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Electoral fraud
Electoral fraud
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Electoral fraud, sometimes referred to as election manipulation, voter fraud, or vote rigging, involves illegal interference with the process of an election, either by increasing the vote share of a favored candidate, depressing the vote share of rival candidates, or both.[1] It differs from but often goes hand-in-hand with voter suppression. What exactly constitutes electoral fraud varies from country to country, though the goal is often election subversion.

Electoral legislation outlaws many kinds of election fraud,[2] but other practices violate general laws, such as those banning assault, harassment or libel. Although technically the term "electoral fraud" covers only those acts which are illegal, the term is sometimes used to describe acts which are legal, but considered morally unacceptable, outside the spirit of an election or in violation of the principles of democracy.[3][4] Show elections, featuring only one candidate, are sometimes classified[by whom?] as electoral fraud, although they may comply with the law and are presented more as referendums/plebiscites.

In national elections, successful electoral fraud on a sufficient scale can have the effect of a coup d'état,[citation needed] protest[5] or corruption of democracy. In a narrow election, a small amount of fraud may suffice to change the result. Even if the outcome is not affected, the revelation of fraud can reduce voters' confidence in democracy.

Law

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Because U.S. states have primary responsibility for conducting elections, including federal elections, many forms of electoral fraud are prosecuted as state crimes. State election offenses include voter impersonation, double voting, ballot stuffing, tampering with voting machines, and fraudulent registration. Penalties vary widely by state and can include fines, imprisonment, loss of voting rights, and disqualification from holding public office.

The U.S. federal government prosecutes electoral crimes including voter intimidation, conspiracy to commit election fraud, bribery, interference with the right to vote, and fraud related to absentee ballots in federal elections.[6]

In France, someone guilty may be fined and/or imprisoned for not more than one year, or two years if the person is a public official.[7][non-primary source needed]

Electorate manipulation

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Electoral fraud can occur in advance of voting if the composition of the electorate is altered. The legality of this type of manipulation varies across jurisdictions. Deliberate manipulation of election outcomes is widely considered a violation of the principles of democracy.[8]

Artificial migration or party membership

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In many cases, it is possible for authorities to artificially control the composition of an electorate in order to produce a foregone result. One way of doing this is to move a large number of voters into the electorate prior to an election, for example by temporarily assigning them land or lodging them in flophouses.[9][10] Many countries prevent this with rules stipulating that a voter must have lived in an electoral district for a minimum period (for example, six months) in order to be eligible to vote there. However, such laws can also be used for demographic manipulation as they tend to disenfranchise those with no fixed address, such as the homeless, travelers, Roma, students (studying full-time away from home), and some casual workers.

Another strategy is to permanently move people into an electoral district, usually through public housing. If people eligible for public housing are likely to vote for a particular party, then they can either be concentrated into one area, thus making their votes count for less, or moved into marginal seats, where they may tip the balance towards their preferred party. One example of this was the 1986–1990 Homes for votes scandal in the City of Westminster in England under Shirley Porter.[11]

Immigration law may also be used to manipulate electoral demography. For instance, Malaysia gave citizenship to immigrants from the neighboring Philippines and Indonesia, together with suffrage, in order for a political party to "dominate" the state of Sabah; this controversial process was known as Project IC.[12] In the United States, there have been allegations of an attempt to alter electoral demography via immigration as part of a far-right Great Replacement Theory conspiracy."[13]

A method of manipulating primary contests and other elections of party leaders are related to this. People who support one party may temporarily join another party (or vote in a crossover way, when permitted) in order to elect a weak candidate for that party's leadership. The goal ultimately is to defeat the weak candidate in the general election by the leader of the party that the voter truly supports. There were claims that this method was being utilised in the UK Labour Party leadership election in 2015, where Conservative-leaning Toby Young encouraged Conservatives to join Labour and vote for Jeremy Corbyn in order to "consign Labour to electoral oblivion".[14][15] Shortly after, #ToriesForCorbyn trended on Twitter.[15]

Disenfranchisement

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The composition of an electorate may also be altered by disenfranchising some classes of people, rendering them unable to vote. In some cases, states had passed provisions that raised general barriers to voter registration, such as poll taxes, literacy and comprehension tests, and record-keeping requirements, which in practice were applied against minority populations to discriminatory effect. From the turn of the century into the late 1960s, most African Americans in the southern states comprising the former Confederacy were disenfranchised by such measures. Corrupt election officials may misuse voting regulations such as a literacy test or requirement for proof of identity or address in such a way as to make it difficult or impossible for their targets to cast a vote. If such practices discriminate against a religious or ethnic group, they may so distort the political process that the political order becomes grossly unrepresentative, as in the post-Reconstruction or Jim Crow era until the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Felons have been disenfranchised in many states as a strategy to prevent African Americans from voting.[16]

Groups may also be disenfranchised by rules which make it impractical or impossible for them to cast a vote. For example, requiring people to vote within their electorate may disenfranchise serving military personnel, prison inmates, students, hospital patients or anyone else who cannot return to their homes. Polling can be set for inconvenient days, such as midweek or on holy days of religious groups: for example on the Sabbath or other holy days of a religious group whose teachings determine that voting is prohibited on such a day. Communities may also be effectively disenfranchised if polling places are situated in areas perceived by voters as unsafe, or are not provided within reasonable proximity (rural communities are especially vulnerable to this).[example needed]

In some cases, voters may be invalidly disenfranchised, which is true electoral fraud. For example, a legitimate voter may be "accidentally" removed from the electoral roll, making it difficult or impossible for the person to vote.[citation needed]

In the Canadian federal election of 1917, during the Great War, the Canadian government, led by the Union Party, passed the Military Voters Act and the Wartime Elections Act. The Military Voters Act permitted any active military personnel to vote by party only and allowed that party to decide in which electoral district to place that vote. It also enfranchised those women who were directly related or married to an active soldier. These groups were believed to be disproportionately in favor of the Union government, as that party was campaigning in favor of conscription.[citation needed] The Wartime Elections Act, conversely, disenfranchised particular ethnic groups assumed to be disproportionately in favour of the opposition Liberal Party.[citation needed]

Division of opposition support

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Stanford University professor Beatriz Magaloni described a model governing the behaviour of autocratic regimes. She proposed that ruling parties can maintain political control under a democratic system without actively manipulating votes or coercing the electorate. Under the right conditions, the democratic system is maneuvered into an equilibrium in which divided opposition parties act as unwitting accomplices to single-party rule. This permits the ruling regime to abstain from illegal electoral fraud.[17]

Preferential voting systems such as score voting and single transferable vote, and in some cases, instant-runoff voting, can reduce the impact of systemic electoral manipulation and political duopoly.[18][19]

Intimidation

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Voter intimidation involves putting undue pressure on a voter or group of voters so that they will vote a particular way, or not at all.[20] Absentee and other remote voting can be more open to some forms of intimidation as the voter does not have the protection and privacy of the polling location. Intimidation can take a range of forms including verbal, physical, or coercion. This was so common that in 1887, a Kansas Supreme Court in New Perspectives on Election Fraud in The Gilded Age said "[...] physical retaliation constituted only a slight disturbance and would not vitiate an election."

Violence or threats of violence

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In its simplest form, voters from a particular demographic or known to support a particular party or candidate are directly threatened by supporters of another party or candidate or by those hired by them. In other cases, supporters of a particular party make it known that if a particular village or neighborhood is found to have voted the 'wrong' way, reprisals will be made against that community. Another method is to make a general threat of violence, for example, a bomb threat which has the effect of closing a particular polling place, thus making it difficult for people in that area to vote.[21] One notable example of outright violence was the 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror attack, where followers of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh deliberately contaminated salad bars in The Dalles, Oregon, in an attempt to weaken political opposition during county elections. Historically, this tactic included Lynching in the United States to terrorize potential African American voters in some areas.[citation needed]

Polling places in an area known to support a particular party or candidate may be targeted for vandalism, destruction or threats, thus making it difficult or impossible for people in that area to vote.[citation needed]

[edit]

In this case, voters will be made to believe, accurately or otherwise, that they are not legally entitled to vote, or that they are legally obliged to vote a particular way. Voters who are not confident about their entitlement to vote may also be intimidated by real or implied authority figures who suggest that those who vote when they are not entitled to will be imprisoned, deported or otherwise punished.[22][23]

For example, in 2004, in Wisconsin and elsewhere voters allegedly received flyers that said, "If you already voted in any election this year, you can't vote in the Presidential Election", implying that those who had voted in earlier primary elections were ineligible to vote. Also, "If anybody in your family has ever been found guilty of anything you can't vote in the Presidential Election." Finally, "If you violate any of these laws, you can get 10 years in prison and your children will be taken away from you."[24][25]

Coercion

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Employers can coerce the voters' decision, through strategies such as explicit or implicit threats of job loss.[26]

Disinformation

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People may distribute false or misleading information in order to affect the outcome of an election.[3] For example, in the Chilean presidential election of 1970, the U.S. government's Central Intelligence Agency used "black propaganda"—materials purporting to be from various political parties—to sow discord between members of a coalition between socialists and communists.[27]

Another method, allegedly used in Cook County, Illinois, in 2004, is to falsely tell particular people that they are not eligible to vote[23] In 1981 in New Jersey, the Republican National Committee created the Ballot Security Task Force to discourage voting among Latino and African-American citizens of New Jersey. The task force identified voters from an old registration list and challenged their credentials. It also paid off-duty police officers to patrol polling sites in Newark and Trenton, and posted signs saying that falsifying a ballot is a crime.[28]

Another use of disinformation is to give voters incorrect information about the time or place of polling, thus causing them to miss their chance to vote. As part of the 2011 Canadian federal election voter suppression scandal, Elections Canada traced fraudulent phone calls, telling voters that their polling stations had been moved, to a telecommunications company that worked with the Conservative Party.[29]

Similarly in the United States, right-wing political operatives Jacob Wohl and Jack Burkman were indicted on several counts of bribery and election fraud in October 2020 regarding a voter disinformation scheme they undertook in the months prior to the 2020 United States presidential election.[30] The pair hired a firm to make nearly 85,000 robocalls that targeted minority neighborhoods in Pennsylvania, Ohio, New York, Michigan, and Illinois. Like Democratic constituencies in general that year, minorities voted overwhelmingly by absentee ballot, many judging it a safer option during the COVID-19 pandemic than in-person voting.[31] Baselessly, the call warned potential voters if they submitted their votes by mail that authorities could use their personal information against them, including threats of police arrest for outstanding warrants and forced debt collection by creditors.[32]

On October 24, 2022, Wohl and Burkman pleaded guilty in Cuyahoga County, Ohio Common Pleas Court to one count each of felony telecommunications fraud.[33] Commenting on the tactic of using disinformation to suppress voter turnout, Cuyahoga County Prosecutor Michael C. O'Malley said the two men had "infringed upon the right to vote", and that "by pleading guilty, they were held accountable for their un-American actions."[34]

False claims of fraud

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To sow election doubt, Donald Trump escalated use of "rigged election" and "election interference" statements in advance of the 2016, 2020 and 2024 elections.[35]

False claims of electoral fraud can be used as a basis for attempting to overturn an election. During and after the 2020 presidential election, incumbent President Donald Trump made numerous allegations of electoral fraud by supporters of Democratic candidate Joe Biden. The Trump campaign lost numerous legal challenges to the results.[36][37][38][39] President of Brazil Jair Bolsonaro also made numerous claims of electoral fraud without evidence during and after the 2022 Brazilian presidential election.[40]

Dead people voting

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Dead people voting refers to instances where ballots are fraudulently cast in the name of deceased individuals. While concerns about this type of electoral fraud often arise, studies suggest that such cases are extremely rare. In many democratic systems, safeguards exist to prevent this, such as regularly updating voter rolls and requiring identification at polling stations. However, in some cases, fraudulent actors may exploit outdated records or use the identification of deceased individuals to attempt illegal voting.[41]

In Indonesia, dead people voting occurred during the 2020 local elections[41] and the 2024 general election.[42] There have been similar incidents reported in smaller regional elections.[43]

Voting in multiple countries

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Elections which allow non-citizen suffrage or multiple citizenship can violate the one person, one vote principle if one person votes in multiple countries.[44] The European Union has implemented safeguards against one person voting in more than one country through electoral roll information exchange.[45]

Vote buying

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Vote buying occurs when a political party or candidate seeks to buy the vote of a voter in an upcoming election. Vote buying can take various forms such as a monetary exchange, as well as an exchange for necessary goods or services.[46]

Voting process and results

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A list of threats to voting systems, or electoral fraud methods considered as sabotage are kept by the National Institute of Standards and Technology.[47]

Misleading or confusing ballot papers

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Ballot papers may be used to discourage votes for a particular party or candidate, using the design or other features which confuse voters into voting for a different candidate. For example, in the 2000 U.S. presidential election, Florida's butterfly ballot paper was criticized as poorly designed, leading some voters to vote for the wrong candidate. While the ballot itself was designed by a Democrat, it was the Democratic candidate, Al Gore, who was most harmed by voter errors because of this design.[48] Poor or misleading design is usually not illegal and therefore not technically election fraud, but it can nevertheless subvert the principles of democracy.[citation needed]

Sweden has a system with separate ballots used for each party, to reduce confusion among candidates. However, ballots from small parties such as Piratpartiet, Junilistan and Feministiskt initiativ have been omitted or placed on a separate table in the election to the EU parliament in 2009.[49] Ballots from Sweden Democrats have been mixed with ballots from the larger Swedish Social Democratic Party, which used a very similar font for the party name written on the top of the ballot.[citation needed]

Another method of confusing people into voting for a different candidate from the one intended is to run candidates or create political parties with similar names or symbols to an existing candidate or party. The goal is to mislead voters into voting for the false candidate or party.[50] Such tactics may be particularly effective when many voters have limited literacy in the language used on the ballot. Again, such tactics are usually not illegal but they often work against the principles of democracy.[citation needed]

Another possible source of electoral confusion is multiple variations of voting by different electoral systems. This may cause ballots to be counted as invalid if the wrong system is used. For instance, if a voter puts a first-past-the-post cross in a numbered single transferable vote ballot paper, it is invalidated. For example, in Scotland and other parts of the United Kingdom, up to three different voting systems and types of ballots may be used, based on the jurisdictional level of the election. Local elections are determined by single transferable votes; Scottish parliamentary elections by the additional member system; and UK Parliamentary elections by first-past-the-post.[citation needed]

Ballot stuffing

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Transparent ballot box used in Ukraine to prevent election officials from pre-stuffing the box with fake ballots
A specialised ballot box used to assist ballot stuffing, featured in Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper in 1856

Ballot stuffing, or "ballot-box stuffing", is the illegal practice of one person submitting multiple ballots during a vote in which only one ballot per person is permitted.

Misrecording of votes

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Votes may be misrecorded at source, on a ballot paper or voting machine, or later in misrecording totals. The 2019 Malawian general election was nullified by the Constitutional Court in 2020 because many results were changed by use of correction fluid, as well as duplicate, unverified and unsigned results forms.[62][63] California allows correction fluid and tape, so changes can be made after the ballot leaves the voter.[64]

Where votes are recorded through electronic or mechanical means, the voting machinery may be altered so that a vote intended for one candidate is recorded for another, or electronic results are duplicated or lost, and there is rarely evidence whether the cause was fraud or error.[65][66][67]

Many elections feature multiple opportunities for unscrupulous officials or 'helpers' to record an elector's vote differently from their intentions. Voters who require assistance to cast their votes are particularly vulnerable to having their votes stolen in this way. For example, a blind or illiterate person may be told that they have voted for one party when in fact they have been led to vote for another.[citation needed]

Misuse of proxy votes

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Proxy voting is particularly vulnerable to election fraud, due to the amount of trust placed in the person who casts the vote. In several countries, there have been allegations of retirement home residents being asked to fill out 'absentee voter' forms. When the forms are signed and gathered, they are secretly rewritten as applications for proxy votes, naming party activists or their friends and relatives as the proxies. These people, unknown to the voter, cast the vote for the party of their choice. In the United Kingdom, this is known as 'granny farming.'[68]

Destruction of ballots

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One of methods of electoral fraud is to destroy ballots for an opposing candidate or party.

While mass destruction of ballots can be difficult to achieve without drawing attention to it, in a very close election it may be possible to destroy a small number of ballot papers without detection, thereby changing the overall result. Blatant destruction of ballot papers can render an election invalid and force it to be re-run. If a party can improve its vote on the re-run election, it can benefit from such destruction as long as it is not linked to it.[citation needed]

During the Bourbon Restoration in late 19th century Spain, the organized "loss" of voting slips (pucherazo) was used to maintain the agreed alternation between the Liberals and the Conservatives. This system of local political domination, especially rooted in rural areas and small cities, was known as caciquismo.[citation needed]

Invalidation of ballots

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Another method is to make it appear that the voter has spoiled his or her ballot, thus rendering it invalid. Typically this would be done by adding another mark to the paper, making it appear that the voter has voted for more candidates than entitled, for instance. It would be difficult to do this to a large number of paper ballots without detection in some locales, but altogether too simple in others, especially jurisdictions where legitimate ballot spoiling by voter would serve a clear and reasonable aim: for example emulating protest votes in jurisdictions that have recently had and since abolished a "none of the above" or "against all" voting option; civil disobedience where voting is mandatory; and attempts at discrediting or invalidating an election. An unusually large share of invalidated ballots may be attributed to loyal supporters of candidates that lost in primaries or previous rounds, did not run or did not qualify to do so, or some manner of protest movement or organized boycott.[citation needed]

In 2016, during the EU membership referendum, Leave-supporting voters in the UK alleged without evidence that the pencils supplied by voting stations would allow votes to be erased from the ballot.[69][70]

Tampering with electronic voting systems

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General tampering

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All voting systems face threats of some form of electoral fraud. The types of threats that affect voting machines vary.[71] Research at Argonne National Laboratories revealed that a single individual with physical access to a machine, such as a Diebold Accuvote TS, can install inexpensive, readily available electronic components to manipulate its functions.[72][73]

Other approaches include:

  • Tampering with the software of a voting machine to add malicious code that alters vote totals or favors a candidate in any way.
    • Multiple groups have demonstrated this possibility[74][75][76]
    • Private companies manufacture these machines. Many companies will not allow public access or review of the machines' source code, claiming fear of exposing trade secrets[77]
  • Tampering with the hardware of the voting machine to alter vote totals or favor any candidate.[75][citation needed]
    • Some of these machines require a smart card to activate the machine and vote. However, a fraudulent smart card could attempt to gain access to voting multiple times[78] or be pre-loaded with negative votes to favor one candidate over another, as has been demonstrated
  • Abusing the administrative access to the machine by election officials might also allow individuals to vote multiple times[citation needed]
  • Election results that are sent directly over the internet from the polling place centre to the vote-counting authority can be vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack, where they are diverted to an intermediate website where the man in the middle flips the votes in favour of a certain candidate and then immediately forwards them on to the vote-counting authority. All votes sent over the internet violate the chain of custody and hence should be avoided by driving or flying memory cards in locked metal containers to the vote-counters. For purposes of getting quick preliminary total results on election night, encrypted votes can be sent over the internet, but final official results should be tabulated the next day only after the actual memory cards arrive in secure metal containers and are counted[79]

South Africa

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In 1994, the election which brought majority rule and put Nelson Mandela in office, South Africa's election compilation system was hacked, so they re-tabulated by hand.[80][81][82]

Ukraine

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In 2014, Ukraine's central election system was hacked. Officials found and removed a virus and said the totals were correct.[83]

Voter impersonation

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United Kingdom

[edit]

Academic research has generally found voter impersonation to be 'exceptionally rare' in the UK.[84] The Conservative government passed the Elections Act 2022, which mandated photo identification.[85][86]

United States

[edit]

Voter impersonation is considered extremely rare in the US by experts.[87] Since 2013, several states have passed voter ID laws to counter voter impersonation. Voter ID requirements are generally popular among Americans [88][89] and proponents have argued that it can be difficult to detect voter impersonation without them.[90][91][92] Voter ID laws' effectiveness given the rarity of voter impersonation, and their potential to disenfranchise citizens without the right ID have created controversy. By August 2016, four federal court rulings (Texas, North Carolina, Wisconsin, and North Dakota) overturned laws or parts of such laws because they placed undue burdens on minorities.[93]

Allegations of widespread voter impersonation often turn out to be false.[94] The North Carolina Board of Elections reported in 2017 that out of 4,769,640 votes cast in the November 2016 election in North Carolina, only one illegal vote would potentially have been blocked by the voter ID law. The investigation found fewer than 500 incidences of invalid ballots cast, the vast majority of which were cast by individuals on probation for felony who were likely not aware that this status disqualified them from voting, and the total number of invalid votes was far too small to have affected the outcome of any race in North Carolina in the 2016 election.[95][96]

Artificial results

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In particularly corrupt regimes, the voting process may be nothing more than a sham, to the point that officials simply announce whatever results they want, sometimes without even bothering to count the votes. While such practices tend to draw international condemnation, voters typically have little if any recourse, as there would seldom be any ways to remove the fraudulent winner from power, short of a revolution.[citation needed]

In Turkmenistan, incumbent President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov received 97.69% of votes in the 2017 election, with his sole opponent, who was seen as pro-government, in fact being appointed by Berdymukhamedov. In Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili received 96.2% of votes in the election following the Rose Revolution while his ally Nino Burjanadze was an interim head of state.[citation needed]

Postal ballot fraud

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In both the United Kingdom and the United States, experts estimate that voting fraud by mail has affected only a few local elections, without likely any impact at the national level.[97][98][99][100] In April 2020, a 20-year voter fraud study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology found the level of mail-in ballot fraud "exceedingly rare" in the United States, occurring only in "0.00006 percent" of instances nationally, and, with Oregon's mail-in-ballots, "0.000004 percent—about five times less likely than getting hit by lightning".[101]

Types of fraud have included pressure on voters from family or others, since the ballot is not always cast in secret;[99][102][103] collection of ballots by dishonest collectors who mark votes or fail to deliver ballots;[104][105] and insiders changing, challenging or destroying ballots after they arrive.[106][107]

A measure championed as a way to prevent some types of mail-in fraud has been to require the voter's signature on the outer envelope, which is compared to one or more signatures on file before taking the ballot out of the envelope and counting it.[99][108] Not all places have standards for signature review,[109] and there have been calls to update signatures more often to improve this review.[99][108] While any level of strictness involves rejecting some valid votes and accepting some invalid votes,[110] there have been concerns that signatures are improperly rejected from young and minority voters at higher rates than others, with no or limited ability of voters to appeal the rejection.[111][112]

Some problems have inherently limited scope, such as family pressure, while others can affect several percent of the vote, such as dishonest collectors[99] and overly strict signature verification.[111]

Non-citizen voting

[edit]

Canada

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In 2019, Elections Canada identified 103,000 non-citizens who were illegally on Canada's federal voters register.[113] It subsequently identified roughly 3,500 cases of potential non-citizens who voted in 2019, but noted that it was not a coordinated effort and did not affect the result in any riding.[114] "But almost a year after Canadians headed to the polls, the agency says it's still trying to determine how many of those cases — if any — involved non-Canadian citizens casting ballots."[114][needs update]

United States

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Illegal non-citizen voting is considered extremely rare in the United States by most experts due to the severe penalties associated with the practice including deportation, incarceration or fines in addition to jeopardizing their attempt to naturalize.[115][116][117][118] The federal form to register a voter does not require proof of citizenship,[115] though non-citizens have been found to vote only in very small numbers.[119][120][further explanation needed]

In legislature

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Vote fraud can also take place in legislatures. Some of the forms used in national elections can also be used in parliaments, particularly intimidation and vote-buying. Because of the much smaller number of voters, however, election fraud in legislatures is qualitatively different in many ways. Fewer people are needed to 'swing' the election, and therefore specific people can be targeted in ways impractical on a larger scale. For example, Adolf Hitler achieved his dictatorial powers due to the Enabling Act of 1933. He attempted to achieve the necessary two-thirds majority to pass the Act by arresting members of the opposition, though this turned out to be unnecessary to attain the needed majority. Later, the Reichstag was packed with Nazi party members who voted for the Act's renewal.[citation needed]

In many legislatures, voting is public, in contrast to the secret ballot used in most modern public elections. This may make their elections more vulnerable to some forms of fraud since a politician can be pressured by others who will know how the legislator voted. However, it may also protect against bribery and blackmail, since the public and media will be aware if a politician votes in an unexpected way. Since voters and parties are entitled to pressure politicians to vote a particular way, the line between legitimate and fraudulent pressure is not always clear.[citation needed]

As in public elections, proxy votes are particularly prone to fraud. In some systems, parties may vote on behalf of any member who is not present in parliament. This protects those members from missing out on voting if prevented from attending parliament, but it also allows their party to prevent them from voting against its wishes. In some legislatures, proxy voting is not allowed, but politicians may rig voting buttons or otherwise illegally cast "ghost votes" while absent.[121]

Detection and prevention

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The three main strategies for the prevention of electoral fraud in society are:

  1. Auditing the election process
  2. Deterrence through consistent and effective prosecution
  3. Cultivation of mores that discourage corruption

Some of the main fraud prevention tactics can be summarised as secrecy and openness. The secret ballot prevents many kinds of intimidation and vote selling, while transparency at all other levels of the electoral process prevents and allows detection of most interference.

Electoral fraud is generally considered difficult to prove, as perpetrators are highly motivated to conceal their acts.[122][123] Researchers must often rely on inferential methods to uncover unusual patterns that could indicate election fraud, as fraud often cannot be observed directly.[124]

Election audits

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Election auditing refers to any review conducted after polls close for the purpose of determining whether the votes were counted accurately (a results audit) or whether proper procedures were followed (a process audit), or both.[citation needed]

Audits vary and can include checking that the number of voters signed in at the polls matches the number of ballots, seals on ballot boxes and storage rooms are intact, computer counts (if used) match hand counts, and counts are accurately totaled.[citation needed]

Election recounts are a specific type of audit, with elements of both results and process audits.[citation needed]

Prosecution

[edit]

In the United States the goal of prosecutions is not to stop fraud or keep fraudulent winners out of office; it is to deter and punish years later. The Justice Department has published Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses in eight editions from 1976 to 2017, under Presidents Ford, Carter, Reagan, Clinton, Bush and Trump. It says, "Department does not have authority to directly intercede in the election process itself. ... overt criminal investigative measures should not ordinarily be taken ... until the election in question has been concluded, its results certified, and all recounts and election contests concluded."[125][126] Sentencing guidelines provide a range of 0–21 months in prison for a first offender;[127] offense levels range from 8 to 14.[128] Investigation, prosecution and appeals can take over 10 years.[129]

In the Philippines, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was arrested in 2011 following the filing of criminal charges against her for electoral sabotage, in connection with the 2007 Philippine general election. She was accused of conspiring with election officials to ensure the victory of her party's senatorial slate in the province of Maguindanao, through the tampering of election returns.[130]

Secret ballot

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The secret ballot, in which only the voter knows how they have voted, is believed by many to be a crucial part of ensuring free and fair elections through preventing voter intimidation or retribution.[131] Others argue that the secret ballot enables election fraud (because it makes it harder to verify that votes have been counted correctly)[132][133] and that it discourages voter participation.[134][failed verification] Although the secret ballot was sometimes practiced in ancient Greece and was a part of the Constitution of the Year III of 1795, it only became common in the nineteenth century. Secret balloting appears to have been first implemented in the former British colony—now an Australian state—of Tasmania on 7 February 1856. By the turn of the century, the practice had spread to most Western democracies.[citation needed]

In the United States, the popularity of the Australian ballot grew as reformers in the late 19th century sought to reduce the problems of election fraud. Groups such as the Greenbackers, Nationalist, and more fought for those who yearned to vote, but were exiled for their safety. George Walthew, Greenback, helped initiate one of the first secret ballots in America in Michigan in 1885. Even George Walthew had a predecessor in John Seitz, Greenback, who campaigned a bill to "preserve the purity of elections" in 1879 after the discovery of Ohio's electoral fraud in congressional elections.[citation needed]

The efforts of many helped accomplish this and led to the spread of other secret ballots all across the country. As mentioned on February 18, 1890, in the Galveston News "The Australian ballot has come to stay. It protects the independence of the voter and largely puts a stop to vote to buy." Before this, it was common for candidates to intimidate or bribe voters, as they would always know who had voted which way.[citation needed]

Transparency

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Most methods of preventing electoral fraud involve making the election process completely transparent to all voters, from nomination of candidates through casting of the votes and tabulation.[135][non-primary source needed] A key feature in ensuring the integrity of any part of the electoral process is a strict chain of custody.[citation needed]

To prevent fraud in central tabulation, there has to be a public list of the results from every single polling place. This is the only way for voters to prove that the results they witnessed in their election office are correctly incorporated into the totals.[citation needed]

End-to-end auditable voting systems provide voters with a receipt to allow them to verify their vote was cast correctly, and an audit mechanism to verify that the results were tabulated correctly and all votes were cast by valid voters. However, the ballot receipt does not permit voters to prove to others how they voted, since this would open the door towards forced voting and blackmail. End-to-end systems include Punchscan and Scantegrity, the latter being an add-on to optical scan systems instead of a replacement.[citation needed]

In many cases, election observers are used to help prevent fraud and assure voters that the election is fair. International observers (bilateral and multilateral) may be invited to observe the elections (examples include election observation by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), European Union election observation missions, observation missions of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as well as international observation organised by NGOs, such as CIS-EMO, European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO), etc.). Some countries also invite foreign observers (i.e. bi-lateral observation, as opposed to multi-lateral observation by international observers).[citation needed]

In addition, national legislatures of countries often permit domestic observation. Domestic election observers can be either partisan (i.e. representing interests of one or a group of election contestants) or non-partisan (usually done by civil society groups). Legislations of different countries permit various forms and extents of international and domestic election observation.[citation needed]

Election observation is also prescribed by various international legal instruments. For example, paragraph 8 of the 1990 Copenhagen Document states that "The [OSCE] participating States consider that the presence of observers, both foreign and domestic, can enhance the electoral process for States in which elections are taking place. They, therefore, invite observers from any other CSCE participating States and any appropriate private institutions and organisations who may wish to do so to observe the course of their national election proceedings, to the extent permitted by law. They will also endeavour to facilitate similar access for election proceedings held below the national level. Such observers will undertake not to interfere in the electoral proceedings".[citation needed]

Critics note that observers cannot spot certain types of election fraud like targeted voter suppression or manipulated software of voting machines.[citation needed]

Statistical indicators and election forensics

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Various forms of statistics can be indicators of election fraud—e.g., exit polls which diverge from the final results. Well-conducted exit polls serve as a deterrent to electoral fraud. However, exit polls are still notoriously imprecise. For instance, in the Czech Republic, some voters are afraid or ashamed to admit that they voted for the Communist Party (exit polls in 2002 gave the Communist party 2–3 percentage points less than the actual result). Variations in willingness to participate in an exit poll may result in an unrepresentative sample compared to the overall voting population.[citation needed]

When elections are marred by ballot-box stuffing (e.g., the Armenian presidential elections of 1996 and 1998), the affected polling stations will show abnormally high voter turnouts with results favouring a single candidate. By graphing the number of votes against turnout percentage (i.e., aggregating polling stations results within a given turnout range), the divergence from bell-curve distribution gives an indication of the extent of the fraud. Stuffing votes in favour of a single candidate affects votes vs. turnout distributions for that candidate and other candidates differently; this difference could be used to quantitatively assess the number of votes stuffed. Also, these distributions sometimes exhibit spikes at round-number turnout percentage values.[136][137][138] High numbers of invalid ballots, overvoting or undervoting are other potential indicators. Risk-limiting audits are methods to assess the validity of an election result statistically without the effort of a full election recount.

Though election forensics can determine if election results are anomalous, the statistical results still need to be interpreted. Alan Hicken and Walter R. Mebane describe the results of election forensic analyses as not providing "definitive proof" of fraud. Election forensics can be combined with other fraud detection and prevention strategies, such as in-person monitoring.[139]

Voting machine integrity

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One method for verifying voting machine accuracy is 'parallel testing', the process of using an independent set of results compared to the original machine results. Parallel testing can be done prior to or during an election. During an election, one form of parallel testing is the voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) or verified paper record (VPR). A VVPAT is intended as an independent verification system for voting machines designed to allow voters to verify that their vote was cast correctly, to detect possible election fraud or malfunction, and to provide a means to audit the stored electronic results. This method is only effective if statistically significant numbers of voters verify that their intended vote matches both the electronic and paper votes.[citation needed]

On election day, a statistically significant number of voting machines can be randomly selected from polling locations and used for testing. This can be used to detect potential fraud or malfunction unless manipulated software would only start to cheat after a certain event like a voter pressing a special key combination (Or a machine might cheat only if someone does not perform the combination, which requires more insider access but fewer voters).[citation needed]

Another form of testing is 'Logic & Accuracy Testing (L&A)', pre-election testing of voting machines using test votes to determine if they are functioning correctly.[citation needed]

Open source

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Another method to ensure the integrity of electronic voting machines is independent software verification and certification.[135] Once a software is certified, code signing can ensure the software certified is identical to that which is used on election day. Some argue certification would be more effective if voting machine software was publicly available or open source.[140][141] VotingWorks has created an open-source voting system in the United States.[142]

Certification and testing processes conducted publicly and with oversight from interested parties can promote transparency in the election process. The integrity of those conducting testing can be questioned.[citation needed]

Testing and certification can prevent voting machines from being a black box where voters cannot be sure that counting inside is done as intended.[135]

One method that people have argued would help prevent these machines from being tampered with would be for the companies that produce the machines to share the source code, which displays and captures the ballots, with computer scientists. This would allow external sources to make sure that the machines are working correctly.[77]

See also

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Further reading

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia

Electoral fraud consists of intentional illegal interference in the electoral process designed to alter election outcomes through deceptive practices such as manipulating voter registration, casting unauthorized ballots, or tampering with vote counts.
Common forms include impersonation at polling places, where individuals vote under another's identity; fraudulent use of absentee or mail-in ballots, often involving coercion or forgery; ineligible voting by non-citizens or deceased persons; and ballot stuffing, which entails inserting multiple or fake ballots into collection boxes.
Although comprehensive empirical analyses conclude that proven instances of voter fraud in U.S. elections are infrequent and insufficient to determine results—typically comprising less than 0.0001% of votes cast—databases compiling judicial convictions and official findings document hundreds of cases spanning decades, underscoring persistent vulnerabilities in systems reliant on expanded access like universal mail voting.
These irregularities erode public confidence in democratic institutions when undetected or unprosecuted, with historical examples from local races overturned due to stuffing or registration fraud highlighting the causal link between lax safeguards and exploitation opportunities.

Core Definitions and Typology

Electoral fraud refers to intentional and illegal interference in the electoral process designed to prevent or alter the expression of voter will, encompassing actions by individuals, officials, or organized groups that undermine . Such interference includes voter-level deceptions like casting fraudulent as well as systemic manipulations like tampering with vote counts or registration rolls, with federal U.S. classifying related crimes under categories such as voter and fraud. Unlike accidental errors or benign irregularities, electoral fraud requires demonstrable intent to deceive, often proven through patterns of false documentation, witness , or forensic analysis of . Typologies of electoral fraud typically divide methods by stage or mechanism, though overlaps exist; pre-election fraud targets voter rolls and eligibility, election-day fraud focuses on casting or counting votes, and post-election fraud involves result . Voter fraud subtypes include impersonation, where individuals vote under another's identity, often at polling places without ID verification; ineligible voting by non-citizens, felons, or deceased persons; and duplicate voting across jurisdictions. Absentee and mail-in fraud constitutes a significant category, involving forged signatures, coerced completions, or harvesting by third parties, with documented cases exceeding 1,500 prosecutions in U.S. databases since 1982. Broader electoral manipulations extend beyond individual voters to institutional acts, such as ballot stuffing—physically adding unmarked or pre-marked ballots to boxes—or altering electronic tallies through unauthorized access to voting machines. and schemes coerce participation, while false registrations inflate rolls with fictitious names to enable later fraudulent casting. These typologies are substantiated by empirical tracking from organizations compiling court-convicted cases, revealing fraud's in weakly secured systems despite claims of rarity in some academic analyses that rely on self-reported data prone to under-detection. Legal standards for electoral fraud encompass definitions of prohibited acts, evidentiary thresholds for prosecution, and prescribed penalties, which exhibit substantial variation across jurisdictions due to differences in electoral administration, cultural norms, and institutional capacities. Core elements such as impersonation, multiple voting, and alteration are criminalized globally, yet the of these definitions—ranging from narrow intent-based requirements to broader inclusions of procedural manipulations—differs markedly. Penalties similarly range from civil fines for minor irregularities to lengthy incarcerations for systemic schemes, with rigor influenced by centralized versus decentralized systems. In the United States, under 52 U.S.C. § 20511 criminalizes knowing submission of voter registrations, punishable by up to five years' and fines. State-level statutes uniformly treat intentional voter as a , but penalties diverge: for instance, wrongful voting in incurs civil penalties up to $5,000, while imposes fines of $300–$500 and one to two years' for unqualified or duplicate voting. Prosecutions often hinge on proving specific intent, contributing to low conviction rates despite documented cases, as decentralized state oversight complicates uniform application. The United Kingdom's Representation of the People Act 1983 specifies offenses like personation (impersonating a voter), carrying maximum penalties of two years' or an unlimited fine, and or , limited to one year's custody. Courts apply these harshly to safeguard electoral trust, with sentences reflecting the offense's gravity against democratic foundations, though postal vote has prompted targeted reforms amid isolated prosecutions. In , § 107a of the Criminal Code proscribes electoral as deceptive interference in voting outcomes, subject to fines or as a alternative offense undermining public will-formation. similarly penalizes under electoral codes, with provisions for up to five years' and €75,000 fines for organized manipulation, though emphasis lies on post-election audits rather than preemptive identity verification. Preventive legal standards further diverge: approximately 75% of countries worldwide mandate for in-person voting to mitigate impersonation risks, a measure adopted in nearly all established democracies outside the U.S. due to historical fraud precedents. In contrast, 15 U.S. states as of 2021 require no identification beyond verbal affirmation, elevating reliance on post-hoc penalties over upfront barriers. Widespread mail-in voting, permitted in the U.S. but restricted or banned in most nations absent overseas exceptions, underscores varying tolerances for fraud-vulnerable methods, as empirical concerns over and have driven global prohibitions. In new democracies and developing contexts, statutory definitions mirror Western models—criminalizing vote-buying and tampering—but penalties often prove ineffectual due to corrupt judiciaries or resource constraints, effectively lowering standards despite formal equivalence. International bodies like the OSCE advocate harmonized principles emphasizing verifiable integrity, yet non-binding guidelines yield persistent disparities in implementation.

Distinction from Irregularities and Errors

Electoral fraud requires deliberate intent to unlawfully alter outcomes through clandestine, illegal actions that violate electoral laws and are concealed from public scrutiny, such as ballot stuffing or systematic vote suppression benefiting a specific or candidate. This distinguishes it from mere irregularities, which encompass procedural deviations—like delayed openings or inconsistent handling—that may disrupt processes without aiming to manipulate results and are not always unlawful. Errors, in contrast, arise from unintentional human or mechanical mistakes, such as miscounts due to faulty equipment calibration or clerical oversights in tallying, lacking any purposeful . Legally, fraud demands proof of (guilty intent), leading to criminal penalties, whereas irregularities and errors typically trigger administrative remedies like recounts or audits without presuming malfeasance. For instance, in the 2019 , tallying discrepancies correlated with the administrative complexity of result sheets rather than systematic bias toward the incumbent, indicating over ; investigators assessed patterns of beneficiary advantage and procedural demands to differentiate the two. Such forensic methods—examining whether anomalies randomly distribute or disproportionately favor one side—underscore that isolated irregularities or errors rarely suffice to overturn results absent evidence of coordinated , though cumulative procedural lapses can erode public confidence if unaddressed. Conflating fraud with non-intentional issues risks undermining , as unsubstantiated allegations may dismiss verifiable errors needing correction, while premature labeling of patterns as mere irregularities can obscure deliberate manipulation; rigorous post-election audits, incorporating statistical analysis of vote distributions and chain-of-custody logs, are essential for accurate classification. In jurisdictions like the , federal statutes such as 52 U.S.C. § 10307(c) criminalize knowing in voting processes, reserving civil responses for inadvertent errors confirmed through bipartisan verification.

Historical Overview

Pre-Modern Instances

In ancient , , including that could influence electoral outcomes and public votes, was addressed through frequent trials; between approximately 430 and 322 BCE, 6–10% of major public officials faced charges of , with around 50% resulting in convictions. Punishments typically involved property confiscation and permanent loss of civic rights for the offender and their descendants, reflecting a societal recognition of 's threat to democratic processes. To mitigate such risks in office selection, largely relied on rather than competitive elections for many magistracies, though assembly votes and procedures remained vulnerable to influence peddling. During the , electoral fraud manifested primarily as ambitus, the systematic of voters in assemblies like the comitia centuriata for consular and other magistracies, often involving cash payments, promises of patronage, or organized gangs. A notable instance occurred in 70 BCE, when opponents deployed extensive bribery to challenge Marcus Tullius Cicero's candidacy for , highlighting how such practices undermined merit-based competition. Indirect methods, such as hosting lavish public banquets or gladiatorial games to sway voters, were common until prohibited by the Lex Tullia in 67 BCE. Republican authorities responded with escalating anti-corruption measures, starting with the Lex Cornelia Baebia in 181 BCE, which disqualified bribery convicts from holding office for 10 years. Subsequent laws, including the Lex Acilia Calpurnia in 67 BCE for lifetime bans and the Lex Licinia in 55 BCE targeting bribery syndicates (sodalitates), imposed harsher penalties like exile and property seizure, yet enforcement faltered amid widespread elite complicity and financial incentives. By the late , ambitus contributed to political instability, as candidates borrowed vast sums for bribes, exacerbating debt crises and paving the way for civil conflicts like the one from 49–45 BCE. In medieval , electoral processes were rarer and more restricted, often confined to elite selections such as papal or imperial elections, where —the buying of ecclesiastical votes—prevailed as a form of . For instance, during the 11th-century , accusations of vote-buying and coercion marred papal conclaves, prompting reforms like the 1059 decree by to limit electors and curb imperial influence, though manipulation persisted through factional alliances. Holy Roman elections among princes similarly involved and strategic voting blocs, as analyzed in medieval procedural texts aimed at minimizing via complex balloting. These instances underscore how limited franchises amplified the impact of elite corruption in pre-modern settings.

19th and Early 20th Centuries

Electoral fraud proliferated in 19th-century elections due to the absence of secret ballots and reliance on party-printed tickets, enabling practices such as , repeat voting, and ballot stuffing. Political machines, notably in , systematized corruption by importing voters, falsifying registrations, and coercing support through patronage and intimidation under figures like William M. "Boss" Tweed, who amassed illicit gains exceeding $200 million by 1871. In the 1844 presidential election, 's reported turnout of 55,000 votes surpassed the 41,000 registered eligible voters, signaling widespread multiple voting and fraudulent tallies. Such irregularities prompted innovations like transparent glass ballot boxes, introduced after a 1856 stuffing incident in to deter physical tampering by allowing visual verification of contents. Tactics extended to voter suppression, including kidnapping opponents and forcing alcohol consumption to incapacitate them on , as documented in Pennsylvania contests during the 1830s and 1840s. The introduction of the Australian ballot system—state-printed, secret s—began in the late , progressively curbing overt fraud by anonymizing votes and standardizing ballots across parties. In Victorian Britain, electoral corruption manifested as , "treating" voters with food and drink, and , persisting despite the 1832 Reform Act's expansion of the electorate. Controverted elections committees investigated hundreds of cases annually, voiding results in boroughs like in 1869 for systemic treating and impersonation. The Ballot Act of 1872 introduced secret voting, reducing overt coercion, while the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act of 1883 imposed fines and imprisonment for , limiting campaign expenditures to diminish buying. Into the early 20th century, fraud lingered in American industrial cities; Pittsburgh's 1900s elections involved "vote hauling" by party operatives and ballot box alterations, though Progressive Era reforms like voter registration laws gradually diminished incidence. By the 1920s, enhanced safeguards had rendered large-scale manipulation rarer, shifting patterns from overt urban machines to subtler forms amid expanding suffrage.

Post-1945 Developments

In the years immediately following , electoral processes in were systematically manipulated to consolidate Soviet influence and install communist regimes. In Poland's 1947 parliamentary elections, the Soviet-backed secured an estimated 80% of seats through tactics including voter intimidation, ballot stuffing, and the falsification of results, as opposition parties were barred from fair competition and independent observers suppressed. Similar rigging occurred in Romania's 1946 general election, where communists and allies claimed over 70% of the vote via coerced participation, exclusion of non-communist candidates, and post-vote alterations, enabling the monarchy's overthrow. In Hungary's 1947 parliamentary election, known as the "blue ballot" due to distinctive communist slips, the Hungarian Independence People's Front—dominated by communists—obtained 60% amid arrests of opponents, media control, and vote tampering, paving the way for one-party rule. These cases exemplified structural fraud in non-competitive systems, where elections served as facades for predetermined outcomes rather than genuine contests. In the United States, post-1945 electoral fraud persisted through localized machine politics, absentee ballot abuses, and tally manipulations, though often confined to specific jurisdictions rather than national scales. The 1946 McMinn County, Tennessee, election triggered the "Battle of Athens," where citizens, suspecting Democratic machine control involving ballot box stuffing and intimidation, armed themselves and seized polling sites, leading to the arrest of officials and installation of new leadership; investigations confirmed widespread irregularities like multiple voting. In Texas's 1948 Democratic Senate primary, Lyndon B. Johnson trailed by 20 votes until "Box 13" from Jim Wells County added 202 names—mostly handwritten and undated—flipping the result by 87 votes; contemporaries and later accounts, including participant testimony, attributed this to coordinated fraud by local bosses, though no successful legal challenge ensued. The Heritage Foundation's database documents over 1,500 proven U.S. cases since 1945, including absentee fraud in Chicago's 1982 judicial elections (where operatives forged thousands of ballots) and multiple voting schemes in New Jersey's 1997 elections, typically involving low-level operatives prosecuted under federal law. During the , electoral fraud proliferated in post-colonial and authoritarian developing states, often enabling incumbents to retain power amid weak institutions. In Nigeria's 1964 federal elections, northern-dominated parties allegedly inflated votes through carousel voting and undercounting in opposition strongholds, sparking ethnic violence and the republic's collapse into . Pakistan's 1988 general election saw military intelligence (ISI) under General Zia-ul-Haq manipulate results against Benazir Bhutto's PPP via fake polling and ballot destruction, as later admitted by officials and confirmed in judicial inquiries. In , Mugabe's ZANU-PF perpetrated fraud in the 1980s and 1990s through voter , ghost voters, and tally alterations, with international observers documenting discrepancies exceeding 20% in some constituencies. Communist states like the maintained non-competitive elections post-1945, with 99-100% turnout and unanimous support for the party engineered via mandatory participation, pre-filled ballots, and surveillance, rendering fraud inherent to the system rather than exceptional. Into the late 20th and early 21st centuries, technological and procedural shifts introduced new vulnerabilities, though proven large-scale fraud remained rare in established democracies while endemic in hybrid regimes. Russia's 2011-2012 parliamentary elections featured documented ballot stuffing and carousel voting, with a PNAS estimating fraud inflated votes by 7-15% in affected precincts via statistical anomalies in turnout and results. In competitive authoritarian contexts like Venezuela's 2017 vote, opposition boycotts and electronic tampering yielded 41% turnout claims contradicted by independent audits showing under 15%, enabling Nicolás Maduro's consolidation. Empirical studies link such fraud to resource abuse and opposition harassment, with peer-reviewed analyses emphasizing detection challenges in low-transparency environments. Overall, post-1945 trends reflect fraud's adaptation to institutional weaknesses, from overt rigging in nascent states to subtler manipulations in maturing ones, underscoring causal links between enforcement gaps and incidence rates.

Methods of Pre-Election Fraud

Electorate Manipulation

Electorate manipulation involves the illicit alteration of voter rolls to include ineligible or fictitious individuals, thereby expanding or distorting the electorate in favor of perpetrators. This pre-election tactic primarily manifests through fraudulent , where applications containing false personal details—such as fabricated names, addresses, or claims—are submitted to election authorities. in the United States criminalizes the knowing or submission of materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent voter registration applications. Such schemes exploit lax verification processes in some jurisdictions, enabling the creation of "ghost voters"—non-existent persons listed on rolls who may later be used for absentee or without detection. Proven instances demonstrate the feasibility and occurrence of these methods. In , former mayor Leonis Malburg and his wife Domenica were convicted of voter registration fraud alongside fraudulent voting, involving the illegal registration of non-residents to bolster support in local elections around 2009–2012. More recently, in February and March 2024, a Russian national and an Uzbek national in conspired to file 132 fraudulent applications in Pinellas County, targeting the upcoming ; they faced federal charges for this pre-election manipulation. In , a 2024 investigation uncovered fraudulent registration forms linked to organized efforts, resulting in criminal charges against seven individuals by October 2025. These cases, cataloged in databases like that of , illustrate how false registrations can infiltrate voter lists, potentially enabling downstream abuses such as multiple or unauthorized voting if safeguards fail. Empirical assessments, including forensic audits of rolls, have identified discrepancies attributable to such fraud, though detection often relies on post-registration cross-checks against death records, address verifications, or citizenship databases. In jurisdictions with automatic registration or third-party drives, the risk escalates, as seen in historical U.S. examples where operatives submitted thousands of invalid forms, though many were caught before voting occurred. While some analyses emphasize the rarity of successful exploitation leading to outcome-altering votes, documented convictions affirm the method's viability where oversight is insufficient.

Registration and Eligibility Fraud

Registration and eligibility fraud encompasses the submission of falsified voter registration applications, including those for fictitious persons, deceased individuals, or ineligible voters such as non-citizens, convicted felons lacking restored rights, or minors. This form of pre-election manipulation aims to inflate voter rolls, potentially enabling subsequent illegal voting or diluting legitimate ballots through administrative overload. In jurisdictions with automatic or same-day registration, lax verification exacerbates risks, as states vary in cross-checking against databases like death records or citizenship files. Documented cases often involve non-citizens falsely claiming eligibility during registration. In , a Mexican national was charged in August 2025 with illegal voting after registering and casting ballots in federal elections, facing up to five years in prison if convicted. Similarly, in , the arrested a non-citizen in January 2025 for voter fraud tied to improper registration. A Jamaican citizen faced charges in May 2025 for falsely claiming U.S. on a 2024 registration form in a federal . Broader probes, such as a 2016 investigation, led to indictments of 19 foreign nationals for illegal voting after fraudulent registrations, with penalties up to 26 years for some. Felons voting without eligibility restoration constitute another subset. In , was convicted in 2016 for casting a provisional while on supervised release for a , despite her claim of unawareness; her five-year sentence was later reduced on appeal but upheld as intentional violation. Organized schemes have yielded multiple convictions, as in a sampling of cases where officials or activists submitted hundreds of fake registrations, leading to guilty pleas for in absentee and registration processes. Recent state-level detections highlight localized risks. In Pennsylvania, a 2024 investigation charged seven individuals with submitting over 100 fraudulent registration forms via street canvassing operations. Michigan's 2025 review of the 2024 election identified 15 credible non-citizen voting instances out of 5.7 million ballots (0.00028%), with 13 referrals for prosecution, underscoring rarity but confirming occurrence amid imperfect safeguards. Prosecution records, such as those compiled in databases of convicted cases, indicate these frauds are provable when audits or tips trigger verification, though underreporting persists due to resource constraints and voluntary self-reporting by non-citizens. Empirical assessments, including cross-state database matches, reveal potential for undetected duplicates or deceased registrations, as each fraudulent entry risks cascading into illicit votes unless purged pre-election.

Disinformation Campaigns

Disinformation campaigns in electoral fraud entail the systematic dissemination of fabricated or deceptive information aimed at altering voter participation or choices, often by targeting specific demographics to suppress turnout or confuse procedures. Such tactics exploit communication channels like robocalls, texts, fliers, and to convey falsehoods about voting eligibility, locations, deadlines, or consequences, potentially violating laws on , , or to deprive voting rights under statutes like 18 U.S.C. § 241. Prosecutions hinge on demonstrating intent to deceive and suppress votes, distinguishing these from mere opinion or protected speech. A prominent example occurred during the 2020 U.S. presidential election, when conservative activists and orchestrated robocalls targeting Black voters in New York, , , and other states. The messages falsely claimed that individuals with outstanding arrest warrants would be detained if they attempted to vote, reaching an estimated 100,000 recipients per state in some instances. In April 2024, a New York court fined them $1.25 million for this scheme, deeming it a deliberate effort to intimidate and suppress minority turnout. They faced additional felony charges in for fraud and violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, resulting in probation and community service, while prosecutors pursued similar breaches. In the , robocalls were sent to approximately 112,000 African American households on Election Day, falsely announcing that Democratic incumbent had already won reelection and urging recipients to stay home to avoid traffic. The calls, funded by O'Malley's campaign at a cost of $31,792, were traced to campaign manager Paul Schurick and media consultant Robert Thomas. Schurick was convicted in 2011 of conspiracy to violate state election laws, attempted fraud, and failing to disclose call sponsorship, receiving a nine-month jail sentence later reduced on appeal; Thomas pleaded guilty to related charges and served 30 days in jail. This case illustrated how insider campaigns can deploy to demobilize opposing voters under the guise of strategic messaging. Other documented instances include deceptive fliers distributed in during the 2006 Maryland gubernatorial race, which listed Republican candidates as Democrats to mislead voters; the tactic, linked to Republican candidate Robert Ehrlich's team, prompted investigations but limited prosecutions due to evidentiary challenges. In Alabama's 2017 Senate special election, text messages falsely notified Jefferson County residents of changed polling locations, potentially disenfranchising voters, though no convictions followed owing to difficulties tracing perpetrators. These cases underscore the role of in digital tools, complicating enforcement, yet highlight growing legal recognition of as a fraudulent tool when intent to suppress is provable.

Methods of Election-Day and Post-Election Fraud

In-Person and Proxy Voting Abuses

In-person voting abuses encompass fraudulent acts committed at polling stations, including voter impersonation, where an individual casts a ballot pretending to be another eligible voter, multiple voting by the same person under their own or false identities, and ballot stuffing, which involves inserting pre-marked or unauthorized ballots into ballot boxes without legitimate voter participation. These methods rely on physical access to polling sites and can undermine vote integrity by inflating tallies for specific candidates. Detection often requires vigilant poll watchers, footage, or post-election audits, as impersonation leaves minimal paper trails. Documented convictions illustrate these abuses. In , Laura Janeth Garza, a non-citizen, pleaded guilty in 2018 to voter impersonation and ineligible voting after using a stolen U.S. citizen identity to an in-person ballot. Similarly, in a 2009 Texas case, Maria Leticia Almanza was convicted of impersonation at the polls and ineligible voting for a ballot under false pretenses. Ballot stuffing cases include arrests in Georgia during the October 26, 2024, parliamentary , where authorities charged two individuals with stuffing boxes, prompting 47 investigations. In the U.S., the Heritage Foundation's database records over 1,500 proven convictions since 1982, with dozens involving in-person impersonation or multiple voting at polls. Proxy voting abuses occur when an individual casts or influences a vote on behalf of another without proper , often exploiting allowances for disabled or absent voters. In systems permitting limited , such as for those unable to attend polls, arises through coerced or fabricated proxies. For example, in Macedonia, widespread family and has been identified as a vector for breaches and , leading to awareness campaigns by UNDP in 2009. In the U.S., where is generally prohibited except in narrow circumstances, abuses manifest as unauthorized assistance or false claims of agency, sometimes prosecuted under broader impersonation statutes; however, convictions remain infrequent due to evidentiary challenges. These practices can dilute genuine voter intent, particularly in close races, though empirical data from prosecution records indicate they are less common than absentee-related but still pose risks in under-monitored settings.

Absentee and Mail-In Ballot Fraud

Absentee and mail-in ballots, which allow voters to cast ballots remotely without in-person verification at polling places, present distinct opportunities for fraud due to the unsupervised and reliance on self-reported eligibility. Common methods include forging signatures on ballot envelopes, requesting or submitting ballots on behalf of ineligible or unwitting voters, ballot harvesting where third parties collect and potentially alter votes, and or vote-buying facilitated by the secrecy of the process. These vulnerabilities stem from the absence of real-time oversight, making detection reliant on post-election audits or complaints, which often undercount incidents due to limited resources for investigation. Proven cases illustrate these risks. In Iowa's 2020 congressional primary, Kim Phuong Taylor was convicted in 2023 for orchestrating a scheme to fraudulently generate absentee votes for her husband by recruiting residents of a care facility to sign blank ballots, which were then filled out by others; she received a four-month sentence. In Bridgeport, Connecticut's 2023 Democratic mayoral primary, five individuals faced charges in February 2025 for mishandling absentee ballots, including collecting and submitting votes without voter consent, leading to a court-ordered redo of the after video evidence showed apparent tampering. Similarly, in a 2023 primary, six people were charged in July 2024 with fraud involving absentee ballots, such as forging applications and submissions to influence the Republican primary outcome. Recent convictions highlight ongoing issues with deceased or incapacitated voters. In , Elizabeth Ann Davis was found guilty on October 23, 2025, of and impersonating electors for submitting mail ballots in the names of her deceased parents and another relative during recent elections. In , Danielle Miller was convicted in 2025 for casting her deceased mother's for in the 2024 presidential election, resulting in a sentence requiring an on voting alongside probation. In Franklin County, Washington, apartment manager Esperanza Contreras was arrested in January 2026 on 12 felony charges for voter fraud after admitting to forging and submitting four mail-in ballots for former tenants during the 2024 general election; three ballots were counted, while one was rejected due to a signature mismatch. The Heritage Foundation's database documents over 1,500 proven election fraud cases as of 2025, with fraudulent absentee and mail-in use comprising a significant category, including instances like the 2005 overturning of a House election due to absentee ballot irregularities involving and . Empirical assessments vary, but documented convictions underscore that while absolute numbers may appear low relative to total ballots—e.g., a analysis estimating minimal increases in fraud reports post-mail voting adoption—close races amplify impacts, as seen in North Carolina's 2018 congressional election voided over nine absentee ballots affected by unauthorized alterations. Critics of expansive mail voting, including analyses from conservative think tanks, argue that systemic under-prosecution and reluctance to audit large volumes conceal higher true rates, particularly in jurisdictions with lax signature matching or third-party collection rules. Conversely, left-leaning reports like those from the Brennan Center claim rarity, citing 491 absentee cases from 2000–2012, but these often exclude unprosecuted suspicions and overlook methodological flaws in detection. Overall, the decentralized nature of U.S. elections limits comprehensive fraud rate data, but convictions demonstrate absentee and mail-in systems enable targeted manipulations more readily than supervised in-person voting.

Tallying and Electronic Manipulation

Electronic tallying manipulation exploits vulnerabilities in voting machines and software to alter recorded votes without physical ballot changes. Direct-recording electronic (DRE) systems, which lack verifiable paper trails, are particularly susceptible to software exploits, firmware modifications, or unauthorized access via USB ports, default credentials, or network connections. Demonstrations at security conferences have shown that machines from major vendors can be compromised in minutes; for example, at DEF CON 25 in 2017, researchers remotely accessed a WinVote DRE machine using a known 2003 Wi-Fi vulnerability and default password "admin/abcde," allowing vote data alteration. Similarly, ES&S iVotronic and Diebold AccuVote TSx models were breached through physical interfaces like JTAG ports or unencrypted programmable election badges (PEBs), enabling malware insertion or tally overrides. Peer-reviewed analyses confirm these risks stem from systemic flaws, such as inadequate , legacy operating systems (e.g., pSOS in Sequoia machines), and issues with foreign components. A 2021 IEEE survey of e-voting systems outlined attack vectors including insider tampering during tabulation, remote code execution via insecure modems, and ballot definition file manipulations that propagate errors across precincts. In jurisdictions using ballot-marking devices (BMDs) or optical scanners, fraud methods include injecting malicious code to flip votes during aggregation or exploiting unpatched software in central tabulators, as evidenced by CISA advisories on Dominion ImageCast X vulnerabilities like buffer overflows and hardcoded credentials. While safeguards like air-gapping and logic/access controls mitigate some threats, physical access—often available to poll workers or technicians—facilitates undetectable changes if no risk-limiting audits occur. Manual tallying fraud, prevalent in pre-electronic eras and still possible in hand-counted systems, involves direct intervention by counters to misrecord totals, discard ballots, or fabricate results sheets. Insiders can switch vote piles, undercount opposition ballots during counts, or collude to report inflated figures from unmonitored precincts. Proven instances include local U.S. cases documented in fraud databases, such as election officials convicted for falsifying tally sheets in unsupervised environments, though widespread detection via bipartisan observers limits scale. In developing contexts, opaque manual processes have enabled larger manipulations, as in historical U.S. machine politics where ward bosses controlled counts. Empirical assessments emphasize that without chain-of-custody protocols or duplicate tallies, such methods evade initial scrutiny but risk exposure through discrepancies in . Hybrid systems combining electronic tabulation with manual verification amplify risks if paper records are ignored or altered post-scan. For instance, optical scanners can be programmed to reject or reassign ballots selectively during , with insiders bypassing anomaly logs. Vulnerabilities persist even in certified equipment, as court demonstrations have shown: researcher J. Alex Halderman extracted and modified data from Georgia's BMDs in 2023, highlighting risks of unauthorized software updates during maintenance. Overall, tallying integrity hinges on auditable trails; absence thereof, as in paperless DREs phased out in many U.S. states post-2000s , enables for manipulators.

Result Alteration and Certification Fraud

Result alteration encompasses the direct manipulation of recorded vote totals after ballots are cast, such as by discarding valid votes, adding fictitious ones, or swapping tallies during aggregation and . fraud occurs when election officials knowingly endorse falsified results through official declarations, bypassing verification protocols to affirm inaccurate outcomes. These practices exploit positions of trust in the post-voting phase, where oversight may be limited compared to polling day, potentially shifting close races without immediate detection. Documented convictions for altering vote counts remain infrequent in jurisdictions with robust safeguards, but databases of prosecuted cases reveal patterns involving insiders like poll workers or judges of elections who exploit access to tabulations. The Heritage Foundation's Election Fraud Database catalogs 138 proven instances of vote count alteration as of July 2025, including criminal convictions where officials tampered with totals for bribes or partisan advantage. These cases often surface through audits or whistleblowers, leading to outcomes like overturned local results or prison terms. A prominent U.S. example unfolded in Philadelphia's 26th Ward during the 2014 Democratic primary, where Judge of Elections Dominique Walston accepted bribes to oversee fraudulent absentee ballot handling, including marking ballots for deceased or ineligible voters, and then certified the manipulated totals as legitimate. Convicted in May 2020 on charges of conspiracy to violate civil rights, bribery, and obstruction, Walston received three years' probation, highlighting how certification of false results can embed alterations into official records unless challenged. Related probes implicated broader networks, with former Congressman Michael Myers pleading guilty in 2022 to similar election-day fraud facilitation. Internationally, convictions for result alteration are harder to quantify due to varying legal standards and reporting, but official reports note instances in transitional democracies. In Romania's 2024 , the annulled the first round citing evidence of algorithmic manipulation and undeclared campaign influence on tallies, though specific individual convictions remain pending. has documented post-election tally fraud in countries like and , where officials altered counts amid weak chain-of-custody protocols, leading to sporadic prosecutions but rarely systemic reform. Detection relies on discrepancies in chain-of-custody logs or statistical anomalies, with fraud often exposed by refusals to sign amid irregularities or post-hoc lawsuits. While peer-reviewed analyses emphasize that such fraud rarely scales to national levels in audited systems, the potential for localized impact underscores the need for mandatory risk-limiting audits before final .

Detection and Empirical Assessment

Statistical Forensics and Indicators

Statistical forensics encompasses quantitative techniques applied to election data to detect irregularities suggestive of fraud, leveraging expected probabilistic patterns in legitimate vote tallies. These methods analyze distributions of digits, turnout rates, vote shares, and spatial correlations, identifying deviations that exceed what random genuine voting would produce. Pioneered in , such approaches, often termed election forensics, rely on null hypotheses of fair and test for systematic biases introduced by manipulation like ballot stuffing or tally alteration. A key indicator is , which posits that in datasets spanning orders of magnitude—such as aggregated precinct vote counts—leading digits follow a , with the digit 1 appearing approximately 30.1% of the time, decreasing to 4.6% for 9. Fraudulent data, often fabricated or rounded, frequently violates this, showing overrepresentation of higher digits due to human tendencies in number generation. This test has been formalized for elections, demonstrating sensitivity to artificial inflation in controlled simulations, though it requires large, heterogeneous samples for reliability and can yield false positives in constrained data like single-precinct results. Additional indicators include non-uniform last-digit frequencies, where legitimate counts approximate a uniform distribution (each digit 0-9 at ~10%), but fraud exhibits preferences for round numbers like 0, 5, or 00 due to manual padding or estimation. Turnout anomalies, such as rates exceeding 100% of registered voters or unnatural uniformity across precincts defying demographic variance, signal over-reporting. Vote-share irregularities, like discontinuities or floor effects where opposition support clusters below improbable thresholds (e.g., exactly 33%), indicate coordinated suppression or stuffing, as validated in cross-national analyses of rigged elections. Spatial forensics examines precinct-level patterns, flagging clusters of extreme results uncorrelated with socioeconomic predictors or historical baselines, while temporal analysis detects spikes in late-counted absentee ballots diverging sharply from in-person trends. These indicators gain strength when combined, as single tests may reflect benign factors like precinct size, but multivariate models enhance detection power, as shown in forensic audits of international elections. Limitations persist, including artifacts and the need for contextual benchmarks, underscoring that statistical signals require corroboration from audits or investigations to infer causation.

Audits, Recounts, and Investigations

Audits entail systematic examinations of voting equipment, ballots, and procedures to verify reported results, often using statistical methods such as risk-limiting audits (RLAs) that sample a of ballots to achieve a specified level in the outcome's accuracy. Recounts involve manual re-tabulation of ballots, typically triggered by close margins or legal challenges, to detect tabulation errors or discrepancies. Investigations, conducted by state election boards, , or courts, target specific allegations of misconduct, employing forensic analysis of records, witness testimonies, and chain-of-custody reviews to substantiate or refute fraud claims. A prominent example of an investigation yielding fraud findings occurred in during the 2018 midterm s, where the state board of elections probed irregularities in handling. The bipartisan panel uncovered evidence that political operative McCrae Dowless, hired by Republican candidate Mark Harris, illegally collected and altered hundreds of , including instances of voters being coerced or unaware of ballot submissions on their behalf. This led to a unanimous 5-0 decision on February 25, 2019, to invalidate the results—where Harris had led by 905 votes—and order a special , demonstrating how targeted probes can identify localized abuses sufficient to compromise district outcomes. In the 2020 U.S. presidential election, recounts and audits in states like Georgia and confirmed certified tallies with minimal variances, attributing discrepancies—such as overvotes or undervotes—to clerical or machine errors rather than intentional manipulation. Georgia's full hand recount of over 5 million ballots, completed on November 19, 2020, adjusted the margin by fewer than 1,200 votes but upheld Joe Biden's victory by approximately 11,779 votes. Similarly, a peer-reviewed analysis of post-election audits across multiple states found average net shifts in presidential vote counts of 0.007%, with errors primarily in down-ballot races and no evidence of outcome-altering fraud. Texas's statewide forensic of the 2020 election, ordered by Ruth Hughs and completed in 2021, examined voting systems in all 254 counties and identified procedural weaknesses, such as inadequate chain-of-custody documentation in some areas, but verified that vote tabulations accurately reflected cast ballots without systemic irregularities. Arizona's Maricopa County , conducted by Cyber Ninjas in 2021 under Republican-led legislative direction, reported discrepancies like 57,000+ ballots with mismatched signatures or envelopes but ultimately affirmed Biden's margin, though critics noted the audit's partisan selection and lack of compromised its . These processes reveal fraud when evidence exists, as in , but their scope—often limited to sampled ballots or reported tallies—may overlook undetected manipulations like uncounted fraudulent insertions if not forensically exhaustive. Databases compiling investigation outcomes, such as those tracking over 1,500 proven fraud cases since , indicate audits and probes primarily detect isolated incidents rather than widespread schemes, underscoring their utility in maintaining integrity amid rare but consequential violations.

Prosecution Records and Databases

The Department of Justice's Election Crimes Branch, part of the Criminal Division's , oversees federal prosecutions of election offenses, including voting fraud such as manipulation, , and false registrations, excluding race-based voter suppression cases handled by the Civil Rights Division. Established in 1980, the branch ensures consistent application of federal law across s, with cases often involving violations of the or other statutes affecting election integrity. Aggregate statistics on annual prosecutions are not publicly detailed by the DOJ, but records indicate sporadic federal convictions, typically numbering in the low dozens or fewer per cycle for voter-specific fraud, as federal applies mainly to interstate or multi-district schemes. At the state level, prosecutions for electoral fraud are pursued by attorneys general and district attorneys under varying statutes, with convictions documented in court records for offenses like duplicate voting, ineligible voting by noncitizens or felons, and ballot tampering. For instance, in , state officials prosecuted over 100 voter fraud cases between 2005 and 2018, resulting in dozens of convictions, often tied to mail-in or abuses. Similarly, in , a 2018 investigation led to the overturning of a congressional due to absentee ballot by political operatives, yielding multiple guilty pleas and convictions. Prominent databases compiling prosecution records include the Heritage Foundation's Election Fraud Database, which as of January 2024 catalogs over 1,500 proven instances of electoral fraud across the since the 1980s, verified through criminal convictions, civil adjudications, or judicial findings sufficient to alter outcomes. The database categorizes cases by type, such as fraudulent use of absentee ballots (e.g., a 2020 Georgia case where operatives harvested and falsified mail-in votes, leading to convictions), false voter registrations (e.g., a 2016 Virginia scheme registering noncitizens, resulting in guilty pleas), and ineligible voting (e.g., felons or deceased individuals' ballots).
Fraud CategoryExample Cases DocumentedOutcomes
Fraudulent Absentee/Mail BallotsOver 400 instances, including 2018 ballot tamperingConvictions, election overturns
False Registrations300+ cases, e.g., 2007 Washington false registrations by operativePrison sentences, fines
Ineligible Voting200+ , including noncitizen votes in multiple statesDeportations, felony convictions
Vote Buying/Duplication100+ , e.g., cash-for-votes schemes in Multi-year sentences
While the Heritage database draws from public court documents and emphasizes detected fraud, critics contend it selectively highlights cases without adjusting for total ballots cast, potentially overstating rarity's implications, though it remains a primary repository of verified prosecutions absent a centralized federal tracker. Internationally, resources like the International for and Electoral Assistance's Electoral Database track disputes and sanctions for misconduct, including fraud prosecutions in countries like (e.g., 2020 cases of ballot stuffing leading to convictions), but lack the case-specific granularity of U.S. compilations. These records underscore that while prosecutions confirm fraud's occurrence, underreporting due to detection challenges limits comprehensive tallies.

Prevention and Mitigation Strategies

Verification and Identification Protocols

Thirty-six states require voters to present identification at polling places to verify identity and eligibility, a protocol aimed at deterring in-person impersonation and multiple voting by ensuring the person matches the registered voter record. Acceptable forms typically include government-issued photo IDs such as driver's licenses, passports, military IDs, or state voter identification cards; non-photo alternatives like utility bills or affidavits are permitted in some jurisdictions but are less effective against fraud due to ease of . In strict photo ID states like Georgia, , and , failure to provide valid ID results in a provisional , counted only after subsequent verification, which has documented utility in blocking fraudulent attempts as evidenced by prosecuted cases of individuals using deceased or fictitious identities in lax-ID areas. For absentee and mail-in ballots, signature verification protocols mandate comparing the voter's signature on the return envelope or to the signature archived in state registration databases, serving as a primary safeguard against unauthorized casting by proxies or non-registrants. This process, employed in over 40 states, rejects mismatched signatures, with national rejection rates averaging 0.8% to 2% in the election cycle, often due to handwriting variations from age, illness, or haste rather than , though it has intercepted forged submissions in documented instances. Automated software and trained officials improve matching accuracy to over 90% in controlled studies, reducing both false positives and exploitation risks, while cure periods allow voters to affirm identity via additional documentation. Supplementary verification includes electronic poll books for real-time cross-checks against statewide voter rolls to flag duplicates or out-of-precinct attempts, integrated with federal systems like the USCIS SAVE program for citizenship confirmation during registration updates. Voter roll maintenance protocols, mandated under the National Voter Registration Act, involve periodic purges of deceased or relocated individuals using and postal data, preventing ballots from inactive entries. Internationally, biometric protocols—such as fingerprint or iris scans linked to voter IDs—have reduced duplicate registrations by up to 5% in deployments in and , offering a model for high-fraud-risk environments by providing immutable identity linkage beyond documents susceptible to or fabrication.

Transparency and Auditing Mechanisms

Transparency mechanisms in elections encompass protocols that enable independent verification of processes such as , ballot handling, and tabulation, often through bipartisan observers and public disclosure of data. Auditing mechanisms, particularly post-election audits, systematically sample and verify ballots against reported results to detect discrepancies arising from errors or malfeasance. These approaches aim to provide statistical confidence in outcomes while minimizing the risk of undetected alterations, with effectiveness depending on the presence of auditable records like paper ballots. Bipartisan poll watchers, appointed by or candidates, play a key role in real-time transparency by observing polling place operations, ballot issuance, and initial counting without interfering. In the United States, all states permit such observers, with rules varying by ; for instance, watchers must typically remain at designated distances but can challenge suspected irregularities, as seen in the 2020 elections where thousands monitored sites amid heightened scrutiny. This presence deters potential abuses and allows contemporaneous documentation of issues, contributing to post-election challenges or investigations, though improper has occasionally led to disputes over access. Post-election tabulation audits represent a core auditing tool, involving hand recounts of randomly selected ballots or precincts to validate electronic tallies. Risk-limiting audits (RLAs), a statistically rigorous variant, continue sampling until the risk of affirming an incorrect outcome falls below a predefined threshold, such as 5%, offering over full recounts. Adopted in 14 U.S. states by 2023, including since 2017 and Georgia since 2020, RLAs confirmed results in Georgia's 2020 presidential contest with minimal discrepancies overall, though subset analyses revealed tabulation errors in specific counties like Fulton, where human errors affected thousands of ballots. Empirical assessments indicate RLAs detect overcounts or undercounts with high probability when paper trails exist, but they fail without verifiable voter-marked records, as in direct-recording electronic systems. Additional auditing practices include chain-of-custody protocols for ballots, requiring logged transfers and secure storage observable by stakeholders, and public release of anonymized voter data or precinct-level results for independent analysis. Best practices emphasize bipartisan oversight in audit execution to mitigate bias, as outlined in guidelines from election research bodies. While comprehensive audits have affirmed broad accuracy in recent U.S. cycles, isolated detections—such as machine malfunctions in , in 2020, uncovered via canvass audits—underscore their utility in identifying localized issues that could otherwise erode trust. Limitations persist in jurisdictions lacking mandatory audits or robust observer access, potentially obscuring fraud in low-visibility processes like mail-in verification.

Technological and Procedural Innovations

Biometric verification systems have emerged as a key technological innovation to mitigate risks of multiple voting and impersonation by linking voter identity to unique physiological traits such as fingerprints, iris scans, or facial recognition during registration and polling. These systems, implemented in over 30 countries including and , enable automated deduplication of voter rolls and real-time at polling stations, reducing fraudulent entries by up to 90% in pilot programs according to vendor analyses from providers like Innovatrics and Laxton. For instance, biometric kits capture and match against centralized databases, preventing the reuse of stolen or fabricated identities, though challenges like spoofing vulnerabilities and accessibility for disabled voters persist, as noted in International IDEA's guidelines on biometric . Distributed ledger technology, particularly , has been proposed to create tamper-resistant digital vote records, allowing verifiable yet anonymous tallies through cryptographic hashing and decentralized consensus mechanisms. Pilot implementations, such as Voatz's mobile voting trials in in 2018 and in 2020, demonstrated end-to-end verifiability where voters could confirm their ballot's integrity without revealing choices, potentially addressing manipulation in electronic systems. However, peer-reviewed analyses highlight limitations, including issues for large-scale elections and unresolved risks in remote voting, leading experts to conclude that blockchain enhances transparency in hybrid systems but does not guarantee security against all cyber threats without accompanying paper audits. Procedural innovations, such as risk-limiting audits (RLAs) integrated with digital tools, provide statistically bounded confidence in election outcomes by sampling paper ballots to test machine tabulations against a predefined risk limit, typically 5-10%. Adopted in states like since 2017 and Georgia following 2020 reforms, RLAs use software like to determine minimal sample sizes based on vote margins, confirming results with high probability while minimizing manual effort; for example, Colorado's 2020 audits examined fewer than 1% of ballots in most races yet achieved over 99% assurance of accuracy. This method counters tallying errors or alterations by enforcing empirical validation, though it requires auditable paper trails, absent in some direct-recording electronic (DRE) machines. Enhanced chain-of-custody protocols, bolstered by RFID tagging and GPS-tracked transport for ballots and devices, represent procedural advancements to prevent unauthorized access or substitution. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission's best practices guide recommends multi-party witnessing and serialized seals with digital logging, as implemented in jurisdictions like , where such measures have been credited with zero reported custody breaches in recent cycles. Additionally, real-time voter roll maintenance using automated cross-referencing with databases like death records and felony convictions, as piloted by the Center for Election Innovation & Research, dynamically removes ineligible entries, reducing over-voting potential by identifying duplicates pre-election. These innovations collectively prioritize verifiable integrity over convenience, grounded in empirical testing rather than unproven assumptions of systemic infallibility.

Prevalence, Impact, and Controversies

Empirical Evidence on Scale and Frequency

In the United States, databases compiling proven cases, such as the Heritage Foundation's Fraud Database, document over 1,500 instances of illegal voting, registration , and related offenses from 1982 through mid-2025, with cases drawn from court convictions, guilty pleas, and official admissions across all 50 states. These primarily consist of individual violations, such as absentee ballot manipulation, double voting, and ineligible voting by noncitizens or felons, averaging roughly 30-40 convictions or resolutions annually in recent years, though the database emphasizes it as a non-exhaustive sampling limited by underreporting and . Relative to over 158 million ballots cast in the 2020 presidential alone, this translates to a detected rate below 0.001%, insufficient on its face to alter national outcomes but potentially material in localized races with narrow margins. Academic and journalistic investigations corroborate low detection rates for certain fraud types, such as in-person voter impersonation. A multi-state review by Loyola Law School's Justin Levitt identified only 31 credible instances of impersonation out of over 1 billion votes cast in general elections from 2000 to 2014. Similarly, an audit of 2.1 million ballots from 2016-2020 yielded 36 potential cases, or about 0.0008% of votes. However, these figures focus narrowly on impersonation and may undercount absentee and mail-in , which comprised 43% of Heritage-documented cases post-2016 and rose with expanded no-excuse absentee voting. U.S. Department of Justice records show sporadic federal prosecutions, such as 10-20 election indictments annually in recent cycles, often tied to schemes involving hundreds of fraudulent ballots rather than isolated votes. Internationally, empirical detection varies by institutional strength, with statistical forensics revealing higher frequencies in less secure systems. Digit-based tests for anomalous vote distributions detected fraud in up to 20-30% of polling stations in Nigeria's 2003 presidential election and Senegal's 2000 legislative vote, where last-digit frequencies deviated significantly from Benford's Law expectations under random counting. In Russia, crowd-sourced data and regression models estimated fraud inflating vote shares by 5-15% in 10-20% of districts across national elections from 2000 to 2021, often through ballot stuffing or coerced turnout. Comparative surveys, such as those from the Varieties of Democracy project, report self-perceived fraud incidence exceeding 10% of votes in 20-30% of elections in hybrid regimes like those in parts of Latin America and Eastern Europe between 2010 and 2020, versus under 1% in consolidated democracies excluding the U.S. Prosecution and audit data underscore that under-detection is systemic due to verification gaps, with only 1-5% of suspected cases typically leading to charges per reports. While mainstream analyses attribute low U.S. rates to robust safeguards, critics argue institutional biases in academia and media—evident in selective emphasis on impersonation over mail fraud—may downplay scalable vulnerabilities exposed in 2020 audits, where discrepancies in matching and chain-of-custody affected thousands of ballots in battleground states. Overall, indicates fraud operates at scales rarely exceeding 0.01% of votes in advanced democracies but can reach outcome-altering levels (5-20%) where oversight is weak, as quantified by forensic residuals and conviction aggregates.

Consequences for Democratic Legitimacy

Electoral fraud erodes democratic legitimacy by decoupling from the authentic aggregation of voter preferences, thereby transforming elections from mechanisms of into instruments of manipulation. This breach of procedural fairness instigates widespread doubt about the mandate of victors, as citizens perceive outcomes as engineered rather than reflective of collective will, which is foundational to underlying . Cross-national empirical analyses substantiate this erosion, revealing that elevated fraud levels—measured via indicators like ballot stuffing, voter intimidation, and irregularities—correlate with substantially reduced public satisfaction with democratic processes. For instance, data from the CSES and PEI datasets spanning 2008–2012 across multiple countries show that a one-standard-deviation increase in perception indices predicts a 0.15–0.20 point drop in satisfaction scores on a 0–10 scale, even after controlling for economic and institutional factors. Such dissatisfaction manifests in declining support for democratic norms, as fraud signals systemic vulnerability, prompting rational actors to withhold from tainted institutions. Beyond satisfaction, fraud precipitates institutional distrust, amplifying perceptions that elites prioritize self-perpetuation over . Longitudinal studies on electoral manipulation demonstrate that overt tactics, including violence and , diminish trust in governance legitimacy, particularly in contexts where fraud is blatant and verifiable through forensic audits or observer reports. This dynamic is evident in from diverse regimes, where post-fraud trust metrics plummet, fostering cycles of non-compliance and demands for extralegal remedies. Fraud further intensifies affective polarization, wherein citizens develop visceral animus toward political adversaries, undermining the deliberative ethos essential to . Examination of 149 elections in 48 countries from 1996 to 2020 indicates that documented events heighten partisan emotional divides by an average of 12–15% in feeling thermometer scores, irrespective of winner-loser status, as they validate narratives of and erode faith in impartial adjudication. In turn, this polarization hampers compromise, elevates , and risks , as polarized electorates become receptive to illiberal solutions promising "restored" purity. Persistent fraud can culminate in broader , including protests or coups, as legitimacy deficits provoke challenges to when peaceful channels appear compromised. While academic sources, often from institutions with potential ideological skews toward downplaying fraud in established democracies, emphasize perceptions over incidence, objective metrics from observer missions consistently link verified manipulations to legitimacy crises in transitional contexts.

Major Disputes and Viewpoint Analysis

One central dispute in discussions of electoral fraud revolves around its scale and potential to alter election outcomes, particularly in closely contested races. Proponents of heightened fraud concerns, including former President , have asserted that the 2020 U.S. involved widespread irregularities sufficient to reverse results in key states, citing anomalies such as abrupt vote count pauses, disproportionate mail-in ballot advantages for Democrats, and statistical deviations in turnout data. These claims were supported by thousands of affidavits from poll watchers alleging procedural violations and by analyses from groups like , which has documented over 1,500 proven fraud cases across U.S. elections since 1982, including instances of misuse and double voting. However, federal and state officials, including the (CISA), declared the 2020 election "the most secure in American history," with no evidence of systemic compromise affecting outcomes. Opposing viewpoints emphasize empirical rarity of fraud. Academic and legal reviews, such as those in the Proceedings of the , have scrutinized statistical claims of 2020 fraud—like violations or late-night ballot surges—and found them attributable to normal counting processes rather than manipulation, dismissing many as methodological errors or cherry-picked data. Courts rejected over 60 lawsuits challenging the results, often for insufficient evidence beyond speculation, as in cases before the U.S. and state tribunals. Studies from institutions like Brookings indicate voter fraud comprises less than 1% of ballots across decades, based on prosecution records and audits, far below thresholds needed to sway national contests. Critics of fraud narratives, including fact-checkers at and Stanford researchers, argue that amplified claims erode trust without substantiation, potentially deterring legitimate voting. A key analytical tension lies in source credibility and institutional incentives. Mainstream analyses from left-leaning organizations like the Brennan Center often frame fraud as a "myth" to prioritize access over safeguards, potentially understating vulnerabilities in expanded mail-in systems untested at 2020's volume. Conversely, conservative databases like Heritage's highlight prosecutable cases but represent a fraction of votes cast, inviting debate on underreporting due to lax enforcement or political reluctance to pursue marginal cases. Psychological research, such as a Nature Human Behaviour study of 1,642 respondents, reveals fraud beliefs correlate with partisan loss and pre-existing distrust, persisting post-audits (e.g., Georgia's hand recounts confirming Biden's win by 11,779 votes) because they align with broader skepticism of media and bureaucratic neutrality. This divide underscores causal realism: while isolated fraud occurs, verifiable evidence for outcome-altering schemes remains absent, yet unresolved transparency gaps—such as limited observer access in some jurisdictions—fuel legitimate contention over preventive rigor.
ViewpointCore ArgumentSupporting EvidenceCounterpoints
Widespread Fraud PossibleVulnerabilities in mail-in and electronic systems enable scalable manipulation, as seen in historical cases.Heritage's 1,500+ convictions; affidavits from observers.Prosecutions too few to indicate scale; anomalies explained by logistics.
Fraud Rare and InsignificantEmpirical data shows minimal incidence, insufficient for flipping results.Audits/recounts upheld tallies; <1% fraud rate in studies.Ignores unprosecuted irregularities and institutional biases minimizing scrutiny.

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