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Thai Chinese
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Key Information
| Thai Chinese | |||||||||||||||||||
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| Traditional Chinese | 泰國華人 / 華裔泰國人 | ||||||||||||||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 泰国华人 / 华裔泰国人 | ||||||||||||||||||
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Thai Chinese (also known as Chinese Thais, Sino-Thais) are people of Chinese descent in Thailand. Thai Chinese are the largest mixed group in the country and the largest overseas Chinese community in the world with a population of approximately 9.5 million people, accounting for 11–14 percent of the country's total population as of 2012. It is also one of the oldest and most prominently integrated overseas Chinese communities, with a history dating back to the 1100s. Slightly more than half of the ethnic Chinese population in Thailand trace their ancestry to Chaoshan, proven by the prevalence of the Teochew dialect among the Chinese community in Thailand as well as other Chinese languages.[5]: 93 The term as commonly understood signifies those whose ancestors immigrated to Thailand before 1949.
The Thai Chinese have been deeply ingrained into all elements of Thai society over the past 200 years. The present Thai royal family, the Chakri dynasty, was founded by King Rama I who himself was partly Chinese.[6] His predecessor, King Taksin of the Thonburi Kingdom, was the son of a Chinese father from Chaoshan.[7] With the successful integration of historic Chinese immigrant communities in Thailand, a significant number of Thai Chinese are the descendants of intermarriages between ethnic Chinese and native Thais. Many of these descendants have assimilated into Thai society and self-identify solely as Thai.[8][9][10]
The Thai Chinese are well-established in the middle class and upper classes of Thai society and are well represented at all levels of Thai society.[11][12][13]: 3, 43 [14][15] They play a leading role in Thailand's business sector and dominate the Thai economy today.[16]: 22 [13]: 179 [17][18] In addition, Thai Chinese elites of Thailand have a strong presence in Thailand's political scene with most of Thailand's former Prime Ministers and the majority of parliament having at least some Chinese ancestry.[19][20][16]: 58 [21] Thai Chinese elites of Thailand are well represented among Thailand's rulers and other sectors.[22][23]
Demographics
[edit]Thailand has the largest overseas Chinese community in the world outside Greater China.[24] 11 to 14 percent of Thailand's population are considered ethnic Chinese.
Official status
[edit]Etymology
[edit]Thailand's longstanding policy was not to regard Thai Chinese as a separate ethnicity, based on the principle of considering all Tai groups living in Thailand as part of the Central Thai people. By endonym, with partial success, now Thai Chinese refer themselves as chao thai (Thai: ชาวไทย, IPA: [tɕʰaːw tʰaj]), however, the term often creates ambiguity among the various Tai groups in the country, especially the Central/Southern Thai who also call themselves the same, these groups Thai Chinese refer as khon pak klang (Thai: คนภาคกลาง, lit: Central Thai people) or khon tai (Thai: คนใต้, lit: Southern Thai people).
In cases where details are required, Thai Chinese people refer to themselves as khon thai chuea sai chin (Thai: คนไทยเชื้อสายจีน, lit: Thai of Chinese origin), or sometimes may refer to the ancestral lands as khon krung thep (Thai: คนกรุงเทพ, lit: Krungthepian, Bangkoker) or khon chon bu ri (Thai: คนชลบุรี, lit: Chonburian), which well known that the Central Thais (Siamese) and Mons were not indigenous to these two provinces but recent internal migration, Bangkok and Chonburi. The term Krungthepians still pinned a resentful connotation towards Central Thais, when Krungthep accent is considered as prestige dialect of Central Thai language, while the Central Thai language of Central Thai people is considered an inappropriate language, known as ner (Thai: เหน่อ).
Identity
[edit]For assimilated second and third generation descendants of Chinese immigrants, it is principally a personal choice whether or not to identify themselves as ethnic Chinese.[25] Nonetheless, nearly all Thai Chinese solely self-identify as Thai, due to their close integration and successful assimilation into Thai society.[26][27] G. William Skinner observed that the level of assimilation of the descendants of Chinese immigrants in Thailand disproved the "myth about the 'unchanging Chinese'", noting that "assimilation is considered complete when the immigrant's descendant identifies himself in almost all social situations as a Thai, speaks Thai language habitually and with native fluency, and interacts by choice with Thai more often than with Chinese."[28]: 237 Skinner believed that the assimilation success of the Thai Chinese was a result of the wise policy of the Thai rulers who, since the 17th century, allowed able Chinese tradesmen to advance their ranks into the kingdom's nobility.[28]: 240–241 The rapid and successful assimilation of the Thai Chinese has been celebrated by the Chinese descendants themselves, as evident in contemporary literature such as the novel Letters from Thailand (Thai: จดหมายจากเมืองไทย) by Botan.[29]
Today, the Thai Chinese constitute a significant part of the royalist/nationalist movements. When the then prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who is Thai Chinese, was ousted from power in 2006, it was Sondhi Limthongkul, another prominent Thai Chinese businessman, who formed and led People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) movement to protest the successive governments run by Thaksin's allies.[30][31] Mr. Sondhi accused Mr. Thaksin of corruption based on improper business ties between Thaksin's corporate empire and the Singapore-based Temasek Holdings Group.[32] The Thai Chinese in and around Bangkok were also the main participants of the months-long political campaign against the government of Ms. Yingluck (Mr. Thaksin's sister), between November 2013 and May 2014, the event which culminated in the military takeover in May 2014.[33]
History
[edit]First wave (Before 1767)
[edit]Traders from China began arriving in Ayutthaya by at least the 12th century. In the 1420s, Chinese merchants were involved in the construction of the major Ayutthaya temple Wat Ratchaburana and left several Chinese inscriptions and cultural objects within the temple's crypt, including the inscribing of several Chinese family names.[34] According to the Chronicles of Ayutthaya, Ekathotsarot (r. 1605–1610) had been "concerned solely with ways of enriching his treasury," and was "greatly inclined toward strangers and foreign nations".
Following the Qing revocation of the private trade ban in 1684, Chinese immigration to Siam steadily increased, particularly following the massive Southern Chinese famines of the early 18th century. Approximately 20,000 Chinese lived in Siam in the 1730s[a] and were prominent in the city of Ayutthaya and were a prominent faction within the Siamese court by 1767.[35]
Second wave (1767–1911)
[edit]When King Taksin, himself the son of a Chinese immigrant, ruled Thailand, King Taksin actively encouraged Chinese immigration and trade. Chinese settlers came to Siam in large numbers.[36] Immigration continued over the following years, and the Chinese population in Thailand jumped from 230,000 in 1825 to 792,000 by 1910. By 1932, approximately 12.2 percent of the population of Thailand was Chinese.[37]
The early Chinese immigration consisted almost entirely of men who did not bring women. Therefore, it became common for male Chinese immigrants to marry local Thai women. The children of such relationships were called Sino-Thai[38] or luk-jin (ลูกจีน) in Thai.[39] These Chinese-Thai intermarriages declined somewhat in the early 20th century, when significant numbers of Chinese women also began immigrating to Thailand.
Economic recession and unemployment forced many men to leave China for Thailand in search of work to seek wealth. If successful, they sent money back to their families in China. Many Chinese immigrants prospered under the "tax farming" system, whereby private individuals were sold the right to collect taxes at a price below the value of the tax revenues.
The local Chinese community had long dominated domestic commerce and had served as agents for royal trade monopolies. With the rise of European economic influence, however, many Chinese shifted to opium trafficking and tax collecting, both of which were despised occupations.
From 1882 to 1917, nearly 13,000 to 34,000 Chinese legally entered Thailand per year, mostly settling in Bangkok and along the coast of the Gulf of Siam. They predominated in occupations requiring arduous labor, skills, or entrepreneurship. They worked as blacksmiths, railroad labourers and rickshaw pullers. While most Thais were engaged in rice production, the Chinese brought new farming ideas and new methods to supply labor on its rubber plantations, both domestically and internationally.[40] However, republican ideas brought by the Chinese were considered seditious by the Thai government. For example, a translation of Chinese revolutionary Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People was banned under the Communism Act of 1933. The government had regulated Chinese schools even before compulsory education was established in the country, starting with the Private Schools Act of 1918. This act required all foreign teachers to pass a Thai language test and for principals of all schools to implement standards set by the Thai Ministry of Education.[41]
Third wave (1911–1949)
[edit]Legislation by King Rama VI (1910–1925) that required the adoption of Thai surnames was largely directed at the Chinese community as a number of ethnic Chinese families left Burma between 1930 and 1950 and settled in the Ratchaburi and Kanchanaburi Provinces of western Thailand. A few of the ethnic Chinese families in that area had already emigrated from Burma in the 19th century.
The Chinese in Thailand also suffered discrimination between the 1930s and 1950s under the military dictatorship of Prime Minister Plaek Phibunsongkhram (in spite of having part-Chinese ancestry himself),[42] which allied itself with the Empire of Japan. The Primary Education Act of 1932 made the Thai language the compulsory medium of education, but as a result of protests from Thai Chinese, by 1939, students were allowed two hours per week of Mandarin instruction.[41] State corporations took over commodities such as rice, tobacco, and petroleum and Chinese businesses found themselves subject to a range of new taxes and controls. By 1970, more than 90 percent of the Chinese ancestry born in Thailand never have Chinese or Taiwanese nationality with Thai only nationality instead. In 1975, diplomatic relations were established with China.[43]
Culture
[edit]Han Chinese intermarriage with ethnic Thais has resulted in many modern Thais who have claimed distant Chinese ancestry.[44] Thais of Chinese descent are concentrated in the coastal areas of the country, principally Bangkok.[45] Considerable segments of Thailand's academic, business, and political elites are of Chinese descent.[46]
The influence of Chinese cuisine on Thai cuisine as a whole has been profound, to the point where there is no longer a clear differentiation between Thai Chinese cuisine and native Thai cuisine. Traditional Thai cuisine loosely falls into four categories: tom (boiled dishes), yam (spicy salads), tam (pounded foods), and kaeng (curries). Deep-frying, stir-frying and steaming are methods introduced from Chinese cuisine.[47] The street food culture of much of Southeast Asia was introduced by Chinese immigrants during the late 19th century. As a result, many Thai street foods are derived from or heavily influenced by Chinese cuisine.[48] Street food was commonly sold by the ethnic Chinese population of Thailand and did not become popular among native Thai people until the early 1960s, when the rapid urban population growth stimulated the street food culture,[49] and by the 1970s, it had "displaced home-cooking."[50]
Language
[edit]Today, nearly all Thai with Chinese ancestry speak Central Thai exclusively (even in Isan, Northern Thailand and Southern Thailand as well).[b] Only elderly Chinese immigrants still speak their native varieties of Chinese. The rapid and successful assimilation of Thai Chinese has been celebrated in contemporary literature such as "Letters from Thailand" (Thai: จดหมายจากเมืองไทย) by a Thai Chinese author Botan.[51] In the modern Thai language there are many signs of Chinese influence.[52] In the 2000 census, 231,350 people identified themselves as speakers of a variant of Chinese (Teochew, Hakka, Hainanese, Hokkien or Cantonese).[46] The Teochew dialect has served as the language of Bangkok's influential Chinese merchants' circles since the foundation of the city in the 18th century. Although Chinese language schools were closed during the nationalist period before and during the Second World War, the Thai government never tried to suppress Chinese cultural expression. Today, businesses in Yaowarat Road and Charoen Krung Road in Bangkok's Samphanthawong District which constitute the city's "Chinatown" still feature bilingual signs in Chinese and Thai.[53] A number of Chinese words have found their way into the Thai language, especially the names of dishes and foodstuffs, as well as basic numbers (such as those from "three" to "ten") and terms related to gambling.[46] In Southern Thailand, the difference between Thai Chinese and Peranakans is that Thai Chinese speak Central Thai and are concentrated in Hatyai and Bandon, while Peranakans speak Southern Thai and are concentrated in Phuket province; however, both groups grow up in diglossic environments. Yunnanese speak Mandarin.
The rise of China's prominence on the global economic stage has prompted many Thai Chinese business families to see Mandarin as a beneficial asset in partaking in economic links and conducting business between Thailand and mainland China, with some families encouraging their children to learn Mandarin in order to reap the benefits of their ethnic Chinese identity and the increasing role of Mandarin as a prominent language of Overseas Chinese business communities.[13]: 184–185 [16]: 59 [13]: 179 [54]: 55 However, equally there are many Thais, regardless of their ethnic background who study Chinese in order to boost their business and career opportunities, rather than due to reasons of ethnic identity, with some sending their children to newly established Mandarin language schools.[13]: 184–185
Trade and industry
[edit]
The Thai Chinese community has played a major role in the development of Thailand's economy and national private sector.[58] The early-21st century saw Thais of Chinese ancestry dominate Thai commerce at every level of society.[59][60][61][62][63][13]: 127, 179 Their economic clout plays a critical role in maintaining the country's economic vitality and prosperity.[54]: 47–48 The economic power of the Thai Chinese is far greater than their proportion of the population would suggest.[13]: 179 [64]: 277 With their powerful economic presence, the Chinese continue to remain a major impetus underpinning the Thailand's commercial undertakings and economic activities and virtually make up the country's entire wealthy elite.[13]: 179 [65] Thailand's lack of an indigenous Thai commercial culture led to the private sector being dominated entirely by Thais of Chinese ancestry themselves.[66][67][68] Development policies imposed by the Thai government provided business opportunities for the Chinese community, where a distinct Thai Chinese business community has emerged as the country's most dominant economic force, controlling the entirety of the country's major industry sectors across the Thai economy.[58][69]: 72 The Chinese community has remained active in every sector of Thailand's economy such as agriculture (sugar, maize, vegetables, rubber), industrial manufacturing, financial services, real estate, and the retail and whole trading sector.[58] The contemporary Thai business sector is highly dependent on Han Chinese entrepreneurs and investors who control virtually all the country's banks and large corporate conglomerates all the way to the smaller retail hawking outlets at the humbler end of the business spectrum with their support and patronage being augmented by the presence of lawmakers and political operatives, where the vast majority of whom are of pure or partial Chinese ancestry themselves.[70][19][71][13]: 179 Thais of Chinese ancestry, a disproportionate wealthy, market-dominant minority not only form a distinct ethnic community, they also form, by and large, an economically advantaged social class: the commercial middle and upper class in contrast to their poorer indigenous Thai majority working and underclass counterparts around them.[13]: 179–183 [19][72][73][74][64]: 261 Highly publicized profiles of wealthy Chinese entrepreneurs and investors attracted great public interest and were used to illustrate the community's strong economic clout.[75] More than 80 percent of the top 40 richest people in Thailand are of pure or partial Chinese ancestry.[76] Of the five billionaires in Thailand in the late-20th century, all of them were of full or at least had partial Han Chinese ancestry.[77][78][79]
Amounting to 10 percent of Thailand's population, the Thai Chinese control approximately 85 percent of the nation's entire economy.[80] Thai investors of Chinese ancestry control more than 80 percent of public companies listed on the Thai stock exchange.[56][57] With 80% of Thailand's market capital under Chinese hands, many Thai entrepreneurs and investors of Chinese ancestry have been at the forefront of the establishing the country's most prominent wholesale trading cooperatives owned by traders, merchants, and brokers flush with private equity and venture capital bearing connections to some of Thailand's wealthiest business families.[55][66][57] 10 Thai business families of Chinese ancestry control half of the all corporate assets in the country.[81] 50 Thai business families of Chinese ancestry dominate the Thai corporate landscape, controlling over approximately 81–90% of the total market capitalization in the country's economy.[82][83][84][85][86][87][88][58][89][90][91][9]: 10 [92][93][94]
British East India Company agent John Crawfurd used detailed company records kept on Prince of Wales's Island (present-day Penang) from 1815 to 1824 to report specifically on the economic aptitude of the 8,595 Chinese there as compared to others. He used the data to estimate the Chinese — about five-sixths of whom were unmarried men in the prime of life — "as equivalent to an ordinary population of above 37,000, and...to a numerical Malay population of more than 80,000!".[95]: p.30 He surmised this and other differences noted as providing, "a very just estimate of the comparative state of civilization among nations, or, which is the same thing, of the respective merits of their different social institutions."[95]: p.34 In 1879, the Chinese controlled all of the steam-powered rice mills, most of which were sold by the British. Most of the leading businessmen in Thailand at this point in time were of Chinese ancestry and accounted for a significant portion of the Thai upper class.[96] In 1890, despite British shipping domination in Bangkok, Thais of Chinese ancestry conducted 62 percent of the Thai shipping sector, operating as agents for Western shipping lines as well as their own.[96] The Chinese also dominated the rubber industry, market gardening, sugar production, and fish export sectors. In Bangkok, Thais of Chinese ancestry dominate the entertainment and media industries, being the pioneers of Thailand's early publishing houses, newspapers, and film studios.[97] By 1899 in Bangkok, the Chinese owned 18 of the 23 rice mills in the city that produced a capacity of over 100 tons of rice paddies and controlled 56 out of the 66 by 1919.[98]
Thai Chinese moneylenders also wielded considerable economic power over the poorer indigenous Thai peasants, prompting accusations of Chinese bribery of government officials, wars between the Chinese secret societies, and the use of violent tactics to collect taxes. Chinese success served to foster Thai resentment against the Chinese at a time when their community was expanding rapidly. Waves of Han Chinese immigration swept into Siam in the 19th and early-20th centuries, peaking in the 1920s. Whereas Thai Chinese bankers were accused of plunging the Thai peasant into poverty by charging high-interest rates, the reality was that the Thai banking business was highly competitive. Chinese millers and rice traders were blamed for the economic recession that gripped Siam for nearly a decade after 1905.[40] The Chinese then moved into extractive industries such as tin mining, logging and sawmilling, rice milling, as well as the construction of ports and railways that would usher in Thailand's modern transportation industry.[54]: 48 Though the Chinese were acknowledged for their industriousness, they were nonetheless scorned by many. In the late 19th century, a British official in Siam said that "the Chinese are the Jews of Siam ... by judicious use of their business faculties and their powers of combination, they hold the Siamese in the palm of their hand."[99] In addition, Chinese millers and rice traders were blamed for an economic recession that gripped Siam for nearly a decade after 1905.[96] Large waves of Han Chinese immigration occurred in the nineteenth and early in the twentieth century, peaking in the 1920s from southern China who was eager to make money and return to their families. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Chinese would lose their control of foreign trade to the European colonial powers and began to act as compradors for Western trading cooperatives. Thais of Chinese ancestry also entered extraction intensive industries such as tin mining, teak-cutting, saw milling, rice-milling, as well as fostered the modernization of the Thai transportation sector through the construction of ports and railways.[100]

By the early 20th century, the resident Chinese community in Bangkok was sizable, amounting to a third of the capital's population.[101] Anti-Chinese sentiment was rife.[13]: 179–183 In 1914, the Thai nationalist King Rama VI, published a pamphlet in Thai and English—The Jews of the East— employing a pseudonym. In it, he lambasted the Chinese.[102][103][104] He described them as "avaricious barbarians who were 'entirely devoid of morals and mercy'."[99] He depicted successful Chinese businessmen as reaping their commercial success at the expense of indigenous Thais, prompting some Thai politicians to blame Thai Chinese businessmen for Thailand's economic woes.[73] Rama VI also implicitly implied that the distinct ethnicity of the Overseas Chinese and their commanding role of Southeast Asia's economy through their commercial businesses have also made them targets of reverse discrimination and resentment by the indigenous Thais and Southeast Asian majorities.[105] King Vajiravudh's views were influential among elite Thais and were quickly adopted by ordinary Thais, fueling their suspicion of and hostility against the Chinese minority.[13]: 181–183 The glaring wealth disparity and the abject poverty of the indigenous Thais resulted in them blaming their socioeconomic ills on the Chinese, especially Chinese moneylenders. Beginning in the late-1930s and recommencing in the 1950s, the Thai government dealt with wealth disparities by pursuing a campaign of forced assimilation achieved through property confiscation, forced expropriation, coercive social policies, and anti-Chinese cultural suppression, seeking to eradicate Han consciousness and identity.[13]: 183 [16]: 58 Thai Chinese became the targets of state discrimination while indigenous Thais were granted economic privileges.[106] The Siamese revolution of 1932 only coagulated the grip of Thai nationalism, culminating in World War II when Thailand's Japanese ally was at war with China.[101]
After 1947 coup d'état, Thailand was an agrarian economy hobbled by state-owned enterprises.[107] Thais of Chinese ancestry provided the impetus for Thailand's industrialization, transforming the Thai economy into an export-oriented, trade-based economy with a global reach.[64]: 261 Over the next several decades, internationalization and capitalist market-oriented policies led to the dramatic emergence of a massive export-oriented, large-scale manufacturing sector, which in turn catapulted Thailand into joining the Tiger Cub Economies.[108] Virtually all the industrial manufacturing and import-export shipping firms establishments including the auto manufacturing behemoth Siam Motors are Chinese controlled.[108][97] In the years between World War I and World War II, Thailand's major exports, rice, tin, rubber, and timber were under Chinese hands.[109] Despite their small numbers as compared to the indigenous Thai population, the Chinese controlled virtually every line of business, ranging from small retail trade to large industries. Constituting merely ten percent of the population, the Chinese dominated over four-fifths of the country's vital rice, tin, rubber, and timber exports, and virtually controlled the country's entire wholesale and retail trade.[110] By 1924, Thais of Chinese ancestry controlled one-third of all the sawmills in Bangkok. Market gardening, sugar production (The Chinese introduced the sugar industry to Thailand), and fish exporting was also dominated by the Chinese.[111][112] Virtually all of the newly minted manufacturing establishments were Chinese controlled. Despite failed Thai affirmative action-based policies in the 1930s to economically redestribute the nation's wealth to empower the impoverished indigenous Thai majority, 70 percent of retailing outlets and 80 to 90 percent of rice mills remained Chinese-controlled.[113] A survey of Thailand's roughly seventy most powerful business groups found that all but three were owned by Thai Chinese.[114][115] Although Bangkok has its own Chinatown, Chinese economic influence is much more pervasive and subtle throughout the city. With Bangkok's Thai Chinese clan associations are prominent throughout the city as the family clans are major property holders and retain ownership of all the non-profit Chinese-operated schools.[58] With Bangkok being the testament that reflected the extent of Chinese influence on Thailand's economic life, virtually all of Bangkok's business elites are of pure Han Chinese or at least of partial Han Chinese ancestry.[116] Thai entrepreneurs and investors of Chinese ancestry who control much of Thai industry, are seen as a wellspring of upfront private equity and venture capital that serve as chief financial backers behind Thailand's latest investment developments including funding Thailand's newest construction projects in addition to financing the country's state-of-the-art telecommunications sector,[116] as Thai entrepreneurs of Chinese ancestry are the key power players behind Thailand's telecommunications industry, being at the forefront of several well-known Thai telecom operators such as the Shinawatra telecommunications group, True Corporation, Jasmine, Ucom, and Samar.[117] Kukrit Pramoj, the aristocratic former prime minister and distant relative of the Thai royal family, once said that most Thais had a Chinese relative "hanging somewhere on their family tree."[118][119] By the 1930s, the Thai Chinese minority dominated construction, industrial manufacturing, publishing, shipping, finance, commerce, and every industry in the country, minor, and major.[97] Among the minor industries that they presided were food vending, salt, tobacco, port, and bird's nest concessions.[120][121] Among the major lucrative industries, the Chinese involved in shipping, rice milling, rubber and tin manufacturing, teak logging, and petroleum drilling.[120]
By the late-1950s, Thais of Chinese ancestry accounted for 70 percent of Bangkok's business owners and senior business managers, and 90 percent of the shares in Thai corporations were said to be held by Thai investors of Chinese ancestry.[122][123] Ninety percent of Thailand's industrial and commercial capital are also held by the Chinese.[124][83][69]: 73 90 percent of all investments in the industrial and commercial sector and at least 50 percent of all investments in the banking and financial sectors are controlled by the Chinese.[125][83][124][126][127][128][129]: 33 [69][128] Economic advantages would also persist as Thai rice merchants of Chinese ancestry controlled 80–90 percent of Thailand's rice mills, the largest merchant food enterprises in the nation.[40] Of the 25 leading entrepreneurs in the Thai business sector, 23 are of Han Chinese or at least of partial Han Chinese ancestry. Thais of Chinese ancestry also account for 96 percent of Thailand's 70 most powerful business groups.[130][13]: 35 [131] Family firms are extremely common in the Thai business sector as they are passed down from one generation to the next.[132] 90 percent of Thailand's industrial manufacturing sector and 50 percent of Thailand's service sector are controlled by the Chinese.[133]<[134][135][136][137][129][138] According to a Financial Statistics of the 500 Largest Public Companies in Asia Controlled by Overseas Chinese in 1994 chart released by Singaporean geographer Dr. Henry Yeung of the National University of Singapore, 39 companies were concentrated in Thailand with a market capitalization of US$35 billion and total assets of US$95 billion.[139][136] Four prominent Thai business families of Chinese ancestry which are the Sophonpanich, Lamsam, Ratanarak, and Tejapaibul families respectively control Thailand's largest private banks: Bangkok Bank (the largest and most profitable in Southeast Asia), Thai Farmers Bank, and the Bank of Ayudhya.[133][140][125][141][142][143][144][123]: 193 [16]: 22 [71][145][58] Thais of Chinese ancestry not dominate Thailand's big banking sector, but also the small banking sector presided by a number of Thai business families as well.[140] As there weren't that many alternative sources of capital prior to the establishment of the Thai Stock Exchange for up-and-coming Thai entrepreneurs of Chinese descent to draw upon, Chinese-owned Thai banks wielded enormous economic power in the Thai private business sector throughout the 1960s to the 1980s.[140] Of the 20 Thai banks that were founded in the years between 1930 and 1950, the Thai Chinese were behind the establishment of 14 of them while the remaining 6 banks were established by the Thai Crown Property Bureau.[146] Thai businessmen and investors of Chinese ancestry are influential in the country's real estate, agriculture, banking, and finance, and the wholesale trading industries.[58] In Central Siam, Thai businessmen and investors of Chinese ancestry control the entirety of the area's residential and commercial real estate and raw land.[120] The Thai Chinese (mainly of Yunnanese origin) also taken over Chiangmai's lucrative gem industry and ended up owning much of the city's fruit orchards, restaurants, and retail shops while profiting handsomely off of the city's land boom that occurred throughout the late 1980s.[147] During the 1980s, Thai Chinese business groups dominated 37 of the top 100 corporations in the country, with much of the wealth being centralized within the hands of five Teochew business families.[80] In the 1990s, among the top ten Thai businesses in terms of sales, nine of them were Chinese-owned with only Siam Cement being the sole firm that was under the ownership of a non-Chinese.[111][148] Following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, structural reforms imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on Indonesia and Thailand led to the loss of many monopolistic positions long held by the Thai Chinese business elite.[149] In spite of the financial and economic downturn, Thais of Chinese ancestry were still estimated to own 65 percent of the total banking assets, 60 percent of the national trade, 90 percent of all local investments in the commercial sector, 90 percent of all local investments in the manufacturing sector, and 50 percent of all local investments in the banking and financial services sector.[128][150][151][152][153]
In the urban center of Chiang Saen, a prominent Thai city situated across from Ton Pheung District in the northern part of Laos, the area served as a diverse economic hub for commercial trade among a multitude of merchants hailing from different ethnic backgrounds, engaging in frontier trading activities. During the era of French colonization, Chiang Saen evolved into a crucial focal point through which the French exerted control over commercial transactions along the Mekong River and assumed authoritative control over the land trade pathways connecting Xishuangbanna, Luang Prabang, and the commercial centers of northern Siam. The French utilized Chiang Saen to advance their economic, cultural, and political interests across borders, often in competition with the British, who operated from the Burmese side of the border. British goods dominated markets in Chiang Mai, Kengtung, and Xishuangbanna, while the French played a significant role in the teak, rice, and opium trade, at times collaborating with ethnic-based trading groups in the region. With the decline of European colonial influence, regional trade, particularly in the nearby highlands, fell largely under the control of the Yunnanese.[154] Due to the relaxation of emigration restrictions influenced by economic reform and the implementation of open-border policies by China and Southeast Asian countries, there has been a significant transformation in Chinese out-migration patterns as a result of noticeable decrease in barriers to emigration. This shift has resulted in a notable increase in mainland Chinese migrants relocating to developing nations in Southeast Asia, particularly to Thailand during the 1990s and 2000s.[155] Many of these Chinese immigrants include petty traders, financial middlemen, investors, owners of small to medium-sized enterprises in the formal business sector, shipping agents (some of which have Thai partners), smaller import-export agents, as well as independent traders and intermediaries associated with Chinese enterprises.[156]
For a select few Chinese entrepreneurs, a number of them have ventured into Thailand to explore potential investment prospects in a market that remains largely untapped amidst the intensifying commercial competition back in China. Certain Chinese real estate investors opt to acquire properties, particularly modern townhouses and structures located along the riverside and in market areas.[157] The rationale behind these property investments has varied, as some investors seek to utilize them for personal residential use, while others strive to establish a lasting commercial real estate foothold in the Chiang Saen area for overseas investment purposes.[157] Entrepreneurs operating within the private sector of Chiang Saen vastly outnumber investors, with shipping agents being a prominent group, boasting at least ten registered enterprises situated along the banks of the Chiang Saen river. Many of these entrepreneurs share a common ethnic background, having commenced their business endeavors as small-scale operators whose initial calculated speculations yielded significant dividends within a burgeoning marketplace.[157] This trend was especially pronounced among Chinese merchants who ventured into small-scale agricultural enterprises, such as the trading of longans, durians, mangosteens, oranges, and apples. In addition to those in the shipping industry, some of the original traders have progressed to become wholesalers, operating warehouses along the river to facilitate the distribution of goods to Bangkok and other parts of Thailand.[157] Within the town of Chiang Saen, small-scale entrepreneurs often specialize in the trade of agricultural products through import and export, as a significant number of these entrepreneurs were previously successful traders back in China, but relocated to the border region due to increased competition within their native market.[158] Petty Chinese merchants operating within the town's premises also engage in the sale of imported Chinese fruits and everyday items to both local residents and tourists exploring Chiang Saen. The high saturation of Chinese merchants operating within this sector has fostered a fiercely competitive atmosphere, albeit they are overshadowed by stiff competition from petty Chinese traders offering Chinese goods in the border markets of northern Laos and northern Vietnam, as well as in urban Cambodia.[158]
With the rise of China as a global economic power, Thai businesses under Chinese hands are now at the forefront of opening up the country's economy for foreign direct investment from mainland China and Thai businesses that are Chinese-owned are now the largest sources of investors in mainland China among all overseas Chinese communities worldwide.[159][160] The influx of Thai Chinese investment capital into mainland China has led to a resurgence of Han Chinese cultural pride among the Thai Chinese community while concurrently pursuing new business and investment opportunities while bringing their influx of foreign capital to create new jobs and economic niches on the mainland. Many Thais of Chinese ancestry have begun to rekindle with their long-lost Han ancestral roots, have sent their children to newly established Chinese language schools, visited China in record numbers, invested money in the mainland Chinese economy, and assumed Chinese surnames alongside their Thai names.[161] The Charoen Pokphand (CP Group), a prominent Chinese-owned Thai conglomerate claiming $9 billion in assets with US$25 billion in annual sales founded by the Chearavanonts, a prominent Thai business family of Chinese ancestry which is one of the most powerful conglomerate companies investing in mainland China today.[162] The conglomerate company is currently the single largest foreign investor in China with over US$1 billion invested with hundreds of businesses across a multivarieted range of industries traversing from agricultural food products, aquaculture, retail, hospitality, and industrial manufacturing while employing more than 150,000 people in mainland China.[111][148][163][160][162] The company is known in China under well-known household names such as the "Chia Tai Group" and "Zheng Da Ji Tuan". The CP Group also owns and operates Tesco Lotus, one of the largest foreign hypermarket operators with 74 stores and seven distribution centers throughout 30 cities across the mainland. One of CP Group's flagship businesses in China is a US$400 million Super Brand Mall, the largest mall in Shanghai's exclusive Pudong business district. Reignwood Pine Valley, CP also controls Telecom Asia, a prominent telecommunications and mobile phone manufacturing company in a joint venture with British Telecom since making its foray into the Thai telecommunications industry.[163] Mainland China's most exclusive golf and country clubs, were established and owned by a Thai business tycoon of Chinese ancestry, Chanchai Rouyrungruen (operator of Red Bull drink business in China). It is cited as the most popular golf course in Asia. In 2008, Chanchai became the first owner of a business jet in mainland China.[164] Anand's Saha-Union, Thailand's leading industrial group, have so far invested over US$1.5 billion in China, and is operating more than 11 power plants in three of China's provinces. With over other 30 businesses in China, the company employs approximately 7000 Chinese workers.[160] Central Group, Thailand's largest operator of shopping centers (and owner of Italy's leading high-end department store, La Rinascente) with US$3.5 billion in annual sales was established by the Chirathivats, a Thai business family of Chinese ancestry, have created three new large scale department store branches in China.[160]
According to Thai historian, Dr. Wasana Wongsurawat, the Thai political elite has remained in power by employing a simple two-part strategy: first, secure the economic base by cultivating the support of the Thai business elites of Chinese ancestry; second, align with the dominant global geopolitical power of the day. As of 2020[update], increasingly, that power is China.[101] As the Chinese economic might grew, the indigenous Thai hill tribes and aborigines were gradually driven out into poorer land on the hills, on the rural outskirts of major Thai cities or into the mountains. The increased economic clout wielded by Thai Chinese has triggered distrust, resentment, and Anti-Chinese sentiment among the poorer working and underclass indigenous Thai majority, many of whom engage in rural agrarian rice peasantry in stark socioeconomic contrast to their modern, wealthier, and cosmopolitan middle and upper class Chinese counterparts.[165]
Religion
[edit]
First-generation Chinese immigrants were followers of Mahayana Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism. Theravada Buddhism has since become the religion of many ethnic Chinese in Thailand, especially among assimilated Chinese. Many Chinese in Thailand commonly combine certain practices of Chinese folk religion with Theravada Buddhism due to the openness and tolerance of Buddhism.[166] Major Chinese festivals such as Chinese New Year, Mid-Autumn Festival and Qingming are widely celebrated, especially in Bangkok, Phuket, and other parts of Thailand where there are large Chinese populations.[167] There are several prominent Buddhist monks with Chinese ancestry like the well-known Buddhist reformer, Buddhadasa Bhikkhu and the former abbot of Wat Saket, Somdet Kiaw.
The Peranakans in Phuket are noted for their nine-day vegetarian festival between September and October. During the festival period, devotees will abstain from meat and the Chinese mediums will perform mortification of the flesh to exhibit the power of the Deities, and the rites and rituals seen are devoted to the veneration of various Deities. Such idiosyncratic traditions were developed during the 19th century in Phuket by the local Chinese with influences from Thai culture.[168]
In the north, there is a small minority of Chinese Muslims known as Chin Ho. They are mainly the descendants of Hui people migrated from Yunnan, China. There are seven Chinese mosques in Chiang Mai.[169] The best known is the Ban Ho Mosque.
In addition, Thai Chinese also have some customs that are different from the mainland China, such as not eating beef, especially among elderly who worship Guanyin, etc.[170]
Dialect groups
[edit]This section needs additional citations for verification. (December 2020) |
The vast majority of Thai Chinese belong to various southern Chinese dialect groups. Of these, 56 percent are Teochew (also commonly spelled as Teochiu), 16 percent Hakka and 11 percent Hainanese. The Cantonese and Hokkien each constitute seven percent of the Chinese population and three percent belong to other Chinese dialect groups, as reported in 1994.[171] A large number of Thai Chinese are the descendants of intermarriages between Chinese immigrants and Thais, while there are others who are of predominantly or solely of Chinese descent. People who are of mainly Chinese descent are descendants of immigrants who relocated to Thailand as well as other parts of Nanyang (the Chinese term for Southeast Asia used at the time) in the early to mid-20th century due to famine, poverty and civil war in the southern Chinese provinces of Guangdong (Teochew, Cantonese and Hakka groups), Hainan (Hainanese), Guangxi (Cantonese group) and Fujian (Hokkien, Hockchew and Henghua groups).
Teochew
[edit]Traditionally, the Teochews are a majority population of coastal provinces like Bangkok, Chonburi and Chachoengsao until the 1950s, in which later it was overwhelmed by Central Thai internal immigrants. Many of Thai military commanders as well as politicians come from Teochew backgrounds, while others were involved in trade. During the reign of King Taksin, some influential Teochew traders were granted certain privileges. These prominent traders were called "royal Chinese" (Jin-luang or จีนหลวง in Thai). Prominent Teochew politicians include former prime ministers Phot Phahonyothin, Pridi Banomyong, Chatichai Choonhavan and Banharn Silpa-archa.
Hakka
[edit]Hakkas are mainly concentrated around Chiang Mai, Nan, Phuket, Chanthaburi as well as some other central western and eastern provinces. The Hakka own many private banks in Thailand, notably Kasikorn Bank and Kiatnakin Bank. Prominent Hakka politicians include former prime ministers Thaksin Shinawatra, Abhisit Vejjajiva and Yingluck Shinawatra, present prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, former deputy prime minister Supachai Panitchpakdi and Sudarat Keyuraphan.
Hainanese
[edit]Hainanese people is another prominent Thai Chinese group which are mainly concentrated in Bangkok, Samui and some central provinces. Notable Hainanese Thai families include the Chirathivat family of Central Group and the Yoovidhya family of Krating Daeng, while politicians from this dialect group include former prime minister Pote Sarasin and politicians such as Boonchu Rojanastien, Banyat Bantadtan, Jurin Laksanawisit and Sondhi Limthongkul.
Hokkien
[edit]Hokkiens or Hoklos are a dominant group of Chinese particularly in the south of Thailand, mostly can trace their ancestry from Xiamen; aside from Thais, they also traded with Indians and other foreigners in Thailand. Hokkiens primarily live in Bandon in Surat Thani Province. A smaller Hoklo community can also be found in Hatyai in Songkhla Province and Satun Province. Some Hokkiens live in Bangkok traces their ancestry from Zhangzhou, like Aiyawatt Srivaddhanaprabha. Prominent Hokkien politicians include former prime ministers Chuan Leekpai, Anand Panyarachun and Srettha Thavisin.
Cantonese
[edit]The Cantonese predominantly came from Taishan as well as Xinhui counties in Jiangmen as well as the city of Guangzhou in Guangdong province of China. This group are not very prominent and are mainly concentrated in Bangkok and the central provinces. Although Cantonese from Yulin primarily live in Betong of Yala Province they are more popularly known as Kwongsai in which they are distinguished from the fellow kinsmen from Guangdong province despite sharing the same native dialect (Thai: กวางไส, 廣西; literally: Western Canton). Among the prominent Thai Chinese politicians with Cantonese ancestry are Chavarat Charnvirakul, Plaek Phibunsongkram and Anutin Charnvirakul.
Fuzhou and Fuqing dialects
[edit]This dialect group is the smallest among the ethnic Chinese populace and are found in places such as Chandi located in Nakhon Si Thammarat province as well as in other provinces such as Chumphon (Lamae and Map Ammarit villages) and also Rayong province (in the settlement of Ban Chandi, which was renamed after their main population centre of Chandi in Southern Thailand as a result of internal immigration and resettlement) as well as a lesser extent a pocket of them being internal migrants residing in Bangkok as well as Central Thailand (surrounding provinces of the capital, Bangkok), they trace their ancestries back to Fuzhou and Ningde towns of northern Fujian province, China.
Peranakan
[edit]Some ethnic Chinese living in the Malay-dominated provinces in the far south use Malay, rather than Thai as a lingua franca, and many have intermarried with local Malays, and are known as Peranakan. They are mostly concentrated in Phuket, Trang and Phang Nga Provinces.[172] In modern sense, Peranakan are not Thai Chinese, because Peranakan speak Southern Thai, while Thai Chinese in Southern Thailand (especially in Hatyai and Bandon) speak a localized accent or variant of Central Thai, known as Leangkaluang (Thai: แหลงข้าหลวง) which exhibits Southern Thai influences.
Family names
[edit]Almost all Thai-Chinese or Sino-Thais, especially those who came to Thailand before the 1950s, only use Thai surname in public, while it was required by Rama VI as a condition of Thai citizenship. The few retaining native Chinese surnames are either recent immigrants or resident aliens. For some immigrants who settled in Southern Thailand before the 1950s, it was common to simply prefix Sae- (from Chinese: 姓, 'family name') to a transliteration of their name to form the new family name; Wanlop Saechio's last name thus derived from the Hainanese 周 and Chanin Sae-ear's last name is from Hokkien 楊. Sae is also used by Hmong people in Thailand. In 1950s-1970s Chinese immigrants had that surname in Thailand, although Chinese immigrants to Thailand after the 1970s use their Chinese family names without Sae-.
Sino-Thai surnames are often distinct from those of the other-Thai population, with generally longer names mimicking those of high officials and upper-class Thais[173] and with elements of these longer names retaining their original Chinese family name in translation or transliteration. For example, former Prime Minister Banharn Silpa-Archa's unusual Archa element is a translation into Thai of his family's former name Ma (trad. 馬, simp. 马, lit. 'horse'). Similarly, the Lim in Sondhi Limthongkul's and Pita Limjaroenrat's name is the pronunciation of the name Lin (林). For an example, see the background of the Vejjajiva Palace name.[174] Note that the latter-day Royal Thai General System of Transcription would transcribe it as Wetchachiwa and that the Sanskrit-derived name refers to 'medical profession'.
Notable figures
[edit]Royalty
[edit]King Rama I | Princess Consort Indrasakdi Sachi |
Queen Suthida |
- King Taksin of Thonburi, son of a Teochew Chinese father migrant gambler or trader and a Thai mother[175]
- King Rama I, son of "a beautiful daughter of a mix of Chinese and Thai family in Ayutthaya"[176]
- Indrasakdi Sachi, Princess consort of Siam
- Queen Suthida, Queen consort of Thailand
Prime Ministers
[edit]Thai Chinese Prime Ministers:
20th century
[edit]- Kon Hutasingha[177]
- Phot Phahonyothin[178][179]
- Plaek Phibunsongkhram[180]
- Seni Pramoj[181]
- Pridi Banomyong[182][183]
- Thawan Thamrongnawasawat[184][185]
- Pote Sarasin[186]
- Thanom Kittikachorn[187]
- Sarit Thanarat[188][189][190]
- Kukrit Pramoj[181]
- Thanin Kraivichien[191]
- Kriangsak Chamanan[192]
- Chatichai Choonhavan[193][194]
- Anand Panyarachun[195][196]
- Suchinda Kraprayoon[197][198][199]
- Chuan Leekpai[5][200]
- Banharn Silpa-archa[201]
- Chavalit Yongchaiyudh[202]
21st century
[edit]- Thaksin Shinawatra[203]
- Samak Sundaravej,[204]
- Abhisit Vejjajiva[205][206]
- Yingluck Shinawatra[203]
- Srettha Thavisin[207]
- Paetongtarn Shinawatra
- Anutin Charnvirakul (incumbent)
Cabinet and governors
[edit]- Boonchu Rojanastien, Banker, Deputy Prime Minister, Finance Minister.
- Chitchai Wannasathit, Minister of Justice, Acting Prime Minister.
- Pao Sarasin, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior.
- Jurin Laksanawisit, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Health
- Chavarat Charnvirakul, Acting Prime Minister of Thailand, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Social Development and Human Security and Minister of Interior.
- Bhichai Rattakul, World President of Rotary International, Deputy Prime Minister, Speaker of the National Assembly, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- Kalaya Sophonpanich, Minister of Science and Technology.
- Bhichit Rattakul, Governor of Bangkok and Businessman.
- Kanchana Silpa-archa, Deputy Minister of Education.
- Apirak Kosayodhin, Governor of Bangkok, CEO of True Corporation.
- Varawut Silpa-archa, Minister of Social Development and Human Security and Minister of Natural Resources and Environment.
- Supachai Panitchpakdi, Deputy Prime Minister and the first and only Asian Director-General of the World Trade Organization
Business and entrepreneur
[edit]- Zheng Yifeng, famously known as Yi Kor Hong or Er Ge Feng, a businessman and philanthropist in 19th century.
- Chin Sophonpanich, Banker that founded the Bangkok Bank and Bangkok Insurance.
- Thaworn Phornprapha, Entrepreneur and founder of Siam Motors Group.
- Chaleo Yoovidhya, Billionaire inventor of Red Bull.
- Vanich Chaiyawan, Billionaire and chairman of Thai Life Insurance, the second-largest life insurer in Thailand.
- Prasert Prasarttong-Osoth, founder and owner of Bangkok Dusit Medical Services, Thailand's largest private health care group, and the owner of Bangkok Airways.
- Dhanin Chearavanont, Billionaire and the senior chairman of CP Group.
- Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi, Billionaire business magnate and investor.
- Krit Ratanarak, Billionaire chairman of Bangkok Broadcasting & Television Company.
- Chalerm Yoovidhya, Billionaire Businessman and heir to the Red Bull fortune.
- Vichai Srivaddhanaprabha, Billionaire founder, owner and chairman of King Power.
- Chartsiri Sophonpanich, Billionaire President of Bangkok Bank.
- Panthongtae Shinawatra, founding Billionaire of Voice TV.
- Aiyawatt Srivaddhanaprabha, youngest Billionaire of Asia.
Others
[edit]- Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, famous and influential Buddhist reformist monk.
- Somdet Heng Khemachari, Chief Monk of the Southern Region.
- Luang Pu Thong Ayana, highly revered and one of the longest-lived Thai monks.
- Maha Khanacharn Phochang, former Chief Monk of the Chinese Sangha of Thailand
- Maha Khanacharn Yen Yi, current Chief Monk of the Chinese Sangha of Thailand
- Pita Limjaroenrat, politician, and businessman. He served as the leader of the Move Forward Party.
- Atthaya Thitikul, professional golfer
- Chang and Eng Bunker, famous conjoined twins.
- Bundit Ungrangsee, symphonic conductor.
- Michael Michai Kitbunchu, cardinal and Archbishop of Bangkok from 1973 to 2009.
- Apichatpong Weerasethakul, award-winning film director.
- Jet Tila, chef and restauraunteur.
- Piyabutr Saengkanokkul, academic and politician. He served as a member of the Thai House of Representatives.
- Parit Wacharasindhu, politician and television host.
- Joey Boy, hip hop singer and producer.
- Puttichai Kasetsin, actor, DJ, television host.
- Tanutchai Wijitwongthong, actor.
- Chalida Vijitvongthong, actress.
- Utt Panichkul, actor, host, television presenter.
- Francis Xavier Kriengsak Kovitvanit, cardinal and Archbishop of Bangkok since 2009.
- Nichkhun, singer and rapper.
- James Ma, actor and model.
- Vachirawit Chivaaree, actor and singer.
- Metawin Opas-iamkajorn, actor.
- Yuenyong Opakul, singer, musician, record producer.
- Ten, singer and dancer.
- BamBam, Boy Band rapper, record producer
- Minnie, singer and actress.
- Sophida Kanchanarin, model, beauty queen, Miss Universe Thailand 2018.
- Tontawan Tantivejakul, actress and model.
See also
[edit]- Chao Mae Thapthim Shrine (水尾聖娘廟)
- China–Thailand relations
- Chinese folk religion in Southeast Asia
- Chow Yam-nam (White Dragon King)
- Gong Wu Shrine
- Kian Un Keng Shrine (建安宮)
- Leng Buai Ia Shrine (龍尾古廟)
- Lim Ko Niao (林姑娘)
- Poh Teck Tung Foundation
- Racism in Thailand
- San Chaopho Suea (Sao Chingcha) (打惱路玄天上帝廟)
- Thian Fah Foundation Hospital (天華醫院)
- Wat Bamphen Chin Phrot (永福寺)
- Wat Mangkon Kamalawat (龍蓮寺)
- Wat San Chao Chet (七聖媽廟)
Notes
[edit]- ^ According to a French missionary.
- ^ In Southern Thai, ethnic Chinese known as Leangkaluang (Southern Thai: แหลงข้าหลวง lit:Central Thai speakers)
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Further reading
[edit]- Chansiri, Disaphol (2008). The Chinese Émigrés of Thailand in the Twentieth Century. Cambria Press.
- Chantavanich, Supang (1997). "From Siamese-Chinese to Chinese-Thai: Political Conditions and Identity Shifts among the Chinese in Thailand". In Leo Suryadinata (ed.). Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. pp. 232–259.
- Tong Chee Kiong; Chan Kwok Bun, eds. (2001). Alternate Identities: The Chinese of Contemporary Thailand. Times Academic Press. ISBN 981-210-142-X.
- Skinner, G. William. Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community in Thailand. Ithaca (Cornell University Press), 1958.
- Sng, Jeffery; Bisalputra, Pimpraphai (2015). A History of the Thai-Chinese. Editions Didier Millet. ISBN 978-981-4385-77-0.
- Wongsurawat, Wasana (October 2019). The Crown and the Capitalists; The Ethnic Chinese and the Founding of the Thai Nation. Critical Dialogues in Southeast Asian Studies (Paper ed.). Seattle: University of Washington Press. ISBN 9780295746241. Retrieved 30 April 2020.
External links
[edit]- Dr. Wasana Wongsurawat lectures about her book The Crown and the Capitalists; The Ethnic Chinese and the Founding of the Thai Nation, 15 January 2020 (video)
- Thai-Chinese chamber of commerce
- Thai Chinese.net (archived 25 February 2021)
- (in Thai) Thai Chinese.net
Associations
[edit]- The Chinese Association in Thailand (Chong Hua)
- Teochew Association of Thailand (archived 2 November 2007)
- Hakka Association of Thailand
- (in Thai) Thai Hainan Trade association of Thailand (archived 22 December 2007)
- Fujian Association of Thailand (archived 21 November 2007)
Miscellaneous
[edit]- Thai Chinese BBS (archived 14 April 2003)
- Assessment for Chinese in Thailand (archived 21 September 2005)
- Anti-Chinese Labor riot of 1924, & bottom of page, how Thai Army suppressed 1889 riot between Chinese triads Tang Kong Xi (Teochew) and Siew Li Kue (Fujian) (archived 6 January 2009)
- Why do Thais have long surnames? (archived 22 July 2012)
Thai Chinese
View on GrokipediaDemographics
Population Estimates and Assimilation Metrics
Estimates of the Thai Chinese population range from 10 to 14 percent of Thailand's total inhabitants, equating to approximately 7.2 to 10 million people given the national population of about 71.9 million in 2024.[5] [2] [1] This variance stems from the lack of direct ethnic enumeration in Thai censuses, which prioritize citizenship and language over ancestry, compounded by extensive intermarriage and name adoption that obscure self-reported Chinese identity.[2] Higher ancestry-based figures, potentially exceeding 40 percent when accounting for partial descent, appear in some analyses but remain unverified by systematic surveys.[6] Assimilation metrics reflect profound integration, particularly among third- and later-generation descendants. Linguistic retention is low: the 2000 census identified just 120,000 household users of Chinese languages, representing under 2 percent of conservative population estimates at the time.[7] Contemporary observations confirm that most Thai Chinese speak Central Thai exclusively, with dialects like Teochew or Hokkien confined to elderly first- or second-generation individuals or recent mainland migrants, while Mandarin proficiency among youth often derives from schooling rather than heritage transmission.[8] [9] Intermarriage has accelerated this process, with historical data indicating widespread unions between Chinese men and Thai women since the late 19th century, yielding a majority mixed-ancestry profile in urban centers.[1] By the mid-20th century, such pairings contributed to the erosion of distinct ethnic endogamy, as state policies post-1930s incentivized Thai naming and cultural conformity.[10] Self-identification surveys and ethnographic studies show near-universal alignment with Thai nationality, with ethnic Chinese traits manifesting more in socioeconomic patterns—like dominance in commerce—than in overt cultural separation.[11] Recent economic ties to China have spurred selective Mandarin revival among elites, but core assimilation endures, evidenced by minimal institutional demands for Chinese-language rights or autonomy.[12]Geographic Distribution and Socioeconomic Profiles
The Thai Chinese population is predominantly urban, with the majority concentrated in Bangkok and the central region of Thailand, reflecting historical migration for trade and commerce opportunities. Smaller communities exist in northern provinces like Chiang Mai and Lampang, often tied to tin mining and local enterprises, as well as in southern areas such as Phuket with Hokkien influences in fisheries and tourism. Rural Sino-Thai settlements are notable in the northeast, where they engage in agriculture, though these represent a minority compared to urban densities.[2][13] By the late 19th century, ethnic Chinese formed 25 to 50 percent of Bangkok's population, establishing enduring commercial enclaves like Yaowarat. Contemporary estimates place Thai Chinese at 10-14 percent of Thailand's total population of approximately 70 million, but precise provincial breakdowns are limited due to high assimilation rates and lack of ethnic census data since 1943. Bangkok's metropolitan area continues to host the largest share, driven by economic pull factors and intergenerational urban residency.[14][1] Socioeconomically, Thai Chinese are disproportionately represented in business and upper socioeconomic strata, with at least 25 percent of the community involved in major Thai enterprises. This stems from historical exclusion from civil service, channeling energies into entrepreneurship, resulting in control of key sectors like retail, manufacturing, and agribusiness through family conglomerates. Over half of Thailand's prime ministers since 1932 have been of Sino-Thai descent, underscoring political-economic intertwined influence.[15][16] Wealth concentration among Sino-Thai elites contributes to Thailand's high inequality, where 1 percent of the population holds 67 percent of national wealth as of 2018, much attributed to ethnic Chinese-descended families dominating listed companies. Educational attainment is higher on average, facilitating professional roles in finance and technology, though disparities exist within the community between established tycoons and newer migrants.[4]Migration History
Pre-Modern and Early Modern Arrivals
Chinese traders from southern provinces, particularly Fujian and Guangdong, began arriving in the region of Siam as early as the 13th century, coinciding with the expansion of maritime trade networks during China's Song Dynasty (960–1279).[17] [18] These early migrants traveled via sea routes from coastal China and overland paths through mainland Southeast Asia, drawn by opportunities in entrepôt trade at emerging Siamese polities like the Sukhothai Kingdom (c. 1238–1438), though substantive settlement appears limited until the subsequent Ayutthaya period.[17] Archaeological evidence from southern Thai sites, such as Laem Pho and Srisatchanalai, reveals Chinese ceramics and trade goods from the 9th–14th centuries, indicating sporadic but growing commercial contacts rather than large-scale population movements.[19] Primarily merchants and artisans, these arrivals integrated into local economies by supplying silk, porcelain, and metals in exchange for regional staples like rice and teak, fostering early Sino-Siamese exchanges without forming distinct enclaves.[20] The Ayutthaya Kingdom (1351–1767) marked the onset of more organized Chinese settlement, as the capital's position as a regional hub amplified trade with Ming (1368–1644) and early Qing China.[21] Diplomatic missions, including 19 Siamese embassies to China during the Ming era, facilitated merchant sojourns, with Chinese financiers and interpreters gaining influence in the royal court and urban commerce.[22] Communities coalesced around guilds and temples, such as those dedicated to Mazu, the sea goddess, reflecting ties to Fujianese origins; by the 17th century, these groups supported Ayutthaya's fiscal system through tax farming and rice milling, though they remained fluid in identity, often intermarrying with Siamese and adopting local customs without rigid ethnic segregation.[23] Estimates suggest thousands of Chinese resided in Ayutthaya by the mid-18th century, contributing to the kingdom's cosmopolitan character amid multi-ethnic foreign quarters that included Persians and Japanese.[24] In the early modern transition following Ayutthaya's fall to Burmese forces in 1767, Chinese networks proved pivotal; King Taksin (r. 1767–1782), of Teochew descent from Guangdong, leveraged ethnic ties to rally merchants and fighters for Thonburi's reconstruction, encouraging further inflows of kin from southern China to rebuild trade infrastructure.[18] This period saw heightened arrivals of skilled laborers and traders, numbering in the thousands, who resettled in Bangkok under the nascent Rattanakosin Kingdom (1782 onward), laying foundations for economic dominance in provisioning the court and military.[20] Unlike later mass migrations, these pre-19th-century movements were elite-driven and adaptive, prioritizing commerce over colonization, with migrants often naturalizing through service to Siamese rulers rather than maintaining isolated diaspora structures.[25]19th-Century Labor and Trade Migration
During the 19th century, Chinese migration to Siam accelerated due to expanding trade networks and labor demands, particularly after the Bowring Treaty of 1855 opened ports to foreign commerce and integrated Siam into global markets, prompting larger inflows of migrants seeking economic prospects.[26] The Chinese population in Siam rose from an estimated 230,000 in 1825 to substantial growth by century's end, driven by annual arrivals from southern Chinese ports that supplied workers and merchants to fill gaps in local labor for commerce and extraction industries.[27] Migrants primarily originated from Guangdong and Fujian provinces, with Teochew speakers from the Swatow (Shantou) area forming the largest group due to established maritime connections, followed by Hokkien from Amoy (Xiamen); these groups arrived as sojourners, often single men intending temporary stays to accumulate wealth before repatriation.[28][29] In trade, Chinese intermediaries dominated bilateral exchanges, exporting Siamese rice and teak to China while importing goods like silk and ceramics, and they secured roles as tax farmers and financiers under Siamese rulers, leveraging networks absent among native populations.[30] Labor migration focused on manual sectors where Chinese filled niches in tin and gold mining in southern Siam, rice processing and distribution, and urban infrastructure projects such as canal digging and building in Bangkok, often under informal contracts rather than the indentured coolie systems prevalent elsewhere in Southeast Asia.[20][31] This influx supported Siam's economic expansion without large-scale coerced labor imports, as migrants responded to voluntary opportunities in a relatively permissive environment compared to colonial territories.[32]20th-Century Political Refugees and Post-War Flows
In the aftermath of the Chinese Civil War, remnants of the Kuomintang (KMT) army, primarily Yunnanese troops and accompanying civilians, retreated from mainland China into Burma following the Communist victory in 1949.[33] These groups, including elements of the 93rd Division and other field armies, faced incursions from the People's Liberation Army and Burmese government pressure, prompting further dispersal into northern Thailand by the early 1960s.[34] Thailand, wary of communist expansion but seeking border stability, permitted settlement under informal agreements, initially treating them as stateless refugees in remote highland areas.[35] Key settlements formed around Doi Mae Salong, where approximately 1,500 troops from the Fifth Field Army under General Duan Xiwen established bases in 1961, alongside about 3,300 individuals from the Third and Fifth Field Armies, encompassing soldiers, families, and civilian refugees.[33] [36] Overall, an estimated 10,000 KMT-linked Yunnanese refugees were escorted into Thailand during the 1960s and 1970s, including Han Chinese and Hui (Yunnanese Muslim) minorities, who built over 70 villages along the Thai-Myanmar border.[34] [37] These migrants, fleeing communist land reforms and purges, initially sustained themselves through opium cultivation and trade in the Golden Triangle, while providing anti-communist intelligence and military support to Thai and Taiwanese interests.[38] Broader post-war flows in the 1950s and 1960s included smaller numbers of Chinese escaping famines and political campaigns like the Great Leap Forward (1958–1962), though Thai immigration controls and Cold War tensions limited large-scale influxes compared to earlier economic waves. These refugees often integrated into existing Thai Chinese communities in urban centers like Bangkok, but documentation remains sparse due to informal entries and assimilation pressures.[39] By the 1970s, Thai authorities granted citizenship to many KMT settlers, facilitating their transition from refugees to farmers and traders, though some statelessness persisted among later arrivals.[35] This episode marked one of the last significant politically motivated Chinese migrations to Thailand before economic reforms in China reduced outflows.[33]Ethnic Identity and Assimilation
Etymology and Terminology
The English term "Thai Chinese" denotes individuals of full or partial Chinese ancestry who are Thai nationals, emphasizing their national identity alongside ethnic origins; it is often used interchangeably with "Chinese Thais" or "Sino-Thais." The descriptor "Sino-Thai" incorporates the prefix "Sino-," a combining form meaning "Chinese" that originates from Late Latin Sinæ (referring to the Chinese people), ultimately tracing to the name of China's Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE).[40] In Thai, the prevalent self-referential term is khon Thai cheuasai chin (คนไทยเชื้อสายจีน), literally "Thai persons of Chinese lineage," which highlights assimilation into Thai society while acknowledging patrilineal descent from Chinese immigrants; this phrasing appears in everyday discourse and official contexts to distinguish ancestry without implying foreign nationality.[41] A broader Thai exonym for those of Chinese heritage, regardless of generation or assimilation, is khon chin or khon jeen (คนจีน), meaning "Chinese people," an umbrella category encompassing both recent migrants and long-established descendants.[42] Due to state policies promoting cultural uniformity since the early 20th century, such as mandatory Thai naming in 1913 and restrictions on Chinese-language education post-1930s, most Thai Chinese prioritize Thai self-identification in daily life, reserving ancestry-specific terms for familial or business discussions involving clan ties (sae, แซ่, denoting Chinese surnames).[43] Kinship address among Thai Chinese often retains Teochew-influenced variants like hia (เฮีย, elder brother or boss) or tia (เตี่ย, father), signaling intra-community recognition without broader ethnic assertion.[44]State-Driven Assimilation Policies
In the 1930s, following the 1932 Siamese revolution, the Thai government under Prime Minister Plaek Phibunsongkhram pursued aggressive nationalist policies to integrate ethnic Chinese into Thai society, viewing their economic dominance and cultural separatism as threats to national unity. These efforts intensified with the issuance of the 1938 Act on the Promotion of Educational Institutions, which mandated that Chinese schools teach exclusively in Thai and adhere to a centralized curriculum, effectively curtailing Chinese-language instruction. By 1939, over 400 Chinese schools were closed or converted, reducing the number of Chinese-medium institutions from approximately 1,000 in the late 1920s to fewer than 100 by the mid-1940s.[45][46] Phibunsongkhram's regime extended assimilation through cultural mandates (Ratthaniyom) proclaimed between 1939 and 1941, which prohibited Chinese associations, newspapers, and dramatic performances while imposing fines for non-compliance with Thai language use in public and business. A 1939 Printing Act banned the importation and publication of Chinese materials, leading to the shutdown of most Chinese presses and the arrest of editors promoting pan-Chinese sentiments. These measures were justified as countermeasures to perceived loyalty to China amid the Sino-Japanese War, though they primarily served to dismantle Chinese communal networks and compel cultural conformity.[10] Name Thai-ification policies accelerated during this period, with Chinese residents encouraged—and in practice required—to adopt Thai surnames to access citizenship, employment, and social acceptance. The 1913 Nationality Law had granted citizenship to many Chinese but tied it to assimilation obligations; by the 1940s, under Phibun's pro-Thai campaigns, thousands of families complied by inventing unique Thai surnames, often transliterating or fabricating from Chinese roots to evade discrimination in government jobs and education. This resulted in widespread name changes, with estimates suggesting over 80% of urban Chinese adopting Thai nomenclature by the 1950s, facilitating generational blending but eroding ancestral ties.[47][2] Post-World War II, under Phibun's second term (1948–1957) and successors like Sarit Thanarat, assimilation persisted through economic restrictions, such as the 1949 ban on foreign retail trade dominated by Chinese, forcing many into Thai partnerships or relocation. However, enforcement waned by the late 1950s as Chinese-Thai elites integrated into the political class, with policies shifting toward tacit acceptance of hybrid identities rather than outright suppression. These state interventions, rooted in fears of economic enclaves and foreign influence, achieved high rates of linguistic and nominal assimilation—evidenced by surveys showing 90% Thai-language proficiency among second-generation Chinese by 1960—but preserved underlying cultural retention in private spheres.[10][27]Intermarriage, Name Changes, and Cultural Retention
Intermarriage between Chinese immigrants and ethnic Thais has been a primary driver of assimilation since the early waves of migration, as the overwhelming majority of arrivals were male laborers and traders who lacked female counterparts from China. This demographic imbalance necessitated unions with local Thai women, producing Sino-Thai offspring who were raised in Thai linguistic and cultural environments, accelerating generational blending. By the mid-20th century, G. William Skinner documented that such intermarriages contributed to near-complete assimilation by the third generation, with endogamous Chinese marriages declining sharply due to the scarcity of unmixed Chinese partners and the social incentives for integration.[10][48] State policies further reinforced name changes as a mechanism of identity convergence. The 1913 Surname Act mandated that all residents adopt official Thai surnames, compelling Chinese families to invent or select Thai-sounding equivalents while often retaining Chinese given names privately. Subsequent Thaification campaigns under Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram from 1938 onward intensified this, prohibiting Chinese surnames in official use, requiring Thai dress and language, and promoting national unity over ethnic distinctions, which led many Sino-Thai to fully Thai-ize their nomenclature to avoid discrimination.[49][50] Despite these pressures, elements of Chinese culture persist among Thai Chinese, particularly in religious syncretism and familial practices. Ancestral worship, clan associations, and folk deities like Mazu continue in private temples and home altars, blending with Thai Buddhism to form hybrid rituals observed during festivals such as Chinese New Year, which has permeated broader Thai society. Business networks rooted in dialect-group ties and Confucian emphases on education and entrepreneurship remain evident, sustaining socioeconomic prominence even as overt political nationalism from China waned post-1960s assimilation. Recent Sino-Thai economic ties have spurred modest revivals in Mandarin learning and heritage tourism, though these coexist with dominant Thai cultural norms rather than supplanting them.[45][51]Linguistic Landscape
Dominant Dialect Groups
The Thai Chinese community encompasses several mutually unintelligible Sinitic dialect groups, reflecting waves of migration from southern China primarily between the 18th and early 20th centuries. Teochew (Chaozhou or Teochiu), originating from the Chaoshan region of eastern Guangdong province, constitutes the largest group, with estimates from linguistic surveys placing it at approximately 56% of dialect-retaining Thai Chinese as of the late 20th century.[52] This dominance stems from Teochew migrants' early establishment in trade networks centered in Bangkok and central Thailand, where the dialect facilitated commerce among merchants from Shantou (Swatow) and surrounding ports. Teochew remains the most commonly used Chinese variety for intergenerational business communication, even as Mandarin gains traction through education and media exposure.[2] Hakka speakers rank as the second-largest group, comprising about 16% of those surveyed in mid-20th-century studies, with origins in the hilly inland regions of Guangdong, Jiangxi, and Fujian provinces.[52] Hakka communities often settled in rural areas and northern provinces like Chiang Mai, engaging in agriculture and mining before urban migration; their dialect's resilience is tied to tighter-knit family clans that preserved oral traditions amid assimilation pressures. Hokkien (Fujianese), at roughly 7%, traces to migrants from southern Fujian and is more prominent in southern Thailand, particularly among early arrivals who integrated into fishing and retail trades in ports like Phuket and Songkhla. Smaller but notable groups include Cantonese (7%), from Guangdong's Pearl River Delta, who concentrated in urban artisan roles such as tailoring and pharmacy in Bangkok's Yaowarat district, and Hainanese (11%), from Hainan Island, historically associated with hospitality and culinary professions like hotel staffing and coffee shop ownership.[52] These proportions, derived from 1994 ethnographic data, highlight dialect clustering by occupation and geography rather than uniform distribution, though intergenerational shift to Thai has reduced fluency across all groups, with only older generations maintaining proficiency in most cases.[52] Dialect retention varies by socioeconomic status, with commercial elites more likely to sustain Teochew for networking, underscoring causal links between economic utility and linguistic persistence.[2]Language Shift and Multilingualism
The Thai Chinese population, primarily descendants of migrants from southern China, initially maintained Southern Min dialects such as Teochew (Chaozhou) and Hokkien, alongside Hakka and Hainanese varieties, as primary languages of communication within communities during the early 20th century.[18][52] Over successive generations, a pronounced language shift occurred toward Central Thai as the dominant vernacular, driven by state-mandated assimilation policies that enforced Thai-medium education from the 1930s onward, restricted Chinese-language schooling, and promoted national linguistic unity to foster loyalty amid fears of divided allegiances.[53][54] This shift was accelerated by intermarriage with ethnic Thais, urbanization, and economic incentives for adopting the majority language in commerce and public administration, resulting in Thai becoming the first language for the majority of Sino-Thai individuals by the mid-20th century.[52] Empirical studies indicate that the extent of this shift varies by generation and region: older Thai Chinese (born before 1950) often retain functional proficiency in ancestral dialects for familial or ceremonial use, but second- and third-generation descendants exhibit significantly diminished fluency, with dialects largely confined to informal home settings or fading entirely.[54][52] Sociological factors, including limited intergenerational transmission due to Thai-dominant schooling and media exposure, have led to widespread attrition; for instance, surveys of Sino-Thai families reveal that while Teochew speakers historically comprised the largest dialect group, contemporary usage has declined sharply, with Thai supplanting dialects in over 80% of households among urban youth.[52] Rural northern communities show slightly higher retention of dialects like those from Yunnan influences, but overall, the pattern aligns with causal pressures of assimilation over cultural preservation.[55] Multilingualism persists among Thai Chinese, particularly in elite and business strata, where proficiency in Thai alongside English and revived Mandarin serves pragmatic ends tied to global trade and ties with mainland China.[45] Since the 1990s, Mandarin has gained traction as a second or third language through private tutoring, Confucius Institutes, and school curricula, reflecting economic incentives rather than dialect revival; recent attitudes surveys among Thai university students of Chinese descent show positive dispositions toward Mandarin for career mobility, though dialectal Chinese remains marginal.[8][56] This results in functional trilingualism (Thai-Mandarin-English) for approximately 20-30% of younger Sino-Thai professionals, but full dialectal competence is rare outside insular family networks, underscoring a selective multilingualism oriented toward utility over heritage.[45][57]Economic Role and Achievements
Historical Foundations in Commerce
The earliest foundations of Thai Chinese involvement in commerce trace to maritime trade networks established during the Ayutthaya Kingdom (1351–1767), where merchants primarily from Fujian and Guangdong provinces in southern China engaged in the exchange of goods such as silk, porcelain, and spices for Siamese rice, hides, and forest products. These traders formed the initial economic bridge between China and Siam, leveraging kinship networks (hometown associations) to facilitate credit, shipping, and market intelligence, which gave them a competitive edge over local Thai participants who focused more on subsistence agriculture and corvée labor. By the 17th century, Chinese junks dominated the import of everyday consumer goods into Siam, establishing permanent trading posts in ports like Ayutthaya and creating a proto-commercial class that intermarried with locals but retained clan-based business practices.[58][18] Following the Burmese sack of Ayutthaya in 1767, waves of Chinese migrants, including refugees and laborers, resettled in the Chao Phraya Delta under the Thonburi Kingdom (1767–1782) and early Chakri dynasty, filling labor shortages while rapidly ascending into intermediary roles in state-controlled trade. King Taksin (r. 1767–1782), himself of Teochew Chinese descent, granted Chinese merchants monopolies on tax farming for commodities like rice, opium, and gambling, enabling them to collect revenues on behalf of the crown in exchange for a fixed sum— a system that generated up to 80% of royal income by the early 19th century and allowed Chinese entrepreneurs to amass capital through efficient collection networks spanning rural mills to urban markets. This tax-farming model, reliant on Chinese familiarity with ledger-keeping and risk assessment honed in China's commercial hubs, entrenched their position as economic middlemen, often acting as "go-betweens" in Sino-Siamese tribute trade where they privately shipped Siamese staples to China for profit margins exceeding official tariffs.[59][60][61] The Bowring Treaty of 1855, which dismantled Siamese trade barriers with Britain and spurred export growth in rice and teak, further solidified Chinese commercial dominance by opening opportunities in brokerage, shipping, and retail distribution; Chinese firms controlled over 90% of Bangkok's wholesale trade in imported textiles and consumer goods by the 1870s, capitalizing on steamship routes and family remittances from China to underwrite ventures that Thai elites, constrained by sakdina feudal obligations, largely avoided. This era saw the rise of Chinese rice mill tycoons, who mechanized milling with imported technology and exported surplus to Europe, accumulating wealth that funded urban real estate and banking precursors—foundational to later conglomerates—while Thai agrarian structures limited indigenous capital formation in non-subsistence sectors. Exclusionary policies, such as restrictions on Thai nobles entering retail to preserve royal monopolies, inadvertently channeled commerce toward Chinese networks, whose dialect-based guilds enforced contracts and mitigated default risks through social enforcement rather than formal courts.[17][58][61]Contemporary Business Conglomerates and Industries
The Chearavanont family, of Teochew Chinese descent, controls the Charoen Pokphand (CP) Group, Thailand's largest private conglomerate by revenue, founded in 1921 as a seeds and agricultural supplies business in Bangkok.[62] The group has expanded into agribusiness, producing animal feed and livestock on a global scale, alongside retail (including the True Corporation telecom and 7-Eleven franchises in Thailand), food processing, and pharmaceuticals, with operations in over 20 countries and annual revenues exceeding $60 billion as of 2023.[63] Led by Dhanin Chearavanont, the family's wealth reached approximately $36.6 billion in 2017 estimates, ranking them among Asia's richest, bolstered by vertical integration in supply chains that capitalized on Thailand's export-oriented agriculture.[64] The Sirivadhanabhakdi family, also Teochew-origin, dominates the beverage sector through Thai Beverage Public Company Limited (ThaiBev), established by Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi in the 1970s from a small liquor distribution operation.[65] ThaiBev, Southeast Asia's largest beverage firm by market capitalization, produces brands like Chang beer and Mekhong whiskey, generating over 300 billion baht in annual revenue as of 2023, with expansions into spirits, soft drinks, and property via the TCC Group.[66] In June 2025, Charoen transferred stakes worth nearly $11 billion equally among his five children, ensuring family continuity amid diversification into hospitality and real estate.[67] Retail and property development are led by the Chirathivat family, Hokkien Chinese immigrants who founded the Central Group in 1956, evolving from a single department store into Thailand's premier mall operator with over 100 locations domestically and abroad.[68] Under Tos Chirathivat's leadership, the group reported net leasable area dominance in Thailand's shopping centers, with family wealth at $8.6 billion as of September 2025, including international acquisitions like Italy's Rinascente department store.[69] These conglomerates exemplify Thai Chinese networks' role in key industries, where family-owned firms leverage intergenerational capital and risk aversion to maintain control over 80% of Thailand's top 100 companies by some sector analyses, though precise dominance varies by industry due to state regulations and competition.[4] Other notable Thai Chinese-led entities include the Yoovidhya family's TC Pharmaceutical Industries, creators of the Red Bull energy drink brand since 1984, which generated global sales exceeding 10 billion euros annually by 2023 through licensing to Austria's Red Bull GmbH.[70] In banking, the Sophonpanich family's legacy persists via Bangkok Bank, though diluted by public listings. Thai Chinese influence extends to construction, electronics assembly, and tourism, often through joint ventures that mitigate political risks, contributing disproportionately to GDP despite comprising 10-14% of the population.[71]Philanthropic Contributions and Broader Impacts
Thai Chinese have established a robust tradition of philanthropy, often rooted in Confucian principles of social harmony and merit accumulation through good deeds, which has significantly benefited Thai society. The Poh Teck Tung Foundation, initiated in 1909 by 12 ethnic Chinese merchants in Bangkok, exemplifies this legacy; it provides emergency rescue services, manages unclaimed bodies with dignified burials, and delivers disaster relief, expending over 511 million baht (approximately USD 15 million) in fiscal year 2567 BE (2024 CE) alone on life-saving and welfare initiatives.[72][73] Prominent Thai Chinese business families have channeled wealth into healthcare and education. The Dhanin Tawee Chearavanont Foundation, led by Dhanin Chearavanont of the Charoen Pokphand Group—a conglomerate founded by Chinese immigrants—partners with global entities to improve access to quality healthcare for vulnerable populations and has supported initiatives like the Global Fund's efforts to eliminate drug-resistant malaria in the Greater Mekong subregion since 2019.[74][75] Similarly, the Sirivadhanabhakdi Foundation, associated with Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi of TCC Group, supplies medical equipment to hospitals nationwide and funds scholarships for underprivileged students, reflecting a pattern of targeted aid during crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, where CP Group donated substantial resources including ventilators worth over 50 million baht in 2021.[76][77] These efforts extend to institutions preserving Chinese cultural elements within Thailand, such as the Huachiew Chalermprakiet University and Huachiew Hospital for Traditional Chinese Medicine, both established under the auspices of Poh Teck Tung-related entities to advance education and integrative healthcare.[78][79] Broader impacts include bolstering Thailand's social safety net—ethnic Chinese foundations have historically aided immigrants and locals alike, from World War II refugees to modern disaster victims—while fostering economic stability through job creation in supported sectors and enhancing bilateral Thailand-China ties via people-to-people exchanges.[80][72] This philanthropy has also facilitated cultural retention amid assimilation, as associations evolved from clan-based networks into modern charitable bodies, contributing to reduced historical tensions by demonstrating communal reciprocity.[81]Cultural and Religious Dimensions
Festivals, Customs, and Family Structures
Thai Chinese communities prominently observe Chinese New Year (known locally as Tron To or Songkran Chinese), a lunar festival typically spanning three days from the eve of the new year, featuring family reunions, ancestral offerings, lion and dragon dances, red decorations symbolizing prosperity, and street parades with food stalls in areas like Bangkok's Yaowarat Chinatown.[82][83] Celebrations include preparing feasts with symbolic foods such as fish for abundance and dumplings for wealth, followed by rituals of respect to ancestors through incense burning and shared meals, often blending with Thai elements like merit-making at temples.[84] Other festivals include Qingming (Tomb-Sweeping Day) in early April, where families visit graves to clean tombs, offer food, and burn incense to honor the deceased, reflecting Confucian filial piety adapted to Thailand's multicultural context.[85] Customs emphasize ancestral veneration, conducted in home altars or clan association halls, where patrilineal descendants offer joss sticks, paper money, and food to appease spirits believed to influence family fortunes, a practice rooted in traditional Chinese folk religion and maintained despite assimilation pressures.[86] Weddings among Thai Chinese incorporate hybrid rites, such as the groom's family presenting betrothal gifts including tea, wine, and red envelopes to the bride's family in a tea-pouring ceremony symbolizing respect, followed by Thai-influenced water-pouring blessings from elders for longevity, often culminating in homage to ancestors at a family altar.[87] Funeral customs involve elaborate multi-day rituals with chanting by Taoist or Buddhist priests, paper effigies burned for the afterlife, and a year-long mourning period emphasizing restraint and offerings, distinguishing them from purely Thai Buddhist practices.[88] Family structures traditionally follow a patrilineal, extended model influenced by Confucian principles, with multiple generations co-residing under the eldest male's authority to ensure business continuity and uphold filial obligations, where sons inherit ancestral responsibilities including worship limited to male lines.[89][88] Parents expect obedience and financial support from children into adulthood, fostering tight-knit units that prioritize collective prosperity over individualism, though urbanization has prompted nuclear family shifts while clan ties persist through associations aiding marriages and disputes.[90] This structure correlates with economic success, as family firms dominate Thai commerce, passing control via primogeniture or merit-based succession among siblings.[89]Religious Practices and Syncretism
Thai Chinese religious practices center on Chinese folk religion, a syncretic tradition integrating Mahayana Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, and ancestor veneration, which has further hybridized with Thailand's dominant Theravada Buddhism and local animist elements since the early 20th century migration waves.[91] This blending reflects pragmatic adaptation to Thai society, where Chinese immigrants established lay Buddhist societies in the 1930s to preserve Mahayana doctrines amid Theravada prevalence, incorporating Thai architectural styles in temples and participating in local merit-making festivals.[92] Key examples include the Chinese Buddhist Research Society of Thailand, founded in 1930 with peak membership of 2,500, focusing on doctrinal studies and rituals like the Ghost Festival, while adopting Thai-style temple designs.[92] Ancestor worship remains a core practice, conducted at home altars or clan halls with offerings of joss sticks, incense, and food to honor deceased forebears and seek their protective intercession, fulfilling Confucian filial piety obligations.[93] These rituals, often held monthly or seasonally per the lunar calendar, emphasize family continuity and are maintained even among assimilated Thai Chinese, blending with Thai Buddhist altar veneration where ancestor photos are placed below Buddha images.[85] In urban settings, such practices sustain ethnic identity, as seen in Thai-Chinese communities' annual ancestral rites that mix Chinese protocols with Thai communal feasts.[85] Deity worship exemplifies hybridization, with Chinese figures like Guanyin (Avalokitesvara) gaining prominence through urban spirit-medium cults since the 1980s, merging Mahayana bodhisattva devotion, vegetarian merit-making, and Thai animist trance rituals.[91] Shrines such as the 1983 Lad Phrao Guanyin tamnak, built at a cost of 40 million baht, feature multi-tiered altars hierarchically arranging Buddha at the apex, followed by Hindu gods, Chinese deities like Mazu and Bentougong, and local spirits, reflecting commodified cosmopolitanism over rigid syncretism.[91] Taoist influences appear in festivals like the Nine Emperor Gods cult in southern Thailand, where Thai-Chinese temples fuse dragon motifs and spirit possession with Theravada ethics, generating economic activity through over 100,000 mediums industry-wide.[91][94] Confucian ethics underpin family and social rituals, emphasizing hierarchy and harmony, while Taoist cosmology informs geomancy and talisman use, often integrated into Thai amulet traditions for protection.[95] Despite assimilation pressures leading to declining memberships in groups like the Dragon-flower Buddhist Society of Siam (peaking at 2,000 members in the 1950s-1960s, now around 400), these practices persist among Thai Chinese, fostering resilience through selective retention amid broader Thai religious pluralism.[92] ![San Chao Po Ongkharak Tutelary Shrine][float-right]Culinary and Artistic Influences
Chinese immigrants, predominantly from Hokkien and Teochew backgrounds, introduced key cooking techniques to Thailand, including stir-frying and deep-frying using the wok, which became integral to Thai culinary practices starting from Hokkien arrivals around the 15th century and larger Teochew settlements in subsequent centuries.[96] These methods facilitated the adaptation of Chinese staples like rice noodles (kuay teow), dumplings (salapao), and steamed buns into everyday Thai street foods, with Teochew influences particularly shaping Bangkok's vendor culture through dishes such as khao man gai (Hainanese chicken rice) and ba mee (egg noodles).[97] Soy sauces, derived from Teochew dialect loanwords and production methods, further embedded Chinese elements in Thai flavor profiles, evident in widespread use across central Thai cooking by the 19th century amid mass immigration waves.[98] This fusion extended to broader street food dominance, where over half of Bangkok's iconic stalls trace origins to Chinese migrants, blending Cantonese roasted meats (muu daeng) and Hakka congee (jok) with local ingredients like Thai basil and chilies, a process accelerated during the 19th- and early 20th-century labor migrations.[96] Pa tong ko (Chinese dough fritters) and other breakfast items exemplify this hybridity, consumed daily by millions and reflecting economic integration rather than cultural isolation.[98] In the arts, Thai Chinese communities preserved and localized Chinese opera (ngiw), an ancient form originating in China's Tang Dynasty (7th century), with performances documented in Thailand from King Narai's reign in the late 17th century and formalized under King Taksin in the 18th century.[99] These troupes, often Teochew-style, perform during festivals like the Tesegan Gin Jeh vegetarian event in Bangkok's Yaowarat district, combining martial arts, acrobatics, singing, and elaborate costumes to invoke deities, sustaining the tradition amid declining audiences due to modern media.[100][101] Artistic influences also manifest in temple architecture and murals, where Chinese motifs—such as scenes from legends featuring figures like Guan Yu—integrated into Thai wats during the Rama III era (1824–1851), imported via Guangzhou artisans and reflecting trade ties rather than imposition.[102] Reverse glass paintings from China, popular in 19th-century Thai courts, influenced local decorative arts by introducing perspectival techniques and vibrant enamels, later syncretized in Buddhist temple interiors.[103] This cross-pollination underscores Thai Chinese role as cultural conduits, with syncretic elements enduring in contemporary festivals and heritage sites despite assimilation pressures.[104]Political Engagement
Evolution from Marginalization to Influence
During the early constitutional period following the 1932 revolution, ethnic Chinese in Thailand encountered systemic barriers to political participation, stemming from Thai nationalist efforts to assert sovereignty against perceived foreign economic dominance.[105] Policies under Prime Minister Plaek Phibunsongkhram intensified this marginalization; from 1938 to 1944, and again from 1947 to 1957, his regime enforced cultural assimilation through decrees banning Chinese-language signage in commerce, closing Chinese-medium schools (reducing their number from over 1,000 in the 1930s to fewer than 200 by the 1950s), and dissolving Chinese associations to prevent ideological infiltration from China.[45][106] These measures, justified as national unification, effectively sidelined Sino-Thai from civil service and military roles, where ethnic Thai preference prevailed.[105] Post-World War II, the rise of communism in China heightened suspicions, leading successive military governments under Sarit Thanarat (1957–1963) and Thanom Kittikachorn (1963–1973) to maintain assimilationist pressures, including restrictions on Chinese remittances abroad and further curbs on cultural expression, limiting overt Sino-Thai political agency.[45] However, enforced assimilation—via intermarriage, Thai-name adoption, and conversion to Theravada Buddhism—paradoxically facilitated deeper societal integration, as Sino-Thai families shed visible ethnic markers to access elite networks. The 1973 student-led uprising against military rule marked a turning point, ushering in democratic openings that allowed economically ascendant Sino-Thai to translate business influence into political capital.[15] Normalization of Thailand-China relations in 1975 eased external fears, enabling Sino-Thai to participate without stigma. By the 1980s and 1990s, assimilated Sino-Thai figures emerged prominently; for instance, Chuan Leekpai, of partial Chinese descent, served as prime minister from 1992 to 1995 and 1997 to 2001, advocating constitutional reforms.[15] This trajectory culminated in substantial representation at the apex of power: approximately 53 percent of Thailand's prime ministers since the end of absolute monarchy have been of Sino-Thai ancestry, underscoring how economic prowess and cultural adaptation overcame historical exclusion to foster elite influence.[15] Subsequent leaders like Thaksin Shinawatra (2001–2006), whose family traces roots to Chinese immigrants, further exemplified this shift, mobilizing rural and urban constituencies through populist policies informed by Sino-Thai commercial acumen.[15]Key Political Figures and Dynasties
Thai Chinese individuals have achieved prominence in Thai politics, particularly through leadership roles such as prime ministerships, reflecting their integration and influence despite historical marginalization.[107] Several prime ministers of partial or full Chinese descent have shaped modern governance, often drawing on family networks rooted in commerce and regional patronage. The Shinawatra family stands out as the most influential political dynasty among Thai Chinese, descending from a Chinese immigrant who married a Thai woman in the late 19th century. Thaksin Shinawatra, whose ancestry traces to Guangdong province, served as prime minister from 2001 to 2006, implementing populist policies like universal healthcare and village funds that boosted rural support but sparked urban elite opposition.[108] His sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, became Thailand's first female prime minister in 2011, continuing pro-poor initiatives amid protests that led to her ouster by court ruling in 2014. Paetongtarn Shinawatra, Thaksin's daughter, assumed the premiership in 2024, maintaining the family's dominance in Pheu Thai Party politics.[109] Other key figures include Chuan Leekpai, a third-generation Hokkien Thai Chinese born in 1938, who led the Democrat Party and served as prime minister from 1992 to 1995 and 1997 to 2001, navigating the 1997 Asian financial crisis with IMF-backed reforms.[110] Banharn Silpa-archa, whose father hailed from Guangdong's Teochew community, held the premiership briefly from 1995 to 1996 after rising through construction and patronage in Suphan Buri province.[111] Srettha Thavisin, with maternal Chinese roots linked to business families, was prime minister from 2023 to 2024, focusing on economic recovery post-COVID.[112] These leaders exemplify how Thai Chinese leverage ethnic ties and economic acumen for political ascent, though without forming hereditary dynasties beyond the Shinawatra model.Influence on Policy and Governance
Ethnic Chinese Thais, through their integration into the political elite, have shaped Thai policy and governance, particularly in economic domains. An estimated 53% of Thailand's prime ministers have been of Chinese descent, reflecting the community's transition from economic specialization to political leadership following assimilation policies in the mid-20th century.[113] This overrepresentation stems from networks built in commerce translating into electoral and bureaucratic influence, enabling priorities aligned with private enterprise and growth-oriented reforms. Key figures exemplify this impact. Chuan Leekpai, from a half-Chinese Hokkien family, served as prime minister from 1992 to 1995 and 1997 to 2001, overseeing fiscal austerity and financial sector restructuring in response to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which stabilized the baht and restored investor confidence despite short-term hardships.[114] Similarly, Thaksin Shinawatra, whose family originated from Hakka immigrants in Guangdong, China, governed from 2001 to 2006 and introduced "Thaksinomics"—policies including rural credit programs, infrastructure projects, and export promotion that achieved average annual GDP growth of 5-6% until political disruptions.[115] [108] These approaches emphasized market liberalization and public-private partnerships, benefiting Sino-Thai-dominated conglomerates while broadening economic participation. In recent governance, Sino-Thai leaders like Anutin Charnvirakul, who acknowledges full Chinese ancestry from Guangdong, assumed the premiership in September 2025, continuing emphases on pragmatic economic diversification amid global pressures.[116] Overall, their influence has fostered policies favoring foreign direct investment, trade openness, and infrastructure development, contributing to Thailand's status as a middle-income economy, though critics attribute persistent inequality to elite capture of state resources.[113]Challenges and Criticisms
Historical Discrimination and Policy Responses
During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, ethnic Chinese in Thailand, who controlled an estimated 80-90% of commerce by the 1930s, faced growing resentment from Thai nationalists concerned over economic dominance and divided loyalties, prompting initial restrictions such as the 1909 head tax increase that sparked a Chinese strike in 1910.[117] [105] These tensions escalated under Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram's ultranationalist government from 1938, which enacted policies to mobilize ethnic Thais against perceived Chinese exploitation, including comparisons of Chinese merchants to "Jews of the East" and forced economic displacement.[105] Key discriminatory measures targeted education and culture to enforce Thaification, with the 1938 closure of numerous Chinese schools and newspapers reducing Chinese-language instruction to as little as 2 hours per week by 1939; by 1940, all Chinese secondary schools in Bangkok were shuttered, and primary education was limited to 10 of 30 weekly hours in Chinese, reflecting fears of Chinese nationalism fostering disloyalty.[45] [117] Economically, the 1939 Commercial Registration Act mandated Thai signage and accounting for businesses, while the 1941 Occupation Act and 1943 Royal Decree reserved 27 trades (later reduced to 7 by 1949) exclusively for Thai nationals, alongside a ban on alien land ownership under the 1943 Land Pertaining to Aliens Act, aimed at protecting Thai employment amid high unemployment.[118] [105] Immigration controls tightened from the 1927/28 Immigration Act's fees (rising to 1,000 baht by 1950) and post-1947 quotas limiting entries to 200 annually by 1949, driven by concerns over communist infiltration following the 1949 Chinese Revolution.[117] [118] Citizenship policies fluctuated, with the 1913 Nationality Law granting jus soli to local-born Chinese children, but the 1953 Act restricting it to those with one Thai parent—reversed in 1956—creating barriers for second-generation Chinese and reinforcing second-class status.[118] These measures, while discriminatory, were framed as assimilation responses to integrate the Chinese minority, which comprised about 12% of the population in the 1940s, into a unified Thai identity amid nation-building efforts; civil service exclusions persisted but saw low Chinese interest due to private sector opportunities.[118] Post-Phibun, under Sarit Thanarat (1957-1963), policies continued with administrative curbs on alien activities, but by the late 1970s, economic liberalization and a 1980 amnesty eased restrictions, lifting bans on Chinese-language education and allowing cultural revival as assimilation proved effective, with most Thai Chinese adopting Thai names and intermarrying by the 1960s.[45] [118] Subsequent reforms, including the 1999 National Education Act integrating Chinese language into curricula and post-2000s MOUs with the People's Republic of China for teacher exchanges, marked a shift from suppression to pragmatic engagement, reflecting reduced domestic tensions as Thai Chinese economic integration stabilized societal roles.[45]Economic Envy and Stereotypes
![Stock Exchange of Thailand building][float-right] The Sino-Thai community, constituting approximately 10-12% of Thailand's population, exerts disproportionate influence over the national economy, with estimates indicating control over 80% of listed companies by market capitalization.[119] At least 25% of Sino-Thais are involved in major Thai businesses, contributing to perceptions of economic dominance despite comprising a minority.[15] This success stems from cultural emphases on education, frugality, family-based enterprises, and networked commerce, enabling rapid capital accumulation and business expansion from historical immigrant roots in trade and retail.[120] Such economic preeminence has fostered stereotypes portraying Sino-Thais as shrewd, clannish operators who prioritize profit and kin loyalty over broader societal ties, often depicted in Thai media and discourse as overly calculating or exploitative in dealings.[121] These views echo broader Southeast Asian patterns of resentment toward market-dominant ethnic Chinese minorities, where prosperity breeds envy, as articulated in analyses of how free markets amplify ethnic disparities without corresponding assimilation or redistribution.[122] In Thailand, however, overt hostility remains subdued compared to neighbors like Indonesia or Malaysia, owing to mid-20th-century assimilation policies mandating Thai names, language, and Buddhist practices, which blurred ethnic lines and reduced visible scapegoating.[123] Underlying envy persists subtly, manifesting in critiques of Sino-Thai "guanxi" networks—informal ties favoring insiders—as unfair barriers to native Thai advancement, and in occasional nativist rhetoric questioning their "Thai-ness" despite intermarriage rates exceeding those in other regional Chinese diasporas.[121] Some Thai business figures propagate images of Chinese merchants as "selfish" or prone to "cheating," fueling competitive tensions, particularly amid perceptions that Sino-Thai conglomerates monopolize sectors like retail, manufacturing, and finance.[124] Empirical data on wealth gaps—where Sino-Thai families dominate Forbes lists of Thailand's richest—reinforce these sentiments, though causal realism attributes disparities more to behavioral adaptations like risk aversion and long-term investment than innate traits, with envy often rationalized through confirmation bias in anecdotal failures of inter-ethnic ventures.[15]Tensions with Recent Chinese Immigration and PRC Influence
In the 2020s, Thailand has experienced a significant influx of migrants from the People's Republic of China (PRC), estimated at 110,000 to 130,000 individuals, driven by economic opportunities, digital nomadism, and post-COVID relocation trends.[125] These newcomers, distinct from the long-assimilated Thai Chinese population, have contributed to sectors like tourism and e-commerce but have also sparked social frictions, including complaints over job displacement for locals, perceived poor public behavior, and strain on urban infrastructure in areas like Bangkok and Chiang Mai.[125][126] Thai social media platforms have amplified grievances, with viral posts decrying "Chinese takeover" of property markets and small businesses, exacerbating envy toward ethnic Chinese economic dominance historically rooted in earlier waves of migration.[127] This immigration surge has intersected with broader anti-Chinese sentiment, including incidents tied to illicit activities; for instance, in October 2025, over 1,000 primarily Chinese nationals fled Myanmar's scam compounds into Thailand following junta raids, prompting concerns over cross-border crime networks and unregulated inflows.[128] Among Thai Chinese communities, tensions arise from cultural and identity divides: newer PRC-oriented migrants often maintain stronger ties to simplified Chinese script and mainland customs, contrasting with the Teochew-influenced, Thai-integrated heritage of established groups, potentially diluting long-term assimilation efforts.[55] Illegal employment practices among some migrants, such as visa overstays and under-the-table hiring in hospitality, have fueled perceptions of unfair competition, leading to calls for stricter visa enforcement amid Thailand's 2025 policy reviews on PRC visa exemptions.[129][125] PRC influence has compounded these dynamics through geoeconomic leverage and soft power initiatives, including Belt and Road projects that have deepened Thailand's infrastructure debt exposure while fostering pro-Beijing networks among overseas Chinese associations. Political deference to Beijing, exemplified by Thailand's February 2025 deportation of over 40 Uyghur refugees despite international human rights concerns, has elicited domestic backlash, with critics arguing it prioritizes PRC relations over sovereignty and fuels resentment toward ethnic Chinese perceived as conduits for external influence.[130][131] Such actions, alongside PRC-backed media and qiaoban (overseas Chinese affairs) outreach in northern border regions, have raised alarms about divided loyalties within Thai Chinese populations, particularly in provincial centers where newer PRC ties challenge traditional Thai nationalist assimilation.[132] Public discourse, including August 2024 protests against alleged Chinese economic encroachment enabled by corrupt officials, reflects growing wariness of PRC soft power eroding Thailand's agency, though empirical data on direct loyalty shifts among Thai Chinese remains limited and contested.[133][15]Notable Figures
Business Magnates
Thai Chinese individuals and families have exerted outsized influence over Thailand's economy, founding and leading many of the country's largest conglomerates in sectors such as agribusiness, beverages, retail, and real estate. Their entrepreneurial success traces back to 19th- and early 20th-century immigrants from southern China, particularly Teochew and Hainanese communities, who began as small-scale traders in seeds, poultry, and consumer goods before scaling into multinational empires through family-run operations emphasizing vertical integration and diversification.[134] This dominance persists, with Thai Chinese controlling an estimated 95% of major businesses in key industries like construction and manufacturing.[135] The Chearavanont brothers—Dhanin, Sumet, Jaran, and Suphachai—head the Charoen Pokphand (CP) Group, Thailand's largest private company by revenue, with combined family wealth of $35.7 billion as of July 2025.[136] Founded in 1921 by their grandfather Chia Ek Chor, a migrant from Guangdong Province who sold vegetable seeds and agricultural supplies in Bangkok's Chinatown, CP evolved into the world's top producer of animal feed, shrimp, and poultry, expanding into retail (e.g., 7-Eleven franchises) and telecommunications.[62][137] Dhanin Chearavanont, the eldest, has steered global diversification, including ventures in China and Vietnam, leveraging the group's supply-chain expertise to achieve annual revenues exceeding $65 billion.[138] The Yoovidhya family, with $44.5 billion in net worth, tops Thailand's richest list through their majority stake in Red Bull GmbH, the energy drink giant co-founded by Chaleo Yoovidhya in 1975.[136] Chaleo, born in 1923 to impoverished Chinese immigrants from central Thailand's rural areas, started with a family duck farm and pharmaceutical sales before inventing Krating Daeng, which became Red Bull after partnering with Austrian Dietrich Mateschitz in 1984.[139] Chalerm Yoovidhya, the eldest son, now oversees the family's 51% ownership, which generated over 10 billion cans sold globally in 2024, funding expansions into banking and hospitality.[140] Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi, worth $10.9 billion, built the TCC Group from a 1977 liquor distribution deal into Thai Beverage Public Company Limited (ThaiBev), Southeast Asia's largest beverage firm by market cap.[136] Born in 1944 in Bangkok's Chinatown to parents from Shantou, China, Charoen began selling ice and beer before acquiring distilleries in the 1980s, producing brands like Chang Beer and Mekhong whiskey; ThaiBev now spans spirits, soft drinks, and food across 90 countries with 2024 revenues of 280 billion baht.[66][141] His empire includes property developments via TCC Assets, reflecting a pattern of Thai Chinese magnates using initial trading capital to consolidate monopolistic positions in regulated industries.[142] Other prominent Thai Chinese-led groups include the Chirathivat family's Central Group, dominating retail with 400+ stores since Tos Chirathivat's 1956 founding as a Chinese immigrant trader, and the Sirivadhanabhakdi extensions into hospitality.[143] These families' intergenerational control, often through cross-holdings and royal connections, has propelled Thailand's GDP growth but highlights concentrated economic power originating from immigrant resilience amid early 20th-century restrictions on land ownership for non-Thais.[4]Political Leaders
![Chuan Leekpai 2010-04-01.jpg][float-right]Chuan Leekpai, a third-generation Thai Chinese of Hokkien descent, served as Prime Minister of Thailand from 1992 to 1995 and again from 1997 to 2001.[144][110] Born in 1938 in Trang Province to parents Niyom and Tuan Leekpai, he rose through the Democrat Party, emphasizing legal reforms and anti-corruption measures during his tenure amid the 1997 Asian financial crisis.[114] His administrations focused on economic stabilization and democratic governance following military rule.[144] The Shinawatra family exemplifies Thai Chinese political prominence, with roots tracing to Teochew migrants from Guangdong Province. Thaksin Shinawatra, born in 1949 in Chiang Mai, served as Prime Minister from 2001 to 2006, implementing populist policies like universal healthcare and rural infrastructure development that boosted his support among lower-income groups but drew criticism for centralizing power and alleged cronyism.[145] His sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, born in 1967, became Prime Minister in 2011, continuing family-oriented welfare programs until her ouster in a 2014 judicial ruling amid protests over amnesty bills.[146] Daughter Paetongtarn Shinawatra, born into this merchant family, held the office from 2024 to 2025, highlighting the dynasty's enduring influence despite coups and exiles.[147][108] ![Yingluck Shinawatra at US Embassy, Bangkok, July 2011.jpg][center]
Other notable figures include Chatichai Choonhavan, of Thai Chinese Teochew descent, who was Prime Minister from 1988 to 1991, shifting foreign policy toward economic diplomacy with former adversaries like Vietnam and Cambodia.[148] Banharn Silpa-archa, whose father hailed from Guangdong's Chiuchow region, led a short-lived coalition government as Prime Minister in 1995–1996, known for patronage networks in Suphan Buri Province.[111][149] Srettha Thavisin, with maternal Chinese ancestry, served as Prime Minister from 2023 to 2024, leveraging his property development background for economic recovery initiatives.[150] Anutin Charnvirakul, from a Thai-Chinese family originating in Guangdong, assumed the premiership in 2025, continuing a pattern where at least six of the last ten prime ministers have had partial Chinese heritage.[116][107] This overrepresentation relative to the Thai Chinese population of approximately 14% underscores their integration into elite networks through business acumen and adaptability to Thai political culture.[107]