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Spread of Islam
Spread of Islam
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The spread of Islam spans almost 1,400 years. The early Muslim conquests that occurred following the death of Muhammad in 632 CE led to the creation of the caliphates, expanding over a vast geographical area; conversion to Islam was boosted by Arab Muslim forces expanding over vast territories and building imperial structures over time.[1][2][3][4] Most of the significant expansion occurred during the reign of the rāshidūn ("rightly-guided") caliphs from 632 to 661 CE, which were the first four successors of Muhammad.[4] These early caliphates, coupled with Muslim economics and trading, the Islamic Golden Age, and the age of the Islamic gunpowder empires, resulted in Islam's spread outwards from Mecca towards the Indian, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans and the creation of the Muslim world. The Islamic conquests, which culminated in the Arab empire being established across three continents (Asia, Africa, and Europe), enriched the Muslim world, achieving the economic preconditions for the emergence of this institution owing to the emphasis attached to Islamic teachings.[5] Trade played an important role in the spread of Islam in some parts of the world, such as Indonesia.[6][7] During the early centuries of Islamic rule, conversions in the Middle East were mainly individual or small-scale. While mass conversions were favored for spreading Islam beyond Muslim lands, policies within Muslim territories typically aimed for individual conversions to weaken non-Muslim communities. However, there were exceptions, like the forced mass conversion of the Samaritans.[8]

First expansion of the Caliphate

Muslim dynasties were soon established and subsequent empires such as those of the Umayyads, Abbasids, Mamluks, Seljukids, and the Ayyubids were among some of the largest and most powerful in the world. The Ajuran and Adal Sultanates, and the wealthy Mali Empire, in North Africa, the Delhi, Deccan, and Bengal Sultanates, and Mughal and Durrani Empires, and Kingdom of Mysore and Nizam of Hyderabad in the Indian subcontinent, the Ghaznavids, Ghurids, Samanids in Persia, Timurids, and the Ottoman Empire in Anatolia significantly changed the course of history. The people of the Islamic world created numerous sophisticated centers of culture and science with far-reaching mercantile networks, travelers, scientists, hunters, mathematicians, physicians, and philosophers, all contributing to the Islamic Golden Age. The Timurid Renaissance and the Islamic expansion in South and East Asia fostered cosmopolitan and eclectic Muslim cultures in the Indian subcontinent, Malaysia, Indonesia and China.[9] The Ottoman Empire, which controlled much of the Middle East and North Africa in the early modern period, also did not officially endorse mass conversions, but evidence suggests they occurred, particularly in the Balkans, often to evade the jizya tax. Similarly, Christian sources mention requests for mass conversions to Islam, such as in Cyprus, where Ottoman authorities refused, fearing economic repercussions.[8]

As of 2016, there were 1.7 billion Muslims,[10][11] with one out of four people in the world being Muslim,[12] making Islam the second-largest religion.[13] Out of children born from 2010 to 2015, 31% were born to Muslims,[14] and currently Islam is the world's fastest-growing major religion.[15][16][17]

Terminology

[edit]

Alongside the terminology of the "spread of Islam", scholarship of the subject has also given rise to the terms "Islamization",[a] "Islamicization",[18] and "Islamification" (Arabic: أسلمة, romanizedaslamah). These terms are used concurrently with the terminology of the "spread of Islam" to refer to the process through which a society shifts towards the religion of Islam and becomes largely Muslim. Societal Islamization has historically occurred over the course of many centuries since the spread of Islam outside of the Arabian Peninsula through the early Muslim conquests, with notable shifts occurring in the Levant, Iran, North Africa, the Horn of Africa, West Africa,[19] Central Asia, South Asia (in Afghanistan, Maldives, Pakistan, and Bangladesh), Southeast Asia (in Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia), Southeastern Europe (in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, among others), Eastern Europe (in the Caucasus, Crimea, and the Volga), and Southern Europe (in Spain, Portugal, and Sicily prior to re-Christianizations).[20] In contemporary usage, "Islamization" and its variants too can also be used with implied negative connotations to refer to the perceived imposition of an Islamist social and political system on a society with an indigenously different social and political background.

The English synonym of "Muslimization", in use since before 1940 (e.g., Waverly Illustrated Dictionary), conveys a similar meaning as "Islamization". 'Muslimization' has more recently also been used as a term coined to describe the overtly Muslim practices of new converts to the religion who wish to reinforce their newly acquired religious identity.[21]

Rashidun and Umayyad caliphates (610–750)

[edit]

Within the century of the establishment of Islam upon the Arabian Peninsula and the subsequent rapid expansion during the early Muslim conquests, one of the most significant empires in world history was formed.[22] For the subjects of the empire, formerly of the Byzantine and the Sasanian Empires, not much changed in practice. The objective of the conquests was mostly of a practical nature, as fertile land and water were scarce in the Arabian Peninsula. A real Islamization therefore came about only during the subsequent centuries.[23]

Ira M. Lapidus distinguishes between two separate strands of converts of the time: animists and polytheists of tribal societies of the Arabian Peninsula and the Fertile Crescent and the native Christians and Jews existing before the Muslims arrived.[24]

The empire spread from the Atlantic Ocean to the Aral Sea, from the Atlas Mountains to the Hindu Kush. It was bounded mostly by "a combination of natural barriers and well-organized states".[25]

For the polytheistic and pagan societies, apart from the religious and spiritual reasons that individuals may have had, conversion to Islam "represented the response of a tribal, pastoral population to the need for a larger framework for political and economic integration, a more stable state, and a more imaginative and encompassing moral vision to cope with the problems of a tumultuous society."[24] In contrast, for tribal, nomadic, monotheistic societies, "Islam was substituted for a Byzantine or Sassanian political identity and for a Christian, Jewish or Zoroastrian religious affiliation."[24] Conversion initially was neither required nor necessarily wished for: "(The Arab conquerors) did not require the conversion as much as the subordination of non-Muslim peoples. At the outset, they were hostile to conversions because new Muslims diluted the economic and status advantages of the Arabs."[24]

Only in subsequent centuries, with the development of the religious doctrine of Islam and with that the understanding of the Muslim ummah, would mass conversion take place. The new understanding by the religious and political leadership in many cases led to a weakening or breakdown of the social and religious structures of parallel religious communities such as Christians and Jews.[24]

The caliphs of the Arab dynasty established the empire's first school, which taught the Arabic language and Islamic studies. The caliphs furthermore began the ambitious project of building mosques across the empire, many of which remain today, such as the Umayyad Mosque, in Damascus. At the end of the Umayyad period, less than 10% of the people in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Tunisia and Spain were Muslim. Only the Arabian Peninsula had a higher proportion of Muslims among the population.[26]

Abbasid Caliphate (750–1258)

[edit]
The Abbasids are known to have founded some of the world's earliest educational institutions, such as the House of Wisdom.

The Abbasids replaced the expanding empire and "tribal politics" of "the tight-knit Arabian elite[25] with cosmopolitan culture and disciplines of Islamic science,[25] philosophy, theology, law and mysticism became more widespread, and the gradual conversions of the empire's populations occurred. Significant conversions also occurred beyond the extent of the empire such as that of the Turkic tribes in Central Asia and peoples living in regions south of the Sahara and north of the Sahel in Africa through contact with Muslim traders active in the area and Sufi orders. In Africa, Islam spread along three routes, across the Sahara and Sahel via trading towns such as Timbuktu, up the Nile Valley through the Sudan up to Uganda and across the Red Sea and down East Africa through settlements such as Mombasa and Zanzibar. The initial conversions were of a flexible nature.

The reasons that by the end of the 10th century, a large part of the population had converted to Islam are diverse. According to the British-Lebanese historian Albert Hourani, one of the reasons may be that

"Islam had become more clearly defined, and the line between Muslims and non-Muslims more sharply drawn. Muslims now lived within an elaborated system of ritual, doctrine and law clearly different from those of non-Muslims. (...) The status of Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians was more precisely defined, and in some ways it was inferior. They were regarded as the 'People of the Book', those who possessed a revealed scripture, or 'People of the Covenant', with whom compacts of protection had been made. In general, they were not forced to convert, but they suffered from restrictions. They paid a special tax; they were not supposed to wear certain colors; they could not marry Muslim women;."[26]

Most of those laws were elaborations of basic laws concerning non-Muslims (dhimmis) in the Quran, which does not give much detail about the right conduct with non-Muslims, but it in principle recognises the religion of "People of the Book" (Jews, Christians and sometimes others as well) and securing a separate tax from them that replaces the zakat, which is imposed upon Muslim subjects.

Ira Lapidus points towards "interwoven terms of political and economic benefits and of a sophisticated culture and religion" as appealing to the masses.[27] He noted:

"The question of why people convert to Islam has always generated the intense feeling. Earlier generations of European scholars believed that conversions to Islam were made at the point of the sword, and that conquered peoples were given the choice of conversion or death. It is now apparent that conversion by force, while not unknown in Muslim countries, was, in fact, rare. Muslim conquerors ordinarily wished to dominate rather than convert, and most conversions to Islam were voluntary. (...) In most cases, worldly and spiritual motives for conversion blended together. Moreover, conversion to Islam did not necessarily imply a complete turning from an old to a totally new life. While it entailed the acceptance of new religious beliefs and membership in a new religious community, most converts retained a deep attachment to the cultures and communities from which they came."[27]

The result, he points out, can be seen in the diversity of Muslim societies today, with varying manifestations and practices of Islam.

Conversion to Islam also came about as a result of the breakdown of historically-religiously organized societies: with the weakening of many churches, for example, and the favouring of Islam and the migration of substantial Muslim Turkish populations into the areas of Anatolia and the Balkans, the "social and cultural relevance of Islam" were enhanced and a large number of peoples were converted. This worked better in some areas (Anatolia) and less in others (such as the Balkans in which "the spread of Islam was limited by the vitality of the Christian churches".)[24]

During the Abbasid period, economic hardships, social disorder, and pressure from Muslim attackers, led to the mass conversion of Samaritans to Islam.[28]

Along with the religion of Islam, the Arabic language, Arabic numerals and Arab customs spread throughout the empire. A sense of unity grew among many though not all provinces and gradually formed the consciousness of a broadly Arab-Islamic population. What was recognizably an Islamic world had emerged by the end of the 10th century.[29] Throughout the period, as well as in the following centuries, divisions occurred between Persians and Arabs, and Sunnis and Shias, and unrest in provinces empowered local rulers at times.[26]

Seljuk and Ottoman states (950–1450)

[edit]

The expansion of Islam continued in the wake of Turkic conquests of Asia Minor, the Balkans and the Indian subcontinent.[22] The earlier period also saw the acceleration in the rate of conversions in the Muslim heartland, and in the wake of the conquests, the newly-conquered regions retained significant non-Muslim populations. That was contrast to the regions in which the boundaries of the Muslim world contracted, such as the Emirate of Sicily (Italy) and Al Andalus (Spain and Portugal), where Muslim populations were expelled or forced to Christianize in short order.[22] The latter period of that phase was marked by the Mongol invasion (particularly the Siege of Baghdad in 1258) and, after an initial period of persecution, the conversion of those conquerors to Islam.

Ottoman Empire (1299–1924)

[edit]
Territories in Central Europe under the Ottoman Empire, 1683

The Ottoman Empire defended its frontiers initially against threats from several sides: the Safavids in the east, the Byzantine Empire in the north until it vanished with the Conquest of Constantinople in 1453, and the great Catholic powers from the Mediterranean Sea: Spain, the Holy Roman Empire, and Venice with its eastern Mediterranean colonies.

Later, the Ottoman Empire set on to conquer territories from these rivals: Cyprus and other Greek islands (except Crete) were lost by Venice to the Ottomans, and the latter conquered territory up to the Danube basin as far as Hungary. Crete was conquered during the 17th century, but the Ottomans lost Hungary to the Holy Roman Empire, and other parts of Eastern Europe, which ended with the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699.[30]

The Ottoman sultanate was abolished on 1 November 1922 and the caliphate was abolished on 3 March 1924.[31]

20th and 21st centuries

[edit]

Islam has continued to spread through commerce and migrations, especially in Southeast Asia, America and Europe.[22]

Modern day Islamization appears to be a return of the individual to Muslim values, communities, and dress codes, and a strengthened community.[32]

Another development is that of transnational Islam, elaborated upon by the French Islam researchers Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy. It includes a feeling of a "growing universalistic Islamic identity" as often shared by Muslim immigrants and their children who live in non-Muslim countries:

The increased integration of world societies as a result of enhanced communications, media, travel, and migration makes meaningful the concept of a single Islam practiced everywhere in similar ways, and an Islam which transcends national and ethnic customs.[33]

This does not necessarily imply political or social organizations:

Global Muslim identity does not necessarily or even usually imply organized group action. Even though Muslims recognize a global affiliation, the real heart of Muslim religious life remains outside politics—in local associations for worship, discussion, mutual aid, education, charity, and other communal activities.[33]

A third development is the growth and elaboration of transnational military organizations. The 1980s and 90s, with several major conflicts in the Middle East, including the Arab–Israeli conflict, Afghanistan in the 1980s and 2001, and the three Gulf Wars (1980–88, 1990–91, 2003–2011) were catalysts of a growing internationalization of local conflicts.[citation needed] Figures such as Osama bin Laden and Abdallah Azzam have been crucial in these developments, as much as domestic and world politics.[33]

Character of conversion

[edit]

Muslim Arab expansion in the first centuries after Muhammad's death soon established dynasties in North Africa, West Africa, to the Middle East, and south to Somalia by the Companions of the Prophet, most notably the Rashidun Caliphate and military advents of Khalid Bin Walid, Amr ibn al-As, and Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas. The historic process of Islamization was complex and involved merging Islamic practices with local customs. This process took place over several centuries. Some scholars reject the stereotype that this process was initially "spread by the sword" or forced conversions.[34]

There are a number of historians who see the rule of the Umayyads as responsible for setting up the "dhimmah" to increase taxes from the dhimmis to benefit the Arab Muslim community financially and to discourage conversion.[35] Islam was initially associated with the Arabs' ethnic identity and required formal association with an Arab tribe and the adoption of the client status of mawali.[35] Governors lodged complaints with the caliph when he enacted laws that made conversion easier since that deprived the provinces of revenues from the tax on non-Muslims. An enfranchisement was experienced by the mawali during the Abbasid period, and a shift was made in the political conception from that of a primarily-Arab empire to one of a Muslim empire.[36] Around 930 a law was enacted that required all bureaucrats of the empire to be Muslims.[35] Both periods were also marked by significant migrations of Arab tribes outwards from the Arabian Peninsula into the new territories.[36]

Richard Bulliet's "conversion curve" shows a relatively low rate of conversion of non-Arab subjects during the Arab centric Umayyad period of 10%, in contrast with estimates for the more politically-multicultural Abbasid period, which saw the Muslim population grow from around 40% in the mid-9th century, with almost the entire population being converted by the end of the 11th century.[36] That theory does not explain the continuing existence of large minorities of Christians during the Abbasids.[original research?] Other estimates suggest that Muslims were not a majority in Egypt until the mid-10th century and in the Fertile Crescent until 1100. What is now Syria may have had a Christian majority until the Mongol invasions of the 13th century.[citation needed]

By region

[edit]
Age of the Caliphs
  Expansion under Muhammad, 622–632/A.H. 1–11
  Expansion during the Rashidun Caliphate, 632–661/A.H. 11–40
  Expansion during the Umayyad Caliphate, 661–750/A.H. 40–129

Arabia

[edit]

At Mecca, Muhammad is said to have received repeated embassies from various tribes.[37]

Greater Syria

[edit]

Like their Byzantine and late Sasanian predecessors, the Marwanid caliphs nominally ruled the various religious communities but allowed the communities' own appointed or elected officials to administer most internal affairs. Yet the Marwanids also depended heavily on the help of non-Arab administrative personnel and on administrative practices (e.g., a set of government bureaus). As the conquests slowed and the isolation of the fighters (muqatilah) became less necessary, it became more and more difficult to keep Arabs garrisoned. As the tribal links that had so dominated Umayyad politics began to break down, the meaningfulness of tying non-Arab converts to Arab tribes as clients was diluted; moreover, the number of non-Muslims who wished to join the ummah was already becoming too large for this process to work effectively.

Palestine

[edit]
The Dome of the Rock atop the Temple Mount in the Old City of Jerusalem

The Siege of Jerusalem (636–637) by the forces of the Rashid Caliph Umar against the Byzantines began in November 636. For four months, the siege continued. Ultimately, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem, Sophronius, an ethnic Arab,[38] agreed to surrender Jerusalem to Umar in person. The caliph, then in Medina, agreed to these terms and travelled to Jerusalem to sign the capitulation in the spring of 637.

Sophronius also negotiated a pact with Umar known as Umar's Assurance, allowing for the religious freedom for Christians in exchange for jizya, a tax to be paid by conquered non-Muslims, called dhimmis. Under Muslim rule, the Jewish and Christian population of Jerusalem in this period enjoyed the usual tolerance given to non-Muslim theists.[39][40]

Having accepted the surrender, Omar then entered Jerusalem with Sophronius "and courteously discoursed with the patriarch concerning its religious antiquities".[41] When the hour for his prayer came, Omar was in the Anastasis church, but refused to pray there, lest in the future Muslims should use that as an excuse to break the treaty and confiscate the church. The Mosque of Umar, opposite the doors of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, with the tall minaret, is known as the place to which he retired for his prayer.

Bishop Arculf, whose account of his pilgrimage to the Holy Land in the seventh century, De locis sanctis, written down by the monk Adamnan, described reasonably pleasant living conditions of Christians in Palestine in the first period of Muslim rule. The caliphs of Damascus (661-750) were tolerant princes who were on generally good terms with their Christian subjects. Many Christians, such as John of Damascus, held important offices at their court. The Abbasid caliphs at Baghdad (753-1242), as long as they ruled Syria, were also tolerant to Christians. Harun Abu Jaʻfar (786-809), sent the keys of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre to Charlemagne, who built a hospice for Latin pilgrims near the shrine.[39]

Rival dynasties and revolutions led to the eventual disunion of the Muslim world. In the ninth century, Palestine was conquered by the Fatimid Caliphate, whose capital was Cairo. Palestine once again became a battleground as the various enemies of the Fatimids counterattacked. At the same time, the Byzantines continued to attempt to regain their lost territories, including Jerusalem. Christians in Jerusalem who sided with the Byzantines were put to death for high treason by the ruling Shiʻi Muslims. In 969, the Patriarch of Jerusalem, John VII, was put to death for treasonous correspondence with the Byzantines.

As Jerusalem grew in importance to Muslims and pilgrimages increased, tolerance for other religions declined. Christians were persecuted and churches destroyed. The Sixth Fatimid caliph, al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah, 996–1021, who was believed to be "God made manifest" by his most zealous Shiʻi followers, now known as the Druze, destroyed the Holy Sepulchre in 1009. This powerful provocation helped ignite the flame of fury that led to the First Crusade.[39] The dynasty was later overtaken by Saladin of the Ayyubid dynasty.

Africa

[edit]

North Africa

[edit]
The Great Mosque of Kairouan, founded in 670 CE (the year 50 according to the Islamic calendar) by the Arab general and conqueror Uqba Ibn Nafi, is the oldest mosque in western Islamic lands[42] and represents an architectural symbol of the spread of Islam in North Africa, situated in Kairouan, Tunisia.

In Egypt conversion to Islam was initially considerably slower than in other areas such as Mesopotamia or Khurasan, with Muslims not thought to have become the majority until around the fourteenth century.[43] In the initial invasion, the victorious Muslims granted religious freedom to the Christian community in Alexandria, and the Alexandrians quickly recalled their exiled Monophysite patriarch to rule over them, subject only to the ultimate political authority of the conquerors. In such a fashion the city persisted as a religious community under an Arab Muslim domination more welcome and more tolerant than that of Byzantium.[44] (Other sources question how much the native population welcomed the conquering Muslims.)[45]

Byzantine rule was ended by the Arabs, who invaded Tunisia from 647 to 648[46] and Morocco in 682 in the course of their drive to expand the power of Islam. In 670, the Arab general and conqueror Uqba Ibn Nafi established the city of Kairouan (in Tunisia) and its Great Mosque also known as the Mosque of Uqba;[47] the Great Mosque of Kairouan is the ancestor of all the mosques in the western Islamic world.[42] Berber troops were used extensively by the Arabs in their conquest of Spain, which began in 711.

No previous conqueror had tried to assimilate the Berbers, but the Arabs quickly converted them and enlisted their aid in further conquests. Without their help, for example, Andalusia could never have been incorporated into the Islamic state. At first only Berbers nearer the coast were involved, but by the 11th century Muslim affiliation had begun to spread far into the Sahara and Sahel.[48]

The conventional historical view is that the conquest of North Africa by the Islamic Umayyad Caliphate between 647–709 CE effectively ended Catholicism in Africa for several centuries.[49] However, new scholarship has appeared that provides more nuance and details of the conversion of the Christian inhabitants to Islam. A Christian community is recorded in 1114 in Qal'a in central Algeria. There is also evidence of religious pilgrimages after 850 CE to tombs of Catholic saints outside of the city of Carthage, and evidence of religious contacts with Christians of Arab Spain. In addition, calendar reforms adopted in Europe at this time were disseminated amongst the indigenous Christians of Tunis, which would have not been possible had there been an absence of contact with Rome.

During the reign of Umar II, the then governor of Africa, Ismail ibn Abdullah, was said to have won the Berbers to Islam by his just administration, and other early notable missionaries include Abdallah ibn Yasin who started a movement which caused thousands of Berbers to accept Islam.[50]

Horn of Africa

[edit]
The port and waterfront of Zeila

The history of commercial and intellectual contact between the inhabitants of the Somalia and the Arabian Peninsula may help explain the Somali people's connection with Muhammad. The early Muslims fled to the port city of Zeila in modern-day Somaliland to seek protection from the Quraysh at the court of the Aksumite Emperor in present-day Ethiopia. Some of the Muslims that were granted protection are said to have then settled in several parts of the Horn region to promote the religion. The victory of the Muslims over the Quraysh in the 7th century had a significant impact on local merchants and sailors, as their trading partners in Arabia had then all adopted Islam, and the major trading routes in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea came under the sway of the Muslim Caliphs. Through commerce, Islam spread amongst the Somali population in the coastal cities. Instability in the Arabian peninsula saw further migrations of early Muslim families to the Somali seaboard. These clans came to serve as catalysts, forwarding the faith to large parts of the Horn region.[51]

East Africa

[edit]
Principal cities of East Africa, c. 1500. The Kilwa Sultanate held sway from Cape Correntes in the south to Malindi in the north.
The Great Mosque of Kilwa Kisiwani, made of coral stones, is the largest Mosque of its kind.

On the east coast of Africa, where Arab mariners had for many years journeyed to trade, mainly in slaves, Arabs founded permanent colonies on the offshore islands, especially on Zanzibar, in the 9th and 10th century. From there Arab trade routes into the interior of Africa helped the slow acceptance of Islam.

By the 10th century, the Kilwa Sultanate was founded by Ali ibn al-Hassan Shirazi (was one of seven sons of a ruler of Shiraz, Persia, his mother an Abyssinian slave girl. Upon his father's death, Ali was driven out of his inheritance by his brothers). His successors would rule the most powerful of Sultanates in the Swahili coast, during the peak of its expansion the Kilwa Sultanate stretched from Inhambane in the south to Malindi in the north. The 13th-century Muslim traveller Ibn Battuta noted that the great mosque of Kilwa Kisiwani was made of coral stone (the only one of its kind in the world).

In the 20th century, Islam grew in Africa both by birth and by conversion. The number of Muslims in Africa grew from 34.5 million in 1900 to 315 million in 2000, going from roughly 20% to 40% of the total population of Africa.[52] However, in the same time period, the number of Christians also grew in Africa, from 8.7 million in 1900 to 346 million in 2000, surpassing both the total population as well as the growth rate of Islam on the continent.[52][53]

Western Africa

[edit]
The Great Mosque of Djenné

The spread of Islam in Africa began in the 7th to 9th century, brought to North Africa initially under the Umayyad Dynasty. Extensive trade networks throughout North and West Africa created a medium through which Islam spread peacefully, initially through the merchant class. By sharing a common religion and a common transliteralization (Arabic), traders showed greater willingness to trust, and therefore invest, in one another.[54] Moreover, toward the 19th century, the Northern Nigeria based Sokoto Caliphate led by Usman dan Fodio exerted considerable effort in spreading Islam.[50]

Persia and the Caucasus

[edit]
Courtiers of the Persian prince Baysunghur playing chess in Ferdowsi's epic work known as the Shahnameh

It used to be argued that Zoroastrianism quickly collapsed in the wake of the Islamic conquest of Persia due to its intimate ties to the Sassanid state structure.[7] Now however, more complex processes are considered, in light of the more protracted time frame attributed to the progression of the ancient Persian religion to a minority; a progression that is more contiguous with the trends of the late antiquity period.[7] These trends are the conversions from the state religion that had already plagued the Zoroastrian authorities that continued after the Arab conquest, coupled with the migration of Arab tribes into the region during an extended period of time that stretched well into the Abbasid reign.[7]

A Persian miniature of Shah Abu'l Ma‘ali, a scholar

While there were cases such as the Sassanid army division at Hamra, that converted en masse before pivotal battles such as the Battle of al-Qādisiyyah, conversion was fastest[55] in the urban areas where Arab forces were garrisoned slowly leading to Zoroastrianism becoming associated with rural areas.[7] Still at the end of the Umayyad period, the Muslim community was only a minority in the region.[7]

Through the Muslim conquest of Persia, in the 7th century, Islam spread as far as the North Caucasus, which parts of it (notably Dagestan) were part of the Sasanid domains.[56] In the coming centuries, relatively large parts of the Caucasus became Muslim, while the larger swaths of it would still remain pagan (paganism branches such as the Circassian Habze) as well as Christian (notably Armenia and Georgia), for centuries. By the 16th century, most of the people of what are nowadays Iran and Azerbaijan had adopted the Shia branch of Islam through the conversion policies of the Safavids.[57]

Islam was readily accepted by Zoroastrians who were employed in industrial and artisan positions because, according to Zoroastrian dogma, such occupations that involved defiling fire made them impure.[50] Moreover, Muslim missionaries did not encounter difficulty in explaining Islamic tenets to Zoroastrians, as there were many similarities between the faiths. According to Thomas Walker Arnold, for the Persian, he would meet Ahura Mazda and Ahriman under the names of Allah and Iblis.[50] At times, Muslim leaders in their effort to win converts encouraged attendance at Muslim prayer with promises of money and allowed the Quran to be recited in Persian instead of Arabic so that it would be intelligible to all.[50]

Robert Hoyland argues that the missionary efforts of the relatively small number of Arab conquerors in Persian lands led to "much interaction and assimilation" between rulers and ruled, and to descendants of the conquerors adapting the Persian language and Persian festivals and culture,[58] (Persian being the language of modern-day Iran, while Arabic is spoken by its neighbors to the west.)

Central Asia

[edit]
Ghurid Empire ruled by Muhammad of Ghor and Ghiyath al-Din Muhammad

A number of the inhabitants of Afghanistan accepted Islam through Umayyad missionary efforts, particularly under the reign of Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik and Umar ibn Abdul Aziz.[59] Later, starting from the 9th century, the Samanids, whose roots stemmed from Zoroastrian theocratic nobility, propagated Sunni Islam and Islamo-Persian culture deep into the heart of Central Asia. The population within its areas began firmly accepting Islam in significant numbers, notably in Taraz, now in modern-day Kazakhstan. The first complete translation of the Qur'an into Persian occurred during the reign of Samanids in the 9th century. According to historians, through the zealous missionary work of Samanid rulers, as many as 30,000 tents of Turks came to profess Islam and later under the Ghaznavids higher than 55,000 under the Hanafi school of thought.[60] After the Saffarids and Samanids, the Ghaznavids re-conquered Transoxania, and invaded the Indian subcontinent in the 11th century. This was followed by the powerful Ghurids and Timurids who further expanded the culture of Islam and the Timurid Renaissance, reaching until Bengal.

Turkey

[edit]

Main articles: Arab-Byzantine Wars, Byzantine-Seljuq wars, Byzantine-Ottoman Wars.

Indian subcontinent

[edit]
A panorama in 12 folds showing an Eid ul-Fitr procession by Muslims in the Mughal Empire
The Age of the Islamic Gunpowders dominating western, central and South Asia

Islamic influence first came to be felt in the Indian subcontinent during the early 7th century with the advent of Arab traders. Arab traders used to visit the Malabar region, which was a link between them and the ports of South East Asia to trade even before Islam had been established in Arabia. According to Historians Elliot and Dowson in their book The History of India as told by its own Historians, the first ship bearing Muslim travelers was seen on the Indian coast as early as 630 CE. The first Indian mosque is thought to have been built in 629 CE, purportedly at the behest of an unknown Chera dynasty ruler, during the lifetime of Muhammad (c. 571–632) in Kodungallur, in district of Thrissur, Kerala by Malik Bin Deenar. In Malabar, Muslims are called Mappila.

In Bengal, Arab merchants helped found the Port of Chittagong. Early Sufi missionaries settled in the region as early as the 8th century.[61][62]

H. G. Rawlinson, in his book Ancient and Medieval History of India (ISBN 978-81-86050-79-8), claims the first Arab Muslims settled on the Indian coast in the last part of the 7th century. This fact is corroborated, by J. Sturrock in his South Kanara and Madras Districts Manuals,[63] and also by Haridas Bhattacharya in Cultural Heritage of India Vol. IV.[64]

The Arab merchants and traders became the carriers of the new religion and they propagated it wherever they went.[65] It was, however, the subsequent expansion of the Muslim conquest in the Indian subcontinent over the next millennia that established Islam in the region.

Mir Sayyid Ali, portrait of a young Indian Muslim scholar, writing a commentary on the Quran, during the reign of the Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan

Embedded within these lies the concept of Islam as a foreign imposition and Hinduism being natural condition of the natives who resisted, resulting in the failure of the project to Islamicize the Indian subcontinent is highly embroiled with the politics of the partition and communalism in India. Considerable controversy exists as to how conversion to Islam came about in the Indian subcontinent.[66] These are typically represented by the following schools of thought:[66]

  1. Conversion was a combination, initially by violence, threat or other pressure against the person.[66]
  2. As a socio-cultural process of diffusion and integration over an extended period of time into the sphere of the dominant Muslim civilization and global polity at large.[67]
  3. A related view is that conversions occurred for non-religious reasons of pragmatism and patronage such as social mobility among the Muslim ruling elite or for relief from taxes[66][67]
  4. Was a combination, initially made under duress followed by a genuine change of heart[66]
  5. That the bulk of Muslims are descendants of migrants from the Iranian plateau or Arabs.[67]
Emperor Aurangzeb, who memorised the Quran, with the help of several Arab and Iraqi scholars compiled the Fatawa-e-Alamgiri
A map of the Bruneian Empire in 1500[68]

Muslim missionaries played a key role in the spread of Islam in India with some missionaries even assuming roles as merchants or traders. For example, in the 9th century, the Ismailis sent missionaries across Asia in all directions under various guises, often as traders, Sufis and merchants. Ismailis were instructed to speak to potential converts in their own language. Some Ismaili missionaries traveled to India and employed effort to make their religion acceptable to the Hindus. For instance, they represented Ali as the tenth avatar of Vishnu and wrote hymns as well as a mahdi purana in their effort to win converts.[50] At other times, converts were won in conjunction with the propagation efforts of rulers. According to Ibn Batuta, the Khaljis encouraged conversion to Islam by making it a custom to have the convert presented to the Sultan who would place a robe on the convert and award him with bracelets of gold.[69] During Delhi Sultanate's Ikhtiyar Uddin Bakhtiyar Khilji's control of the Bengal, Muslim missionaries in India achieved their greatest success, in terms of number of converts to Islam.[70]

The Mughal Empire, founded by Babur, a direct descendant of Timur and Genghis Khan, was able to conquer almost the entirety of South Asia. Although religious tolerance was seen during the rule of emperor Akbar's, the reign under emperor Aurangzeb witnessed the full establishment of Islamic sharia and the re-introduction of Jizya (a special tax imposed upon non-Muslims) through the compilation of the Fatawa-e-Alamgiri.[71][72] The Mughals, already suffering a gradual decline in the early 18th century, was invaded by the Afsharid ruler Nader Shah.[73] The Mughal decline provided opportunities for the Maratha Empire, Sikh Empire, Mysore Kingdom, Nawabs of Bengal and Murshidabad and Nizams of Hyderabad to exercise control over large regions of the Indian subcontinent.[74] Eventually, after numerous wars sapped its strength, the Mughal Empire was broken into smaller powers like Shia Nawab of Bengal, the Nawab of Awadh, the Nizam of Hyderabad, and the Kingdom of Mysore, which became the major Asian economic and military power on the Indian subcontinent.[citation needed]

Southeast Asia

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Minaret of the Menara Kudus Mosque, influenced by both Islamic and mainly Hindu-Buddhist temple-like Javanese structure

Even before Islam was established amongst Indonesian communities, Muslim sailors and traders had often visited the shores of modern Indonesia, most of these early sailors and merchants arrived from the Abbasid Caliphate's newly established ports of Basra and Debal, many of the earliest Muslim accounts of the region note the presence of animals such as orang-utans, rhinos and valuable spice trade commodities such as cloves, nutmeg, galangal and coconut.[75]

A Muslim "Food jar" from the Philippines, also known as gadur, well known for its brass with silver inlay

Islam came to the Southeast Asia, first by the way of Muslim traders along the main trade-route between Asia and the Far East, then was further spread by Sufi orders and finally consolidated by the expansion of the territories of converted rulers and their communities.[76] The first communities arose in Northern Sumatra (Aceh) and the Malacca's remained a stronghold of Islam from where it was propagated along the trade routes in the region.[76] There is no clear indication of when Islam first came to the region, the first Muslim gravestone markings year 1082.[77]

When Marco Polo visited the area in 1292 he noted that the urban port state of Perlak was Muslim,[77] Chinese sources record the presence of a Muslim delegation to the emperor from the Kingdom of Samudra (Pasai) in 1282,[76] other accounts provide instances of Muslim communities present in the Melayu Kingdom for the same time period while others record the presence of Muslim Chinese traders from provinces such as Fujian.[77] The spread of Islam generally followed the trade routes east through the primarily Buddhist region and a half century later in the Malacca's we see the first dynasty arise in the form of the Sultanate of Malacca at the far end of the Archipelago form by the conversion of one Parameswara Dewa Shah into a Muslim and the adoption of the name Muhammad Iskandar Shah[78] after his marriage to a daughter of the ruler of Pasai.[76][77]

In 1380, Sufi orders carried Islam from here on to Mindanao.[citation needed] Java was the seat of the primary kingdom of the region, the Majapahit Empire, which was ruled by a Hindu dynasty. As commerce grew in the region with the rest of the Muslim world, Islamic influence extended to the court even as the empires political power waned and so by the time Raja Kertawijaya converted in 1475 at the hands of Sufi Sheikh Rahmat, the Sultanate was already of a Muslim character. In Vietnam, the Cham people proselytized due to contact with traders and missionaries from Kelantan.

Another driving force for the change of the ruling class in the region was the concept among the increasing Muslim communities of the region when ruling dynasties to attempt to forge such ties of kinship by marriage.[citation needed] By the time the colonial powers and their missionaries arrived in the 17th century the region up to New Guinea was overwhelmingly Muslim with animist minorities.[77]

Flags of the Sultanates in the East Indies

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Inner Asia and Eastern Europe

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Ilkhanate Empire ruler, Ghazan, studying the Quran (Azerbaijani culture)

In the mid 7th century CE, following the Muslim conquest of Persia, Islam penetrated into areas that would later become part of European Russia.[79] A centuries later example that can be counted amongst the earliest introductions of Islam into Eastern Europe came about through the work of an early 11th-century Muslim prisoner whom the Byzantines captured during one of their wars against Muslims. The Muslim prisoner was brought into the territory of the Pechenegs, where he taught and converted individuals to Islam.[80] Little is known about the timeline of the Islamization of Inner Asia and of the Turkic peoples who lay beyond the bounds of the caliphate. Around the 7th and 8th centuries some states of Turkic peoples existed - like the Turkic Khazar Khaganate (see Khazar-Arab Wars) and the Turkic Turgesh Khaganate, which fought against the caliphate in order to stop Arabization and Islamization in Asia. From the 9th century onwards, the Turks (at least individually, if not yet through adoption by their states) began to convert to Islam. Histories merely note the fact of pre-Mongol Central Asia's Islamization.[81] The Bulgars of the Volga (to whom the modern Volga Tatars trace their Islamic roots) adopted Islam by the 10th century.[81] under Almış. When the Franciscan friar William of Rubruck visited the encampment of Batu Khan of the Golden Horde, who had recently (in the 1240s) completed the Mongol invasion of Volga Bulgaria, he noted "I wonder what devil carried the law of Machomet there".[81]

Another contemporary institution identified as Muslim, the Qarakhanid dynasty of the Kara-Khanid Khanate, operated much further east,[81] established by Karluks who became Islamized after converting under Sultan Satuq Bughra Khan in the mid-10th century. However, the modern-day history of the Islamization of the region - or rather a conscious affiliation with Islam - dates to the reign of the ulus of the son of Genghis Khan, Jochi, who founded the Golden Horde,[82] which operated from the 1240s to 1502. Kazakhs, Uzbeks and some Muslim populations of the Russian Federation trace their Islamic roots to the Golden Horde[81] and while Berke Khan became the first Mongol monarch to officially adopt Islam and even to oppose his kinsman Hulagu Khan[81] in the defense of Jerusalem at the Battle of Ain Jalut (1263), only much later did the change became pivotal when the Mongols converted en masse[83] when a century later Uzbeg Khan (lived 1282–1341) converted - reportedly at the hands of the Sufi Saint Baba Tukles.[84]

Some of the Mongolian tribes became Islamized. Following the brutal Mongol invasion of Central Asia under Hulagu Khan and after the Battle of Baghdad (1258), Mongol rule extended across the breadth of almost all Muslim lands in Asia. The Mongols destroyed the caliphate and persecuted Islam, replacing it with Buddhism as the official state religion.[83] In 1295 however, the new Khan of the Ilkhanate, Ghazan, converted to Islam, and two decades later the Golden Horde under Uzbeg Khan (reigned 1313–1341) followed suit.[83] The Mongols had been religiously and culturally conquered; this absorption ushered in a new age of Mongol-Islamic synthesis[83] that shaped the further spread of Islam in central Asia and the Indian subcontinent.

In the 1330s, the Mongol ruler of the Chagatai Khanate (in Central Asia) converted to Islam, causing the eastern part of his realm (called Moghulistan) to rebel.[85] However, during the next three centuries these Buddhist, Shamanistic and Christian Turkic and Mongol nomads of the Kazakh Steppe and Xinjiang would also convert at the hands of competing Sufi orders from both east and west of the Pamirs.[85] The Naqshbandis are the most prominent of these orders, especially in Kashgaria, where the western Chagatai Khan was also a disciple of the order.[85]

Muslims of Central Asian origin played a major role in the Mongol conquest of China. Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar, a court official and general of Turkic origin who participated in the Mongol invasion of Southwest China, became Yuan Governor of Yunnan in 1274. A distinct Muslim community, the Panthays, was established in the region by the late 13th century.

Europe

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Tariq ibn Ziyad was a Muslim general who led the Islamic conquest of Visigothic Hispania in 711-718 A.D. He is considered to be one of the most important military commanders in Iberian history. The name "Gibraltar" is the Spanish derivation of the Arabic name Jabal Tāriq (جبل طارق) (meaning "mountain of Tariq"), named after him.

There are accounts of the trade connections between the Muslims and the Rus, apparently Vikings who made their way towards the Black Sea through Central Russia. On his way to Volga Bulgaria, Ibn Fadlan brought detailed reports of the Rus, claiming that some had converted to Islam.

According to the historian Yaqut al-Hamawi, the Böszörmény (Izmaelita or Ismaili / Nizari) denomination of the Muslims who lived in the Kingdom of Hungary in the 10th to 13th centuries, were employed as mercenaries by the kings of Hungary.

Hispania / Al-Andalus

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The interior of the Cathedral of Cordoba, formerly the Great Mosque of Córdoba was built in 742. It is one of the finest examples of Islamic architecture in the Umayyad style; inspired the design of other Mosques in Al-Andalus.

The history of Arab and Islamic rule in the Iberian peninsula is probably one of the most studied periods of European history. For centuries after the Arab conquest, European accounts of Arab rule in Iberia were negative. European points of view started changing with the Protestant Reformation, which resulted in new descriptions of the period of Islamic rule in Spain as a "golden age" (mostly as a reaction against Spain's militant Roman Catholicism after 1500).[citation needed]

The tide of Arab expansion after 630 rolled through North Africa up to Ceuta in present-day Morocco. Their arrival coincided with a period of political weakness in the three-centuries-old kingdom established in the Iberian peninsula by the Germanic Visigoths, who had taken over the region after seven centuries of Roman rule. Seizing the opportunity, an Arab-led (but mostly Berber) army invaded in 711, and by 720 had conquered the southern and central regions of the peninsula. The Arab expansion pushed over the mountains into southern France, and for a short period Arabs controlled the old Visigothic province of Septimania (centered on present-day Narbonne). The Arab Caliphate was pushed back by Charles Martel (Frankish Mayor of the Palace) at Poitiers, and Christian armies started pushing southwards over the mountains, until Charlemagne established in 801 the Spanish March (which stretched from Barcelona to present day Navarre).

A major development in the history of Muslim Spain was the dynastic change in 750 in the Arab Caliphate, when an Umayyad Prince escaped the slaughter of his family in Damascus, fled to Cordoba in Spain, and created a new Islamic state in the area. This was the start of a distinctly Spanish Muslim society, where large Christian and Jewish populations coexisted with an increasing percentage of Muslims. There are many stories of descendants of Visigothic chieftains and Roman counts whose families converted to Islam during this period. The at-first small Muslim elite continued to grow with converts, and with a few exceptions, rulers in Islamic Spain allowed Christians and Jews the right specified in the Koran to practice their own religions, though non-Muslims suffered from political and taxation inequities. The net result was, in those areas of Spain where Muslim rule lasted the longest, the creation of a society that was mostly Arabic-speaking because of the assimilation of native inhabitants, a process in some ways similar to the assimilation many years later of millions of immigrants to the United States into English-speaking culture. As the descendants of Visigoths and Hispano-Romans concentrated in the north of the peninsula, in the kingdoms of Asturias/Leon, Navarre and Aragon and started a long campaign known as the 'Reconquista' which started with the victory of the Christian armies in Covadonga in 722. Military campaigns continued without pause. In 1085 Alfonso VI of Castille took back Toledo. In 1212 the crucial Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa meant the recovery of the bulk of the peninsula for the Christian kingdoms. In 1238 James I of Aragon took Valencia. In 1236 the ancient Roman city of Cordoba was re-conquered by Ferdinand III of Castille and in 1248 the city of Seville. The famous medieval epic poem 'Cantar de Mio Cid' narrates the life and deeds of this hero during the Reconquista.

The Islamic state centered in Cordoba had ended up splintering into many smaller kingdoms (the so-called taifas). While Muslim Spain was fragmenting, the Christian kingdoms grew larger and stronger, and the balance of power shifted against the 'Taifa' kingdoms. The last Muslim kingdom of Granada in the south was finally taken in 1492 by Queen Isabelle of Castille and Ferdinand of Aragon. In 1499, the remaining Muslim inhabitants were ordered to convert or leave (at the same time the Jews were expelled). Poorer Muslims (Moriscos) who could not afford to leave ended up converting to Catholic Christianity and hiding their Muslim practices, hiding from the Spanish Inquisition, until their presence was finally extinguished.

Balkans

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In Balkan history, historical writing on the topic of conversion to Islam was, and still is, a highly charged political issue. It is intrinsically linked to the issues of formation of national identities and rival territorial claims of the Balkan states. The generally accepted nationalist discourse of the current Balkan historiography defines all forms of Islamization as results of the Ottoman government's centrally organized policy of conversion or dawah. The truth is that Islamization in each Balkan country took place in the course of many centuries, and its nature and phase was determined not by the Ottoman government but by the specific conditions of each locality. Ottoman conquests were initially military and economic enterprises, and religious conversions were not their primary objective. True, the statements surrounding victories all celebrated the incorporation of territory into Muslim domains, but the actual Ottoman focus was on taxation and making the realms productive, and a religious campaign would have disrupted that economic objective.

Ottoman Islamic standards of toleration allowed for autonomous "nations" (millets) in the Empire, under their own personal law and under the rule of their own religious leaders. As a result, vast areas of the Balkans remained mostly Christian during the period of Ottoman domination. In fact, the Eastern Orthodox Churches had a higher position in the Ottoman Empire, mainly because the Patriarch resided in Istanbul and was an officer of the Ottoman Empire. In contrast, Roman Catholics, while tolerated, were suspected of loyalty to a foreign power (the Papacy). It is no surprise that the Roman Catholic areas of Bosnia, Kosovo and northern Albania, ended up with more substantial conversions to Islam. The defeat of the Ottomans in 1699 by the Austrians resulted in their loss of Hungary and present-day Croatia. The remaining Muslim converts in both elected to leave "lands of unbelief" and moved to territory still under the Ottomans. Around this point in time, new European ideas of romantic nationalism started to seep into the Empire, and provided the intellectual foundation for new nationalistic ideologies and the reinforcement of the self-image of many Christian groups as subjugated peoples.

As a rule, the Ottomans did not require followers of Greek Orthodoxy to become Muslims, although many did so in order to avert the socioeconomic hardships of Ottoman rule.[86] One by one, the Balkan nationalities asserted their independence from the Empire, and frequently the presence of members of the same ethnicity who had converted to Islam presented a problem from the point of view of the now dominant new national ideology, which narrowly defined the nation as members of the local dominant Orthodox Christian denomination.[87] Some Muslims in the Balkans chose to leave, while many others were forcefully expelled to what was left of the Ottoman Empire.[87] This demographic transition can be illustrated by the decrease in the number of mosques in Belgrade, from over 70 in 1750 (before Serbian independence in 1815), to only three in 1850.

Immigration

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Since the 1960s, many Muslims have migrated to Western Europe. They have arrived as immigrants, guest workers, asylum seekers or as part of family reunification. As a result, the Muslim population in Europe has steadily risen.

A Pew Forum study, published in January 2011, forecast an increase of the proportion of Muslims in the European population from 6% in 2010 to 8% in 2030.[88]

See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The spread of Islam denotes the propagation of the monotheistic founded by in 7th-century Arabia, which expanded via military campaigns, commercial networks, and socio-economic pressures to claim approximately 2 billion adherents globally by 2020. Initiated after Muhammad's death in 632 CE, the Rashidun Caliphs oversaw conquests that dismantled the and seized Byzantine territories in the , , and , creating an empire stretching from the to the Atlantic within a century. Successor Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties extended dominion to Iberia, , and northwest , while maritime and overland disseminated the faith to and , where adoption often proceeded independently of armed incursions. Conversion patterns revealed slow, multi-generational shifts driven by exemptions from the levied on non-Muslims, intermarriage, and elite emulation, though direct coercion manifested in specific contexts like tribal submissions or later Ottoman practices, contradicting the Quranic injunction against compulsion in religion.

Origins and Initial Spread

Terminology and Definitions

Islam derives from the Arabic root s-l-m, connoting submission or surrender, specifically to the will of as revealed through the to in 7th-century Arabia. This etymology underscores the religion's core tenet of total obedience to divine commandments, distinguishing it from pre-Islamic Arabian and tribal customs. A Muslim, from the active participle of the same root, denotes "one who submits," referring to adherents who affirm the (declaration of faith: "There is no god but , and is His messenger"). In the context of Islam's initial dissemination, da'wah—literally "invitation" or "summons" in —refers to the proactive call to embrace the faith, as exemplified by Muhammad's public preaching in from 610 CE onward. This propagation relied on verbal exhortation, persuasion, and example rather than in the prophetic phase, though it faced opposition leading to the hijra (emigration). The hijra, occurring in 622 CE, marked Muhammad's migration with followers from to to evade persecution, establishing the first Islamic polity and initiating the Muslim . The emerged as the transnational community of believers, supplanting Arabian tribal (qabilah) loyalties with bonds of faith, as articulated in the Medinan of 622 CE, which united Muslims, Jews, and others under a shared covenant. , from the root j-h-d meaning "to strive" or "exert effort," encompassed both internal spiritual struggle (jihad al-nafs) and external defensive warfare in early , such as the in 624 CE, where 313 Muslims confronted a Meccan force of about 1,000 to protect the nascent community. These terms frame the causal dynamics of 's origins: da'wah initiated voluntary adherence, hijra enabled survival and governance, ummah fostered unity, and secured expansion against hostility.

Prophetic Era and Arabian Peninsula (610–632)

ibn Abdullah, born around CE in , began receiving revelations from the angel in CE while meditating in the Cave of Hira, marking the inception of as a monotheistic faith emphasizing submission to one God (Allah) and rejection of polytheism. These revelations, later compiled as the , initially attracted a small circle of converts including his wife Khadijah, cousin Ali ibn Abi Talib, and friend , totaling perhaps a few dozen by 613 CE when public preaching commenced. Opposition arose swiftly from the tribe, Mecca's dominant clan controlling trade and the pilgrimage site, who viewed the message as a threat to , ancestral traditions, and economic interests tied to ; early Muslims faced boycotts, , and social , prompting some to seek refuge in around 615 CE. By 622 CE, intensified persecution led to the Hijra (migration) of and approximately 70-100 followers to Yathrib (later ), invited by local tribes seeking arbitration amid feuds; this event established the first Muslim polity, with drafting the to govern relations among Muslims, Jews, and pagans, fostering communal solidarity and laying groundwork for expansion. In , the community grew through alliances, raids on Meccan caravans for sustenance, and military engagements; the in March 624 CE saw 313 Muslims defeat a force of about 1,000, boosting morale and attracting converts via demonstrated divine favor, though estimates of Muslim numbers remained under 1,000. Setbacks followed, including the in 625 CE where tactical errors led to Muslim losses against 3,000 , and the in 627 CE, where a coalition siege of failed due to defensive innovations, weakening Meccan prestige and prompting Jewish tribe expulsions for alleged treason. The Treaty of Hudaybiyyah in 628 CE with allowed pilgrimage access and a ten-year truce, enabling peaceful proselytizing; its violation by a Meccan ally in 630 CE precipitated the bloodless with 10,000 Muslims, where destroyed 360 idols in the , granting to most opponents and securing submission. This victory triggered widespread tribal delegations from across Arabia pledging allegiance () in 631 CE, drawn by military success, economic incentives like trade protections, and the appeal of a unifying transcending tribal feuds; by 's death on June 8, 632 CE, had nominally unified central Arabia's tribes through conversion, alliance, or subjugation, though adherence varied and loomed post-mortem. Traditional accounts, derived from 8th-9th century compilations like Ibn Ishaq's Sirah, emphasize spiritual causation but reflect later Islamic framing; modern scholarship notes the role of pragmatic power consolidation amid Arabia's fragmented structure, with no contemporary non-Muslim corroboration surviving.

Early Conquests and Caliphates (632–750)

Rashidun Caliphate Expansions (632–661)

Following the death of on June 8, 632 CE, was elected as the first caliph of the . He immediately confronted the (632–633 CE), a series of rebellions by Arabian tribes renouncing or withholding zakat payments. dispatched armies, including under , to suppress these uprisings; key engagements included the Battle of Yamama in December 632 CE, where forces defeated the false prophet , though at the cost of around 1,200 Muslim casualties. By mid-633 CE, Arabia was unified under central Islamic authority, enabling outward expansions. Under the second caliph, Umar ibn al-Khattab (r. 634–644 CE), military campaigns targeted the weakened Byzantine and Sassanid empires. In the Levant, Rashidun forces invaded Syria in 634 CE, culminating in the Battle of Yarmouk (August 636 CE), where approximately 20,000–40,000 Muslims defeated a Byzantine army of up to 100,000, securing control over Syria, Palestine, and Jerusalem by 638 CE after the city's peaceful surrender. Concurrently, in Mesopotamia, the Battle of al-Qadisiyyah (late 636 CE) saw 30,000 Muslims under Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas rout a larger Sassanid force, leading to the fall of the Persian capital Ctesiphon in 637 CE. Further victories, including the Battle of Nahavand (642 CE), facilitated the conquest of much of Persia by 651 CE, though full subjugation extended into Uthman's reign. Egypt was invaded by Amr ibn al-As in 639 CE, with Alexandria captured by 642 CE, incorporating the province into the caliphate. The third caliph, ibn Affan (r. 644–656 CE), oversaw continued territorial gains despite growing internal dissent. Naval raids captured in 649 CE, while armies pushed into (conquered 653–655 CE) and initiated incursions into , reaching Tripoli by 647 CE. These expansions relied on mobile Arab tribal armies, leveraging superior morale, , and the exhaustion of Byzantine and Sassanid forces from prior wars. Under Ali ibn Abi Talib (r. 656–661 CE), the focus shifted to civil strife during the , including the (656 CE) and (657 CE) against Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan. No significant external conquests occurred, as resources were diverted to internal conflicts, ending the era of rapid expansion with Ali's assassination in 661 CE.

Umayyad Caliphate Conquests (661–750)

The , founded by in 661 after the , centralized power in and initiated a phase of rapid territorial expansion that more than doubled the realm's extent from the era. Under caliphs like Abd al-Malik (r. 685–705) and his son (r. 705–715), military campaigns targeted Byzantine remnants in , Berber tribes in , Visigothic , Hindu kingdoms in , and Turkic principalities in , incorporating regions spanning from the Atlantic to the . These conquests relied on Arab tribal armies supplemented by Berber and converted auxiliaries, employing mobile cavalry tactics and siege warfare to subdue fortified cities and open-field armies. In , Uqba ibn Nafi's expeditions from 670 onward pushed beyond , establishing the garrison city of in 670 as a base for further advances against Byzantine and Berber resistance, though Uqba was killed in 683 near . Hasan ibn al-Nu'man recaptured in 698 and defeated Berber coalitions, while consolidated control from 705 to 709, subduing the Rif Mountains and reaching by 710, thus securing the up to the Atlantic coast. These victories facilitated the 711 invasion of Iberia, where , under Musa's orders, landed with approximately 7,000 troops and decisively defeated the Visigothic King at the (July 19, 711), opening to Muslim rule; Musa followed with reinforcements, capturing Toledo and by 712. Eastward expansions under included the conquest of by , who in 711 defeated Raja Dahir at the Battle of and , then besieged and took in 712, establishing Arab control over the Indus Valley and introducing Islamic administration with taxation on non-Muslims. In , launched campaigns from 705, capturing in 709 after multiple sieges, in 712 following the Battle of Talas precursors, and extending to the Jaxartes River by 715, incorporating Sogdian cities through a mix of , tribute extraction, and against local governors and Turkic nomads. Northern frontiers saw raids into the against and , with temporary gains reversed by counteroffensives. Despite setbacks, such as the failed Second Siege of Constantinople (717–718), where a combined Arab fleet and army of over 100,000 was repelled by and Byzantine defenses, resulting in heavy losses, the Umayyad conquests created a vast empire of 5.79 million square miles by 715, fostering the gradual spread of Islam through military garrisons, economic incentives for conversion, and the system's protections and poll taxes that encouraged assimilation over generations. Overextension, tribal rivalries, and revolts like the (740–743) ultimately contributed to the dynasty's fall in 750 to the Abbasids, but the territorial framework endured.

Medieval Islamic Expansion (750–1500)

Abbasid Caliphate and Cultural Diffusion (750–1258)

The Abbasid Caliphate was established in 750 following the Abbasid Revolution, which overthrew the Umayyad dynasty through a revolt initiated in 747 in Khurasan and culminating in the defeat of Umayyad forces at the Battle of the Zab. The new rulers, descendants of Abbas ibn Abd al-Muttalib, the Prophet Muhammad's uncle, positioned themselves as restorers of orthodox Islam, emphasizing piety and inclusion of non-Arab Muslims (mawali) who had been marginalized under Umayyad Arab-centric policies. Under Caliph al-Mansur (r. 754–775), the capital was relocated to the newly founded city of Baghdad in 762, a circular planned metropolis on the Tigris River designed to centralize administration and symbolize Abbasid authority. This shift eastward from Damascus facilitated greater integration of Persian and Central Asian influences, consolidating Islamic rule over territories stretching from North Africa to Central Asia. The Abbasid era (750–1258) marked a period of cultural and intellectual efflorescence, often termed the , where patronage of scholarship drove the translation and synthesis of knowledge from Greek, Persian, Indian, and Syriac sources into . The (Bayt al-Hikma) in , established under Caliph (r. 786–809) and expanded by (r. 813–833), served as a major intellectual hub, employing translators and scholars to render works by , , and , fostering advancements in fields like —such as al-Khwarizmi's development of around 820—and medicine, exemplified by al-Razi's (Rhazes) clinical observations and pharmacological texts. Astronomy benefited from observatories and refinements to the , while philosophical debates integrated Islamic with rational inquiry, attracting diverse scholars and disseminating as a of science. This elevated the prestige of Islamic civilization, encouraging voluntary conversions among elites and urban populations who sought access to administrative roles and tax relief—converting Muslims paid (typically lighter than ) and gained —while non-Muslims retained status with protections in exchange for the and restrictions on public worship. Conversion rates accelerated in core regions like and Persia by the , with comprising majorities in urban centers due to intermarriage, economic incentives, and the appeal of the ummah's egalitarian ethos over prior tribal hierarchies, though rural and frontier areas saw slower, often trade-mediated Islamization. Abbasid policies maintained the dhimma pact, granting non- (primarily , , and Zoroastrians) autonomy in personal law and employment in bureaucracy—such as Nestorian in translation roles—but imposed as a financial disincentive to retention of minority faiths, contributing to gradual demographic shifts without widespread forced conversions. The caliphs' sponsorship of madrasas and libraries further embedded Islamic norms in education, promoting that indirectly advanced Islam's spread through prestige and institutional dominance rather than solely military means. By the 10th century, Abbasid authority waned amid fiscal strains, provincial revolts, and Shia Buyid dynasty's de facto control from 945, reducing caliphs to figureheads while Sunni Seljuk Turks assumed military sultans from 1055. Internal fragmentation and Crusader pressures compounded vulnerabilities, culminating in the led by Hulagu Khan, who besieged and sacked in 1258, massacring inhabitants—including Caliph —and destroying libraries, effectively ending the caliphate's political and cultural centrality. Despite this cataclysm, the Abbasid-era diffusion of knowledge via translated texts and scholarly networks laid foundations for later Islamic expansions in regions like and , where cultural prestige facilitated conversions through trade and Sufi orders.

Seljuk, Ayyubid, and Regional Dynasties (950–1250)

The Seljuk Turks, originating as Oghuz nomads from Central Asia, converted to Sunni Islam by the late 10th century and rapidly expanded their influence across Persia and Iraq. Under Tughril Beg, they defeated the Buyids and entered Baghdad in 1055, securing recognition from the Abbasid Caliph al-Qa'im as protectors of the Sunni caliphate, which facilitated their legitimation as rulers over Muslim territories. This alliance marked a shift toward Sunni revival, countering Shia influences, and enabled further conquests, including the decisive victory at the Battle of Manzikert in 1071 against the Byzantine Empire, which opened Anatolia to mass Turkish migration and settlement. The influx of Turkic Muslim warriors and families into previously Christian-majority Anatolia initiated a process of gradual Islamization through military garrisons, intermarriage, and the establishment of Muslim principalities, transforming the region's demographic and religious landscape over subsequent centuries. The Seljuk Empire fragmented into regional branches, such as the Sultanate of Rum in Anatolia, which continued to fortify Islamic rule amid Crusader incursions and Byzantine remnants. Their patronage of madrasas and support for orthodox Sunni scholars reinforced Islamic doctrine and education, contributing to cultural diffusion and voluntary conversions among local populations incentivized by social integration under Muslim governance. By the mid-12th century, Seljuk domains extended from Central Asia to the Levant, solidifying Islam's presence in diverse ethnic regions through administrative iqta' systems that tied land grants to military service and Islamic loyalty. The , founded by the Kurdish Muslim Salah ad-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub (), emerged in 1171 after he abolished the Shia in and proclaimed allegiance to the Sunni Abbasid Caliph. consolidated power by conquering between 1174 and 1186, uniting , , northern , and parts of under centralized Ayyubid rule. His campaigns culminated in the victory at the on July 4, 1187, followed by the recapture of on October 2, 1187, from Crusader forces, which expelled Latin Christian control and reasserted Islamic sovereignty over key holy sites. The Ayyubids promoted Sunni orthodoxy by founding numerous madrasas, such as those in and , and suppressing Ismaili Shia elements, fostering religious uniformity and scholarship that aided the integration of diverse Muslim populations. Regional dynasties further extended Islamic frontiers during this era. In the east, the Ghaznavids (977–1186), under Mahmud of Ghazni, conducted 17 raids into northern India starting in 1001, sacking temples like Somnath in 1025 and capturing thousands of Hindu and Buddhist slaves, some of whom converted to Islam under captivity or incentives, while establishing Muslim outposts in Punjab. The subsequent Ghurid dynasty (1148–1215), based in modern Afghanistan, advanced these efforts; Muhammad of Ghor invaded India from 1175, conquering Multan in 1175, Lahore, and defeating Prithviraj Chauhan at the Second Battle of Tarain in 1192, securing Delhi and laying the foundation for the Delhi Sultanate. Ghurid forces destroyed Buddhist monasteries and Hindu temples across the Gangetic Plain, including in Banaras, accelerating the decline of non-Muslim institutions and promoting Islam through military dominance and settlement of Muslim administrators and soldiers, which over time led to demographic shifts via conversions motivated by dhimmi taxes and elite emulation. These conquests marked the onset of sustained Muslim rule in the Indian subcontinent, transitioning from raid-based extraction to territorial governance that embedded Islamic law and culture. In and , Berber dynasties like the Almoravids (c. 1040–1147) and Almohads (1121–1269) consolidated and expanded Islamic authority, reconquering territories from Christian kingdoms in Iberia, such as the Almohad victory at Alarcos in 1195, while enforcing stricter Maliki Sunni doctrine that reinforced Islam's dominance over Berber tribes and urban centers. These efforts sustained the Islamization of the , building on earlier Arab conquests through campaigns and tribal alliances, ensuring the region's adherence to Islamic governance amid internal fragmentation.

Mongol Invasions and Recovery (1200–1500)

The Mongol invasions of the Islamic world began in 1219 under , targeting the Khwarezmian Empire after its ruler Muhammad II executed Mongol envoys, leading to the conquest of major cities like and by 1221 and the near-total destruction of Khwarezmian Muslim polities. These campaigns, driven by Mongol imperial expansion rather than religious antagonism, resulted in the deaths of an estimated 2-4 million in the region, depopulating agricultural heartlands and disrupting trade routes central to Islamic economies. The invasions fragmented Muslim political authority in and Persia, replacing established dynasties with Mongol overlordship while initially preserving local administrative structures under non-Muslim rulers who imposed heavy tribute. Under Hulagu Khan, Genghis's grandson, the Mongols advanced westward, defeating the Nizari Ismailis in 1256 and besieging Baghdad in January 1258, where Abbasid Caliph Al-Musta'sim surrendered after a 13-day siege. The ensuing sack saw the city's population—estimated at 800,000 to 1 million—reduced by massacres, with reports of 200,000-800,000 killed, the Tigris running black with ink from destroyed libraries and red with blood. This event terminated the Abbasid Caliphate's temporal power, symbolizing the collapse of centralized Islamic authority in the eastern caliphate, though a puppet caliphate persisted in Cairo under Mamluk protection. The destruction targeted intellectual centers, including the House of Wisdom, exacerbating a decline in scientific output, as evidenced by reduced manuscript production and migration of scholars westward to Syria and Egypt. Initial Mongol rule in Persia and via the (established 1256) remained pagan or shamanistic, fostering resentment among Muslim subjects through policies like tax exemptions for non-Muslims and suppression of religious endowments, which slowed Islamic institutional recovery. However, elite conversions began in the 1260s, accelerated by inter-khanate rivalries and Sufi influences; the Golden Horde's adopted around 1313, influencing Ilkhanid policy. The pivotal shift occurred in 1295 when Ilkhan Khan, facing rebellions and advised by Muslim viziers like Rashid al-Din, converted to on June 16, proclaiming it the and ordering mass conversions among nobles. 's reforms included abolishing non-Islamic taxes, building madrasas, and patronizing Persianate Islamic scholarship, integrating Mongol governance with elements and stabilizing rule over a Muslim-majority populace of approximately 5-10 million. Post-Ilkhanate fragmentation after 1335 led to local dynasties in Persia, but recovery accelerated under (Tamerlane), a Turco-Mongol Muslim who rose in by 1370, claiming Genghisid legitimacy while framing conquests as . 's campaigns from 1380-1405 subdued Persia, the , and parts of , culminating in the 1398 sack of , where he massacred 100,000 prisoners to deter resistance, yet spared Muslim holy sites and imposed Islamic governance. His empire, spanning from to the Indus, facilitated the spread of among nomadic tribes in through forced resettlements and patronage of , with Timurid rulers like (1405-1447) and promoting centers in , blending Persian-Islamic culture with Mongol military traditions. By 1500, these dynamics had Islamized Mongol successor states, extending Islamic political and cultural influence into the steppes despite earlier devastations, as Mongol khans' adoption of unified diverse polities under shared religious law.

Gunpowder Empires and Consolidation (1500–1924)

Ottoman Empire's Territorial Growth (1299–1924)

The originated as a small Turkic principality in northwestern around 1299, founded by , who led ghazi warriors motivated by Islamic expansion against Byzantine territories. Early gains included the capture of in 1326 under Osman's son , establishing it as the first capital, and crossings into Europe via Gallipoli in 1354, followed by the seizure of Adrianople () in 1361, which became a key base for Balkan incursions. These advances displaced Byzantine control and integrated Muslim settlers, laying groundwork for Islam's foothold in through military colonization and frontier doctrines. Under (r. 1362–1389), the empire consolidated and Macedonia, defeating a Serbian-led coalition at the in 1389, which opened central despite heavy losses. (r. 1389–1402) accelerated expansion, annexing by 1393 and besieging in 1394–1396, though halted by Timur's invasion in 1402, which temporarily fragmented Ottoman holdings. Recovery under (r. 1413–1421) and (r. 1421–1444, 1446–1451) restored momentum, with victories at Varna (1444) against Crusader forces, enabling further penetration into and . The pivotal conquest of on May 29, 1453, by (r. 1444–1446, 1451–1481) ended the , renaming the city and establishing Ottoman dominance over the straits, which facilitated trade and administrative centralization under Islamic governance. This event symbolized Islam's enduring presence in former Christian heartlands, with styling himself as "the Conqueror" and patronizing mosques and madrasas to embed Sunni institutions. Selim I (r. 1512–1520) shifted focus eastward, defeating the Safavid Shia forces at Chaldiran in 1514 and conquering the by 1517, annexing , , the (including and custodianship), and parts of , thereby unifying much of the Arab Islamic world under Ottoman Sunni caliphal claims from 1517 onward. This secured control over key routes and Islamic holy sites, reinforcing the empire's role as defender of orthodox against Persian rivals. Under I (r. 1520–1566), territorial zenith was reached with the capture of in 1521, decisive victory at in 1526 subjugating , and sieges of in 1529 and 1532, extending influence to while incorporating diverse Muslim converts via the system, which conscripted and Islamized Christian youths for elite corps. Naval dominance under Barbarossa integrated , , and Tripoli by the 1530s–1540s, projecting power across the Mediterranean and North African coasts, where local Muslim corsair states aligned with Ottoman . In the , Ottoman rule from the 14th to 19th centuries spurred gradual Islamization, particularly in Bosnia, , where conversions peaked due to tax exemptions ( avoidance), land grants to Muslim settlers, and social advancement for elites, rather than mass coercion, resulting in Muslim majorities in these regions by the . Turcoman tribal migrations and Sufi orders further disseminated Islamic practices amid frontier warfare. Peak extent circa 1683 spanned three continents: , the to Hungary's borders, the , , , and North African regencies, encompassing over 2 million square kilometers and 20–30 million subjects, with as the shaping legal (Sharia-influenced) and military structures. Subsequent stagnation followed the failed Vienna siege of 1683 and the (1699), which ceded and parts of the to Habsburgs and Venetians, marking the end of major gains. 19th-century nationalist revolts eroded territories: gained autonomy in 1815–1830, independence in 1830, and in 1878 via the Treaty of Berlin, while under (r. 1805–1849) achieved de facto independence by 1841. (1912–1913) stripped remaining European holdings except , and World War I alliances led to (1916–1918) losses in the , culminating in the empire's partition under the 1920 and abolition on November 1, 1922, with the ended in 1924. Despite decline, Ottoman expansion enduringly embedded in Balkan demographics and Arab administrative traditions, with legacy communities persisting amid post-imperial nation-states.

Safavid Persia and Mughal India (1501–1857)

The , established in 1501 by after his conquest of , marked a pivotal shift in the religious landscape of Persia by declaring the official state religion of the empire. Prior to this, the region had been predominantly Sunni under various dynasties, with Shiism representing a minority sect. , claiming descent from the Seventh , mobilized Safavid forces—initially a Sufi order militarized into warriors—to enforce this doctrine, initiating a campaign of systematic conversion that transformed into a Shia-majority territory. This conversion process involved coercive measures, including the expulsion or execution of Sunni ulama, destruction of Sunni institutions, and incentives or threats compelling the populace to adopt Twelver rituals such as public cursing of the first three caliphs. By the reign of Shah Abbas I (1588–1629), these policies had solidified Shiism's dominance, with estimates suggesting that over the , the majority of Iran's population shifted allegiance, though resistance persisted in Sunni strongholds like and among nomadic tribes. The Safavids' state-sponsored importation of Shia scholars from and further institutionalized Twelver , embedding it in governance and society until the dynasty's decline in 1736. In parallel, the in , founded by in 1526 following his victory at , extended Islamic rule over a vast Hindu-majority subcontinent, but its impact on widespread conversion was more limited compared to the Safavids' transformative efforts. Under (r. 1556–1605), policies emphasized , including the abolition of the tax on non-Muslims in 1564 and the promotion of a syncretic that incorporated elements of , , and other faiths, which discouraged aggressive proselytization. This approach fostered administrative integration but resulted in minimal demographic shifts, with Muslim populations growing primarily through elite conversions and immigration rather than mass coercion. Genetic studies indicate that Islam's expansion in involved predominantly with limited from West Asian populations. Subsequent rulers like (r. 1658–1707) adopted stricter orthodox policies, reimposing in 1679 and destroying select Hindu temples to assert Islamic supremacy, yet these measures failed to significantly alter the subcontinent's religious composition. By the mid-18th century, Muslims constituted approximately 15% of India's population, concentrated in urban centers and the northwest, reflecting incremental growth via Sufi missions and economic incentives rather than wholesale conversion. The Mughal era thus consolidated Muslim political dominance from 1526 to 1857, when British forces deposed the last emperor, but left the majority Hindu demographic intact, underscoring the limits of imperial coercion in diverse societies. Both empires, as part of the Islamic gunpowder triad alongside the Ottomans, leveraged and centralized administration to expand and defend territories, thereby stabilizing Islamic governance amid sectarian and confessional challenges. However, the Safavids' success in sectarian reconfiguration contrasted with the Mughals' maintenance of pluralism, highlighting varied causal dynamics in Islamic consolidation: doctrinal in Persia versus pragmatic coexistence in .

Mechanisms of Spread

Military Conquest and Jihad Doctrine

The doctrine of , derived from imperatives and prophetic example, framed military action as a religious obligation to combat unbelief and establish Islamic dominance. In its martial dimension, known as jihad al-sayf or " of the sword," it encompassed both defensive warfare against aggressors and offensive campaigns to subdue non-Muslims, as articulated in verses such as 9:29, which commands fighting against those who do not believe in until they pay the tax in submission. This interpretation, rooted in Medinan surahs revealed after Muhammad's migration in 622 CE, authorized expansion beyond Arabia, distinguishing from mere secular war (harb) by tying it to divine unity and the ummah's supremacy. Early jurists like those in the Hanafi and Maliki schools classified such offensive as a collective duty (fard kifaya) on the Muslim community to propagate faith and weaken , enabling conquests that integrated vast territories under caliphal rule. Under , manifested in over 80 military expeditions (ghazawat and sariya), including the in 624 CE, where 313 Muslims defeated a Meccan force of 1,000, and the in 630 CE, which unified Arabia without widespread forced conversions but through subjugation and treaty terms favoring Islam. Following his death in 632 CE, Caliph invoked to suppress the (632–633 CE) against apostate tribes, then redirected forces outward; by 636 CE, the Battle of Yarmouk routed 40,000–100,000 Byzantine troops with 20,000–40,000 Arab fighters, securing . successors conquered Sassanid Persia by 651 CE, extinguishing the Zoroastrian empire after battles like Qadisiyyah (636–637 CE), and by 642 CE under , with surrendering after minimal resistance due to Byzantine exhaustion from prior wars. These campaigns, often outnumbered yet victorious through mobility and morale fueled by promises of paradise for martyrs and spoils (ghanimah), expanded Islamic control from Iberia to within a century. Umayyad Caliphs (661–750 CE) institutionalized as state policy, launching annual raids (sawa'if) into and further conquests, including by 709 CE and the in 711 CE under , who defeated Visigothic King at Guadalete with 7,000–12,000 Berber-Muslim troops. The doctrine justified these offensives not merely as defensive—despite claims in some apologetic scholarship—but as proactive imperatives to invite submission (da'wa) followed by combat if rejected, as per 8:39 and 9:5, which urge fighting until "no fitnah remains" and prevails. Empirical patterns reveal low immediate conversion rates post-conquest, with Islamization accelerating via systemic pressures rather than battlefield coercion alone, yet military victory dismantled rival polities, creating status for non-Muslims under protection taxes. Later empires, like the Ottomans, revived jihad fatwas for campaigns such as the 1453 , where II's forces overwhelmed Byzantine defenses, fulfilling prophetic hadiths on conquering the city. This doctrinal continuity underscores jihad's causal role in territorial spread, though interpretive debates persist, with classical texts prioritizing expansionary over strictly defensive paradigms.

Trade Networks, Sufi Missions, and Voluntary Conversion

Muslim merchants facilitated the spread of along extensive trade routes, particularly in the and networks, where conversion offered economic advantages such as access to intra-Muslim commercial partnerships and reduced transaction costs. Muslim merchants often spread Islam through demonstrations of honesty, ethical conduct, and personal character, attracting conversions independently of formal dawah efforts, as evidenced by historical accounts in regions like and . By the mid-, Muslim control of key segments of the ensured that long-distance trade traversed Islamic territories, incentivizing local elites and traders in regions like and to adopt for expanded networks and protection. In , Arab traders established permanent settlements along the from the onward, introducing through in goods like , , and slaves, with archaeological evidence of mosques dating to the in sites such as Kilwa and . In , Islam disseminated primarily through Gujarati, Persian, and merchants arriving via maritime routes from the , though mass conversions accelerated after the 13th century as rulers in ports like and adopted the faith to consolidate trade alliances, culminating in the Sultanate of 's establishment around 1400, which served as a hub exporting Islam to , , and the . These conversions were often gradual and elite-driven, with intermarriage between Muslim traders and local women fostering community integration and voluntary adherence among coastal populations, unaccompanied by large-scale military campaigns. Similarly, in , trans-Saharan trade from the exposed Sahelian societies to Islam, where merchants' demonstrations of and ethical business practices appealed to rulers, leading to the Empire's partial Islamization by the without conquest. Sufi missionaries complemented trade by penetrating inland areas, emphasizing personal devotion, mysticism, and cultural adaptation over rigid , which resonated in diverse settings like Central Asia's nomadic steppes and South Asia's rural villages from the . Orders such as the Naqshbandiyya and dispatched itinerant saints who established khanqahs (lodges) as centers for teaching and charity, attracting converts through displays of miracles, egalitarian teachings, and with local spiritual practices, as seen in the Chishti order's influence in 13th-century under figures like Moinuddin Chishti. In , Sufi brotherhoods like the Tijaniyya expanded from the , integrating with existing animist traditions to facilitate voluntary shifts, particularly among Fulani pastoralists, where emphasis on inner purification over legalism lowered barriers to entry. Voluntary conversions were propelled by pragmatic incentives, including for lower castes in and in trading diasporas, alongside Islam's doctrinal simplicity and promise of direct access to the divine, which contrasted with hierarchical indigenous systems. Historical records indicate that in , by the 15th century, over 90% of coastal elites had converted without coercion, driven by the faith's alignment with mercantile ethics and royal prestige, as evidenced by gravestone inscriptions and court chronicles from . In , oral traditions and Portuguese accounts from the describe conversions as responses to traders' prosperity and communal harmony, rather than force, though inland diffusion remained limited until later Sufi efforts. Empirical patterns show higher conversion rates in trade-proximate zones, underscoring causal links between , adaptability, and non-coercive appeal, distinct from conquest-driven expansions elsewhere.

Systemic Incentives: Jizya, Dhimmitude, and Coercive Pressures

The was a levied on adult non-Muslim males under Islamic rule, mandated by 9:29 and implemented systematically following the early conquests, such as in in 641 CE where it was tied directly to religious affiliation to create a fiscal incentive for conversion. Exempt from and , non-Muslims paid jizya at rates often equivalent to or exceeding Muslim taxes, with historical enforcement varying but frequently burdensome; for instance, under Abbasid caliphs, it could reach one annually per person, pressuring lower socioeconomic groups toward to alleviate financial strain. This exemption upon conversion contributed to gradual demographic shifts, as evidenced in where Coptic Christians, comprising the majority at the 7th-century Arab conquest, declined to approximately 10-15% by the amid sustained tax disparities favoring Muslims. Dhimmitude refers to the institutionalized subordinate status of non-Muslims (dhimmis) as "protected peoples" in exchange for submission, codified in treaties like the (attributed to Caliph II, circa 717-720 CE, though likely compiled later), which imposed restrictions to affirm Islamic supremacy and deter proselytism. These included prohibitions on building or repairing churches, displaying crosses publicly, ringing bells loudly, riding horses or carrying weapons, adopting Muslim attire or architecture, and serving as witnesses against Muslims in court, alongside requirements for distinctive clothing and deference in public interactions. Such measures, enforced variably across empires like the Umayyads and Ottomans, fostered social isolation and economic disadvantage, as dhimmis faced barriers to public office and trade guilds dominated by Muslims. Combined with , these systemic pressures exerted coercive influence without overt mass compulsion, as Islamic doctrine nominally prohibited ( 2:256) yet permitted conditions that eroded non-Muslim viability over generations. In Persia, Zoroastrians dwindled from near-majority status post-651 CE Sassanid fall to under 1% by the Safavid era, attributable to taxes, sporadic persecutions, and inheritance laws favoring Muslim kin, which incentivized familial conversions. Ottoman saw similar patterns, with evasion cited as a primary economic driver for conversions among peasants from the 15th to 19th centuries, accelerating Islamization in regions like and Bosnia. While rulers sometimes mitigated enforcement to sustain revenue—preferring taxable subjects over converts—the cumulative effect of subordination, as analyzed in studies, systematically tilted incentives toward , transforming conquered pluralistic societies into Muslim-majority domains by the medieval period.

Regional Patterns

Middle East and North Africa

The spread of Islam in the originated in the following Muhammad's death in 632 CE, with rapid military conquests establishing Muslim rule over former Byzantine and Sassanid territories. Under the (632–661 CE), Arab armies defeated Byzantine forces at the Battle of Yarmouk in 636 CE, securing and by 638 CE, and conquered by 642 CE after the fall of . Simultaneously, invasions into Sassanid Persia culminated in the in 642 CE, leading to the collapse of the empire by 651 CE. These conquests transitioned diverse populations—predominantly Christian in the and , Zoroastrian in Persia—from polytheistic, Jewish, or other faiths to Muslim governance, though initial conversions remained limited among conquered peoples. The (661–750 CE) extended control westward into , completing the conquest of the by the early 8th century after overcoming Berber resistance, including the defeat of Queen Kahina's forces around 702 CE. In these regions, Islamization proceeded gradually over centuries, driven by economic incentives such as the levied exclusively on non-Muslims, which exempted converts and thereby encouraged mass adoption to alleviate financial burdens. Social factors, including intermarriage between Arab settlers and local women, elite conversions for political advancement, and restrictions on non-Muslim public worship under status, further accelerated the shift, though outright forced conversions were infrequent. In Persia, significant conversion began soon after conquest, with Zoroastrian elites adopting Islam for administrative roles, leading to a Muslim majority by the 9th–10th centuries despite persistent minority communities. In , the Coptic Christian population, nearly 100% of inhabitants in 641 CE, declined sharply due to these pressures; historical records indicate comprised about 10–20% by the , shrinking further to 7% by amid revolts crushed by Muslim rulers and demographic shifts from conversions and emigration. North African , initially resistant and adhering to indigenous or Christian beliefs, underwent Islamization by the , fueling dynasties like the Almoravids that propagated the faith southward. The saw similar patterns, with Christian majorities eroding through comparable mechanisms, though pockets like retained higher Christian proportions into the medieval period. By the , Muslim majorities predominated across most of the region, solidified under Abbasid, Fatimid, and Ayyubid rule, with accompanying religious change via language policies and migration. Persistent non-Muslim communities, such as and in , highlight uneven conversion rates influenced by geographic isolation and communal solidarity, yet systemic disincentives for dhimmis ensured Islam's demographic dominance. Scholarly analyses, drawing from tax records and chronicles, attribute this trajectory less to proselytization alone and more to pragmatic responses to fiscal and legal disparities, underscoring causal roles of structures over purely doctrinal appeal.

Sub-Saharan and East Africa

Islam reached primarily through maritime trade networks across the , beginning in the CE with Arab merchants from the establishing settlements along the . The port city of in present-day hosted one of the earliest Muslim communities, with the Qiblatain Mosque constructed around this period, reflecting initial migrations following the Prophet Muhammad's lifetime. These traders introduced Islamic practices alongside commerce in goods such as , , and slaves, fostering gradual adoption among coastal Bantu-speaking populations through intermarriage and rather than military conquest. By the , the emerged as a prominent Islamic polity off the coast of modern , founded by ibn al-Hassan Shirazi, a trader from , , who established a dynasty blending Persian, Arab, and local elements. Kilwa's rulers constructed the Great Mosque around 1100 CE, and the sultanate dominated regional trade, exporting African gold and to the and importing ceramics and textiles, which facilitated the spread of to inland areas via merchants. Archaeological evidence, including coral-stone mosques and Islamic inscriptions, confirms that by the 13th century, had permeated urban centers like , though rural hinterlands retained indigenous beliefs longer. In Sub-Saharan West Africa, Islam penetrated via trans-Saharan caravan routes starting in the 8th century CE, as North African Berber and traders exchanged salt, horses, and textiles for gold and slaves from the . The ancient (c. 300–1100 CE) saw Muslim merchant quarters by the 11th century, but elite conversion occurred later; the Mali Empire's ruler , reigning from 1312 to 1337 CE, exemplified deepened Islamic commitment through his 1324 pilgrimage to , accompanied by 12,000 followers and vast gold, which funded mosques like Djinguereber in and attracted scholars from across the Muslim world. Sufi orders, particularly the Qadiriyya from the 15th century onward, accelerated Islam's inland diffusion by emphasizing mystical practices adaptable to local animist traditions, establishing brotherhoods in rural villages and converting masses through teaching and miracles attributed to saints. In the Songhai Empire (c. 1464–1591 CE), successor to Mali, Askia Muhammad's 1495 hajj further centralized Islamic governance, imposing sharia while tolerating syncretic elements. Overall, conversions proceeded voluntarily among traders and elites for economic advantages, with broader adoption via Sufi networks, though dhimmis paid jizya under Muslim rulers, creating incentives for alignment without widespread coercion. By 1500 CE, Islam dominated the Sahel, influencing empires' administration and scholarship, as evidenced by Timbuktu's universities hosting up to 25,000 students.

Central Asia, Persia, and South Asia

The Arab conquest of the began in 633 CE with invasions into , culminating in the in 636 CE, where Arab forces under defeated the Sasanian army, leading to the fall of the capital in 637 CE. The last Sasanian emperor, , fled eastward and was killed in 651 CE near , marking the effective end of Sasanian rule and the incorporation of into the and later Umayyad Caliphates. Initial conversions to among were limited, with remaining dominant for centuries; the tax on non-Muslims and dhimmi protections under Islamic law provided systemic incentives for gradual Islamization, though Zoroastrian communities faced periodic and emigration eastward. By the , Persian elites increasingly adopted , accelerating under the , with full demographic majoritization occurring by the 10th-11th centuries amid administrative favoritism toward converts. In , Umayyad forces under conquered between 705 and 715 CE, capturing cities like and after battles against local Sogdian and Turkic rulers, though resistance persisted until the Abbasid era. The in 751 CE, where Abbasid forces allied with Karluk Turks defeated Tang , facilitated further Arab influence but did not immediately yield mass conversions; Turkic tribes, initially shamanist or Buddhist, converted gradually starting with elites. The Qarakhanid dynasty, the first Turkic state to embrace , saw its ruler Satuq Bughra Khan convert around 934 CE, followed by broader Turkic adoption by the mid-10th century, driven by political alliances, military integration into Abbasid armies, and economic pressures from jizya exemptions for Muslims. By the 11th century, under Seljuk Turks, was predominantly Muslim, with Sufi orders reinforcing the faith among nomadic populations, though pre-Islamic elements like lingered in syncretic forms. Islam's entry into South Asia occurred via the Umayyad conquest of Sindh in 711-713 CE, led by , who defeated Raja Dahir at the Battle of Aror and captured , , and Brahminabad, establishing the first Muslim foothold with tolerant policies toward Hindus and Buddhists but imposing on non-Muslims. Expansion stalled beyond and until the Ghaznavid raids under from 1001 to 1026 CE, which sacked over 17 temples including Somnath in 1025 CE, yielding plunder estimated at millions of dirhams and facilitating elite conversions through enslavement and patronage, though permanent rule was limited. The under advanced further, defeating at the Second Battle of Tarain in 1192 CE, enabling the establishment of the by 1206 CE and subsequent Turkic-Afghan rule over northern India. Conversions accelerated under sultanates via Sufi missionaries like the , fiscal incentives like (which non-Muslims paid at rates up to 48 dirhams annually per adult male), and coercive measures including temple conversions to mosques and periodic forced conversions during famines or revolts; by the under Mughals, Muslims comprised an estimated 15-25% of the subcontinent's population, concentrated in ruling classes and urban centers.

Southeast Asia and Maritime Trade Routes

Islam reached primarily through maritime trade routes connecting the to the region, with merchants from , Persia, and Arabia introducing the faith to coastal trading ports starting as early as the , though substantive establishment occurred later. These traders, often Sufi-influenced, settled in key entrepôts like those in , fostering gradual conversions via economic ties, intermarriage, and cultural exchange rather than military imposition. The earliest confirmed Muslim polities emerged in northern Sumatra by the late 13th century, exemplified by the , where the gravestone of as-Salih dates to 1297 CE, marking the first clear archaeological evidence of an Islamic ruler in the archipelago. Marco Polo's 1292 account also noted a Muslim community in the area, highlighting Perlak or nearby ports as initial footholds for trade-driven Islamization. From these bases, Islam spread southward and eastward along spice and silk routes, with Sufi missionaries emphasizing mystical practices adaptable to local animist and Hindu-Buddhist traditions, facilitating voluntary adoption among elites. The , founded around 1400 CE on the , became a pivotal hub for Islamic dissemination after its ruler Parameswara converted circa 1414 CE, renaming himself Iskandar Shah and aligning the polity with Muslim trading networks from and the . 's strategic position monopolized strait trade, drawing Gujarati and other Muslim merchants who propagated Islam through commerce, legal codes like the Undang-Undang Melaka, and pilgrimage ties, extending influence to , , and the by the 15th century. Conversion patterns typically involved rulers adopting for trade advantages—access to dar al-Islam markets and alliances—followed by subjects, often retaining syncretic elements like shadow puppetry infused with Islamic narratives in . In , the Brunei Sultanate, islamized by the 14th century, projected influence via maritime expeditions to coastal in the , where Sharif Abu Bakr established the Sulu Sultanate around 1450 CE through trade and marriage. 's north coast ports (pesisir) saw rise in the early , accelerating inland penetration via wali songo (), Sufi figures blending evangelism with local customs. By the , dominated coastal from to the Moluccas, with over 90% of modern Indonesia's population—approximately 230 million Muslims—tracing roots to this trade-facilitated expansion, distinct from conquest-driven patterns elsewhere due to the absence of large-scale or caliphal armies. incursions from 1511 disrupted but did not halt the process, as inland sultanates like Mataram in consolidated Islamic rule amid ongoing merchant activity.

Europe: Iberia, Balkans, and Eastern Frontiers

The Umayyad conquest of Iberia began in 711 CE when , leading a Berber army of approximately 7,000–12,000 under the command of , defeated the Visigothic King Roderic at the , enabling rapid advances that secured most of the peninsula by 718 CE. Initial Muslim settlement involved small and Berber elites, with the indigenous Hispano-Roman and Visigothic populations largely retained as dhimmis—non-Muslims subject to poll tax and restricted rights, which created economic and social incentives for conversion over subsequent centuries. By the , conversions accelerated among lower classes seeking tax relief and equality, though elite Muladis (native converts) often rebelled against dominance; estimates suggest comprised a majority by the 11th century, facilitated more by these systemic pressures than trade or Sufi missions, which played minimal roles in early . The , a series of Christian campaigns, gradually reversed Muslim territorial control, culminating in the 1492 surrender of to and , after which remaining Muslims—numbering 500,000–600,000—faced forced conversions, expulsion, or status under inquisitorial oversight, effectively ending institutional Islam in Iberia by the early 17th century. This reversal highlights the fragility of Islam's foothold, dependent on military dominance rather than deep-rooted voluntary adherence, as Christian kingdoms exploited internal Muslim divisions like the fitna of the taifas. Ottoman expansion into the commenced in the mid-14th century, with the capture of Gallipoli in 1354 providing a European foothold, followed by victories at in 1389 and the conquest of by 1396, enabling the subjugation of , Bosnia, and by the early under Sultans and . Islam's spread occurred primarily through the millet system, which granted religious communities autonomy but imposed on non-Muslims and devshirme levies—forced recruitment of Christian boys for conversion and service—creating material incentives for elite and rural conversions, particularly in Bosnia (where Bogomil heretics reportedly converted en masse to evade ) and (reaching 70% Muslim by the ). Scholarly analyses of Ottoman defters (tax registers) indicate gradual demographic shifts, with voluntary elements among local lords seeking land grants and tax exemptions, though systemic coercion via economic disparity and occasional forced conversions during rebellions contributed; by 1600, Muslims formed 30–50% of the population in core Balkan provinces, unevenly distributed and tied to Ottoman administrative integration rather than or unprompted Sufi appeal. Further east, Ottoman advances stalled at Hungary's frontiers, exemplified by the 1526 where I's 60,000–100,000 troops annihilated Louis II's forces, partitioning and occupying , yet failing to sustain deep Islamization due to persistent Habsburg and Transylvanian resistance. Sieges of in 1529 and 1683 marked high-water marks, with the latter's relief by Polish King John III Sobieski's winged hussars halting further penetration; conversions remained negligible, limited to garrison communities and collaborators, as Hungarian Protestants and Catholics maintained cohesion against impositions, resulting in Muslim demographics under 5% even in occupied zones by the . This limited spread underscores conquest's necessity for enduring presence, absent which and incentives yielded minimal traction amid fortified Christian polities.

Modern and Contemporary Dynamics (1924–Present)

Post-Ottoman Fragmentation and Nationalism (1924–1945)

The abolition of the on March 3, 1924, by the Turkish Grand National Assembly under [Mustafa Kemal Atatürk](/page/Mustafa Kemal_Atat%C3%BCrk) initiated the post-Ottoman era of fragmentation, as the symbolic institution uniting over 300 million Muslims dissolved, prompting widespread dismay and debates over Islamic governance across the former empire's territories. In , this facilitated aggressive secular reforms, including the 1924 unification of under state control, abolition of religious courts in 1924, and adoption of the in 1926, which marginalized and suppressed public Islamic expression, though private adherence persisted among the population, estimated at 13 million Muslims in by 1927. These measures prioritized Turkish over pan-Islamic solidarity, contributing to a decline in institutional Islam's influence while fostering underground religious networks. In Arab mandates under British and French administration—encompassing Iraq (population ~3 million, mostly Muslim by 1920), Syria-Lebanon (~2.5 million), and Palestine (~700,000 Arabs, predominantly Muslim)—nationalist movements emerged, often invoking Islam as a unifying force against colonialism but subordinating it to secular or ethnic agendas. For instance, in Egypt, where British influence lingered post-1922 nominal independence, the 1928 founding of the Muslim Brotherhood by Hassan al-Banna responded to caliphal abolition and Westernization by promoting societal Islamization through Quranic education, youth branches, and welfare programs; by 1940, it claimed 500 branches and 200,000 members, extending da'wah efforts to counter secular elites and foster Islamist activism amid urbanization that drew rural Muslims to cities like Cairo. Similar societies in Syria and Iraq blended anti-mandate resistance with Islamic revival, though conversions remained negligible in already Muslim-majority areas, with spread occurring via ideological reinforcement rather than expansion. The Arabian Peninsula diverged through consolidation under Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, who, leveraging Wahhabi alliances since 1902, captured the Hijaz in 1925 and proclaimed the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd (later Saudi Arabia) in 1932, unifying ~5 million people under strict Wahhabi enforcement that demolished shrines and mandated puritanical practices. Suppressing the 1927-1930 Ikhwan revolt—radical Wahhabi tribesmen demanding further jihad—via British-mediated pacts and fatwas from Najdi ulama, Ibn Saud stabilized a theocratic state that propagated Wahhabism regionally through Hajj pilgrimage controls, influencing ~100,000 annual pilgrims by the 1930s and exporting reformist texts despite oil discoveries in 1938 shifting focus to modernization. Overall, this era saw limited demographic spread of Islam beyond existing communities, as fragmentation prioritized state-building over conquest, yet Islamist groups like the Brotherhood initiated organized da'wah that laid foundations for future ideological dissemination amid nationalist secular pressures.

Decolonization, Migration, and Oil Wealth (1945–2000)

Decolonization after facilitated the emergence of numerous independent Muslim-majority states, including in 1947, following its revolution from 1945 to 1949, and in 1962, often invoking Islamic solidarity against colonial rule. These transitions shifted power from European secular administrations to local governments, some of which emphasized Islamic identity to unify populations fragmented by colonial borders, though secular nationalism predominated in many cases like Nasser's . This revival countered Western-imposed secularism, enabling greater internal propagation of Islamic practices and institutions, such as the reintroduction of elements in 's 1956 constitution. Mass migration from these newly independent or decolonizing Muslim regions to accelerated the establishment of Islamic communities in the West, driven by post-war labor shortages. From the 1950s onward, programs like Germany's initiative recruited over 1 million Turkish Muslims by 1973, while received hundreds of thousands from and , and the from Pakistan and . By the late , the Muslim population in had grown to approximately 15-20 million, comprising about 4-5% of the total population, largely through chain migration, , and higher fertility rates averaging 2.6-3.0 children per Muslim woman compared to 1.4-1.6 for non-Muslims. These networks built mosques and cultural centers, fostering efforts and sustaining Islamic adherence amid secular host societies, though integration challenges persisted due to parallel societal structures. The generated vast petrodollar wealth for Gulf states, particularly , whose revenues surged from $4.3 billion in 1972 to $22.5 billion in 1974, enabling extensive global funding for Islamic propagation. By the , had invested billions in constructing over 1,500 mosques, 210 Islamic centers, and thousands of madrasas worldwide, often promoting Salafi interpretations through organizations like the . This funding targeted both Muslim-majority and non-Muslim regions, supporting scholarships, publications, and preachers that reinforced orthodoxy among migrants and converts, with expenditures estimated at tens of billions by 2000 despite debates over the precise causal link to . In and , such investments facilitated the growth of Islamic infrastructure, amplifying the visibility and influence of in urban enclaves.

21st-Century Growth: Demographics, Dawah, and Conflicts (2000–Present)

The global Muslim population expanded from approximately 1.3 billion in 2000 to 2.0 billion by , representing a growth rate of about 1.8% annually during that period, outpacing the world's overall population increase of roughly 1.1%. Key factors driving this growth include high fertility rates among , averaging 2.9 children per woman as of the 2010s—exceeding the global replacement level of 2.1 and surpassing rates for other —a youthful with a median age of 24 years compared to 30 for the world, migration to non-Muslim regions such as and , and conversions in some regions. Migration also contributed significantly; between 2010 and 2016, an estimated 3.7 million migrated to , driven by conflicts in the and , elevating the Muslim share of Europe's population from 4.9% in 2010 to projections of 7-14% by 2050 under varying migration scenarios. In , Muslim immigrants arriving since 2000 constituted about 56% of the U.S. Muslim population by 2017, with many originating from high-conflict regions. Dawah efforts, encompassing organized proselytization and outreach, intensified in the 21st century through digital platforms, mosques funded by Gulf states, and groups like the Tablighi Jamaat, which mobilized millions for grassroots preaching. Social media enabled rapid dissemination of Islamic teachings, with scholars leveraging platforms to reach global audiences, contributing to localized conversions, such as Islam becoming the fastest-growing religion in the U.S. partly via structured dawah programs. However, empirical analyses indicate dawah's role in net global growth remains marginal; Pew Research attributes less than 0.5% of Muslim population increases to conversions, dwarfed by natural demographic expansion, with many Western converts later disaffiliating due to doctrinal or cultural mismatches. Ongoing conflicts in Muslim-majority regions profoundly shaped demographic shifts, often propelling migration that embedded larger Muslim communities in non-Muslim host societies. The post-2001 wars in and , followed by the (2011 onward) and ISIS (2014-2019), displaced over 13 million Muslims by 2015, with refugee flows peaking at 1.3 million arrivals in in 2015 alone, predominantly from , , and . Islamist insurgencies, including Boko Haram in (active since 2009, displacing 2.2 million by 2020) and Al-Shabaab in , similarly generated outflows, while intra-Muslim violence—accounting for 86% of Islamist terrorist attacks and 89% of fatalities since 1979—concentrated demographic pressures within and beyond conflict zones. These dynamics facilitated Islam's spatial spread via resettlement, though they also spurred and backlash in recipient countries, complicating integration; for instance, 's 2015-2016 migrant influx correlated with heightened jihadist incidents, yet bolstered Muslim shares through family reunifications and higher birth rates. Projections from Pew Research forecast the Muslim population reaching 2.8 billion by 2050, comprising 30% of the global total and nearing parity with , sustained by sustained fertility advantages (projected at 2.3 children per woman versus 2.1 globally) and net migration gains, though slowing growth rates in urbanizing Muslim societies may temper this trajectory. Conflicts continue to influence these trends causally, as unresolved insurgencies in the and exacerbate displacement, while state failures in governance perpetuate high fertility through limited access to and contraception.

Controversies and Scholarly Debates

Claims of Peaceful vs. Violent Expansion

The spread of Islam has prompted competing narratives, with proponents of a predominantly peaceful expansion emphasizing trade networks, intermarriage, and Sufi missionary activities, particularly in regions like and coastal , where Muslim merchants introduced the faith gradually from the 7th to 15th centuries without large-scale invasions. In contrast, advocates for a violent characterization highlight the doctrine of —framed in early Islamic texts as offensive warfare to expand dar al-Islam—and the rapid military conquests that established Muslim rule over the , , and Persia between 632 and 750 CE, encompassing battles such as Yarmouk in 636 CE against Byzantines and Qadisiyyah in 636–637 CE against Sassanids, which resulted in the subjugation of millions under caliphal authority. Quranic injunctions, including Surah 9:29 urging combat against those who do not believe until they pay in submission, and historical accounts of the (632–633 CE) suppressing through force, underscore jihad's role as a causal driver of territorial gains, enabling the collection of jizya taxes that incentivized conversions over generations by imposing economic disadvantages on non-Muslims. In Persia, the fall of the Zoroastrian led to demographic shifts toward , facilitated not by immediate mass forced baptisms but by systemic pressures including higher taxes, restrictions on public worship, and intercommunal dynamics that eroded minority populations, with Muslim majorities emerging by the 9th–10th centuries despite initial tolerance policies. Scholar Hugh Kennedy argues that while early Arab armies were too small for widespread forced conversions—numbering around 10,000–20,000 in key campaigns—and prioritized tribute over immediate Islamization, the conquests' violence nonetheless created the political framework for Islam's dominance, contradicting claims of purely voluntary diffusion in core regions. In Southeast Asia, Sufi orders adapted to local animist traditions, fostering conversions through syncretism and commerce along Indian Ocean routes by the 13th century, yet even here, post-conversion sultanates like those in Indonesia enforced Sharia via local militias, blending initial peaceful infiltration with later coercive consolidation. Mainstream academic sources, often influenced by post-colonial sensitivities, tend to minimize jihad's expansionary impetus, yet primary texts and battle records indicate military prowess as foundational, with peaceful mechanisms supplementing rather than supplanting conquest in achieving global reach.

Evidence of Forced Conversions and Demographic Shifts

In the early Islamic conquests following the death of in 632 CE, the (632–633 CE) involved military campaigns against apostate Arab tribes, resulting in forced re-submission and conversions to maintain Islamic unity under Abu Bakr's . Subsequent expansions into Byzantine and Sasanian territories imposed status on non-Muslims, subjecting , , and Zoroastrians to taxation and social restrictions that incentivized conversion over time. Historical analyses indicate that while direct sword-point conversions were not universal, the economic burden of —often levied progressively higher on non-Muslims—correlated with rising conversion rates, as evidenced by econometric studies of early caliphal fiscal policies. Demographic shifts in the were profound: regions like and , predominantly Christian before the 7th-century conquests, saw Christian populations decline from majorities to minorities over centuries, with falling to approximately 10% in by modern estimates. In Persia, Zoroastrians, who comprised the majority under the , dwindled to under 1% by the due to combined pressures of taxation, periodic persecutions, and incentives for conversion under Umayyad and Abbasid rule. These transitions were gradual but inexorable, driven by fiscal policies and legal asymmetries rather than solely voluntary adoption, as non-Muslims faced exemptions from only upon conversion while bearing the full weight of . Under the (14th–20th centuries), the system forcibly levied Christian boys from Balkan families, converting them to and training them as elite troops, with estimates of tens of thousands affected between the 14th and 17th centuries. This practice, while providing for converts, represented institutionalized coercion, contributing to the erosion of Christian demographics in and the , where Orthodox populations shifted from majorities to significant minorities by the 19th century. In , Mughal emperor (r. 1658–1707) reimposed in 1679, banned Hindu fairs, and ordered temple destructions, policies documented in contemporary farmans that pressured Hindu conversions amid reports of coerced adherence in regions like . Scholarly debates persist, with some attributing shifts primarily to incentives like tax relief and career access, yet primary sources and demographic reconstructions underscore coercive elements, including sporadic mass conversions of groups like under early caliphs and Zoroastrian communities fleeing persecution. These patterns reveal a causal link between conquest-enabled structures and long-term Islamization, distinct from purely mercantile or in other contexts.

Long-Term Impacts: Cultural Assimilation vs. Erasure

The expansion of Islam across diverse regions produced divergent long-term cultural trajectories, with assimilation evident in the selective integration of indigenous elements into Islamic norms—such as Persian administrative traditions influencing Abbasid governance—and erasure manifested in the near-total displacement of pre-Islamic religions and artifacts, as seen in the extinction of ancient Mesopotamian and Egyptian polytheistic practices beyond archaeological remnants. In core territories like the Middle East and Persia, systemic pressures including the jizya tax on non-Muslims, restrictions on public religious expression, and social incentives for conversion accelerated the decline of Zoroastrianism from a majority faith in Sassanid Iran (pre-651 CE conquest) to fewer than 25,000 adherents by 2012, comprising less than 0.03% of the population, with many fleeing to India as Parsis to preserve rituals like fire temples. This erosion was not solely coercive but compounded by doctrinal incompatibility, as Islamic monotheism rejected Zoroastrian dualism and fire worship, leading to the abandonment of sacred sites and texts; historical accounts document sporadic persecutions under caliphs like al-Mutawakkil (847–861 CE), who enforced distinctive clothing for dhimmis and demolished non-Islamic structures. Scholarly analyses, often drawing from Islamic chronicles biased toward portraying tolerance, nonetheless confirm demographic tipping points by the 10th century, where Zoroastrian elites converted to retain land and status, entrenching Arabic as the liturgical and administrative language over Middle Persian. In , Hindu cultural persistence contrasted with partial erasure under centuries of Muslim rule (712–1857 CE), where despite documented —such as of Ghazni's raids destroying the in 1026 CE and over 80 major temple sites per contemporary Persian records—core Vedic traditions, systems, and festivals endured among the Hindu majority, adapting through syncretic movements like . Mughal emperors like (r. 1556–1605) fostered alliances by patronizing scholarship and interfaith dialogues, enabling Hindu elites to maintain autonomy under jizya exemptions for converts, yet stricter rulers like (r. 1658–1707) reimposed taxes and temple demolitions, correlating with localized conversions estimated at 10–20% of the population by 1700 CE based on land revenue shifts. Empirical data from Mughal censuses and traveler accounts indicate no wholesale erasure, as Hindu demographics stabilized at 70–80% by the , though linguistic assimilation advanced with Persian influencing and courtly culture; revisionist academic narratives minimizing destruction reflect post-colonial sensitivities, but primary sources like Ferishta's chronicles substantiate targeted erasures of idolatrous symbols to assert Islamic supremacy. Southeast Asia exemplified assimilation through trade-driven Islamization (13th–16th centuries), where Sufi merchants integrated local animist and Hindu-Buddhist customs into a tolerant variant, as in Java's kejawen tradition blending music and shadow puppetry with , preserving pre-Islamic epics like the in performance arts. Unlike the Middle East's doctrinal rigidity, which purged syncretic survivals, Indonesian Islam retained matrilineal inheritance and spirit veneration, with conversion rates reaching 90% by 1600 CE via elite adoption rather than conquest, yielding hybrid architectures like the Great Mosque of Demak () incorporating Hindu motifs. In the Ottoman (14th–19th centuries), partial erasure occurred through incentives like tax relief and military recruitment (devshirme system conscripting Christian boys, converting ~200,000 by 1600 CE), fostering Islamization in Bosnia (50% Muslim by 1800) and , yet the millet framework preserved Orthodox and Catholic liturgies and among non-converts, preventing full cultural homogenization. Ottoman defters (tax registers) reveal conversion curves peaking in frontier zones due to land grants, but resistance in mountainous areas like maintained Christian majorities, underscoring how geographic and administrative factors modulated between assimilation and targeted religious displacement. Overall, erasure predominated in arid core regions conducive to centralized caliphal control, extinguishing majority faiths via compounded fiscal, social, and occasional violent mechanisms, while peripheral zones with decentralized polities favored assimilation, allowing cultural hybrids that enriched Islamic expressions but subordinated indigenous identities to sharia-framed hierarchies; quantitative proxies like surviving counts (e.g., Zoroastrian Avestas reduced to fragments post-9th century) versus persistent Hindu epics highlight causal realism in conquest dynamics over idealized narratives of peaceful diffusion.

Historical Population Shifts

The rapid military conquests of the 7th and 8th centuries established Islamic rule over vast territories from the to Persia, encompassing populations numbering in the tens of millions, yet initially constituted a small minority in these regions. armies, often totaling 10,000 to 20,000 soldiers per campaign, relied on local alliances and did not involve mass population replacement or immediate forced conversions. Non-Muslims, including Christians in and , Zoroastrians in Persia, and in , continued to form the demographic majority, subject to the poll tax that provided fiscal incentives for eventual conversion. Conversion to Islam proceeded gradually over centuries, modeled in scholarly analyses as an S-shaped curve reflecting social diffusion rather than abrupt shifts. In , following the Sasanian Empire's fall in 651 CE, Zoroastrian adherents declined as approached 40% of the population by the mid- and neared 90% by the late , driven by intermarriage, urban opportunities, and . Quantitative studies using onomastic evidence from biographical dictionaries indicate that in Persia, half the population had converted by around the early , accelerating thereafter due to the absence of significant but presence of systemic advantages for . Similar patterns emerged in and , where Christian majorities persisted until the 10th-12th centuries, with majorities achieved around the in Syria-Palestine through economic and political pressures rather than . In Egypt, Coptic Christians dominated demographically post-conquest in 642 CE, with Muslims likely remaining a minority until the 10th-14th centuries, varying by estimate; one analysis posits majority status by the mid-10th century, while others extend it to the 14th, attributing delays to rural conservatism and tax exemptions for monasteries. North Africa's Berber populations underwent Islamization by the 11th century, incorporating tribal revolts and voluntary adoptions that facilitated demographic dominance without wholesale Arab settlement. These shifts, while not uniformly coercive, reflected causal mechanisms like dhimmi subordination, which eroded non-Muslim communities over generations, leading to near-total Muslim majorities in core caliphal lands by the High Middle Ages.

Current Global Distribution and Growth Rates

As of 2025, the global is estimated at approximately 2.05 billion people, representing over 25% of the world's total of about 8.2 billion. This figure reflects a continuation of rapid demographic expansion observed in recent decades, with comprising the second-largest religious group after . The majority of Muslims reside in the Asia-Pacific region, which hosts about 62% of the global total, followed by the Middle East-North Africa (MENA) region at around 20%, at 15%, at 3%, and the at less than 1%. Within Asia-Pacific, South and Southeast Asia dominate, with alone accounting for the largest national at over 240 million , or roughly 12% of the worldwide total. Other leading countries include (235 million), (213 million), and (150 million), which together represent nearly 40% of all .
CountryMuslim Population (millions, est. 2025)Percentage of National Population
24587%
23596%
21315%
15091%
14050%
10290%
8599%
8599%
252%
4499%
This table highlights the top countries by Muslim population size, based on recent estimates; note that figures for countries like and include significant non-majority Muslim communities. In MENA, nearly all countries exceed 90% Muslim majorities, while sub-Saharan Africa's growth is driven by nations like and . Europe's Muslim share, though small globally, has risen to about 5-6% in due to immigration, concentrated in , , and the . Muslim population growth outpaced the global average from 2010 to 2020, increasing by 21% (from 1.7 billion to 2.0 billion) compared to the world's 11% rise, making the fastest-growing major during that period. This equates to an average annual growth rate of about 1.9% for versus 1.0% globally, driven primarily by higher total rates (averaging 2.9 children per Muslim woman versus 2.3 worldwide) in Muslim-majority countries, a younger median age (24 years for Muslims compared to 30 globally), migration to regions like and , and limited net conversions (under 0.3% annually). Growth rates vary regionally: highest in (over 2.5% annually) due to elevated birth rates, and slower in MENA (around 1.5%) amid declining from and . These trends are projected to continue, potentially elevating to nearly 30% of the by 2050, though decelerating could moderate future rates.

Future Projections and Influencing Factors

Projections from the indicate that the global Muslim population, which reached approximately 2.0 billion in 2020, is expected to grow to about 2.8 billion by 2050, comprising roughly 30% of the world's total and approaching parity with at 2.9 billion. This growth rate, which outpaced the global average by a factor of two between 2010 and 2020, stems primarily from demographic momentum—higher fertility rates in Muslim-majority countries, a younger population profile (median age of 24 years versus 30 globally), and migration to Europe and North America—rather than significant religious switching, with conversions exerting limited net influence. data align with this trajectory, forecasting continued expansion in Muslim-majority regions due to a youthful structure, though global declines could temper long-term rates. The primary drivers of these projections are higher-than-average fertility rates and a median age among Muslims of 24 years, compared to 30 for the world overall, enabling sustained natural increase even as total fertility rates (TFR) in Muslim-majority countries fall from historical highs. For instance, the population-weighted TFR in Muslim areas has declined by 41% over recent decades, mirroring broader trends toward replacement-level fertility (around 2.1 births per woman) projected globally by 2050, but remains elevated at an average of 2.9 in many such nations versus 2.3 worldwide. Migration contributes modestly, particularly to Europe, where Muslim shares could rise to 7-14% by 2050 under varying immigration scenarios, driven by inflows from high-fertility regions. Conversion and apostasy exert limited net influence, with analyses showing religious switching as a minor factor in overall growth; inflows to roughly balance outflows, though underreporting of apostasy prevails in surveys from countries enforcing penalties for leaving the faith. Emerging studies highlight rising ex-Muslim communities in the West and secularizing Muslim societies like , where unreported apostasy rates may offset some demographic gains, potentially altering projections if economic development accelerates fertility convergence or cultural liberalization. External factors include policy responses in host nations, such as integration measures or restrictions on migration, which could curb inflows; (proselytization) efforts by organizations; and geopolitical instability, which both displaces populations (boosting migration) and disrupts fertility through conflict. Economic modernization, women's , and —causally linked to TFR declines across Muslim contexts—represent downward pressures, as evidenced by sub-replacement fertility in (1.6) and (1.7) as of recent data. These projections assume trend continuity, but variances in or policy could yield outcomes ranging from moderated growth to stagnation in non-majority settings.

References

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