even neo-fascist.[40] The party has anti-immigration,[8] anti-Masonic[41] and pro-Russian views,[42][43] and it was also accused of having anti-Islamic,[42] antiziganist,[44][45] antisemitic[46][47] views. The party holds national conservative,[6] traditionalist[7] and social conservative positions.[48]

Economy

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The party also positioned itself as agrarianist.[49] According to the movement, Hungary should become economically independent, and to this end, the party would create hundreds of small and large food processing plants in the country and announce a new land distribution program.[50] With the distribution of land, they would like to favor young Hungarians in particular.[51] They would re-establish the Hangya Szövetkezet (Ant Cooperative)[52] that existed in Hungary in the first half of the 20th century, whose task was to ensure that farmers achieved a good position in the market, allowing their interests to prevail.[53]

The movement holds anti-communist views.[54] The party demands the disclosure of agent lists, the accountability of party state leaders – for example, MSZMP leaders, KISZ secretaries, Workers' Militia and ÁVH members – and their ban from public life, as well as the withdrawal of communist luxury pensions.[52] The party considers the Antifa movement a terrorist organization.[55][56] They support the demolition of statues containing communist symbols, such as the Soviet Heroic Monument on Liberty Square.[57]

Corruption

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To curb corruption,[58] they would abolish immunity. They oppose joining the European Public Prosecutor's Office,[59] instead wishing to establish a Hungarian Anti-corruption Prosecutor's Office.[60] The executive board of the organization would include prosecutors delegated by the government and the opposition, as well as non-parliamentary social organizations.[52]

Diaspora

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The party supports the autonomy of Hungarian communities abroad, for example, it supports the Székely autonomy movement and it also supports Hungarian Regional Autonomy.[61] They would support education of the Hungarian diaspora in the Hungarian language from kindergarten to university, as well as the use of Hungarian national symbols.[52][62] The party wishes to establish the day of the signing of the Second Vienna Award as a holiday, called the Day of Homecoming, to commemorate the territorial revisions recovered by regent Miklós Horthy.[63]

Social issues

[edit]

The party strongly opposes LGBT rights.[64] After the release of a children's book, Meseország mindenkié, which features LGBT members and ethnic minorities as characters, the Deputy President of the party, Dóra Dúró, referred to the book as "homosexual propaganda" during a press conference, and promptly ripped pages out of the book and then shredded them. The move caused significant controversy and garnered international attention.[65] The party has called for a ban on LGBT pride marches.[66][67]

Environment

[edit]

In an interview with Mandiner, party leader László Toroczkai described MHM as "a unique green party in Europe", stating that "we are unwilling to accept that only anti-social and anti-human liberal parties can be green parties. We think that those who do not want to protect our environment, our forests, our beautiful Great Plain, Lake Balaton, our rivers cannot really love their homeland". Thus, the party is sometimes referred to as supporting some form of green conservatism.[6]

Health

[edit]

Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the party has protested lockdown measures set in place by the government, accusing them of "inciting panic" and ruining the country.[68] The party also promotes vaccine hesitancy, having launched a petition against the use of COVID-vaccines on children aged 12–15.[69] In 2024, they called on the government to explore the possibility of banning mRNA vaccines, which they say are "responsible for many health problems and deaths".[70] Previously, several politicians of the party have falsely spread the claim that vaccines are "three times more deadly than the virus itself."[71] They support withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO).[72]

Security

[edit]

The party supports the reintroduction of the death penalty, and it also supports the reintroduction of conscription.[73][74][75] They support the re-establishment of the Hungarian Border Guard,[76] the development of the Hungarian national defence and military industry.[77] However, they oppose the participation of Hungarian soldiers in international missions.[78][79]

Foreign policy

[edit]

In foreign policy, the party advocates closer ties with Turkey, the states of the Persian Gulf, the BRICS countries, and Palestine.[80][81]

During the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the party referred to Ukraine as an "unfriendly country" and called on it to give up territory claimed by Russia "for the sake of peace".[82][83] They did not support sanctions against Russia and voted against Finland's[84] and Sweden's[85] accession to NATO. On 27 January 2024 Toroczkai said at a conference that the party would lay claim to a Hungarian-populated region in western Ukraine if the war led to Ukraine losing its statehood.[86]

The party advocates neutrality in the Israel-Palestine conflict and criticises the Fidesz government for its pro-Israel stance, with Our Homeland Movement calling for an immediate ceasefire and two-state solution, condemning the death of civilians on both sides, and describing the Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip as a "massacre".[87] The party later invited the Ambassador of South Africa to Hungary to present its claim of Israeli genocide in Gaza at an event held at the Turkish Embassy, and advocated for designating Israeli settlers in the West Bank as terrorists.[88]

The movement would initiate a referendum on Hungary's withdrawal from the European Union.[89][90] They believe that Western European multinational companies take more profits out of the country than money comes in from the EU.[52] They completely reject the European Federalism.[91] Instead, they prefer nationalist nation-states. As a result, Mi Hazánk has been described as nationalist,[92] and eurosceptic.[93]

Education

[edit]

In education, their goal is to modernize the curriculum and reduce the amount of current curriculum. They believe that IT, English and physical education should be given priority. In addition, they consider the nationalist education of young Hungarians and their education for family life to be important. They support the creation of Christian and nationalist children's movements, such as the Levente Movement. In the summer of 2023, they started such camps in several settlements of the country. The party supports the segregation of Hungarian and Roma pupils in educational institutions.[94] However, according to the party's official position, students would be segregated based on their behavior rather than their nationality.[52]

Organizational structure

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László Toroczkai speaking at Corvin köz

Leaders

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Image Name Entered office Left office Length of Leadership
1 László Toroczkai 23 June 2018 present 7 years, 4 months and 12 days

Membership

[edit]
The number of members of Our Homeland Movement
Year Membership
2019 Increase 1,000[95]
2020 Increase 1,300[96]
2022 Increase 2,500 – 3,000[2]

Paramilitary wing

[edit]

In May 2019, it was announced the party would be forming the National Legion, a uniformed "self-defense" group similar to Magyar Gárda, the paramilitary wing of Jobbik, which was banned in 2009.[97][98] The National Legion ceased to exist a year later, and its members merged into the Hungarian Self-Defense Movement, which operated independently of the party.[99]

Electoral results

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National Assembly

[edit]
Election Leader Constituency Party list Seats +/– Status
Votes % Votes %
2022 László Toroczkai 307,064 5.71% (#3) 332,487 5.88% (#3)
6 / 199
 New Opposition

European Parliament

[edit]
Election List leader Votes % Seats +/− EP Group
2019 László Toroczkai 114,156 3.29 (#6)
0 / 21
 New –
2024 306,404 6.71 (#4)
1 / 21
 Increase 1 ESN

References

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Our Homeland Movement

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The Our Homeland Movement (Mi Hazánk Mozgalom (short name: Mi Hazánk)) is a Hungarian nationalist established in June 2018 by , a journalist, activist, and former vice-president of the party who serves as its ongoing leader. The party emerged from dissatisfaction within Jobbik's more radical factions over its moderating shift toward centrism, positioning itself as a defender of Hungarian against perceived threats from mass immigration, supranational institutions, and cultural erosion. Mi Hazánk's platform, outlined in its Dawn Program, prioritizes border security to halt unauthorized migration, promotion of work-based economic policies that reward diligence and expertise, support for family formation through incentives for domestic child-rearing, and a Eurosceptic stance favoring national independence over deeper EU integration. The movement advocates irredentist elements, such as claims to territories with ethnic Hungarian populations like Ukraine's Zakarpattia region, reflecting a broader emphasis on ethnic Hungarian unity across borders. In the 2022 parliamentary elections, it achieved 6.18% of the national list vote, securing seven seats in the 199-member National Assembly and becoming the third-largest party by parliamentary representation. This breakthrough marked its transition from fringe activism to institutionalized opposition, further evidenced by László Toroczkai's election to the European Parliament in 2024 with approximately 6% of Hungary's vote. The party's rise has highlighted fractures in Hungary's right-wing spectrum, challenging Fidesz's dominance while critiquing both the ruling coalition and left-liberal opposition for insufficient defense of national interests.

History

Founding and Initial Mobilization

The Our Homeland Movement (Mi Hazánk Mozgalom) was established in June 2018 by , the mayor of Ásotthalom and former vice-president of , in collaboration with and Előd Novák, shortly after Toroczkai's expulsion from Jobbik on June 8, 2018. The initiative arose amid dissatisfaction among hardline nationalists with Jobbik's shift toward moderation and cooperation with left-leaning opposition forces, prompting a push to preserve more uncompromising positions on national sovereignty, immigration restriction, and anti-globalism. Initial mobilization efforts began immediately, with the movement announcing its first public action on June 17, 2018, involving the distribution of perforated flags ("lyukaszászlók") to symbolize demands for a thorough reckoning with Hungary's communist past and the removal of Soviet-era symbols. This symbolic protest aimed to rally supporters around historical revisionism and anti-communist sentiments, drawing on Toroczkai's prior activism in border security and opposition to migration during the . By July 17, 2018, the group presented a 20-point "debate starter" document outside the Hungarian Parliament, outlining provocative positions such as holding a on Hungary's membership and stricter border controls. The movement's founding declaration was debated publicly starting in July 2018 and formally unveiled during an event on August 20, 2018, emphasizing themes of national and resistance to perceived threats from international organizations and mass immigration. Early activities focused on organizing, street demonstrations, and media appearances to consolidate a base among voters disillusioned with mainstream right-wing parties, achieving initial visibility through Toroczkai's established profile in nationalist circles. These efforts laid the groundwork for broader mobilization, prioritizing over institutional politics at the outset.

Break from Jobbik and Party Registration

In the aftermath of the April 2018 Hungarian parliamentary elections, underwent significant internal reforms aimed at moderating its image and broadening its appeal, prompting dissent from its more radical nationalist faction. , 's vice-president and mayor of Ásotthalom, emerged as a leading critic of this , advocating for a return to the party's original hardline positions on , , and anti-globalism. On June 8, 2018, Jobbik's disciplinary committee expelled , citing violations of party bylaws related to his independent political activities and platform, which included organizing a parallel presidential candidacy effort. , another prominent MP aligned with Toroczkai, faced similar expulsion shortly thereafter, accelerating the fracture within the party's radical wing. The expelled leaders promptly established a new organization to represent those dissatisfied with Jobbik's pivot toward . Initially formed as Mi Magunk (We Ourselves), the group rebranded to Mi Hazánk Mozgalom (Our Homeland Movement) on June 15, 2018, explicitly positioning itself as the guardian of Jobbik's founding ethno-nationalist principles that the parent party was allegedly abandoning. The movement officially launched on June 23, 2018, drawing supporters from Jobbik's grassroots base and former members who viewed the split as a necessary preservation of ideological purity amid Jobbik's electoral strategy to ally with left-leaning opposition against . Toroczkai was elected founding president, with the platform emphasizing , border security, and rejection of —issues where Jobbik's had alienated core voters. To contest elections formally, Mi Hazánk pursued legal registration as a under Hungarian , which requires approval and submission of founding documents, signatures, and bylaws. The registration process began in July 2018, with Toroczkai indicating plans for official party status by to enable participation in upcoming polls. On August 21, 2018, vice-president announced that the Metropolitan of had finalized the entry into the official registry of , granting Mi Hazánk full legal standing as a competing entity. This milestone allowed the party to field candidates independently, marking the culmination of the break and enabling its mobilization as a distinct radical nationalist alternative to both and the ruling .

2022 Electoral Breakthrough

In the Hungarian parliamentary election held on 3 April 2022, Our Homeland Movement achieved its first entry into the by crossing the 5% electoral threshold. The party campaigned independently, emphasizing nationalist positions distinct from both the ruling alliance and the united opposition coalition. Our Homeland Movement received 332,487 votes on the , amounting to 5.91% of the valid votes cast. This performance yielded seven seats in the 199-member legislature, all from the compensatory proportional list, as the party secured no victories in the 106 single-member districts. The result marked a significant advance from prior local and European elections, where the party had not attained national parliamentary representation despite growing support. The breakthrough positioned Our Homeland Movement as the third strongest party by national list vote share among those gaining seats, behind Fidesz-KDNP (54.13%) and the united opposition (34.44%). Analysts attributed the gains partly to voter dissatisfaction with Fidesz's governance and the opposition's perceived moderation, drawing support from former sympathizers and conservative nationalists. Party leader highlighted the outcome as validation of the movement's stance against , globalism, and perceived elite corruption.

Developments Since 2022

Following its entry into the in 2022 with six seats, Mi Hazánk Mozgalom has sustained its parliamentary opposition role, advocating for stricter immigration enforcement, economic independence from global influences, and reduced integration. The party has frequently criticized the Fidesz government's migration policies as insufficiently rigorous. In 2023, Mi Hazánk organized anti-migrant patrols in alongside affiliated groups, highlighting ongoing concerns over border security and urban safety. Party leader reiterated support for restoring for severe crimes, positioning the party as advocating tougher measures. The group also participated in public demonstrations against perceived government leniency on cultural and sovereignty issues. The 2024 elections marked a consolidation of support. In the elections held on June 9, 2024, Mi Hazánk secured representation, with Toroczkai elected as a . Concurrently, in the local elections on the same date, the party finished second in nearly every contest, outperforming several established opposition groups and indicating expanded regional influence. Post-2024, Mi Hazánk has intensified rally activities at sites like Corvin köz, mobilizing supporters against EU-driven policies and domestic economic challenges. In 2024, Toroczkai facilitated the creation of a new European political alliance with like-minded nationalist parties, aiming to amplify hard Eurosceptic voices outside major groupings. The party proposed amendments to social media regulations to curb perceived foreign influence on Hungarian discourse. By late 2025, Mi Hazánk continued preparing for future national contests, emphasizing national preservation amid geopolitical tensions.

Ideology and Principles

Nationalism and National Sovereignty

The Our Homeland Movement promotes a rooted in the preservation of Hungarian ethnic identity, , and historical continuity, viewing the nation as an organic community bound by shared ancestry, , and traditions. Central to this is the protection of Hungary's thousand-year Christian-Western cultural framework alongside its ancient Magyar roots, which the argues form the basis of national cohesion and resilience against external dilutions. This perspective manifests in policies prioritizing the interests of ethnic , including support for communities in neighboring countries and opposition to demographic changes driven by mass immigration, which the movement contends erode national homogeneity and . In terms of national , Mi Hazánk advocates for Hungary's absolute control over its borders, , and foreign policy, rejecting supranational encroachments that subordinate domestic priorities to international agendas. The party grounds its in arguments that EU integration has progressively undermined state autonomy, particularly through migration quotas, fiscal transfers, and centralized , and calls for a reformed "Europe of Nations" model emphasizing equal , national veto rights, and repatriation of competencies to member states. It has proposed exiting alliances like if they conflict with Hungarian neutrality and , as articulated in response to conflicts involving Hungarian-minority regions in and . Leader has emphasized as a bulwark against globalist influences, arguing that true national independence requires rejecting and prioritizing citizen protection from both internal decay and external pressures, such as those posed by or Washington. This stance aligns with the party's 2022 electoral platform, which framed restoration as essential for economic and cultural , garnering 6.18% of the national vote and parliamentary representation.

Anti-Globalism and Euroscepticism

The Our Homeland Movement (Mi Hazánk Mozgalom) positions itself as a proponent of hard , rejecting deeper integration in favor of a loose modeled on a " of Nations," where member states maintain full , cultural , and rights over supranational decisions. This framework, articulated in party communications, prioritizes national independence over federalist structures, viewing the current as eroding Hungary's through policies on migration, economic oversight, and . In its 2022 parliamentary election program Virradat (Dawn), the party pledged to initiate a national referendum on Hungary's EU membership, arguing that persistent "intellectual, economic, and moral destruction" inflicted by Brussels—such as mandatory migrant quotas and regulatory overreach—could justify withdrawal if unresolved. Mi Hazánk frames the EU as a "globalist empire" engineered to forge a centralized "United States of Europe," which it contends subordinates national parliaments to unelected bureaucrats and multinational interests. Leader László Toroczkai has explicitly linked Euroscepticism to broader anti-globalism, urging the party on January 28, 2024, to "find partners in our fight against globalism" at a congress focused on resisting supranational erosion of sovereignty. He reiterated this on October 23, 2023, calling for a "global opening against globalisation" to preserve Hungarian identity amid demographic shifts and cultural homogenization driven by international bodies like the UN and EU. These views manifest in opposition to global pacts, such as WHO influence on national health policy, which Toroczkai critiqued in 2023 as initial steps toward supranational governance overriding domestic priorities. The party's anti-globalist rhetoric emphasizes causal threats to national cohesion, including economic dependencies that favor multinational corporations over local industries and migration frameworks that dilute ethnic majorities, positioning Hungary's as contingent on reclaiming policy control from transnational elites. This stance differentiates Mi Hazánk from softer critics like , advocating outright confrontation rather than tactical negotiation within institutions.

Social Conservatism and Family Values

The Our Homeland Movement advocates for social conservatism rooted in the preservation of traditional Hungarian family structures, emphasizing the nuclear family as the foundation of national continuity and demographic stability. The party positions the family as central to countering Hungary's population decline, which it quantifies as a loss of 1.6 million ethnic Hungarians since 1989, warning of potential shifts in ethnic composition if trends persist. This stance aligns with a broader rejection of globalist influences, including what the party describes as the promotion of sexual deviance under the guise of LGBTQ rights, viewed as part of an agenda to undermine traditional values. Party vice-president Dóra Dúró has publicly opposed the inclusion of homosexual themes in children's literature, shredding a copy of a disputed book in parliament in September 2020 to protest perceived propaganda targeting youth. In family policy, the movement proposes measures to incentivize and child-rearing among working , including financial support for full-time parenting contingent on prior or history, inflation-adjusted allowances, and reduced VAT on child-related goods. It calls for linking family benefits from child onward to parental , aiming to foster self-sufficiency while addressing the "demographic catastrophe" through a dedicated Authority. These initiatives prioritize ethnic Hungarian reproduction, with proposals for enhanced patriotic in a national children's movement to instill values of , , and national heritage from an early age. On abortion, the party seeks to restrict on-demand procedures, which it cites as numbering around 30,000 annually and constituting a national crisis, by requiring medical justification and mandating that women hear the fetal heartbeat before proceeding. Dúró has advocated this measure as essential for protecting fetal life, positioning Mi Hazánk as the sole party committed to such safeguards. The approach reflects a causal emphasis on reducing s through maternal awareness and alternative support, rather than outright bans, while critiquing liberal policies for enabling demographic erosion. Culturally, the movement promotes Christian-national education to reinforce traditional gender roles and family norms, opposing gender theory and LGBTQ content in schools as threats to . It has called for bans on pride marches and defunding of related state-supported activities, framing these as deviations from a where long-term is viable without pressures. This framework integrates with , arguing that external progressive agendas exacerbate internal declines in birth rates and cultural cohesion.

Policy Positions

Economy and Corruption

The Our Homeland Movement promotes an economically sovereign emphasizing self-sufficiency and national interests over global integration. Its Virradat Program outlines a "real and strong national economy" built on three pillars: , , and public safety, with proposals to construct 700 plants within two years to bolster domestic production and reduce import dependence. The party prioritizes support for Hungarian small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) through state interventions, including land redistribution for farmers and redirection of subsidies away from multinational corporations, which it claims receive HUF 51.8 billion annually under the current government—higher than the HUF 18.6 billion under prior left-liberal administrations. This approach seeks economic resilience via independence, accepting potentially slower growth in favor of protecting domestic wages and employment. Fiscal policies include tax reductions to stimulate activity: lowering VAT on basic foodstuffs and child-rearing essentials to ensure price drops, implementing a multi-tiered tax system to raise net salaries up to HUF 1.2 million monthly, and cutting employer wage deductions to boost hiring. Revenue for these measures would derive from expanded agricultural and sectors, alongside targeted levies such as a on billionaires and a pandemic solidarity tax on multinational profiteers from , earmarked for HUF 3 trillion in total investments to repair pandemic-related economic damage, starting with HUF 1.5 trillion. Debt management would involve extending maturities and keeping borrowings domestic, modeled partly on Japan's approach, while directing National Bank of profits to the budget with mandates for transparency and prioritizing Hungarian jobs. Rural revitalization features prominently, with plans for job creation and service restoration in villages through SME incentives and programs distinguishing value-creating labor at from rehabilitative roles. On corruption, the movement positions itself against the ruling system's alleged , advocating abolition of to enable prosecutions and establishment of an independent national Prosecutor’s Office—led by a bipartisan panel—to probe all political graft, rejecting integration with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office in favor of domestic control. Proposals include mandatory quadrennial wealth audits for officials, doubled sentences for economic crimes, full upon conviction, and re-nationalization of corruptly acquired lands or contracts, such as revising exclusive deals in infrastructure like motorways. The party has pursued these stances through actions like filing criminal complaints over government deals, including a August 2024 on the state’s HUF 600 billion purchase of offices from figures linked to Orbán’s son-in-law at a 40% markup. Funding for economic recovery, including anti-COVID measures, would partly stem from recovered corrupt assets, underscoring the party's view that curbing elite enrichment enables broader fiscal relief.

Immigration and Diaspora Protection

The Our Homeland Movement maintains a hardline anti-immigration stance, prioritizing the preservation of Hungary's ethnic composition and through comprehensive border controls and rejection of migrant inflows. In its 2022 parliamentary election program, the party declares a policy of " vis-à-vis migration," aiming for a "0% immigrant, 100% Hungarian country" by halting all , including legal pathways for non-Europeans, to shield domestic labor markets from undercutting by low-wage foreign workers. It credits founder with pioneering the southern border fence concept in 2014 and pledges to expand it alongside re-establishing a dedicated force, drawn from residents of frontier counties for localized expertise. Enforcement would include "deterrent fire order" against violent border violators and immediate fines in the millions of Hungarian forints for detected illegal entrants, framing such measures as essential defenses against "external housebreakers." The party also targets state programs perceived as facilitating migration, such as the Stipendium Hungaricum scholarship initiative, which it estimates costs 30-40 billion HUF annually to host thousands of non-European students, advocating redirection of funds to Hungarian educational needs. This position aligns with broader critiques of migration pressures, positioning Mi Hazánk as more restrictive than even the governing party's policies, though both emphasize over supranational quotas. On diaspora protection, the movement emphasizes safeguarding ethnic Hungarians in neighboring states severed by the 1920 , proposing repeal of Act XXXIII of 1921 that ratified the treaty's losses and pursuit of moral and legal redress via the . It advocates autonomy rights, mother-tongue schooling, and cross-border infrastructure like a proposed from Ásotthalom to Szabadka in to foster ties with separated communities. Further, the program endorses voluntary military service eligibility for Hungarian-speaking citizens from "annexed territories" to bolster national defense and integrates cultural preservation by mandating inclusion of literature from authors, such as , in school curricula. This irredentist-leaning approach underscores a commitment to "Greater Hungary" ideals, with leader Toroczkai publicly asserting claims to Hungarian-populated areas like Ukraine's Zakarpattia region amid geopolitical shifts.

Security and Law Enforcement

The Our Homeland Movement advocates prioritizing the rights of officers and law-abiding citizens over those of criminals in criminal policy, criticizing prevailing liberal approaches for undermining effective policing. The proposes enhancing police capabilities by allowing off-duty officers to carry firearms, increasing salaries—which have not risen since 2008—and restoring service pensions to improve recruitment and retention. Additionally, it calls for stronger legal protections against prosecution for lawful actions taken in the line of duty, positioning these measures as essential to bolstering public safety and deterring . To address , the party supports re-establishing a dedicated force recruited locally and creating a unit with specialized training and distinctive uniforms to high-risk areas and intimidate potential offenders. It emphasizes zero-tolerance enforcement, including lowering the threshold for property offenses from 50,000 HUF to 20,000 HUF to classify more acts as criminal. These initiatives aim to shift focus from reactive policing to proactive deterrence, with the party arguing that current systems fail to ensure amid rising threats. In terms of , the movement proposes transforming prisons into compulsory labor camps where inmates work unpaid to compensate for damages caused, rejecting rehabilitation models in favor of restitution and deterrence. For severe offenses such as by repeat offenders or political crimes, it endorses reinstating the death penalty, citing a study by professors claiming a reduction of 74 homicides per execution as evidence of efficacy. Extreme measures include deporting dangerous criminals to remote facilities like for lifelong isolation, intended to eliminate risks and signal uncompromising resolve against . The party critiques systemic flaws in the justice system that it views as enabling , such as fostering , and proposes its abolition alongside an independent prosecutor's office led by bipartisan oversight. It also advocates withdrawing from the ' jurisdiction to halt what it describes as a "prison compensation business" that incentivizes frivolous claims against . To expedite processes, trials would face strict continuation limits, such as 30 days, aiming to prevent delays that undermine enforcement credibility.

Environment and Health

The Our Homeland Movement has established a dedicated environmental cabinet known as Zöld Hazánk, formed on June 5, 2019, to address nature conservation, environmental protection, and animal welfare. The party describes itself as Europe's first "green national radical" organization, emphasizing the safeguarding of the Carpathian Basin's natural resources against pollution and overexploitation. Key proposals include rigorous monitoring of soil, water, and air quality, with strict penalties imposed on industrial facilities violating emission standards, and initiatives to expand green spaces in urban areas to mitigate heat islands and enhance CO2 absorption. In , the movement advocates for sustainable practices, including GMO-free production, reduced use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, and promotion of to preserve and ensure . It opposes of Hungarian land and , viewing them as national assets requiring protection from misuse. Additional measures target reduction through reusable alternatives and stricter animal protection laws, such as banning fur farms and imposing jail terms for deliberate animal cruelty. On health, the party prioritizes accessible, high-quality public healthcare, calling for increased funding, higher salaries for medical staff, and penalties for corruption such as unofficial gratuities. It seeks to bolster primary care infrastructure and reduce administrative burdens on providers while developing a national strategy to extend healthy life expectancy and curb preventable mortality through lifestyle promotion, including anti-smoking and anti-alcohol campaigns via targeted taxes and school programs. Preventive health links to environmental and agricultural policies, with emphasis on chemical-free domestic food production to counter health risks from imported, low-quality goods. The movement has expressed strong opposition to the World Health Organization, advocating Hungary's withdrawal following the United States' example under President Trump, citing concerns over global health governance.

Education and Cultural Preservation

The Our Homeland Movement advocates for a comprehensive reform of Hungary's system, emphasizing the transmission of genuine knowledge, national values, and moral formation alongside academic instruction. Party leaders, including vice-president , have criticized the current framework for producing functional illiterates and failing to respect educators, calling for immediate overhauls in teacher training and curriculum design to prioritize talent development and competition through intellectual excellence rather than cost-cutting measures. In line with its nationalist orientation, the movement seeks to integrate more Hungarian historical narratives into schooling, such as mandatory education on events like the 1956 Breakout (Kitörés), which its argues addresses gaps in the . Proposals include segregating disruptive students—particularly those unable to adhere to community norms—into boarding schools to maintain discipline and focus in mainstream classrooms, a stance articulated in early policy positions. On cultural preservation, the party positions itself as a defender of Hungarian identity, , and heritage against perceived erosion from and politicized influences. Its stresses safeguarding traditional national culture, viewing current cultural policies as insufficiently rooted in ethnic Hungarian values and overly susceptible to external pressures. The Virradat Program critiques the entanglement of politics and culture, advocating for depoliticization while reinforcing state support for indigenous artistic and historical expressions to foster generational continuity.

Foreign Policy Priorities

The Our Homeland Movement prioritizes Hungarian national sovereignty in its foreign policy, advocating for an independent stance free from supranational obligations and globalist influences. The party seeks to terminate Hungary's subordinate role within the , proposing a on membership by 2029 and potential withdrawal by 2030 if globalist trends persist, while demanding equal partnership rather than integration into a "United States of ." It opposes the EU's foreign entanglements and critiques core member states' exploitation of peripheral nations like . On military alliances, the movement calls for strict neutrality, rejecting NATO's commitments and urging to veto further expansion of the alliance, which it views as eroding national independence. The party advocates withdrawing Hungarian troops from foreign missions, such as those in and , to focus resources on domestic defense capabilities, including compulsory national defense training for men and voluntary service incentives. It opposes a common , seeing it as a mechanism for suppressing national resistance rather than genuine security. In relations with neighboring states, the movement emphasizes protecting ethnic Hungarian minorities, particularly in Ukraine's region, where it condemns Kyiv's restrictions on Hungarian-language education and political participation. It supports codifying the results of the Transcarpathian , in which 78% favored or , and has expressed readiness to pursue territorial claims there should weaken amid conflict. Toward Russia, the party opposes Western sanctions as economically damaging to Hungary and favors reopening trade ties, including energy diversification away from Ukrainian transit risks, as part of an eastward-oriented policy. Broader anti-globalist efforts include repealing the 1920 Trianon Treaty to seek reparations through the and building alliances with like-minded nations against institutions like the . The movement proposes protective measures for the in post-Trianon territories, such as ensuring safety, education in Hungarian, and economic aid, potentially modeling Austria's role over . It also envisions integrating diaspora into national defense through voluntary service options.

Organizational Structure

Leadership and Key Figures

The Our Homeland Movement is presided over by , its founder and longtime leader, who has held the position of party president since the organization's establishment on February 24, 2018. , a former vice-president of the party and mayor of Ásotthalom from 2013 to 2024, broke from due to its moderation efforts and formed Mi Hazánk to maintain a harder line on nationalism and immigration opposition. In the 2024 European Parliament elections, secured a seat as a representing the party. On October 17, 2025, the party nominated as its candidate for in upcoming national elections. Dóra Dúró serves as the party's deputy president and holds the role of deputy speaker in the Hungarian National Assembly, a position she assumed following the 2022 parliamentary elections. Previously the spokesperson for , Dúró joined Mi Hazánk alongside Toroczkai and has been active in parliamentary debates on family policy and issues. Előd Novák acts as one of the party's vice presidents and represents Mi Hazánk as a member of the National Assembly since 2022. Novák, who has focused on media law and demographic concerns in his advocacy, participated in party efforts to counter public demonstrations, such as organizing responses to Pride marches in 2025. The national presidency, reaffirmed at the party's congress on September 28, 2024, includes additional figures such as party director István Szabadi and other vice presidents like István Apáti, Dávid Dócs, and Zoltán Pakusza, who contribute to organizational and regional leadership.

Membership and Internal Organization

The Our Homeland Movement operates with a formalized membership system outlined in its statutes. Membership is divided into regular members, who possess full voting and participatory and are required to pay monthly dues of 1,000 Hungarian forints; supporting members, who contribute the same dues amount but lack voting ; and honorary members, granted recognition for significant contributions without voting privileges. Admission for regular membership entails submitting an application accompanied by a , a , and recommendations from two existing members, followed by review and approval by the party's within 30 days; applicants with criminal convictions undergo additional scrutiny by the and disciplinary . Internally, the party is structured hierarchically, with the serving as the supreme decision-making body, convening biennially to amend statutes, elect , and address major matters, requiring simple majorities for routine decisions and qualified majorities (two-thirds or three-quarters) for foundational changes such as dissolution or statutory revisions. The , comprising seven members including the president, five vice-presidents, and a party director, handles executive operations, convenes monthly, and appoints leaders for specialized units; it operates on simple majority votes with a exceeding 50% attendance. An and disciplinary of three members enforces internal standards and processes exclusions. The organization extends to territorial units, including constituency-level assemblies and Budapest-specific bodies, which elect their leaders biennially and function with similar and rules to ensure local within the national framework. Professional cabinets, formed by the , support policy development in specific domains. A dedicated caters to individuals aged 14 to 35 (extendable to those up to 35 years old), focusing on youth-oriented initiatives and led by a president and vice-presidents appointed by the . This structure, established in the party's 2018 foundational statutes, emphasizes disciplined coordination from national to local levels, though exact membership figures remain undisclosed in official disclosures.

Affiliated Militant and Civic Groups

The Our Homeland Movement is closely associated with the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement (HVIM; Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom), a nationalist civic organization founded by party president in 2001 to promote irredentist claims over territories lost after the 1920 , referencing Hungary's historic 64 counties. HVIM organizes annual protest marches, such as those on commemorating Trianon, drawing thousands of participants focused on territorial revisionism and anti-EU sentiments; the group has coordinated joint events with Mi Hazánk, including counter-demonstrations against LGBT+ gatherings in 2025. In May 2019, Mi Hazánk established the National Legion (Nemzeti Légió) as a militant-style civic group for national defense training, historical reenactments, and border vigilance operations, explicitly positioned to supplement state efforts in migration control and homeland protection. The Legion merged into the Hungarian Self-Defense Movement (Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom; MÖM) by 2020, which continues similar activities, including volunteer flood defense work along the River in 2024 and patrols against perceived illegal crossings at southern borders; MÖM members, often overlapping with Mi Hazánk activists, emphasize paramilitary drills and community self-reliance. These groups have faced criticism from organizations for promoting exclusionary , though Mi Hazánk describes them as patriotic volunteer initiatives filling gaps in official security. Additional affiliations include Légió Hungária, a smaller militant formation participating in joint rallies with Mi Hazánk, such as the October 2024 Turul statue defense protest involving around 1,000 attendees from various nationalist outfits; the group focuses on symbolic guardianship of Hungarian heritage sites and anti-globalist actions. These entities operate semi-autonomously but align ideologically with Mi Hazánk's platform on and ethnic preservation, providing mobilization for the party's campaigns without formal integration into its structure.

Electoral Performance

National Parliamentary Elections

The Our Homeland Movement participated in Hungary's parliamentary election on 3 April 2022, marking its debut at the national level following its registration as a political party in 2018. The party fielded candidates in all 106 single-member districts but secured no victories there, as Fidesz–KDNP dominated with wins in every constituency. On the national party list, Mi Hazánk received 311,657 votes, equivalent to 5.88 percent of valid ballots cast, surpassing the five percent threshold required for proportional representation seats. This performance entitled the party to six compensatory list seats in the 199-seat National Assembly, establishing its first parliamentary presence. The results reflected Mi Hazánk's appeal among voters disillusioned with the unified opposition coalition's failure to challenge effectively, drawing support from former sympathizers and those prioritizing stricter immigration controls and national sovereignty issues central to the party's platform. Analysts noted the party's vote share as a notable achievement for a new entrant outside the Fidesz-opposition duopoly, positioning it as a distinct voice on the right despite Fidesz's overall of 135 seats. Turnout was 69.9 percent, with Mi Hazánk's gains concentrated in rural and eastern regions where nationalist sentiments were pronounced. In , the six Mi Hazánk MPs, led by figures such as , focused legislative efforts on proposals for border security enhancements and opposition to migration policies, though the party's limited numbers constrained its influence amid Fidesz's dominance. No further national parliamentary elections have occurred as of October 2025, with the next scheduled for 2026.

European Parliament Elections

In the held on 26 May, Our Homeland Movement contested independently and received 3.32% of the valid votes (113,657 votes out of approximately 3.4 million), failing to secure any of Hungary's 21 seats under the system, which allocated mandates primarily to parties exceeding higher vote thresholds effectively required for representation. The party achieved a breakthrough in the on 9 June, capturing 6.71% of the national vote and earning one seat. Zsuzsanna Borvendég, positioned on the party list, assumed the mandate and joined the Europe of Sovereign Nations political group in the . Party leader László Toroczkai headed the list but remained focused on national activities rather than taking the European seat. This result marked Mi Hazánk's entry into the , reflecting growing support among voters disillusioned with established parties amid debates over migration, , and EU policies.

Local and Municipal Results

In the municipal elections held on , the Our Homeland Movement, contesting for the first time as a distinct entity, achieved limited success, primarily retaining the mayoralty in Ásotthalom through the re-election of party leader with strong local support. The party also secured a small number of seats in local councils and county assemblies, reflecting its nascent organizational presence concentrated in rural and conservative-leaning areas. The 2024 municipal elections, conducted alongside the vote on June 9, marked a step forward in council-level representation despite no mayoral wins among party-nominated candidates across 128 contests. Mi Hazánk obtained 96 mandates as municipal representatives—predominantly via compensation lists in larger settlements and individual districts—and 62 seats on assembly lists, indicating consolidation of a rural base where it frequently garnered the second-highest vote shares after . This outcome, amid a record 59% turnout, positioned the party as a viable alternative on the right-wing spectrum in non-urban locales, though urban penetration remained weak.
CategoryMandates Won (2024)
Municipal Representatives96
County Assembly Seats62
Mayoral Positions0

Controversies and Debates

Accusations of and

The Our Homeland Movement has been accused of by organizations monitoring right-wing groups, such as the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC), which described its program as containing "explicit anti-Roma " alongside homophobia and theories, positioning the party as more extreme than other Hungarian nationalist factions. These claims cite the party's emphasis on "gypsy crime" as a for ethnic targeting, evidenced by rallies in and 2023 where speakers, including allies of leader , warned of demographic shifts due to higher Roma birth rates compared to ethnic . Toroczkai's background fuels allegations, as he founded the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement in 2001, which organized paramilitary-style marches against Roma communities, including a 2012 event in Devecser where participants chanted anti-Roma slogans and called for segregation, drawing condemnation from for inciting hatred. In 2019, the party launched a "self-defense" explicitly to counter "gypsy ," prompting the Committee on the Elimination of to express "deep alarm" over escalating targeting Roma in . Critics, including the ERRC—an focused on Roma rights—argue such initiatives echo vigilante actions from Toroczkai's earlier career, though the party frames them as responses to localized patterns rather than ethnic animus. Racism accusations extend to the party's local policies under Toroczkai's mayoralty in Ásotthalom, where bylaws in 2016 prohibited Muslim calls to prayer and LGBT events, later ruled unconstitutional by Hungary's in 2017 for violating equality principles. International observers, such as the , link the movement to broader far-right networks through Toroczkai's splits from , portraying it as a hub for unmoderated nationalist views post-2018. These charges predominantly originate from NGOs and UN bodies with mandates to combat discrimination, which Hungarian nationalists often critique as overlooking crime statistics in Roma-majority areas, such as higher reported theft and assault rates in certain settlements per official data from Hungary's Central Statistical Office. , founder and leader of the Our Homeland Movement, has faced multiple legal proceedings related to his prior activism. In 2011, a Hungarian court convicted him of incitement to hatred for an article published on the website in 2009 that targeted homosexuals, imposing a two-year probationary sentence. This stemmed from his role in far-right media and organizations, including the Hungarian Guard, a uniformed group dissolved by court order in 2009 for promoting hatred and constituting a threat to constitutional order. Toroczkai served as the Guard's national commander until its ban. In a related case, Hungarian authorities denied registration for Toroczkai's proposed Civil Örökzöld Association in 2007, citing its ties to the banned Hungarian Guard as evidence of unconstitutional aims. The ruled in 2013 that this refusal violated Article 11 of the , affirming the right to absent direct evidence of illegality. The Our Homeland Movement, formed in 2018 as a , has avoided similar dissolution despite affiliations with groups like the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement and the 2019-established National Legion, which conducts defense training and has drawn comparisons to prohibited entities; no successful legal challenges to these structures have been documented. The party has also pursued and encountered regulatory friction in digital platforms. Toroczkai sued in 2023 over the removal of his account and posts, alleging infringement of and seeking HUF 100 million in damages; Hungarian courts, including the in 2025, upheld Meta's actions as compliant with community standards prohibiting . Such cases highlight tensions between the movement's rhetoric on migration, Roma communities, and national sovereignty—which critics from organizations like the European Roma Rights Centre label as extremist—and platform moderation policies, though no broader regulatory bans on the party's operations have materialized.

Internal and External Conflicts

The Our Homeland Movement has maintained a relatively cohesive internal structure since its founding in 2018 by former radicals dissatisfied with that party's moderation, with no major schisms or widespread expulsions reported until mid-2025. However, tensions emerged in June 2025 when Vékony Csongor, the party's chapter president and a key organizer, resigned, publicly citing with leader over territorial revisionism; Vékony argued that the party's stance against pursuing border changes contradicted its nationalist principles on irredentist claims like those in . The party leadership countered that Vékony's exit stemmed not from policy disputes but from his reluctance to relinquish the presidency after internal elections, framing it as personal ambition rather than ideological rift, though the incident highlighted potential fractures among hardline revisionists within the ranks. Externally, the movement has positioned itself in opposition to Fidesz, criticizing the ruling party for perceived compromises on immigration enforcement, corruption in state institutions, and insufficient opposition to NATO involvement in Ukraine, while competing directly for nationalist voters disillusioned with Fidesz's governance. This rivalry intensified post-2022 elections, where Mi Hazánk's 6% vote share siphoned support from Fidesz's right flank, leading to accusations from Mi Hazánk that Fidesz stifles radical alternatives through media dominance and electoral system advantages. Relations with emerging centrist challengers like Péter Magyar's Tisza Party escalated into public confrontations, including a August 2025 disruption at a Dorog campaign event where Toroczkai and supporters accused Magyar of hypocrisy on national sovereignty and demanded greater humility toward established nationalists. Mi Hazánk has also clashed with left-liberal opposition coalitions, rejecting alliances and framing them as globalist threats, as evidenced by its isolation from the 2022 United for Hungary bloc amid ideological incompatibilities on issues like EU integration and migration. These disputes underscore Mi Hazánk's strategy of carving out a purist nationalist niche, often amplifying calls for Hungary's EU exit and neutrality in foreign conflicts to differentiate from both ruling and opposition establishments.

Reception and Political Impact

Base of Support and Achievements

The Our Homeland Movement primarily attracts supporters from the radical nationalist segment of the electorate, particularly former adherents of who rejected the party's shift toward after 2018. This base includes individuals prioritizing hardline anti-immigration stances, national sovereignty, and , with early surveys indicating that approximately 35% of voters expressed sympathy for the movement shortly after its founding. The party's voters exhibit demographic traits akin to those of early radical , though deviating from standard radical right profiles by featuring a higher share of young supporters and less than 50% male composition. Support remains stable at 6-7% in national polls, concentrated among those dissatisfied with Fidesz's policies on relations, migration, and Ukraine aid, positioning the movement as a protest vehicle for stricter nationalist alternatives. This consistency reflects effective mobilization via and grassroots networks rooted in predecessor groups like the Hungarian Defense Movement, which maintained thousands of active members. The movement's key achievements include consolidating fragmented radical nationalist elements into a unified platform that reclaimed core tenets of anti-immigration and Eurosceptic advocacy previously diluted in mainstream right-wing politics. It has organized high-profile protests, such as demonstrations against NATO battle group deployments in Hungary on national security grounds, amplifying public discourse on sovereignty threats. Through parliamentary presence since 2022, the party has proposed legislation reinforcing family policies and border controls, contributing to pressure on the governing coalition to maintain conservative lines amid opposition fragmentation. Locally, under figures like László Toroczkai in Ásotthalom, it has demonstrated practical implementation of restrictive migration ordinances, influencing national debates on community-level enforcement.

Criticisms from Opponents

Opponents, particularly left-leaning political groups and organizations, have frequently accused the Our Homeland Movement of fostering extremism and racism, pointing to its leader László Toroczkai's prior involvement in groups like the Hungarian Guard, which was dissolved by courts in 2009 for promoting activities and ethnic hatred. The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), in its 2023 report on , described Mi Hazánk as a far-right party openly promoting anti-Roma and antisemitic views, warning that its electoral gains could exacerbate ethnic tensions. Similarly, the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) labeled the party's 2022 election platform as containing explicit anti-Roma racism alongside conspiracy theories, positioning Mi Hazánk as a vehicle for neo-fascist sentiments that threaten minority communities. These NGOs, often aligned with progressive advocacy, argue such rhetoric normalizes hatred, though critics of these bodies note their selective focus on right-wing actors amid broader debates. Critics have also targeted the party's stance on LGBTQ issues, accusing it of systematic homophobia. In 2019, Mi Hazánk vice-president publicly shredded books from the Labrisz Lesbian Association, claiming they propagated "homosexualism," an action decried by as emblematic of broader efforts against sexual minorities. Academic analyses of parliamentary discourse highlight Mi Hazánk MPs' active role in online homophobic , framing LGBTQ visibility as a cultural threat. Hungarian opposition figures from parties like and the Democratic Coalition have echoed these concerns, portraying the movement's policies—such as proposals to ban "LGBT propaganda"—as regressive assaults on , potentially isolating internationally. Broader political opponents contend that Mi Hazánk undermines democratic norms through xenophobic . The ERRC has warned of the party's potential to incite violence against Roma, citing Toroczkai's history of organizing rallies near minority areas that heightened local fears. Left-wing commentators argue its anti-immigration absolutism, including calls for border fortifications and deportation quotas, echoes historical ethnic exclusions rather than pragmatic policy, with some equating it to interwar radicalism. These accusations persist despite Mi Hazánk's denials, with opponents like the Tisza Party viewing its rise as a symptom of unaddressed polarization that exploits, though empirical vote data shows its support drawn from disillusioned nationalists rather than mainstream conservatives.

Influence on Hungarian Right-Wing Politics

The Our Homeland Movement, established in June 2018 as a splinter from the more moderate wing of , has reshaped Hungary's right-wing political landscape by offering a platform for radical nationalists dissatisfied with 's governance pragmatism and 's centrist pivot. Attracting key figures like , , and Előd Novák, the party quickly garnered support from an estimated 35% of 's voter base in early surveys, filling a gap for harder-line positions on national and ethnic homogeneity, such as the slogan "White Hungary." This emergence compelled to intensify its own nationalist rhetoric to preempt vote erosion, particularly amid 's decline. The party's 2022 parliamentary election performance—securing 6.2% of the national vote and seven seats—marked a pivotal breakthrough, positioning it as the third-largest and intensifying competition within the right-wing spectrum. Analysts assess this as both a risk to , through potential fragmentation of the nationalist electorate, and an opportunity, as has co-opted elements of Our Homeland's agenda, including stricter anti-LGBTQ policies like adoption bans and the child protection act, to consolidate support. On migration, Our Homeland's uncompromising stance—advocating border fortifications and cultural preservation—has pressured to maintain its restrictive policies amid economic pressures that could otherwise shift voters rightward. Beyond elections, the movement influences right-wing discourse through Eurosceptic advocacy, including proposals for an exit by 2029, which challenges 's selective engagement with while amplifying shared themes of . Experts like Bulcsu Hunyadi of Institute predict sustained pressure on to radicalize further, as Our Homeland positions itself as a "third force" critiquing both government and opposition on and . By 2024 elections, it secured one seat, sustaining its role in mobilizing nationalists without formal alliances, thereby forcing to balance mainstream viability with ideological purity.

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