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Nikola Gulev (born Lakia Guli), an IMRO revolutionary of Aromanian descent and son of Pitu Guli

Bulgarophiles[1] (Bulgarian: българофили, romanized: bălgarofili; Serbian and Macedonian: бугарофили, romanized: bugarofili; Greek: βουλγαρόφιλοι, romanized: boulgarófiloi; Romanian: bulgarofilii) or Bugaraši (Serbian and Macedonian: бугараши),[2][3][4] is a pejorative term used for Slavic people from the regions of Macedonia and Pomoravlje[5][6][7] who identify as ethnic Bulgarians. In Bulgaria, the term Bulgaromans; (Bulgarian: българомани, romanized: bălgaromani; Romanian: bulgaromani) refers to non-Slavic people such as Aromanians[8] with a Bulgarian self-awareness.[9]

It was only after the Serbian revolution and subsequent Serbian independence when the Serbian national idea gained finally momentum in what is today Southern and Eastern Serbia.[10] According to different authors ca. 1850 the delineation between Serbs and Bulgarians ran north of Niš.[11][12] On the other hand, according to historian Apostolos Vacalopoulos, from the beginning of the 18th century, the Bulgarians in Macedonia formed the largest Slavic community and had gradually absorbed the sparse Serbs in the area. As a result, after the rise of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire, the Slavic-speakers there, already Bulgarian by name, began to acquire mainly a Bulgarian national identity.[13] During the 19th and early 20th century the Bulgarian national identification arose as a result of an educational campaign and the affiliation with the Bulgarian millet and Bulgarian Exarchate.[14][15] In the 20th century, Bulgarophiles in neighboring Yugoslavia and Greece were considered enemies of the state harboring irredentist tendencies.[16][17]

Plaque on the grave of priest Konstantin Minovic (Konstantin Minov) in Skopje. He swiched from the Bulgarian to the Serbian side and was killed on the order of the IMRO. The plaque was placed after the area was ceded to Serbia in 1913 and states that he was killed by Bugaraši. [18]

Adherents of the view that the Macedonian nation is a 20th century phenomenon and that it has close relation with the Bulgarian nation get accused of being Bulgarophiles in North Macedonia.[19] In the context of North Macedonia, the term also means feeling a close ethnic relation with Bulgarians or being of Bulgarian origin.[20]

See also

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References

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Bulgarophiles

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Bulgarophiles, a term denoting affinity for Bulgaria or the , historically applies to Slavic inhabitants of Macedonia and Pomoravlje regions who identified ethnically as or supported Bulgarian ecclesiastical and national aspirations, as well as non-Slavic groups like who aligned with these causes during the Ottoman era and early . The label, often pejorative in Serbian, Macedonian, and Greek contexts, emerged amid struggles over church jurisdiction between the and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, where opting for the former signified pro-Bulgarian orientation. Prominent Bulgarophiles included Aromanian revolutionaries such as , a leader in the (IMRO) during the Ilinden-Preobrazhenie Uprising of 1903, and his son Nikola Gulev, who continued IMRO activities in the despite their non-Bulgarian ethnic origins. These figures exemplified how minority groups contributed to Bulgarian-oriented efforts for autonomy or unification in Ottoman Macedonia, amid competing Grecoman and Serboman factions. Following the and Macedonia's partition in 1913, majorities in affected areas were identified as Bulgarophiles, prompting migrations to and assimilation pressures elsewhere. The concept persists in historiographical debates, where "Bulgarophiles" describes those acknowledging cultural-linguistic proximity between Macedonians and , challenging narratives of distinct identities forged under Yugoslav policies. Controversies arise from the term's use to delegitimize Bulgarian ethnic claims in disputed regions, reflecting ongoing tensions despite empirical evidence of historical Bulgarian self-identification among local prior to mid-20th-century identity engineering.

Definition and Etymology

Terminology

The term Bulgarophile designates an individual who favors or admires , its culture, or the people, functioning as both an and in English. It is formed by the prefix "Bulgaro-", derived from references to or , with the "-phile", denoting affinity or love, analogous to terms like or Russophile. The earliest documented usage appears in 1876, in a letter by S. G. B. St. Clair, amid 19th-century European discussions of Balkan ethnicities and national revivals. Bulgarophilia, the nominal form, describes a strong or partisan support for Bulgarian interests, often contrasted with antonyms like Bulgarophobia in historiographical analyses of Balkan sentiments. Related variants include Bulgarophilism, attested from 1879 in British periodicals covering diplomacy. In academic linguistic and historical contexts, terms like Bulgarophone specify Bulgarian-language speakers, distinguishing linguistic from ethnic or ideological affiliations. Within the Macedonian region's discourse, Bulgarophile typically refers to Slavic inhabitants asserting Bulgarian ethnic self-identification, particularly those rejecting the distinct Macedonian nationality codified in Yugoslav Macedonia after 1944. This application, emerging prominently in 20th-century nationalist polemics, often bears weight, framing such views as influenced by Bulgarian or disloyal to local efforts; for example, post-World War II authorities in the of Macedonia accused independent nationalists of Bulgarophilia to suppress pro-Bulgarian orientations. In , equivalent Slavic groups from Macedonia may be termed Bulgaroromâni or simply ethnic , emphasizing continuity over labeling.

Usage Contexts

The term "Bulgarophiles" is predominantly employed in discussions of ethnic identity and within the , particularly to describe Slavic populations in Macedonia, Pomoravlje, and adjacent areas who express affinity for heritage or self-identify as ethnic . In historical analyses of the Ottoman era and early , it refers to the majority of Slavic inhabitants in undivided Macedonia who aligned with Bulgarian cultural and political aspirations, as evidenced by statistical inquiries and contemporary accounts indicating widespread Bulgarophile sentiments prior to the 1913 partition. In interwar and , the label acquired a connotation, applied by state authorities to Slavic minorities suspected of irredentist leanings toward , often resulting in repressive measures against perceived Bulgarophile activities. For instance, Serbian officials categorized many Macedonians as Bulgarophiles to justify assimilation policies, reflecting broader efforts to suppress Bulgarian-oriented identities in favor of emergent national constructs. This usage persisted in documentation, where Bulgarophiles were distinguished from those adopting distinct Macedonian or other affiliations post-1913. Contemporary political discourse in frequently deploys "Bulgarophiles" derogatorily against individuals or organizations promoting Bulgarian historical figures or dual identity, framing them as threats to national unity; this has led to legal actions, such as crackdowns on cultural clubs honoring Bulgarian revolutionaries, amid tensions over accession and constitutional recognition of Bulgarian minorities. In Bulgarian contexts, the term or equivalents like "Bulgaromans" neutrally denotes ethnic kin in neighboring regions maintaining Bulgarian self-identification, contrasting with Macedonian narratives that portray such affiliations as externally influenced. Academic studies occasionally extend it to pre-modern phenomena, such as Cuman alliances with the Second Bulgarian Empire in the 12th-13th centuries, denoting strategic "Bulgarophilia" driven by military and dynastic interests rather than ethnic solidarity. Overall, the term's application highlights contested causal histories of , where empirical evidence of historical Bulgarian identification clashes with state-sponsored Macedonian ethnogenesis post-1944.

Historical Origins

Medieval Bulgarophilia

The phenomenon of medieval Bulgarophilia manifested primarily through the strategic affinity and consistent military-political support provided by Cuman (Qïpchaq) groups to the nascent during the late 12th and early 13th centuries. This support, termed Bulgarophilia by Konstantin Golev, represented a patterned orientation toward alignment with Bulgarian rulers under the Asenid dynasty, driven by pragmatic material interests such as mutual defense against sedentary empires rather than ethnic kinship or sentimental attachment. The , Turkic nomadic warriors who had migrated into the amid the broader disruptions of the Mongol incursions and Byzantine decline, integrated into Bulgarian forces as allies, providing expertise that bolstered the empire's expansion. The Second Bulgarian Empire emerged from the Vidin uprising led by the Asen brothers—Peter and Ivan Asen—in 1185–1186, overthrowing Byzantine rule in the region after the heavy taxation and administrative pressures imposed following the First Empire's fall in 1018. rapidly aligned with this revolt, joining Asenid troops as early as the summer of 1186 to contest Byzantine control over and . This collaboration continued through key conflicts, including the decisive Bulgarian-Latin victory at the on April 13–14, 1205, where Cuman contingents under Kaloyan (r. 1197–1207) played a pivotal role in routing the Crusader forces of the . Their involvement extended to campaigns against Hungarian incursions in the north and Byzantine remnants in the south, sustaining Bulgarian territorial gains until approximately 1211. Cuman Bulgarophilia reflected a broader steppe nomadic strategy of balancing alliances with sedentary states, leveraging Bulgarian to secure pastures, tribute, and military opportunities in the . Dynastic ties further cemented this orientation, as Cuman elites intermarried with Asenid nobility, exemplified by the integration of Cuman warriors into the and administration during Boril's reign (1207–1218). However, this phase waned after 1218 amid internal Bulgarian instability and shifting nomadic pressures, including Mongol expansions that redirected Cuman migrations eastward. Golev interprets this support not as a catalyst for Bulgarian revival but as one factor among geopolitical dynamics, evidenced by comparative analysis of Byzantine, Latin, Rus', and Islamic chronicles. No comparable patterns of Bulgarophilia appear in earlier medieval records from the (681–1018), where Bulgar-Slavic emphasized internal consolidation over external nomadic affinities.

19th-Century Bulgarian National Revival

The 19th-century phase of the intensified efforts to cultivate a distinct Bulgarian ethnic identity among Orthodox Slavs under Ottoman rule, emphasizing vernacular education, , and as countermeasures to Greek cultural dominance via the Phanariote hierarchy. This period saw the proliferation of chitalishta (community reading rooms) and secular schools teaching in the Bulgarian vernacular, with over 1,000 such institutions established by the 1860s, fostering literacy rates that rose from negligible levels to around 10-15% among urban Bulgarian-speakers by mid-century. Key intellectuals like Lyuben Karavelov, who founded the newspaper in in 1869, advocated for national rooted in historical Bulgarian continuity rather than broader Slavic unity, critiquing as diluting specific ethnic aspirations. A pivotal development was the ecclesiastical struggle culminating in the Ottoman Sultan's of February 27, 1870, establishing the as an independent millet separate from the Ecumenical Patriarchate in . This granted Bulgarians administrative control over their churches and schools in designated territories, including significant portions of Ottoman Macedonia and , where the opened 22 dioceses and hundreds of parishes by 1913, serving populations that largely self-identified along Bulgarian lines at the time. In Macedonia, this institutional expansion—supported by local merchants and clergy—promoted Bulgarian historical narratives and language standardization, drawing Slavic inhabitants into networks of national consciousness that resisted and later Serb or distinct Macedonian framing. Such adherents, by embracing Bulgarian-oriented education and church affiliation, exemplified early forms of Bulgarophilia, prioritizing ethnic-linguistic ties to over regional or imperial Ottoman identities. The Revival's revolutionary crescendo arrived with the , organized by the Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee under figures like , who commanded a volunteer detachment and penned revolutionary poetry emphasizing Bulgarian sovereignty. Though brutally suppressed, with an estimated 15,000-30,000 casualties, the revolt prompted Russian intervention via the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), leading to the Treaty of San Stefano's initial vision of a greater encompassing Macedonia—though scaled back at . This era's national mobilization not only solidified core Bulgarian identity but also engendered enduring pro-Bulgarian affinities among Macedonian Slavs exposed to Revivalist propaganda, laying causal groundwork for later Bulgarophile self-identification amid post-Ottoman ethnic contests.

Bulgarophiles in Macedonia

Identity and Self-Identification

In North Macedonia, Bulgarophiles typically self-identify as ethnic Bulgarians, emphasizing shared historical, linguistic, and cultural ties with Bulgaria while rejecting the distinct Macedonian ethnic identity as a product of mid-20th-century Yugoslav policies. This self-perception aligns with declarations of Bulgarian origin required for obtaining Bulgarian citizenship, through which over 216,000 North Macedonian citizens have naturalized since the early 2000s, often citing ancestral Bulgarian ethnicity supported by historical documents. Such individuals frequently view the Macedonian language as a regional dialect of Bulgarian and trace their heritage to the Bulgarian national revival of the 19th century, when populations in Ottoman Macedonia predominantly identified as Bulgarian. Official self-identification remains limited, with only 3,504 residents declaring as ethnic in the 2021 , comprising 0.19% of the —a figure that increased modestly from 1,487 in but is dwarfed by citizenship application trends. Analysts attribute this discrepancy to societal pressures, including potential , lack of constitutional minority status for , and a national narrative that frames Bulgarian identification as disloyalty, prompting many to conceal their preferences. Bulgarian diplomatic efforts, including accession negotiations, have highlighted these barriers, advocating for protections to enable open self-identification without repercussions. While some Bulgarophiles maintain a dual or hybrid sense of identity—acknowledging regional Macedonian ties but prioritizing Bulgarian ethnicity—the core assertion is one of ethnic continuity with , often substantiated by family lore, church records, or exonym usage in pre-1944 documents. This contrasts with the majority Macedonian self-view, which posits a separate Slavic identity rooted in ancient regional , though Bulgarophiles contend such claims lack empirical continuity in Slavic-era self-appellation. The pursuit of Bulgarian passports, peaking at thousands annually in recent years (e.g., 1,992 in 2022), underscores pragmatic incentives like mobility alongside genuine ethnic affirmation, though critics argue economic motives predominate without altering core Macedonian allegiance.

Political Movements and Organizations

In , Bulgarophiles have organized primarily through non-governmental associations and cultural clubs rather than formal , reflecting the political risks of overt advocacy for Bulgarian identity amid state emphasis on Macedonian nationhood. These entities focus on promoting Bulgarian language, heritage, and historical interpretations that emphasize shared or Bulgarian roots for the region's population, often lobbying for and constitutional recognition of ethnic as a co-founding group. Such activities gained visibility following the 2017 Bulgaria-North Macedonia friendship treaty, which committed to protecting Bulgarian cultural associations, though implementation has been contentious. The Bulgarian Cultural Club – Skopje, registered on May 22, 2008, exemplifies these efforts by organizing events to preserve Bulgarian cultural elements and advocate for dual identity recognition among residents. Similarly, the Association "Macedonian-Bulgarian Friendship" works to build bilateral ties, particularly through youth programs promoting mutual historical understanding and countering narratives of division. Other groups, such as local clubs honoring figures like Tsar Boris III or Exarch Stefan, have emerged in cities including Ohrid and Strumica, but faced dissolution orders in 2022 under amended association laws targeting perceived threats to constitutional order and foreign-backed revisionism. These organizations lack electoral representation as a distinct party, with self-identified ethnic —numbering around 1,336 in the 2021 census—typically aligning with broader conservative parties like , which prioritize pragmatic ties with over explicit ethnic advocacy. Their activities intersect with accession debates, pressuring to amend its constitution for Bulgarian minority inclusion, as demanded by since 2020, though progress remains stalled amid domestic opposition. Critics, including Macedonian nationalists, accuse such groups of irredentism or , leading to and legal restrictions, while supporters argue they defend suppressed identities against state assimilation policies.

Notable Figures

Historical Activists

Gotse Delchev (1872–1903), a prominent revolutionary in the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), actively promoted armed uprising against Ottoman rule while identifying the Slavic population of Macedonia as Bulgarian, as evidenced by his correspondence and organizational affiliations. Delchev, born in Kilkis (then Ottoman Empire), joined IMRO in 1894 and focused on building networks of committees across Macedonia, emphasizing education in Bulgarian language and culture through Exarchist schools to counter Greek Patriarchate influence. His efforts culminated in preparations for the 1903 Ilinden–Preobrazhenie Uprising, where he sought broader Balkan cooperation but prioritized Bulgarian national liberation goals. Todor Alexandrov (1881–1924), a Bulgarian army officer and IMRO leader from 1918 until his assassination, directed operations aimed at incorporating Macedonia into , rejecting separate Macedonian ethnic identity in favor of Bulgarian unity. Operating from Nevrokop, Alexandrov reorganized IMRO after disruptions, conducting guerrilla actions against Yugoslav forces and negotiating with Bulgarian governments for support; by 1923, his faction controlled much of the organization's resources and international recognition. Alexandrov's pragmatic diplomacy included alliances with figures like Aleksandar Protogerov, though internal rivalries led to his killing in 1924, attributed to communist or rival factions. Ivan Mihailov (1897–1970), Alexandrov's successor as IMRO leader, sustained the organization's Bulgarian-oriented through interwar terrorism and collaborations, explicitly stating in interviews his Bulgarian identity from Macedonia. Exiled after 1924, Mihailov directed assassinations against Yugoslav officials and, during Bulgarian occupation of Vardar Macedonia (1941–1944), oversaw administrative roles that reinforced Bulgarian cultural policies, including language standardization. Postwar, he advocated from for Macedonian autonomy under Bulgarian influence, rejecting Yugoslav-imposed Macedonian separatism; his legacy includes over 17,000 IMRO fighters under his command by 1944. These activists' actions, rooted in 19th-century Exarchist networks that established over 1,300 Bulgarian schools in Macedonia by 1900, reflected a causal link between ecclesiastical autonomy and national activism, though contested by later state narratives.

Contemporary Individuals

Mile Nedelkovski, a , , and , has publicly affirmed his Bulgarian ethnic self-awareness, earning recognition including literary awards in for works emphasizing shared . Denko Malevski, a professor and public intellectual based in , advocates for the unity of Macedonians and as a single people, positioning himself as a key voice in intellectual debates on regional identity. Ljupcho Georgievski, an activist promoting Bulgarian cultural and historical narratives within , faced a court sentence in 2025 for activities deemed to incite ethnic tensions, highlighting the contentious environment for such advocacy. These figures represent a small but vocal minority amid broader societal pressures, where Bulgarophile expressions often encounter legal or social backlash from Macedonian nationalist groups. The pursuit of Bulgarian by over 100,000 nationals since 2001 further underscores latent Bulgarophile affinities, driven by historical ties and economic incentives rather than overt activism.

Controversies and Debates

Macedonian-Bulgarian Ethnic Dispute

The Macedonian-Bulgarian ethnic dispute revolves around the classification of the Slavic population in the region (present-day ), with asserting that they represent an ethnic Bulgarian subgroup whose regional "Macedonian" identity predates modern national constructs but was artificially severed and elevated to a distinct by mid-20th-century Yugoslav policies to serve geopolitical aims. North Macedonian state narratives, in contrast, posit a separate Macedonian ethnos with unique linguistic, historical, and cultural markers tracing to ancient precedents, though empirical evidence for pre-1940s differentiation remains sparse. This contention has persisted since the (1912–1913), when the region's partition among , , and disrupted shared Slavic self-perceptions, but crystallized post-World War II under Josip Broz Tito's regime. During the Ottoman era, Slavic Christians in Macedonia lacked a codified ethnic category beyond religious affiliation (primarily Exarchist Orthodox, aligned with emerging Bulgarian nationalism after the 1870 Bulgarian Exarchate's establishment), with no Ottoman censuses recording a distinct "Macedonian" nationality; by the late 19th century, national awakening movements, including the 1893-founded (IMRO), predominantly invoked Bulgarian ethnic solidarity in pursuit of autonomy from Ottoman rule, as reflected in revolutionary manifestos and church loyalties where Exarchist parishes outnumbered Patriarchist Greek ones by over 2:1 in Macedonian territories by 1900. Post-partition, in Serbian-administered Vardar Macedonia, authorities suppressed Bulgarian identifiers through assimilation campaigns, yet underground networks and censuses (e.g., data showing significant Bulgarian declarations before revisions) indicated persistent self-identification as Bulgarian among the populace. The dispute's causal roots lie in these suppressed affiliations, which Bulgarophiles argue represent authentic pre-communist realities distorted by state-engineered identities. The pivotal shift occurred in 1944–1945, when Tito's partisans, via the Anti-Fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) on August 2, 1944, proclaimed a Macedonian republic within , codifying a standardized from central-western dialects to differentiate it from Bulgarian and Serbian, while purging Bulgarian cultural elements from education and historiography to preempt after the 1941–1944 Axis occupation. This top-down , justified as unifying partitioned Macedonian lands but empirically serving Yugoslav federal stability, transformed regional dialect speakers into a , with genetic and anthropological studies showing no substantive divergence from broader South Slavic (including Bulgarian) clusters. Linguistically, Macedonian and Bulgarian exhibit near-complete , sharing identical case systems, verb conjugations, and core lexicon, forming a where separations are sociopolitical rather than structural—evidenced by pre-1940s texts lacking codified distinctions and Bulgaria's 1999 recognition of Macedonian as an without conceding ethnic separation. In the contemporary era, the dispute manifests politically through Bulgaria's November 2020 of North Macedonia's accession framework, leveraging its membership to demand constitutional amendments recognizing as a founding minority (currently absent despite 2021–2023 French-mediated deals), excision of anti-Bulgarian tropes from school curricula (e.g., portraying 19th-century revolutionaries as non-Bulgarian), and acknowledgment of "shared history" without imposed uniqueness. By June 2025, over 216,000 North Macedonian citizens had obtained Bulgarian passports by attesting to pre-1944 Bulgarian ancestry via documents like church records, comprising nearly 10% of the and underscoring latent ethnic affinities suppressed in official 2021 censuses where Bulgarian self-identifiers numbered under 1,200 amid reported intimidation. Bulgarophiles, often these passport applicants or affiliates, frame the impasse as resistance to "Yugoslav legacy" fabrications, advocating historical rectification; critics in decry it as hegemonic denialism, though Bulgaria's position aligns with archival of fluid, Bulgarian-dominant identities prior to communist intervention.

Pejorative Connotations and Criticisms

In , the term "Bulgarophile" (often rendered as bugaraš or bugarofil in Macedonian) functions as a label for individuals or groups expressing affinity for Bulgarian ethnic, linguistic, or historical claims, implying to Bulgarian interests and a rejection of distinct Macedonian nationhood. This connotation stems from historical inter-ethnic rivalries in the late Ottoman and early 20th-century , where pro-Bulgarian activists in Macedonia were derogatorily termed bugaraši by Serbian and Greek propagandists to denote perceived cultural betrayal. In post-Yugoslav , the label evokes associations with and collaboration, as Macedonian communist-era narratives framed interwar Bulgarophile figures—such as leaders of the Internal Macedonian Organization's right-wing faction—as traitors who undermined Slavic unity against Ottoman rule by aligning with Bulgarian . Critics in accuse Bulgarophiles of eroding the country's and identity by promoting narratives that equate Macedonian ethnicity with Bulgarian, thereby justifying Bulgarian vetoes on 's EU accession since 2020 over historical and linguistic disputes. Such views have led to legal and social repercussions, including government crackdowns on cultural clubs since 2022 that honor figures like Goce Delchev—revered in Bulgaria as a Bulgarian revolutionary but officially Macedonian in —deeming their activities as threats to national unity. Political opponents have invoked charges in and against proposals to constitutionally recognize a Bulgarian minority, as seen in 2022 incidents labeling such amendments "treason" amid Bulgaria's demands for protections of Bulgarian self-identification. Macedonian nationalists further criticize Bulgarophiles for alleged foreign funding from , portraying them as tools of that perpetuate ethnic division, with public discourse in 2021–2022 surveys showing widespread Bulgarophobia tied to fears of . These criticisms reflect deeper tensions from Yugoslav-era suppression of Bulgarophile sentiments, where post-1944 policies aimed to eradicate "Bulgarophilia" through re-education and purges, framing it as a remnant of wartime Bulgarian occupation (1941–1944) . Detractors argue that contemporary Bulgarophile , including petitions for dual identity recognition, undermines the 1945 codification of Macedonian as a separate and , potentially inviting Bulgarian influence over and media. While some Macedonian scholars acknowledge historical Bulgarophile prevalence in pre-WWII Macedonia—estimating up to 80% of elites identified as Bulgarian in 1900 censuses—they contend that post-independence assertions of it represent revisionism rather than authentic self-expression, often dismissing proponents as marginalized outliers or Bulgarian agents.

International Perspectives

The has framed the recognition of Bulgarophiles—often viewed as part of 's Bulgarian minority—within broader requirements for good neighborly relations and protection as preconditions for accession. In the 2020-2024 negotiation framework, the EU explicitly mandated constitutional amendments in to include alongside other minorities, citing anti-Bulgarian rhetoric and historical denialism as barriers to progress; this stance reflects concerns over against self-identified , estimated at around 3,000 in the 2021 but potentially higher given citizenship applications exceeding 100,000 since 2001. Bulgaria's 2020 veto, upheld into 2025, prompted EU frustration, with reports delayed in the due to Bulgarian lobbying against formulations affirming a distinct Macedonian identity without reciprocal minority safeguards. The has advocated and bilateral to resolve identity disputes, emphasizing North Macedonia's path while acknowledging Bulgaria's security concerns tied to minority treatment; in 2023, U.S. officials pressed both nations to reduce inflammatory rhetoric amid fears of Russian exploitation of divisions. This approach aligns with American support for Balkan stability post-NATO integration, viewing Bulgarophile expressions as legitimate self-identification rather than , though without direct endorsement of the term, which remains regionally specific and in Macedonian discourse. Analysts in Western outlets have split on the issue: some, like those in New Eastern Europe, argue the should prioritize North Macedonia's self-determined identity over Bulgaria's historical claims to avoid empowering vetoes by member states, potentially sidelining under the guise of enlargement urgency. Others, including reports from think tanks, highlight pre-1940s Ottoman and Balkan censuses where significant Macedonian populations self-identified as Bulgarian, framing current Bulgarophile activism as a continuity of suppressed ethnic realities rather than imported loyalty. , having resolved its naming dispute via the 2018 , maintains a neutral-to-cautious stance, supporting but wary of precedents affecting its own minority policies in .

Cultural and Social Impact

Influence on Regional Politics

Bulgarophiles, denoting individuals in and adjacent regions who espouse pro-Bulgarian ethnic or cultural affiliations, have exerted influence on regional politics chiefly by amplifying historical and identity disputes that impede 's . This advocacy has bolstered 's leverage within the to condition 's accession talks on resolving bilateral tensions, including recognition of shared heritage and . Since 2020, has vetoed the start of these negotiations, citing Skopje's alleged suppression of Bulgarian self-identification and distortion of 19th- and 20th-century , thereby stalling regional convergence toward EU norms. The scale of Bulgarian grants to North Macedonian nationals—exceeding 216,000 passports issued over the past 18 years as of June 2025—illustrates the tangible political weight of Bulgarophile sentiments, as applicants self-declare Bulgarian origin under Sofia's streamlined process. This phenomenon, far outpacing the official Bulgarian minority count of around 3,000 in North Macedonia's 2021 , signals widespread latent sympathies that undermine the post-1944 Macedonian identity framework and compel governments in to navigate domestic backlash while seeking accommodation with . Such dual loyalties have fueled electoral dynamics, with pro-EU factions compelled to address Bulgarophile demands to avert vetoes. In the May 2024 parliamentary and presidential elections, the victory of the coalition, securing 58 seats and electing Gordana Siljanovska-Davkova as president, reflected voter frustration with stalled progress amid Bulgaria's conditions, positioning the to potentially revive talks by acknowledging Bulgarian historical figures and minority status. However, subsequent hesitance from Prime Minister on constitutional amendments—including Bulgarians among co-founding ethnic groups—highlights ongoing tensions, as Bulgarophile advocacy intersects with nationalist resistance. These frictions extend regionally, complicating cohesion in the and inviting external actors like to exploit divisions, as evidenced by campaigns targeting the dispute. Historically, Bulgarophile networks supported Bulgarian irredentist claims during the and occupation of Vardar Macedonia, influencing local alliances and post-war suppressions under Yugoslav rule. In contemporary terms, absent dedicated , their impact manifests through informal lobbying and cultural organizations that pressure on language standardization and heritage sites, perpetuating a cycle where overrides pragmatic regional cooperation. In , official data indicate a small but fluctuating identifying as ethnic . The 1953 recorded 920 such individuals, rising to 3,334 by 1971, before declining to 1,487 in 2002. The 2021 reported 3,504 ethnic , representing 0.19% of the total of 1,836,713 residents.
YearNumber Identifying as BulgarianPercentage of Population
1953920~0.07%
19713,334~0.2%
20021,487~0.07%
20213,5040.19%
These figures likely underrepresent Bulgarophile sentiments due to historical and ongoing social pressures, including Yugoslav-era policies promoting a distinct Macedonian identity and contemporary risks of for those affirming Bulgarian ties. A key indicator of broader demographic trends is the surge in Bulgarian citizenship applications from , which requires applicants to affirm Bulgarian ethnic origin, pass a language test, and provide documentary evidence of descent. Between 2007 and mid-2025, over 216,000 North Macedonian citizens obtained Bulgarian passports, with annual grants accelerating: approximately 90,000 from 2002 to 2019, and nearly 1,700 in 2024 alone. This equates to roughly 10-12% of 's ethnic Macedonian population engaging in the process, driven by economic incentives like mobility alongside cultural and historical affinities. Outside , Bulgarophile demographics are harder to quantify but include ethnic Bulgarians in neighboring (southwestern ), where regional identity retains strong Bulgarian character without separate enumeration. and dual further diffuse these populations, with tens of thousands holding Bulgarian passports while residing abroad or in . Overall, while overt identification remains marginal in censuses, citizenship data reveal a growing, latent Bulgarophile constituency amid 's of 9.2% since 2002.

References

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  29. https://meta.mk/en/census-results-3504-bulgarians-reside-in-north-macedonia-and-only-762-speak-bulgarian-at-home/
  30. https://balkaninsight.com/2022/03/30/north-macedonia-census-reveals-big-drop-in-population/
  31. https://www.ecmi.de/infochannel/detail/ecmi-minorities-blog-identity-disputes-and-the-eu-enlargement-the-case-of-north-macedonia
  32. https://parliament140.bnr.bg/en/post/101807362/significant-decline-in-the-number-of-north-macedonians-becoming-bulgarian-citizens?page_1_3=8
  33. https://www.slobodenpecat.mk/en/bugarsko-drzhavjanstvo-lani-dobile-1-700-makedonski-gragjani/
  34. https://www.gmfus.org/news/bulgarian-factor-north-macedonias-elections-and-eu-prospects
  35. https://balkaninsight.com/2022/11/04/north-macedonia-law-change-on-associations-concerns-bulgaria/
  36. https://apnews.com/article/bulgaria-european-union-northmacedonia-skopje-9be0b24d89671097301f3aa9d35073ad
  37. https://www.developmentaid.org/organizations/view/230038/macedonian-bulgarian-friendship-association-sdruzenie-za-makedonsko-balgarsko-prijatelstvo
  38. https://kids.kiddle.co/Gotse_Delchev
  39. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Internal-Macedonian-Revolutionary-Organization
  40. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Todor-Aleksandrov
  41. http://kroraina.com/www.todoralexandrov.com/ta/12.html
  42. https://fakti.bg/en/bulgaria/199833-31-avgust-1924-g-ubit-e-todor-aleksandrov
  43. https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Ivan_Mihailov
  44. https://macedonia.kroraina.com/im_statii/im_s4.html
  45. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/374030600_Between_the_Patriarchate_of_Constantinople_and_the_Bulgarian_Exarchate_The_Difficult_Choice_of_the_Macedonian_Bulgarians_at_the_End_of_the_19th_Century
  46. https://bnr.bg/en/post/101297431
  47. https://greekcitytimes.com/2020/05/02/bulgarian-professor-mp-macedonians-and-bulgarians-are-one-people/
  48. https://eualive.net/north-macedonias-sentence-against-bulgarian-activist-sparks-backlash-in-sofia/
  49. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/215-languages-and-ethnicity-balkan-politics-macedonian-bulgarian-and-albanian
  50. https://ojs.southfloridapublishing.com/ojs/index.php/jdev/article/download/3136/2366/7235
  51. https://nationalia.info/new/11298/north-macedonias-quest-for-its-own-national-identity
  52. https://cepa.org/article/whats-in-a-language-that-which-we-call-a-dialect/
  53. https://apnews.com/article/north-macedonia-costa-eu-membership-bulgaria-7eec884f6e3aac56d6dbe83df3fa19ec
  54. https://balkaninsight.com/2025/07/14/european-mps-report-revives-bulgaria-north-macedonia-identity-battle/
  55. https://istorijskizapisi.me/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/B-Vucetic-Some-Considerations-on-the-Emergence-of.pdf
  56. https://www.bta.bg/en/news/balkans/780292-graffiti-tug-of-war-bulgarians-in-the-constitution-is-treason-messages-resurf
  57. https://balkaninsight.com/2019/06/25/long-dead-heros-memory-tests-bulgarian-north-macedonian-reconciliation/
  58. https://www.politico.eu/article/bulgaria-european-parliament-bill-north-macedonia-eu-accession-green-austria-waitz-lobby-vote-smear-campaign/
  59. https://www.novinite.com/articles/218660/The%2BUS%2Bto%2BBulgaria%2Band%2BNorth%2BMacedonia%253A%2BQuickly%2BSolve%2Byour%2BProblems%2Band%2BReduce%2BTension
  60. https://neweasterneurope.eu/2024/11/22/in-the-western-balkans-brussels-must-side-with-north-macedonia-in-its-dispute-with-bulgaria/
  61. https://eurasiatique.ca/2022/04/03/hostages-of-history-north-macedonia-bulgaria-and-the-hazards-of-eu-accession/
  62. https://www.iemed.org/publication/north-macedonia-after-greece-bulgaria-appears-north-macedonias-obstacle-course-to-enter-the-eu/
  63. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/is-a-breakthrough-coming-between-bulgaria-and-north-macedonia/
  64. https://balkaninsight.com/2023/04/06/north-macedonia-slates-scandalous-bulgarian-push-for-role-in-constitutional-change/
  65. https://ecfr.eu/article/fool-me-thrice-the-pattern-of-political-instability-in-bulgaria-georgia-and-moldova/
  66. https://balkaninsight.com/2023/01/25/heros-memorial-day-further-inflames-north-macedonia-bulgaria-relations/
  67. https://balkaninsight.com/2021/03/29/like-i-dont-belong-balkan-neighbours-identity-dispute-casts-long-shadow/
  68. https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/North-Macedonia/North-Macedonia-and-emigration-an-eternal-issue-219177
  69. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/bulgaria-grants-citizenship-over-16000-new-citizens-shahzeb-anwer-lst2e
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