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Members of a Russophone association supporting the 2006 decision of the Kharkiv City Council to make the Russian language official at local level.
Party of Regions 2012 parliamentary election campaign poster in Crimea stating "Russian: (upgrade it) from a regional language to the second official (state) language"

Russian is the most common first language in the Donbas and Crimea regions of Ukraine and the city of Kharkiv, and the predominant language in large cities in the eastern and southern portions of the country.[1][needs update] The usage and status of the language is the subject of political disputes. Ukrainian is the country's sole state language since the adoption of the 1996 Constitution, which prohibits an official bilingual system at state level but also guarantees the free development, use and protection of Russian and other languages of national minorities.[2] In 2017 a new Law on Education was passed which restricted the use of Russian as a language of instruction.[2]

History of the Russian language in Ukraine

[edit]
Main article: History of the Russian language in Ukraine

The East Slavic languages originated in the language spoken in Rus in the medieval period. Significant differences in spoken language in different regions began after the division of the Rus lands between the Golden Horde (from about 1240) and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Lithuanian state eventually allied with the Kingdom of Poland in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth of 1569–1795. Russians under the Golden Horde developed what became the modern Russian language; people in the northern Lithuanian sector developed Belarusian, and in the southern Polish sector Ukrainian.

The ethnonym "Ukrainian" for the south-eastern Slavic people did not become well-established until the 19th century, although English-speakers (for example) called those peoples' land "Ukraine" in English from before the 18th century (the Oxford English Dictionary traces the word "Ukrainian" in English back as far as 1804, and records its application to the Ukrainian language from 1886[3]). The western part of the country, Austrian Galicia, Bukovina, and Carpathian Ruthenia, was generally known in German, French and English as "Ruthenia", and the people as "Ruthenians."[4] The Russian imperial centre, however, preferred the names "Little" and "White" Russias for the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands respectively, as distinct from Great Russia.

No definitive geographical border separated people speaking Russian and those speaking Ukrainian – rather gradual shifts in vocabulary and pronunciation marked the areas between the historical cores of the languages.

Although Goriuns resided in the Putyvl region (in present-day northern Ukraine) in the times of Grand Duchy of Lithuania or perhaps even earlier,[5][6] the Russian language mostly came through the migration of ethnic Russians to Ukraine and through the adoption of the Russian language by Ukrainians during the Russification of Ukraine.[citation needed]

Russian settlers

[edit]

The first new waves of Russian settlers onto what is now Ukrainian territory came in the late-16th century to the empty lands of Slobozhanshchyna[7] (in the region of Kharkiv) that Russia had gained from the Tatars,[8] or from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania[citation needed] - although Ukrainian peasants from the Polish-Lithuanian west escaping harsh exploitative conditions outnumbered them.[9]

More Russian speakers appeared in the northern, central and eastern territories of modern Ukraine during the late-17th century, following the Cossack Rebellion (1648–1657) which Bohdan Khmelnytsky led against Poland. The Khmelnytsky Uprising led to a massive movement of Ukrainian settlers to the Slobozhanshchyna region,[10] which converted it from a sparsely inhabited frontier area to one of the major populated regions of the Tsardom of Russia.[citation needed] Following the Pereyaslav Rada of 1654 the northern and eastern parts of present-day Ukraine came under the hegemony of the Russian Tsardom. This brought the first significant, but still small, wave of Russian settlers into central Ukraine (primarily several thousand soldiers stationed in garrisons,[11][need quotation to verify] out of a population of approximately 1.2 million[12] non-Russians). Although the number of Russian settlers in Ukraine prior to the 18th century remained small, the local upper-classes within the part of Ukraine acquired by Russia came to use the Russian language widely.

Beginning in the late 18th century, large numbers of Russians (as well as of Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks and of other Christians and Jews) settled in newly acquired lands in what is now southern Ukraine, a region then known as Novorossiya ("New Russia"). These lands – previously known as the Wild Fields – had been sparsely populated prior to the 18th century due to the threat of Crimean-Tatar raids, but once Saint Petersburg had eliminated the Tatar state as a threat, Russian nobles were granted large tracts of fertile land for working by newly arrived peasants, most of them ethnic Ukrainians but many of them Russians.[13]

Settlement in the 19th century

[edit]
Dialects map of the Russian Language. Russian Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1914.
  Little Russian (Ukrainian)
  Great Russian (Russian)
  White Russian (Belarusian)

The 19th century saw a dramatic increase in the urban Russian population in present-day Ukraine, as ethnic Russian settlers moved into and populated the newly industrialised and growing towns.[citation needed] At the beginning of the 20th century the Russians formed the largest ethnic group in almost all large cities within Ukraine's modern borders, including Kyiv (54.2%), Kharkiv (63.1%), Odesa (49.09%), Mykolaiv (66.33%), Mariupol (63.22%), Luhansk, (68.16%), Kherson (47.21%), Melitopol (42.8%), Ekaterinoslav, (41.78%), Kropyvnytskyi (34.64%), Simferopol (45.64%), Yalta (66.17%), Kerch (57.8%), Sevastopol (63.46%).[14] The Ukrainian migrants who settled in these cities entered a Russian-speaking milieu (particularly with Russian-speaking administration) and needed to adopt the Russian language.

Suppression and fostering of the Ukrainian language

[edit]
Main article: Russification of Ukraine

The Russian Empire promoted the spread of the Russian language among the native Ukrainian population, actively refusing to acknowledge the existence of a Ukrainian language.

Alarmed by the threat of Ukrainian separatism (in its turn influenced by the 1863 demands of Polish nationalists), the Russian Minister of Internal Affairs Pyotr Valuev in 1863 issued a secret decree that banned the publication of religious texts and educational texts written in the Ukrainian language[15] as non-grammatical, but allowed all other texts, including fiction. The Emperor Alexander II in 1876 expanded this ban by issuing the Ems Ukaz (which lapsed in 1905). The Ukaz banned all Ukrainian-language books and song-lyrics, as well as the importation of such works. Furthermore, Ukrainian-language public performances, plays, and lectures were forbidden.[16] In 1881 the decree was amended by Alexander III to allow the publishing of lyrics and dictionaries, and the performances of some plays in the Ukrainian language with local officials' approval.[17] Ukrainian-only troupes were, however, forbidden. Approximately 9% of the population[which?] spoke Russian at the time of the Russian Empire Census of 1897, as opposed to 44.31% of the total population of the Empire.[18]

In 1918 the Soviet Council of People's Commissars decreed that nationalities under their control had the right to education in their own language.[19] Thus Ukrainians in the Soviet era were entitled to study and learn in the Ukrainian language. During the Soviet times, the attitude to Ukrainian language and culture went through periods of promotion (policy of "korenization", c. 1923 to c. 1933), suppression (during the subsequent period of Stalinism), and renewed Ukrainization (notably in the epoch of Khrushchev, c. 1953 to 1964). Ukrainian cultural organizations, such as theatres or the Writers' Union, were funded by the central administration.[which?]

The issue of the Russification of Ukraine and linguistic discrimination of Ukrainian speakers during the Soviet era was studied by the Ukrainian Soviet dissident Ivan Dziuba in his work "Internationalism or Russification?".[20] While officially there was no state language in the Soviet Union until 1990, Russian in practice had an implicitly privileged position as the only language widely spoken across the country. In 1990 Russian became legally the official all-Union language of the Soviet Union, with constituent republics having rights to declare their own official languages.[21][22] The Ukrainian language, despite official encouragement and government funding,[citation needed] like other regional languages, was often frowned upon or quietly discouraged, which led to a gradual decline in its usage.[23]

Ukrainization in modern Ukraine

[edit]
Main article: Ukrainization
See also: Language policy in Ukraine, Law of Ukraine "On protecting the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language", Russian book ban in Ukraine, and Derussification in Ukraine

Since the Euromaidan of 2013–2014, the Ukrainian government has issued several laws aimed at encouraging Ukrainization in the media, in education and in other spheres.

In February 2017, the Ukrainian government banned the commercial importation of books from Russia, which had accounted for up to 60% of all titles sold in Ukraine.[24]

On May 23, 2017, the Ukrainian parliament approved the law that most broadcast content should be in Ukrainian (75% of national carriers and 50% of local carriers).

The 2017 law on education provides that Ukrainian language is the language of education at all levels except for one or more subjects that are allowed to be taught in two or more languages, namely English or one of the other official languages of the European Union (i.e. excluding Russian).[25] The law does state that persons belonging to the indigenous peoples of Ukraine are guaranteed the right to study at public pre-school institutes and primary schools in "the language of instruction of the respective indigenous people, along with the state language of instruction" in separate classes or groups.[25][relevant?] The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) has expressed concern with this measure and with the lack of "real consultation" with the representatives of national minorities.[26] In July 2018, The Mykolaiv Okrug Administrative Court liquidated the status of Russian as a regional language, on the suit (bringing to the norms of the national legislation due to the recognition of the law "On the principles of the state language policy" by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine as unconstitutional) of the First Deputy Prosecutor of the Mykolaiv Oblast.[27] In October and December 2018, parliaments of the city of Kherson and of Kharkiv Oblast also abolished the status of the Russian language as a regional one.[28]

The 2019 language law made Ukrainian mandatory in a number of spheres of public life.

In 2019 the law "On supporting the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the State language" made the use of Ukrainian compulsory (totally or within quotas) in more than 30 spheres of public life, including public administration, electoral process, education, science, culture, media, economic and social life, health and care institutions, and activities of political parties.[29][30] The Venice Commission and Human Rights Watch expressed concern about the 2019 law's failure to protect the language rights of Ukrainian minorities.[30][31]

The 2019 law did not regulate private communication nor ban the use of Russian language in the country, contrary to what some online claims created by Russia have asserted.[32][33][34]

In 2021 Dnipropetrovsk District Administrative Court [uk] cancelled the regional language status of Russian in the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[35]

In January 2022, a law requiring all print media to be published in Ukrainian came into force. It did not ban publication in Russian; however, it stipulated that a Ukrainian version of equivalent circulation and scope must be published – which is not a profitable option for publishers. Critics argue that the law could disenfranchise the country's Russian-speakers.[36]

After the Russian invasion of Ukraine

[edit]

Since February 2022, the beginning of Russian invasion, the everyday usage of Russian language in Ukraine has notably decreased, from 33% in 2021 to 23% in 2022.[37] According to a survey of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in December of 2022, 58 percent of Ukrainians considered Russian "unimportant".[38] Additionally, in the fall of 2022, Russian was taken out of the educational curriculum in the cities of Kyiv, Mykolaiv, and Odesa.[39] As per a February 2023 poll by RATING, 58% of respondents spoke exclusively Ukrainian at home, 30% spoke both Russian and Ukrainian, 11% spoke only Russian, 1% spoke a different one, and 1% found it difficult to say.[40] However, this survey excluded the occupied Luhansk and Donetsk regions, as well as Crimea, and that in the different areas of the country (North, South, East and West), these percentages differed. For example, in the East, only 19% said that they speak exclusively Ukrainian, with 28% stating that they speak exclusively Russian, and 53% stating that they speak both languages.[40]

According to a survey taken in April and May of 2023 by the International Republican Institute, Russian remained widely used as the language spoken at home in many eastern Ukrainian cities, and a sizeable minority language elsewhere. The survey reported the following results:[41]

Languages of Ukrainian Cities, May 2023
City Russian Ukrainian Other languages[A]
Odesa 80% 16% 4%
Kharkiv 78% 16% 6%
Zaporizhzhia 67% 23% 10%
Dnipro 66% 27% 7%
Mykolaiv 61% 30% 9%
Chernihiv 41% 53% 6%
Kyiv 38% 59% 3%
Sumy 27% 64% 9%
Kropyvnytskyi 20% 77% 3%
Cherkasy 18% 80% 2%
Chernivtsi 15% 82% 3%
Vinnytsia 15% 85% < 1%
Zhytomyr 14% 82% 4%
Poltava 12% 75% 13%
Uzhhorod 9% 85% 6%
Khmelnytskyi 9% 88% 3%
Lviv 3% 96% 1%
Rivne 3% 96% 1%
Ivano-Frankivsk 3% 97% < 1%
Ternopil 1% 98% 1%
Lutsk 1% 98% 1%
A In the survey, the majority of the people who picked the "Other languages" option used it to indicate "Both Russian and Ukrainian", especially in the eastern regions.

Usage statistics

[edit]
Percentage of people with Russian as their native language according to 2001 census (in regions).
Map of people who declare Russian as their native language for each district or city (in circles)
(according to 2001 census)
Map of majority declared native language by city, town or village council according to 2001 census

There is a large difference between the numbers of people who report their native language as Russian and people who use Russian as their everyday communication language. The percentage of Russian-speaking citizens is significantly higher in cities than in rural areas across the whole country.

2001 Census

[edit]

According to official data from the 2001 Ukrainian census, the Russian language was native for 29.6% of Ukraine's population (about 14.3 million people).[42] Ethnic Russians formed 56% of the total Russian-native-language population, while the remainder were people of other ethnic background: 5,545,000 Ukrainians, 172,000 Belarusians, 86,000 Jews, 81,000 Greeks, 62,000 Bulgarians, 46,000 Moldovans, 43,000 Tatars, 43,000 Armenians, 22,000 Poles, 21,000 Germans, 15,000 Crimean Tatars.

Polls

[edit]

According to data obtained by the "Public Opinion" foundation in 2002, the population of the oblast centres preferred to use Russian (75%).[43] Continuous Russian linguistic areas occupied certain regions of Crimea, Donbas, former Sloboda Ukraine, southern parts of Odesa and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, while Russian linguistic enclaves exist in central and northern Ukraine.[citation needed]

According to a 2004 public opinion poll by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, the number of people using Russian language in their homes considerably exceeded the number of those who declared Russian as their native language in the census. According to the survey, Russian is used at home by 43–46% of the population of the country (in other words a similar proportion to Ukrainian) and Russophones made a majority of the population in Eastern and Southern regions of Ukraine:[44]

According to July 2012 polling by Rating, 50% of the surveyed adult residents over 18 years of age considered their native language to be Ukrainian, 29% said Russian, 20% identified both Russian and Ukrainian as their native language, 1% gave another language.[45] 5% could not decide which language is their native one.[45] Almost 80% of respondents stated they did not have any problems using their native language in 2011.[45] 8% stated they had experienced difficulty in the execution (understanding) of official documents; mostly middle-aged and elderly people in South Ukraine and the Donbas.[45]

In the 2000s, Russian dominated in informal communication in the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv.[46][47] It was also used by a sizeable linguistic minority (4-5% of the total population) in Central and Western Ukraine.[48] 83% of Ukrainians responding to a 2008 Gallup poll preferred to use Russian instead of Ukrainian to take the survey.[49]

According to the survey carried out by Rating in August 2023 in the territory controlled by Ukraine and among the refugees, almost 60% of the polled usually speak Ukrainian at home, about 30% – Ukrainian and Russian, only 9% – Russian. Since March 2022, the use of Russian in everyday life has been noticeably decreasing. For 82% of respondents, Ukrainian was their mother tongue, and for 16%, Russian was their mother tongue. IDPs and refugees living abroad were more likely to use both languages for communication or speak Russian. Nevertheless, more than 70% of IDPs and refugees considered Ukrainian to be their native language.[50] According to Rating, the percentage of Ukrainians who usually speak Ukrainian at home had grown to 62% by July 2025, while Russian was usually spoken by 10%.[51]


Native language (according to annual surveys by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences):[52]
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Russian language 34.7 37.8 36.1 35.1 36.5 36.1 35.1 38.1 34.5 38.1 35.7 34.1
Spoken language in family (at home) (according to annual surveys by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences)[52]
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Mainly Russian 32.4 32.8 33.1 34.5 33.4 33.6 36.0 36.7 33.2 36.0 34.3 36.4
Both Russian and Ukrainian 29.4 34.5 29.6 26.8 28.4 29.0 24.8 25.8 28.0 25.2 26.3 21.6

Russian language in Ukrainian politics

[edit]
See also: Legislation on languages in Ukraine
Russophone activists collect signatures in support of introducing the Russian language as regional in Odesa, 2007

The Russian language in Ukraine is recognized (along with all other languages) as the "language of a national minority". Ukrainian is the only state language; every other language is declared to be the "language of a national minority" in the Constitution of Ukraine adopted by the parliament in 1996, but only Russian is explicitly named. Article 10 of the Constitution reads: "In Ukraine, the free development, use and protection of Russian, and other languages of national minorities of Ukraine, is guaranteed".[53] The Constitution declares Ukrainian language as the state language of the country, while other languages spoken in Ukraine are guaranteed constitutional protection, but are not in practice protected from book bans. The Ukrainian language was adopted as the state language by the Law on Languages adopted in Ukrainian SSR in 1989; Russian was specified as the language of communication with the other republics of Soviet Union.[54] Ukraine signed the European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages in 1996, but it was only partially ratified, and only in 2002 by the Parliament[55][clarification needed]

The issue of Russian receiving the status of second official language has been the subject of extended controversial discussion ever since Ukraine became independent in 1991. In every Ukrainian election, many politicians, such as former president Leonid Kuchma, were elected by Ukrainians after making Russian language rights a key part of their platform. Former President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych continued this practice when he was opposition leader. In an interview with Kommersant, during the 2010 Ukrainian presidential election-campaign, he stated that the status of Russian in Ukraine "is too politicized" and said that if elected president in 2010, he would "have a real opportunity to adopt a law on languages, which implements the requirements of the European Charter of regional languages". He implied this law would need 226 votes in the Ukrainian parliament (50% of the votes instead of the 75% of the votes needed to change the constitution of Ukraine).[56] After his early 2010 election as president, Yanukovych stated (on March 9, 2010) "Ukraine will continue to promote the Ukrainian language as its only state language".[57] At the same time, he stressed that it also necessary to develop other regional languages.[58]

In 1994, a referendum took place in the Donetsk Oblast and the Luhansk Oblast, with around 90% supporting the Russian language gaining status of an official language alongside Ukrainian, and for the Russian language to be an official language on a regional level, but it was ignored by Parliament.[59][60]

Former president Viktor Yushchenko, during his 2004 Presidential campaign, also claimed a willingness to introduce more equality for Russian speakers. His clipping service spread an announcement of his promise to make Russian language proficiency obligatory for officials who interact with Russian-speaking citizens.[61] In 2005 Yushchenko stated that he had never signed this decree project.[62] The controversy was seen by some as a deliberate policy of Ukrainization.[63][64]

In 2006, the Kharkiv City Rada was the first to declare Russian to be a regional language.[65] Following that, almost all southern and eastern oblasts (Luhansk, Donetsk, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts), and many major southern and eastern cities (Sevastopol, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Yalta, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Kryvyi Rih, Odesa) followed suit. Several courts overturned the decision to change the status of the Russian language in the cities of Kryvyi Rih, Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia and Mykolaiv while in Donetsk, Mykolaiv and Kharkiv oblasts it was retained.[66]

In August 2012, a law on regional languages entitled any local language spoken by at least a 10% minority to be declared official within that area.[67] Russian was within weeks declared as a regional language in several southern and eastern oblasts and cities.[68] On 23 February 2014, a bill repealing the law was approved by 232 deputies out of 450[69] but not signed into law by acting-president Oleksandr Turchynov.[70] On 28 February 2018, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine ruled on the matter.[71]

In December 2016, the importation of "anti-Ukrainian" books from Russia was restricted. In February 2017 the Ukrainian government completely banned the commercial importation of books from Russia, which had accounted for up to 60% of all titles sold.[72]

Surveys on the status of the Russian language

[edit]
Do you consider it necessary to make Russian an official language in Ukraine? (according to annual surveys by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences):[52]
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Yes 52.0 50.9 43.9 47.6 46.7 44.0 47.4 48.6 47.3 47.5 48.6
Hard to say 15.3 16.1 20.6 15.3 18.1 19.3 16.2 20.0 20.4 20.0 16.8
No 32.6 32.9 35.5 37.0 35.1 36.2 36.0 31.1 31.9 32.2 34.4
No answer 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1
Usage of the Russian language in Ukraine by region (2003).

According to a survey by the Research and Branding Group (June 2006), the majority of respondents supported the decisions of local authorities: 52% largely supported (including 69% of population of eastern oblasts and 56% of southern regions), 34% largely did not support the decisions, 9% – answered "partially support and partially not", 5% had no opinion.[73] According to an all-Ukrainian poll carried out in February 2008 by "Ukrainian Democratic Circle" 15% of those polled said that the language issue should be immediately solved,[74] in November 2009 this was 14.7%; in the November 2009 poll 35.8% wanted both the Russian and Ukrainian language to be state languages.[75]

According to polling by RATING, the level of support for granting Russian the status of a state language decreased (from 54% to 46%) and the number of opponents increased (from 40% to 45%) between 2009 and May 2012;[45] in July 2012 41% of respondents supported granting Russian the status of a state language and 51% opposed it.[45] (In July 2012) among the biggest supporters of bilingualism were residents of the Donets Basin (85%), South Ukraine (72%) and East Ukraine (50%).[45] A further poll conducted by RATING in September–October 2012 found 51% opposed granting official status to the Russian language, whereas 41% supported it. The largest regions of support were Donbas (75%), southern (72%) and eastern (53%), whereas nearly 70% of northern and central Ukraine, and 90% of western Ukraine were in opposition.[76] A survey conducted in February 2015 by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology found that support for Russian as a state language had dropped to 19% (37% in the south, 31% in Donbas and other eastern oblasts).[77] 52% (West: 44%, Central: 57%; South: 43%; East: 61%) said that Russian should be official only in regions where the majority wanted it and 21% said it should be removed from official use.[77]

A poll conducted in March 2022 by RATING in the territory controlled by Ukraine found that 83% of the respondents believe that Ukrainian should be the only state language of Ukraine. This opinion dominates in all macro-regions, age and language groups. On the other hand, before the war, almost a quarter of Ukrainians were in favour of granting Russian the status of the state language, while today only 7% support it. In peacetime, Russian was traditionally supported by residents of the south and east. But even in these regions, only a third of them were in favour, and after Russia's full-scale invasion, their number dropped by almost half.[78]

Other surveys

[edit]

The Russo-Ukrainian director of the Kyiv branch of the Institute of the CIS Countries [ru], Vladimir Vladimirovich Kornilov [ru], presented the results of a poll carried out by the Research & Branding Group in late 2006. As reported by the Russian-language REGNUM News Agency, it found that "68% of Ukrainians are fluent in Russian and 57% are fluent in Ukrainian."[79]

Although a census conducted in Ukrainian showed that Russian speakers comprise about 30% (2001 census), 39% of Ukrainians interviewed in a 2006 survey believed that the rights of Russophones were violated[80] because the Russian language is not official in the country, whereas 38% had the opposite position.[81][82]

According to a poll carried out by the Social Research Center at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in late 2009 ideological issues were ranked third (15%) as reasons to organize mass protest actions (in particular, the issues of joining NATO, the status of the Russian language, the activities of left- and right-wing political groups, etc.); behind economic issues (25%) and problems of ownership (17%).[83] According to a March 2010 survey, forced Ukrainization and Russian language suppression are of concern to 4.8% of the population.[84]

According to 2016-2017 polls by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, Rating, and GfK Ukraine, about 1% of respondents across the country, and fewer than 3% of respondents in eastern parts of Ukraine, found the status of the Russian language to be an important political issue. The same 2017 polls indicated 64% support for state policies favoring the usage of the Ukrainian language.[85]

Use of Russian in specific spheres

[edit]

Russian literature of Ukraine

[edit]
Oleg Ladyzhensky and Dmitry Gromov, two Russophone Ukrainian co-authors, were named Europe's best science fiction writers in 2006 by ESFS[86]

Historically, many famous writers of Russian literature were born and lived in Ukraine. Nikolai Gogol is probably the most famous example of shared Russo-Ukrainian heritage: Ukrainian by descent, he wrote in Russian, and significantly contributed to culture of both nations. Russian author Mikhail Bulgakov was born in Kyiv, as well as poet Ilya Erenburg. A number of notable Russian writers and poets hailed from Odesa, including Ilya Ilf and Yevgeny Petrov, Anna Akhmatova, Isaak Babel. Russian child poet Nika Turbina was born in Yalta, Crimea.

A significant number of contemporary authors from Ukraine write in Russian.[87] This is especially notable within science fiction and fantasy genres.[87] Kharkiv is considered the "capital city" of Ukrainian sci-fi and fantasy, it is home to several popular Russophone Ukrainian writers, such as H. L. Oldie (pen name for Oleg Ladyzhensky and Dmitry Gromov),[88] Alexander Zorich,[89] Andrei Valentinov, and Yuri Nikitin. Science fiction convention Zvezdny Most (Rus. for "Star Bridge") is held in Kharkiv annually. Russophone Ukrainian writers also hail from Kyiv, those include Marina and Sergey Dyachenko[90] and Vladimir Arenev. Max Frei hails from Odesa, and Vera Kamsha was born in Lviv. Other Russophone Ukrainian writers of sci-fi and fantasy include Vladimir Vasilyev, Vladislav Rusanov, Alexander Mazin and Fyodor Berezin. RBG-Azimuth, Ukraine's largest sci-fi and fantasy magazine, is published in Russian, as well as now defunct Realnost Fantastiki.[91]

Outside science fiction and fantasy, there is also a number of Russophone realist writers and poets. Ukrainian literary magazine Sho listed Alexander Kabanov, Boris Khersonsky, Andrey Polyakov, Andrey Kurkov and Vladimir Rafeyenko as best Russophone Ukrainian writers of 2013.[92]

According to H. L. Oldie, writing in Russian is an easier way for Ukrainian authors to be published and reach a broader audience. The authors say that it is because of Ukraine's ineffective book publishing policy: while Russian publishers are interested in popular literature, Ukrainian publishers rely mostly on grant givers.[87] Many Ukrainian publishers agree and complain about low demand and low profitability for books in Ukrainian, compared to books in Russian.[93]

In the media

[edit]

A 2012 study showed that:[94]

  • on the radio, 3.4% of songs were in Ukrainian while 60% were in Russian
  • over 60% of newspapers, 83% of journals and 87% of books were in Russian
  • 28% of TV programs were in Ukrainian, even on state-owned channels

Russian-language programming is sometimes subtitled in Ukrainian, and commercials during Russian-language programs are in Ukrainian on Ukraine-based media.

On March 11, 2014, amidst pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine, the Ukrainian National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting shut down the broadcast of Russian television channels Rossiya 24, Channel One Russia, RTR Planeta, and NTV Mir in Ukraine.[95][96] Since 19 August 2014 Ukraine has blocked 14 Russian television channels "to protect its media space from aggression from Russia, which has been deliberately inciting hatred and discord among Ukrainian citizens".[97]

In early June 2015, 162 Russian movies and TV series were banned in Ukraine because they were seen to contain popularization, agitation and/or propaganda for the 2014–15 Russian military intervention in Ukraine (this military intervention is denied by Russia).[98][99] All movies that feature "unwanted" Russian or Russia-supporting actors were also banned.[100]

On the Internet

[edit]

Russian is by far the preferred language on websites in Ukraine (80.1%), followed by English (10.1%), then Ukrainian (9.5%). The Russian language version of Wikipedia is five times more popular within Ukraine than the Ukrainian one, with these numbers matching those for the 2008 Gallup poll cited above (in which 83% of Ukrainians preferred to take the survey in Russian and 17% in Ukrainian.)[101]

While government organizations are required to have their websites in Ukrainian, Ukrainian usage of the Internet is mostly in the Russian language. According to DomainTyper, the top ranking .ua domains are google.com.ua, yandex.ua, ex.ua and i.ua, all of which use the Russian language as default.[102] According to 2013 UIA research, four of the five most popular websites (aside from Google) in Ukraine were Russian or Russophone: those are Vkontakte, Mail.ru, Yandex, and Odnoklassniki.[103] The top Ukrainian language website in this rank is Ukr.net, which was only the 8th most popular, and even Ukr.net uses both languages interchangeably.

On May 15, 2017, Ukrainian president Poroshenko issued a decree that demanded all Ukrainian internet providers to block access to all most popular Russian social media and websites, including VK, Odnoklassniki, Mail.ru, Yandex citing matters of national security in the context of the war in Donbas and explaining it as a response to "massive Russian cyberattacks across the world".[104][105] On the following day the demand for applications that allowed to access blocked websites skyrocketed in Ukrainian segments of App Store and Google Play.[106] The ban was condemned by Human Rights Watch that called it "a cynical, politically expedient attack on the right to information affecting millions of Ukrainians, and their personal and professional lives",[107] while head of Council of Europe[108][better source needed] expressed a "strong concern" about the ban.

In January 2016, the ratio of Russian to Ukrainian Wikipedia use in Ukraine was 4.6 times, decreasing to 2.6 times in January 2019, 2.4 times in January 2020, and 2 times in January 2021.[109] In October 2023, the difference in the number of pageviews between the Wikipedias was 10 million (the Ukrainian Wikipedia had 90 million views, while the Russian Wikipedia had 100 million), the lowest ever recorded.[110]

The usage of the Russian language on social media sharply decreased after the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. According to a poll conducted the following December, only 2% of respondents used exclusively Russian on the Internet, while another 4% used mostly Russian. 38% used Ukrainian and Russian equally, 26% used mostly Ukrainian, and another 26% used exclusively Ukrainian.[111][112] As of October 2023, Ukrainian significantly dominated Russian on Instagram, Twitter, and Facebook, slightly prevailed on Tik Tok, and almost equaled Russian on YouTube.[113]

In education

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See also: Ukrainization § 2017 law "On Education"

Among private secondary schools, each individual institution decides whether to study Russian or not.[114]

The number of Russian-teaching schools has reduced since Ukrainian independence in 1991 and in 2021 it is much lower than the proportion of Russophones,[115][116][117] but still higher than the proportion of ethnic Russians.

The Law on Education formerly granted Ukrainian families (parents and their children) a right to choose their native language for schools and studies.[118] This was changed by a new law in 2017 that only allows the use of Ukrainian in secondary schools and higher.

Higher education institutions in Ukraine generally use Ukrainian as the language of instruction.[1]

According to parliamentarians of the Supreme Council of Crimea, in 2010 90% students of Crimea were studying in Russian language schools.[119] At the same time, only 7% of students in Crimea were studying in Ukrainian language schools.[120] In 2012, the only Ukrainian boarding school (50 pupils) in Sevastopol was closed, and children who would not study in Russian language were to be transferred to a boarding school for children with intellectual disabilities.[121]

In courts

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Since 1 January 2010, court proceedings have been allowed to take place in Russian on mutual consent of parties. Citizens who are unable to speak Ukrainian or Russian are allowed to use their native language or the services of an interpreter.[122]

Article 14 of the 2019 Law of Ukraine "On protecting the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language" states:

1. In the courts of Ukraine, proceedings shall be conducted and records shall be kept in the State language.

2. Other languages than the State language may be used in court proceedings in the manner prescribed by the procedural codes of Ukraine and the Law of Ukraine on Judicial System and Status of Judges.

3. Courts shall adopt decisions and make them public in the State language in the manner prescribed by law. Texts of court decisions shall be drafted with regard to the State language standards.[123]

In business

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As of 2008, business affairs in Ukraine were mainly dealt with in Russian.[1] Advanced technical and engineering courses at the university level in Ukraine were taught in Russian, which was changed according to the 2017 law "On Education".

Article 20 of the 2019 Law of Ukraine "On protecting the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language" states:

1. No one shall be forced to use a language other than the State language while being at work and performing duties under an employment contract, except when:

a) serving consumers or other customers who are foreigners or stateless persons;

b) drawing up legal, technical, informational and promotional texts or other messages and documents (including verbal ones) addressed to foreigners or stateless persons, legal entities, authorities and officers of foreign states and international organisations.

2. Employment contracts in Ukraine shall be executed in the State language, which shall not preclude the parties thereto from using its translation.[124]

See also

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References

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General Sources

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Russian language in Ukraine

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The Russian language in Ukraine constitutes the native tongue for 29.6% of the population, or approximately 14.3 million people, according to the official 2001 all-Ukrainian census, with concentrations exceeding 50% in eastern and southern oblasts such as Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Crimea, as well as in urban centers like Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk. This demographic footprint stems from centuries of Russification under the Russian Empire and Soviet Union, where Russian supplanted Ukrainian in administration, education, and industry, fostering bilingualism wherein many ethnic Ukrainians adopted Russian as a primary or secondary language for practical utility. Ukrainian, designated the sole state language by Article 10 of the 1996 Constitution, receives state protection for its development and use in public domains, while Russian lacks official status at the national level but persists in private communication, family life, and certain cultural expressions. Post-Soviet language policies have progressively prioritized Ukrainian in spheres like , schooling, and media to counter historical asymmetries, notably through the 2012 regional language law—later annulled in 2014—and the 2019 Law on Ensuring the Functioning of the as the State Language, which mandates Ukrainian quotas in broadcasting, publishing, and public services, effectively diminishing Russian's institutional roles amid debates over and national cohesion. These measures, accelerated by the 2014 Revolution and the 2022 Russian invasion, have prompted shifts in usage patterns, with surveys indicating reduced daily reliance on Russian in favor of Ukrainian, though native proficiency remains entrenched among older generations and in affected regions. Controversies persist regarding the balance between linguistic and the accommodation of Russian speakers, who comprise a substantial bilingual segment, influencing electoral and without evidence of outright prohibition on private Russian employment.

Historical Development

Pre-20th Century Settlement and Influence

The incorporation of into the Russian state following the 1654 Treaty of Pereiaslav initiated a process of administrative and cultural integration, with Russian gradually entering official correspondence alongside Church Slavonic and Ruthenian variants used in the . This treaty, while preserving initial Cossack autonomy, facilitated the influx of Russian military personnel and envoys, establishing early pockets of Russian linguistic influence in governance and garrisons east of the Dnieper River. In the mid-17th century, the frontier zone—spanning modern , , and oblasts—was actively settled by Russian migrants fleeing and internal conflicts, granted tax exemptions (slobody) to form defensive Cossack-style regiments against Tatar incursions. These settlers, numbering in the tens of thousands by the late 1600s, intermixed with local Ukrainian populations, promoting a hybrid linguistic environment where blended with Ukrainian, particularly in urban centers like and , and laying groundwork for Russian dominance in regimental administration. Catherine II's policies after the 1764 partition of Poland and abolition of Hetmanate autonomy accelerated ; by the early 1780s, she mandated Russian as the administrative language, supplanting vernacular-based "prosta mova" (simple speech) systems previously used in local courts and records, while encouraging noble education in Russian through imperial lyceums. State-sponsored colonization of the "Wild Fields" (southern steppes) under the New Russia governorate from 1764 onward drew Russian peasants, , and officials via land grants and military relocation, concentrating Russian speakers in emerging ports like (founded 1794) and military hubs, where they comprised urban elites amid a rural Ukrainian majority. Nineteenth-century imperial reforms further entrenched Russian: the 1804 education statute phased out Ukrainian in schools, mandating Russian instruction; noble families, integrated via service in St. Petersburg, adopted Russian through intermarriage and bureaucracy, viewing it as a marker of imperial loyalty. The 1863 Valuev Circular, authored by Pyotr Valuev, banned Ukrainian-language publications except for historical documents and , declaring "a Little Russian language has not existed, does not exist, and cannot exist" but rather a Russian dialect distorted by Polish and local influences, thereby channeling literary output into Russian and restricting Ukrainian to private oral domains. This measure, enforced via censorship committees, reflected causal incentives for linguistic unification to counter Polish unrest post-1863 uprising and consolidate central control, though rural Ukrainian vernacular persisted unaffected by print bans. By century's end, Russian prevailed in universities (e.g., Imperial University, 1805), press, and commerce, influencing even Ukrainian intellectuals who code-switched for prestige, while settlement patterns yielded Russian-speaking majorities in southern and eastern industrial enclaves.

Soviet Russification and Suppression of Ukrainian

In the early 1920s, Soviet authorities implemented korenizatsiya, a policy of promoting local languages including Ukrainian in administration, education, and party affairs to secure loyalty in non-Russian regions of the USSR. This initially expanded Ukrainian-language schooling and publications, with Ukrainian comprising the in a majority of primary schools in the Ukrainian SSR by the late 1920s. However, viewed rising Ukrainian cultural autonomy as a threat to centralized control, leading to a sharp policy reversal by 1932–1933 that prioritized to foster a unified Soviet identity under Russian dominance. Pavel Postyshev, appointed second secretary of the in January 1933, spearheaded this shift by importing Russian cadres and denouncing "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" as counterrevolutionary. He oversaw the closure of Ukrainian cultural institutions, theaters, and newspapers, while purging party and intellectual elites accused of nationalism; by 1934, Ukrainian-language press output plummeted, with many outlets Russified or eliminated. This coincided with the (1937–1938), during which over 200 Ukrainian writers and scholars were executed or imprisoned, effectively dismantling the linguistic and cultural infrastructure built during korenizatsiya. Post-World War II policies accelerated by designating Russian as the lingua franca for technical, scientific, and military domains, while confining Ukrainian to rural or "artistic" uses to prevent nationalistic revival. Khrushchev's 1958 education reforms allowed parental choice for Russian-medium schooling, resulting in a rapid decline in Ukrainian instruction; by the 1960s, Russian dominated urban and higher institutions in . Late Soviet decrees, such as the 1972 push against "national deviations," further marginalized Ukrainian in media and bureaucracy, enforcing bilingualism skewed toward Russian proficiency for career advancement.

Post-Soviet Transition and Early Independence

Upon Ukraine's declaration of independence on August 24, 1991, and its confirmation via nationwide referendum on December 1, 1991, the new state inherited the 1989 Law on Languages adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR on October 28, 1989, which designated Ukrainian as the state language and outlined measures for its expanded application in administration, education, science, culture, and media. The law emphasized the progressive introduction of Ukrainian into these domains while affirming citizens' rights to use their native or other languages in private and public life, reflecting a framework that prioritized the titular language without prohibiting others. The 1996 Constitution, ratified on June 28, 1996, codified this approach in Article 10, stating that "the state language of Ukraine is the " and obligating the state to ensure its "comprehensive development and functioning in all spheres of social life" across the territory, while simultaneously guaranteeing "the free development, use and protection of Russian, and other languages of national minorities." This provision rejected official bilingualism at the national level but accommodated regional and minority linguistic practices, aligning with Ukraine's demographic reality where Russian served as a widespread , particularly among urban populations and ethnic proficient in it from Soviet-era exposure. Implementation in the 1990s focused on affirmative measures to elevate Ukrainian, including mandates for its use in operations, public signage, television broadcasts, and as a compulsory subject with dedicated literature courses in schools; for instance, 176 Ukrainian-medium schools opened in 1990, alongside increased instructional hours for Ukrainian and geography. Russian-language schools, numbering in the thousands, continued operating without restriction, especially in eastern and southern regions like , , , and , where Russian-native speakers exceeded 30-50% of the population per lingering Soviet census patterns. Despite these initiatives, Russian retained dominance in informal communication, commerce, print media, and private broadcasting throughout the decade, as economic turmoil post-independence diverted resources from rigorous enforcement, and entrenched Soviet bilingualism—evident in surveys showing high Russian proficiency among ethnic —sustained its everyday utility. Regional disparities complicated uniform application, with western oblasts advancing more swiftly than Russophone east and south, where political figures like President (1991-1994) and (1994-2005) navigated competing nationalist and pragmatic pressures without enacting prohibitions on Russian. This era thus marked a foundational shift toward Ukrainian as the symbolic and administrative core of state identity, grounded in correcting prior imbalances, while pragmatically preserving Russian's societal role to maintain stability amid transition.

Demographic and Linguistic Usage

Official Census Data and Declared Native Speakers

The most recent comprehensive official data on declared native languages in derives from the All-Ukrainian Population Census conducted by the State Statistics Committee of . In this census, 67.5% of respondents (approximately 32.7 million individuals out of a total population of 48.5 million) identified Ukrainian as their mother tongue, while 29.6% (about 14.3 million people) declared Russian as their native language; the remaining 2.9% reported other languages. This marked a shift from the preceding of the Ukrainian SSR, where Ukrainian was declared as the native language by 64.7% of the population and Russian by 32.8%, based on comparative analysis provided in the 2001 census report. The increase in Ukrainian declarations and corresponding decrease in Russian ones between 1989 and 2001 have been attributed by some analysts to post-independence ethnic and linguistic reidentification, particularly among bilingual ethnic who previously reported Russian as their mother tongue under Soviet-era influences.
YearUkrainian Native (%)Russian Native (%)Other Native (%)Total Population (millions)
198964.732.8~2.5~51.7
67.529.62.948.5
The 1989 and censuses relied on self-reported mother tongue, a standard metric that captures declared primary but may not fully reflect everyday usage or proficiency, especially in bilingual contexts prevalent in eastern and southern regions. No subsequent nationwide has provided updated native data; the planned 2020 census was indefinitely postponed due to the 2014 annexation of , conflict in , and the 2022 full-scale Russian invasion, leaving the figures as the latest official benchmark as of 2025.

Survey-Based Usage Patterns and Bilingualism

Surveys conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) reveal a marked shift in domestic language use following Russia's full-scale in 2022. In a February–March 2025 poll of 1,029 adults across government-controlled territories, 63% reported speaking primarily Ukrainian at home, up from 52% in 2020, while 13% used primarily Russian, down from 25%; 19% employed both languages equally, a figure stable from 18% in 2020. This trend reflects broader patterns in everyday communication, with respondents preferring Ukrainian for interviews rising to 88% in 2025 from 64% in 2020. An October 2024 survey by the (IRI) in collaboration with the Rating Sociological Group, polling 2,000 adults, found 58% using only Ukrainian in daily life, 9% only Russian, and 31% both languages. Regional disparities were pronounced, as shown below:
RegionOnly Ukrainian (%)Only Russian (%)Bilingual Use (%)
West9016
Central65627
South321651
East242252
These figures indicate persistent bilingual practices in eastern and southern areas, where mixed usage remains common amid historical Soviet-era influences, though overall Ukrainian dominance has grown. Bilingualism in , defined by proficiency in both Ukrainian and Russian, prevails at high levels despite usage shifts toward Ukrainian. Pre-invasion surveys estimated that over 80% of adults spoke at least one additional language fluently beyond their native tongue, with Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism central due to decades of and urban Russian prevalence. Recent wartime data from KIIS corroborates sustained comprehension, as even among those using Russian at home, 81% opposed granting it regional official status in 2024, implying functional Ukrainian skills. IRI's 2024 findings highlight active bilingual use at 31% nationally, concentrated in conflict-proximate regions, underscoring retained communicative versatility amid policy-driven . This competence facilitates adaptation, with 89% of respondents in a 2023 ancillary poll reporting increased Ukrainian use post-invasion without proficiency loss in Russian.

Regional and Urban-Rural Disparities

The distribution of Russian language usage in Ukraine displays sharp regional variations, primarily aligned with historical settlement patterns, Soviet-era industrialization, and ethnic demographics. In the eastern and southern oblasts, Russian has historically dominated daily communication, with native speakers comprising 58.3% of Crimea's population and around 38-39% in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts according to the 2001 census. These figures reflect concentrated Russian-speaking communities in industrial hubs like Donbas and port cities such as Odesa, where Russian accounted for over 27% of native speakers and became the lingua franca during Soviet-era industrialization, with many ethnic Ukrainians assimilating to it in urban workplaces amid multi-ethnic workforces; dominance extended through policies and migration even to rural areas. In contrast, western regions like Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts reported native Russian speakers at under 2%, underscoring a predominantly Ukrainian linguistic environment shaped by limited Russification and stronger national identity ties. Urban-rural divides further accentuate these patterns, with Russian prevalence significantly higher in cities than countryside areas nationwide. Large urban centers in the east, including and , featured predominantly Russian-speaking populations in surveys up to the early 2000s, often exceeding 70% usage in public life due to migration, education, and media influences. Rural areas, particularly in central and , tended toward Ukrainian or mixed —a hybrid dialect blending Ukrainian and Russian elements—reflecting agrarian traditions and less exposure to standardized Russian. This urban bias stemmed from Soviet policies favoring Russian in administration and industry, concentrating speakers in metropolitan zones while rural communities retained more Ukrainian substrate. Post-2014 efforts and the 2022 full-scale invasion have narrowed some disparities through accelerated , even in eastern regions where Russian was once predominant. Surveys indicate a rapid shift, with Ukrainian usage rising in everyday communication across oblasts, though eastern and urban areas retain higher residual bilingualism and variants compared to the west and rural locales. For instance, pre-war data showed Russian dominant in eastern daily interactions, but wartime analyses reveal a marked increase in Ukrainian on and public spheres, driven by national solidarity and policy enforcement, without fully erasing regional gradients. A 2023 study confirmed this acceleration, attributing it to causal factors like conflict-induced identity reinforcement rather than coercion alone. Regional polls by the International Institute of (KIIS) in 2022-2023 highlight persistent but diminishing divides, with only 13% nationally reporting primary home use of Russian by 2025, lowest in rural west and highest in urban east remnants.

Evolution of Language Laws Post-1991

Following Ukraine's declaration of independence on August 24, 1991, the Verkhovna Rada affirmed Ukrainian as the state language, building on the 1989 Soviet-era law that had already designated it as such. The 1996 Constitution, adopted on June 28, formalized this in Article 10, stating: "The state language of Ukraine is the Ukrainian language" while committing the state to support the free development, use, and protection of Russian and other minority languages. This provision aimed to balance national identity with linguistic diversity, though implementation remained inconsistent amid widespread Russian usage in eastern and southern regions. In the early 2000s, legislative efforts to regulate language policy faltered, with a 2003 draft law failing to pass. Under President Viktor Yanukovych, the 2012 Law "On the Principles of State Language Policy," adopted July 3 and effective August 10, marked a shift by allowing Russian regional official status in territories where at least 10% of the population declared it as native, based on the 2001 census. This enabled expanded use in local governance, education, and media in Russian-majority areas like Crimea and Donetsk, prompting criticism from Ukrainian nationalists as a concession to pro-Russian interests but praised by others for reflecting demographic realities. The 2014 Revolution of Dignity led to an immediate pushback; on February 23, the voted 278-38 to repeal the 2012 law, though Acting President refrained from signing, leaving it nominally in effect. The declared it unconstitutional on February 28, 2018, citing procedural violations in its passage, effectively voiding it and reverting to constitutional primacy of Ukrainian without a comprehensive replacement statute. Subsequent laws strengthened Ukrainian's role. The September 5, , Law on Education mandated Ukrainian as the primary language of instruction from grade 5 onward, limiting minority languages—including Russian—to no more than state language quotas in secondary schools, with full transition by 2020. This aimed to enhance proficiency amid concerns over bilingualism's erosion of national cohesion but drew international criticism for potentially disadvantaging Russian speakers in affected regions. The April 25, 2019, Law "On Ensuring the Functioning of the as the State Language," signed July 15 and effective July 16, 2019, required in , services, media (with quotas rising to 90% by 2024), and , while permitting Russian in private communication or by mutual agreement in non-official settings. It distinguished Russian as a non-indigenous language, subjecting it to stricter regulations than those for groups like , and established a for enforcement. Post-2022 Russian invasion, wartime measures intensified restrictions; on June 19, 2022, laws banned Russian-language books conflicting with Ukrainian interests and limited Russian music on radio to 2% of airtime, framing these as security imperatives against cultural influence. This evolution reflects a from bilingual accommodation to assertive , driven by geopolitical tensions and efforts to consolidate national unity.

Provisions on Russian and Minority Protections

The , in Article 10, designates Ukrainian as the state while guaranteeing the "free development, use and protection of Russian, other languages of national minorities of ." This provision also ensures that citizens belonging to national minorities have the right, in accordance with law, to in their native or to study their native in public educational institutions or through national cultural societies. Article 11 further protects the "free development, use and protection of the languages of " without specifying Russian explicitly, though it has been invoked in debates over bilingual practices in regions with significant Russian-speaking populations. The 2019 Law "On Ensuring the Functioning of the as the State Language," effective from July 16, 2019, mandates Ukrainian's exclusive use in , courts, , healthcare, and media, but includes safeguards for minority languages in non-official contexts. Article 20 permits national minorities to use their languages alongside Ukrainian in private communication, cultural events, religious services, and media, provided Ukrainian quotas are met in broadcast content (e.g., at least 90% Ukrainian in national TV after 2024). For indigenous peoples like and national minorities, the law allows native-language instruction in preschools and primary schools, with a gradual transition to Ukrainian as the primary language of instruction thereafter, excluding official languages which receive broader exemptions. Russian, classified as a language of a national minority rather than an indigenous or language, is thus restricted in state-funded secondary and higher education, though private institutions may use it fully. Post-2014 reforms, including the 2017 Education Law and the 2019 State Language Law, revoked the regional co-official status previously granted to Russian under the 2012 law (where it met the 10% threshold in 13 oblasts and ), shifting it to de facto minority protections amid concerns over Russian influence following the annexation of and conflict in . These measures require civil servants, including in Russian-speaking regions, to demonstrate Ukrainian proficiency by 2021 for most roles, but exempt private business and daily , where Russian remains prevalent. The 2023 Law on National Minorities reinforces , allowing minorities to establish associations and media in their languages, but ties expanded protections to alignment with EU standards, implicitly differentiating Russian due to its association with the aggressor state. has noted that while no outright ban exists, enforcement of Ukrainian quotas in media and services can indirectly pressure Russian usage in public-facing roles. In practice, these provisions balance Ukrainian consolidation—driven by historical reversal—with minority accommodations, though Russian speakers, comprising about 30% native speakers per 2001 data, report challenges in official domains without equivalent bilingual mandates. The endorsed the 2019 law's core but recommended clearer minority exemptions to prevent disproportionate impacts.

Enforcement Mechanisms and Challenges

The primary enforcement mechanism for the 2019 Ukrainian language law is the Office of the for the Protection of the State Language, an independent body tasked with monitoring compliance, receiving public complaints, and imposing administrative penalties. The investigates violations such as failure to use Ukrainian in official communications, public services, or media, with a mandate to respond to complaints within 10 working days and issue protocols for non-compliance. Fines were activated on July 16, 2022, ranging from 3,400 UAH (approximately 85 USD at the time) for initial offenses by officials or service providers to 5,100–8,500 UAH for repeats within a year, targeting entities like local governments, businesses, and broadcasters for inadequate Ukrainian usage. Enforcement activities include on-site inspections, complaint-driven probes, and penalties against civil servants; for instance, in early 2024, issued 19 fines to local officials for language violations in administrative proceedings, with amounts tied to repetition. By the first quarter of 2025, the Commissioner processed 646 citizen complaints, reflecting ongoing monitoring efforts amid heightened scrutiny post-2022 . Additional mechanisms involve judicial oversight, where violators can appeal fines in administrative courts, and integration with sector-specific regulators, such as media quotas enforced by the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting requiring at least 90% Ukrainian content in certain broadcasts. Challenges to enforcement persist due to regional linguistic divides, with lower compliance in historically Russian-dominant eastern and southern oblasts like Donetsk and Odesa, where entrenched bilingual practices and cultural resistance hinder adoption despite quotas. The 2022 Russian invasion exacerbated implementation issues by displacing populations, disrupting inspections in occupied territories, and shifting priorities toward wartime resilience, leading to uneven application and allowances for Russian in informal or emergency contexts. International critiques, including from the in 2019, highlight imbalances favoring Ukrainian over minority languages like Russian without sufficient transitional periods or exemptions, potentially violating European standards on and prompting calls for amendments to avoid disproportionate restrictions. Practical hurdles include limited resources for the Commissioner's office, which relies heavily on citizen reports rather than proactive nationwide audits, resulting in that critics argue favors high-profile cases over systemic change. Legal challenges in courts have delayed or overturned some fines, while Russian propaganda amplifies isolated non-compliance as evidence of "genocide" against Russian speakers, complicating domestic buy-in among bilingual populations who view the as symbolic but disruptive to daily commerce and media habits. Despite fines totaling thousands of UAH annually, collection rates remain inconsistent, underscoring enforcement's reliance on voluntary adherence amid Ukraine's hybrid Russophone-Ukrainophone identity, where private Russian usage endures unchecked.

Applications in Key Sectors

Media, Literature, and Publishing

In the media landscape of , Russian-language content predominated in the post-Soviet era, with surveys indicating that over 60% of newspapers and a significant portion of radio broadcasts featured Russian prior to 2014 reforms. Television channels, particularly those popular in eastern and southern regions, often aired programming in Russian, reflecting bilingual usage patterns among audiences. Following the 2014 annexation of and conflict in , enacted language quotas mandating at least 75% Ukrainian content in national television and radio by 2017, rising to 90% for music, which reduced Russian-language broadcasts substantially. By 2022, a law required all national print media to publish exclusively in Ukrainian, further marginalizing Russian in formal outlets, though regional and online media retained some Russian usage informally. Literature in Russian has been produced by numerous Ukrainian authors, especially in urban centers like and , where it served as a literary due to Soviet-era and market dynamics. Notable examples include the duo H. L. Oldie (Dmitry Gromov and Oleg Ladyzhensky), whose works in Russian gained international recognition while rooted in Ukrainian cultural contexts. Many Russophone writers, such as Volodymyr Rafeyenko, continued producing in Russian into the 2010s, but the 2022 invasion prompted shifts, with some authors like Rafeyenko expressing personal aversion to the language amid wartime trauma and others transitioning to Ukrainian. This reflects broader trends where Russian-language literature, once comprising 80-85% of the market in the 2000s, faced declining viability due to cultural reorientation and policy pressures rather than outright prohibition of domestic creation. Publishing in Russian experienced a marked contraction post-2014, accelerated by wartime measures. In 2019, Russian-language books totaled 4.8 million copies amid 46.1 million overall, but by 2022, titles dropped 59.3% and circulation fell 68.4% from the prior year, driven by import bans on Russian-origin works and domestic preferences for Ukrainian. In 2022, approved restrictions on Russian books and music from post-Soviet artists, prohibiting distribution of titles promoting aggression or imported from and , though domestic Russian publishing persisted at reduced scales. By 2023, over 90% of publications were in Ukrainian, with only 700 Russian titles versus 12,688 in Ukrainian, signaling a structural shift toward linguistic amid the invasion's cultural fallout.

Education and Schooling

In the early post-Soviet period, Russian served as the primary language of instruction in many Ukrainian schools, particularly in eastern and southern regions, reflecting Soviet-era legacies where Ukrainian-language schooling comprised only about 22% of enrollment by the mid-1990s. By the 2005-2006 school year, Ukrainian-language schools accounted for 78% of elementary and secondary students nationwide, with Russian-medium instruction predominant in urban areas like and . This distribution aligned with demographic patterns, as Russian speakers often preferred instruction in their native , though bilingual practices allowed for Ukrainian as a subject in Russian schools. The 2017 Law on Education mandated Ukrainian as the state language of instruction from the onward in public schools, progressively limiting Russian and other minority languages to no more than a few subjects in , with full implementation targeted by 2020. This reform affected approximately 400,000 students in Russian-medium schools, representing about 10% of the total student population at the time, prompting a transitional period where schools in regions like and oblasts began shifting curricula. By the 2019-2020 , over 99% of secondary students were enrolled in Ukrainian-language instruction, with Russian retained primarily as a subject in some areas. In 2015, Ukraine had 621 fully Russian-language schools, but enforcement challenges, including teacher retraining shortages and resistance in Russophone communities, delayed full compliance until post-2014 efforts accelerated the transition. Following Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian authorities in government-controlled territories further restricted Russian in education, with cities like eliminating it entirely as a subject of instruction by August 2022. By the 2023-2024 school year, only 345 students nationwide were receiving any Russian-language education or studying it as a , a sharp decline attributed to wartime security concerns and national unity policies. Higher education institutions, historically mixed but trending toward Ukrainian since the , now overwhelmingly use Ukrainian as the medium, with Russian limited to optional electives in select programs. In Russian-occupied territories, authorities have imposed Russian as the mandatory language of instruction since September 2022, coercing teachers through threats and abductions to adopt Moscow-aligned curricula that exclude Ukrainian history and language beyond minimal exposure. documented cases in Kharkivska, Khersonska, and Zaporizka oblasts where schools faced forced , affecting an estimated one million school-age children, with Ukrainian-language classes effectively banned starting in the 2025-2026 . This policy, enforced via oversight and requirements for enrollment, contrasts with pre-invasion patterns and has drawn international condemnation for violating children's rights to in their mother tongue.

Government, Courts, and Public Administration

The Law of "On Ensuring the Functioning of the as the State Language," adopted on April 25, 2019, and entering into force on July 16, 2019, mandates the exclusive use of Ukrainian in the activities of public authorities, local self-government bodies, and their officials, including in official communications, document drafting, and public services provision. This includes requirements for civil servants to demonstrate proficiency in Ukrainian, with transitional periods extending proficiency certification deadlines to 2021 for certain positions and full implementation by 2023 for others. While Russian may be used informally among staff or in non-official interactions, all formal outputs, such as decrees, reports, and websites of state institutions, must be in Ukrainian, with provisions for translations into minority languages only where required by European obligations, which do not extend to Russian as a widely spoken non-indigenous language in this context. In courts, the 2019 law stipulates that proceedings, including hearings, decisions, and publications, occur in Ukrainian, with court rulings required to be issued and publicized solely in the state language. Participants unable to use Ukrainian are entitled to free services, but prior allowances for Russian-language proceedings on mutual consent of parties, as permitted under a 2010 , have been superseded by the mandatory state language framework, prioritizing Ukrainian to ensure uniformity and national cohesion. The of upheld the law's constitutionality in 2021, rejecting challenges that it discriminated against Russian speakers by affirming that threats to the state language equate to threats to . Enforcement is overseen by the for the Protection of the State Language, appointed in 2020, who monitors compliance and can impose fines ranging from 200 to 400 tax-free minimum incomes for initial violations in , escalating for repeats. Pre-2022 implementation faced delays in regions with high Russian usage, such as eastern oblasts, where informal Russian persisted in local administrations despite formal mandates, but audits revealed gradual shifts, with over 90% of state websites transitioning to Ukrainian by 2021. Following Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, adherence accelerated in government-controlled territories, driven by heightened national unity and security concerns, resulting in near-universal Ukrainian usage in official spheres without reported widespread disruptions to administrative functions.

Business, Commerce, and Everyday Communication

In business and commerce, Russian long functioned as the dominant language, particularly in urban and , where it facilitated , negotiations, and internal operations due to Soviet-era and its status as a lingua franca for economic elites. This persisted post-independence, with Russian preferred in private sector dealings in cities like and , where surveys prior to 2014 indicated over 70% usage in commercial contexts in regional centers. However, the 2019 Law on Ensuring the Functioning of the as the State Language mandated Ukrainian as the primary language for service provision, advertising, and contracts, with Russian allowed only upon request in minority-heavy areas. The 2022 Russian invasion accelerated de-Russification in commerce, prompting major firms to adopt Ukrainian for branding, customer service, and documentation to align with national resilience efforts and avoid perceptions of collaboration. By mid-2023, workplace surveys showed 68% of using Ukrainian exclusively or predominantly, versus 11% for Russian, reflecting enforced compliance and voluntary shifts amid wartime scrutiny. In specific , 50% reported exclusive Ukrainian use, with only 4% relying solely on Russian, though bilingual practices—such as —remain common in informal negotiations, especially in eastern regions where 25% still prefer Russian at home and extend this to private deals. Everyday communication exhibits persistent bilingualism, with Russian enduring in personal interactions, family settings, and casual commerce like markets, despite public sector Ukrainization. Pre-2022, equal bilingual use hovered around 20-30% nationally, higher in the south and east. Post-invasion, Ukrainian surged to 71% in daily life by late 2022 (from 64% in 2021), driven by ideological rejection of Russian amid aggression, though 13-15% continue primary Russian use at home, often among older demographics or in hybrid forms. By August 2025, everyday Ukrainian reached 68%, but surveys note uneven enforcement allows Russian in private retail exchanges, particularly in de-occupied areas where cultural inertia sustains it. This private persistence contrasts with official domains, underscoring bilingual resilience rooted in historical inter-ethnic ties rather than policy alone.

Political and Ideological Debates

Arguments for Bilingualism and Russian Rights

Proponents of bilingualism in Ukraine argue that the demographic prevalence of Russian speakers necessitates recognition of Russian alongside Ukrainian to reflect linguistic realities and prevent exclusion. According to the 2001 census, 29.6% of 's population reported Russian as their native , totaling approximately 14.3 million individuals, with concentrations in eastern and southern regions such as , , , , and where Russian often predominated in urban areas and exceeded 50% in some locales. This substantial presence, combined with widespread bilingual proficiency—where around 80% of adults spoke at least one additional fluently—positions bilingualism as a practical foundation for communication rather than a challenge. Such advocates, including political figures from the , contended that granting Russian regional status in areas with significant speakers would foster administrative efficiency and economic ties, particularly given historical trade dependencies on Russian-speaking markets. In regions like and the , where Russian was the primary language of commerce and daily interaction, bilingual policies enabled smoother governance and business operations without undermining national unity. Official bilingualism, with Ukrainian as the state language nationally and Russian regionally, was seen as aligning with demographic distributions to avoid disadvantaging local populations in public services, courts, and . From a stability perspective, protecting Russian language rights mitigates alienation among the largest minority group—ethnic Russians comprising over 15% of the population—and counters narratives of cultural suppression that could exacerbate regional tensions. Demonstrations of loyalty from Russian-speaking eastern Ukrainians, including high military enlistment during the conflict, underscored that language preference does not equate to disloyalty, supporting arguments for inclusive policies to bolster state cohesion. International frameworks reinforce this, as the Council of Europe's emphasized balancing Ukrainian promotion with minority safeguards, including for Russian where thresholds of usage are met, to uphold equality and participation under the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. OSCE recommendations similarly advocate for minority language use in public life proportional to demographic shares, viewing bilingual accommodations as essential for integration and preventing kin-state interference pretexts. Critics of monolingual shifts, such as the 2019 language law, argue these measures risk disproportionate impacts on Russian speakers by limiting access to services in their primary language, potentially fueling resentment without commensurate security gains, as evidenced by pre-2014 bilingual practices coexisting with civic loyalty. In essence, bilingualism is framed not as dilution of Ukrainian identity but as pragmatic realism enhancing social harmony in a historically intertwined .

Nationalist Perspectives on De-Russification

Ukrainian nationalists frame de-Russification as a necessary reversal of historical policies imposed by the and , which systematically suppressed and culture to foster imperial loyalty. Policies such as the Valuev Circular of 1863 and Ems Ukaz of 1876 banned Ukrainian publications and schooling, while Soviet in the 1920s gave way to renewed by the 1930s, culminating in the Holodomor-era cultural purge. Nationalists argue that post-1991 bilingualism perpetuated this legacy, allowing Russian to dominate public spheres in eastern and southern regions, where it served as a vector for pro-Russian sentiment rather than a neutral . Figures from parties like Svoboda emphasize combating "pro-Russian tendencies" in politics and society to reclaim national sovereignty, viewing the 2012 Kivalov-Kolesnichenko law—repealed amid 2014 protests—as a Yanukovych-era concession that enabled regional . From a standpoint, nationalists posit that de-Russification strengthens state cohesion against Russian hybrid threats, citing empirical patterns where heavily Russified areas like and exhibited higher support for pro-Moscow forces in 2014 referendums and subsequent insurgencies. A 2025 analysis contends that regions with deep integration into Russian- media and cultural spaces were prime targets for invasion, as linguistic affinity facilitated informational and ideological penetration, undermining Ukrainian unity. The 2019 law, signed by President Poroshenko, mandated Ukrainian in , , and media to foster , with nationalists defending it as a bulwark against "fifth columns" rather than , given Russian's status as the aggressor's language rather than a vulnerable minority tongue. Poroshenko positioned Ukrainian promotion central to his reelection platform, arguing it counters centuries of imposed bilingualism that diluted . Post-2022 invasion, nationalists accelerated de-Russification as , linking it to broader efforts like renaming over 1,000 toponyms with Russian imperial origins by 2023 and banning Russian imports of books and media to excise cultural dependencies. This shift, they claim, empirically boosted national consolidation, with surveys showing even Russian-speaking Ukrainians increasingly adopting Ukrainian in daily use amid war-induced reevaluation of Russian ties. Critics from Western bodies decry restrictions as infringing , but nationalists rebut that such views naively equate Russian with other languages, ignoring its role in Soviet-era forced assimilation and current weaponization by ; true protections apply to non-aggressor minorities like Hungarian or Romanian speakers. De-Russification thus embodies anti-imperial resilience, prioritizing empirical state survival over abstract multilingual ideals.

International Views and Human Rights Critiques

In its December 2019 opinion on Ukraine's Law on Supporting the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language, the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe determined that the legislation imposes less favorable treatment on the Russian language relative to certain European and indigenous minority languages, particularly in quotas for media and education. The Commission acknowledged the legitimacy of promoting Ukrainian as the state language but criticized the law for insufficient safeguards against disproportionate impacts on Russian speakers, who constitute a significant portion of the population in eastern and southern regions, recommending amendments to enhance proportionality and transitional periods. It urged Ukraine to develop a comprehensive law on national minorities to address these gaps, noting that language policy must comply with the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which Ukraine ratified in 2003. The OSCE on National Minorities has repeatedly addressed Ukraine's language policies through bilateral consultations, stressing the importance of mechanisms to protect in areas with substantial Russian-speaking populations, such as local administration and . In 2017 discussions, the highlighted three core objectives for Ukraine's policy—promoting state language proficiency, preserving s, and fostering —but recommended bolstering frameworks to prevent exclusionary effects, including clearer criteria for use in public services where minorities exceed 10-15% of the population. These views align with OSCE recommendations for inclusive policies that mitigate tensions without compromising national cohesion, particularly post-2014 . Human Rights Watch critiqued a January 2022 amendment to the state language law mandating Ukrainian proficiency for notaries, doctors, and teachers by 2025, arguing it risks inadequate protections for Russian and other minority speakers by lacking sufficient training support or exemptions in compact minority areas. Similarly, a March 2022 statement by the UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues condemned escalations in targeting Russian-speaking Ukrainians amid the invasion, urging authorities to ensure language restrictions do not foster or erode multi-ethnic cohesion, while emphasizing that security imperatives must respect international standards. The Council of Europe's Committee of Experts on the European for Regional or Minority Languages, in a 2022 evaluation, rejected the Russian Federation's portrayal of Russian speakers' conditions in as justification for military action, deeming it a despite acknowledging implementation shortcomings in obligations, such as incomplete judicial and educational access in Russian. In April 2025, the UN Committee on the Elimination of reviewed 's report and expressed concerns over the 2022 Law on National Minorities' potential discriminatory effects on Russian speakers by prioritizing EU-language minorities, recommending broader inclusivity to align with the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of . These critiques underscore a consensus among bodies like the and OSCE that while state language promotion serves , it requires calibrated minority protections to avoid alienating large linguistic groups, informed by 's demographic realities where Russian remains prevalent in private and some public spheres.

Consequences of the 2022 Russian Invasion

Accelerated Shift to Ukrainian in Government-Controlled Areas

Following Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, Ukrainian government-controlled territories—encompassing the majority of the country outside occupied regions—experienced a rapid increase in Ukrainian language usage across public and private spheres, driven by both heightened national solidarity and reinforced state policies. Societal surveys indicate a marked decline in Russian as the primary home language, dropping from 46% in early 2022 to 30% by mid-2025, with Ukrainian rising correspondingly as the dominant tongue in households. This shift was particularly pronounced in urban centers and eastern regions previously favoring Russian, reflecting a causal response to perceived existential threats from Russian aggression rather than prior linguistic coercion. In December 2022, a nationwide poll reported 41% of respondents using Ukrainian exclusively in daily interactions, up from lower pre-invasion figures, with an additional 17% employing it in most situations; by the same period, primary Russian speakers fell to 14.8% from around 30% in 2021. platforms showed parallel trends, with Ukrainian tweets surging to parity or dominance over Russian by March 2022 and accelerating thereafter, as users in government-held areas distanced themselves linguistically from the invader. Overall everyday Ukrainian usage climbed to 71% in 2022 from 64% the prior year, per data, underscoring a grassroots acceleration beyond formal mandates. State actions amplified this momentum through targeted legislation. On June 19, 2022, Ukraine's enacted restrictions prohibiting the import, production, and distribution of Russian-language books and music products deemed to promote aggression or deny Ukraine's , extending pre-existing 2019 language laws with stricter wartime enforcement in and media. These measures, applied uniformly in non-occupied territories, prioritized Ukrainian in official communications, courts, and services, though compliance varied regionally; for instance, declared Ukrainian use in everyday communication in select areas rose from 13% in 2017 to 30% by 2022. Businesses and entrepreneurs in and other controlled cities increasingly adopted Ukrainian for operations, citing it as a marker of national resilience against Russification narratives. This linguistic pivot has not been without friction, as some Russian-speaking residents—prevalent in government-held eastern oblasts—faced adaptation challenges, yet empirical data shows broad voluntary participation, including among defending these areas. The invasion's role as a catalyst is evident in longitudinal studies, which attribute the surge to identity realignment rather than isolated policy effects, with Ukrainian solidifying as a unifying medium in wartime governance and society.

Russification Efforts in Occupied Territories

In the territories of Ukraine occupied by Russian forces following the full-scale invasion in February 2022, including parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, Russian authorities have pursued policies aimed at integrating Russian language dominance into public life, often described as Russification. These efforts include mandating Russian as the primary language of instruction in schools, with a full ban on Ukrainian-language education implemented starting in the 2025–2026 academic year across occupied regions. Russian officials have justified the removal of Ukrainian language and literature from curricula by citing a purported lack of demand, though independent reports indicate this reflects coercive suppression rather than organic preference. Approximately one million school-age children are affected, with Ukrainian experts estimating 458,000 in Crimea alone, where similar policies have been in place since 2014 but intensified post-2022. Administrative and legal systems in these areas have been reoriented to require Russian for official documentation, court proceedings, and public services, effectively marginalizing Ukrainian usage. Russian occupation administrations have imposed the Russian nationwide, incorporating anti-Ukrainian propaganda and patriotic to foster loyalty, while prohibiting Ukrainian-language textbooks and materials. Media outlets operating under occupation are compelled to broadcast in Russian, with independent Ukrainian media banned and replaced by state-controlled Russian channels promoting narratives of historical unity. These measures extend to cultural institutions, where Ukrainian symbols and language in public signage have been systematically removed or overwritten in Russian. Human Rights Watch and UN reports document these policies as part of broader cultural erasure, creating a climate where non-compliance risks , , or worse, though Russian sources frame them as restoring "historical norms" in regions with significant Russian-speaking populations. By mid-2025, over 90% of schools in occupied and had transitioned to full Russian instruction, per occupation authority claims, accelerating demographic shifts toward Russophone integration. Such efforts align with Russia's stated goal of fortifying these territories against Ukrainian reclamation, prioritizing linguistic assimilation as a tool for long-term control.

Long-Term Demographic and Cultural Impacts

The 2022 has markedly accelerated a prior gradual decline in the prevalence of Russian as a primary of communication, with surveys documenting a sharp increase in Ukrainian usage across demographics. According to data from the International Institute of (KIIS), the proportion of respondents reporting primary use of Ukrainian in everyday communication rose from 49% in 2017 to 58% by December 2022, while Russian usage fell from 26% to 15%. This shift is evident even in historically Russian-dominant eastern and southern regions, where home use of Russian dropped from 53% in 2020 to 32% by 2025 in the east and from 42% to 24% in the south. Analysis of activity, including over 4.4 million geo-tagged tweets from 2020 to 2022, reveals that more than half of users previously tweeting primarily in Russian switched to Ukrainian following the invasion's onset in 2022, with Ukrainian tweet probability surging from 48% pre-invasion to 76% by 2022. These trends suggest a causal link between wartime experiences of Russian and deliberate behavioral changes, potentially entrenching a demographic pattern where future cohorts exhibit higher rates of Ukrainian .
PeriodUkrainian as Primary Home Language (%)Russian as Primary Home Language (%)Both Languages (%)Source
2020522519KIIS survey via The Insider
2025631319KIIS survey via The Insider
Demographically, the ongoing portends reduced transmission of Russian as a across generations, particularly among urban and younger populations displaced or influenced by conflict dynamics. Pre-war patterns already showed ethnic comprising 17.3% of Ukraine's population in the 2001 , down from higher Soviet-era figures due to assimilation and lower birth rates, but post-invasion migration— including the exodus of over 6 million refugees, many from Russian-speaking areas—has further diluted concentrations of Russian-primary speakers in government-controlled territories. In family settings, the stabilization of bilingual home use at around 19% indicates persistent comprehension of Russian, yet the halving of exclusive Russian use signals a long-term contraction in the speaker base, with projections from linguistic analyses implying that wartime trauma and policy enforcement could render Russian a minority by mid-century absent reversals. This demographic reconfiguration aligns with broader patterns of internal relocation toward , where Ukrainian dominance prevails, fostering environments less conducive to Russian maintenance. Culturally, the decline in active use has facilitated a reorientation toward Ukrainian-centric , diminishing the influence of Russian literary, media, and artistic traditions while amplifying indigenous cultural outputs. Public attitudes have shifted markedly, with opposition to Russian-language instruction in schools rising to 58% by 2025, reflecting a perception of Russian as tied to imperial rather than neutral heritage. This has manifested in reduced consumption of Russian-language content, including books and , and efforts to promote Ukrainian equivalents, potentially leading to a generational of familiarity with Russian-influenced hybrid forms like while strengthening cohesive national narratives rooted in Ukrainian linguistics and folklore. However, in Russian-occupied territories, enforced policies—such as mandatory Russian in education—counter this trajectory locally, though their long-term viability remains contingent on territorial outcomes and resistance patterns. Overall, the interplay of conflict-driven aversion and state policies suggests a where bilingual passive understanding endures among older demographics, but active Russian engagement wanes, prioritizing causal resilience in Ukrainian cultural sovereignty over preserved .

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  117. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/06/20/ukraine-forced-russified-education-under-occupation
  118. https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2024C38/
  119. https://cepa.org/programs/democratic-resilience/behind-the-lines/
  120. https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/report/auto-draft/2025-03-21-ohchr-report-children-s-rights-in-ukraine.pdf
  121. https://theins.ru/en/society/283514
  122. https://www.rferl.org/a/1101889.html
  123. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/06/russia-ukrainians-embrace-language-war
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