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Drill Master diving accident
Drill Master diving accident
Drill Master diving accident
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Drill Master diving accident
Date17 January 1974 (1974-01-17)
LocationNorth Sea, Norway
CauseDiving bell drop weight accidentally released
ParticipantsPer Skipnes, Robert John Smyth
Ocean Systems' bell showing drop weight

The Drill Master diving accident was an incident in Norway in January 1974 that resulted in the death of two commercial divers. During a two-man dive from the North Sea rig Drill Master, the diving bell's drop weight was accidentally released, causing the bell to surface from a depth of 320 feet (98 m) with its bottom door open and drag the diver working outside through the water on his umbilical. The two divers, Per Skipnes and Robert John Smyth, both died from rapid decompression and drowning.[1][2] The accident was caused by instructions aboard Drill Master which had not been updated when the bell system was modified and which stated that a valve that was closed during the dive should have been open.[1]\ Skipnes' body was never recovered.[3]

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Drill Master diving accident

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The Drill Master diving accident was a fatal incident that took place on 16 January 1974 aboard the Drill Master in the Norwegian sector of the , just north of the , resulting in the deaths of two divers from rapid decompression and drowning after their uncontrollably surfaced from a depth of approximately 250 feet (77 meters). The victims were Norwegian diver Per Skipnes, aged 37 and a veteran of prior North Sea operations including a 1971 rescue from a sunken diving bell on the Ocean Viking, and British diver Robert John Smyth, both employed by the diving contractor Ocean Systems and conducting a saturation dive on behalf of Esso Exploration and Production Norway. During a routine two-man excursion from the diving bell to inspect underwater infrastructure, the bell's drop weights—intended to maintain its position on the seabed—were accidentally released due to a brake failure in the ballast system, exacerbated by a communication breakdown within Ocean Systems regarding recent modifications to the weight-slipping mechanisms on the newly installed French-manufactured equipment. With the bell's bottom door open, the rapid ascent exposed the divers to an extreme pressure differential, causing severe injuries from rapid decompression and drowning. The accident highlighted critical safety lapses in early saturation diving operations, including inadequate equipment manuals and inter-departmental coordination, prompting an investigation by the Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority (NLIA), which recommended fining Ocean Systems for negligence—an unusual attribution of blame directly to the contractor rather than the operator or external factors. Despite its severity, the incident received minimal media attention at the time, overshadowed by the burgeoning oil exploration boom, but it contributed to evolving regulations on design, weight release protocols, and procedures in the region. The event remains a stark example of the high risks faced by commercial divers in the 1970s , where at least 55 fatalities occurred before 1979 amid rapid technological adoption and harsh environmental conditions.

Background

North Sea Oil Operations in the 1970s

The discovery of the on October 25, 1969, by marked Norway's entry into exploration, transforming the nation's economic landscape following decades of limited onshore activity. This find, confirmed on Christmas Eve 1969, was the first major hydrocarbon reservoir in the Norwegian sector, located approximately 320 kilometers southwest of in water depths of about 70 meters. Production from Ekofisk commenced on June 15, 1971, initiating a rapid expansion of drilling operations amid the global oil crisis of 1973, which heightened incentives for offshore development. Economic motivations drove Norway's aggressive pursuit of resources, with activities promising substantial revenue to fund national welfare and . Investments in the sector surged from 0.3 billion Norwegian kroner in 1970 to 5.5 billion in 1975, reflecting the high stakes of capturing this "black gold" to bolster and export earnings. However, technological challenges abounded due to the 's harsh environment, including gale-force winds, towering waves up to 30 meters, and water temperatures near freezing, which complicated rig stability and drilling accuracy in depths exceeding 100 meters. These conditions necessitated innovative to mitigate risks like structural fatigue and operational downtime, often extending project timelines by months. Semi-submersible drilling rigs, such as the Drill Master, emerged as critical tools for operations in the Norwegian sector, offering superior stability through submerged pontoons that reduced wave impact compared to fixed platforms. Deployed widely from the early , these mobile units enabled exploratory and development drilling in dynamic waters, with over 50 such rigs active across the by mid-1977. Underwater inspections played a vital role in installations, involving divers or early remotely operated vehicles to verify structural integrity, seal connections, and detect corrosion on subsea templates, ensuring safe flow from reservoirs at depths up to 3,000 meters. supported these tasks as a key activity, though detailed practices evolved separately. Oil production in the Norwegian grew exponentially in the early 1970s, from initial Ekofisk output of around 50,000 barrels per day in 1971 to contributing over 1 million barrels daily by the decade's end, alongside significant gas volumes. This boom attracted an influx of international contractors, primarily American and British firms like Phillips and Shell, which dominated exploration and dominated early licensing rounds under minimal Norwegian oversight. Operations remained largely unregulated until the mid-1970s, lacking comprehensive safety and environmental standards; it was not until the 1977 Working Environment Act's extension to the continental shelf that formalized protections were introduced, highlighting the pioneering yet precarious nature of these ventures.

Commercial Diving Practices and Equipment

Saturation diving, a technique developed in the mid-20th century and widely adopted in the 1970s for deep-water operations, allowed commercial divers to remain at pressure for extended periods by living in hyperbaric chambers on support vessels. Divers' tissues become saturated with inert gases, reaching equilibrium with the ambient pressure at depths typically ranging from 65 to 1,000 feet, in accordance with Henry's law, after which additional time at depth incurs no further saturation risk. This method eliminated repetitive decompression for each dive, enabling multi-day work cycles; for instance, at 200 feet, saturation could occur within about 24 hours, but decompression required roughly one day per 100 feet of depth plus an additional day. In North Sea oil operations, divers breathed heliox—a mixture of helium and oxygen—to avoid nitrogen narcosis and high-pressure nervous syndrome, with transfers to the worksite occurring via closed bells that maintained pressure throughout the excursion. The closed-bell system, standard in 1970s saturation diving including on vessels like the Drill Master, consisted of a submersible pressure vessel—often egg-shaped and sized for two to three divers—that transported personnel from surface chambers to the . Key components included dead weights or drop weights attached to the bell's base for stability and controlled descent, preventing uncontrolled during operations at depths around 200 feet. Umbilicals, bundled hoses connecting the bell to the surface support system, supplied , hot water for thermal protection via suits, electrical power, and hydraulic controls, while also facilitating video monitoring and voice communication. Communication tools, such as helmet-mounted microphones and surface voice descramblers, were essential to counteract the high-pitched, distorted speech caused by , ensuring clear coordination between divers, tenders, and supervisors. These systems were typically deployed from vessels to maintain precise location in harsh conditions. Commercial diving in the 1970s carried significant hazards, particularly in the North Sea's cold, turbulent waters, where equipment failures and procedural errors frequently led to fatalities. Common risks included malfunctioning bells or umbilicals, such as entanglement or gas supply interruptions, which could strand divers or cause asphyxiation. Rapid ascents, often triggered by accidental release of stabilizing weights, posed the greatest threat by inducing explosive decompression and severe decompression sickness (the bends), with symptoms ranging from joint pain to neurological damage due to gas bubble formation in tissues. Pre-1974, the Norwegian Continental Shelf recorded at least three commercial diving fatalities from such incidents, contributing to an overall North Sea fatality rate exceeding 1% annually in the early oil boom years, underscoring the nascent and perilous nature of these operations before stricter regulations.

The Incident

Operational Context

The Drill Master was a operating in the Norwegian sector of the , positioned in the Odin field (block 30/10) just north of the , approximately 220 kilometers northwest of , . The rig was owned and operated by Esso Exploration and Production , a of Exxon, in support of early and gas exploration activities. The specific dive on January 16, 1974, was part of routine operations to support , involving and tasks at a depth of approximately 250 feet (77 meters). The dive team for this operation included two saturation divers—Per Skipnes, a Norwegian with prior experience including a 1971 incident on the rig, and Robert John Smyth, a British diver—along with a bell tender and surface support crew consisting of umbilical handlers, a dive supervisor, and chamber operators, typical for a two-man bell dive setup. The plan called for a standard two-man bell dive using saturation techniques, where the divers would be transported to the worksite in a for extended bottom time, with the bell serving as a portable connected to the surface via umbilicals for gas supply and communication. This configuration allowed for efficient underwater work without repeated decompression, though specific pre-dive checks for equipment integrity, such as ballast system verification, followed company protocols of the era but were not independently documented in regulatory records. The operation occurred amid limited regulatory oversight for in Norway's sector at the time, as formal rules governing diving were largely non-existent until 1978, with the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate—established in 1972—focusing primarily on drilling permits rather than detailed diving safety standards. Divers often maintained dual logbooks compliant with or Norwegian requirements, reflecting the patchwork of international practices in the absence of unified Norwegian mandates. Environmental conditions on January 16, 1974, aligned with typical mid-winter patterns, featuring cold temperatures and potential for moderate seas, though no anomalous weather events were reported that directly impacted pre-dive preparations.

Sequence of Events

On January 16, 1974, two commercial divers employed by Ocean Systems International entered a diving bell aboard the semi-submersible drilling rig Drill Master, positioned in the Odin field (block 30/10) in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea. The bell, used for a saturation dive, was deployed with the divers for underwater tasks at a planned depth of approximately 77 meters. The bell descended successfully to the , where the divers exited through the open door to perform their work, remaining tethered to the bell via umbilicals that supplied and communications. Standard procedure involved securing the bell's negative buoyancy using drop weights attached by lanyards or chains to prevent unintended ascent. During the dive, a mechanical failure occurred in the weight release mechanism, recently modified by the company, resulting in the unintended release of the drop weights. This sudden loss of caused the bell to gain positive and begin an uncontrolled ascent toward the surface, with its door still open and the tethered divers being dragged along. A breakdown in company communications prevented timely correction of the malfunction, exacerbating the issue as the bell accelerated upward from 77 meters to the surface in a of seconds. Surface crew monitored the situation via radio but could not intervene effectively before the bell breached , completing the and initiating the decompression crisis.

Casualties and Immediate Response

The Victims

The victims of the Drill Master diving accident were Per Kristen Skipnes, a 37-year-old Norwegian commercial diver, and Robert John Smyth, a 37-year-old British commercial diver, both employed by Ocean Systems. Skipnes had extensive prior experience in operations, having served as part of the diving team on the Ocean Viking during early exploration efforts; he survived a major accident on that vessel in March 1971, after which he temporarily ceased diving due to safety concerns before resuming work. Smyth was likewise an experienced commercial diver with a background in assignments. In the operation, Skipnes and Smyth were the two divers positioned inside the for the descent to approximately 250 feet (76 meters).

Medical and Rescue Efforts

Upon the uncontrolled surfacing of the from a depth of approximately 250 feet (76 meters) in the Norwegian sector of the , the surface crew aboard the Drill Master rig promptly secured the bell to the platform to prevent further movement. The team then accessed the interior to recover the two divers, Per Skipnes and Robert John Smyth, who were working for Ocean Systems. Both were found deceased inside the bell, victims of the rapid decompression experienced during the ascent, which caused severe and gas embolisms. The physiological effects of the sudden pressure change were catastrophic, leading to the expansion of inert gases in the divers' tissues and bloodstream, resulting in (commonly known as the bends) and arterial gas embolism. These conditions disrupted vital functions, including circulation and respiration, and contributed to the fatalities. In addition, was determined as a contributing factor, likely occurring as the divers struggled amid the chaos of the ascent or upon breaching the surface. No advanced medical interventions were possible, as the divers showed no signs of life upon recovery. Medical personnel on the rig conducted immediate assessments and officially declared the deaths on 16 January 1974. The bodies were subsequently transferred to shore facilities for postmortem examination, confirming the causes related to the decompression incident. This rapid timeline underscored the limitations of on-site emergency responses in such operations during the era.

Investigation and Aftermath

Official Inquiry Findings

The official inquiry into the Drill Master diving accident was conducted by Norwegian authorities, including the Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority (NLIA) and relevant government departments, in collaboration with police investigators and UK authorities, including analysis at the Admiralty Experimental Diving Unit. The process involved examining evidence from the surfaced diving bell, operational logs from the Ocean Systems diving team, and witness statements from rig personnel and surviving crew members. Equipment components, including the ballast system, were analyzed at specialized facilities such as the Admiralty Experimental Diving Unit to assess mechanical integrity post-incident. Key findings highlighted a fault in the dead weight release mechanism of the , specifically due to a breakdown in communications regarding recent modifications to the weight-slipping devices and the installation of a new system. This was compounded by inadequate maintenance procedures following the modification, including mismatched installation of a new system and insufficient post-alteration safety checks. played a significant role, as pre-dive inspections were compromised by a breakdown in communications among company personnel, leaving divers unprepared due to missing or incorrect instructions for the updated equipment. The inquiry report emphasized design vulnerabilities in 1970s-era diving bells, such as reliance on manual weight-slipping mechanisms without inherent redundancies, which allowed a single-point to cause uncontrolled ascent. The inquiry emphasized design vulnerabilities and recommended improved safety protocols, including verification procedures for equipment modifications, with findings disseminated to diving contractors to enhance overall operational safety. The official inquiry by the Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority (NLIA) attributed full responsibility for the Drill Master diving accident to the diving contractor, Ocean Systems, citing in the form of inadequate communication about a recently installed valve system in the diving bell's mechanism, which caused the unintended release of drop weights and the bell's rapid ascent. This determination was unusual for incidents of the era, as blame was placed exclusively on the contractor rather than shared with the oil company operator () or equipment issues. In response, the NLIA recommended that the public prosecutor impose a fine on Ocean Systems for the procedural failures that contributed to the fatalities, though records do not confirm whether the fine was ultimately levied. No lawsuits from victims' families or operational suspensions for Ocean Systems are documented in relation to this event, reflecting the limited legal frameworks available for offshore diving accountability in 1974. The accident prompted immediate reviews of diving bell designs and communication protocols across similar operations in the Norwegian sector. The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD), established just a year prior in , leveraged the inquiry's findings to initiate early enforcement actions, including mandatory audits of contractor safety procedures and a push toward standardized equipment certifications—actions that signaled a departure from the previously permissive regulatory environment in Norwegian offshore activities.

Legacy

Impact on Diving Safety Standards

The Drill Master accident, involving the unintended release of the diving bell's ballast due to inadequate instructions for a modified valve system, underscored vulnerabilities in diving bell operations and prompted enhancements in equipment safeguards across the industry. In response, mandatory protocols for dead weight retention and release mechanisms were introduced to prevent uncontrolled ascents, with diving bells required to incorporate brakes and stability verification during pre-dive checks. These measures, developed through collaboration between operators and classification societies like , addressed the rapid decompression risks exposed by the 1974 incident. Norwegian diving regulations evolved significantly in the years following the accident, shifting from minimal oversight to structured frameworks emphasizing contractor accountability and technological integration. By 1978, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate established preliminary rules under the Working Environment Act, mandating certification for diving contractors to ensure compliance with safety protocols, including equipment maintenance and operational planning. This included requirements for bell diving certificates, with over 1,340 issued by the end of 1980 to qualify personnel for saturation and bell operations. Additionally, the integration of dynamic positioning systems on support vessels and rigs became standard by the early 1980s, improving positional stability during dives and reducing hazards from platform movement, as seen in operations on vessels like the Seaway Condor. The reforms contributed to a measurable decline in ascent-related incidents and overall fatalities in Norwegian offshore diving. Prior to 1978, the recorded 82 offshore deaths, including 10 divers, with multiple bell ascent failures like the Drill Master case highlighting systemic risks. From 1978 to 1990, fatalities dropped to 13 total, with only 7 involving divers, reflecting improved survival rates through better safeguards and training—bends cases, for instance, fell from 54 in 1978 to 5-6 annually by the early 1990s. No diving fatalities have been reported in the Norwegian sector since 2016 as of 2025, attributing this long-term trend to the post-1974 regulatory advancements.

Comparisons to Other North Sea Incidents

The Drill Master accident shares notable parallels with other North Sea diving incidents of the 1970s, particularly those involving failures in diving bell operations and decompression procedures, which highlighted the era's hazardous conditions for saturation divers. For instance, the Waage Drill II incident on September 9, 1975, saw two Oceaneering divers, Peter Holmes and Roger Baldwin, trapped inside a diving bell due to a procedural error during umbilical disentanglement, leading to fatal heatstroke from inadequate ventilation and rising temperatures inside the chamber. Similarly, the later Byford Dolphin accident on November 5, 1983, involved an explosive decompression in a saturation chamber system, killing four divers and one tender through catastrophic pressure loss during a transfer procedure, underscoring persistent risks in bell-to-chamber connections and rapid pressure changes. These events, like Drill Master, exposed common vulnerabilities such as equipment malfunctions and human error in high-pressure environments, contributing to a pattern of bell-related fatalities in the North Sea oil boom. Distinct from these, the Drill Master incident in uniquely attributed primary blame to the contractor Ocean Systems' modified instructions for a weight-slipping device on the , which caused an unintended rapid ascent from 250 feet without the explosive decompression seen in or the entrapment in Waage Drill II; instead, the divers suffered compounded by drowning upon surfacing. This contractor-specific procedural flaw differentiated it amid broader systemic issues. By mid-decade, the had recorded at least 31 fatalities between 1971 and 1975 alone, driven largely by (16 cases), equipment failures (9 cases), and inadequate training or supervision, prompting international scrutiny and calls for standardized safety regulations from bodies like the Department of Energy.

References

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  2. https://lescompagnonsdusaga.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/northseadivers.pdf
  3. https://emialliance.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/2022-12-A-Report-on-Fatalities-in-Commercial-Diving-Paper-Cambridge-University-V2.pdf
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  5. https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/facts/field/ekofisk/
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  9. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1977/december/north-sea-drilling-oil-troubled-waters
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  15. https://diverdown.org.uk/about-the-memorial-charity/
  16. https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/nou-2003-5/id381525/?ch=16
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  20. https://ancestors.familysearch.org/en/L2NY-WPY/robert-john-smyth-1936-1974
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